http://www.historycommons.org The Center for Grassroots Oversight aims to provide the public with a means to collaborate on investigations at the grassroots level. en-us http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a112209KSMChangePlea#a112209KSMChangePlea http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a112209KSMChangePlea#a112209KSMChangePlea A lawyer acting for Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, one of a five high-profile defendants to be tried in New York for 9/11, says that his client and the others intend to plead not guilty. The lawyer, Scott Fenstermaker, says they will do so not in the hope of an acquittal, but to air their criticism of US foreign policy. While incarcerated at Guantanamo, the five had intended to plead guilty before a military commission . According to Fenstermaker, the men will admit carrying out 9/11, but intend to formally plead not guilty so they can "explain what happened and why they did it." They will give "their assessment of American foreign policy," which is "negative." Fenstermaker recently met with his client, but has not met with the other four defendants, although he says the five have discussed the issue among themselves. In response, Justice Department spokesman Dean Boyd says that while the men may attempt to use the trial to express their views, "we have full confidence in the ability of the courts and in particular the federal judge who may preside over the trial to ensure that the proceeding is conducted appropriately and with minimal disruption, as federal courts have done in the past." KJF 2010-03-10T14:59:45-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a032804KSMLambScoop#a032804KSMLambScoop http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a032804KSMLambScoop#a032804KSMLambScoop The Sunday Times publishes details of interrogations of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), who is being held by the CIA. The article, written by Christina Lamb, indicates the information is from "transcripts" of his interrogations. It also quotes KSM as making various statements, such as "The original plan [for 9/11] was for a two-pronged attack with five targets on the East Coast of America and five on the West Coast." The report makes the following claims: KSM introduced Osama bin Laden to Hambali, leader of the Southeast Asian militant organization Jemaah Islamiyah, who KSM first met during the Soviet-Afghan War in Peshawar, Pakistan. KSM was "impressed" with "Hambali's connections with the Malaysian government," and bin Laden and Hambali forged an alliance in 1996. After 1996, KSM became a "key planner in almost every attack, including the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998." He was the "chief planner" for 9/11 and planning started very early, before his associate Ramzi Yousef was captured , when they hit upon the idea of using planes to attack the US. The plan for 9/11 initially had two parts, one on the US East Coast and the other on the west, but bin Laden canceled the second half. This part was then spun off into a second, separate plot, to be carried out independently, and one of the operatives to be involved was Zacarias Moussaoui. The first two operatives selected for 9/11 were Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, followed by Mohamed Atta and his associates from Hamburg. Al-Qaeda was very surprised by the US response to the 9/11 attacks. "Afterwards we never got time to catch our breath, we were immediately on the run," KSM is quoted as saying. He added that the US campaign seriously disrupted operations. Britain was the next target after 9/11, because, "Osama declared [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair our principal enemy and London a target." However, a plot to attack Heathrow Airport never got beyond the planning stage. KSM also described Hambali's departure from Afghanistan in November 2001, and said the two kept in touch through Hambali's brother. 'The article points out that "the interrogation transcripts are prefaced with the warning that 'the detainee has been known to withhold information or deliberately mislead,'" and also mentions some allegations made against US interrogators, including sleep deprivation, extremes of heat and cold, truth drugs, and the use of Arab interrogators so that detainees thought they were in an Arab camp. When it becomes clear what techniques have been used to obtain information from KSM, doubts will be expressed about the reliability of his information (see and ). However, most of this information will appear in the relevant sections of the 9/11 Commission report, which are based on reports produced by CIA interrogators. Despite this, some of the information contained in the report seems to be incorrect. For example, Abu Zubaida is described as a member of al-Qaeda's inner shura council, although it appears he was not that close to al-Qaeda's senior leadership . In addition, KSM is described as the head of al-Qaeda's military committee, although he will later deny this . KJF 2010-03-10T14:49:53-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a021904KSMMuradWalkOnPart#a021904KSMMuradWalkOnPart http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a021904KSMMuradWalkOnPart#a021904KSMMuradWalkOnPart Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) tells US interrogators that Abdul Hakim Murad, along with KSM a key conspirator in the Bojinka plot, only had a small role in the operation, according to the 9/11 Commission. The Commission will cite four intelligence reports, drafted on February 19 (two), February 24, and April 2, 2004, as the source of this claim. According to KSM, Murad's only role in the plot was to courier $3,000 from Dubai to Manila. However, other evidence indicates Murad was much more significantly involved in the plot (see and ). The Commission will comment, "This aspect of KSM's account is not credible, as it conflicts not just with Murad's own confession [note: this may be unreliable as Murad was tortured ] but also with physical evidence tying Murad to the very core of the plot, and with KSM's own statements elsewhere that Murad was involved in planning and executing the operation." KJF 2010-03-10T14:44:03-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0503InspectorGeneralMissingTapes#a0503InspectorGeneralMissingTapes http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0503InspectorGeneralMissingTapes#a0503InspectorGeneralMissingTapes The CIA's Office of the Inspector General reviews videotapes of the interrogation and custody of militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida. The tapes, made in 2002 , show 83 applications of the waterboarding technique, most of which last for less than 10 seconds. However, 11 of the interrogation videos turn out to be blank, two others are blank except for one or two minutes, and two more are broken and cannot be reviewed. The Inspector General then compares the tapes to logs and cables about the interrogations and identifies a 21-hour period, including two waterboarding sessions, that is not captured on the tapes. KJF 2010-03-10T14:41:04-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abetweenlate05CIANoBlackStations#abetweenlate05CIANoBlackStations http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abetweenlate05CIANoBlackStations#abetweenlate05CIANoBlackStations The CIA shuts down 10 of its 12 "black stations"--agency bases located not in embassies, but under the cover of ficticious companies. The program to establish the stations began after 9/11 and cost hundreds of millions of dollars . However, at some point around 2005 the agency decides to start closing the network. Its establishment had been the source of significant dispute at the agency leading to a "very bitter fight," according to one CIA official. One problem is that the stations are large, with six to nine officers. Therefore, if the cover of one is blown, this will affect all his colleagues. To deal with this problem the officers were not to operate in the country where their front company was based, but were to take on a second alias before traveling to their target. Critics inside the agency said this arrangement was convoluted, and argued the CIA should focus on creating covers on platforms that can get US spies close to their most important targets, such as student aid organizations that work with Muslim students. The timing of the closures is unclear. They result from a review of the program instigated by CIA Director Porter Goss, who arrived at the agency in September 2004 . The review is conducted by Rolf Mowatt-Larseen, head of the CIA's European division, who leaves the agency in November 2005 and begins the closures himself before departing. However, the closures will be first reported in February 2008. KJF 2010-03-09T19:43:48-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aafter030103KSMKidsWillBeHurt#aafter030103KSMKidsWillBeHurt http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aafter030103KSMKidsWillBeHurt#aafter030103KSMKidsWillBeHurt At some point after alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is captured , interrogators threaten to kill his children if he does not co-operate with them. An "experienced agency interrogator" will tell the CIA inspector general that "interrogators said to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that if anything else happens in the United States, 'We're going to kill your children.'" According to author Ron Suskind, this is after CIA headquarters authorizes the interrogators to "do whatever's necessary" to get information. However, according to a CIA manager with knowledge of the incident, "He [KSM] basically said, so, fine, they'll join Allah in a better place." KJF 2010-03-09T19:02:20-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=ashortlyafter091101BlackStations#ashortlyafter091101BlackStations http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=ashortlyafter091101BlackStations#ashortlyafter091101BlackStations The CIA begins to build "black stations" around the world. There are around 12 such stations, which are based in front companies. About half of them are located in Europe, including one in Portugal, partly because of the comfortable living conditions and ease of travel. The program costs hundreds of millions of dollars as the stations have to rent office space, hire staff to answer phones, and pay for cars and other props, as well as creating fictitious client lists and resumes that can withstand sustained scrutiny. The black stations differ from normal CIA stations, which are based at US embassies and staffed with officers posing as officials of other US agencies, because their staff pose as employees of investment banks, consulting firms, or other fictitious enterprises with no apparent ties to the US government. Whereas the CIA had previously used one- or two-person consulting firms as vehicles for nonofficial cover, the new black stations are companies employing six to nine officers, plus support staff. Due to the size of the stations, they not only have experienced officers, but also relatively inexperienced ones, who are rotated in and out in much the same way they would be in standard embassy assignments. One reason for setting up the network is that embassy-based stations are not as useful against the CIA's new adversaries as they were against the KGB and its proxies, which were also based in embassies. As a government official will later comment, "Terrorists and weapons proliferators aren't going to be on the diplomatic cocktail circuit." In addition, the Bush administration orders the CIA to expand its overseas operation by 50 percent, Congress pressures it to alter its approach to designing cover, and it gets extra funding for the nonofficial cover program--the black stations are a way of dealing with all these three aspects. Further, the CIA has a lot of recruits after 9/11, but no open overseas positions to put them in. Some of the new hires are discouraged by this and leave, and the agency hopes the black stations will encourage people to stay. The plan is to use the stations solely as bases. Officers are forbidden from conducting operations in the country where their company is located. Instead, they are expected to adopt second and sometimes third aliases before traveling to their targets. The companies then remain intact to serve as vessels for the next crop of officers, who will have different targets. Therefore, if an operation goes wrong, the locals will only identify a single agent, but will not be able to trace him back to a black station because he is using a second alias. For example, the officers at the black station in Portugal are to travel to North Africa for missions. The program will be significantly curtailed some years later . KJF 2010-03-09T18:57:43-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore0208PoundCoverChief#abefore0208PoundCoverChief http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore0208PoundCoverChief#abefore0208PoundCoverChief Eric Pound is appointed head of the CIA's external operations and cover division. Pound is a veteran officer who was CIA station chief in Athens during the 2004 Olympics . KJF 2010-03-09T18:55:38-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1105MowattLarssenLeavesAgency#a1105MowattLarssenLeavesAgency http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1105MowattLarssenLeavesAgency#a1105MowattLarssenLeavesAgency Rolf Mowatt-Larssen leaves the CIA and joins the Department of Energy, where he becomes director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. He will remain with the department until January 2009. KJF 2010-03-09T18:54:28-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a04PoundAgencyAthens#a04PoundAgencyAthens http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a04PoundAgencyAthens#a04PoundAgencyAthens Eric Pound is appointed chief of the CIA's station in Athens, Greece. He will be in the position during the Olympic Games this year. KJF 2010-03-09T18:53:45-08:00