http://www.historycommons.org The Center for Grassroots Oversight aims to provide the public with a means to collaborate on investigations at the grassroots level. en-us http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a10140445minclaimerror#a10140445minclaimerror http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a10140445minclaimerror#a10140445minclaimerror British Prime Minister Tony Blair formally admits that he was wrong to have claimed that Saddam Hussein could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of giving the order (see and ). Blair's Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, reveals that MI6, the British intelligence agency, has formally withdrawn the claim, as well as other intelligence concerning Iraq's ability to produce biological weapons. The claim has been heavily refuted for well over a year (see and ). Straw refuses to say that it was a mistake to overthrow the Saddam government, saying instead that "deciding to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt would have required a huge leap of faith. ... I do not accept, even with hindsight, that we were wrong to act as we did." He notes that other governments, most notably the US government, were also convinced that Saddam had an array of WMD which could have been quickly deployed against targets in the region. Conservative MP Gary Streeter says the Blair administration owes the nation a "full apology": "Not an apology for the intelligence but an apology for the way that the intelligence was conveyed by the government to the country." Liberal Democrat Party leader Charles Kennedy accuses Blair of "avoiding answering" questions about the absence of Iraqi WMD. Liberal Democrat deputy leader Menzies Campbell says: "The withdrawal of the 45-minute claim drives a horse and cart through government credibility. ... The building blocks of the government's case for military action are crumbling before our eyes." blackmax 2009-11-19T08:33:21-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a08160345minshearsay#a08160345minshearsay http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a08160345minshearsay#a08160345minshearsay A previously unrevealed document shows that British Prime Minister Tony Blair's claim that Iraq could strike a target with weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order to deploy was based on hearsay information. The claim had already been shown to be the product of an unreliable Iraqi defector from Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress , but an internal Foreign Service document released by the Hutton inquiry undercuts the original claim even further. British and US officials had stated that the 45-minute claim came from an Iraqi officer high in Saddam Hussein's command structure; the document shows, however, that it came from an informant who passed it on to British intelligence agency MI6. The Guardian writes, "[T]he foundation for the government's claim was ... a single anonymous uncorroborated source quoting another single anonymous uncorroborated source." Liberal Democrat Menzies Campbell says: "This is classic hearsay. It provides an even thinner justification to go to war. If this is true, neither the prime minister nor the government have been entirely forthcoming." blackmax 2009-11-19T08:32:42-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a092402blairdossierspeech#a092402blairdossierspeech http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a092402blairdossierspeech#a092402blairdossierspeech British Prime Minister Tony Blair gives a speech to Parliament concurrent with the just-released dossier on Iraqi WMD . Blair combines fact--such as Iraq's lengthy defiance and deception of UN weapons inspections since the 1991 Gulf War, the possible existence of tons of chemical and biological weapons material left unaccounted for in 1998, and the attempts by Iraq to subvert the UN's Food for Oil program--with speculation that Saddam Hussein's "chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons program is not an historic leftover from 1998. ... His WMD program is active, detailed, and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The WMD program is not shut down. It is up and running." Blair calls the dossier "extensive, detailed, and authoritative," and says that according to intelligence data used to compile it: "Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. ... Saddam has continued to produce them ... he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shi'a population, and ... he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability." Only the "45-minute" strike capability is not sourced from the dossier . Blair makes a number of patently false allegations about Iraq's nuclear weapons, including the disputed aluminum tubes claim and the tale about Iraq attempting to purchase uranium from Niger . "[W]e know Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful," Blair says. He tells the assembled lawmakers: "There will be some who dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For some of this material there may be innocent explanations. There will be others who say, rightly, that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before he acquires a usable nuclear weapon. Though, if he were able to purchase fissile materiel illegally, it would only be a year or two. But let me put it at its simplest: on this 11-year history; with this man, Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available; with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate: would the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed; to say, despite 14 separate UN demands on this issue, all of which Saddam is in breach of, we should do nothing; to conclude that we should trust not to the good faith of the UN weapons inspectors but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime?" After all of this buildup, Blair says that he is not necessarily calling for military action against Iraq, but "the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament ... is overwhelming." He then makes the case for regime change, citing the need for a new leader "who can bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not languishing as a pariah. Someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by Saddam's personal greed. Someone who can lead a government more representative of the country as a whole, while maintaining absolutely Iraq's territorial integrity. We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Liberated from Saddam, they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the Middle East. So the ending of regime would be the cause of regret for no one other than Saddam." Blair says, "our purpose is disarmament," not military action, but it is hard to conceive how the regime change he advocates could be effected without military action. Two years later, Blair will admit that the claim is erroneous . blackmax 2009-11-19T08:31:17-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a09101102scarlettsraft1#a09101102scarlettsraft1 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a09101102scarlettsraft1#a09101102scarlettsraft1 The first draft of the British intelligence dossier entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction" is circulated. The principal author is John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and therefore the report comes to be known as the "Scarlett dossier." Scarlett had considerable input from intelligence officials and Downing Street officials, including communications director Alastair Campbell, who will later insist he gave nothing more than "presentational" advice and did not pressure Scarlett to "sex up" the dossier. (Campbell's claim will be challenged when evidence is later produced that shows senior press official John Williams helped Scarlett write the dossier--see .) Section 6 of the first draft states flatly that "Uranium to be used in the production of suitable fissile material has been purchased from Africa." The context of the section makes it clear that the reference is not to uranium purchased by Iraq from Niger in 1982 and later sealed and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is clear that the reference is to the supposed uranium deal from 1999-2000. That deal was clearly never made, and allegations to the contrary were based upon fabricated documents. Fabricated evidence or not, the dossier states that not only was Iraq seeking uranium, but that uranium "has been purchased." Eight pages later, the dossier claims that "there is compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa," a significant language shift--from flat certainty to an assertion of "compelling evidence." And in the executive summary, Scarlett writes that "recent intelligence ... indicates" Iraq "has purchased large quantities of uranium ore, despite having no civil nuclear programme that would require it." The document's claims fluctuate from one section to the next. The final version will be released later in the month, and include the same vagaries of language . blackmax 2009-11-19T08:30:39-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0902diauranium#a0902diauranium http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0902diauranium#a0902diauranium The Defense Intelligence Agency releases an intelligence assessment entitled "Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program" that claims, "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" for the production of nuclear weapons. The DIA is referring to the tale of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal , as well as purported dealings with Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The assessment says that "DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources." blackmax 2009-11-19T05:54:38-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a020502ciadodneocons#a020502ciadodneocons http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a020502ciadodneocons#a020502ciadodneocons Though the CIA has chosen not to add anything about the Iraq-Niger allegations to the President's Daily Briefing, it issues a new report on the purported deal, including what it calls "verbatim text" of the agreement between Iraq and Niger . The neoconservatives in the Pentagon , in author Craig Unger's words, "pounce ... on the new material, and quickly begin working on their own reports that will allege Iraqi attempts to buy enough uranium to make nuclear weapons." blackmax 2009-11-17T17:30:25-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a053003wolfowitzrationale#a053003wolfowitzrationale http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a053003wolfowitzrationale#a053003wolfowitzrationale In the upcoming issue of Vanity Fair, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz admits that the Bush administration chose the issue of Iraqi WMD as its primary justification for war, not because it was necessarily a legitimate concern, but because it was, in the words of reporter David Usbourne, "politically convenient." Wolfowitz also acknowledges that another justification played a strong part in the decision to invade: the prospect of the US being able to withdraw all of its forces from Saudi Arabia once Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown. "Just lifting that burden from the Saudis is itself going to the door" towards making progress elsewhere in achieving Middle East peace, says Wolfowitz. The presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia has been one of the main grievances of al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups. The most controversial statement by Wolfowitz is his acknowledgement that, "For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on." Usbourne writes, "The comments suggest that, even for the US administration, the logic that was presented for going to war may have been an empty shell." He notes that finding a rationale for attacking Iraq that was "acceptable to everyone" may refer to Secretary of State Colin Powell, the most prominent Cabinet member to vocally, if privately, oppose the invasion. Powell relied on the WMD issue in his February presentation to the UN Security Council , which many consider to be a key element in the administration's effort to convince the American citizenry that the invasion was necessary and justified. Many Congressional Democrats echo the sentiments of Senator Joe Biden (D-DE), who says of the administration's push for war: "I do think that we hyped nuclear, we hyped al-Qaeda, we hyped the ability to disperse and use these weapons. I think that tends to be done by all presidents when they are trying to accomplish a goal that they want to get broad national support for. ... I think a lot of the hype here is a serious, serious, serious mistake and it hurts our credibility." Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who quit as leader of the House of Commons to protest the war, says he never believed Iraq had the WMD claimed by US and British government officials. "The war was sold on the basis of what was described as a pre-emptive strike, 'Hit Saddam before he hits us,'" he says. "It is now quite clear that Saddam did not have anything with which to hit us in the first place." Former Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen says he is shocked by Wolfowitz's claim. "It leaves the world with one question: What should we believe?" he says. After the initial reports of the interview and the resulting storm of controversy and recriminations, Wolfowitz and his defenders will claim that Vanity Fair reporter Sam Tanenhaus misquoted his words and took his statements out of context . blackmax 2009-11-15T16:54:54-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly0302plamewilsonreads#aearly0302plamewilsonreads http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly0302plamewilsonreads#aearly0302plamewilsonreads Senior CIA case officer Valerie Plame Wilson , whose husband, former ambassador Joseph Wilson, has recently returned from a trip to Africa to find out the facts behind the allegation that Iraq had attempted to buy uranium from Niger , receives a copy of the final intelligence report written about her husband's trip . In her 2007 book ''Fair Game'', Plame Wilson says she receives the report "as a simple courtesy [from] the reports officer" who had suggested Wilson journey to Niger and investigate the allegations. Plame Wilson will recall the report as being "a couple of pages long and fairly straightforward, in the typical bland style of such reports." She reads the report, makes "no changes," and gives it back to the reports officer. blackmax 2009-11-15T16:53:52-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly02dodneocons#aearly02dodneocons http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly02dodneocons#aearly02dodneocons While most US military and intelligence professionals dismiss the Iraq-Niger uranium deal as sheer fabrications that have been repeatedly discredited , neoconservatives in the Pentagon keep the reports alive. They "delighted in telling people, 'You don't understand your own data,'" former DIA analyst Patrick Lang will later recall. "'We know that Saddam [Hussein] is evil and deceptive, and if you see this piece of data, to say just because it is not well supported it's not true, is politically naive.'" blackmax 2009-11-15T16:52:47-08:00 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1201iraqnigerinr#a1201iraqnigerinr http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1201iraqnigerinr#a1201iraqnigerinr Greg Thielmann, director for strategic proliferation and military affairs at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), reviews Iraq's alleged WMD programs for Secretary of State Colin Powell. Thielmann's review concludes that Italian reports of a possible uranium deal between Iraq and Niger are completely false. Thielmann will later recall: "A whole lot of things told us that the report was bogus. This wasn't highly contested. There weren't strong advocates on the other side. It was done, shot down" . blackmax 2009-11-15T16:50:03-08:00