http://www.cooperativeresearch.org The Center for Grassroots Oversight aims to provide the public with a means to collaborate on investigations at the grassroots level. en-us http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a031808khadduri#a031808khadduri http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a031808khadduri#a031808khadduri Nofa Khadduri, an Iraqi peace activist now studying at the University of Toronto, writes an op-ed for the Arabic news network al-Jazeera that terms the Iraq war, and the subsequent occupation, "corporate genocide." Khadduri writes: "I cannot say this is a war like any other, or even that it is a just war. This war has been too long, too painful, too costly, too evil, too inhumane, and too unjust to simply be deemed an invasion, or even worse, a liberation. ... I want this war to be recognized for what it truly is--a genocide against the Iraqi people. It is a corporate hate crime. It is not a 'just' war. It does not have a 'just' cause. It lacks legitimate authority, it was executed with all the wrong intentions, it was certainly not a last resort, the probability of success was slim. ... If the international community recognizes the conflicts in Bosnia, Armenia, and Rwanda as genocides where human rights are replaced with the extermination of ethnic groups, then Iraq deserves the same recognition--and more." Khadduri explains the term "corporate genocide" as something new and horrifyingly different. "Corporate genocide is the mass cooperation of a business-led military invasion, where a population is sacrificed for the economic profit of the invader. A corporate genocide goes beyond blind hate and killing innocent civilians to gain power and territory. In pursuing its economic strategies, the US has caused the death and injury, deliberate or not, of millions of Iraqis. ... Foreign businesses that profit and thrive on war have gained new power in Iraq, but lack accountability. Private security firms have little motivation to promote peace--though it is their job--and to end this genocide. Terrorizing my people puts bread in their mouths and takes it away from the mouths of starving Iraqi children. Our war is their income. To keep the money flowing, private security firms dehumanize Iraqi resistance and rebel groups by labeling them as terrorists. The international propagation of this portrayal is one element in the structuring of a corporate genocide. Another is the inability of neither international law nor the international community to hold these firms accountable for their actions, including their killings of innocent people. Individuals perceived to be a threat to the firm are treated as such and can be disposed of under the false guise of an attack, leaving the firms unaccountable. And because these firms have power, they can easily deny misusing it and be believed, if they admit to using it at all." Khadduri writes that the US has achieved little towards implementing democracy in Iraq. It has assuaged little of the suffering caused by the invasion and occupation, and the subsequent civil war raging in parts of the country. This, he writes, is not a failure of US policy, but an effect of the policy. "Iraqi natural resources are being distributed and scattered among the most powerful corporations, with very little profit earmarked towards the rebuilding of Iraq," he writes. "This is what the corporate genocide is about. There is much debate about whether Iraq can stand on its own after the departure of the US Army. But it is crucial to keep in mind that the US never held Iraq up as a country and it never helped Iraqis come together as a nation." The US will never impose its own form of government on Iraq, Khadduri asserts, stating: "I said it five years ago and repeat it now: a Western-style democracy cannot be forced on a nation that does not welcome it. To not believe that we, the Iraqi people, will establish a form of government that we see fit for our needs, by ourselves, is an insult to the Iraqi solidarity and historical heritage that has always, continues to, and will never cease to exist." mtuck 2013-01-21T17:48:30+01:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a110907kerikiraqmccain#a110907kerikiraqmccain http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a110907kerikiraqmccain#a110907kerikiraqmccain Senator John McCain (R-AZ), considered a leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, says former New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik did an irresponsible job training police officers in Iraq . McCain's criticism of Kerik is an indirect means of attacking former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, another Republican presidential contender. Kerik withdrew his name from consideration for head of the Department of Homeland Security--a position Giuliani recommended him for--amid questions about his corrupt business practices . McCain, whose comments are made the same day Kerik surrenders to face federal corruption charges in New York, says Giuliani's longtime friendship and business relationships with Kerik are reason to doubt Giuliani's judgment. McCain says of Kerik's job performance in Iraq: "I don't know Mr. Kerik. I do know that I went to Baghdad shortly after the initial victory and met in Baghdad with [then-ambassador Paul] Bremer and [Lieutenant General Ricardo] Sanchez. And Kerik was there. Kerik was supposed to be there to help train the police force. He stayed two months and one day left, just up and left. ... That's why I never would've supported him to be the head of homeland security because of his irresponsible act when he was over in Baghdad to try and help train the police. One of the reasons why we had so much trouble with the initial training of the police was because he came, didn't do anything, and then went out to the airport and left." McCain is joined on the campaign trail by former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, who says of Giuliani: "It was clear the mayor and I had a different view what the department does and the kind of leadership it needed. His judgment would've been different than mine. ... We're not talking about some urban city patronage job. That's not what a Cabinet secretary's about." mtuck 2012-07-10T07:22:40+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=bw_csgas_200505#bw_csgas_200505 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=bw_csgas_200505#bw_csgas_200505 Blackwater Worldwide, one of several Blackwater brand companies, deploys CS nerve gas on a crowded Green Zone checkpoint from both a helicopter and an armored vehicle. Army Captain Kincy Clark documents and reports the incident. Former Army lawyers will state that use of such riot control agents requires the approval of the military's most senior commanders. Blackwater initially had a contract to provide security for American officials in Iraq with the Coalition Provisional Authority, an agreement which did not address the use of CS gas. When the contracts for Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy are renewed after the incident, these contracts will forbid the use of CS gas. Commanders in the field will state that they fear the incident being used for propaganda by insurgents, who will say the US was using chemical weapons. tmfgl 2012-07-08T21:42:05+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a062012dcpolliraq#a062012dcpolliraq http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a062012dcpolliraq#a062012dcpolliraq According to a poll just released by Dartmouth professor Benjamin Valentino, 63 percent of self-identified Republicans still believe that Iraq under Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction when the US invaded in March 2003 . Twenty-seven percent of self-identified independents and 15 percent of self-identified Democrats hold that view. The question was: "Do you believe that the following statement is true or not true? 'Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the United States invaded in 2003.'" Reporter Dan Froomkin, commenting on the poll results, writes: "The Bush administration's insistence that the Iraqi government had weapons of mass destruction and might give them to terrorists was a key selling point in its campaign to take the country to war . It turned out to be untrue. ... There is no reality-based argument that Iraq actually had WMD, after extensive searches found none , but this is hardly the first time many Americans have been certain of something that simply wasn't true" . The 65-question poll was conducted by YouGov from April 26 through May 2, 2012, and surveyed 1,056 respondents. It has a margin of error of plus/minus 3.18 percent. mtuck 2012-06-28T09:49:02+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a0104mcclellanpoliticize#a0104mcclellanpoliticize http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a0104mcclellanpoliticize#a0104mcclellanpoliticize After weapons inspector David Kay's resignation , the call to investigate the failure of intelligence surrounding the Iraq invasion reaches a fever pitch. White House press secretary Scott McClellan will later write: "[President] Bush and his advisers feared outside investigators. However, as momentum built for yet another independent probe, we saw the benefit of acting quickly and on our terms. Bush soon announced the creation of a bipartisan, independent commission to look into our intelligence on WMD, including Iraq . Its members were appointed by the president, and its scope set by his team. It would not include looking at how the intelligence had been used to make the case for war. That was something Bush and his top advisers sought to avoid, concerned at a minimum--particularly in an election year--that it would prove politically fatal. They were willing to allow things to become more politicized, some considering it a battle that could be fought to a draw or even used to motivate the base, and believed that the short-term political cost could be minimized. In Bush's mind, how the case for had been made scarcely mattered. What mattered now was the policy and showing success. The public tends to be more forgiving when the results are promising. If the policy was right and the selling of the policy could be justified at the time, then any difference between the two mattered little. In this view, governing successfully in Washington is about winning public opinion and getting positive results. To this day, the president seems unbothered by the disconnect between the chief rationale for war and the driving motivation behind it, and unconcerned about how the case was packaged." mtuck 2012-06-28T09:14:03+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a082707hoareludicrous#a082707hoareludicrous http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a082707hoareludicrous#a082707hoareludicrous Retired General Joseph Hoare, a former commander of US CENTCOM, says: "The idea that [Iraq] is going to go the way the guys [in the Bush administration] planned is ludicrous. There are no good options." mtuck 2012-06-26T15:32:29+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=aearly2007neoconignorance#aearly2007neoconignorance http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=aearly2007neoconignorance#aearly2007neoconignorance A State Department official reflects on the Bush administration's expectation that Iraq would function smoothly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the administration's complete failure to anticipate an insurgency and the sectarian strife which together have engulfed the country in violence. The official, who chooses to remain anonymous to interviewer Craig Unger, says this all happened because the neoconservatives driving the White House foreign policy know next to nothing about Iraq's history and culture. "In all the literature they've written about Iraq, you will not see anything by them that has anything about the nature of Iraqi society," the official says. "It was as if that stuff did not exist. Likewise, they did not think about Iraq in the context of the region. They viewed those things as distractions from their larger objectives. That is what was so frustrating about [Brent] Scowcroft and others who spent a lifetime developing knowledge and expertise to examine the unintended consequences of various policies." Scowcroft and other "realists" in the administration, most prominently Colin Powell, were derided, mocked, and ultimately driven out of the administration by the neoconservatives, to the detriment of the administration's Iraq policies. mtuck 2012-06-26T15:29:50+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a121406aeicounterproposal#a121406aeicounterproposal http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a121406aeicounterproposal#a121406aeicounterproposal After the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report is tossed aside by President Bush , his neoconservative advisers quickly locate a study more to their liking. Not surprisingly, it is from the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute. The study, written by Frederick Kagan (the brother of Robert Kagan, a signatory of the 1998 PNAC letter urging then-President Clinton to overthrow Saddam Hussein--see ), was commissioned in late September or early October by Kagan's AEI boss, Danielle Pletka, the vice president of foreign and defense studies at the institute. Kagan later says that Plekta thought "it would be helpful to do a realistic evaluation of what would be required to secure Baghdad." The study is released during a four-day planning exercise that coincides with the release of the ISG report, but Kagan says neither the timing nor the report itself has anything to do with the ISG. "This is not designed to be an anti-ISG report," Kagan insists. "Any conspiracy theories beyond that are nonsense. There was no contact with the Bush administration. We put this together on our own. I did not have any contact with the vice president's office prior to ... well, I don't want to say that. I have had periodic contact with the vice president's office, but I can't tell you the dates." Kagan's study, with the appealing title "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq," says that 20,000 more US troops deployed throughout Baghdad will turn the tide and ensure success. The study becomes the centerpiece of Bush's "surge" strategy . mtuck 2012-06-26T15:25:34+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a112906friedmantenmonths#a112906friedmantenmonths http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a112906friedmantenmonths#a112906friedmantenmonths Thomas Friedman, the New York Times foreign affairs columnist who has recently been made a figure of fun for predicting resolution in Iraq "within six months" for the last three years , writes that Iraq will be resolved one way or another within "10 months." Friedman expands on his new prediction, saying Iraq "is so broken it can't even have a proper civil war. There are so many people killing so many other people for so many different reasons--religion, crime, politics--that all the proposals for how to settle this problem seem laughable. ... Iraq is in so many little pieces now, divided among warlords, foreign terrorists, gangs, militias, parties, the police, and the army, that nobody seems able to deliver anybody. Iraq has entered a stage beyond civil war--it's gone from breaking apart to breaking down. This is not the Arab Yugoslavia anymore. It's Hobbes's jungle. Given this, we need to face our real choices in Iraq, which are: 10 months or 10 years. Either we just get out of Iraq in a phased withdrawal over 10 months, and try to stabilize it some other way, or we accept the fact that the only way it will not be a failed state is if we start over and rebuild it from the ground up, which would take 10 years. This would require reinvading Iraq, with at least 150,000 more troops, crushing the Sunni and Shi'ite militias, controlling borders, and building Iraq's institutions and political culture from scratch. Anyone who tells you that we can just train a few more Iraqi troops and police officers and then slip out in two or three years is either lying or a fool. The minute we would leave, Iraq would collapse. There is nothing we can do by the end of the Bush presidency that would produce a self-sustaining stable Iraq--and 'self-sustaining' is the key metric." Friedman concludes: "This has left us with two impossible choices. If we're not ready to do what is necessary to crush the dark forces in Iraq and properly rebuild it, then we need to leave--because to just keep stumbling along as we have been makes no sense. It will only mean throwing more good lives after good lives into a deeper and deeper hole filled with more and more broken pieces." Four months ago, Friedman had written that the only way to resolve Iraq was to stop trying to rebuild the country and just find a way to exit gracefully . mtuck 2012-06-26T15:24:34+02:00 http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a101206isgchannels#a101206isgchannels http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a101206isgchannels#a101206isgchannels The Iraq Study Group, working to finalize its long-awaited report , works all of its connections to the White House to ensure that the report receives a fair hearing. No one in the study group anticipates their report will receive a warm reception from the White House. Co-chairman James Baker is playing on both his ties with the president's father and on the fact that he secured the 2000 election victory for President Bush. "Here you have Baker coming back trying to pull the president's chestnuts out of the fire," a former State Department official later observes. "Not only did he help Bush out in Florida, but now he is doing the Baker-Hamilton commission. He and [Brent] Scowcroft were talking relentlessly during the policy formulation of the Iraq Study Group report. Baker was keeping the president informed the whole time. He is trying to throw him a lifeline and give him an exit." Scowcroft, another close ally of the elder Bush, is working with his former protege, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, to try to gain Bush's attention. Rice indicates that she will help; unfortunately, she is not sincere in her assurances, as she never intervenes on Scowcroft's behalf. mtuck 2012-06-26T15:21:24+02:00