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Context of 'After April 9, 2003: Shiite Groups Provide Social Services in Order to Gain Support'

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Following the model of Hamas and Hezbollah, various Shiite Islamist factions exploit the lack of security and basic services in post-invasion Iraq by policing neighborhoods and providing social services to the impoverished Shiite population. Moqtada Al-Sadr’s organization, for example, sets up administrative offices around the country and pays the salaries of civil servants. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) turns its militia members into aid workers that distribute food and set up clinics. [New York Times, 4/23/2003; Christian Science Monitor, 6/9/2003]

Entity Tags: Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Hamid Bayati, spokesperson for the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), tells the Washington Post: “If [Bremer] is going to appoint an administration, we can’t be part of that. We will only be part of an administration selected by the Iraqi people. There are certain lines which we cannot cross.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2003]

Entity Tags: Hamid Bayati

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation

An Iraqi voter displays her purple finger for a reporter’s camera.An Iraqi voter displays her purple finger for a reporter’s camera. [Source: Agence France-Presse]Elections for Iraq’s 275-member national assembly are held, the first democratic elections in Iraq in 50 years. Fifty-eight percent of Iraqis go to the polls to vote for a new government, the first national elections since Saddam Hussein’s overthrow. Iraqis proudly display their ink-dipped purple fingers as signs that they voted. In Washington, Republicans display their own enpurpled fingers as a sign of solidarity with President Bush and as a symbol of their pride in bringing democracy to Iraq. The Shi’ite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) wins 48.2 percent of the vote, a coalition of two major Kurdish parties garners 25.7 percent, and a bloc led by interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi wins only 13.8 percent. As expected, the Sunni parties capture only a fraction of the vote. [Washington Post, 2/14/2005; Unger, 2007, pp. 327-329]
Shi'ite Turnout High, but Election Marred by Violence - Suicide bombers and mortar attacks attempt to disrupt the elections, killing 44 around the country, but voters turn out in large numbers regardless of the danger. Three cloaked women going to polls in Baghdad tell a reporter in unison, “We have no fear.” Another Iraqi tells a reporter: “I am doing this because I love my country and I love the sons of my nation. We are Arabs, we are not scared and we are not cowards.” [Associated Press, 1/31/2005]
Sunni Boycott Undermines Legitimacy of Election Results - The political reality of the vote is less reassuring. Millions of Shi’ites do indeed flock to the polls, but most Sunnis, angered by years of what they consider oppression by US occupying forces, refuse to vote. Brent Scowcroft, the former foreign policy adviser held in such contempt by the administration’s neoconservatives (see October 2004), had warned that the election could well deepen the rift between Sunnis and Shi’a, and indeed could precipitate a civil war. Soon after the elections, Sunni insurgents will shift their targets and begin attacking Shi’ite citizens instead of battling US troops. Another popular, and effective, target will be Iraq’s decaying oil production infrastructure.
UIA Links to Iran and Terrorism Undermine US Ambitions - Another troublesome consequence of the elections is that Bush officials are forced to support a Shi’ite government led by Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a member of the Dawa Party, one of the two Shi’ite factions comprising the United Iraq Alliance. Dawa is so closely aligned with Iran that not only had it supported Iran in the Iraq-Iran War, but it had moved its headquarters to Tehran in 1979. While in the Iranian capital, Dawa had spun off what Middle East expert Juan Cole called “a shadowy set of special ops units generically called ‘Islamic Jihad,’ which operated in places like Kuwait and Lebanon.” Dawa was also an integral part of the process that created the Shi’ite terrorist group Hezbollah. And Dawa was founded by Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, the uncle of radical Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army has been accused of attempting to exterminate Sunni populations. In other words, the US is now supporting a government which not only supports terrorism, but itself incorporates a terrorist-affiliated organization in its executive structure. Author Craig Unger will write: “One by one the contradictions behind America’s Middle East policies emerged—and with them, the enormity of its catastrophic blunder. Gradually America’s real agenda was coming to light—not its stated agenda to rid Iraq of WMDs, which had been nonexistent, not regime change, which had already been accomplished, but the neoconservative dream of ‘democratizing’ the region by installing pro-West, pro-Israeli governments led by the likes of Ahmed Chalabi in oil-rich Middle East states. Now that Chalabi had been eliminated as a potential leader amid accusations that he was secretly working for Iran (see April 2004), and the Sunnis had opted out of the elections entirely, the United States, by default, was backing a democratically elected government that maintained close ties to Iran and was linked to Shi’ite leaders whose powerful Shi’ite militias were battling the Sunnis.” Moreover, the Iraqi security forces have little intention of cooperating with the US’s plan to “stand up” as US forces “stand down.” Their loyalties are not to their country or their newly elected government, but to their individual militias. Journalist and author Nir Rosen says the Iraqi soldiers are mainly loyal to al-Sadr and to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, the other member of the United Iraq Alliance), “but not to the Iraqi state and not to anyone in the Green Zone.” Unger will write, “Unwittingly, America [is] spending billions of dollars to fuel a Sunni-Shi’ite civil war.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 327-329]

Entity Tags: Juan Cole, Nir Rosen, United Iraqi Alliance, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Iyad Allawi, Brent Scowcroft, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, Ahmed Chalabi, Craig Unger

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Britain accuses Iran of having played a role in the transfer of explosive technology from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army in Iraq. British officials say Iran is responsible for the deaths of all eight UK soldiers killed in Iraq this year, all of whom died in explosions. Iran denies the charges. [BBC, 9/5/2005; Reuters, 10/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Moqtada al-Sadr, Hezbollah, Mahdi Army

Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

Since Britain has withdrawn its troops from the Iraqi city of Basra, attacks against British and Iraqi forces have dropped by 90%, according to the commander of British forces in southern Iraq. Major General Graham Binns says that the reason for the drop is simple: the presence of British forces in downtown Basra was the single largest instigator of violence. “We thought, ‘If 90 percent of the violence is directed at us, what would happen if we stepped back?’” Binns says. Britain’s 5,000 troops pulled out of their barracks—in a palace built for the use of former dictator Saddam Hussein—in early September, and instead set up a garrison at an airport on the edge of the city. Since the pullback, Binns says, there has been a “remarkable and dramatic drop in attacks.… The motivation for attacking us was gone, because we’re no longer patrolling the streets.” Last spring, British forces waged relentless and bloody battles with Shi’ite militias through the streets of central Basra. British forces have now left the in-town patrols to Iraqi forces, who, Binns says, can now handle the remaining problems in the city. By the middle of December, British troops will return control of Basra province back to Iraqi officials, formally ending Britain’s combat role in the area. Binns says, “We’ve been in that de facto role since we moved out of the palace… but we hope the transfer will symbolize the end of a period many in Basra city perceived as occupation.” Binns says he and other British military officials were surprised that the expected spike in what is termed “intra-militia violence” after the pullback never occurred. Binns says the Mahdi Army, the Shi’ite militia led by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, is “all powerful” in Basra. The rival Badr Brigade, tied to Iraq’s largest Shi’ite party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, will not openly challenge the Mahdis in the city. Britain’s troop levels have steadily declined from a high of 46,000 in March 2003 to about 5,000 now. [Associated Press, 12/15/2007]

Entity Tags: Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Badr Brigade, Mahdi Army, Gordon Brown, Moqtada al-Sadr, Graham Binns

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

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