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Context of '(After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Oxygen Level Is Found to Be Dangerously Low in the Pentagon Command Center'

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Brehon B. Somervell.Brehon B. Somervell. [Source: Public domain]Construction begins on the Pentagon. The structure was conceived at the request of Brigadier General Brehon B. Somervell in 1941, in order to provide a temporary solution to the growing US War Department’s critical shortage of space. The groundbreaking ceremony takes place on September 11, 1941. [Fine, 1972, pp. 265-266, 348-351, 431-432, 434; PR Web, 1/16/2018] Exactly 60 years later, Flight 77 will crash into the Pentagon as part of the 9/11 attacks (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: Pentagon, Brehon B. Somervell

Timeline Tags: US Military

Fort AP Hill.Fort AP Hill. [Source: United States Army]At the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, members of the Army’s aviation support unit for the Washington, DC, area are away for weapons training, and do not set out to return to their base until after the time the Pentagon is hit. [Army Center of Military History, 11/14/2001 pdf file; Pentagram, 11/16/2001; Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002] The 12th Aviation Battalion is the Military District of Washington’s aviation support unit, and includes three helicopter companies. It operates UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The battalion is stationed at Davison Army Airfield, which is at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon. [Military District of Washington, 8/2000] Davison Airfield’s missions include maintaining “a readiness posture in support of contingency plans,” exercising “operational control” of the Washington area airspace, and providing “aviation support for the White House, US government officials, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and other government agencies.” [Pentagram, 5/7/1999] A chief warrant officer with the 12th Aviation Battalion will later recall that members of the battalion are away this morning, at the shooting range at another Virginia Army base, Fort AP Hill, for their annual weapons training. They had set off early and driven there—a journey of one and a half to two hours. They are at the range when the attacks on the WTC take place, and only learn of them when the sister of one of their captains calls her brother with news of the attacks, presumably after seeing the coverage on television. The chief warrant officer will recall that, after hearing of the second attack on the WTC, “[W]e were all pretty much thinking we probably need to go—you know, probably need to come to work.” The range officer calls Davison Airfield and is told that the members of the battalion should “pack it in and come on back” to base. He is also told during the call that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), meaning this call does not occur until after 9:37 a.m. According to the chief warrant officer, the Pentagon “is basically one of our missions. So we just pretty much packed up and came back up here and came into work.” Exactly how many of the 12th Aviation Battalion’s members are away from base for the weapons training is unstated, as is the exact time they arrive back at Davison Airfield. But considering it is one and a half to two hours drive between there and the range, they presumably do not get there until some time after about 11:15 a.m. When they do eventually get back to base, the battalion members will prepare to launch helicopters in response to the Pentagon attack (see (After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Army Center of Military History, 11/14/2001 pdf file; Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002]

Entity Tags: 12th Aviation Battalion

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Lyndon Willms.Lyndon Willms. [Source: Effingham Daily News]The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) activates its Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon to respond to the terrorist attacks, although the time this occurs at is unclear. [US Congress, 9/13/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 pdf file; US Air Force, 9/9/2003] General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the JCS, will later tell a congressional hearing that in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center: “We stood up our Crisis Action Team.… And we started talking to the federal agencies.” [US Congress, 9/13/2001] The JCS’s CAT apparently assembles in the National Military Command Center (NMCC), which is located in the JCS area of the Pentagon and is responsible for monitoring worldwide events for the JCS. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 pdf file; GlobalSecurity (.org), 7/24/2011; Effingham Daily News, 9/12/2011] Myers will state that the CAT is activated just after 8:46 a.m., when the first hijacked plane crashed into the WTC (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). He will say it is activated “[a]t the time of the first impact on the World Trade Center.” “That was done immediately,” he will add. [US Congress, 9/13/2001] However, other accounts will indicate that the CAT is activated after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon attack occurs (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Lieutenant Colonel Lyndon Willms is an Air Force officer currently assigned to the Pentagon, working as a joint strategic planner for the JCS. After he and his colleagues in the Joint Vision and Transformation Division of the JCS learn from television reports of the second hijacked plane hitting the WTC, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), they “knew a decision would be made to either send us to augment one of the crisis action teams forming in the National Military Command Center across the hall or be evacuated to another site,” Willms will recall. It appears from Willms’s account, however, that the CAT is only activated later on. By around 9:51 a.m., Willms will state, the CAT is forming in the NMCC, but he and his colleagues are “a bit confused because we thought we would be going in to augment” it. Instead, they are evacuated from the Pentagon. [Effingham Daily News, 9/12/2011] Lieutenant Colonel James Foley, the NMCC operations officer, will also indicate that the CAT is only activated after the Pentagon is hit. He will state that “a Joint Staff Crisis Action Team assembled… within the first two hours, while the situation was entirely uncertain and the Pentagon was burning.” [US Air Force, 9/9/2003] And when they visit the NMCC in 2003, members of the 9/11 Commission staff will be told that a CAT “was stood up” in the NMCC “sometime in the afternoon on 9/11.” [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 pdf file] It is apparently standard procedure for the JCS to activate its CAT during a terrorist attack. A Department of Defense memorandum sent in March 2001, about how the US military responds to terrorism, will state that in a crisis, the operations directorate of the JCS “establishes a Crisis Action Team (CAT) to prepare and coordinate deployment, and execute orders.” [US Department of Defense, 3/15/2001]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Lyndon Willms, James A. Foley, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Matt Swanson.Matt Swanson. [Source: Iowa State University]The Air Force’s Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon is activated and will go on to play a key role in the Air Force’s response to the terrorist attacks. [Dover Post, 9/19/2001; Prospectus, 9/2006, pp. 3-6 pdf file] The CAT, which is under the command of the Air Force chief of staff, is a “disaster response group,” which, according to the Dover Post, “coordinates Air Force reaction to anything that might be a threat to the United States.” [Dover Post, 9/19/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2011] It carries out its activities in the Air Force Operations Center, in the basement of the Pentagon’s C Ring. [Syracuse University Magazine, 12/2001; Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003] Its usual first in charge is away today and so Lieutenant Colonel Matt Swanson, its second in command, has to take their place supervising emergency operations for the Air Force. [Prospectus, 9/2006, pp. 3-6 pdf file]
Crisis Team Becomes 'Eyes and Ears' of the Air Force - Prior to the Pentagon being hit at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), according to the Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack, “Members of the Air Force Crisis Action Team [have] already begun to assemble [in the Operations Center] for a 10:00 a.m. briefing.” This is because “one of their responsibilities [is] to work with the Army to provide assistance to civil authorities in New York.” [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 136] Major Donna Nicholas arrives in the Operations Center to assist the CAT at some time after 9:03 a.m., when the second hijacked plane crashes into the World Trade Center (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). When she gets there, someone tells her, “Just so you know, we’re considering that we’re under attack.” After arriving at her station and pulling out emergency checklists, she will later recall, Nicholas finds the area around her is “a flurry of activity as Air Force officials worked to gather information, both from the media and from their own intelligence sources.” [Dover Post, 9/19/2001] The CAT becomes “the eyes and ears of the Air Force” as it responds to the terrorist attacks, according to Major Harry Brosofsky, who will go to the Operations Center to assist the CAT after the Pentagon is attacked. [Syracuse University Magazine, 12/2001]
Air Force Leaders Only Join Crisis Team after Pentagon Attack - It is unclear when exactly the CAT is activated. Nicholas is told it has been activated at “about 9 a.m.,” according to the Dover Post. [Dover Post, 9/19/2001] Tim Green, assistant executive to the Air Force chief of staff, will say that after senior Air Force officials who are together in a staff meeting (see (9:00 a.m.-9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) see the second crash at the WTC at 9:03 a.m., they “set up a Crisis Action Team down in our Operations Center and they began working immediately.” [Midland Reporter-Telegram, 4/2/2002] However, senior officials such as General John Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, and James Roche, the secretary of the Air Force, will only head to the Operations Center to assist the response from there after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003; Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] Swanson—the man in charge of the CAT today—will say he receives a phone call in his office at the Pentagon at some time after the second WTC tower is hit, in which he is told he has to go and join the CAT. However, he will apparently only reach the Operations Center to do so after the Pentagon is attacked: He will say that when he arrives, he is greeted by Jumper and Roche, and these two men only get there after the Pentagon is hit (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Prospectus, 9/2006, pp. 3-6 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Harry Brosofsky, Matthew Swanson, US Department of the Air Force, Air Force Crisis Action Team, Donna Nicholas, Tim Green

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

In the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) comptroller’s office, on the first floor of the Pentagon’s C-ring, workers are reportedly uneasy at the news of the plane crashes in New York. However, Paul Gonzales, a retired Navy commander who is now a supervisor there, confidently declares that the Pentagon is probably the safest building in the world. So by 9:30 a.m., most of the workers in his section will be settling back to their usual business. The DIA comptroller’s office is one of the areas impacted when the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Of the 18 workers there, seven will die and five others will be hospitalized. [Washington Post, 3/11/2002; Vogel, 2007, pp. 429; Tennessean, 9/11/2007]

Entity Tags: Paul Gonzales, Defense Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Gary Walters.Gary Walters. [Source: C-SPAN]Gary Walters, the chief White House usher, and a few of his colleagues take the time to clear up the White House grounds ready for when President Bush returns, and even continue with the task after the White House is evacuated. Earlier this morning, many White House staffers were busy preparing for the annual Congressional picnic, which was scheduled to take place this evening (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). About 170 to 180 picnic tables have been set up on the South Lawn for the event. After he learns that a second plane has crashed into the World Trade Center (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Walters decides to start moving the picnic tables off the lawn so Bush’s helicopter will be able to land on the grounds when the president returns to the White House. [National Journal, 8/31/2002; Values in World Thought, 4/4/2006; Peter Schnall, 7/12/2016]
Usher Arranges to Clear the Lawn - He coordinates with the National Park Service, which is in charge of the White House grounds, to determine who will be clearing away the picnic tables. [Brower, 2015, pp. 257] He then sets about moving the tables. “I got the staff together and started sending them out to the south grounds—anybody I could think of—because I knew that we had to try to move as quickly as possible,” he will later recall. [National Journal, 8/31/2002] However, at about 9:45 a.m., the White House is evacuated after the Secret Service learns of a possible threat against it (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; CNN, 9/12/2001]
Staffers Continue Clearing the Grounds, despite the Danger - Around this time, Walters sees the smoke coming from the Pentagon, which was attacked at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), and realizes the White House could be hit next. And yet he decides that he needs to stay where he is in order to clear up the grounds. “As far as I was concerned, my responsibility was there at the White House,” he will comment. [Brower, 2015, pp. 258] “I knew we had to get those tables out,” he will state, adding, “I even felt more urgency, since obviously this was a coordinated attack now.” [National Journal, 8/31/2002] While the Secret Service is ordering people to run for their lives, Walters grabs a few of his colleagues and tells them they need to stay and help clear away the picnic tables. “I got the word that everybody was evacuating, but we had something that we needed to do,” he will comment. [Brower, 2015, pp. 258] After hearing that another suspicious plane is approaching, however, Walters and his colleagues go to the southeast knoll, a rise in the White House lawn, and just stand there, watching the sky and waiting.
Lawn Is Cleared by Early Afternoon - By around 11:00 a.m., they are becoming impatient. Walters therefore says, “Guys, let’s go move some picnic tables.” The men then start carrying the picnic tables off the lawn. A police officer joins them and eventually about a dozen people are helping them to move the tables. By around 1:00 p.m. all of the tables have been removed from the lawn. At about 3:45 p.m., Walters is called by someone from the military, who asks him to clear the South Lawn so the president’s helicopter will be able to land there. Walters laughs and says this has already been done. [National Journal, 8/31/2002] The president’s helicopter, with Bush on board, will land on the South Lawn at around 6:55 p.m. (see (6:54 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/12/2001; Rove, 2010, pp. 263]
Usher Will Later Justify His Actions - Walters will, in 2016, explain why he made the effort to clear up the White House grounds, despite the danger to himself and his colleagues. “One of the things that I turned to in my own mind on 9/11 was the role that the White House plays in disasters, wars,” he will say, adding, “People have a tendency to turn to the White House.” He will continue: “And I knew that the president wasn’t gonna be satisfied talking from a bunker somewhere or away from the White House. And that’s why we put the effort that we did into cleaning up the south grounds, so that [his] helicopter could land there. That was what the American people were used to seeing—the presidential helicopter coming in—and the president was going to address the nation from the Oval Office.” [Peter Schnall, 7/12/2016]

Entity Tags: National Park Service, Gary Walters

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

A sign at the entrance to Peterson Air Force Base.A sign at the entrance to Peterson Air Force Base. [Source: US National Archives]General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talks briefly over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who updates him on what is happening and the actions NORAD is taking in response to the terrorist attacks. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file] Myers is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). He is aware of the two crashes at the World Trade Center and realizes they were terrorist attacks (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9] Eberhart, meanwhile, is in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He, too, is aware of the crashes at the WTC and has determined that a coordinated terrorist attack is underway (see (9:03 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] He called Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, who is at the Pentagon, and said he urgently wanted to speak to the vice chairman (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Klimow then called Myers and let him know that NORAD wanted to talk to him (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Has to Talk on an Unsecured Line - As Myers is coming out of Cleland’s office following his meeting with the senator, his military aide, Captain Chris Donahue, approaches him and says Eberhart is on his cell phone and wants to talk to him. “In this emergency, I had to forgo the luxury of a secure encrypted Red Switch phone and use Donahue’s cell,” Myers will later comment. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9] Myers and Eberhart then have a “short conversation.”
Eberhart Describes the 'Confused' Situation in the Air - Eberhart updates Myers on the current situation. He says the two towers of the WTC have been hit and there are “several hijack codes in the system.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file] By this, he means that “the transponders in the aircraft are talking to the ground and they’re saying… ‘We’re being hijacked,’” Myers will explain. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, none of the pilots of the planes hijacked this morning punched the emergency four-digit code that would indicate a hijacking into their planes’ transponders (see (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; Newsday, 9/13/2001] It is therefore unclear what “hijack codes” Eberhart is referring to. In one interview, Myers will recall Eberhart saying that the situation in the air is “confused.” He says there are “aircraft squawking that they had been hijacked” and he is “going to land them all at the nearest suitable base to sort it out.” [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] On another occasion, Myers will recall him saying, “The decision I’m going to make is, we’re going to land everybody and we’ll sort it out when we get them on the ground.” [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
Eberhart and Myers Don't Discuss 'Rules of Engagement' - Eberhart says NORAD has scrambled fighter jets in response to the hijackings (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, the two men do not discuss the issue of “rules of engagement” for the fighter pilots during this conversation. Indeed, Myers makes no decisions and takes no action at this time. Instead, Eberhart does most of the talking. Myers will recall that he “mainly listened” during the call. He tells Eberhart he needs to get to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon because he cannot communicate from a cell phone, presumably referring to the fact that it is an unsecured line. “I’m going to head back to the Pentagon. I’ll talk to you there,” he says. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file] “Get back to the Pentagon,” Eberhart tells him. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004]
Call Occurs before 9:30 a.m. - The time when this call occurs is unclear. At some time after talking to Myers, Eberhart will head out to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will estimate that he leaves Peterson Air Force Base at “approximately” 9:30 a.m. If correct, this would mean the call occurs before 9:30 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] Myers, meanwhile, will be vague about when it occurs, telling the 9/11 Commission only that it takes place after the second crash at the WTC, sometime between 9:03 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. Furthermore, while Klimow’s account of this morning’s events will imply that it occurs after Klimow called the vice chairman and let him know that NORAD wanted to talk to him, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will describe talking to Eberhart before he receives the call from Klimow. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will subsequently head back to the Pentagon. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] He does so “immediately” after talking to Eberhart, he will say. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001] He will learn about the attack on the Pentagon, which occurs at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), around the time he is leaving the building and getting into his car on Capitol Hill (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Chris Donahue, Ralph Eberhart, Richard B. Myers, North American Aerospace Defense Command

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

At the National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, Michael Hayden, the agency’s director, orders the evacuation of all nonessential personnel from the NSA complex. His two reasons for this, he later says, are “just pure safety,” and to protect the people who work at the agency by sending “them home on the dispersal plan.” In a 2007 speech, he will state that he gave this order at 9:30 a.m. But in the account of author James Bamford, around the time Hayden gives the order he hears “some early reports about the explosion at the Pentagon.” Yet the attack on the Pentagon does not occur until 9:37 (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). The reason for this discrepancy is unclear. Hayden’s evacuation order is announced over loudspeakers throughout the NSA, and many of the 16,000 employees there leave. After hearing for sure that the Pentagon has been struck and that one or more hijacked aircraft is heading toward Washington, Hayden orders the three to four thousand remaining essential personnel to immediately evacuate the agency’s three tall towers and relocate to the low-rise Ops 1 Building. However, as Hayden later says, “[W]e really couldn’t afford to move the counterterrorism shop” where experts and linguists who track terrorists’ foreign communications work, even though it is located near the top of one of the NSA’s high-rise buildings. Maureen Baginski, the NSA’s director of signals intelligence, goes up there shortly after the time of the Pentagon attack to calm down the workers who, according to Hayden, are “emotionally shattered.” [US Congress, 10/17/2002; Bamford, 2004, pp. 52-54; National Journal, 6/19/2006; Central Intelligence Agency, 5/4/2007] At 9:53, analysts in the counterterrorism office will pick up and quickly translate a phone call from a bin Laden operative in Afghanistan, apparently referring to the attacks (see 9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Michael Hayden, Maureen Baginski

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Two unidentified military aircraft fly in the vicinity of the Pentagon at an altitude of over 20,000 feet, and are in the area during the minutes before the Pentagon is hit. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003 pdf file] Between at least 9:31 a.m. and 9:40 a.m., the two aircraft communicate with the air traffic control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, which is less than a mile from the Pentagon. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001 pdf file; St. Petersburg Times, 10/3/2001] Radar data will show that they fly “in trail” (in single file, with one aircraft directly behind the other) at 21,000 feet, and are overhead during the last few minutes that Flight 77 is airborne, before it hits the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003 pdf file]
Launched from Delaware Base - The identities of the two aircraft are unclear. They have the call signs “Bobcat 14” and “Bobcat 17.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001 pdf file] A 9/11 Commission memorandum will state that “flight strips and other information indicate that Bobcat 14 and Bobcat 17 originated out of Dover Air Force Base in Delaware.… It is possible, but not confirmed, that they were Air Force corporate passenger jets.”
Airport Managers Do Not Recall Planes - Two key officials will later be unable to specifically recall the aircraft when questioned by the 9/11 Commission. Bob Lazar, the acting operations manager at Reagan National Airport, will say he “did not remember any aircraft with the call sign ‘Bobcat’ that hung out over the National airspace” on this day. However, as well as two of the fighter jets that are inbound from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he will recall two aircraft “coming from the north, but he did not think that they entered National’s airspace.” Donny Simons, the airport manager at Baltimore-Washington International Airport in Linthicum, Maryland, will stress “that he did not remember the Bobcats specifically,” but he speculates that controllers at his airport “were working the two ‘Bobcats’ and needed vectors from National controllers.” [9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Bob Lazar, Donny Simons

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

A group from FAA headquarters, who are apparently oblivious to the morning’s crisis, request and are given a tour of the air traffic control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, until they are forced to leave there just before the time of the Pentagon attack. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 157-158] Reagan Airport is located less than a mile from the Pentagon. [St. Petersburg Times, 10/3/2001]
Tour Group Wants to See Tower - At 9:32, the tower supervisor, Chris Stephenson, receives a phone call from one of the airport’s maintenance workers. The maintenance worker says he has a group there from the FAA’s Washington headquarters that is visiting the airport to go over some maintenance issues, but they are also curious to see what goes on in the control tower. It appears the FAA personnel are unaware of the attacks in New York, and Stephenson is asked if it is okay to bring them up. Though he is busy dealing with the chaos resulting from the ground stop recently ordered by the FAA’s Command Center (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Stephenson reluctantly agrees. The group arrives moments later, but Stephenson tries to ignore them. According to author Lynn Spencer, Stephenson is as yet unaware that an errant aircraft has been spotted heading toward Washington (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 157] But according to USA Today, the Secret Service warned him about this aircraft at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/11/2002]
Group Ordered to Leave - Shortly after the group arrives, Stephenson is called by a controller at the TRACON and notified of the unidentified aircraft (presumably Flight 77), which is five miles west of the tower (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). When he looks out the window, he sees it, now less than a mile away and approaching fast. Stephenson yells at the tour group: “Out! Get out!” The FAA group heads off down the stairs, but the last in the line looks out the window at the descending aircraft and asks, “What’s that guy doing?” ”Get out!” Stephenson repeats, and pushes the man into the stairwell. Soon afterwards, the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 158]

Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Chris Stephenson, Federal Aviation Administration

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Nantucket Hair Salon.The Nantucket Hair Salon. [Source: Nantucket Hair Salon]Lynne Cheney, the wife of Vice President Dick Cheney, is evacuated from a hair salon in Washington, DC, by her Secret Service agents, but, after initially heading toward the vice president’s residence, her car changes direction and heads to the White House after the Pentagon is hit. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; White House, 11/9/2001] Cheney was at the Nantucket Hair Salon, near the White House, at the time of the plane crashes at the World Trade Center, but the Secret Service agents accompanying her did not evacuate her in response to those attacks (see (8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] At around 9:33 a.m., however, air traffic controllers informed the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39]
Cheney Driven at 'High Speed' Away from Hair Salon - Presumably just a short time later, the Secret Service Joint Operations Center alerts the agents accompanying Cheney to the suspicious aircraft. One of the agents therefore decides to evacuate Cheney to the vice president’s residence, which is on the grounds of the US Naval Observatory in northwest Washington. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; CNN, 10/26/2001; Washington Post, 11/27/2008] Cheney will later recall that her agents move her “rather briskly into a car” and then drive “at rather high speed” toward the vice president’s mansion. [White House, 11/9/2001; Newsweek, 12/30/2001]
Car Makes 'Dramatic U-turn' and Heads to White House - During the journey, one of Cheney’s Secret Service agents phones a colleague who tells them that “the suspect airplane had crashed into the Pentagon,” according to Michael Seremetis, who is one of the agents accompanying Cheney this morning. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] (The Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10] ) The colleague says that since Cheney’s motorcade is “on 15th Street and near the White House,” it should change destination and take Cheney to “the White House shelter” where she can join her husband. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] Cheney will recall that after her car has been heading toward the vice president’s residence for about five minutes, “we made a rather dramatic U-turn in the middle of the street and headed toward the White House.” [White House, 11/9/2001] She will comment that after the Pentagon has been hit, the Secret Service “decided that maybe it would be safer for me to be underneath the White House. The immediate threat was gone, so they took me there.” [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7/2/2002; NPR, 7/2/2002] Cheney will arrive at the White House as it is being evacuated (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/30/2001]

Entity Tags: US Secret Service, Michael Seremetis, Lynne Cheney

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Marriott Residence Inn in Arlington, Virginia.The Marriott Residence Inn in Arlington, Virginia. [Source: Marriott International]An American Airlines plane takes off from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, flying toward the Pentagon, just before the Pentagon attack occurs, according to a witness who says he sees the plane out the window of his hotel room.
Plane Takes Off toward Pentagon - Jeffrey Mark Parsons, an assistant chief patrol agent with the United States Border Patrol, is staying on the 17th floor of the Marriott Residence Inn in Arlington, Virginia. When later interviewed by Navy historian John Darrell Sherwood about his experiences of the 9/11 attacks, Parsons will recall: “I was looking out my window. I have a perfect view of Reagan National Airport. An American Airlines plane had just taken off, I mean, not 30 seconds before this plane [Flight 77] hit the Pentagon.” Parsons will add that the American Airlines plane is “taking off to the north, to the, different than the normal way. In other words, they were taking off toward the Pentagon.” [US Naval Historical Center, 12/13/2001; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 258] Reagan National Airport is less than a mile from the Pentagon. [St. Petersburg Times, 10/3/2001] Parsons will continue, “Well, this American Airlines plane had just taken off, I mean it couldn’t have been a minute, 30 seconds before this plane [Flight 77] hit the Pentagon.” [US Naval Historical Center, 12/13/2001] Flight 77 hits the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001) and, like the plane Parsons sees, is an American Airlines aircraft. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10]
American Airlines and Reagan Airport Planes Supposedly Grounded - And yet Chris Stephenson, the supervisor in the Reagan National Airport control tower, reportedly stopped takeoffs from Reagan Airport in the minutes after 9:03 a.m., when Flight 175 hit the World Trade Center (see (9:04 a.m.-9:11 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/11/2002] And at 9:00 a.m., American Airlines ordered all its aircraft in the Northeast United States that had not yet taken off to remain on the ground (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 30] Furthermore, the FAA ordered a nationwide ground stop at around 9:26 a.m., which was supposed to prevent any aircraft taking off across the US (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Congress. House. Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure, 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 25] Parsons will ask Sherwood if anyone has interviewed the pilot of the American Airlines plane he saw taking off, since that pilot must have witnessed the attack on the Pentagon. Sherwood will answer no, but add, “[T]hat’s another good lead for either myself or one of the other people to follow up on.” Whether the pilot is ever identified or interviewed is unknown. [US Naval Historical Center, 12/13/2001]

Entity Tags: Jeffrey Mark Parsons, John Darrell Sherwood, American Airlines, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Pentagon explodes. 
The Pentagon explodes. [Source: Donley/ Sipa]Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. All 64 people on the plane are killed. A hundred-and-twenty-four people working in the building are killed, and a further victim will die in hospital several days later. Hijackers Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi presumably are killed instantly. (Typically, they are not included in the death counts.) [CNN, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; Guardian, 10/17/2001; Washington Post, 11/21/2001; USA Today, 8/12/2002; Associated Press, 8/21/2002; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; ABC News, 9/11/2002; CBS, 9/11/2002] Flight 77 hits the first floor of the Pentagon’s west wall. The impact and the resulting explosion heavily damage the building’s three outer rings. The path of destruction cuts through Army accounting offices on the outer E Ring, the Navy Command Center on the D Ring, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s comptroller’s office on the C Ring. [Vogel, 2007, pp. 431 and 449] Flight 77 strikes the only side of the Pentagon that had recently been renovated—it was “within days of being totally [renovated].” [US Department of Defense, 9/15/2001] “It was the only area of the Pentagon with a sprinkler system, and it had been reconstructed with a web of steel columns and bars to withstand bomb blasts. The area struck by the plane also had blast-resistant windows—two inches thick and 2,500 pounds each—that stayed intact during the crash and fire. While perhaps, 4,500 people normally would have been working in the hardest-hit areas, because of the renovation work only about 800 were there.” More than 25,000 people work at the Pentagon. [Los Angeles Times, 9/16/2001] Furthermore, the plane hits an area that has no basement. As journalist Steve Vogel later points out, “If there had been one under the first floor, its occupants could easily have been trapped by fire and killed when the upper floors collapsed.” [Vogel, 2007, pp. 450]

Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, US Department of Defense, Salem Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Pentagon

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

James Roche.James Roche. [Source: United States Air Force]General John Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, and James Roche, the secretary of the Air Force, head to the Air Force Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon, where they will assist the Air Force’s response to the terrorist attacks. [CNN, 10/10/2001; Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003; Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] Roche learned about the attacks on the World Trade Center while he was holding a breakfast meeting with several members of Congress in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon. He then arranged for the members of Congress to return to their offices, but stayed in his own office (see (Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] Jumper learned about the attacks during a staff meeting he was chairing, but initially continued the meeting (see (9:00 a.m.-9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 136] He adjourned it at 9:20 a.m., according to the Daytona Beach News-Journal. [Daytona Beach News-Journal, 9/7/2004 pdf file] He then headed up to Roche’s office. [Airman, 9/15/2011]
Roche and Jumper Possibly Unaware of Plane Approaching Washington - In the office now with Roche and Jumper are Colonel Philip Breedlove, Roche’s senior military assistant, and Colonel Jack Egginton, executive officer to the Air Force chief of staff. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] It is unclear whether the men in Roche’s office realized a suspicious aircraft was approaching Washington, DC, before the Pentagon was hit, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Lieutenant General Lance Lord, assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force, will later say that those who attended Jumper’s staff meeting “heard there was another plane inbound to Washington” as they were heading to their offices after the meeting. [Air Force Space Command News Service, 9/5/2002] And Egginton will say that a few minutes before the Pentagon was hit, “We received word that another aircraft was headed toward Washington.” [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003] But according to the Midland Reporter-Telegram, Jumper’s staff had “no idea that they [i.e. the Pentagon] would be the next target for terrorists.” [Midland Reporter-Telegram, 4/2/2002]
Roche and Jumper Possibly Initially Unaware that the Pentagon Had Been Attacked - Breedlove will recall that shortly before the Pentagon was hit, while Roche and Jumper had their backs to the window, he and Egginton “saw an airplane go by really close to the building.” People who work at the Pentagon or visit it regularly are used to seeing planes flying by, near the building. “But that one seemed closer than any other,” Breedlove will comment. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] However, it is unclear whether the men in Roche’s office immediately realized the Pentagon had been attacked when it was hit. The office is on the opposite side of the building to where the attack occurred and so, according to some accounts, Roche and Jumper did not feel the impact. They only realized something was wrong when they saw “people running down the halls and trying to evacuate the premises,” according to the Midland Reporter-Telegram. Roche will say that all he initially knew was that “the building was putting out the alert that something had gone wrong.” “It was amazing, from inside the building, how little we knew about what actually went on,” Tim Green, assistant executive to the Air Force chief of staff, who is with Jumper, will comment. “People outside of the building… probably knew more about what happened from the news than I did.” [CNN, 10/10/2001; Midland Reporter-Telegram, 4/2/2002] Egginton and Breedlove, however, will contradict these accounts. “I felt the building shake upon impact,” Egginton will say. Breedlove will recall, “We felt a tremor in the building and then alarms start flashing.”
Roche and Jumper Taken to Operations Center - Breedlove will say that, in response to the attack on the Pentagon, he promptly arranges for Jumper and Roche to be escorted to the Air Force Operations Center, in the basement of the Pentagon’s C Ring. He will recall that he hits the “duress button” and then security officers enter Roche’s office almost immediately. “We said, ‘We need to get to the bunker; we need to get down to our operations area,’” he will say. [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003; Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] Roche, though, will give a different account. He will say that his office had been “on the phone to our Operations Center” and then “we were called down,” presumably by whoever they were talking to in the Operations Center. [CNN, 10/10/2001] Roche and Jumper are escorted to the Operations Center through “smoke, alarms, and throngs of people heading for the exits,” Egginton will recall. [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003]
Roche and Jumper Learn a Plane Hit the Pentagon - In the Operations Center, members of the Air Force Crisis Action Team have already begun to assemble so as to help provide assistance to civil authorities in New York (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 136] When Roche and Jumper reach the center, they will learn that the Pentagon has been hit by an aircraft (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 10/10/2001] Other Air Force officials, including Lord, also head to the Operations Center after the Pentagon is hit. [Lompoc Record, 9/11/2003]

Entity Tags: John P. Jumper, Lance Lord, Philip M. Breedlove, Jack B. Egginton, James G. Roche, Tim Green

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Marc Sasseville.Marc Sasseville. [Source: CBC]Four pilots with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, finally receive authorization to get airborne in their fighter jets, and are given instructions on their mission. The pilots are Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville, Lieutenant Heather Penney Garcia, Captain Brandon Rasmussen, and Major Daniel Caine.
Pilot Waiting 'for Somebody to Task Me with Something' - Rasmussen will later recall that, although he and his colleagues at the unit had been aware of the attacks in New York, it is only after the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001) that “we knew that we were going to be sticking around home and being quite busy.” And until the pilots are authorized to take off, he is “just kind of standing back, waiting for somebody to task me with something.” He will recall, “I was just waiting at the ops desk for someone to say, ‘Okay, we’ve been cleared to take off and go.’”
Sasseville Briefs Other Pilots - Rasmussen says that, after Sasseville and Caine receive authorization from their wing commander to get airborne and to use missiles, Sasseville, who is the acting operations group commander, looks at Penney Garcia and says, “You’re flying with me, and [Caine] you’re flying with [Rasmussen], do suit up and get out there as quick as possible.” According to another account, Sasseville gives his three fellow pilots a short briefing, telling them: “I have no idea what’s going on, but we’re flying. Here’s our frequency. We’ll split up the area as we have to. Just defend as required. We’ll talk about the rest in the air.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; Filson, 2003, pp. 82-84; Rasmussen, 9/18/2003] Sasseville will recall, “There wasn’t a whole hell of a lot to talk about, because we didn’t know what was going on.” [Vogel, 2007, pp. 446]
Pilots Prepare to Fly - According to Rasmussen: “We were relieved to actually be given permission to go up and do something instead of feeling totally helpless. I mean we are fighter pilots, just like guard dogs chomping at the bit ready to go.” The four pilots run down the hallway and throw on their gear, grabbing their helmets, g-suits, and parachute harnesses, before heading to the operations desk to get their aircraft assignments. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; Rasmussen, 9/18/2003]
Commander Gives Instructions - According to author Leslie Filson, before Sasseville and Penney Garcia head to their jets, Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, gives them instructions, regarding their mission. As Wherley will later recall, “My translation of the rules [of engagement] to [Sasseville] was, ‘You have weapons free flight-lead control.’” [Filson, 2003, pp. 82] “Weapons free” means the decision whether to shoot at a hostile aircraft rests with the lead pilot. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 44] Wherley says, “Do you understand what I’m asking you to do?” and both pilots respond, “Yes.” Wherley then tells them to be careful. “It was important for them to understand that this was weapons free,” he will recall. [Filson, 2003, pp. 82] However, Sasseville will tell the 9/11 Commission that he does not remember receiving the rules of engagement he is supposed to follow until later on, after he has taken off. [9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 pdf file]
Jets Don't Launch until 10:42 and After - The exact times when the four pilots are authorized to get airborne and receive their mission instructions are unclear. But Sasseville and Penney Garcia will take off from Andrews at 10:42 a.m., with their planes armed only with guns, and no missiles (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). Rasmussen and Caine take off at 11:11 a.m., by which time their jets have been armed with missiles (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 82-84; 9/11 Commission, 2004]

Entity Tags: David Wherley, Daniel Caine, Heather Penney Garcia, Leslie Filson, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Marc Sasseville, Brandon Rasmussen

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Robert Medairos.Robert Medairos. [Source: ABC News]The Arlington County Police Department (ACPD) begins securing the perimeter of the Pentagon Reservation just minutes after the Pentagon attack occurred. [Washington Post, 9/20/2001; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 162; Defense Media Network, 9/11/2015] Corporal Barry Foust and Officer Richard Cox of the ACPD witnessed the attack on the Pentagon, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), and immediately called the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center to report what they had seen (see (9:36 a.m.-9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). ACPD headquarters then sent a pager message to all members of the department with instructions to report for duty, thereby initiating an immediate response to the incident.
Arlington Police Take Charge of Security - Lieutenant Robert Medairos was the first ACPD command-level official to reach the scene and took command of the department’s response there. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C6-C7 pdf file] While the Defense Protective Service (DPS)—the law enforcement agency that guards the Pentagon—has exclusive jurisdiction within the Pentagon Reservation, the ACPD has jurisdiction around it. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C1 pdf file; Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1/31/2006 pdf file; Defense Media Network, 9/11/2019] Medairos therefore promptly comes to an arrangement with the DPS for the ACPD to secure the perimeter of the Reservation.
Police Close All Roads around the Pentagon - Along with his colleagues Lieutenant Brian Berke and Sergeant James Daly, he assesses the road network conditions and identifies 27 intersections that require immediate police posting. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C7 pdf file; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 162] At 9:42 a.m., he orders the closure of all roads surrounding the Pentagon. [Washington Post, 9/20/2001] Berke and Daly take action to keep all traffic except emergency vehicles off the feeder roads to Route 27, just west of the crash site. Police officers close Route 27 to regular traffic and prevent first responders from blocking emergency lanes or parking their vehicles haphazardly. The Pentagon’s parking lot and the field adjacent to it are cordoned off, and guards are posted around the perimeter. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C7 pdf file; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 162] Sniper teams are set up to monitor the local highways. ACPD officers monitor traffic around the area and screen pedestrians entering the crash site. Anyone delivering equipment has to be escorted to the Pentagon by police officers. [Middletown Press, 1/29/2002]
Other Police Departments Will Assist the Response - The ACPD has a memorandum of understanding with all the other police departments in the area and it calls these departments to request assistance. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1/31/2006 pdf file] Consequently, by 11:00 a.m., over 100 law enforcement officers will have reported to the staging area at the Pentagon. Along with members of the ACPD, officers will have come from Fairfax County Police Department, Alexandria Police Department, Arlington County Sheriff’s Office, Arlington County Park Rangers, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Captain Rebecca Hackney will soon take over from Medairos as the commander of the ACPD at the Pentagon. Deputy Chief Stephen Holl, who was at a meeting in Richmond, Virginia, when the Pentagon attack occurred, immediately heads back to Arlington after hearing what happened, and will arrive at the ACPD command post at the Pentagon around midday and take over command of the ACPD from Hackney. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C6-C7, C13 pdf file; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 162, 164]

Entity Tags: Brian Berke, Defense Protective Service, Arlington County Police Department, James Daly, Robert Medairos

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

John Keane.John Keane. [Source: US Army]The Army’s Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon is “formally stood up” and its members respond to the terrorist attacks. [Rossow, 2003, pp. 66; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 135; St. Louis Jewish Light, 9/8/2011] Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Stramara activated the CAT after the second hijacked aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center, at 9:03 a.m., on the orders of Major General Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s director of operations, readiness, and mobilization (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 96-97] Chiarelli’s intention was, he said, “to respond to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials.” [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 134] The CAT is now “formally stood up,” according to author Robert Rossow, although exactly what this means is unstated.
Senior Officials Come to Operations Center - When the CAT is activated, its members assemble in the Army Operations Center (AOC) in the basement of the Pentagon. [Rossow, 2003, pp. 64, 66] Numerous senior officials now start arriving in the AOC. These include General John Keane, vice chief of staff of the Army; Brigadier General Clyde Vaughn, deputy director of operations, readiness, and mobilization; Major General Philip Kensinger, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations and plans; and Thomas White, the secretary of the Army. More senior officers come to the AOC than would usually be the case in a crisis, according to Chiarelli, “because a large portion of the Army section of the building had been destroyed” in the attack on the Pentagon. “People had been forced out of their space,” he will later say, and “were looking for some place to go.” [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; US Army Center of Military History, 2/12/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 135; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 98-101; Fox News, 9/12/2011]
Operations Center Personnel Unaware that a Plane Hit the Pentagon - Chiarelli arrived at the AOC shortly before the Pentagon was hit (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and, he will recall, heard a “muffled noise” when the attack occurred, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 98-99] Colonel Henry Huntley, who also arrived at the AOC around the time of the Pentagon attack, will recall, “Alarms started going off and there was an announcement that an explosion had gone off in the building.” [Daily American, 7/8/2008] However, those in the AOC are apparently initially unaware that a plane has hit their building. Vaughn, who witnessed the attack from the road outside the Pentagon, calls Major George Sterling, the AOC commandant, and says to him, “You know that you’ve been hit by an airplane?” Sterling responds, “Is that what happened?” Vaughn will comment that “many people… didn’t find out for some time” that the Pentagon had been hit by an airplane. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/12/2002; Rossow, 2003, pp. 15-16; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 3-4]
Support Agency Commander Unaware that the US Is under Attack - Colonel Bruce Bachus, commander of the Command and Control Support Agency, who is responsible for keeping the AOC operating, arrived at the Pentagon around the time the attack there occurred and yet he is unaware of the crisis taking place in the US when he gets to the AOC. In the AOC, Dick Mansfield, deputy director of the Command and Control Support Agency, says to him: “We’ve been hit! The CAT has been stood up!” But Bachus appears to be puzzled. Mansfield therefore asks him, “Sir, do you know what’s going on?” Bachus says no and that he had not been listening to the radio—like he usually does—while he drove to work. He says he heard a loud sound while he was in the Pentagon’s A-E Drive, and saw people shouting and running down the corridors, but he’d had no idea what was going on. Mansfield therefore has to quickly brief him on the catastrophic events of the past hour. [Rossow, 2003, pp. 9, 68]
Crisis Team Assesses How Many Army Staffers Are Missing - The “first big task” for the CAT, according to Vaughn, is “to get a count on how many people were missing on the Army staff.” Chiarelli instructs Vaughn to focus on this assignment. Vaughn then announces on the CAT floor that he wants each section “to start that process of figuring out who was missing and who was not.” “For a long time, our number one priority was locating and identifying and taking care of… our soldiers and civilians,” Vaughn will say. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/12/2002] Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kotch, who is working in the AOC this morning, will recall that those in the operations center also “assured continuity of operations after the impact [i.e. the attack on the Pentagon].” [St. Louis Jewish Light, 9/8/2011]
Intelligence Officers Give Inaccurate Reports of Hijackings - Meanwhile, after he arrives at the AOC, Chiarelli receives reports from his intelligence officers informing him, inaccurately, about additional hijacked aircraft. He is told there are “a minimum of four aircraft that were hijacked and a possibility, at one time, [of] as high as seven.” [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 99]
Operations Center Has Sophisticated Equipment - The CAT, according to Soldiers magazine, “consists of a dedicated ‘hot’ desk with classified and unclassified computers, and secure telephones for 24 separate Army staff sections.” [Soldiers, 9/2004] The AOC, where its members assemble, is equipped with state-of-the-art communications equipment and has television sets for monitoring news coverage. [Washington Post, 8/25/1995] A glassed-in balcony overlooks the main floor and four giant screens are on the wall above the computer workstations. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 99-100]
Watch Team Regularly Communicates with Government Agencies - AOC personnel usually work around the clock to keep senior Army leaders aware of issues and events around the world. A watch team monitors the world constantly and is ready to sound the alarm if a crisis erupts somewhere. The watch team also “directs hundreds of communications daily to the FBI, the State Department, the White House command center, local law enforcement agencies, and others,” according to Soldiers magazine. The AOC is equipped with an “emergency action console,” which is a switchboard with a sophisticated communications system that allows watch team members to contact, at the touch of a button, the White House, the secretary of defense’s office, and Army commands around the world. [Washington Post, 8/25/1995; Soldiers, 9/2004] The CAT will become “a focal point for all Pentagon activities” in response to the terrorist attacks, according to Kotch. [St. Louis Jewish Light, 9/8/2011] It will continue working around the clock in the aftermath of the attacks. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002]

Entity Tags: Bruce Bachus, George Sterling, Clyde A. Vaughn, Dick Mansfield, US Army Crisis Action Team, US Department of the Army, Richard A. Kotch, Henry Huntley, Thomas E. White, John Keane, Philip R. Kensinger Jr., Peter W. Chiarelli

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The White House mess.The White House mess. [Source: Unknown]People at the White House are ordered to go to the “mess,” the senior staff dining room. David Kuo, a special assistant to the president, and John Bridgeland, the director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, will later recall being ordered to go downstairs to the mess by armed Secret Service agents. Meanwhile, Anita McBride, the acting director of White House personnel, is instructed by members of the Secret Service to “go through West Wing offices and tell everyone to ‘get out’ and stay put” in the mess. [Kuo, 2006, pp. 185; Politico, 9/9/2011; Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 3] Mary Matalin, a counselor to Vice President Dick Cheney, will recall, “Everyone still remaining in the West Wing was shepherded to the White House mess, where we were to await further instructions.” [Carville and Matalin, 2014, pp. 138]
Mess Is a 'Tiny, Unsecure' Facility - The White House mess is an exclusive dining facility run by the US Navy, located in the basement of the West Wing, just under the Oval Office. [All Hands, 12/1/2001; National Review, 10/8/2013] Bridgeland will recall thinking “how odd it was” for White House staffers to all be evacuated to this “tiny, unsecure” facility. [Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 4] People in the mess are watching television or just waiting. [White House, 8/29/2002] Kuo will describe: “All the tables had been tossed onto their sides to make room for as many people as possible. Fifty people stood there, shocked, quiet, confused.” [Kuo, 2006, pp. 185]
People Ordered to the Mess after the Pentagon Attack - The exact time at which staffers are ordered to go to the mess is unclear. Matalin will recall being told to go there “moments” after she sees Cheney being evacuated from his office, which would be some time shortly after 9:36 a.m. (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [National Review, 9/8/2011; Carville and Matalin, 2014, pp. 137-138] Bridgeland and Kuo will recall being ordered to go there shortly after they learn the Pentagon has been hit, which would be some time after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon attack occurred (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Kuo, 2006, pp. 184-185; Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 3]
People in the Mess Ordered to Leave the Building - People will only spend a short time in the mess before they are told to get out of the building. The Secret Service will reportedly order them to evacuate the White House at 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Bridgeland will describe: “[A]n alarmed police officer came into the White House mess and instructed us to leave. Another officer outside was receiving the latest communications by wire (apparently alerted that United Airlines Flight 93 was headed toward the White House or US Capitol building) and commanded us, ‘Take off your shoes and run as fast as you can.’” [Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 4] Matalin will recall that the order she hears, which is delivered “in a weirdly calm manner,” is: “Run for your lives. A plane is going to hit the White House.” [Carville and Matalin, 2014, pp. 138]

Entity Tags: Anita McBride, John Bridgeland, Mary Matalin, David Kuo, US Secret Service

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Eisenhower Executive Office Building.The Eisenhower Executive Office Building. [Source: White House]The Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB), a government building located next to the West Wing of the White House, is evacuated. [CNN, 9/11/2001; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] The EEOB is where most of the president’s staff works. [New York Times, 1/8/2009] It is evacuated on the orders of the Secret Service. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, recently learned that a suspicious aircraft was flying toward the White House, and as a result said he would initiate the evacuations of the White House and the EEOB (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He then instructed a “White House security representative” to evacuate the White House. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]
Guards Scream at People to Leave Building - Lloyd Blanchard, who works for the Office of Management and Budget in the EEOB, will later describe the evacuation. He will recall seeing “security personnel… moving frantically through the building, telling everyone to evacuate.” Blanchard and his colleagues are unaware of why, specifically, they are being ordered to leave the building. [IEM, 9/11/2011] Cesar Conda, a domestic policy adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, whose office is in the EEOB, will recall seeing guards “screaming to everyone to ‘move’ and ‘run’ out of the White House complex.” [Politico, 4/23/2009] The New York Times will describe bomb squads “racing through the upper floors of the [EEOB], screaming, ‘Get out, get out, this is real!’” [New York Times, 9/16/2001] And Ron Christie, the deputy assistant to the vice president for domestic policy, will describe the scene on the second floor of the EEOB, writing: “[T]he offices containing the vice president’s Secret Service detail were flung open. Men and women I’d never seen before ran out with automatic weapons. They began to shout: ‘Everybody evacuate the building. Get out now!’” [Christie, 2006, pp. 129]
Some People Hear Recorded Evacuation Order - Apparently, some people in the EEOB hear an announcement instructing them to evacuate, but others do not. Time magazine will describe a recorded announcement going off. It will report: “Staff members in the [EEOB]… were huddled in front of their TV screens when they heard from TV reporters that they were being evacuated. Then the tape loop began. ‘The building is being evacuated. Please walk to the nearest exit.’” [Time, 9/14/2001] According to White House spokesman Scott Stanzel, who is in the EEOB, “[A]larms sounded, a steady, electronic beep, followed by a recorded male voice [saying,] ‘Evacuate the White House.’” [Knight Ridder, 9/16/2001] And Major Robert Darling, who is in the White House Airlift Operations office on the fourth floor of the EEOB, will recall, “The building’s intercom suddenly came to life and ordered all personnel to evacuate the White House and the adjoining Eisenhower Executive Office Building.” The announcement states: “Evacuate the White House complex! All personnel are to evacuate the White House complex immediately!” [Darling, 2010, pp. 46]
Some People Hear 'No Alarm Bells' - However, Yvonne Boulding, who works for the Office of Management and Budget, hears no announcement. “There was no announcement to evacuate,” she will recall. “Everybody just started yelling, ‘Get out, get out.’” [Boston Globe, 9/11/2001] And according to Mitch Daniels, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, “There was some confusion” but “no alarm bells went off.” Daniels will say that people instead decide to leave the building based on “word of mouth.” [New York Times, 9/12/2001]
Commotion, but No Evacuation Order Earlier On - Apparently no order was given to evacuate the EEOB earlier on, even when the nearby Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Conda will recall that at the time he heard the boom in the distance from the Pentagon attack, the EEOB had not yet been evacuated. He had, however, already noticed “a lot of commotion, with the Secret Service agents scurrying up and down the marbled hallway” outside his office. [Politico, 4/23/2009] Just before the evacuation begins, Christie saw a Secret Service officer he is friends with outside the office of Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, on the second floor of the EEOB. The agent waved frantically when he noticed Christie and then told him: “Ron, you need to get out of here. I’ve heard there’s another plane inbound to the White House and it could get here in less than two minutes. You need to get your staff, get out, and stay away from the windows.” [Christie, 2006, pp. 128-129] The EEOB will be mostly empty by 10:05 a.m., according to a Secret Service timeline. [United States Secret Service, 9/12/2001] The White House is evacuated around the same time as the EEOB is (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; CNN, 9/12/2001]

Entity Tags: Yvonne Boulding, Lloyd Blanchard, Eisenhower Executive Offices Building, US Secret Service, Cesar Conda, Ron Christie, Mitch Daniels, Scott Stanzel, Robert J. Darling

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Engine Company 16.Engine Company 16. [Source: District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department]The District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFD) sends engines to the White House after the Secret Service incorrectly reports that a plane has crashed into the presidential residence and the building is on fire. As well as reporting the supposed plane crash and fire, the Secret Service says the White House, or at least part of it (the specific details are unclear), has collapsed. In response to the report, the fire communications center dispatches a “box alarm” from Engine Company 16, the station that serves the White House. [Washington City Paper, 9/21/2001; Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 4/2002 pdf file; Firehouse Magazine, 10/31/2002] A box alarm consists of four engines, two trucks, a rescue company, and a battalion chief. [Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 4/2002 pdf file] Since the alleged incident is at the White House—the home of the US president—the response is increased by sending an additional battalion chief and the deputy fire chief, Rogers Massey, to deal with it. And because a building collapse has been reported, the DCFD’s cave-in task force, which comprises Rescue 3, Battalion Chief 3, Engine 15, and the hazmat (hazardous materials) task force, is also sent. However, when the crews arrive at the White House, they are promptly told to leave. A uniformed Secret Service officer waves them away and says: “Get the f_ck outta here! There’s a plane coming in!” Lieutenant Jeff Wright, one of the firefighters involved in the response, will later recall the turn of events, saying: “It was mass confusion. We go down to the White House and no one knows what’s going on. We could see smoke coming from Virginia [where the Pentagon is located].” The report of the incident at the White House is investigated and determined to be unfounded. However, after he receives intelligence reports from the FBI, Special Operations Battalion Chief Michael Sellitto decides he will keep his units near the White House in case attacks should subsequently occur there or at the Capitol building. [Washington City Paper, 9/21/2001; Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 4/2002 pdf file; Firehouse Magazine, 10/31/2002] The DCFD will also respond to the attack on the Pentagon, which occurred at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). It will dispatch a box alarm to the Department of Defense’s headquarters at around 9:48 a.m. [DCFD (.com), 9/12/2001; Washington City Paper, 9/21/2001; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 72]

Entity Tags: District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, US Secret Service, Jeff Wright, Michael Sellitto, Rogers Massey, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Members of New York Police Department’s elite Emergency Service Unit (ESU) are given an order that means they have to get out of the World Trade Center or delay entering it and consequently many of them will avoid being killed when the South Tower collapses, at 9:59 a.m. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 101-102; Appel, 2009, pp. 112-113] The ESU is a highly trained organization comprised of first response rescuers. [City of New York, 6/29/2002] Its members respond to situations that require the most specialized training, such as hostage taking and water rescue, and use the most advanced equipment. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 101]
Officers Are Ordered to Come Down from the WTC - Inspector Ronald Wasson, commanding officer of the ESU, earlier on divided his officers into four teams of five or six men and then sent two teams into each of the Twin Towers to assist the rescue operation. [New York Daily News, 11/11/2001] But now, ESU commanders give the order for the unit’s members to “go tactical.” This means the officers in the towers have to come out of the buildings and go to the unit’s SWAT (special weapons and tactics) vans; put on their BDU (battle dress uniform) suits, flak jackets, and Kevlar helmets; and arm themselves with heavy weapons and assault rifles.
Commander Thinks Terrorists Might Attack the First Responders - The decision to order ESU officers to go tactical is made by Wasson, according to a book by Lieutenant William Keegan of the Port Authority Police Department. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 101-102] Wasson is currently assembled with a number of other ESU officers outside the Twin Towers, at the corner of West and Vesey Streets. [Appel, 2009, pp. 68] He decides that ESU officers should go tactical due to his concern that armed terrorists might attack the first responders at the WTC. He is “worried that with all his personnel inside the buildings, he [has] no way to protect the cops, firefighters, or civilians from the kind of low-intensity warfare—snipers, automatic weapons, car bombs, hostage situations—he [is] sure [will] follow the attack,” Keegan will write. He believes it is the responsibility of the New York Fire Department to deal with the fires in the Twin Towers, while the Police Department should be preparing for what might happen next. Many ESU members will come out of the towers after receiving the order to go tactical, according to Keegan. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 101-102]
Order Is Given after an Officer Hears of the Pentagon Attack - However, according to author Anthea Appel, the order to go tactical is made by Sergeant Tom Sullivan, another ESU officer. Sullivan is currently at the corner of West and Vesey Streets along with Wasson, getting ready to take two teams into the WTC. At 9:56 a.m., after hearing over his radio about the attack on the Pentagon, which occurred at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), he exclaims, “Screw rescue!” He then pulls his men back and announces that all ESU teams will be “going in tactical,” according to Appel. “I want heavy vests, helmets, rifles, and machine guns,” he says. In response to his announcement, ESU officers start taking off their rescue gear and putting on combat gear. They take off their safety helmets and replace them with ballistic helmets. They take off their air tanks, unbuckle their Roco harnesses, and put on more body armor over their bulletproof vests. They also unlock their gun bins and take out shotguns, submachine guns, and assault rifles. Some officers grumble under their breath, annoyed at being held back. “They didn’t like wasting time fiddling around with equipment,” Appel will comment, “and this sudden switch interrupted their adrenaline momentum.” They will be in the middle of changing into their combat gear when the South Tower collapses (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Appel, 2009, pp. 112-113]
Order Is Wrong but Saves Lives - The order to go tactical will turn out to be mistaken as there are no attacks by armed terrorists on the first responders at the WTC. However, as a result of it being issued, numerous ESU members will be outside the Twin Towers instead of inside the buildings when the South Tower comes down and many of them will therefore avoid being killed in the collapse. While 14 ESU members will die in the WTC collapses, a far greater number will survive, Keegan will write, “because Wasson’s order pulled them out of the towers and saved their lives.” [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 102] One ESU member, Detective Frank DeMasi, will conclude that Sullivan “definitely saved his life when he made that last-minute decision to switch from rescue to tactical mode,” according to Appel, since the delay while they changed into their combat gear “kept DeMasi and his teammates from walking into the South Tower before it collapsed.” [Appel, 2009, pp. 265-266]

Entity Tags: New York City Police Department, Ronald Wasson, Frank DeMasi, Tom Sullivan

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Current Actions Center.The Current Actions Center. [Source: Federation of American Scientists]General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon and starts participating in the conference call being conducted from there. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Myers recently arrived at the Pentagon following a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Shortly Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] He joined Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, at the River Entrance and the two men then headed to the NMCC. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] The NMCC is the US military’s “worldwide monitoring, crisis response center,” according to Myers. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 pdf file] It is “a communications hub, a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders,” he will later write. Klimow will call it “the nerve center of the Pentagon.” It includes the large Current Actions Center (CAC), which is filled with computer cubicles.
Myers Goes to the Deputy Director's Office - When Myers and Klimow arrive at the NMCC, they find “soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines” sitting at “their consoles, their telephones, and their computers, manning communication links around the world.” They head to the deputy director for operations’ office, located at one end of the CAC. This small, windowless room, also known as the “DDO shack,” has several desks, a conference table, and lots of telephones. It is where the 24-hour watch takes place and is “the heart of the NMCC,” according to Klimow. In it, Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations, is participating in a conference call. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call commenced at 9:29 a.m. as a “significant event conference” (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) but was upgraded to an “air threat conference” at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] It links the NMCC to NORAD, the White House, and other agencies. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
Myers Is Concerned about What Could Happen Next - After arriving in the NMCC, Myers wants to gain “situational awareness.” His first thought is, “What’s next?” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] One of his priorities is “looking ahead and giving strategic guidance to make sure we were prepared to handle whatever came next,” he will recall. “We didn’t know at that time if we were in the middle of a several-day long attack, what kind of attacks could come next, or who and what might be targeted,” he will add. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 pdf file]
Myers Discusses Evacuating the Sears Tower - The exact time when Myers reaches the NMCC is unclear. He will estimate that he arrives there between 10:00 a.m. and 10:10 a.m. when he is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 pdf file] However, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that he joins the air threat conference being run from there shortly before 10:00 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] And evidence will indicate that he in fact reaches the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m. or shortly before then. Leidig will tell the 9/11 Commission that he is “certain that the vice chairman was in the room” when the “Sears Tower issue” was discussed over the air threat conference. He will say he recalls telling Myers there is a recommendation to evacuate the Sears Tower, and Myers saying in response that this is a good idea and the military supports it. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 pdf file] The discussion Leidig will be referring to is apparently one that occurs at 9:58 a.m. At that time, he is recorded saying over the air threat conference, “The vice chairman recommends evacuating [the] Chicago Tower [i.e. the Sears Tower in Chicago] based on the flight plan of one of the possible hijacked aircraft.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file] However, after spending only a short time in the NMCC, Myers will leave there in order to search for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Charles Leidig, Matthew S. Klimow, National Military Command Center

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Twenty minutes after the 9/11 attacks in New York (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Washington (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), a bomb truck is stationed in downtown Oklahoma City, in preparation for any potential bombing related to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (see 8:35 a.m. - 9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995). Additionally, an Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Department command post is activated where convicted bombing conspirator Terry Nichols (see September 5, 2001) is being held. [The Oklahoman, 4/2009]

Entity Tags: Terry Lynn Nichols

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, US Domestic Terrorism

George Piro.George Piro. [Source: FBI]George Piro and Ken Williams, two agents at the FBI field office in Phoenix, Arizona, visit a flight school in Phoenix to see if any suspicious students have attended it recently and the manager immediately informs them about Hani Hanjour, one of the alleged hijackers of Flight 77. As they watched the terrorist attacks unfolding on television, Piro and Williams decided they wanted to start responding to the crisis on their own initiative, rather than sitting around and waiting for an order. They know Phoenix has the second-highest concentration of flight schools in the nation. Piro therefore looked in the Yellow Pages and found three programs that offer commercial pilot licenses. With this information in hand, the two agents set out to visit some flight schools. The first one they go to is the Sawyer School of Aviation at Sky Harbor Airport in Phoenix. They ask the manager there if any suspicious students have attended recently. Almost without hesitation, she gives them the file of one such student: Hanjour. [Graff, 2011, pp. 325; Washingtonian, 5/5/2011] Hanjour received training at the flight school earlier this year and, previously, in 1998 (see 1998 and Summer 2001). [Washington Post, 10/15/2001; Associated Press, 12/29/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 529] He allegedly flew Flight 77 into the Pentagon (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Fox News, 1/7/2016] Just after they are given the file, Piro receives a call on his cell phone from an agent from the FBI’s Boston office. The agent, who is currently at Logan International Airport in Boston, says he has a name from the passenger manifest for Flight 77 that the Phoenix agents should look into: Hani Hanjour. To the agent’s surprise, Piro replies, “I’m holding his file in my hands right now.” Piro and Williams then head back to their office to report their progress. At the office, Piro tells their squad leader, “I’ve identified one of the hijackers.” Incredulous at this news, the squad leader replies, “Get out of here—I don’t have time for jokes today.” [Graff, 2011, pp. 325-326; Washingtonian, 5/5/2011]

Entity Tags: George Piro, Ken Williams, Hani Hanjour, Sawyer School of Aviation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Supreme Court building.The Supreme Court building. [Source: Supreme Court of the United States]The Supreme Court building in Washington, DC, is only evacuated more than half an hour after the attack on the Pentagon, even though it is a potential target for terrorists. At 9:30 a.m., Chief Justice William Rehnquist was convening a meeting of the Judicial Conference at the Supreme Court. [Washington Post, 4/12/2002; Gellman, 2008, pp. 125-126] The Judicial Conference of the United States is the principal policy-making body for the federal court system. It meets twice a year to consider administrative and policy issues affecting the court system. [United States Courts, 9/19/2001] Twenty-six judges from around the country were with Rehnquist for today’s meeting. [Washington Post, 4/12/2002] Rehnquist learned of the first attack on the World Trade Center as the judges were preparing to convene. [Rehnquist, 1/1/2002] Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who had come to attend the meeting, heard something on the radio about an explosion and the WTC while he was being driven to the Supreme Court. When Rehnquist arrived in the conference room, Leahy whispered to him, “Before we start, I believe we have a terrorist attack.”
Judges Heard the Explosion from the Pentagon - Then, at 9:37 a.m., those in the conference room heard a muffled boom, which came from the Pentagon, across the Potomac River from the Supreme Court, when it was attacked (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, no attempt was made to evacuate the building at the time. Instead, agitated security personnel started coming in with notes for Rehnquist. [Time, 9/14/2001; Washington Post, 4/12/2002; O'Harrow, 2005, pp. 12-13] Peter Bowal, a law professor on a fellowship at the Supreme Court, will later recall that while attendees at the conference talked, he “noticed aides entering, handing the chief justice notes, and taking his quickly scratched answers away.” [LawNow, 12/2001 pdf file]
Judges Suggested Having a Short Recess - Rehnquist was apparently soon informed that the boom heard by those in the conference room was due to an attack at the Pentagon. When Representative Howard Coble (R-NC), who had come to address the Judicial Conference, was approaching the podium, Rehnquist handed him a note that read, “The Pentagon has been bombed.” [US Congress. Senate, 9/6/2005] However, even though Supreme Court police officers in the hallway could be heard shouting, “There’s a plane in the air now and it’s heading for us!” the meeting continued. A few judges only suggested, “Should we have a short recess?” [LawNow, 12/2001 pdf file]
Judges Are Escorted out of the Building - Rehnquist finally announces that the Judicial Conference session is being suspended and the Supreme Court building is going to be evacuated at 10:15 a.m., more than half an hour after the attack on the Pentagon occurred. [United States Courts, 9/19/2001; Washington Post, 4/12/2002] This is the first time a Judicial Conference meeting has been canceled since the conference was created, in 1922. [Rehnquist, 1/1/2002] Rehnquist is quickly escorted away to a secure location. The other judges at the meeting are then instructed to leave the building by members of the Supreme Court police, who usher them out the side entrance. Once outside, however, they are left to fend for themselves, wandering the sidewalks of Capitol Hill. Some of them walk back to their hotels. [LawNow, 12/2001 pdf file; Washington Post, 4/12/2002]
Court Is a Potential Terrorist Target - The failure to evacuate the Supreme Court until long after the attacks on the US began is notable because the court is one of a number of key government buildings in Washington that are potential targets for terrorists, who could have planned to crash a plane into it. Journalist and author Barton Gellman will point out that it is “big and distinctive enough to pick out from the air on a clear, sunny day.” [Gellman, 2008, pp. 125-126] One federal judge will suggest what could have happened to those attending the Judicial Conference meeting if Flight 93, which was heading toward Washington before it went down in rural Pennsylvania (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), crashed in the capital. “If the plane had come, we’d have all been blown up and someone would pick up the pieces later on,” he will comment.
Court's 'Continuity Plan' Is Not Activated - The failure to evacuate the Supreme Court until 10:15 a.m. is also notable because the court has a “continuity plan” for dealing with emergencies. The plan, however, is apparently not activated in response to today’s attacks. “September 11 was not a continuity plan,” Supreme Court spokeswoman Kathy Arberg will comment, adding, “That was more of an emergency evacuation.” [Washington Post, 4/12/2002] Other key government buildings in Washington, such as the Justice Department and the State Department, are also only evacuated after 9:45 a.m. (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US News and World Report, 9/14/2001; US Department of State, 8/15/2002]

Entity Tags: Howard Coble, Patrick J. Leahy, Kathy Arberg, Peter Bowal, William Rehnquist

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Brigadier General Montague Winfield finally returns to his post as the deputy director for operations (DDO) in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, after leaving a colleague, who only recently qualified to take over the position, to stand in for him throughout the terrorist attacks. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] At 8:30 a.m. Winfield left his post to attend a pre-scheduled meeting that was unrelated to the morning’s attacks and had been convened by the Air Force. Since that time, Captain Charles Leidig has replaced him as the DDO (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). Leidig, the deputy for Command Center operations, only qualified to stand in as the DDO in the NMCC about a month ago. Even though officers in the NMCC realized the US was under terrorist attack when the second plane hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m., Winfield did not return to his post at that time (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 pdf file]
Winfield Returns to His Post, but Timing Unclear - Now Winfield finally relieves Leidig and resumes his duties as DDO. This happens after Flight 93 has crashed in Pennsylvania (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), although the exact time is unclear. In a private interview with the 9/11 Commission, Leidig will say he is “certain that Winfield returned [from the meeting] after the Pentagon was hit” at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), but he “is not certain of Winfield’s arrival in relationship with the vice chairman” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 pdf file] (According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Myers arrived at the NMCC shortly before 10:00 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] ) Winfield then takes over as DDO “at some point in relation to the report of the Pennsylvania crash,” according to Leidig. As the 9/11 Commission will point out, since the crash of Flight 93 happened around 10:03 a.m., “any reporting would be after that time.” [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 pdf file] During a public hearing of the 9/11 Commission, Leidig will similarly say that Winfield takes over from him “[r]ight after we resolved what was going on with United 93.” He will also say that a report over the NMCC’s air threat conference at 10:37 a.m., about an anonymous threat against Air Force One (see (10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), occurs “right after I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] This would indicate that Winfield takes over from Leidig at around 10:30 a.m.
Unclear If Winfield Returns to Post Immediately after Meeting - It is also unclear whether Winfield returns to his position as DDO immediately after leaving the Air Force-convened meeting, or he allowed Leidig to continue in his place even while he was available to resume his duties. A 9/11 Commission memorandum will state, “Winfield transitioned into the position [of DDO] upon his return to the NMCC,” following the meeting. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 pdf file] Leidig will recall that he “looked up at one point and General Winfield was standing next to him.” He will also recall that Myers “looked at him at one time and realized the coordinator [i.e. the DDO] was not a general as the position called for, and asked who the general or admiral was that had duty that day.” The guidance that was subsequently given was “to get General Winfield briefed up and in the chair.”
Leidig Listens to Conference before Returning to Post - After Winfield returns to his position as DDO, Leidig initially “stands next to him and listens to the [NMCC’s air threat] conference.” Leidig will then transition into his regular job, which involves making sure the NMCC operates properly, and start dealing with the smoke coming into the center and other issues effecting operations there. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Montague Winfield, National Military Command Center, Charles Leidig

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room.The Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room. [Source: Federation of American Scientists]Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several more senior officials at the Pentagon participate in a secure video teleconference with other government agencies in which the rules of engagement for fighter jets responding to the terrorist attacks are discussed. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers has been in the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and Rumsfeld has been with him there since around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, announced earlier on that a secure video teleconference with the White House was going to take place at 11:00 a.m. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 pdf file] Rumsfeld, Myers, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, now leave the DDO’s office to participate in this. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] The teleconference takes place in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room, which is more commonly known as “the tank.” [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 pdf file] This is the “NMCC facility for secure teleconferences” and is “a tiny room with a thick, airtight door” that is “severely cramped,” according to Myers. Klimow will later describe it as “a small soundproof room just big enough for six or seven people.” Along with Myers, Rumsfeld, and Klimow, other officials in the room for the teleconference include Giambastiani; Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld’s closest aide; William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense; and Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz participates in the teleconference after arriving at the alternate military command center inside Raven Rock Mountain on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and can be seen by his colleagues at the Pentagon in a small box in the top right corner of their screen. The identities of the other participants will be unstated. The purpose of the teleconference is to link the Department of Defense’s civilian and military leadership with the rest of the government, and the main issue discussed is the rules of engagement for NORAD to follow should more hijackings occur, according to Myers. Further details of what the participants talk about will be unstated. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] It is unclear how long the teleconference lasts. Joseph Wassel, assistant to the secretary of defense for communications, who waits outside the room while it is taking place, will recall only that it “went on for quite a while.” [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 pdf file] As the teleconference progresses, its participants in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room will start feeling sick due to the deteriorating air quality. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Edmund Giambastiani, Joseph M. Wassel, William J. Haynes, Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen A. Cambone, Richard B. Myers, White House, Matthew S. Klimow, Victoria (“Torie”) Clarke

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Steve Wragg.Steve Wragg. [Source: Steve Wragg]Investigators at Washington’s Dulles International Airport sternly refuse to let Steve Wragg, a manager, get involved with interviews of his employees, even just to help as a translator for workers with limited English-speaking skills. [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 128-129] Flight 77 took off from Dulles Airport at 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 8, 10] Wragg works as the district manager in charge of the airport for Argenbright Security, which handles the passenger security checkpoints, baggage, and other services there for American Airlines and United Airlines. [Atlanta Business Chronicle, 10/12/2001; Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 125] Having just returned from a trip to Boston, he was away from work when the crashes at the World Trade Center took place. [Brighton Argus, 9/26/2001] But after learning of the attacks, he headed to Dulles Airport to check on Ed Nelson, a security manager who works for him, and the airport’s screeners. He arrived at around 11:00 a.m. and found the place in chaos, filled with people dressed in suits who were wearing earpieces and carrying guns. He found Nelson and the two men headed to the airport’s security checkpoints where they saw personnel standing around, being interviewed by men in suits with clipboards.
Manager Is Told that the Investigation Is None of His Business - Wragg now heads to his office, where screeners are being questioned by investigators, and sees people who belong to numerous agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, airport police, the Department of Transportation, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. However, he is unable to find anyone who can tell him who is in charge, what is going on, or who he is meant to talk to. Instead, an agent orders him to get out. “Anybody I spoke to said, ‘We need you to stay out of this, we’re taking over, this is none of your business right now,’” he will later recall.
Manager's Offer of Help with Translation Is Rejected - Wragg calls Argenbright Security’s headquarters, and is told to “secure the records” and “make sure no one touches anything.” He explains to his bosses what the situation is like at the airport and asks what they want him to do. He is instructed to try and get involved if investigators are speaking to Argenbright employees. He then attempts to do this but the investigators refuse to let him participate. “You’re not going to be a part of this,” they tell him. Wragg thinks the investigators will need him to help translate, since many of his company’s employees are immigrants with limited English-speaking skills. Some of them are saying yes to investigators when they don’t know the answer to a question, just to pacify their interrogators, and some of the investigators are getting frustrated at the situation. Wragg wants to assist. “I’m not here for any other reason but to help,” he tells the investigators, but they still order him to “get out.” [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 128-129]

Entity Tags: Argenbright Security, Central Intelligence Agency, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ed Nelson, Steve Wragg, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Transportation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

American Airlines issues a statement confirming that it has lost two of its aircraft in “tragic incidents this morning.” The statement identifies the aircraft as “Flight 11, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles,” and “Flight 77, a Boeing 757 operating from Washington Dulles to Los Angeles.” The statement adds, “Because of the heightened security due to the nature of today’s events, American said it is working closely with US government authorities and will not release more information at this time.” [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: American Airlines

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asks officers at the Pentagon what else they think the terrorists might do and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggests they could conduct an attack using weapons of mass destruction. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 302] Myers has been in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and Rumsfeld has been there since around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38, 43-44] Since 11:00 a.m., the two men were with other senior officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room within the NMCC, participating in a teleconference with other government agencies (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 pdf file; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155] That meeting has now been adjourned and they start making their way back to the deputy director for operations’ office within the NMCC along with Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant. Suddenly Rumsfeld stops Myers and Klimow in their tracks. Then, in a command voice, he calls out to the dozen or so officers in the room: “What haven’t we thought of yet? What else can the enemy do?” He “was thinking ahead, engaging in [his] well-known outside-the-box speculation,” Myers will later comment. “He was always challenging his staff to think out of the box,” Klimow will say. Immediately, Myers replies, “NBC,” meaning a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. Apparently as a result of this interaction, Myers orders that special response units be positioned outside Washington, DC, and New York, presumably in case a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack should occur in one of these cities. It is unclear exactly when the interaction occurs. However, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will place it before midday, when Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirms to him and his colleagues in the NMCC that today’s attacks have undoubtedly been committed by al-Qaeda (see 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001). Klimow will explain why he considers Rumsfeld’s question about what else the terrorists might do to have been “significant in terms of lessons learned.” Rumsfeld was simply saying words to the effect of: “Wake up! Wake up! What else can happen?” But, Klimow will comment, “Somebody needed to do it and they needed to do it right at that moment.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 302]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Donald Rumsfeld, Matthew S. Klimow

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Officers in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon are concerned about the air quality in the center and an air quality expert subsequently informs them that the oxygen level there is dangerously low. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 277-278] From around 11:00 a.m., a small number of Pentagon officials, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room within the NMCC, participating in a secure video teleconference with other government agencies (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 pdf file; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155]
Officials Start Feeling Unwell - During this teleconference, Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, starts feeling sick and becomes unable to concentrate. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 277] Others in the room also feel unwell. “Our eyes became red and our throats itchy,” Rumsfeld will later recall. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340] Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, is concerned about the conditions in the small conference room. “It started to get really hot and the air got bad,” he will describe. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8/1/2002 pdf file; Graff, 2019, pp. 277-278] Realizing what the problem is, he shakes Klimow and then tells him what is wrong. “I’m a submariner; I know what’s going on,” he says and then explains: “There’s no oxygen in this room. It’s filling up with carbon dioxide.”
Officers Consider Moving to Another Area - “Let’s get everybody out of here,” he says. He suggests they all go to the Navy Command Center. Although Klimow is unaware that the Navy Command Center was destroyed when the Pentagon was hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), he rejects the proposal. “I’ve been trying to get hold of the [Navy Command Center]; I can’t raise him,” he says. He suggests they go to the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon basement instead. Giambastiani says he will do a reconnaissance to the Army Operations Center, and advises Klimow to “go find an air monitor and see how bad it is in here.” Klimow therefore calls Captain Chris Donahue, Myers’s military aide, and instructs him to find an air monitor.
Air Quality Expert Warns of Low Oxygen - Giambastiani subsequently returns from his reconnaissance, shaking his head. He tells Klimow they will be unable to go to the Army Operations Center since the passageways in the outer areas of the Pentagon are impassible due to thick smoke. Donahue then comes in with the Arlington County Fire Department’s air quality specialist. The air quality specialist has taken readings and explains to Klimow that he and the others in the conference room are in a precarious situation. “In some of the corridors in the Pentagon, the air is filled with about 88 percent carbon dioxide—that’s lethal,” he says. “In the outer office here in the NMCC you’re at 33 percent oxygen,” he continues. He says that in the conference room, “you’re at 16 percent oxygen.” If the oxygen level gets down to 13 percent, he says, “you cannot survive.” Therefore, he concludes, “You need to leave.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 278] Fortunately, Giambastiani subsequently finds a smoke-free area for the group in the conference room to relocate to: the Executive Support Center (ESC) on the third floor of the Pentagon. Rumsfeld, Myers, and their entourage will therefore move to the ESC (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8/1/2002 pdf file; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157]
Air Handling Units Have Been Shut Down - The lack of oxygen in the NMCC is apparently the result of a misunderstanding. According to Klimow, the “incident commander”—presumably meaning Assistant Chief James Schwartz of the Arlington County Fire Department—was incorrectly told that the entire Pentagon had been evacuated and, “with the fires raging out of control,” shut down the building’s air handling units. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Rumsfeld, though, will suggest a different explanation. “The air-conditioning [in the Pentagon] was supposed to have been disabled to avoid circulating the hazardous smoke, but apparently it took some time for it to be shut down,” he will write. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340]

Entity Tags: Chris Donahue, Arlington County Fire Department, Edmund Giambastiani, Donald Rumsfeld, National Military Command Center, Richard B. Myers, Matthew S. Klimow

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

The Executive Support Center.The Executive Support Center. [Source: US Department of Defense]Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several other senior Pentagon officials move from the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to the Executive Support Center (ESC) due to the poor air quality in the NMCC. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157] Since around 11:00 a.m., Rumsfeld, Myers, and a small number of their colleagues had been in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room within the NMCC, participating in a secure video teleconference (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 pdf file; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155] As the teleconference progressed, they started feeling unwell, and an air quality specialist with the Arlington County Fire Department subsequently came and told them that the oxygen level in the conference room was dangerously low (see (After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 277-278] Fortunately, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, who had been participating in the teleconference, found that the ESC was smoke-free. Those in the conference room consequently relocate there. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157] The ESC, on the third floor of the Pentagon, is a secure communications hub with a video teleconference facility. [Vogel, 2007, pp. 440] It also has its own air-conditioning system. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8/1/2002 pdf file] Once he has settled there, Myers passes on Rumsfeld’s authorization for a partial Reserve call-up. Those activated include fighter pilots, air tanker crews, and communications specialists. “With the country suddenly at war, we would need all the help we could muster, and much of that help was in the Reserve and National Guard,” Myers will later comment. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Executive Support Center, Edmund Giambastiani, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Steven Bucci.Steven Bucci. [Source: Zeno Gamble / US Department of Defense]Army Captain Lincoln Leibner, who witnessed the attack on the Pentagon, speaks to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his entourage, and is the first person to confirm to them that the building was hit by an American Airlines plane. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 5; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 61-62; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 62] Leibner works in the Executive Support Center (ESC)—a secure communications hub on the third floor of the Pentagon. He was scheduled to come into work at 10:00 p.m. this evening for a night shift and was therefore at home when the crashes at the World Trade Center took place. But after seeing the second crash live on television, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), he called the ESC and said he was going to come in right away to help out, since “any crisis or any development requiring the attention of the secretary [of defense] causes our activity to go up most dramatically,” he will later comment. When he got to the Pentagon, he found his usual parking space was taken and so he had to park in lane one of the south parking lot, which is the lane furthest from the building. After leaving his car, he started jogging toward the building.
Witness Saw 'the Entire Terminal Descent' of Flight 77 - While he was approaching one of the entrances, he witnessed Flight 77 crashing into the building, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). He initially heard the very loud sound of jet engines. He turned his head toward where the noise was coming from, expecting to see a fighter jet there, but instead saw a passenger aircraft descending toward the Pentagon. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 3] “I saw the jetliner clear the ridge right by the Navy Annex, coming down Columbia Pike,” he will describe. [Lofgren, 2011, pp. 56] “I watched the entire terminal descent,” he will recall. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 3] The plane was so close to him that he noticed the American Airlines markings on it. “I could see actually through the windows of the airplane as it came past; it was that close,” he will say. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 57] He saw the last three or four seconds of the plane’s flight and then watched “the entire airplane go into the building.”
Witness Was Probably the First Person to Reach the Crash Site - He was about 100 yards from the point of impact and immediately ran toward the building. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 3] “I was probably the first person on the scene,” he will comment. [US Medicine, 5/2002] He was able to enter the building through a door that had been blown off its hinges. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 61] He then went in and out several times, helping rescue people from there. [US Medicine, 5/2002] Firefighters told people to get away from the building just before the wall that was impacted collapsed (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, even though he had only minor injuries, he was put in an ambulance and taken to the Virginia Hospital Center in Arlington. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 4-5; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 61] He was able to return to the Pentagon early in the afternoon. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 62]
Witness Was Advised to Talk to Rumsfeld - Once there, he went to the ESC, where he told his immediate supervisor what he had experienced. He then talked to Colonel Steven Bucci, military assistant to the secretary of defense, and Bucci recommended that he talk to Rumsfeld. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 5] Rumsfeld moved to the ESC earlier this afternoon after smoke from the crash site started seeping into the National Military Command Center, where he had been located (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340-341]
Rumsfeld Seems to Doubt the Witness's Account - Leibner goes into the conference room where Rumsfeld and a few of his colleagues, including General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are sitting, and describes to them what he saw when the Pentagon was attacked. “I told them the plane came in full throttle, level, flaps up, wheels up; wasn’t crashed into the building, was flown into the building,” he will recall. He says the aircraft he saw was an American Airlines plane. This is “the first personal account” that Rumsfeld has heard of the attack, Leibner will comment. The secretary of defense, however, appears incredulous. “Even at this point, I don’t believe the secretary was confident that, in fact, a civilian airliner had hit the building,” Leibner will say, adding, “I think they still speculated about a bomb, a cruise missile, a small aircraft.” Rumsfeld asks Leibner if he is positive about what hit the Pentagon. “Was I sure? Was I certain?” Leibner will recall being asked. However, “I was close enough to look into the windows of the airplane as it flew past,” he will comment, and so there is “no doubt in my mind what I had seen.” [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 5-6; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 62]
Rumsfeld Earlier Determined that an American Airlines Plane Hit the Pentagon - Although Rumsfeld now appears dubious of Leibner’s account of what hit the Pentagon, he in fact determined himself that the building was likely hit by a large plane after examining the crash site this morning. He immediately headed to the site after the Pentagon was hit (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001) and had seen “[h]undreds of pieces of metal… scattered across the grass in front of the building.” He had picked up what he will describe as “a small, twisted piece of metal from whatever had hit the Pentagon.” [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 335-336] He “looked at some inscription on it” and then said aloud, “American Airlines,” according to Officer Aubrey Davis, one of his security guards (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/20/2006 pdf file; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 2] When he returned to the building and went to the ESC, he told the people there, “I’m quite sure it was a plane and I’m pretty sure it’s a large plane” (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WBZ Radio 1030 (Boston), 9/15/2001; Clarke, 2006, pp. 221] After telling Rumsfeld what he witnessed, Leibner is advised to go home, but he decides to stay at the ESC and continues working there for the rest of the day. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 6; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 62-63]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Richard B. Myers, Steven Bucci, Lincoln Leibner

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

The FBI arrives at Washington’s Dulles International Airport and begins its investigation of the hijacking of Flight 77, which departed from the airport this morning. [9/11 Commission, 9/29/2003 pdf file; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 161] Flight 77 took off from Dulles Airport at 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 8, 10] The FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) was reportedly notified of the hijacking of Flight 77 at around 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C-45 pdf file] Dulles Airport has now been locked down, preventing people from entering or leaving it, and the terminals have been evacuated (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 11:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 10/16/2003 pdf file; Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 36; Priska Neely, 10/21/2010]
Fifty FBI Agents Arrive at Dulles Airport - The FBI is responsible for investigating the hijacking of Flight 77, and so Special Agent in Charge Arthur Eberhart has sent a team of 50 agents to the airport to look into it and provide additional security to prevent another hijacking. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A-23, C-45 pdf file] However, the agents only arrive there at around 12:40 p.m., according to a 9/11 Commission memorandum. [9/11 Commission, 9/29/2003 pdf file] The first thing they do there is seize the security tape at the main terminal’s west checkpoint, according to Ed Nelson, a security manager at the airport. [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 36] They also interview ticket agents, security personnel, baggage and food handlers, and other personnel, and collect evidence. [US Naval Historical Center, 1/15/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 161] They order the confiscation of the 52 computer hard drives that record all electronic television and security information at the airport. The hard drives contain all of the video recorded by the airport’s surveillance cameras and all records of electronic badges used to gain access to secure areas. [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 34]
Agents Assess the Passengers on Grounded Planes - Airport officials have received no guidance regarding how passengers on planes that have been grounded in response to the terrorist attacks this morning should be processed. But the FBI agents at the airport now take the lead in reviewing the passengers who have deboarded from planes. [9/11 Commission, 9/29/2003 pdf file] The FBI will set up a command post and a substantial operation at Dulles Airport to carry out its investigation of the hijacking of Flight 77. Van Harp, head of the WFO, will assume responsibility for its response at the airport. [US Naval Historical Center, 12/12/2001]

Entity Tags: Ed Nelson, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Federal agents ask managers Steve Wragg and Ed Cox to help identify the screeners who worked at the checkpoint at Washington’s Dulles International Airport that the alleged hijackers of Flight 77 passed through this morning, and suggest these screeners could be guilty of collusion with the hijackers. [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 129] Flight 77 took off from Dulles Airport at 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 8, 10] Wragg works as the district manager in charge of the airport for Argenbright Security, which handles the passenger security checkpoints, baggage, and other services there for American Airlines and United Airlines. [Atlanta Business Chronicle, 10/12/2001; Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 125] Cox is the airport security coordinator at Dulles Airport. [9/11 Commission, 10/16/2003 pdf file] Wragg was away from work when the crashes at the World Trade Center took place but promptly headed to Dulles Airport when he learned of them (see After 11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 128] Cox, meanwhile, was at work in the airport operations office when they occurred. [9/11 Commission, 10/16/2003 pdf file]
Agents Say They Are 'Looking for Collusion' - At some point this afternoon, CIA and FBI agents who have come to the airport to look into the hijacking of Flight 77 ask the two men to help identify the screeners who were working at a security checkpoint at the airport when the hijackers passed through it. The agents apparently believe that some of the screeners may be complicit in this morning’s attacks. “We want you to identify the screeners and quite frankly we’re looking for collusion here,” they say. They show Wragg and Cox video on which the alleged hijackers can be seen passing through the checkpoint (see 7:18 a.m. September 11, 2001, 7:35 a.m. September 11, 2001, and 7:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). (It is unclear whether Wragg and Cox are shown footage of all the hijackers going through the checkpoint or just some of them.)
Agents Seem Desperate to Find Incriminating Evidence - Wragg gets the impression that the federal agents are desperate to find something incriminating on the video. As one of the hijackers is shown walking through a metal detector, an agent asks, “Is he looking at your agent there?” Presumably referring to hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi, an FBI agent asks: “Can you zoom in on that guy’s back pocket? Zoom in. Is that a box cutter? Zoom in on that.” Wragg just laughs at this, which strikes him as “absolutely just a stupid comment.” “You could not identify what it was” in the pocket and the screener “had done everything perfectly,” he will remark. A screener is shown randomly selecting Alhazmi to have his carry-on luggage traced with the explosive detection system. “It was perfect procedure,” Wragg will opine. The fact that the hijacker was chosen for this procedure at random “just shows that we were doing everything we were supposed to,” he will add.
Agents Copy All the Files with Details of the Screeners - The federal agents want details of all the screeners who were working at Dulles Airport this morning and so they go to Argenbright Security’s office at the airport and copy all of the files with information about them. “Anything we had on them was copied, and we copied and copied and copied,” Wragg will recall. He will add that the agents “came back on more than one occasion and asked for the same copies they had already taken earlier.” However, Wragg notices nothing incriminating in the evidence he reviews with the federal agents. He sees no evidence “that any of the hijackers had gone through security at Dulles with any weapon, legal or illegal,” according to investigative journalists Joseph Trento and Susan Trento. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 27; Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 129-130]

Entity Tags: Argenbright Security, Edward T. Cox, Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi, Steve Wragg, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

James L. Jones.James L. Jones. [Source: US Marine Corps]The Navy establishes a new command center at the Navy Annex in Arlington, Virginia, after its original command center was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon. The original Navy Command Center, located on the first floor of the Pentagon, provided Navy leaders with timely information and intelligence about operations around the world. But it was destroyed, and many of its personnel died, when the Pentagon was hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/20/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 133] Reportedly, 70 percent of the Navy’s spaces in the Pentagon were damaged or destroyed in the Pentagon attack. [Navy Times, 10/1/2001]
Navy Invited to Join Marines at Navy Annex - General James Jones, the commandant of the Marine Corps, therefore invited several of his Navy counterparts and their staffs to co-locate with the Marine Corps at the Navy Annex. [Sea Power, 1/2002] The Navy Annex is a huge building located a few hundred yards uphill from the Pentagon. It has enough room for 6,000 employees. Currently, about 100 Navy personnel work in it, and most of the space is used by the Marine Corps. [American Forces Press Service, 9/24/2001; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 14; GlobalSecurity (.org), 5/7/2011] It is the location of the Marine Corps Command Center. [Sea Power, 1/2002] Admiral William Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations, has consequently made arrangements for the Navy’s leadership and support personnel to move to the Navy Annex. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 133]
Building Manager Unhappy about Moving People to Navy Annex - At around 3:00 p.m., Coneleous Alexander, a building manager at the Navy Annex, learns from one of the Marine Corps administrative managers of the plan to relocate the Navy Command Center to his building. The new command center will be set up in an area on the fourth floor that, Alexander will later say, “had been demolished for use by the build out for ballistic missiles.” [Naval Historical Center, 12/21/2001] It is unclear from Alexander’s account whether he means that missiles are being stored at the Navy Annex, or is referring to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, which has been housed at the Navy Annex since February this year. [US Department of Defense, 11/30/2001; US Air Force Academy, 5/2/2002] Alexander is unsure whether it is a good idea to move personnel to the Navy Annex. One reason for his uncertainty, he will say, is “the ballistic missiles” being there. He thinks a better choice would be to move people to Henderson Hall, the Marine Corps headquarters, which is located next to the Navy Annex.
Only Mission-Essential Personnel Allowed into Building - All the same, Marines start moving equipment into the Navy Annex, and maintenance crews set up portable air conditioners and exhaust fans for the Navy’s new command center there. It is decided that, due to the fear of another attack, only mission-essential personnel may enter the building. [Naval Historical Center, 12/21/2001; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 133] While some Navy staffs will be able to promptly return to their spaces at the Pentagon, others have to temporarily move to offices at locations that, as well as the Navy Annex, include the Washington Navy Yard and Northern Virginia’s Crystal City office complex. [Navy Times, 10/1/2001]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy, Coneleous Alexander, US Department of the Marines

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Pentagon crash site.The Pentagon crash site. [Source: US Department of Defense]Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visit the site of the Pentagon attack. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Since 12:19 p.m., the two men have been in the Executive Support Center, on the third floor of the Pentagon (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157] Rumsfeld visited the crash site this morning, immediately after the Pentagon was attacked (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 1-3; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130] But this is the first time Myers has been there. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, accompanies them. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Notices Plane Parts - When they arrive at the crash site, the men inspect it. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158] Klimow will later describe what he sees. “The first thing I saw was a huge debris field—bits and pieces of Flight 77”—the plane that hit the Pentagon (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001)—“scattered on the ground, glittering in the sun like confetti,” he will say. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will recall that some of the heavier parts of the airliner—the landing gear and the engines—are recognizable. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] Klimow also notices the “huge V-shaped gash in the building” and “smoke still billowing up.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] “The walls and roof on a wide section of this western Pentagon sector had collapsed into a heap of still-smoldering rubble,” Myers will describe. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158] However, he will comment, he is “impressed that more of the building hadn’t collapsed.” [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] Myers also notices the many workers, including firefighters, medical personnel, and police officers, who are trying to help in any way they can. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]
Rumsfeld and Myers Talk to Rumsfeld's Flight Surgeon - While Rumsfeld and Myers are at the crash site, Colonel John Baxter comes over and talks to them. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Baxter is the commander of the Pentagon’s Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic and also Rumsfeld’s flight surgeon, who accompanies the secretary of defense on trips. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 58; Condon-Rall, 2011, pp. 15] He describes to Rumsfeld, Myers, and Klimow the triage and treatment of patients he has conducted. It is unclear when Rumsfeld and Myers visit the crash site. They go there at 4:00 p.m., according to Klimow. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] But Myers will recall that they go there “[j]ust before 5:00 p.m.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158] Rumsfeld will visit the site again later this afternoon with a larger group (see (Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2006, pp. 228]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Matthew S. Klimow, John Baxter, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Sergei Ivanov.Sergei Ivanov. [Source: Russian government]Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld calls Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and requests that the Russians call off an exercise their military has been conducting. Since 12:19 p.m., Rumsfeld has been based in the Executive Support Center, on the third floor of the Pentagon (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131-132] He calls Ivanov, who is in Moscow, sometime after the meeting of the National Security Council convened by President Bush from Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska—which he participated in—ends (see (3:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001). Ivanov “sounded sad” as the two men discuss the casualties of today’s terrorist attacks, Rumsfeld will later recall. Rumsfeld requests that the Russian military stand down an exercise near Alaska. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 343-344] The Russian Air Force began this major exercise over the North Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans yesterday and it was scheduled to last all week (see September 10, 2001). [BBC, 2001, pp. 161; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/9/2001; Washington Times, 9/11/2001] “[O]ur forces were understandably sensitive now about any intrusions into American airspace,” Rumsfeld will comment, and, he will add, “I didn’t want problems to arise inadvertently between our two countries.” [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 344] Ivanov says the Russian military is immediately canceling the exercise. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 160] The exercise was in fact canceled this morning, according to some accounts (see (After 10:03 a.m.) September11, 2001), and Russian President Vladimir Putin promptly informed the US government of this when he spoke to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice over the phone (see Between 10:32 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/27/2002; Baker and Glasser, 2005, pp. 122; Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, 9/8/2011] Ivanov also promises “solidarity” and Russian cooperation with the US during the call with Rumsfeld, and recommends a G-8 summit on terrorism. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 160; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 344]

Entity Tags: Russian Air Force, Donald Rumsfeld, Sergei Ivanov

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announces that, despite the unprecedented attack there this morning, September 12 will be a normal day at the Pentagon and he wants all employees to report for work. [Vogel, 2007, pp. 455; Graff, 2019, pp. 362] Rumsfeld has, since 12:19 p.m., been based in the Executive Support Center, on the third floor of the Pentagon (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132] Earlier in the afternoon, he went outside to inspect the crash site and saw the extent of the damage there (see (Between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] He saw that while the west wall is breached and on fire, the building’s other four sides are undamaged and at least 60 percent of the building is unaffected by the attack. [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 247-248]
Rumsfeld Has Not Consulted the Incident Commander - He now tells those around him: “I want the chain of command to notify everybody that tomorrow, 12 September, is a normal workday at the Pentagon. I want everybody here reporting for work.” This is “a pretty startling announcement,” Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later comment. [Graff, 2019, pp. 362] Rumsfeld did not consult Assistant Chief James Schwartz of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD), who is the incident commander at the Pentagon, or building supervisors before making the decision to reopen the Pentagon. [Vogel, 2007, pp. 455] “I hadn’t talked to anybody when I said that [the Pentagon should open the next day],” he will recall. His decision was based on his impression “that the smoke and problems had declined, and that there were undoubtedly significant portions of the building that could be occupied safely,” he will say. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 12/23/2002 pdf file] “Having it open for business the next day seemed to me to be important,” he will comment.
Firefighters Will Be Alarmed at Rumsfeld's Decision - Rumsfeld’s announcement, however, will cause concern among senior fire officials. Schwartz will be “astonished at the news,” according to journalist and author Steve Vogel, since firefighters are “battling a big and dangerous fire, an unknown number of dead [are] in the rubble, and there [is] danger of further collapse.” [Vogel, 2007, pp. 455] Chief Edward Plaugher of the ACFD will also be concerned, for a number of reasons. Pamela Varley, a senior case writer at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, will describe these, writing: “From a fire safety perspective, it was not considered wise to have the utilities turned back on in parts of the building while the roof was on fire and a large volume of water was being sprayed there. In addition, the crash and fire were emitting potentially dangerous toxins into the building’s air supply. Finally, to have thousands of workers coming and going from the Pentagon complicated the task of controlling and securing the site, and threatened to impede the emergency response.” [Varley, 2009, pp. 256] FBI representatives, meanwhile, will be concerned because the Pentagon is a crime scene. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 144] And Steve Carter, the assistant building manager, will be “flabbergasted,” according to Vogel, although he will understand the rationale behind Rumsfeld’s decision, since the Pentagon has never closed its doors in its history. [Vogel, 2007, pp. 455]
Special Measures Will Be Arranged So the Pentagon Can Reopen - Rumsfeld’s decision will place additional burdens on the ACFD response force and the FBI’s evidence recovery team. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A65 pdf file] Plaugher and John Jester, chief of the Defense Protective Service—the law enforcement agency that guards the Pentagon—will begin an informal negotiation over what will be necessary for large numbers of people to return to the Pentagon. Plaugher will insist that plywood barriers be erected to cordon off the whole area between Corridors 3 and 6. He will also want armed guards with the authority to turn back even the most senior officers placed at every juncture, to prevent military personnel returning to their wrecked offices. And, in light of the smoke and fumes from the fires, he will want plans in place to evacuate the building at a moment’s notice, if necessary. [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 248-249] Due to FBI concerns, yellow crime scene tape and guards will signify that sections of the building between Corridors 2 and 7 are off limits, and wooden wall barriers will later be built to further restrict access to the crash site. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 144] Rumsfeld will publicly announce his decision to reopen the Pentagon on September 12 during a news briefing at 6:42 p.m. (see 6:42 p.m. September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001; Government Executive, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Arlington County Fire Department, Edward Plaugher, Steve Carter, Donald Rumsfeld, Matthew S. Klimow, James Schwartz, Pentagon, John Jester

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Carl Levin.Carl Levin. [Source: Publicity photo]Air Force General Richard Myers is questioned about the US military’s response to the 9/11 attacks when he appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee for his confirmation hearing as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but his answers are vague and confused, and he claims, incorrectly, that no fighter jets were scrambled in response to the hijackings until after the Pentagon was hit. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 119; Farmer, 2009, pp. 241-243] Myers has been the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since March 2000. [US Air Force, 9/2005] With General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, flying toward Europe on the morning of September 11 (see (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he served as the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 9/11 attacks. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 10; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 431-433]
Myers Says Fighters Were Only Scrambled after the Pentagon Attack - During the hearing, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) asks if the Department of Defense was contacted by “the FAA or the FBI or any other agency” after the first two hijacked aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center, at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), but before 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Myers replies, “I don’t know the answer to that question.” Levin then asks if the military was “asked to take action against any specific aircraft” during the attacks. Myers answers, “When it became clear what the threat was, we did scramble fighter aircraft, AWACS, radar aircraft, and tanker aircraft to begin to establish orbits in case other aircraft showed up in the FAA system that were hijacked.” Myers elaborates later in the hearing, telling Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): “[A]fter the second tower was hit, I spoke to the commander of NORAD, General [Ralph] Eberhart (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). And at that point, I think the decision was at that point to start launching aircraft.” But he tells Levin that “to the best of my knowledge,” the order to scramble fighters was only given “after the Pentagon was struck.”
Flight 93 Was Not Shot Down, Myers Says - Myers addresses the military’s response to Flight 93, the fourth hijacked plane, which crashed in a field in Pennsylvania (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He says: “[I]f my memory serves me… we had launched on the one that eventually crashed in Pennsylvania. I mean, we had gotten somebody close to it, as I recall.” However, he adds, “I’ll have to check that out.” When Levin mentions that there have been “statements that the aircraft that crashed in Pennsylvania was shot down,” Myers responds, “[T]he armed forces did not shoot down any aircraft.” He says, “[W]e never actually had to use force.” Although Myers appears unclear about when the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) launched fighters in response to the hijackings, he is more confident when he states: “At the time of the first impact on the World Trade Center, we stood up our Crisis Action Team. That was done immediately. So we stood it up. And we started talking to the federal agencies.” [US Congress, 9/13/2001]
NORAD and the 9/11 Commission Contradict Myers's Account - Myers’s claim that fighters were only launched in response to the hijackings after the Pentagon was hit will later be contradicted by the accounts of NORAD and the 9/11 Commission, which state that fighters were ordered to take off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20, 27] The 9/11 Commission will also contradict Myers’s claim that the military launched fighters in response to Flight 93 and “had gotten somebody close to it.” “By the time the military learned about the flight,” the 9/11 Commission Report will state, “it had crashed.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 34]
Myers's Testimony Prompts Criticism in the Media - Journalist and author Philip Shenon will question why Myers, a veteran Air Force fighter pilot, would give such an inaccurate account of the military’s response to the 9/11 attacks during the hearing. “It seemed obvious that Myers, of all people at the Pentagon, would want to know—would demand to know—how jet fighters under NORAD’s control had responded on the morning of September 11 to the threat in the skies,” he will write. [US Congress, 9/13/2001; Shenon, 2008, pp. 119] John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will comment that “Myers’s evident confusion about precisely what had occurred prompted criticism in the media and a quick, if contradictory, response from the administration.” [Farmer, 2009, pp. 243] Major General Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, will provide a more detailed account of the military’s response to the hijackings in an “impromptu hallway interview” at the Pentagon on September 14 (see September 14, 2001). [Dallas Morning News, 9/14/2001] And four days later, NORAD will release a timeline of its response to the hijackings (see September 18, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, Clarence W. (“Bill”) Nelson

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Major General Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, provides reporters with details of the 9/11 attacks and the US military’s response to the hijackings. Speaking at the Pentagon, Weaver gives reporters a detailed account of what happened on September 11. He says Air National Guard planes responded to the hijackings on orders from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), which was alerted to the hijackings by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Fighters Took Off Too Late to Catch Flight 175 - Weaver says that at 8:53 a.m., seven minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), two F-15 fighter jets took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, in pursuit of Flight 175, the second plane to be hijacked (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, Weaver says, the FAA had only told NEADS that “there was an airplane that had a problem,” and at that time it was unclear if Flight 175 had been hijacked. He says that although the fighters flew at over 500 miles per hour, they were unable to catch up with Flight 175 before it hit the South Tower of the WTC at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).
More Fighters Were Launched Just before Pentagon Was Hit - Weaver says Flight 77, the third aircraft to be hijacked, flew west for 45 minutes and then turned east, and its transponder was turned off. He does not claim that the military received notice that it had been hijacked, but says NEADS scrambled F-16 fighters that were on alert at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia at 9:35 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Two minutes later, at 9:37 a.m., the Pentagon was hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). The F-16s, he says, subsequently remained on patrol over the Pentagon.
No Fighters Took Off to Intercept Flight 93 - Weaver says no fighters were scrambled to chase after Flight 93, the fourth hijacked plane, which crashed in a field in Pennsylvania (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “There was no notification for us to launch airplanes,” he tells the reporters. “We weren’t even close.” [Dallas Morning News, 9/14/2001; Farmer, 2009, pp. 244] (However, also on this day, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz contradicts Weaver’s claim. He tells PBS’s NewsHour, “[W]e were already tracking in on that plane that crashed in Pennsylvania,” and adds, “[T]he Air Force was in a position to do so [i.e. shoot Flight 93 down] if we had had to.” [NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 9/14/2001; Farmer, 2009, pp. 245] ) Weaver says that even if fighters had caught up with the hijacked planes, they may have been unable to stop them reaching their targets. “You’re not going to get an American pilot shooting down an American airliner,” he says. “We don’t have permission to do that.” According to Weaver, only the president can issue an order to shoot down an American airliner. [Dallas Morning News, 9/14/2001]
Weaver's Account Is the 'Most Accurate' Prior to the 9/11 Commission's Investigation - The account he gives to reporters today, according to John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will be “the last public statement uttered by General Weaver on the subject and proved to be the most accurate account of events issued until the 9/11 Commission’s investigation.” [Farmer, 2009, pp. 245] Apparently after Weaver issues his statement to the reporters, an Air Force spokesman, speaking on condition of anonymity, adds that no regular Air Force planes were scrambled during the 9/11 attacks, “because continental air defense is the mission of the Air National Guard.” He says regular Air Force fighters “have air superiority as their mission,” which means they train “to deploy somewhere where we are engaged in hostile action and secure the skies.” These fighters, according to the spokesman, “ordinarily are not ready to fly on short notice and their pilots are not on standby to defend the United States.” [Dallas Morning News, 9/14/2001]
Pentagon Has Been Slow to Answer Questions about Response to Hijackings - The Washington Post will comment, “Questions about the time it took US military planes to respond to the threat of several hijacked aircraft speeding toward the nation’s financial and military centers have dogged the Pentagon since the attacks.” It will add, “Top Pentagon officials have been slow to respond to press inquiries for a timeline that would establish the exact times that civil aviation authorities became aware of the hijackings, when US military commanders were notified, and when US fighter jets took to the air.” [Washington Post, 9/15/2001] The previous day, Air Force General Richard Myers was questioned about the military’s response to the attacks before the Senate Armed Services Committee, but his answers were vague and confused (see September 13, 2001). [US Congress, 9/13/2001; Farmer, 2009, pp. 241-242] NORAD will release its own timeline of the events of September 11 and its response to the hijackings on September 18 (see September 18, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Air Force, Paul Wolfowitz, Paul Weaver

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) releases a chronology of the events of September 11 and its response to the terrorist attacks that day, but the accuracy of this account will later be challenged by the 9/11 Commission. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 34; 9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004]
NORAD Learned of First Hijackings Too Late to Defend the WTC - The chronology provides the times at which NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) was alerted to the hijackings and when fighter jets were scrambled in response to the hijackings. It states that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) notified NEADS about Flight 11, the first hijacked aircraft, at 8:40 a.m. In response, the order was given to scramble two F-15 fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), the same time that Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and the fighters were airborne at 8:52 a.m. (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). The FAA notified NEADS about Flight 175, the second hijacked aircraft, at 8:43 a.m., according to the chronology. When Flight 175 crashed into the WTC at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), the chronology states, the Otis fighters were 71 miles away from New York.
Fighters Were Scrambled in Response to Flight 77 Hijacking - NEADS was alerted to Flight 77, the third hijacked aircraft, at 9:24 a.m., according to the chronology. In response, the order was given to scramble two F-16 fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) and these were airborne at 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But the F-16s were 105 miles from the Pentagon when it was hit at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Regarding the fourth hijacked aircraft, Flight 93, the chronology gives “N/A” as the time the FAA alerted NEADS, but it also states that the FAA and NEADS discussed the flight on “a line of open communication.” At 10:03 a.m., when Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the chronology states, the F-16s launched from Langley Air Force Base in response to the hijacking of Flight 77 were “in place to protect DC.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001]
9/11 Commission Disputes NORAD's Account - The 9/11 Commission Report, released in 2004, will highlight what it says are inaccuracies in NORAD’s timeline of the events of September 11. It will state that NORAD’s claim that NEADS was alerted to Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. was incorrect. The notice NEADS received at that time, according to the report, was the incorrect claim that Flight 11 “had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, DC” (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). “NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked,” the report will state. “It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was six miles southwest of the White House” (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). The report will state that NORAD’s claim that the Langley fighters were scrambled in response to the notification about Flight 77 is also incorrect. Instead, it will state, the fighters were scrambled in response to the incorrect report that Flight 11 was still airborne and heading south. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 34]
9/11 Commission Disputes NORAD's Account regarding Flights 175 and 93 - Furthermore, whereas NORAD’s chronology claims that NEADS discussed Flight 93 with the FAA on “a line of open communication,” the 9/11 Commission Report will state that NEADS “first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at [the FAA’s] Cleveland Center at 10:07,” by which time the plane “had already crashed” (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30] And while NORAD states that the FAA notified NEADS about Flight 175 at 8:43 a.m., according to the report, the first notification came “in a phone call from [the FAA’s] New York Center to NEADS at 9:03” (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 23]
Military Has Been Slow to Provide Details of Its Response on September 11 - US military officials, according to the Washington Post, “have been slow to respond to press inquiries for a timeline that would establish the exact times that civil aviation authorities became aware of the hijackings, when US military commanders were notified, and when US fighter jets took to the air.” [Washington Post, 9/15/2001] On September 13, Air Force General Richard Myers was questioned about the military’s response to the 9/11 attacks before the Senate Armed Services Committee, but his answers were vague and confused (see September 13, 2001). [US Congress, 9/13/2001; Farmer, 2009, pp. 241-242] A day later, Major General Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, provided reporters with details of the military’s response to the hijackings in an “impromptu hallway interview” at the Pentagon (see September 14, 2001). [Dallas Morning News, 9/14/2001]

Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

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