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Context of 'December 14, 1999: Group Files Lawsuit Against Monsanto Alleging Violation of Anti-Trust Law'

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Over the span of two decades, Monsanto accumulates approximately 650 plant-related biotech patents, including the patent on the 35S promoter, a genetic mechanism used extensively in the biotech industry. All biotech companies using the promoter must pay Monsanto a technology use fee. By 2004, the company has a 29.82 percent share of all research and development in the biotech industry. [Center for Food Safety, 2005, pp. 13 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Canada grants Monsanto patent no. 1313830 for glyphosate-resistant plant genes and cells. The patent grants the company the exclusive right, privilege, and liberty of making, constructing, using, and selling the invention in Canada until the patent’s expiration on February 23, 2010. [Canadian Patents Database, 2/23/1993; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 3 pdf file] Though Canada’s Plant Breeders’ Rights Act protects the intellectual property rights of seed developers, Monsanto felt a patent would provide more protection since it would deny farmers the right to save and re-use seeds containing the company’s patented genes and cells. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 43 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

A number of agricultural biotech firms secure patents on genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs). GURT, more commonly known as “terminator” technology, involves genetically engineering seeds to grow into sterile plants. The motivation behind this technology is to provide a means for seed companies to protect their intellectual property rights. By making their seeds genetically sterile, seed companies can prevent farmers from saving and replanting proprietary seeds, thus forcing farmers to purchase new seeds every year. Critics say that biotech companies intend to use the technology to force their seeds on Third World farmers, most of whom engage in subsistence-level farming and plant only common seed. The seed industry sees these farmers as a huge untapped market. Seed savers number an estimated 1.4 billion farmers worldwide—100 million in Latin America, 300 million in Africa, and 1 billion in Asia—and are responsible for growing between 15 and 20 percent of the world’s food supply. [USPTO Patent Database, 3/3/1998; Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998; Ecologist, 9/1998] In addition to GURT, companies are seeking to develop a similar technology, called T-GURT or genetic trait control. This technology would make plant growth or the expression of certain genes contingent on whether or not the seed or plant is exposed to certain chemicals. For example, AstraZeneca is developing a technology to produce crops that would fail to grow properly if they are not regularly exposed to the company’s chemicals. The Canadian-based Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) suggests that T-GURT could serve as a platform upon which certain proprietary traits could be placed. In order to turn positive traits (e.g., herbicide-resistance) on, or negative traits (e.g., sterility) off, the farmer would need to either apply proprietary chemicals to the crops as they grow or pay to have the seeds soaked in a catalyst solution prior to planting. Critics note that this technology, like terminator technology, would require that farmers pay every year to have functioning seeds. Farmers would, in effect, be leasing the seed. Companies developing GURT and T-GURT seeds include Novartis, AstraZeneca, Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-Bred, Rhone Poulenc, and DuPont. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 1/27/1999; Rural Advancement Foundation International, 1/30/1999; Rural Advancement Foundation International, 1/30/1999]
Critics Say: -
bullet Terminator seeds would either turn poor farmers into “bioserfs,” by requiring them to pay for their seed every year, or drive these farmers out of farming all together. Proponents counter that farmers would not be forced to buy the seed. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998]
bullet If biotech seed companies were to penetrate the markets of non-industrialized countries, their seeds would replace thousands of locally grown and adapted varieties resulting in a significant loss of the world’s agricultural biodiversity. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998]
bullet The use of terminator technology would allow the seed industry to expand into new sectors of the seed market, like those for self-pollinating crops such as wheat, rice, cotton, soybeans, oats and sorghum, according to the Canadian-based Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI). “Historically there has been little commercial interest in non-hybridized seeds such as wheat and rice because there was no way for seed companies to control reproduction. With the patent announcement, the world’s two most critical food crops—rice and wheat—staple crops for three-quarters of the world’s poor, potentially enter the realm of private monopoly.” The organization notes that according to FAO, wheat, the world’s most widely cultivated crop, was grown on 219 million hectares in 1995. Rice, which was cultivated on 149 million hectares that year, produced the most crop by weight at 542 million tons. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998]
bullet Critics warn that terminator technology would threaten the farmers’ expertise in seed selection and traditional plant breeding. [India, 12/2/1998]
bullet Some scientists have warned that introducing terminator genes into the germplasm could result in the development of a virus that could disable all non-terminator seeds. “This is perfectly possible,” according to Dr. Owain Williams, of the Gaia Foundation. “Already bacteria have been developed for fixing nitrogen into corn roots, so why not a killer bacteria?” [Independent, 3/22/1998]
bullet Terminator technology is also likened to piracy. Anuradha Mittal and Peter Rosset of Food First/The Institute for Food and Development Policy, write: “Patenting genes the same way you patent software robs Third World farmers. While they and their ancestors developed almost all important food crops, transnational corporations can now blithely patent those crops and make mega profits without in any way compensating traditional farm communities for the original research. Genetic resources taken freely from southern countries will be returned to them later as pricey patented commodities. ‘Terminator’ technology is a way of locking this ‘bio-piracy’ into the very genes themselves.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 3/1/1999]
Proponents Say: -
bullet Supporters of the technology say that farmers will not be required to buy the seed and therefore will not purchase it unless they perceive some benefit from using it. Critics say that this scenario is not realistic. In a market dominated by an ever diminishing number of seed companies, selection will be limited. RAFI notes: “Current trends in seed industry consolidation, coupled with rapid declines in public sector breeding, mean that farmers are increasingly vulnerable and have far fewer options in the marketplace.” [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998]
bullet Some proponents argue that terminator seeds would be no different than F1 hybrids, which produce lower quality seeds than their parents. [London Times, 11/4/1998]
bullet Advocates say that terminator technology will allow the industry to safely release genetically modified plants into the environment, without the risk of contaminating related crops or wild plants. [New Scientist, 2/26/2005] Critics say that alleged benefit is outweighed by the danger terminator seeds pose to food safety, farmers’ rights, and agricultural biodiversity. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998]

Timeline Tags: Seeds, Food Safety

Monsanto obtains Canadian regulatory approval for the unconfined release of its patented Roundup Ready gene (see February 23, 1993) into the environment. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Monsanto spends $8 billion acquiring, or establishing relationships with, several US and foreign seed companies. [Canadian Business, 10/8/1999; Center for Food Safety, 2005, pp. 9-10 pdf file] The list of companies includes: Calgene, Inc.; Asgrow Agronomics; Asgrow and Stine Seed; Agracetus; Holden’s Foundation Seeds, Inc.; Monsoy (a Brazilian soybean company); Cargill’s international seed divisions (with operations in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Central and South America); Plant Breeding International; and DeKalb Genetics (the world’s second largest seed company). Pioneer Hi-Bred is the only major US seed company that Monsanto does not buy out. However, Pioneer has purchased rights from Monsanto to use technology relating to Roundup Ready soybeans and Bt corn. A 2005 report by the Center for Food Safety will say that one of the factors contributing to Monsanto’s cornering of the GM market (see 1998 and later) is its control of these seed companies. “[T]hese companies (often owned or indirectly controlled by Monsanto) had to agree that 90 percent of the sales of herbicide-tolerant soybeans would contain Monsanto’s patented technology. This requirement was later dropped to 70 percent after Monsanto came under scrutiny from government regulators. Through this sort of ownership and control of seed companies, Monsanto has been able to ensure that competition [will] remain small and that its patented genetically engineered crop varieties [will] be the ones most readily available to the American farmer.” [Center for Food Safety, 2005, pp. 9-10 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Calgene, Inc, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., Agracetus, Asgrow and Stine Seed, Asgrow Agronomics, Holden’s Foundation Seeds, Inc, Monsoy, Plant Breeding International, DeKalb Genetics, Cargill

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Elmer Borstmeyer, a farmer who is a licensed Roundup Ready Canola grower, drives his grain truck by four of Percy Schmeiser’s canola fields. He later testifies in court that on one or two of his trips the tarp was loose, and he believes he lost a lot of canola seed. “The tarp acted like a cyclone,” he will recall. “I lost some seed. That’s for sure.” [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/16/2000; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 50 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Borstmeyer

Timeline Tags: Seeds

According to the 2000 court testimony of Percy Schmeiser’s field hand, Carlyle Moritz, swaths (swaths are the debris left over after a field has been mowed) from a neighbor’s field planted with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Canola are blown onto one of Schmeiser’s fields. The swaths are subsequently picked up by a combine and deposited into the grain bins on that field. It is later suggested that some of the Roundup Ready Canola later found in Schmeiser’s crop may have grown from seeds carried onto his property in these swaths. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 6 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Carlyle Moritz

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Between 1997 and 2002, Monsanto makes at least $700,000 in illicit payments to at least 140 current and former Indonesian government officials and their family members in an effort to obtain legislation and ministerial decrees supporting the cultivation of genetically modified crops. The payments are made through Monsanto’s affiliates and representatives who have offices in Jakarta. The largest payment is for $373,990, which is used to design and build a house for a senior Ministry of Agriculture official. Monsanto even purchases the land for the house. “Other examples of improper payments include, among others, payments to a senior official of Budget Allocation at the National Planning and Development Board, totaling $86,690, and payments to other Ministry of Agriculture officials, totaling $8,100,” according to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. $29,500 is given to officials at the agriculture ministry in South Sulawesi, where the first shipment of Monsanto cotton is sent in 2001 (see March 15, 2001). [Reuters, 1/7/2001; Jakarta Post, 1/10/2001; US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1/6/2005; BBC, 1/7/2005] The payments are financed in part “through unauthorized, improperly documented and inflated sales of Monsanto’s pesticide products in Indonesia,” Monsanto later admits. [Monsanto, 1/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Percy Schmeiser has Roundup sprayed in the ditches and around the telephone poles adjacent to the road that runs along four of his nine canola fields. After the spraying, he notices that roughly 60 percent of the canola plants survived the application. Curious about the possibility that his canola may have developed a resistance to glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, he sprays a trial strip about 100 feet wide in one of the fields that is next to the road. He later says in court that the total area represented a “good three acres.” As a result of the spraying, roughly 40 percent of the canola plants die. The surviving 60 percent are scattered in clumps and are mostly concentrated near the road. [Alberta Report, 9/6/1999; Leader Post (Regina, Saskatchewan), 6/13/2000; Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 6 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Wayne Derbyshire, an investigator with Robinson Investigation Canada Ltd, goes to Percy Schmeiser’s farm to obtain plant samples on behalf of Monsanto. Monsanto has hired Robinson Investigation to obtain the samples because the company believes that Schmeiser planted its patent-protected seeds and that he illegally purchased them from a Monsanto-licensed farmer. Monsanto’s “Technology Use Agreement” (see 1996) prohibits licensed farmers from making patented seeds available to other growers. (Selling seeds under the table in this manner is referred to as “brown-bagging.”) [Washington Post, 5/2/1999; Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 15-17 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 19 pdf file] One set of samples is taken from a field that later court testimony reveals may not have been Schmeiser’s. The second set of samples is taken from plants owned by Percy Schmeiser that are growing in the ditches and public right-of-way where Schmeiser earlier discovered the presence of Roundup-resistant canola (see Summer 1997). Derbyshire sends the samples to his boss, Mike Robinson, on August 27. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 15-17 pdf file] When Schmeiser later learns of this sampling in 1998, he will accuse Robinson Investigation of trespassing (see March 1998). Farmers are permitted to grow and harvest crops in public right-of-ways, and on this basis, Schmeiser’s lawyer will later argue in court that the crops taken by Derbyshire were in fact property of Schmeiser. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 15-17 pdf file] Philip Angell, Monsanto’s director of corporate communications, disputes Schmeiser’s allegation, telling the Washington Post in 1999 that it is not completely clear whether Derbyshire actually crossed Schmeiser’s property line. Angell also asserts that trespassing is neither a criminal nor a civil offense in Saskatchewan. [Washington Post, 5/2/1999]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Robinson Investigation Canada Ltd, Monsanto, Wayne Derbyshire, Philip Angell

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Percy Schmeiser’s field hand, Carlyle Moritz, swaths and combines Schmeiser’s canola fields. The grain collected from the field where Roundup-resistant plants were earlier discovered (see Summer 1997) is stored in an old truck. The truck contains grain from both the area that Schmeiser sprayed and other areas of the same field. Schmeiser will use these seeds for his 1998 crop (see Spring 1998). [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 7 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 18-19 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Carlyle Moritz

Timeline Tags: Seeds

On September 2, Mike Robinson sends the canola plant samples taken from Percy Schmeiser’s farm (see August 18, 1997) to Aaron Mitchell, the Monsanto employee who is in charge of the company’s investigation of Schmeiser. Each sample is said to contain between 10 and 40 pods. Upon receipt of the pods, Mitchell removes the seeds and places them in coin envelopes. He then sends them to Merle Waterfield of the Crop Science Department of the University of Saskatchewan for a grow-out test. Only four seeds from each sample are planted. All except one of the plants that germinate from these seeds survive an application of Roundup. The remaining samples are then returned to Mitchell. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 17 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 20 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merle Waterfield, Aaron Mitchell, Mike Robinson

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Monsanto has become the world’s largest supplier of genetically modified seeds and the second largest seller of all seed types. Only Pioneer Hi-Bred, soon to be purchased by Dupont (see March 14, 1999), sells more seeds than Monsanto. Within the US, Monsanto directly or indirectly controls nearly half the corn germplasm market and most of the soybean market. Its dominant position in the market has been attributed to several factors: its two-year buying spree of other seed companies (see 1996-1998), its control of a large percentage of the biotech industry’s plant patents (see 1980s-2004), and the Technology Use Agreement (see 1996) it forces farmers to sign. According to a 2005 report by the Center for Food Safety (CFS), the availability of conventional seeds to farmers worldwide has been dramatically reduced as a result of Monsanto’s control of the market. “For many farmers across the country, it has become difficult if not impossible, to find high quality, conventional varieties of corn, soy, and cotton seed. Making matters worse, the direction of land-grant university research has been shifting away from producing new conventional seed varieties and toward biotech applications,” the report says. Indiana soybean farmer Troy Roush tells the Center, “You can’t even purchase them in this market. They’re not available.” Another farmer interviewed by the organization, a Texan, similarly states, “Just about the only cottonseed you can get these days is [genetically engineered]. Same thing with the corn varieties. There’s not too many seeds available that are not genetically altered in some way.” [Center for Food Safety, 2005, pp. 9-10 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Mike Robinson, owner of a private investigation company that works for Monsanto, visits Percy Schmeiser at his farm. Schmeiser learns that Monsanto is investigating him and that an investigator working for Robinson took plant samples from his fields in 1997 (see August 18, 1997). Robinson says Monsanto suspects Schmeiser is illegally growing its patent-protected Roundup Ready Canola. Schmeiser accuses Robinson’s company of trespassing. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/14/2000; Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 21 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 21 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Mike Robinson, Percy Schmeiser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Delta & Pine Land Company jointly obtain US patent 5,723,765 for a technology that would be used to make sterile seeds (see 1994 and after). The seeds, dubbed “terminator” seeds by critics, would grow into plants that would produce seeds that when replanted would literally kill themselves by producing a toxic protein. Delta & Pine Land has exclusive licensing rights, while the USDA would earn about 5 percent of the net sales of any commercial product using the technology. The USDA and Pine Land Co. have also applied for patents in at least 78 other countries. Delta & Pine Land says in its press release that the technology has “the prospect of opening significant worldwide seed markets to the sale of transgenic technology for crops in which seed currently is saved and used in subsequent plantings.” [USPTO Patent Database, 3/3/1998; Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998; Ecologist, 9/1998]

Entity Tags: Delta & Pine Land Company, US Department of Agriculture

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Willard Phelps of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) tells Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) that the goal of terminator technology is “to increase the value of proprietary seed owned by US seed companies and to open up new markets in Second and Third World countries.” Phelps says he wants terminator technology to be “widely licensed and made expeditiously available to many seed companies.” [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 3/30/1998] The USDA shares a patent for terminator technology with Delta & Pine Land (see March 3, 1998).

Entity Tags: Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration, Willard Phelps

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Before planting his 1998 crop, Percy Schmeiser brings approximately four tons of seed that came from the field (see Fall 1997) where patches of Roundup-resistant canola were discovered the year before (see Summer 1997) to Humboldt Flour Mills for inoculation against diseases and insects. According to Schmeiser, the seeds have not been cleaned and therefore are full of chaff. [Washington Post, 5/2/1999; Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 7-8 pdf file; Crop Choice, 5/24/2002]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Humboldt Flour Mills

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Monsanto says it will purchase Delta & Pine Land Company, the company that shares a jointly-held patent on terminator technology with the US Department of Agriculture (see March 3, 1998). [Ecologist, 9/1998] The acquisition will be stalled by US anti-trust agencies, and in December 1999 Monsanto will drop its bid (see December 19, 1999).

Entity Tags: Delta & Pine Land Company

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Percy Schmeiser plants 1,030 acres in nine of his fields with canola. He uses a mixture of seed saved from 1997 and seed saved from previous years. He knows that the 1997 seed was saved from a field where Roundup-resistant plants had been discovered (see Summer 1997). [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Monsanto files a lawsuit against Percy Schmeiser alleging that in 1997 or earlier Schmeiser illegally obtained Roundup Ready Canola seed from an unnamed Monsanto-licensed farmer, planted his fields with the seed, and then saved the seed for the following year’s planting without ever having entered into an agreement with Monsanto. In doing so, Monsanto claims, Schmeiser infringed on its patent. According to Schmeiser, the presence of Monsanto’s patented genes in his crop was a result of infestation, possibly resulting from wind-blown pollen or seed. He recalls that in 1997 (see Summer 1997), after spraying Roundup in his ditches and around telephone poles adjacent to his canola field, approximately 60 percent of the canola plants in that area survived. He then proceeded to spray a trial strip roughly 100 feet wide in the adjacent field which also revealed the presence of Roundup-resistant canola. In 1998, he used the seed from that field mixed in with seed from previous years to plant his 1998 crop (see Spring 1998). [Alberta Report, 9/6/1999; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 5 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Monsanto secures a court order permitting the company to take plants from Percy Schmeiser’s canola fields. Monsanto believes that Schmeiser is illegally growing the company’s patent-protected Roundup Ready Canola. Schmeiser is aware that some of his canola is resistant to Roundup but denies that this is the result of any willful action on his part. He claims to have never purchased or otherwise obtained Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Canola pedigree seed. He thinks the presence of plants resistant to Roundup is the result of cross-pollination or seeds blown from a nearby farm or off passing grain trucks. [Washington Post, 2/3/1999] Monsanto, in a letter to the court dated August 12, says it will notify Schmeiser’s lawyer before entering onto Schmeiser’s property. The sample is to be collected in the presence of Schmeiser and split between Monsanto and Schmeiser so each party can have it tested separately. According to Schmeiser, Don Todd (Robinson Investigation) and James Vancha (Monsanto), arrive unannounced and do not allow him to accompany them. However, Todd and Vancha will dispute Schmeiser’s version of events in court testimony, saying the farmer had declined to participate because of a “bad leg.” Instructions contained in the court order do not specify that they use any sort of representative sampling technique that could be used to determine what percentage of Schmeiser’s canola plants are resistant to Roundup. Rather, since Monsanto is interested only in proving the presence of the patented gene in Schmeiser’s fields, Todd and Vancha are just asked to randomly collect a total of 54 samples from Schmeiser’s 9 fields (27 for Monsanto and 27 for Schmeiser). In spite of the fact that no method is employed to ensure that the composition of the samples are representative of the composition of the fields, Monsanto will later cite test results based on these samples when making assertions in court about the percentage of Roundup-resistant plants growing on Schmeiser’s farm (see January 1999) [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 21 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 24-25 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Robinson Investigation Canada Ltd, Don Todd, James Vancha, Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Darwin Murrell of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) emails a memo informing the department’s scientists that any research into terminator technology must now be reviewed by senior managers. The USDA jointly holds a patent on the technology with Delta & Pine Land (see March 3, 1998). This is a “sensitive issue,” Murrell says. “Imposing an extra level of review for this research will not create undue delays nor will it restrict the creative talents of our scientists, but it will help them avoid potential political and legal pitfalls.” [New Scientist, 10/10/1998]

Entity Tags: US Department of Agriculture, Clinton administration

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Ray Mowling, a vice president for Monsanto Canada in Mississauga, concedes to the Washington Post that some cross-pollination does occur between Monsanto’s genetically modified plants and other plants. Referring to Monsanto’s lawsuit against Percy Schmeiser, a canola farmer accused of illegally growing Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Canola, Mowling “acknowledges the awkwardness of prosecuting farmers who may be inadvertently growing Monsanto seed through cross-pollination or via innocent trades with patent-violating neighbors,” but explains that Monsanto believes that Schmeiser’s case is “critical” to win in order to protect its patent rights against the use of its seed by farmers who have not paid Monsanto’s technology use fees. [Washington Post, 2/3/1999]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Ray Mowling, Percy Schmeiser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

DuPont pays $7.7 billion for Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., making DuPont the world’s largest seed supplier. [Wall Street Journal, 12/22/1999]

Entity Tags: Dupont, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc.

Timeline Tags: Seeds

On the advice of his lawyer, Percy Schmeiser purchases new canola seeds for his 1999 crop instead of planting the seeds retained from his 1998 harvest. Schmeiser has been using saved seed since 1994 and says that this decision causes him great distress. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/14/2000]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Canadian farmer Charlie Boser discovers between 300 and 500 Roundup Ready Canola plants in a field that was sprayed twice for weeds with Roundup mixtures. “Everything along that quarter was burnt to a crisp quite brown except for the canola,” he later testifies in court. The plants had apparently come to his fields from the east. “I was a little upset to have this contaminant on my land. I’d never used a Roundup Ready Canola.” He contacts Monsanto, who compensates him for one of his spray applications and pays the person who had done the chemical fallow to “get some kids to come pick it out,” according to Boser. A Monsanto representative later informs him that a field adjacent to his was planted with Roundup Ready Canola. [Alberta Report, 9/6/1999; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/16/2000; Western Producer (Saskatoon), 6/22/2000]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Charlie Boser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The Scientific Body of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity (SBSTTA) rejects proposals during a meeting in Montreal to recommend a permanent moratorium on genetic use restriction technologies (GURT). GURTs are those which use genetic engineering to restrict the growth of plants in order to protect the intellectual property rights of the seed developer. The most well-known restriction technology is “terminator” technology (see 1994 and after). Another is “traitor” technology, so named because the traits of seeds and plants produced with this technology can be genetically controlled, e.g., a certain proprietary chemical may be required in order for certain genes to be expressed. The proposal to ban GURTs was made after a report by a blue-ribbon scientific panel was presented before the SBSTTA. The report had concluded that restriction technologies are a threat to agricultural biodiversity and national food security. The delegates at the meeting reportedly agreed that the study was broadly based and well done. After listening to the report, the government of Norway proposed that the SBSTTA recommend a moratorium on field trials and commercialization of the technology. India, Portugal, Kenya, Peru, and several other countries backed the proposal. The US opposed it, as did Canada—though only the US delegation attempted to defend the technology. One of the concerns expressed by supporters of the proposal was that terminator technology could be used to strong arm poorer countries into adopting or accepting certain trade policies. Countries like the US, it was suggested, could withhold seed or the chemicals needed to sustain the growth of chemically dependent plants as a sort of ransom. With the US and Canada opposed to Norway’s proposal, an alternative resolution was drafted by Britain (and then amended by Suriname). Though different than Norway’s, Britain’s proposal would have also recommended a ban on commercialization and field trials. But this was not considered agreeable either. Finally, a “contact group” was formed, which went into private discussion. The compromise that resulted from the closed-door meeting looked nothing like either of the original proposals. Under the provisions of the compromise resolution, governments would have the option of imposing a ban on field trials and commercialization. It failed to affirm the conclusions of the Blue Panel report, making no mention of GURT posing a direct threat to biodiversity or national sovereignty over genetic resources. “I don’t know what happened in that room,” Silvia Ribeiro of Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) says, “There were two reasonably strong resolutions when they went in and one very weak proposal when they came out. I think the South has been tricked.” The new proposal was then weakened even further by the efforts of Australia. Even an industry representative took a stab at weakening the proposal. “In the feeding frenzy, a representative from the seed industry became so excited that he took the floor, presumed the prerogative of a government, and proposed additional resolution text to restrict farmers’ rights to save, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed,” according to RAFI. The following day, during a plenary discussion, RAFI called attention to a little noticed provision that had been slipped into the draft by Australia as an amendment. RAFI noted that it would restrict countries’ rights to impose a moratorium on GURT by linking any moratorium to potential trade sanctions. “Shortly before the debate ended, the US delegation made an ugly and aggressive intervention that put the question to rest: The US bluntly threatened trade sanctions on countries that impose a moratorium and made clear that it was willing to use the WTO to force terminator down the world’s throat,” according to RAFI. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 6/25/1999; Convention on Biodiversity, 6/27/1999, pp. 23-26 pdf file; Convention on Biodiversity, 6/27/1999; Rural Advancement Foundation International, 6/28/1999; Economic Times of India, 7/8/1999]

Entity Tags: Suriname, Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, Portugal, United States, United Kingdom, Peru, Kenya, Australia, Canada, Norway, India

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Dr. Gordon Conway, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, says in a speech before Monsanto’s board of directors: “The agricultural seed industry must disavow use of the terminator technology to produce seed sterility… The possible consequences, if farmers who are unaware of the characteristics of terminator seed purchase it and attempt to reuse it, are certainly negative and may outweigh any social benefits of protecting innovation.” [Conway, 1/24/1999]

Entity Tags: Gordon Conway

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The US Department of Agriculture and cotton seed producer Delta & Pine Land jointly acquire a new patent (US Patent No 5,925,808) for genetic seed sterilization, also known as terminator technology. The patent is for innovations related to its original patent for seed sterilization (see March 3, 1998) issued in March 1998. [USPTO Patent Database, 7/20/1999]

Entity Tags: Delta & Pine Land Company, US Department of Agriculture

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Percy Schmeiser gives the 27 canola pods that were collected by Monsanto a year before (see August 12, 1998) to his lawyers who then send them to the University of Manitoba to be tested for the presence of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Canola genes. Lyle Friesen, a plant biologist at the university who conducts the tests, finds that 15 of the samples are too moldy to grow. The seeds in the other 12 samples germinate and are sprayed with Roundup. Survival rates in these samples range from 0 to 67 percent. As Schmeiser’s lawyer will later note in court, the people hired by Monsanto to obtain the samples did not collect them using a methodology that would have ensured that the composition of the samples were representative of the composition of the fields (see August 12, 1998). Therefore, according to Schmeiser’s lawyer, the samples can only indicate “what is in the bags, not what is in the fields.” Also included in the samples sent to Friesen are the seeds (the authenticity of which Schmeiser challenges (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000)) that were returned to Schmeiser by Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (who took over operations of Humboldt Flour Mills in 1998) earlier in the year. Tests performed on these seeds indicate that between 95 and 99 percent contained the patented gene. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 22 pdf file; Crop Choice, 5/24/2002]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Lyle Friesen

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Monsanto CEO Robert B. Shapiro says in an open letter to Gordon Conway, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, that Monsanto is “making a public commitment not to commercialize sterile seed technologies, such as the one dubbed ‘terminator.’” Conway had asked the company’s board of directors to “disavow use of the terminator technology” (see June 24, 1999). Shapiro says the company still intends to research other technologies that would help the company protect its intellectual property rights Such technologies would include ways to switch certain genetic traits vital to a crop’s productivity on or off. Critics have called this technology “traitor” and say that, like terminator seeds, this technology would also threaten biodiversity, food security, and the 12,000 year old practice of seed saving. [Shapiro, 10/4/1999; BBC, 10/5/1999]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Robert B. Shapiro, Gordon Conway

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The US Patent office issues its third patent (US Patent No 5,977,441) to the US Department of Agriculture and cotton seed producer Delta & Pine Land for genetic seed sterilization, commonly known as terminator technology. The patent is for innovations related to two earlier patents (see March 3, 1998) issued in March 1998 and July 1999 (see July 20, 1999). [USPTO Patent Database, 11/2/1999]

Entity Tags: Delta & Pine Land Company, US Department of Agriculture

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The Foundation on Economic Trends (FOET) files a class-action lawsuit against Monsanto on behalf of a group of Iowa, Indiana, and French farmers. The suit alleges that Monsanto failed to ensure that its genetically modified seeds were safe for consumers and the environment before it brought them to market. It also claims that the company, which has bought out numerous seed companies in recent years (see 1996-1998), seeks to control world production of agriculture and food through the spread of its patented genes. “Through various anti-competitive practices, it seeks to control world production of agriculture and food, with particular concentration on power over seeds,” says Jeremy Rifkin, the foundation’s president. “What this means is that if the companies get their way, no farmer in the world will ever own a seed again. If that doesn’t hold implications for anti-trust law in the world of agriculture, then I don’t know what does.” [Reuters, 12/15/1999]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Jeremy Rifkin, Foundation on Economic Trends

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Biotech giant Monsanto and drug maker Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc. agree to merge. Together the two companies have a combined market value of about $52 billion. [New York Times, 12/20/1999] Shortly after the merger announcement, Monsanto says it has decided to drop its bid (see May 11, 1998) for Delta & Pine Land, the cotton seed company that shares a patent (see March 3, 1998) with the Department of Agriculture for terminator technology. [Reuters, 12/22/1999]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc, Delta & Pine Land Company

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Shortly after Monsanto announced (see October 4, 1999) that it would not commercialize sterile seed technologies, the Department of Agriculture’s Richard Parry tells the Wall Street Journal, “I think Monsanto needs to carefully reconsider its position.” [Wall Street Journal, 12/22/1999]

Entity Tags: Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Aaron Mitchell, Monsanto’s lead investigator in the Percy Schmeiser case, sends seed samples that were taken from Percy Schmeiser’s farm in 1997 (see August 18, 1997) to Keith Downey, emeritus professor of Agricultural Canada and University of Saskatchewan. Mitchell has been in possession of the seeds since the fall of 1997. The seeds were stored in coin envelopes. When Downey receives the seeds there are very few left—one envelope only contains two seeds, while the envelope with the most seeds has only about 30. According to Schmeiser, the envelopes should contain between 200 and 800 seeds each. Schmeiser, who has been invited to witness the planting of the seeds, later claims that the sample includes numerous cleaver seeds. Schmeiser also says that the sample includes cracked seeds and debris indicating that they had been through a combine. If these samples were indeed the ones taken in 1997, there should be no cleaver seeds, cracked seeds, or debris, Schmeiser’s lawyer will later note in the closing argument of Schmeiser’s June 2000 trial (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000). Downey’s grow-out of these seeds results in a 50 percent germination rate. All the resulting plants prove resistant to Roundup. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 17 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 20 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Keith Downey, Aaron Mitchell

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Lyle Friesen, a plant biologist at the University of Manitoba, obtains seed samples—presumably from Percy Schmeiser’s 1997 harvest (see August 18, 1997)—from Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (which took over Humboldt Flour Mills). He performs a grow-out test of these seed samples and finds that as many as 98 percent of them are Roundup-resistant. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 22 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 26-27 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Lyle Friesen

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Canadian canola seeds sold to Europe by Advanta Canada are discovered to be contaminated with a small percentage of genetically modified (GM) seeds. [Canadian Press, 6/4/2000] The contamination resulted from pollen that was blown in from a farm growing GM crops more than a kilometer away. European citizens and governments are outraged and farmers in some of the countries plow their crops under. [Globe and Mail, 5/25/2000; New Scientist, 12/23/2000]

Entity Tags: Advanta Canada

Timeline Tags: Seeds

At the fifth meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), member countries adopt a recommendation not to approve field testing or commercialization of GURTs, also known as terminator technology, until additional scientific research has been done. The recommendation, submitted by the Convention’s Scientific Advisory Body (SBSTTA) (see June 15, 1999-June 21, 1999), also say countries should have the option to ban the technologies at the national-level if they so choose. Delegates from several of the non-industrialized countries and a number of civil society organizations are disappointed with the COP 5 decision. They wanted a complete and immediate permanent international ban on the technology because of the potentially devastating effect the technology could have on the food security and agricultural biodiversity. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 6/16/2000] For example, the African Group’s statement calls on all countries to “immediately ban the terminator technology from respective national territories and thus, from the whole of Africa, as intolerable politically, economically and ethically and in terms of safety of plant life, and in the future, be constantly on the look out for unacceptable products of biotechnology.” [Biodiversity Convention African Group, 5/2000] Other parties calling for a complete ban on terminator technology include Kenya, the Philippines, India, Tanzania, and Malawi. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 6/16/2000] Many countries, including most of the G77 (with the exception of Argentina) and China, though not calling for an immediate ban, nonetheless agree that GURT is a very serious issue. Noting the heavy reliance on subsistence farming of farmers in their respective countries, they say in a statement, “[W]e feel very strongly on the GURTs issue, as they may impact negatively on our agricultural biodiversity.” [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 6/16/2000] It is also noted at the meeting that portions of the SBSTTA decision are outdated. For example, the SBSTTA in making its recommendation the previous year assumed that GURTs were “not likely to be commercialized in the near future and that at this time no example of the technology has been released in either research or investigative field trial.” This can no longer be said, according to Rural Advancement Foundation International, whose monitoring of the industry has revealed that seven new terminator patents were issued to industry and public sector researchers in 1999 and that biotech company AstraZeneca has already conducted field trials on genetic trait control technology in Britain. [Rural Advancement Foundation International, 6/16/2000] The final text of the GURTs portion of the COP5 decision reads: “[I]n the current absence of reliable data on genetic use restriction technologies without which there is an inadequate basis on which to assess their potential risks, and in accordance with the precautionary approach, products incorporating such technologies should not be approved by Parties for field testing until appropriate scientific data can justify such testing, and for commercial use until appropriate, authorized and strictly controlled scientific assessments with regard to, inter alia, their ecological and socio-economic impacts and any adverse effects for biological diversity, food security and human health have been carried out in a transparent manner and the conditions for their safe and beneficial use validated. In order to enhance the capacity of all countries to address these issues, Parties should widely disseminate information on scientific assessments, including through the clearing-house mechanism, and share their expertise in this regard.” [Convention on Biodiversity, 5/2000]

Entity Tags: Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity

Timeline Tags: Seeds

After Percy Schmeiser and Monsanto fail to reach an out-of-court settlement, Monsanto takes the 69-year-old canola farmer to court. Monsanto claims that in 1998, Schmeiser planted 1,030 acres with seed from his 1997 canola crop containing a gene or cell that was protected by Monsanto’s 1993 (see February 23, 1993) patent on glyphosate-resistant plants and that he did so without permission from Monsanto. The company further alleges that in doing so Schmeiser illegally used, reproduced, and created genes, cells, plants, and seeds containing the patent-protected genes and cells. According to Monsanto, it is of no consequence how the gene arrived in Schmeiser’s field; his mere planting of the gene constitutes infringement. The company is suing for the $15 CAD/acre technology fee that other farmers using the seed are required to pay (A total of $15,450 CAD), the profits resulting from Schmeiser’s 1998 crop ($105,000 CAD, according to Monsanto), interest, exemplary damages ($25,000 CAD), and court costs. [Toronto Star, 6/3/2000; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/6/2000; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/21/2000] Terry Zakreski, Schmeiser’s attorney, does not deny that the some of the canola plants in Schmeiser’s 1998 crop contained Monsanto’s patent-protected Roundup-resistant gene. However, he rejects Monsanto’s claim that Schmeiser infringed on the company’s patent when he planted the crop since the presence of Monsanto’s Roundup Resistance canola was not a result of any deliberate action on the part of Schmeiser. The defense suggests that Monsanto’s patented-gene arrived on Schmeiser’s property by way of pollination or wind-blown seed. [Alberta Report, 9/6/1999]
Plaintiff Argument--Tests show high percentage of Roundup in sample taken from Schmeiser's 1997 crop - In spite of the fact that Monsanto’s argument does not hinge in anyway on how its Roundup Ready Canola came to grow on Schmeiser’s fields, it nonetheless attempts to make the case that the alleged high percentage of Roundup-resistant canola in Schmeiser’s 1997 crop was too high to have resulted solely from cross-pollination or wind-blown seed as Schmeiser claims. As evidence of this, Monsanto cites tests (see Fall 1997) (see January 24, 2000) performed on plant samples taken in August of that year by Wayne Derbyshire (see August 18, 1997). Those tests found that the samples contained a very high percentage (more than 90 percent) of seeds containing the patented genes. Monsanto also introduces as evidence, tests performed on seeds given to Monsanto by Humboldt Flour Mills (see Between April 24 and April 28, 1998), the company that had inoculated Schmeiser’s seeds prior to the 1998 planting season. Tests later performed on those seeds found that 95 to 98 percent of them contained Monsanto’s patented gene (see April 2000; (August 26, 1999)). [Toronto Star, 6/6/2000; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/6/2000]
Plaintiff Argument--Tests show high percentage of Roundup in Schmeiser's 1998 crop - Monsanto also presents evidence aimed at demonstrating that Schmeiser’s 1998 crop consisted almost entirely of plants containing Monsanto’s patented Roundup-resistant gene. As evidence, it cites tests performed on samples that were taken from Percy’s crop in the summer of 1998 (see August 12, 1998). The tests done by Aaron Mitchell of Monsanto on these samples indicated that between 92 and 97 percent of the seeds in the samples were resistant to Roundup (see January 1999). [Toronto Star, 6/6/2000; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/6/2000]
Plaintiff Argument--Schmeiser used Roundup on his 1998 crop - In an effort to prove that Schmeiser’s 1998 crop consisted mostly of Roundup Ready Canola and that Schmeiser sought to take advantage of its resistance to the herbicide, Monsanto cites the testimony of Wesley Niebrugge, a farmer and employee of the Esso bulk dealership in Bruno. Niebrugge claims that in 1997 and 1998 Schmeiser’s farm hand Carlyle Moritz told him that Schmeiser had sprayed his fields with Roundup after having seeded his fields with Roundup Ready Canola. Monsanto argues that in spite of Schmeiser’s claims that he did not use Roundup on his crops in 1998, there is no evidence that he used Muster and Assure herbicides as claimed. Furthermore, Monsanto provides evidence that Schmeiser purchased 720 liters of Roundup in 1998. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/17/2000]
Plaintiff Argument--Roundup Ready Canola presence in Schmeiser's fields cannot be explained by windblown seed - Monsanto also argues that seed blown off the top of passing grain trucks could not have been responsible for the Roundup-resistant canola plants that Schmeiser found in his field more than 100 feet away from the road in 1997 (see Summer 1997). As evidence, Monsanto cites the testimony of Barry Hertz, a mechanical engineer hired by Monsanto because of his expertise in road vehicle aerodynamics. Hertz tells the court that according to his own calculations, canola seed blown off the top of a moving grain truck would fly no more than 8.8 meters from the road. His calculations are based on the weather conditions recorded at the Saskatoon airport in October and May of 1996, 100 kilometers away from Schmeiser’s farm. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/9/2000; Canadian Press, 6/9/2000]
Plaintiff Argument--Schmeiser segregated his crop - Monsanto argues that Schmeiser segregated his crop when he chose to save and plant the seeds harvested from the same field where he knew Roundup Ready plants had grown. The company’s lawyer questions why he would have done so if he considered those plants to be a contaminant on his land. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/15/2000]
Defense Argument--Schmeiser did not undertake any deliberate action to obtain Monsanto's Roundup Ready Canola - According to Schmeiser, the presence of Monsanto’s patented gene in his crop was not a result of any deliberate action he took. Rather he suggests that his crop was likely contaminated with Monsanto’s genes from wind-blown pollen or seed.
bullet Zakreski notes that there is no evidence whatsoever that Schmeiser illegally obtained Roundup Ready Canola seed. Monsanto has never identified anyone who may have sold Roundup Ready Canola seed to Schmeiser, and Schmeiser has never admitted to having acquired the seed. Monsanto employee Aaron Mitchell candidly testifies to this fact on the stand. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/9/2000; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/13/2000]
bullet Percy Schmeiser’s field hand, Carlyle Moritz, testifies that swaths from a neighboring canola field planted with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Canola blew onto one of Schmeiser’s fields in 1996 (see Fall 1996). The swaths were subsequently picked up by a combine on Schmeiser’s fields and deposited in the grain bins on that field. The defense believes it is possible that some of the seed from that bin was used to plant Schmeiser’s 1997 crop. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 6 pdf file]
bullet Schmeiser recalls that in 1997 (see Summer 1997), after spraying Roundup in his ditches and around telephone poles adjacent to his canola field, approximately 60 percent of the canola plants in that area survived. Curious about the possibility that his canola plants may have developed a resistance to Roundup, he sprayed a trial strip about 100 feet wide in one of the fields that is next to the road. The total area of the strip was a “good three acres,” he says. As a result of the spraying, roughly 40 percent of the canola plants died. The surviving 60 percent were scattered in clumps and were mostly concentrated near the road. He believes that the uneven presence of clumps that were thicker closest to the road and thinner towards the center of the field is evidence that plants had been sown from seed coming from the direction of the road, probably from seed blown off passing grain trucks in late 1996.
bullet Zakreski argues that Schmeiser’s plants may have been pollinated with pollen transported by wind or other means from a neighboring farm. He notes that Monsanto scientist Robert Horsch has acknowledged in court testimony that the company’s dominant Roundup-resistant gene would be present in any pollen from a Roundup Ready Canola plant and therefore could pollinate non-transgenic plants. Zakreski also cites the testimony of Monsanto witness Keith Downey that “one hungry bee” is capable of traveling a great distance. Even though Monsanto employee Aaron Mitchell testified that the closest field planted with Monsanto licensed Roundup Ready Canola seed was approximately five miles away, Zakreski notes that it is impossible to state for sure that someone was not illegally growing it closer. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/6/2000; Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 28 pdf file; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 16 pdf file]
bullet Schmeiser’s neighbor Elmer Borstmeyer testifies that he grew Roundup Ready Canola under agreement for four years beginning in 1996 and that he drove his truck by four of Schmeiser’s fields after harvest. He recalls that on one or two of his trips, the tarp was loose, and he believes he lost a lot of canola seed. “The tarp acted like a cyclone,” he said. “I lost some seed. That’s for sure” (see Fall 1996). [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/16/2000; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 50 pdf file]
bullet Schmeiser’s lawyer cites other cases where farmers’ fields have been contaminated with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Canola, including farmers Charles Boser (see Summer 1999) and Louis Gerwing (see Summer 1999). He also notes that just a few weeks before, Canadian canola seeds sold to Europe by Advanta Canada were discovered to have been contaminated with a small percentage of genetically modified (GM) seeds (see May 2000). [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/16/2000]
bullet Zakreski also addresses the various tests that were conducted on samples taken from Schmeiser’s 1997 and 1998 crops. Monsanto had used some of the tests as evidence to argue that more than 90 percent of the plants in some of Schmeiser’s fields contained Monsanto’s patented gene. Of the samples that were taken by Wayne Derbyshire in 1997 (see August 18, 1997) and used as the basis for two grow-out tests (see Fall 1997) (see January 24, 2000), and of the samples that were taken by Don Todd and James Vancha in 1998 (see August 12, 1998) and used for a grow-out test performed by Aaron Mitchell (see January 1999), Zakreski argues that they were all (1) taken illegally, and should not be admitted by the court; (2) taken using a methodology that was not intended to be representative of the fields from which they were taken; and (3) were not obtained, stored, or tested in a scientific manner or by independent parties. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000 pdf file]
bullet Of the samples that were handled by Aaron Mitchell before being sent to and tested by Keith Downey on January 24, 2000 (see January 24, 2000), Zakreski questions (1) why so many seeds were apparently missing from the coin envelopes; and (2) why there were cleaver seeds, debris, and cracked seeds present in this sample—presumed to have been taken directly from canola pods. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 18 pdf file]
bullet Zakreski also challenges the authenticity of seeds used in a grow-out test that was performed by Aaron Mitchell in January 1999 (see January 1999). He asks how it came to be that seeds Mitchell brought to Leon Perehudoff were clean when in fact the seeds in the original sample contained debris. Though Mitchell claims to have cleaned the seeds by hand in a matter of an hour, plant biologist Lyle Friesen, another witness, testifies that such a task should have taken “days” to do by hand. Zakreski also notes that is unclear why the seeds Mitchell planted enjoyed a 100 percent germination rate when Friesen and experts at Monsanto headquarters in St. Louis were able to get only about half their seeds—presumably taken the same day as Mitchell’s seeds—to grow. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 23-25 pdf file]
bullet Additionally, Zakreski questions the authenticity of the seed samples that Monsanto obtained from Humboldt Flour Mills (see Between April 24 and April 28, 1998). The seeds tested by Monsanto had apparently been cleaned, when in fact the seeds supplied to the mill by Schmeiser (see April 24, 1998) were bin-run seeds full of chaff. No evidence is provided by the plaintiff to explain how the seeds cleaned themselves. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 19 pdf file]
Defense Argument--One must use a patented invention for there to be infringement - Zakreski argues that for a patent infringement to occur, one must use the invention. His argument can be summarized as thus: (1) Monsanto has a patent on a gene, not a plant; (2) it is not a patent infringement to merely possess a patented invention, one must either use, or intend to use, the patented invention in order for there to be an infringement; (3) the act of growing a plant that contains the patented gene does not imply the use of that gene since that gene is not needed for the plant to grow; (4) the use of a patented invention necessarily entails that the “object,” or “essence,” of a patent be utilized, which in this case is a cell’s resistance to Roundup; (5) to use Monsanto’s invention, one must therefore either use, or intend to use, Roundup on one’s crop; and (6) because Schmeiser did not use Roundup on his crop, he did not infringe on Monsanto’s patent. The evidence Zakreski provides to support this argument can be summarized as follows: (a) there was no motive for Schmeiser to acquire and use Monsanto’s patented technology; (b) Schmeiser did not attempt to segregate seed known to be Roundup-resistant from the rest of his seed and therefore had no intention of using the properties of Monsanto’s patented gene; and (c) Schmeiser’s 1998 crop was a mixture of Roundup-resistant and non-resistant canola plants and therefore Schmeiser derived no benefit from Monsanto’s technology; and (d) Schmeiser did not, in fact, use Roundup on his 1998 crop.
a -
bullet Using Roundup Ready Canola would have made it impossible for Schmeiser to grow canola back-to-back, his preferred method of growing canola (see 1994-1998). [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 2-3 pdf file]
bullet The only benefit of using Roundup Ready Canola is that it allows one to spray Roundup herbicide on one’s crop. Roundup can only be applied after the weeds have germinated and there is weed foliage to spray. Schmeiser prefers not to spray weeds in his crop at this late stage because it would allow the weeds to use much of the soil’s moisture that would otherwise be available to the crop. Instead, he uses products that can be incorporated into the soil, or that kill weeds as they germinate (see 1994-1998). Furthermore, Schmeiser notes that Roundup is thought to leave a residue in the soil that kills mycorrhiza, a beneficial fungus that helps plants absorb nutrients in the soil. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 3 pdf file]
bullet Schmeiser prefers to save his seeds rather then buy new seeds each year, which he considers to be an unnecessary expense. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 2 pdf file]
bullet There was nothing wrong with Schmeiser’s seed stock that would have warranted interest in acquiring new seed. Schmeiser’s crops have performed much better than others in the area and are relatively free of common diseases that affect canola. Schmeiser has never had to file an insurance claim for his crop and because of this he receives a discount on his crop insurance premium. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 2 pdf file]
b -
bullet Zakreski notes that in 1997, Schmeiser made no attempt to segregate the Roundup-resistant plants from the non-resistant plants in his fields. His farmhand, Carlyle Moritz, saved the seed from both the area where Roundup-resistant crop was known to have grown and other areas where these plants were not known to have grown (see Fall 1997). In spring 1998, these seeds were combined with bin-run seeds from previous years to sow Schmeiser’s canola crop (see Spring 1998). [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 11 pdf file]
c -
bullet Schmeiser’s attorney argues that Schmeiser had nothing to gain in planting a mixed crop of Roundup-resistant and non-resistant canola plants. “The advantage in growing Roundup Ready Canola is that a grower may spray in-crop with Roundup and achieve broad spectrum weed control. If a grower plants a crop which is a mixture of Roundup Ready and Roundup susceptible canola, he cannot spray in-crop with Roundup. To do so would be suicide.” [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 28-29 pdf file]
d -
bullet Schmeiser says that in 1998 the herbicides he used on his crops were the brand-names Muster and Assure. It would have made no sense, Zakreski argues, for Schmeiser to have knowingly planted Roundup Ready Canola. “It would make no sense if he knowingly proceeded to seed Roundup Ready Canola and not use Roundup,” notes Zakreski. [Leader Post (Regina, Saskatchewan), 6/13/2000] Schmeiser, however, as noted by the plaintiff, was unable to produce receipts showing he had used Muster and Assure on his canola. He explains that the Esso bulk dealership where he lives changed hands after 1998 and the new owners were unable to locate the receipts. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/15/2000]
bullet Weed ecology expert Rene Van Acker testifies that the test results from Manitoba (which identified the presence of non-resistant canola plants in a sample taken from Schmeiser’s fields) (see (August 26, 1999)) prove that Schmeiser did not spray his fields with Roundup. If he had sprayed his fields, he would have killed much of his crop. “It would make no sense for a producer to sow Roundup Ready Canola and not use Roundup,” Van Acker recently wrote in a report requested by the defense. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/17/2000]
bullet While Schmeiser did purchase 720 liters of Roundup in 1998, as noted by the plaintiff, Schmeiser says that he used this quantity of Roundup to clear his fields before spring planting and also to clear the weeds in the roadside ditches and around telephone poles. Schmeiser testifies that he would have used 515 liters of the herbicide to chem fallow his 1,030 acres leaving 205 liters for the ditches and right-of-ways. Zakreski’s final brief includes a table depicting Schmeiser’s use of the chemical in 1996, 1997, and 1998, demonstrating that the amount of Roundup used in 1998 was entirely consistent with the previous two years. Additionally, Schmeiser explains that if he had planted 100 percent Roundup Ready Canola that year, following Monsanto’s recommended application rate of 1 liter/acre, he would have needed an additional 1,000 liters, a claim that not one of Monsanto’s witnesses attempts to challenge. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 13 pdf file]
Defense Argument--Monsanto's patent does not confer property rights - Another argument advanced by Schmeiser’s attorney is that because Monsanto’s patent does not confer ownership rights of the gene to the company, only intellectual property rights, the insertion of that gene into someone’s plant cannot possibly make that plant property of Monsanto. If the pollen produced by a Roundup Ready Canola plant fertilizes a non-transgenic plant owned by another farmer, Monsanto can claim no property rights to the plant’s offspring. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 38-39 pdf file]
bullet In support of this argument, Zakreski cites the similarity of this case to “stray bulls” cases in which the owners of cows impregnated by stray bulls owned by someone else have successfully sued for damages on the basis that early breading stunted the growth of their cows. In no such cases, notes Zakreski, has an owner of a stray bull attempted to claim any rights to the stray bull’s offspring. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 38-39 pdf file]
bullet Zakreski also states that the law of admixture applies to this case. The premise of that law is as follows: “… where a man willfully causes or allows property of another to inter-mix with his own without the other’s knowledge or consent, the whole belongs to the latter…”. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 38-39 pdf file]
Defense Argument--Monsanto waved its patent rights when it released its invention unconfined into the environment - The defense also argues that Monsanto waived the patent rights on its invention when it failed to control the spread of its invention after it was released into the environment unconfined. The lawyer writes: “Had [Monsanto] maintained control over its invention, it may have maintained its exclusive rights. However, inventions do not usually spread themselves around. They do not normally replicate and invade the property and lands of others. Ever since regulatory approval for this invention was given, it has been released unconfined into the environment. Mr. Schmeiser has produced ample evidence of just how extensive the release is in the Rural Municipality of Bayne, where he farms. Any exclusive rights Monsanto may have had to its invention were lost when it lost control over the spread of its invention. Surely, the exclusive right to possess such an invention cannot be maintained if the spread of the invention cannot be controlled. The unconfined and uncontrolled release into the environment is an act by Monsanto completely inconsistent with its exclusive rights. It cannot on the one hand unleash self-propagating matter uncontrolled into the environment and then claim exclusively wherever it invades. It can, by this, be taken by its conduct to have waived its statutory rights.” Zakreski warns that giving Monsanto property rights to any and all genes or plants that result from the uncontrolled replication of its invention could potentially cause all Canadian canola farmers to lose their right to save and replant seed. “It can never be said with certainty that Monsanto’s gene will not soon be present on any canola field in western Canada. Accordingly, no farmer who saves and re-uses his seeds can be sure the Monsanto gene is not present in his seed supply.” Zakreski suggests: “Perhaps this is a benefit that Monsanto hoped to achieve by releasing their product into the environment without any control.” [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 39-41 pdf file; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/22/2000] As evidence that Monsanto failed to control the spread of its invention, Schmeiser spends several hours showing the courtroom pictures he took in the vicinity where he lives of volunteer Roundup-resistant canola plants growing in ditches, flower beds, cemeteries, and roadways. He explains how he sprayed the plants with Roundup and then returned to see if they had survived. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/14/2000]
Defense Argument--Monsanto's patent is invalid; Monsanto's intellectual rights are protected under the Plant Breeders' Rights Act - Zakreski argues that a gene is “not the proper subject matter for a patent” and therefore the patent “should be declared invalid.” In support of this claim, he cites a federal appeals court’s 1998 decision in the case Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents). In that case, the judges ruled that “A complex life form does not fit within the current parameters of the Patent Act… .” Zakreski further argues that there already is legislation—the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act—that protects the intellectual property rights of those who develop new plant varieties. He notes that unlike the Patent Act, the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act explicitly preserves farmers’ rights to save and re-plant their seed. [Federal Court of Canada, 6/22/2000, pp. 43 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Monsanto, Terry Zakreski, Rene Van Acker

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Ethics Panel meets in Rome to consider the ethical implications of recent advances in biotechnology. The panel is made up of world-renowned agronomists and ethicists. The focus of their discussion is on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Following the meeting, the panel prepares a report that includes a summary of its views and lists a number of recommendations. The overriding concern of the report, completed some time in 2001, is that there is an inherent conflict between the interests of the corporations developing the technology and the social issues that GMO defenders say the technology will address. The biotech industry’s primary concern is “to maximize profits,” not to address the needs of the world’s rural poor, the report says. The panel notes that the private sector receives more resources than the public sector for GMO research, and that in some cases, public resources are actually being diverted to support private sector priorities. Another problem, according to the panel, is that the adoption of GM crops could undermine farmers’ livelihoods. Noting the power and leverage enjoyed by industry, the panel’s report warns that seed companies “may gain too much control over the rights of local farmers” and create a dependency among the rural poor on imported seeds. This would especially be the case if the biotech industry were to move ahead with genetic use restriction technologies (GURT), more commonly known as terminator technology (see 1994 and after). “The Panel unanimously stated that the ‘terminator seeds’ are generally unethical, as it is deemed unacceptable to market seeds whose offspring a farmer cannot use again because the seeds do not germinate,” the report says. “GURTs are not inherent in genetic engineering. While corporations are entitled to make profits, farmers should not be forced to become dependent on the supplier for new seeds every planting season.” However the panel says it does believe there is potential for the ethical use of GURTs. According to the panel, “Where the concern is with possible outcrossing of crops, for example GMOs that could damage wild plant populations, GURTs might be justified. This may also apply elsewhere: when the primary concern is to prevent reproduction of farmed fish with wild populations, for example, then GURTs could be useful in protecting wild populations.” In conclusion, the panel stresses the need for independent, publicly-funded research on GMOs that is “directed to the needs and benefits of poor farmers, herders, foresters and fishers.” [Food and Agriculture Organization, 2001 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Panel of Eminent Experts on Ethics in Food and Agriculture

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Dr. Ignacio Chapela, a microbial ecologist, and his assistant, David Quist, a graduate student at UC Berkeley, discover the presence of genetically modified (GM) genes in native Mexican maize growing in the remote hills of Oaxaca, Mexico. The contaminant genes contain DNA sequences from the cauliflower mosaic virus, which is often used as a promoter to “switch on” insecticidal or herbicidal properties in GM plants. Contamination is also found in samples from a government food store that purchases animal feed from the US. The Oaxaca region is considered to be the birthplace of maize and the world’s center of diversity for corn, “exactly the kind of repository of genetic variation that environmentalists and many scientists had hoped to protect from contamination,” the New York Times reports. Scientists worry that the genes could spread through the region’s corn population reducing its genetic diversity. Critics of genetically modified crops have long argued that the technology cannot be contained. According to Dr. Norman C. Ellstrand, evolutionary biologist at University of California at Riverside, the discovery “shows in today’s modern world how rapidly genetic material can move from one place to another.” The findings are not good news for the biotech industry which is currently lobbying Brazil, the European Union, and Mexico to lift their embargoes on genetically modified crops. [New York Times, 10/2/2001; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 12/12/2001; BBC, 3/13/2002] It is later learned that the contamination resulted from Oaxacan peasants planting kernels they purchased from a local feed store. Though there’s a moratorium on the growing of GM crops, there’s no such ban on animal feed containing GM seed. [Cox News, 10/2/2001]

Entity Tags: Bivings Group, Monsanto, David Quist, Ignacio Chapela, Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources

Timeline Tags: Seeds

A set of documents is forged implicating Iraq in an attempt to purchase 500 tons of uranium oxide, also known as “yellowcake,” from Niger. [Agence France-Presse, 7/19/2003; Reuters, 7/19/2003; New Yorker, 10/27/2003; Talking Points Memo, 10/31/2003; La Repubblica (Rome), 10/24/2005] It is possible that official stamps and letterhead stolen from the Niger embassy in Rome (see January 2, 2001) are used to fabricate the documents, though a subsequent police investigation suggests that the break-in may have been staged to provide a cover story for the origins of the documents. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 88] Material gleaned from real Italian intelligence (SISMI) documents dating back to the 1980s concerning Iraq’s yellowcake purchases from Niger during that period are also incorporated into the set of forged documents. [La Repubblica (Rome), 10/24/2005; San Francisco Chronicle, 10/30/2005] But it is unclear who exactly is responsible for the forgeries. In August 2004, the Financial Times will report that according to Rocco Martino, the Italian information peddler who later tries to sell the documents, the documents are fabricated by SISMI, which passes them on to Martino through embassy employee Laura Montini, a paid SISMI asset. [Financial Times, 8/2/2004] In October 2005, the Italian newspaper La Repubblica will suggest the forgery is done by Montini and fellow embassy employee Zakaria Yaou Maiga under the guidance of Martino and Antonio Nucera, the deputy chief of the SISMI center in Viale Pasteur in Rome. [La Repubblica (Rome), 10/24/2005] In 2006, an official investigation will add support to this account, concluding that Montini and Maiga, motivated by money, were indeed the forgers of the documents. [Sunday Times (London), 4/9/2006] SISMI director Nicolo Pollari will later acknowledge that Martino had worked as a SISMI agent in the past, but deny any SISMI involvement in the Iraq-Niger affair. “[Nucera] offered [Martino] the use of an intelligence asset [Montini]—no big deal, you understand—one who was still on the books but inactive—to give a hand to Martino,” Pollari will explain. Author Craig Unger will observe that the issue is, if Pollari is to be believed, just one friend helping another friend by loaning him an intelligence asset to help disseminate forged documents. Martino has a different explanation: “SISMI wanted me to pass on the documents, but they didn’t want anyone to know they had been involved.” The information is quite contradictory. The Italian newspaper La Repubblica will call Martino “a failed carabiniere and dishonest spy,” and a “double-dealer” who “plays every side of the fence.” But Unger will later note that assets like him are valuable precisely because they lack credibility. “If there were a deep-cover unit of SISMI, it would make sense to hire someone like Rocco,” says former DIA analyst Patrick Lang. “His flakiness gives SISMI plausible deniability. That’s standard tradecraft for the agencies.” Until Martino stops talking to journalists in 2005, he will insist he believed the documents were authentic (see Summer 2004). “I sell information, I admit,” he will tell a London reporter. “But I only sell good information.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 236]

Entity Tags: Rocco Martino, Nicolo Pollari, Laura Montini, La Repubblica, Zakaria Yaou Maiga, Antonio Nucera, Craig Unger, SISMI, Patrick Lang

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Forty tons of Monsanto’s Bt cotton seed arrives in Makassar, the capital city of the Indonesian province South Sulawesi. Local authorities apparently try to keep news of the shipment under wraps. According to the Jakarta Post, “The provincial plantation office denied reports of the seed’s arrival on Thursday morning, but at approximately 1 pm on Thursday, the Jakarta Post noticed a Russian Ilyusin transport plane, with body number IL-76T, unloading the seed in the airport’s military area. The wide-bodied plane, chartered by Norse Air Charter from Johannesburg, was tightly guarded, and reporters and photographers were barred from approaching the plane.” Four Monsanto officials eventually meet with the press and say the seeds have been imported to meet the needs of Indonesian farmers. “There are at least 400,000 hectares of cotton plantations to be developed by the farmers here,” one of the executives says. Activists try unsuccessfully to block the convoy of trucks as they leave the airport. [Jakarta Post, 3/17/2001] The trucks, under armed guard and marked “rice delivery,” deliver the cotton seeds to farms in seven different districts in South Sulawesi. [Asia Times, 1/20/2005] The seeds will be grown as part of an experiment aimed at assessing the crop’s performance so a decision can be made on whether the seeds should be grown commercially. [Institute for Science in Society, 12/5/2004]

Entity Tags: Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Canadian Federal Judge Andrew MacKay rules in favor of Monsanto in its case against Canadian canola farmer Percy Schmeiser (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000). [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 3/30/2001]
Judge MacKay decides the following: -
bullet That all test results submitted to the court as evidence by Monsanto was admissible and worthy of consideration by the court. The test results had indicated that a high percentage (in most cases, more than 90 percent) of the seed present in several samples presumably taken from Schmeiser’s canola fields contained Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready gene. Schmeiser’s lawyer had argued (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000) that the samples had been taken illegally and were invalid because they were not obtained, stored, or tested in a scientific manner or by independent parties. Schmeiser’s lawyer also raised questions about the authenticity of the samples noting multiple contradictions in the observed properties of the samples as they changed possession from one person to another. The judge dismissed all of these concerns insisting that certain “conclusions of fact” could nonetheless be “drawn from evidence of the various tests.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 34 pdf file; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 3/30/2001]
bullet That based on expert testimony and results from the tests on samples taken from Schmeiser’s property, “none of the suggested possible sources of contamination of Schmeiser’s crop was the basis for the substantial level of Roundup Ready canola growing in field number 2 in 1997.” (“Field number 2” is the field where Schmeiser discovered the presence of Roundup Canola in 1997 (see Summer 1997)) [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 51 pdf file]
bullet That “the source of the Roundup-resistant canola in the defendants’ 1997 crop is really not significant for the resolution of the issue of infringement which relates to the 1998 crop.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 51 pdf file]
bullet That Schmeiser infringed on Monsanto’s patent when he planted seed that he “knew or ought to have known” contained Monsanto’s patented gene. Judge MacKay disagrees with the defense’s argument that in order to have used the essence of Monsanto’s patent, Schmeiser would have had to have applied Roundup to his crop. According to MacKay, the acts of replanting and selling the seed in and of themselves constituted use of the patent’s essence. “Growth of the seed, reproducing the patented gene and cell, and sale of the harvested crop constitutes taking the essence of the plaintiffs’ invention, using it, without permission.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 51-53 pdf file; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 3/30/2001]
bullet That the law of admixture and the precedent set by “stray bull” cases do not apply to this case. What distinguishes this case from cases where admixture is relevant, says MacKay, is that “Monsanto does have ownership in its patented gene and cell and pursuant to the [Patent] Act has the exclusive use of its invention.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 55-56 pdf file]
bullet That Monsanto’s patent is valid. MacKay rejects Zakreski’s argument that the Harvard Mouse case relates to this case in the way he described. Rather according to MacKay, while that case concerned the patent on an organism, this case concerns a gene, the process for its insertion, and the cell derived from that process. As such, the Harvard Mouse case “implicitly support[s] the grant of the patent to Monsanto.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 40 pdf file]
bullet That Monsanto’s patent rights on its Roundup-resistant gene persist even after it has inserted itself into a plant owned by someone else. Schmeiser’s lawyer had argued (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000) that Monsanto’s patent confers only intellectual property rights, not actual property ownership rights, of the gene to the company and that therefore the insertion of Monsanto’s patented gene into a plant owned by someone else does not make that plant or its offspring property of Monsanto. While Judge MacKay agrees with the defense that the property ownership rights over a plant would not change in such a case, MacKay says that the interest of the person who owns that plant would nonetheless be subject to Monsanto’s patent rights. “Thus,” writes Judge MacKay, “a farmer whose field contains seed or plants originating from seed spilled into them, or blown as seed, in swaths from a neighbor’s land or even growing from germination by pollen carried into his field from elsewhere by insects, birds, or by the wind, may own the seed or plants on his land even if he did not set about to plant them. He does not, however, own the right to the use of the patented gene, or of the seed or plant containing the patented gene or cell.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 40-41 pdf file; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 3/30/2001; Natural Life, 5/2001]
bullet That Monsanto did not implicitly waive its patent rights on the Roundup Ready gene because of any alleged failure to control the spread of its gene, as the defendant argued (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000). According to Judge MacKay, Monsanto has taken adequate steps to control the spread of its product. He cites Monsanto’s efforts to limit the use of the invention to only those plots of land farmed by licensed farmers for which the technology use fee has been paid; the company’s efforts to enforce the terms of its Technology Use Agreement; and the company’s efforts to remove plants that have invaded the properties of other farmers. MacKay makes little of the several photographs that Schmeiser had taken of Roundup-resistant Canola volunteers that he discovered scattered though out his community. [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 40-44 pdf file]
bullet To issue an injunction barring Schmeiser from planting “any seed saved from plants which are known or ought to be known to be Roundup tolerant, and from selling or otherwise depriving the plaintiffs of their exclusive right to use plants which the defendants know or ought to know are Roundup tolerant, or using the seeds from such plants.” [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 55 pdf file]
bullet That Schmeiser’s unauthorized use of Monsanto’s patented gene entitles the company to the profit realized by Schmeiser as a result of the sale of his 1998 crop, plus interest. However Judge MacKay believes that Monsanto has overstated Schmeiser’s profit because it did not factor in his labor as an expense. MacKay also disagrees with the plaintiff that exemplary damages are warranted in this case. MacKay gives Schmeiser and Monsanto three weeks to agree on the value of Schmeiser’s 1998 profit. If they cannot come to an agreement by then, Schmeiser is to pay Monsanto the sum of $15,450 CAD, or $15 CAD/acre planted and harvested in 1998. [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 3/29/2001, pp. 56-60 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Percy Schmeiser, Andrew MacKay

Timeline Tags: Seeds

(Show related quotes)

Photo of Iraqi aluminum tube, misidentified as a component for a nuclear reactor.Photo of Iraqi aluminum tube, misidentified as a component for a nuclear reactor. [Source: CIA]The CIA writes at least 15 reports (only seven of which have been identified; see, e.g., June 20, 2001, June 30, 2001, September 2004-September 2006, November 24, 2001, December 15, 2001, June 14, 2001, April 10, 2001) about Iraq’s interest in purchasing 7075-T6 aluminum tubes. Several of the assessments are distributed only to high-level policy makers, including President Bush, and are not sent to other intelligence agencies for peer review. According to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation, all the assessments rely on the same evidence and they all fail to note that the opinions of leading centrifuge experts at the Energy Department conflict with the CIA’s view. [US Congress, 7/7/2004, pp. 59; New York Times, 10/3/2004]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, US Department of Energy

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Canadian farmer Percy Schmeiser is ordered to pay $19,832 CAD in damages to Monsanto for having planted and harvested canola in 1998 that he “knew or ought to have known” contained Monsanto’s patent-protected Roundup-resistant gene. Several weeks earlier, a Canadian federal court ruled that Monsanto was entitled to the profits plus interest from Schmeiser’s 1998 canola crop (see March 29, 2001). [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 5/24/2001]

Entity Tags: Percy Schmeiser, Monsanto

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Percy Schmeiser files an appeal against Judge Andrew MacKay’s ruling (see March 29, 2001) that he infringed on Monsanto’s patent for Roundup Ready Canola when he planted seed in 1998 that he “knew or ought to have known” was resistant to Roundup. In his grounds for appeal, attorney Terry Zakreski makes 17 points (see May 15-16, 2002). [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/21/2001]

Entity Tags: Terry Zakreski, Percy Schmeiser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Ratcheting up the anti-Iraq rhetoric in the press, neoconservative Reuel Marc Gerecht writes in the Weekly Standard that the US is a “cowering superpower” for not directly challenging Iraq, and demands that President Bush explain “how we will live with Saddam [Hussein] and his nuclear weapons.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 206]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, Reuel Marc Gerecht

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

After CIA analyst Joe Turner’s presentation to UN atomic energy scientists (see Late July 2001), one of the scientists calls David Albright, a nuclear physicist who runs the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, and warns him that the “people across the river [i.e., the CIA] are trying to start a war. They are really beating the drum. They want to attack.” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 37]

Entity Tags: David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In the months leading up to the war with Iraq, Bush administration officials manipulate the intelligence provided to them by analysts in order to drum up support for the invasion. Some analysts complain that they are under pressure to write assessments that support the administration’s case for invading Iraq. On March 7, 2002, Knight Ridder reports that various military officials, intelligence employees, and diplomats in the Bush administration have charged “that the administration squelches dissenting views and that intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House’s argument that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States that preemptive military action is necessary.” [Knight Ridder, 10/7/2002]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

David Wurmser (left) and Michael Maloof (right).David Wurmser (left) and Michael Maloof (right). [Source: ThinkProgress.org (left) and PBS (right)]Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith set up a secret intelligence unit, named the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (CTEG—sometimes called the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group), to sift through raw intelligence reports and look for evidence of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. [Risen, 2006, pp. 183-184; Quarterly Journal of Speech, 5/2006 pdf file]
Modeled after "Team B" - The four to five -person unit, a “B Team” commissioned by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and modeled after the “Team B” analysis exercise of 1976 (see November 1976), is designed to study the policy implications of connections between terrorist organizations. CTEG uses powerful computers and software to scan and sort already-analyzed documents and reports from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies in an effort to consider possible interpretations and angles of analysis that these agencies may have missed due to deeply ingrained biases. Middle East specialist Harold Rhode recruits David Wurmser to head the project. Wurmser, the director of Middle East studies for the American Enterprise Institute, is a known advocate of regime change in Iraq, having expressed his views in a 1997 op-ed piece published in the Wall Street Journal (see November 12, 1997) and having participated in the drafting of the 1996 policy paper for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (see July 8, 1996). F. Michael Maloof, a former aide to Richard Perle, is also invited to take part in the effort, which becomes known internally as the “Wurmser-Maloof” project. Neither Wurmser nor Maloof are intelligence professionals [Washington Times, 1/14/2002; New York Times, 10/24/2002; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Los Angeles Times, 2/8/2004; Reuters, 2/19/2004; Quarterly Journal of Speech, 5/2006 pdf file] , but both are close friends of Feith’s.
Countering the CIA - Since the days of Team B, neoconservatives have insisted the CIA has done nothing but underestimate and downplay the threats facing the US. “They have a record over 30 years of being wrong,” says Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle, who adds that the CIA refuses to even allow for the possibility of a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda—one of the topics that most interests Wurmser and Maloof. [Unger, 2007, pp. 226-227]
Finding Facts to Fit Premises - Maloof and Wurmser set up shop in a small room on the third floor of the Pentagon, where they set about developing a “matrix” that charts connections between terrorist organizations and their support infrastructures, including support systems within nations themselves. Both men have security clearances, so they are able to draw data from both raw and finished intelligence products available through the Pentagon’s classified computer system. More highly classified intelligence is secured by Maloof from his previous office. He will later recall, “We scoured what we could get up to the secret level, but we kept getting blocked when we tried to get more sensitive materials. I would go back to my office, do a pull and bring it in.… We discovered tons of raw intelligence. We were stunned that we couldn’t find any mention of it in the CIA’s finished reports.” Each week, Wurmser and Maloof report their findings to Stephen Cambone, a fellow member of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC—see January 26, 1998) neoconservative and Feith’s chief aide. George Packer will later describe their process, writing, “Wurmser and Maloof were working deductively, not inductively: The premise was true; facts would be found to confirm it.” CTEG’s activities cause tension within the intelligence community. Critics claim that its members manipulate and distort intelligence, “cherry-picking” bits of information that support their preconceived conclusions. Although the State Department’s own intelligence outfit, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), is supposed to have access to all intelligence materials circulating through the government, INR chief Greg Thielmann later says, “I didn’t know about its [CTEG’s] existence. They were cherry-picking intelligence and packaging it for [Vice President] Cheney and [Defense Secretary] Donald Rumsfeld to take to the president. That’s the kind of rogue operation that peer review is intended to prevent.” A defense official later adds, “There is a complete breakdown in the relationship between the Defense Department and the intelligence community, to include its own Defense Intelligence Agency. Wolfowitz and company disbelieve any analysis that doesn’t support their own preconceived conclusions. The CIA is enemy territory, as far are they’re concerned.” Wurmser and Maloof’s “matrix” leads them to conclude that Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and other groups with conflicting ideologies and objectives are allowing these differences to fall to the wayside as they discover their shared hatred of the US. The group’s research also leads them to believe that al-Qaeda has a presence in such places as Latin American. For weeks, the unit will attempt to uncover evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks, a theory advocated by both Feith and Wolfowitz. [Washington Times, 1/14/2002; New York Times, 10/24/2002; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Los Angeles Times, 2/8/2004; Quarterly Journal of Speech, 5/2006 pdf file; Unger, 2007, pp. 226-227]
Denial - Defending the project, Paul Wolfowitz will tell the New York Times that the team’s purpose is to circumvent the problem “in intelligence work, that people who are pursuing a certain hypothesis will see certain facts that others won’t, and not see other facts that others will.” He insists that the special Pentagon unit is “not making independent intelligence assessments.” [New York Times, 10/24/2002] The rest of the US intelligence community is not impressed with CTEG’s work. “I don’t have any problem with [the Pentagon] bringing in a couple of people to take another look at the intelligence and challenge the assessment,” former DIA analyst Patrick Lang will later say. “But the problem is that they brought in people who were not intelligence professionals, people were brought in because they thought like them. They knew what answers they were going to get.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 226-227]
Dismissing CIA's Findings that Iraq, al-Qaeda are Not Linked - One example is an early CTEG critique of a CIA report, Iraq and al-Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship. CTEG notes that the CIA included data indicating links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and then blast the agency for “attempt[ing] to discredit, dismiss, or downgrade much of this reporting, resulting in inconsistent conclusions in many instances.” In CTEG’s view, policy makers should overlook any equivocations and discrepancies and dismiss the CIA’s guarded conclusions: “[T]he CIA report ought to be read for content only—and CIA’s interpretation ought to be ignored.” Their decision is powered by Wolfowitz, who has instructed them to ignore the intelligence community’s view that al-Qaeda and Iraq were doubtful allies. They also embrace the theory that 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta met with an Iraqi official in Prague, a theory discredited by intelligence professionals (see December 2001 and Late July 2002). Author Gordon R. Mitchell refers to the original Team B in calling the critique “1976 redux, with the same players deploying competitive intelligence analysis to sweep away policy obstacles presented by inconvenient CIA threat assessments.” In 1976, the Team B members were outsiders; now they are, Mitchell will write, “firmly entrenched in the corridors of power. Control over the levers of White House bureaucracy enabled Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to embed a Team B entity within the administration itself. The stage was set for a new kind of Team B intelligence exercise—a stealth coup staged by one arm of the government against the other.” [Quarterly Journal of Speech, 5/2006 pdf file; Agence France-Presse, 2/9/2007]
Stovepiping Information Directly to White House - The group is later accused of stovepiping intelligence directly to the White House. Lang later tells the Washington Times: “That unit had meetings with senior White House officials without the CIA or the Senate being aware of them. That is not legal. There has to be oversight.” According to Lang and another US intelligence official, the two men go to the White House several times to brief officials, bypassing CIA analysts whose analyses they disagreed with. They allegedly brief White House staffers Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, and Lewis “Scooter” Libby, chief of staff for Vice President Richard Cheney, according to congressional staffers. [Washington Times, 7/29/2004] In October 2004, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) will conclude, “[T]he differences between the judgments of the IC [intelligence community] and the DOD [Department of Defense] policy office [CTEG] might have been addressed by a discussion between the IC and DOD of underlying assumptions and the credibility and reliability of sources of raw intelligence reports. However, the IC never had the opportunity to defend its analysis, nor point out problems with DOD’s ‘alternative’ view of the Iraq-al-Qaeda relationship when it was presented to the policymakers at the White House.” Levin will add, “Unbeknownst to the IC, policymakers were getting information that was inconsistent with, and thus undermined, the professional judgments of the IC experts. The changes included information that was dubious, misrepresented, or of unknown import.” [Quarterly Journal of Speech, 5/2006 pdf file]
Passing Intelligence to INC - According to unnamed Pentagon and US intelligence officials, the group is also accused of providing sensitive CIA and Pentagon intercepts to the US-funded Iraqi National Congress, which then pass them on to the government of Iran. [Washington Times, 7/29/2004] “I knew Chalabi from years earlier,” Maloof later recalls, “so I basically asked for help in giving us direction as to where to look for information in our own system in order to be able to get a clear picture of what we were doing. [Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress] were quite helpful.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 226-227]
CTEG Evolves into OSP - By August 2002, CTEG will be absorbed into a much more expansive “alternative intelligence” group, the Office of Special Plans (OSP—see September 2002). Wurmser will later be relocated to the State Department where he will be the senior adviser to Undersecretary Of State for Arms Control John Bolton.(see September 2002). [American Conservative, 12/1/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Quarterly Journal of Speech, 5/2006 pdf file]
Public Finally Learns of CTEG's Existence - Over a year after its formation, Rumsfeld will announce its existence, but only after the media reveals the existence of the OSP (see October 24, 2002).

Entity Tags: Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, David Wurmser, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, F. Michael Maloof, Harold Rhode, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Gordon R. Mitchell, ’Team B’, Stephen J. Hadley, Paul Wolfowitz, Greg Thielmann, Richard Perle

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

A Defense Department paper for a Camp David meeting with top Bush administration officials to take place the next day (see September 15, 2001) specifies three priority targets for initial action in response to the 9/11 attacks: al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argues that of the three, al-Qaeda and Iraq pose a strategic threat to the US. Iraq’s alleged long-standing involvement in terrorism is cited, along with its interest in WMDs. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 335, 559]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Mexico’s Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources announces that it has found genetically modified (GM) corn growing in 15 different localities. It began investigating potential GM contamination after two Berkeley scientists found maize growing in Oaxaca (see October 2000) that was contaminated with genetically engineered DNA sequences from the cauliflower mosaic virus. [New York Times, 10/2/2001] Mexico does not release its study until January 2002 (see January 2002).

Entity Tags: Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The Defense Policy Board (DPB) meets in secret in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon conference room on September 19 and 20 for 19 hours to discuss the option of taking military action against Iraq. [New York Times, 10/12/2001] They also discuss how they might overcome some of the diplomatic and political pressures that would likely attempt to impede a policy of regime change in Iraq. [New York Times, 10/12/2001] Among those attending the meeting are Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Princeton academic Bernard Lewis, Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi (see 1992-1996), Chalabi’s aide Francis Brooke, and the 18 members of the DPB. [New York Times, 10/12/2001; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 236; New Yorker, 6/7/2004] Defense Intelligence Agency official Patrick Lang will later call the DPB “a neocon[servative] sanctuary,” boasting such members as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, former CIA Director James Woolsey, former arms control adviser Ken Adelman, former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, and former Vice President Dan Quayle. [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
Powell, State Officials Not Informed of Meeting - Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State Department officials in charge of US policy toward Iraq are not invited and are not informed of the meeting. A source will later tell the New York Times that Powell was irritated about not being briefed on the meeting. [New York Times, 10/12/2001]
Chalabi, Lewis Lead Discussion - During the seminar, two of Richard Perle’s invited guests, Chalabi and Lewis, lead the discussion. Lewis says that the US must encourage democratic reformers in the Middle East, “such as my friend here, Ahmed Chalabi.” Chalabi argues that Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists and asserts that Saddam Hussein’s regime has weapons of mass destruction. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 232; Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004] He also asserts “there’d be no resistance” to an attack by the US, “no guerrilla warfare from the Ba’athists, and [it would be] a quick matter of establishing a government.” [New Yorker, 6/7/2004]
Overthrow of Hussein Advocated - Attendees write a letter to President Bush calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein. “[E]ven if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack [of 9/11], any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism,” the letter reads. The letter is published in the Washington Times on September 20 (see September 20, 2001) in the name of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank that believes the US needs to shoulder the responsibility for maintaining “peace” and “security” in the world by strengthening its global hegemony. [Project for the New American Century, 9/20/2001; Manila Times, 7/19/2003] Bush reportedly rejects the letter’s proposal, as both Vice President Dick Cheney and Powell agree that there is no evidence implicating Saddam Hussein in the 9/11 attacks. [New York Times, 10/12/2001]
Woolsey Sent to Find Evidence of Hussein's Involvement - As a result of the meeting, Wolfowitz sends Woolsey to London to find evidence that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attacks and the earlier 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (see Mid-September-October 2001). [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]

Entity Tags: Newt Gingrich, Paul Wolfowitz, James Woolsey, Kenneth Adelman, Patrick Lang, Harold Brown, Defense Policy Board, Francis Brooke, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, Fred C. Ikle, Ahmed Chalabi, Dan Quayle, Bernard Lewis, Henry A. Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Douglas Feith suggests in a draft memo [Washington Post, 8/7/2004] that the US should consider “hitting terrorists outside the Middle East in the initial offensive, perhaps deliberately selecting a non-al-Qaeda target like Iraq.” Other regions he proposes attacking include South America and Southeast Asia. He reasons that an initial attack against such targets would “surprise… the terrorists” and catch them off guard. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 277, 533; Newsweek, 8/8/2004] According to Newsweek, the content of Feith’s memo derives from the work of the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (see Shortly After September 11, 2001), a project headed by Michael Maloof and David Wurmser. The group suggested that an attack on the remote Triborder region, where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil meet and where Iranian-backed Hezbollah is said to have a presence, would have a ripple effect among international Islamic militant groups. [Newsweek, 8/8/2004] Feith later says his memo merely expands upon ideas put forth by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a memo (see September 19, 2001) the secretary wrote the day before to Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Washington Post, 8/7/2004] The logic behind proposing strikes against targets outside of the Middle East, Feith says, was based on the need to “cast a wide net” and achieve “additional objectives,” such as creating fissures in the enemy network, highlighting “the global nature of the conflicts,” showing “seriousness of US military purpose,” and demonstrating that the “war would not be limited geographically to Afghanistan.” [Washington Post, 8/7/2004]

Entity Tags: David Wurmser, Douglas Feith, F. Michael Maloof

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

The Observer reports that investigators of the anthrax attacks (see October 5-November 21, 2001) believe Iraq is the prime suspect. One CIA source says, “They aren’t making this stuff in caves in Afghanistan. ‘This is prima facie evidence of the involvement of a state intelligence agency. Maybe Iran has the capability. But it doesn’t look likely politically. That leaves Iraq.” [Observer, 10/14/2001] However, this theory only remains the predominant one for a few days. On October 19, the New York Times is dismissive of the Iraq theory and suggests al-Qaeda or a disgruntled American loner could be behind the attacks instead (see October 19, 2001). In November, the American loner theory will become predominant (see November 10, 2001). But in late 2002, with war against Iraq growing increasingly likely, the Iraq theory appears to make a comeback (see October 28, 2002).

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 2001 Anthrax Attacks

When Dr. Ignacio Chapela, a microbial ecologist who recently discovered the presence of genetically modified (GM) genes in Mexican maize (see October 2000), meets with a Mexican agricultural official to discuss the GM contamination, he is warned not to publish his research. Chapela later recalls in an interview with BBC Newsnight, “He [told] me how terrible it was that I was doing the research and how dangerous it would be for me to publish.” When he refuses to back off the issue, the official suggests that Chapela join a research team tasked with proving that the suspected GM genes are actually naturally occuring gene sequences similar to the ones in GM corn. “We were supposed to find this in an elite scientific research team of which I was being invited to be part of and the other people were two people from Monsanto and two people from Dupont supposedly… .” Monsanto denies its scientists were involved in any such study. Chapela also meets with Mexico’s Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, whose officials are concerned about the discovery. They launch their own investigation and also find evidence of contamination (see September 18, 2001). [BBC, 6/2/2002]

Entity Tags: Ignacio Chapela, Mexico, Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, says in a speech delivered at the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s annual dinner that Saddam Hussein “is busily at work on a nuclear weapon” and that “it’s simply a matter of time before he acquires nuclear weapons.” His assertion is based on information that was provided to him personally by Iraqi defector Khidir Hamza. According to Perle, Hamza said that after the Israeli strikes against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 (see June 7, 1981), Iraq built some 400 uranium enrichment facilities all over the country in order to protect its nuclear program from future attacks. “Some look like farmhouses, some of them look like classrooms, some of them look like warehouses. You’ll never find them. They don’t turn out much but every day they turn out a little bit of nuclear materials.” [Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11/14/2001]

Entity Tags: Khidir Hamza, Richard Perle

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle, discussing the US’s planned reaction to the 9/11 attacks, says that Iraq is next on the US’s military strike list. CNN anchor John King asks, “Next phase Saddam Hussein?” and Perle replies, “Absolutely.” The day before, on ABC, Perle explained why the US had to make such a move: “Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein, plus his known contact with terrorists, including al-Qaeda terrorists, is simply a threat too large to continue to tolerate.” And what would the upshot of such an invasion be? Perle tells his CNN listeners, “We would be seen as liberators in Iraq.” [PBS, 4/25/2007]

Entity Tags: ABC News, Richard Perle, CNN, Al-Qaeda

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

Berkeley grad student David Quist and Dr. Ignacio Chapela, a microbial ecologist, publish the results of a study (see October 2000) finding that native Mexican maize has been contaminated with genetically modified genes. The study—published by the British journal Nature after an eight-month long peer-review process—presents two arguments. In addition to reporting the discovery that some of Oaxaca’s maize contains transgenic material, the paper says they found transgene fragments scattered throughout the plants’ modified DNA. [Quist and Chapela, 11/29/2001 pdf file] The study’s second conclusion causes a controversy because it contradicts the assertions of the biotech industry that genetic engineering is a safe and exact science, and that the technology is capable of controlling precisely where the modified sequences are positioned, how they will be expressed, and whether or not they will be passed on to successive generations. One of the main arguments of the technology’s detractors is that the methods used to insert trangenic genes into an organism’s DNA cannot be done with accuracy and therefore are liable to produce unpredictable and undesirable effects. Following the publication of Quist and Chapela’s article, other Berkeley biologists—who work in a Berkeley University program partially funded by Syngenta, a major biotech firm—criticize the study, leading Quist and Chapela to acknowledge that the analyses of two of the eight gene sequences in their paper were flawed. However they stand by their conclusions that the remaining six sequences contained scattered modified gene sequences. Critics of the article also note that both Quist and Chapela strongly oppose the genetic engineering of crops and participated in an unsuccessful effort to block the Berkeley-Syngenta partnership. The issue soon grows into a very large controversy that some suggest is fueled by the efforts of the biotech industry, and in particular, the Bivings Group, a PR firm on Monsanto’s payroll. Forum postings at AgBioWorld.org are reportedly traced to a Bivings’ employee. It is also noted that another person posting on the forum makes “frequent reference to the Center for Food and Agricultural Research, an entity that appears to exist only online and whose domain is [allegedly] registered to a Bivings employee.” Bivings denies that it is in any way connected to the forum postings. In spite of the controversy surrounding the article’s second finding, the other conclusion, that Mexico’s maize has been contaminated, is largely uncontested, and is buttressed by at least three other studies (see January 2002; February 19, 2003-February 21, 2003). [Associated Press, 4/4/2002; East Bay Express, 5/29/2002; BBC, 6/2/2002; Mother Jones, 7/9/2002]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Bivings Group, David Quist, Ignacio Chapela, Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Some months after the arrival of 40 tons of Monsanto’s Bt cotton seeds (see March 15, 2001), after a change in government, Indonesia’s environment ministry issues a decree requiring an environmental impact assessment for Monsanto’s cottonseeds. [US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1/6/2005; Asia Times, 1/20/2005]

Entity Tags: Indonesia

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Mexico’s Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources publishes the results of its study (see September 18, 2001) on transgenic contamination in Oaxaca and nearby Puebla. The study found contamination levels between 3 and 13 percent in eleven communities and between 20 and 60 percent in four others. Tests conducted on maize sold in government food stores revealed that 37 percent contained the GM genes. [East Bay Express, 5/29/2002]

Entity Tags: Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources

Timeline Tags: Seeds

President Bush orders the CIA to start focusing on Iraq, and find evidence that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. CIA analysts will not find any hard evidence of Iraqi WMDs. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 169]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In an unprecedented move, Nature runs an editorial pulling its support for a controversial study by Berkeley scientists David Quist and Dr. Ignacio Chapela on genetic contamination of native Mexican maize. The study, published the previous fall (see Late November 2001), reported that native maize in Oaxaca had been contaminated with genetically modified (GM) genes and that transgene fragments were found scattered throughout the plants’ modified DNA. Immediately after being published, the article came under attack by pro-GM scientists who disputed Quist’s and Chapela’s second finding. “In light of these discussions and the diverse advice received, Nature has concluded that the evidence available is not sufficient to justify the publication of the original paper,” the journal’s editor, Philip Campbell, writes. “As the authors nevertheless wish to stand by the available evidence for their conclusions, we feel it best simply to make these circumstances clear, to publish the criticisms, the authors’ response and new data, and to allow our readers to judge the science for themselves.” Though the journal withdraws its support, it does not retract the article. [Associated Press, 4/4/2002; East Bay Express, 5/29/2002; Mother Jones, 7/9/2002] The decision to withdraw support is based on the opinions of three unnamed independent experts whom Nature consulted. Only one of those experts, however, disputed Quist’s and Chapela’s finding that there was evidence of contamination. All three agreed that the second finding—that transgene fragments were scattered throughout the plants’ modified DNA—was flawed. [BBC, 6/2/2002]

Entity Tags: David Quist, Ignacio Chapela, Philip Campbell

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Jorge Soberon, the executive secretary of Mexico’s biodiversity commission, announces that government scientists have confirmed that genetically modified (GM) corn is growing in Mexico. The finding supports what two US scientists reported several months earlier (see Late November 2001) in a highly controversial paper published in the journal Science. Calling it the “world’s worst case of contamination by GM material,” he says 95 percent of the sites sampled in Oaxaca and Puebla were found to have GM maize. Samples taken from these sites indicated a contamination level as high as 35 percent. [Daily Telegraph, 4/19/2002; Mother Jones, 7/9/2002]

Entity Tags: Jorge Soberon, Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Federal Court of Canada Justice Andrew MacKay orders Percy Schmeiser to pay Monsanto $153,000 CAD in order to compensate the company for a portion of its legal costs. Monsanto sued Schmeiser in 2000 (see June 5, 2000-June 21, 2000) for illegally planting and harvesting canola in 1998 that he “knew or ought to have known” contained Monsanto’s patent-protected Roundup-resistant gene. This sum of money is in addition to the $19,832 CAD that Schmeiser has already been ordered to pay the company (see May 23, 2001). [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 4/29/2002]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Percy Schmeiser, Terry Zakreski

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Percy Schmeiser’s lawyer, Terry Zakreski, in his argument before the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals, cites 17 grounds for the appeal of Judge MacKay’s March 2001 decision (see March 29, 2001) against Schmeiser. The judge had ruled that Schmeiser had infringed on Monsanto’s patent when he planted canola seed in 1998 that he “knew or ought to have known” was resistant to Roundup. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 5/16/2002; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 5/17/2002; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 5/17/2002; Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 5/17/2002] Monsanto lawyer Roger Hughes is also present for a cross-appeal to contest MacKay’s decision to award the company only $19,832 CAD—the figure MacKay determined was Schmeiser’s profit from the sale of his 1998 crop. According to Monsanto’s calculations, Schmeiser’s profits were $105,935 CAD, or 74 percent of his $142,625 CAD gross. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 5/17/2002]
Zakreski's Grounds for Appeal - Some of the issues that Zakreski contends MacKay made erroneous judgments about include the following (As summarized in the 12/31/2001 Court of Appeals Submission):
bullet Interpreting the Patent Act and the Patent so as to deprive farmers the ownership of canola plants and seeds containing the patented gene. Zakreski says that MacKay was wrong to conclude that the Patent Act gives Monsanto “ownership in its patented gene and cell” because the act only grants it the right to make, construct, and use the patented gene and sell it to others to be used. It does not grant ownership. Zakreski argues that according to common law, ownership rights come from possession and control of, or intent to control, a property; and Schmeiser had both possession and control. Zakreski says MacKay’s decision permits Monsanto “to invade the common law property rights of [a farmer] in order to assert its patent rights” merely because its “patented gene happens to be in a seed or plant belonging to a farmer.” [Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 12-14 pdf file]
bullet Interpreting the Patent Act and the Patent so as to deprive farmers of there vested right to being able to save and re-use their own canola seed that may contain the patented gene. Zakreski says that the implication of MacKay’s interpretation “is that no farmer who becomes aware, or ought to be aware, that his canola contains the gene patented by [Monsanto] will have the right to save and reuse his canola seed.” [Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 13 pdf file]
bullet Finding that it is not necessary that a farmer take advantage of the patented gene by in-crop spraying with a glyphosate based herbicide such as Roundup in order to infringe the Patent. Zakreski says that MacKay was wrong to conclude that Schmeiser had used the patent by merely growing plants containing Monsanto’s gene. He argues that the utility of the patented gene can only be exploited when the crop is sprayed with Roundup, which Schmeiser did not do. The gene, notes Zakreski, is not used at any other time and is certainly not used when the plant is merely growing because the patented gene does not help the plant grow in any way. He cites a case in British Admiralty law, where a sea captain was accused of patent infringement because he had a patent-protected pump aboard his ship. The court found there was no infringement because the pump was not used . [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/21/2001; Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 21-28 pdf file]
bullet Determining that the Respondents had not waived their patent rights by the “unconfined release” of their invention. Zakreski says that while MacKay apparently did not disagree that the “unconfined release” of an invention can result in the waiver of a patentholder’s rights, the judge believed that Monsanto took adequate steps to control the spread of its patented gene. Zakreski says this is not true. He says that several of the steps undertaken by Monsanto cited by MacKay were responses prompted by the fact that the gene had already spread. Thus Monsanto’s actions are evidence that Monsanto had “already lost control of their own product.” Zakreski also notes that where Monsanto had an opportunity to reduce the risk of gene drift, it chose not to. For example, (1) Monsanto’s Technology Use Agreement “places no restrictions on growers aimed at reducing (much less preventing) the escape of genetically modified canola,” does not require seed segregation, does not require a buffer zone, and did not require methods of transport that would have prevented seed loss; and (2) at Monsanto’s informational meetings, which all new Roundup Ready Canola growers are required to attend, farmers were not warned about cross-pollination, not instructed to maintain a buffer strip, not told to warn neighbors who grow non-transgenic canola, not told to segregate seed, and not told to prevent seed loss during transport. [Star Phoenix (Saskatoon), 6/21/2001; Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 29-35 pdf file]
bullet Finding that there was “no evidence” that the canola seed used by the appellants to see the 1997 canola crop, included genetically modified seed and pollen carried into field #6 from a neighbor’s field. Zakreski says that this statement is false because it ignores Schmeiser’s testimony that his 1997 canola crop “came from field number 1 and field number 6.” [Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 35-37 pdf file]
bullet Giving undue weight and significance to the internal sampling and testing done by the Respondents. As he did in his original closing argument, Zakreski argues that the test results were invalid because the samples were not obtained, stored, or tested in a scientific manner or by independent parties. He also notes that there were multiple contradictions in the observed properties of the samples as they changed possession from one person to another, suggesting that the seed that was ultimately tested may not have actually been seed from Schmeiser’s farm. [Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 37-41 pdf file]
bullet Determining that the Respondents were entitled to the profits made by Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. for its entire 1998 canola crop. Zakreski notes that (1) Monsanto’s patent grants it exclusive rights to sell its invention “to others to be used”; and (2) that Schmeiser sold his canola crop “to a grain elevator to be sent to a commercial crushing plant to make the canola seed into canola oil.” Thus, “the presence or absence of Monsanto’s patented gene added no value whatsoever to the canola seed which was, clearly, the Appellants’ property.” The judge’s ruling to award 100 percent of Schmeiser’s profit to Monsanto was erroneous, Zakreski argues, since Schmeiser “realized no profit or advantage from the presence of the patented gene.” [Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 43 pdf file]
bullet Issuing an injunction that would impair the Appellants from engaging in the traditional farming practice of saving and re-using canola seed during the term of the Patent. Zakreski says that the injunction would make it illegal for Schmeiser to farm because unwanted Roundup Ready Canola volunteers continue to grow in his fields (see Spring 1999), even though he planted his fields in 1999 with entirely new seed (see Summer 1999). [Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Appellants, Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. Percy Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 12/3/2001, pp. 44 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Terry Zakreski, Percy Schmeiser

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, says that “informants within the Iraqi intelligence community,” have revealed “that Hussein’s VX stockpile is far larger than the 3.9 tons Iraq reported—something UNSCOM inspectors have long suspected,” reports the Washington Post. “Chalabi also says that the VX had been converted into a dry salt for long term storage and was positioned in various sites across Iraq for use in the event of a foreign attack. UNSCOM officials said the account seemed credible, given what was learned about Iraq’s VX program in the final months of weapons inspections.” [Washington Post, 7/31/2002]

Entity Tags: Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi, United Nations Special Commission

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Cheney speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars.Cheney speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars. [Source: White House]In a speech to the Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vice President Dick Cheney says Saddam Hussein will “seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.” He also states unequivocally that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.… What he wants is time, and more time to husband his resources to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons program, and to gain possession of nuclear weapons.… Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined,” he says. “The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.… The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents, and they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago.” Therefore he argues, the answer is not weapons inspections. “Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of shoot and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.” He also says: “Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace.” [White House, 8/26/2002]
First White House Assertion of Iraq's Nuclear Program - Cheney’s speech marks the first major statement from the White House regarding the Bush administration’s Iraq policy following a flood of criticisms from former officials. Significantly, the speech was not cleared by the CIA or the State Department. [Newsweek, 9/9/2002] Furthermore, Cheney’s comments dismissing the need for the return of inspectors, were not cleared by President Bush, according to White House chief of staff Andrew Card. [Newsweek, 9/9/2002] The speech creates a media stir because it is the first time a senior US official has asserted Iraq has nuclear capabilities with such certainty. The CIA is astonished by the claim. CIA official Jami Miscik will later recall: “He said that Saddam was building his nuclear program. Our reaction was, ‘Where is he getting that stuff from? Does he have a source of information that we don’t know about?’” CIA analysts redouble their efforts to collect and review evidence on Iraq and nuclear weapons, but analysts know very little. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 167-169] Cheney’s assertions are contradicted by a broad base of military experts. [Dean, 2004, pp. 138]
Powell 'Blindsided' by Cheney - Three days after the speech, a State Department source tells CNN that Secretary of State Colin Powell’s view clashes with that which was presented in Cheney’s speech, explaining that the secretary of state is opposed to any military action in which the US would “go it alone… as if it doesn’t give a damn” what other nations think. The source also says that Powell and “others in the State Department were ‘blindsided’ by Cheney’s ‘time is running out’ speech… and were just as surprised as everyone else.” [CNN, 8/30/2002] Author and Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward will later describe Powell as “dumbfounded.” [Roberts, 2008, pp. 145] Cheney did, however, inform President Bush he would be speaking to the VFW. He did not provide Bush a copy of his speech. Bush merely told Cheney, “Don’t get me into trouble.” [Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 175]
'Off Script' - Current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later observe that it was always a tactic of the Iraq campaign strategy for Cheney to “lean a little more forward in his rhetoric than the president.” However, McClellan will go on to say that Cheney did not always “stay on message,” and will blame Cheney’s “deep-seated certitude, even arrogance” that sometimes operates “to the detriment of the president.” Cheney’s assertion to the VFW that it would be pointless to send UN inspectors back to Iraq is, McClellan will reflect, “off script.” Bush wants to continue to “show that he [is] exhausting all diplomatic options” before invading Iraq. [McClellan, 2008, pp. 138]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, US Department of State, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Scott McClellan, Jami Miscik, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Bob Woodward

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

During a Defense Department news briefing on Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says: “We know that they were a lot closer than any of the experts had estimated they would be with respect to [developing] a nuclear weapon. To the extent that they have kept their nuclear scientists together and working on these efforts, one has to assume they’ve not been playing tiddlywinks.” [US Department of Defense, 9/3/2002; Associated Press, 9/3/2002; United Press International, 9/3/2002]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

At a meeting of the White House Iraq Group, speechwriter Michael Gerson suggests that Bush argue in his next speech that the US should not wait until there is conclusive evidence that Iraq has acquired a nuclear weapon because the first sign of a “smoking gun” may be a “mushroom cloud.” Gerson’s suggestion is met with enthusiastic approval. The soundbite is so well liked that the phrase is leaked to the New York Times before the speech, appearing in an article on September 8 (see September 8, 2002). [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 35] Gerson, a devout evangelical Christian, was trained by former Nixon aide Charles Colson, whom Colson’s former colleague John Dean describes as “Nixon’s hatchet man and political schemer.” [Dean, 2004, pp. 62]

Entity Tags: Michael Gerson, White House Iraq Group

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Condoleezza Rice appears on CNN to discuss the alleged threat posed to the US by Saddam Hussein. She insists that Iraq is intent on developing a nuclear weapon. “We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance—into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to—high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon. And we know that when the inspectors assessed this after the Gulf War, he was far, far closer to a crude nuclear device than anybody thought, maybe six months from a crude nuclear device. The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t what the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” [CNN, 9/8/2002; CNN, 9/8/2002; New York Times, 7/20/2003; US House Committee on Government Reform, 3/16/2004] In his 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, author Ron Suskind writes, “The statement sent off shock waves. Rice was criticized for fear-mongering, for suggesting that there was evidence that Hussein might have such a weapon. Arguments about proof, though, were missing the point—Rice’s roundabout argument was that the United States should act whether or not it found a “smoking gun.” She was showing an edge of the actual US policy: the severing of fact-based analysis from forceful response; acting on any inkling was now appropriate—to be safe, to be sure, to get an opponent before he can develop capability, so others know to not even start down that path.” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 170]

Entity Tags: White House Iraq Group, Ron Suskind, Condoleezza Rice

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Vice President Dick Cheney, appearing on CNN’s American Morning, says: “I think that the people of Iraq would welcome the US force as liberators; they would not see us as oppressors, by any means.” [American Morning with Paula Zahn, 9/9/2002]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In remarks made at a foreign policy conference at the University of Virginia, Philip Zelikow says that Iraq is more of a threat to Israel than to the US and that protecting Israel would be a major motive for a US-Iraq war. Zelikow’s speech goes unreported at the time but will come to light in a 2004 article. Zelikow says: “Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I’ll tell you what I think the real threat (is) and actually has been since 1990—it’s the threat against Israel.… And this is the threat that dare not speak its name, because the Europeans don’t care deeply about that threat, I will tell you frankly. And the American government doesn’t want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell.” Zelikow is at the time a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), and will later serve as the executive director to the 9/11 Commission. [Asia Times Online, 3/31/2004] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt will later use Zelikow’s statement in their controversial paper “The Israel Lobby” as evidence that the Iraq War was launched in part to advance Israel’s security. [London Review of Books, 3/23/2006; London Review of Books, 4/25/2006; London Review of Books, 4/25/2006]

Entity Tags: John Mearsheimer, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Stephen Walt, Philip Zelikow

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline

The White House publishes a 26-page government white paper titled, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” which seeks to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein represents a serious and imminent threat to the United States. The report, written by White House Iraq Group member James Wilkinson, relies primarily on public sources, including reports that have been published by human rights groups and the State Department, as well as various newspaper articles, including two by the New York Times. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 48] Section 5 of the report deals with “Saddam Hussein’s support for international terrorism,” though it makes no attempt to tie Hussein’s government to al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. It lists six points linking Saddam Hussein to terrorist activities, some dating as far back as the ‘70s. One of the points criticizes Iraq for its ties to the Mujahadeen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), an obscure militant Iranian dissident group whose main office is in Baghdad. The report says: “Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several US military personnel and US civilians.” The paper notes that the US State Department classified MKO as a “foreign terrorist organization” in 1997, “accusing the Baghdad-based group of a long series of bombings, guerilla cross-border raids and targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders.” [Newsweek, 9/26/2002 Sources: Richard Durbin] The administration is quickly ridiculed for making the claim when, two weeks later, Newsweek reports that MKO’s front organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, has a small office in the National Press Building in Washington, DC. It is also reported that only two years beforehand this very group had been supported by then-Senator John Ashcroft and more than 200 other members of Congress. On several issues the senator and his colleagues had expressed solidarity with MKO at the behest of their Iranian-American constituencies. [Newsweek, 9/26/2002] Another allegation included in the paper states that Iraqi defector Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, a civil engineer, “had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.” According to the White House dossier, Haideri “supported his claims with stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical specifications.” Ten months earlier, the CIA had debriefed Haideri in Bangkok and concluded from the results of a polygraph that Haideri account was a complete fabrication (see December 17, 2001). [Executive Office of the President, 9/12/2002 pdf file]

Entity Tags: White House Iraq Group, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, Osama bin Laden, US Congress, John Ashcroft, James R. Wilkinson, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

The French arrange a backchannel meeting between a friend of Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Hadithi and the CIA’s station chief in Paris, Bill Murray. Sabri’s friend, a Lebanese journalist, tells Murray that Sabri would be willing to provide the CIA with accurate information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program in exchange for $1 million. The CIA agrees to advance the journalist $200,000. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 45; MSNBC, 3/21/2006] When CIA Director George Tenet announces the deal during a high-level meeting at the White House—attended by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice—the news is greeted with enthusiasm. “They were enthusiastic because they said, they were excited that we had a high-level penetration of Iraqis,” Tyler Drumheller, the agency’s head of spying in Europe, later tells 60 Minutes. [CBS News, 4/23/2006] But Sabri does not tell the CIA what the White House is expecting to hear. In a New York hotel room, the Lebanese journalist says that according to Sabri Iraq does not have a significant, active biological weapons program. He does however acknowledge that Iraq has some “poison gas” left over from the first Gulf War. Regarding the country’s alleged nuclear weapons program, Sabri’s friend says the Iraqis do not have an active program because they lack the fissile material needed to develop a nuclear bomb. But he does concede that Hussein desperately wants one. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 62-63; MSNBC, 3/21/2006] “He told us that they had no active weapons of mass destruction programs,” Drumheller, will recall. [Unger, 2007, pp. 246-247] The White House immediately loses interest in Sabri as a source after the New York meeting. Sabri, Bush says, is merely telling the US “the same old thing.” The CIA continues to corroborate material provided to the agency by Sabri. Wiretaps on Sabri’s phone conversations by French intelligence back up Sabri’s claims, but Bush could not care less. “Bush didn’t give a f_ck about the intelligence,” a CIA officer will later say. “He had his mind made up.” CIA agent Luis (whose full name has never been disclosed) and John Maguire, the chief and deputy chief of the Iraq Operations Group, also lose interest in the lead. In one confrontation between Maguire and Murray, Maguire allegedly says: “One of these days you’re going to get it. This is not about intelligence. This is about regime change.” Drumheller will agree, saying the White House is “no longer interested.… They said, ‘Well, this isn’t about intel anymore. This is about regime change.’” [MSNBC, 3/21/2006; CBS News, 4/23/2006; Unger, 2007, pp. 246-247]

Entity Tags: Naji Sabri Hadithi, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Luis, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Bill Murray, Central Intelligence Agency, John Maguire

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Eleven days after the New York Times published a front-page article detailing Iraq’s supposed attempt to procure components for creating nuclear weapons (see August 2002 and September 8, 2002), the Washington Post’s Joby Warrick has a story published, “Evidence on Iraq Challenged; Experts Question if Tubes Were Meant for Weapons Program,” that disputes the Times’ article and questions whether the components—aluminum tubes—are indeed intended for nuclear use. Warrick cites “a report by independent experts” from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) questioning the conclusion that the tubes must be for use in constructing nuclear weapons (see September 23, 2002). The ISIS report also notes that the Bush administration is trying to rein in dissent among its own analysts about how to interpret the evidence provided by the aluminum tubes. “By themselves, these attempted procurements are not evidence that Iraq is in possession of, or close to possessing, nuclear weapons,” the report says. “They do not provide evidence that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant or when such a plant could be operational.” In recent days, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has told television viewers that the tubes “are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs” (see September 8, 2002). But Warrick’s story is buried on page 18 of the Post and widely ignored. Author Craig Unger will later write: “No one paid attention. Once the conventional wisdom had been forged, mere facts did not suffice to change things.” [Washington Post, 9/19/2002; Unger, 2007, pp. 254]

Entity Tags: Institute for Science and International Security, Condoleezza Rice, Craig Unger, New York Times, Joby Warrick, Washington Post

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In a classified session, George Tenet and other intelligence officials brief the Senate Intelligence Committee on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq (see October 1, 2002). In his summary of the document, Tenet reportedly says that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Niger. Though he mentions that there are some doubts about the reliability of the evidence, he does not provide any details. [Washington Post, 6/12/2003 pdf file; ABC News, 6/16/2003] Tenet also says that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq (see July 2001) were intended for its nuclear program, that the country has a fleet of mobile biological weapons labs, and that Iraq has developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be armed with chemical or biological weapons for an attack against the US mainland. At one point during the session, a committee staff member slips Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) a note suggesting that the senator ask Tenet what “technically collected” evidence does the CIA have that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. Biden asks the question and Tenet replies, “None, Senator.” Everyone becomes silent. Biden, apparently annoyed by the answer, asks Tenet, “George, do you want me to clear the staff out of the room,” meaning that if the intelligence is so classified that it shouldn’t be shared with staffers he will ask them to leave. But Tenet says, “There’s no reason to.” When Tenet finishes his testimony, he leaves to attend his son’s basketball game. Other senators also leave. The next witnesses are Carl Ford, Jr., the State Department’s chief intelligence officer, and Rhys Williams, the chief intelligence officer in the Energy Department. Both men say they do not believe that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were intended for a nuclear program. But few senators are still in the room to hear these opinions. After the hearing, Peter Zimmerman, the committee’s scientific advisor, asks Robert Walpole the CIA’s national intelligence officer for nuclear weapons, to show him one of the tubes referred to by Tenet. Zimmerman looks at the sample Walpole brought and becomes immediately doubtful. He then grills Walpole on several technical details, who fails to provide any convincing answers. Zimmerman gets the impression that Walpole has little understanding of centrifuges. “I remember going home that night and practically putting my fist through the wall half a dozen times,” Zimmerman later recalls. “I was frustrated as I’ve ever been. I remember saying to my wife, ‘They’re going to war and there’s not a damn piece of evidence to substantiate it.’” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 117-119]

Entity Tags: Joseph Biden, Carl W. Ford, Jr., Robert Walpole, Peter Zimmerman, George J. Tenet, Rhys Williams

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

In his weekly radio address, President Bush tells the nation: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more, and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.” Many Americans are shocked and frightened by Bush’s flat litany of assertions. What they do not know is that none of them are true. The CIA had reluctantly agreed to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq less than three weeks before (see September 5, 2002); the result is an NIE packed with half-truths, exaggerations, and outright lies (see October 1, 2002). None of Bush’s statements are supported by hard intelligence, and all will later be disproven. [White House, 9/28/2002; Center for Public Integrity, 1/23/2008] In 2007, author Craig Unger will write that the conflict seems to have gotten personal with Bush. “There’s no doubt [Saddam Hussein’s] hatred is mainly directed against us,” Bush says during the address. “There’s no doubt he can’t stand us. After all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one time.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 264]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Fallujah II chemical plant.Fallujah II chemical plant. [Source: CIA]In a televised speech, President Bush presents the administration’s case that Saddam Hussein’s regime is a threat to the security of the nation and insists that regime change would improve lifes for Iraqis. “Some worry that a change of leadership in Iraq could create instability and make the situation worse. The situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq. The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan’s citizens improved after the Taliban.” The speech is widely criticized for including false and exaggerated statements.
Iraq has attempted to purchase equipment used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons - Bush claims that a shipment of 3,000 aluminum tubes to Iraq, which were intercepted in Jordan by US authorities in July of 2001 (see July 2001), had been destined for use in a uranium enrichment program. But by this time numerous experts and government scientists have already warned the administration against making this allegation. [US President, 10/14/2002] Three weeks before Bush’s speech, The Washington Post ran a story on the aluminum tubes. The article summarized a study by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), disputing the administration’s claim that the tubes were to be used for gas centrifuges. The report was authored by the institute’s president and founder, David Albright, a respected nuclear physicist, who had investigated Iraq’s nuclear weapons program after the First Gulf War as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection team and who has spoken before Congress on numerous occasions. In his study, he concluded that Iraq’s attempts to import the tubes “are not evidence that Iraq is in possession of, or close to possessing, nuclear weapons” and “do not provide evidence that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant or when such a plant could be operational.” [Washington Post, 9/19/2002; Guardian, 10/9/2002; San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002; Albright, 10/9/2003] Soon after the speech, Albright tells The Guardian newspaper that there is still no evidence to substantiate that interpretation. As one unnamed specialist at the US Department of Energy explains to the newspaper, “I would just say there is not much support for that [nuclear] theory around here.” [Guardian, 10/9/2002] The Washington Post article also reported that government experts on nuclear technology who disagreed with the White House view had told Albright that the administration expected them to remain silent. [Washington Post, 9/19/2002; Independent, 9/22/2002] Houston G. Wood III, a retired Oak Ridge physicist considered to be “among the most eminent living experts” on gas centrifuges reviewed the tube question in August 2001 (see 1950s) and concluded at that time that it was very unlikely that the tubes had been imported to be used for centrifuges in a uranium enrichment program. He later tells The Washington Post in mid-2003 that “it would have been extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges,” adding that it stretched “the imagination to come up with a way.” He also says that other centrifuge experts whom he knew shared his assessment of the tubes. [Washington Post, 8/10/2003] In addition to the several outside experts who criticized the tubes allegation, analysts within the US intelligence community also doubted the claim. Less than a week before Bush’s speech, the Energy Department and the State Department’s intelligence branch, the INR, had appended a statement to a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq disputing the theory (see October 1, 2002). [Central Intelligence Agency, 10/1/2002 Sources: David Albright]
Saddam Hussein ordered his nuclear program to continue in 1998 - Bush says that US intelligence has information that Saddam Hussein ordered his nuclear program to continue after inspectors left in 1998. “Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium enrichment sites,” Bush charges. “That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002; US President, 10/14/2002] But Bush’s “high-ranking” source turns out to be Khidir Hamza, who is considered by many to be an unreliable source. Albright, who was president of the Institute for Science and International Security where Hamza worked as an analyst from 1997 to 1999, says that after Hamza defected, “he went off the edge [and] started saying irresponsible things.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002] And General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law who was in charge of the dictator’s former weapons program but who defected in 1995, told UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors, as well as US and British intelligence, that Khidir Hamza was “a professional liar.” Kamel explained, “He worked with us, but he was useless and always looking for promotions. He consulted with me but could not deliver anything…. He was even interrogated by a team before he left and was allowed to go.” [United Nations Special Commission, 4/16/1998; New Yorker, 5/12/2003]
Iraq is developing drones that could deploy chemical and biological weapons - The President claims that Iraq is developing drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which “could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.” He goes so far as to say, “We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.” [Guardian, 10/9/2002; US President, 10/14/2002] But this claim comes shortly after US intelligence agencies completed a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, in which Air Force intelligence had disputed the drone allegation (see October 1, 2002). Bush’s drone allegation is quickly derided by experts and other sources. The Guardian of London reports two days later that according to US military experts, “Iraq had been converting eastern European trainer jets, known as L-29s, into drones, but… that with a maximum range of a few hundred miles they were no threat to targets in the US.” [Guardian, 10/9/2002] And the San Francisco Chronicle will cite experts who say that “slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles would likely be shot down as soon as they crossed Iraq’s borders” because “Iraqi airspace is closely monitored by US and British planes and radar systems.” The report will also note, “It’s also unclear how the vehicles would reach the US mainland—the nearest point is Maine, almost 5, 500 miles away—without being intercepted.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002] Anthony Cordesman, a security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will say he believes the drone allegation is unrealistic. In an interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, he says, “As a guesstimate, Iraq’s present holdings of delivery systems and chemical and biological weapons seem most likely to be so limited in technology and operational lethality that they do not constrain US freedom of action or do much to intimidate Iraq’s neighbors.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002] These criticisms of Bush’s claim are validated after the US invasion of Iraq. Two US government scientists involved in the post-invasion hunt for weapons of mass destruction will tell the Associated Press in August 2003 that they inspected the drones and concluded that they were never a threat to the US. “We just looked at the UAVs and said, ‘There’s nothing here. There’s no room to put anything in here,’” one of the scientists will say. “The US scientists, weapons experts who spoke on condition of anonymity, reached their conclusions after studying the small aircraft and interviewing Iraqi missile experts, system designers and Gen. Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, the Iraqi head of the military facility where the UAVs were designed,” the Associated Press will explain in its report. [Associated Press, 8/24/2003]
Saddam Hussein could give terrorists weapons of mass destruction - Bush asserts, “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.” [US President, 10/14/2002] But not only have numerous experts and inside sources disputed this theory (see July 2002-March 19, 2003), US intelligence’s National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq—completed just one week before—concluded that this is an unlikely scenario (see October 1, 2002). “Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States,” the document clearly stated. “Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be deterred he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002]
Iraq rebuilding facilities associated with production of biological and chemical weapons - Bush claims that surveillance photos indicate that Iraq “is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons.” [US President, 10/14/2002] On the following day, photos are published on the White House website showing that Iraq had repaired three sites damaged by US bombs—the Al Furat Manufacturing Facility, the Nassr Engineering Establishment Manufacturing Facility, and Fallujah II. [US President, 10/14/2002] But no evidence is provided by the White House demonstrating that these sites have resumed activities related to the production of weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi authorities will give reporters a tour of the facilities on October 10 (see October 10, 2002).
Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases - Bush alleges that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda operatives “in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.” [US President, 10/14/2002] The claim is based on a September 2002 CIA document which had warned that its sources were of “varying reliability” and that the claim had not yet been substantiated (see September 2002). The report’s main source, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda operative who offered the information to CIA interrogators while in custody, later recants the claim (see February 14, 2004). A Defense Intelligence Agency report in February 2002 (see February 2002) had also expressed doubt in the claim, going so far as to suggest that al-Libi was “intentionally misleading [his] debriefers.” [CNN, 9/26/2002; New York Times, 7/31/2004; Newsweek, 7/5/2005; New York Times, 11/6/2005] And earlier in the month, US intelligence services had concluded in their National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that this allegation could not be confirmed. [CNN, 9/26/2002; Newsday, 10/10/2002; San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002; Washington Post, 6/22/2003]
A very senior al-Qaeda leader received medical treatment in Baghdad - Bush claims: “Some al-Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al-Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks.” The allegation refers to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian who is the founder of al-Tawhid, an organization whose aim is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan. It was first leaked to the press by an anonymous US official several days before Bush’s speech (see October 2, 2002). The allegation is partly based on intercepted telephone calls in which al-Zarqawi was overheard calling friends or relatives (see December 2001-Mid-2002). But on the same day as Bush’s speech, Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that according to US intelligence officials, “The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq.” [Knight Ridder, 10/7/2002; US President, 10/14/2002] Al-Zarqawi will link with al-Qaeda, but only in 2004, after the start of the war in Iraq (see October 17, 2004).

Entity Tags: Al-Tawhid, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Anthony Cordesman, David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, George W. Bush, Hussein Kamel, Houston G. Wood III, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, International Atomic Energy Agency, US Department of State, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, US Department of Energy, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Taliban, Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, Khidir Hamza

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

At a White House press conference, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer is asked, “Ari, back to the postwar plans for Iraq, you’ve disputed our use of the word ‘occupation.’ I don’t understand why. Are American and/or other forces not going to be occupying Iraqi territory? And are not at least some of the Iraqis going to be objecting to it?” Fleischer responds: “… I dispute that notion, because I have made the case about Afghanistan. I don’t think anybody views the United States as an occupying power in Afghanistan. The presence of the United States military is the presence of the military. Obviously, we have military in other places around the world. Are we an occupying power? I just disagree with that comparison, especially the comparison to Japan. The Japanese, of course, fought the United States for a four-year sustained period in World War II. The country actively fought the United States. As we saw in 1991 in Iraq, the Iraqi military actively surrendered to the American military at first chance. Now, that’s not to predict what the ultimate outcome could be if we go to war, because there nobody is saying a war will not have difficulties and there will not be casualties. My point is, the likelihood is much more like Afghanistan, where the people who live right now under a brutal dictator will view America as liberators, not conquerors.” [White House, 10/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Iraq reiterates its claim that it has no weapons of mass destruction in the country, foreshadowing the content of its formal declaration, which is due in five days. Responding to the statement, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, “Any country on the face of the earth with an active intelligence program knows that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.” And President Bush says, “He [Saddam Hussein] says he won’t have weapons of mass destruction; he’s got them.” [BBC, 12/4/2002]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Iraq submits its declaration of military and civilian chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities to the UN one day early. It consists of 12 CD-ROMs and 43 spiral-bound volumes containing a total of 11,807 pages. General Hussam Amin, the officer in charge of Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate, tells reporters a few hours before the declaration is formally submitted: “We declared that Iraq is empty of weapons of mass destruction. I reiterate Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. This declaration has some activities that are dual-use.” Lt. Gen. Amer al-Saadi, a senior adviser to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, says the next day that Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear program may have been close to developing a nuclear bomb, but denies that Baghdad continued the program. Meanwhile, the Bush administration remains furious over the Security Council’s previous day ruling that no member state—including the US—will be permitted access to the report until after “sensitive information about weapons manufacture had been removed.” White House officials say they were “blind-sided” by the decision. [Daily Telegraph, 12/8/2002; Observer, 12/8/2002; New York Times, 12/8/2002; Associated Press, 12/9/2002]
Iraq's nuclear program - Roughly 2,100 pages of the declaration include information on Iraq’s former nuclear programs, including details on the sites and companies that were involved. [Associated Press, 12/9/2002; BBC, 12/10/2002]
Iraq's chemical programs - It contains “several thousand pages,” beginning with a summary of Iraq’s former chemical weapons program, specifically “research and development activities, the production of chemical agents, relations with companies and a terminated radiation bomb project.” [Associated Press, 12/9/2002]
The biological declaration - This section is much shorter than the sections dealing with Iraq’s nuclear and chemical programs. It includes “information on military institutions connected with the former biological weapons program, activities at the foot-and-mouth facility and a list of supporting documents.” [Associated Press, 12/9/2002]
The ballistic missile declaration - This is the shortest section of Iraq’s declaration totaling about 1,200 pages. It consists of a chronological summary of the country’s ballistic missile program. [Associated Press, 12/9/2002]
Iraq's suppliers of chemical and biological agent precursors - Iraq’s declaration includes the names of 150 foreign companies, several of which are from the US, Britain, Germany and France. Germany allowed eighty companies to supply Iraq with materials that could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction since 1975, while the US allowed 24 of its own businesses. Also included in the list are ten French businesses and several Swiss and Chinese companies. “From about 1975 onwards, these companies are shown to have supplied entire complexes, building elements, basic materials and technical know-how for Saddam Hussein’s program to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction,” the Independent explains. “They also supplied rockets and complete conventional weapons systems.” [BBC, 12/10/2002; Reuters, 12/10/2002; Washington Post, 12/11/2002; New York Times, 12/12/2002; Newsday, 12/13/2002; Los Angeles Times, 12/15/2002; Independent, 12/18/2002]

Entity Tags: Hussam Mohammad Amin, United Nations, Amir Hammudi al-Saadi

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Barton Gellman.Barton Gellman. [Source: Publicity photo via Washington Post]On December 12, 2002, the Washington Post publishes a front-page story by reporter Barton Gellman entitled “US Suspects Al-Qaeda Got Nerve Agent From Iraqis.” It states: “The Bush administration has received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al-Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq last month or late in October, according to two officials with firsthand knowledge of the report and its source. They said government analysts suspect that the transaction involved the nerve agent VX and that a courier managed to smuggle it overland through Turkey.” [Washington Post, 12/12/2002] The story proves so controversial that the Post’s ombudsman Michael Getler writes a column about in on December 22. Getler notes that, “[B]eginning with the second paragraph, which started out, ‘If the report proves true…’ the story contains an extraordinary array of flashing yellow lights.” He asks, “[W]hat, after all, is the use of this story that practically begs you not to put much credence in it? Why was it so prominently displayed, and why not wait until there was more certainty about the intelligence?” However, he says the Post stands by publishing the story. [Washington Post, 12/12/2002] Slate will comment in 2004, “[T]he Gellman scoop withered on the vine.… nobody advanced or refuted the story—not even Gellman.” Gellman will later admit that he should have run a follow-up story, if only to point out that no confirming evidence had come out. [Slate, 4/28/2004] He will later admit the story was incorrect. But he will continue to defend the story, claiming that “it was news even though it was clear that it was possible this report would turn out to be false.” [Washington Post, 8/12/2004]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Michael Getler, Barton Gellman

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

The State Department publishes a fact sheet titled “Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council,” which states that in its December 2002 declaration (see December 7, 2002) to the UN, Iraq “ignores [its] efforts to procure uranium from Niger.” [US Department of State, 12/19/2002; Associated Press, 6/12/2003; Associated Press, 7/13/2003] Secretary of State Colin Powell rejects the UN dossier, in part because it does not account for the Nigerien uranium (see Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001) and aluminum tubes (see Between April 2001 and September 2002) Iraq is supposedly using to make nuclear weapons. [Unger, 2007, pp. 268] But at this time, there is no evidence that Iraq had in fact sought to obtain uranium from Niger. Prior to the fact sheet’s publication, the CIA had warned the State Department about this and recommended that the phrase be removed—advice the State Department chose to ignore. [Associated Press, 6/12/2003] Throughout the rest of December, almost every statement the US goverment makes on Iraq will include references to the Nigerien uranium deal. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Powell will all state publicly that Iraq had been caught trying to buy uranium from Niger. [Unger, 2007, pp. 268]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Colin Powell, United Nations Security Council, Condoleezza Rice, US Department of State

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

UNMOVIC inspectors say they have yet to uncover evidence indicating that Iraq has resumed its production of weapons of mass destruction. After providing the UN Security Council with a summary of the inspectors’ findings, Hans Blix tells reporters in New York, “We have now been there for some two months and been covering the country in ever wider sweeps and we haven’t found any smoking guns.” [Guardian, 1/10/2003] But Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, insists that the absence of evidence is of little concern, asserting, “The problem with guns that are hidden is you can’t see their smoke. We know for a fact that there are weapons there.” [Guardian, 1/10/2003] When asked how he knows this, Fleischer quotes from the UN weapons inspectors’ report and notes, “So while they’ve [UN Inspectors] said that there’s no smoking gun, they said the absence of it is not assured. And that’s the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is Iraq is very good at hiding things.” [White House, 1/9/2003] John Negroponte, the US ambassador to the UN, accuses Iraq of “legalistic” cooperation, claiming that it needs to act proactively. He also says, “There is still no evidence that Iraq has fundamentally changed its approach from one of deceit to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming.” [Guardian, 1/10/2003] Colin Powell also seems undaunted by Blix’s remarks. “The lack of a smoking gun does not mean that there’s not one there,” he says, “If the international community sees that Saddam Hussein is not cooperating in a way that would not allow you to determine the truth of the matter, then he is in violation of the UN resolution [1441] (see November 8, 2002)…You don’t really have to have a smoking gun.” [News24, 1/10/2003] Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British ambassador to the UN, echoes views from Washington, asserting that the “passive cooperation of Iraq has been good in terms of access and other procedural issues,” and adds, “But proactive cooperation has not been forthcoming—the kind of cooperation needed to clear up the remaining questions in the inspectors’ minds.” [Guardian, 1/10/2003]

Entity Tags: John Negroponte, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Ari Fleischer, Jeremy Greenstock, Hans Blix, Colin Powell

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) completes an analysis on the implications of genetic use restriction technology (GURT) for small farmers, indigenous peoples, and local communities. The paper was requested the previous year by member governments of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. In its 6-page memorandum, UPOV says it believes that using GURTs as a means to protect intellectual property would be less advantageous for society than implementing Plant Breeders’ Rights legislation based on UPOV’s 1991 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (see December 19, 2002). UPOV notes that unlike GURT, its 1991 convention has provisions that allow farmers to save seeds; set a time-limit (20 years) on a breeder’s exclusive rights; and permit farmers, researchers, and breeders to breed protected seeds when it is done privately, for non-commercial or experimental purposes, and when it is done to breed new varieties. Furthermore, under GURT, there is “no provision for public interest, allowing government access to varieties under particular circumstances,” as there is in the UPOV’s convention. [Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1/10/2003 pdf file; ETC Group, 4/17/2003]

Entity Tags: International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants

Timeline Tags: Seeds

The British government releases a dossier titled “Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception, and Intimidation.” The government says the dossier is based on high-level intelligence and diplomatic sources and was produced with the approval of Prime Minister Tony Blair; it also wins praise from US Secretary of State Colin Powell (see February 7, 2003). Unfortunately, the dossier is almost wholly plagiarized from a September 2002 article by university student Ibrahim al-Marashi. [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2/23/2003] Al-Marashi was doing postgraduate work at Oxford University when he wrote it. [International Policy Fellowships, 10/1/2006] The article is entitled “Iraq’s Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis,” and was published in the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal (MERIA). [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2/23/2003] The British dossier plagiarizes two other articles as well, both from Jane’s Intelligence Review (see February 8, 2003), some of which were published as far back as 1997. MERIA is based in Israel, which even moderate Arabs say makes it a suspect source, and all the more reason why the origin of the information should have been cited. [Guardian, 2/7/2003] MERIA, an Internet-based magazine with about 10,000 subscribers, is edited by Jerusalem Post columnist Barry Rubin. [Jerusalem Post, 2/8/2003] Rubin will responds dryly: “We are pleased that the high quality of MERIA Journal’s articles has made them so valuable to our readers.… As noted on the masthead of each issue and all our publications, however, we do appreciate being given credit.” [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2/23/2003] Al-Marashi, currently working at California’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, describes himself as an opponent of Saddam Hussein’s regime: “As an Iraqi, I support regime change in Iraq,” he says. [Reuters, 2/8/2003; Associated Press, 2/7/2007]
Article Used Information from 1991 - He examined Iraq’s secret police and other, similar forces in detail, using captured Iraqi documents from the 1991 Gulf War and updating that information to be more timely. [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9/2002] The dossier contains entire sections from al-Marashi’s article quoted almost verbatim, including typographical errors contained in the original. When asked about the plagiarism, al-Marashi says he was not approached by the British government for permission to use his work. “It was a shock to me,” he says. Chris Aaron, editor of Jane’s Intelligence Review, says he had not been asked for permission to use material from his article in the dossier. The dossier uses the three articles to detail methods used by the Iraqi government to block and misdirect UN weapons inspectors’ attempts to locate weapons stockpiles in Iraq. The dossier claims that while the UN only has 108 weapons inspectors inside Iraq, the Iraqi government has 20,000 intelligence officers “engaged in disrupting their inspections and concealing weapons of mass destruction.” The dossier claims that every hotel room and telephone used by the weapons inspectors is bugged, and that WMD-related documents are being concealed in Iraqi hospitals, mosques, and homes. Powell will cite the dossier as part of his presentation to the UN detailing evidence of Iraqi weapons programs (see February 5, 2003). [Associated Press, 2/6/2003; BBC, 2/7/2003] When the media exposes the origins of the dossier, Blair officials will concede that they should have been more honest about the source material (see February 6, 2003).
British 'Inflated' Some Numbers, Used More Extreme Language - Al-Marashi, who learns of the plagiarism from a colleague, Glen Rangwala (see February 5, 2003), says the dossier is accurate despite “a few minor cosmetic changes.” He adds: “The only inaccuracies in the [British] document were that they maybe inflated some of the numbers of these intelligence agencies. The primary documents I used for this article are a collection of two sets of documents, one taken from Kurdish rebels in the north of Iraq—around four million documents—as well as 300,000 documents left by Iraqi security services in Kuwait.” [BBC, 2/7/2003] Al-Marashi and Rangwala both note that the dossier uses more extreme language. “Being an academic paper, I tried to soften the language” al-Marashi says. “For example, in one of my documents, I said that [the Iraqi intelligence agency known as the Mukhabarat] support[s] organizations in what Iraq considers hostile regimes, whereas the [British] document refers to it as ‘supporting terrorist organizations in hostile regimes.’” [Guardian, 2/7/2003; New York Times, 2/8/2003]
Third Attempt to Pass Off Old Information as New Evidence - This is the third time in recent months that Downing Street has tried to pass off old, suspect information as damning evidence against Iraq. In September, it released a 50-page dossier, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,” that used years-old information from the Foreign Office and British intelligence to make its case (see September 24, 2002); UN inspectors and British journalists visited some of the “facilities of concern” and found nothing (see September 24, 2002). In December, Downing Street released a 23-page report, “Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses,” that was heavily criticized by human rights groups, members of Parliament, and others for reusing old information. When that dossier was released, the Foreign Office put forward an Iraqi exile who had been jailed by Hussein for 11 years. The exile displayed handcuffs he said had been placed on him while in captivity. Afterwards, the exile admitted that the handcuffs were actually British in origin. [Guardian, 2/7/2003]
Dossier Product of Heated Debate - The Observer writes of the current “dodgy dossier” that discussions between Blair’s head of strategic communications, Alastair Campbell, foreign policy adviser David Manning, senior intelligence officials, and the new head of British homeland security, David Omand, resulted in a decision to “repeat a wheeze from last autumn: publishing a dossier of ‘intelligence-based evidence,’” this time focusing on Iraq’s history of deceiving weapons inspectors. The dossier had to be released before chief UN inspector Hans Blix could make his scheduled report in mid-February. The previous dossier, about Iraq’s dismal human rights record, had led to what The Observer calls “several stand-up rows between Omand and Campbell, with the former accusing the latter of sprinkling too much ‘magic dust’ over the facts to spice it up for public consumption.” That dossier left “the more sensationalist elements” in the forward, but for this dossier, “there was no time for such niceties. Led by Campbell, a team from the Coalition Information Center—the group set up by Campbell and his American counterpart during the war on the Taliban—began collecting published information that touched on useful themes.” Al-Marashi’s work became the central piece for the cut-and-pasted dossier, which The Observer says was compiled so sloppily that, in using the al-Marashi report and one of the Jane’s articles, two different organizations were confused with one another. [Observer, 2/9/2003]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix, UK Security Service (MI5), David Omand, Glen Rangwala, Ibrahim al-Marashi, Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, Jerusalem Post, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Mukhabarat, David Manning, Colin Powell, Blair administration, Christopher Aaron, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Coalition Information Center, Alastair Campbell, Saddam Hussein, Barry Rubin, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, British Foreign Office, Tony Blair

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Colin Powell and George Tenet, at the UN presentation.Colin Powell and George Tenet, at the UN presentation. [Source: CBS News]US Secretary of State Colin Powell presents the Bush administration’s case against Saddam to the UN Security Council, in advance of an expected vote on a second resolution that the US and Britain hope will provide the justification to use military force against Iraq. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] At the insistence of Powell, CIA Director George Tenet is seated directly behind him to the right. “It was theater, a device to signal to the world that Powell was relying on the CIA to make his case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction,” Vanity Fair magazine will later explain. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 371-2; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 232] In his speech before the Council, Powell makes the case that Iraq is in further material breach of past UN resolutions, specifically the most recent one, UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002). Sources cited in Powell’s presentation include defectors, informants, communication intercepts, procurement records, photographs, and detainees. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] Most of the allegations made by Powell are later demonstrated to be false. “The defectors and other sources went unidentified,” the Associated Press will later report. “The audiotapes were uncorroborated, as were the photo interpretations. No other supporting documents were presented. Little was independently verifiable.” [Associated Press, 8/9/2003]
Iraq's December 7 Declaration Was Inaccurate - Powell contends that Iraq’s December 7 declaration was not complete. According to UN Resolution 1441 the document was supposed to be a “currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects” of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. But Saddam has not done this, says Powell, who explains that Iraq has yet to provide sufficient evidence that it destroyed its previously declared stock of 8,500 liters of anthrax, as it claimed in the declaration. Furthermore, notes the secretary of state, UNSCOM inspectors had previously estimated that Iraq possessed the raw materials to produce as much as 25,000 liters of the virus. [New York Times, 2/5/2003; US Department of State, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 2/6/2003]
Iraq Has Ties to Al-Qaeda - Powell repeats earlier claims that Saddam Hussein’s government has ties to al-Qaeda. Powell focuses on the cases of the militant Islamic group Ansar-al-Islam and Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian, who had received medical treatment in Baghdad during the summer of 2002 (see December 2001-Mid-2002). [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] However, just days before Powell’s speech, US and British intelligence officials—speaking on condition of anonymity—told the press that the administration’s allegations of Iraqi-al-Qaeda ties were based on information provided by Kurdish groups, who, as enemies of Ansar-al-Islam, should not be considered reliable. Furthermore, these sources unequivocally stated that intelligence analysts on both sides of the Atlantic remained unconvinced of the purported links between Iraq and al-Qaeda (see February 3-4, 2003). [Independent, 2/3/2003; Daily Telegraph, 2/4/2003] Powell also claims that Iraq provided “chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaeda associates beginning in December 2000.” The claim is based on a September 2002 CIA document which had warned that its sources were of “varying reliability” and that the claim was not substantiated (see September 2002). The report’s main source, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda operative who offered the information to CIA interrogators while in custody, later recounts the claim (see February 14, 2004). [CNN, 9/26/2002; New York Times, 7/31/2004; Newsweek, 7/5/2005] Larry Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, will later say that neither he nor Powell ever received “any dissent with respect to those lines… indeed the entire section that now we know came from [al-Libi].” [Newsweek, 11/10/2005] Senior US officials will admit to the New York Times and Washington Post after the presentation that the administration was not claiming that Saddam Hussein is “exercising operational control” of al-Qaeda. [New York Times, 2/6/2003; Washington Post, 2/7/2003]
Iraq Has Missiles Capable of Flying Up to 1,200 Kilometers - Describing a photo of the al-Rafah weapons site, Powell says: “As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what’s going on underneath the test stand.” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; New York Times, 2/5/2003] But according to the Associated Press, “… UN missile experts have reported inspecting al-Rafah at least five times since inspections resumed Nov. 27, have studied the specifications of the new test stand, regularly monitor tests at the installation, and thus far have reported no concerns.” [Associated Press, 2/7/2003] Similarly, Reuters quotes Ali Jassem, an Iraqi official, who explains that the large stand referred to in Powell’s speech is not yet in operation and that its larger size is due to the fact that it will be testing engines horizontally. [Reuters, 2/7/2003; Guardian, 2/15/2003] Several days later, Blix will report to the UN that “so far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity.” [Guardian, 2/15/2003]
Iraqis Attempted to Hide Evidence from Inspectors - Powell shows the UN Security Council satellite shots depicting what he claims are chemical weapons bunkers and convoys of Iraqi cargo trucks preparing to transport ballistic missile components from a weapons site just two days before the arrival of inspectors. “We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites,” Powell explains. “We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] But the photos are interpreted differently by others. An unnamed UN official and German UN Inspector Peter Franck both say the trucks in the photos are actually fire engines. [Mercury News (San Jose), 3/18/2003; Agence France-Presse, 6/6/2003]
'Literally Removed the Crust of the Earth' - Another series of photos—taken during the spring and summer of 2002—show that Iraqis have removed a layer of topsoil from the al-Musayyib chemical complex. This piece of evidence, combined with information provided by an unnamed source, leads Powell to draw the following conclusion: “The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity.” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 2/6/2003] Showing another series of pictures—one taken on November 10 (before inspections) and one taken on December 22—Powell says that a guard station and decontamination truck were removed prior to the arrival of inspectors. Powell does not explain how he knows that the truck in the photograph was a decontamination truck. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 2/6/2003; Washington Post, 2/6/2003] AP reporter Charles Hanley says that some of Powell’s claims that Iraq is hiding evidence are “ridiculous.” Powell says of a missile site, “This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what’s going on underneath the test stand.” Hanley later says, “What he neglected to mention was that the inspectors were underneath, watching what was going on.” [PBS, 4/25/2007]
Communication Intercepts Demonstrate Iraqi Attempts to Conceal Information from Inspectors - Powell plays recordings of three conversations intercepted by US intelligence—one on November 26, another on January 30, and a third, a “few weeks” before. The conversations suggest that the Iraqis were attempting to hide evidence from inspectors. [New York Times, 2/5/2003; US Department of State, 2/5/2003; London Times, 2/6/2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 2/7/2003] Senior administration officials concede to the Washington Post that it was not known “what military items were discussed in the intercepts.” [Washington Post, 2/13/2003] Some critics argue that the intercepts were presented out of context and open to interpretation. [Sydney Morning Herald, 2/7/2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 2/9/2003] Others note that the conversations were translated from Arabic by US translators and were not analyzed or verified by an independent specialist. [Newsday, 2/6/2003]
Biological Weapons Factories - Colin Powell says that US intelligence has “firsthand descriptions” that Iraq has 18 mobile biological weapons factories mounted on trucks and railroad cars. Information about the mobile weapons labs are based on the testimonies of four sources—a defected Iraqi chemical engineer who claims to have supervised one of these facilities, an Iraqi civil engineer (see December 20, 2001), a source in “a position to know,” and a defected Iraqi major (see February 11, 2002). Powell says that the mobile units are capable of producing enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill several thousand people. He shows computer-generated diagrams and pictures based on the sources’ descriptions of the facilities. Powell says that according to the chemical engineer, during the late 1990s, Iraq’s biological weapons scientists would often begin the production of pathogens on Thursday nights and complete the process on Fridays in order to evade UNSCOM inspectors whom Iraq believed would not conduct inspections on the Muslim holy day. [New York Times, 2/5/2003; US Department of State, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 2/6/2003; Reuters, 2/11/2003] Powell tells the delegates, “The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer, who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents.” He displays models of the mobile trucks drawn from the source’s statements. [CBS News, 11/4/2007] Responding to the allegation, Iraqi officials will concede that they do in fact have mobile labs, but insist that they are not used for the development of weapons. According to the Iraqis, the mobile labs are used for food analysis for disease outbreaks, mobile field hospitals, a military field bakery, food and medicine refrigeration trucks, a mobile military morgue and mobile ice making trucks. [Guardian, 2/5/2003; ABC News, 5/21/2003] Iraq’s explanation is consistent with earlier assessments of the UN weapons inspectors. Before Powell’s presentation, Hans Blix had dismissed suggestions that the Iraqis were using mobile biological weapons labs, reporting that inspections of two alleged mobile labs had turned up nothing. “Two food-testing trucks have been inspected and nothing has been found,” Blix said. And Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, said, “The outline and characteristics of these trucks that we inspected were all consistent with the declared purposes.” [Guardian, 2/5/2003; ABC News, 5/21/2003]
'Curveball' Primary Source of Claims - Powell’s case is further damaged when it is later learned that one of the sources Powell cited, the Iraqi major, had been earlier judged unreliable by intelligence agents at the Defense Intelligence Agency (see February 11, 2002). In May 2002, the analysts had issued a “fabricator notice” on the informant, noting that he had been “coached by [the] Iraqi National Congress” (INC) (see May 2002). But the main source for the claim had been an Iraqi defector known as “Curveball,” who was initially believed to be the brother of a top aide to Ahmed Chalabi. The source claimed to be a chemical engineer who had helped design and build the mobile labs. His information was passed to Washington through Germany’s intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), which had been introduced to the source by the INC. In passing along the information, the BND noted that there were “various problems with the source.” And only one member of the US intelligence community had actually met with the person—an unnamed Pentagon analyst who determined the man was an alcoholic and of dubious reliability. Yet both the DIA and the CIA validated the information. [Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, 8/22/2003; Los Angeles Times, 3/28/2004; Knight Ridder, 4/4/2004; Newsweek, 4/19/2004; Newsweek, 7/19/2004] Powell says that the US has three other intelligence sources besides Curveball for the mobile bioweapons labs. Powell will be infuriated to learn that none of those three sources ever corroborated Curveball’s story, and sometimes their information contradicted each other. One of the three had failed a polygraph test and was determined to have lied to his debriefers. Another had already been declared a fabricator by US intelligence community, and had been proven to have mined his information off the Internet. [Buzzflash (.com), 11/27/2007] In November 2007, Curveball is identified as Rafid Ahmed Alwan. Serious questions about Curveball’s veracity had already been raised by the time of Powell’s UN presentation. He will later be completely discredited (see November 4, 2007).
Further Problems with Mobile Lab Claims - In addition to the inspectors’ assessments and the dubious nature of the sources Powell cited, there are numerous other problems with the mobile factories claim. Raymond Zilinskas, a microbiologist and former UN weapons inspector, argues that significant amounts of pathogens such as anthrax, could not be produced in the short span of time suggested in Powell’s speech. “You normally would require 36 to 48 hours just to do the fermentation…. The short processing time seems suspicious to me.” He also says: “The only reason you would have mobile labs is to avoid inspectors, because everything about them is difficult. We know it is possible to build them—the United States developed mobile production plants, including one designed for an airplane—but it’s a big hassle. That’s why this strikes me as a bit far-fetched.” [Washington Post, 2/6/2003] After Powell’s speech, Blix will say in his March 7 report to the UN that his inspectors found no evidence of mobile weapons labs (see March 7, 2003). [CNN, 3/7/2003; Agence France-Presse, 3/7/2003; CNN, 3/7/2003] Reporter Bob Drogin, author of Curveball: Spies, Lies and the Con Man Who Caused a War, says in 2007, “[B]y the time Colin Powell goes to the UN to make the case for war, he shows the world artists’ conjectures based on analysts’ interpretations and extrapolations of Arabic-to-German-to-English translations of summary debriefing reports of interviews with a manic-depressive defector whom the Americans had never met. [CIA director George] Tenet told Powell that Curveball’s information was ironclad and unassailable. It was a travesty.” [Alternet, 10/22/2007]
'Four Tons' of VX Toxin - Powell also claims that Iraq has “four tons” of VX nerve toxin. “A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes,” he says. “Four tons.” Hanley later notes, “He didn’t point out that most of that had already been destroyed. And, on point after point he failed to point out that these facilities about which he was raising such alarm were under repeated inspections good, expert people with very good equipment, and who were leaving behind cameras and other monitoring equipment to keep us a continuing eye on it.” [PBS, 4/25/2007]
Iraq is Developing Unmanned Drones Capable of Delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction - Powell asserts that Iraq has flight-tested an unmanned drone capable of flying up to 310 miles and is working on a liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of 745 miles. He plays a video of an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet dispersing “simulated anthrax.” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; New York Times, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 2/6/2003] But the Associated Press will later report that the video was made prior to the 1991 Gulf War. Apparently, three of the four spray tanks shown in the film had been destroyed during the 1991 military intervention. [Associated Press, 8/9/2003]
Imported Aluminum Tubes were Meant for Centrifuge - Powell argues that the aluminum tubes which Iraq had attempted to import in July 2001 (see July 2001) were meant to be used in a nuclear weapons program and not for artillery rockets as experts from the US Energy Department, the INR, and the IAEA have been arguing (see February 3, 2003) (see January 11, 2003) (see August 17, 2001) (see January 27, 2003). To support the administration’s case, he cites unusually precise specifications and high tolerances for heat and stress. “It strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds US requirements for comparable rockets,” he says. “Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so.” Powell also suggests that because the tubes were “anodized,” it was unlikely that they had been designed for conventional use. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 2/5/2003; Washington Post, 3/8/2003] Powell does not mention that numerous US nuclear scientists have dismissed this claim (see August 17, 2001) (see September 23, 2002) (see December 2002). [Albright, 10/9/2003] Powell also fails to say that Iraq has rockets identical to the Italian Medusa 81 mm rockets, which are of the same dimensions and made of the same alloy as the 3,000 tubes that were intercepted in July 2001 (see After January 22, 2003). [Washington Post, 8/10/2003] This had been reported just two weeks earlier by the Washington Post. [Washington Post, 1/24/2003] Moreover, just two days before, Powell was explicitly warned by the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research not to cite the aluminum tubes as evidence that Iraq is pursuing nuclear weapons (see February 3, 2003). [Financial Times, 7/29/2003]
Iraq Attempted to Acquire Magnets for Use in a Gas Centrifuge Program - Powell says: “We… have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium. In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That’s the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq’s gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War.” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; New York Times, 2/6/2003] Investigation by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] will demonstrate that the magnets have a dual use. IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said a little more than a week before, on January 27, in his report to the Security Council: “Iraq presented detailed information on a project to construct a facility to produce magnets for the Iraqi missile program, as well as for industrial applications, and that Iraq had prepared a solicitation of offers, but that the project had been delayed due to ‘financial credit arrangements.’ Preliminary investigations indicate that the specifications contained in the offer solicitation are consistent with those required for the declared intended uses. However, the IAEA will continue to investigate the matter….” (see January 27, 2003) [Annan, 1/27/2003 pdf file] On March 7, ElBaradei will provide an additional update: “The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing.” (see March 7, 2003) [CNN, 3/7/2003]
Iraq Attempted to Purchase Machines to Balance Centrifuge Rotors - Powell states: “Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer show that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; New York Times, 2/6/2003]
Powell Cites Documents Removed from Home of Iraqi Scientist Faleh Hassan - Powell cites the documents that had been found on January 16, 2003 by inspectors with the help of US intelligence at the Baghdad home of Faleh Hassan, a nuclear scientist. Powell asserts that the papers are a “dramatic confirmation” that Saddam Hussein is concealing evidence and not cooperating with the inspections. The 3,000 documents contained information relating to the laser enrichment of uranium (see January 16, 2003). [Daily Telegraph, 1/18/2003; Associated Press, 1/18/2003; BBC, 1/19/2003; US Department of State, 2/5/2003] A little more than a week later, in the inspectors’ February 14 update to the UN Security Council (see February 14, 2003), ElBaradei will say, “While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq’s laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq’s laser enrichment program.” [Guardian, 2/15/2003; BBC, 2/17/2003; Associated Press, 8/9/2003]
Iraq is Hiding Missiles in the Desert - Powell says that according to unidentified sources, the Iraqis have hidden rocket launchers and warheads containing biological weapons in the western desert. He further contends that these caches of weapons are hidden in palm groves and moved to different locations on a weekly basis. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] It will later be suggested that this claim was “lifted whole from an Iraqi general’s written account of hiding missiles in the 1991 war.” [Associated Press, 8/9/2003]
Iraq Has Scud Missiles - Powell also says that according to unnamed “intelligence sources,” Iraq has a few dozen Scud-type missiles. [Associated Press, 8/9/2003]
Iraq Has Weapons of Mass Destruction - Secretary of State Colin Powell states unequivocally: “We… have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more.” Elsewhere in his speech he says: “We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more.” [US Department of State, 2/5/2003; CNN, 2/5/2003]
Governments, Media Reaction Mixed - Powell’s speech will fail to convince many skeptical governments, nor will it impress many in the European media. But it will have a tremendous impact in the US media (see February 5, 2003 and After).

In a radio address to the US nation, President Bush reiterates the two main reasons for military action against Iraq, named the certain existence of WMD and al-Qaeda training camps in Iraq. He says, “We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons—the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have.… We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior al-Qaeda terrorist planner. This network runs a poison and explosive training camp in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad.” [President Bush, 8/2/2003]

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

An ad hoc expert panel created by the sixth conference of the Biodiversity Convention convenes in Montreal to consider the impact that genetic use restriction technology (GURT), also known as terminator technology, would have on small farmers, indigenous peoples, and local communities. The expert panel hears from 11 groups including the US, Canada, two individual farmers, an indigenous rights group, four civil society organizations, the International Seed Federation, and the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). [Collins and Krueger, n.d. pdf file; ETC Group, 4/17/2003; Convention on Biological Diversity, 9/29/2003 pdf file] The paper presented by UPOV, completed in January (see January 10, 2003), is not well-received by the US or industry representatives. Though the UPOV is generally an ardent supporter of intellectual rights protections, its analysis argues that GURT technology could threaten the interests of small farmers. The paper is so unwelcome, in fact, that the US and the International Seed Federation will succeed in pressuring the UPOV to revise it (see March 13, 2003-April 11, 2003), eliminating all references to GURT from the body of the paper. Prepared by Monsanto’s Roger Krueger and Harry Collins of Delta & Pine Land (D&PL), the International Seed Federation’s analysis takes the position that GURT technology would be advantageous for small farmers. Their paper argues that GURT would benefit small farmers and indigenous peoples by providing them with more options. “The International Seed Federation (ISF) believes that GURTs have the potential to benefit farmers and others in all size, economic and geographical areas… In reality, the potential effects of the GURTs may be beneficial to small farmers… ,” the paper asserts. “It is the strong belief and position of the ISF that GURTs would potentially provide more choice, to the farmers, rather than less choice.” Kruefer and Collins also say the technology could be used to prevent the contamination of non-transgenic plants with genetically modified genes and thus could be “quite positive for the environment and biodiversity.” [Collins and Krueger, n.d. pdf file; ETC Group, 4/17/2003; Convention on Biological Diversity, 9/29/2003 pdf file] The expert panel’s final report will list 35 “potential negative impacts” of GURT on small farmers and local communities and only nine “potential positive impacts.” It will recommend, among other things, “that parties and other governments consider the development of regulatory frameworks not to approve GURTs for field-testing and commercial use.” [Convention on Biological Diversity, 9/29/2003 pdf file]

Entity Tags: International Seed Federation, International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Roger Krueger, Harry B. Collins

Timeline Tags: Seeds

On March 13, Lois Boland, administrator for external affairs at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), sends a letter to UPOV Vice-Secretary General Rolf Jordens asking him to withdraw UPOV’s analysis on genetic use restriction technology (GURT) (see January 10, 2003). The analysis, presented in February to an expert panel convened by the Biodiversity Convention (see February 19, 2003-February 21, 2003), argued that GURT would not serve the interests of farmers or the public. In her letter, Boland complains that the UPOV Council did not allow the US to see the analysis before it was presented. “Even more troubling,” she adds, “the document submitted to the CBD is not a neutral presentation of facts and prevailing opinions; instead, it represents a one-sided negative view of GURTs.” In light of these concerns, she asks that the memo be discussed at the next scheduled meeting of UPOV’s Administrative and Legal Committee on April 10, 2003. [US Patent and Trademark Office, 3/13/2003 pdf file] In response, Jordens suggests that the matter be considered by UPOV’s Consultative Committee instead. [Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 3/17/2003 pdf file] Boland replies that that would not be acceptable and insists that it be debated in the Administrative and Legal Committee. [US Patent and Trademark Office, 3/28/2003 pdf file] Jordens gives in. [Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 3/17/2003 pdf file] On March 31, Secretary-General of the International Seed Federation Bernard Le Buanec also voices concerns about the UPOV analysis, writing in a letter that the federation “is really concerned by the memorandum, as it presents a variety of unbalanced views.” [International Seed Federation, 3/31/2003 pdf file] On April 10, the UPOV memo is debated in the Administrative and Legal Committee. Under pressure from the US, the UPOV agrees to say that it is not a “competent body to provide advice to CBD on GURTs.” A new version of the memo is posted on the UPOV’s website the next day with the following explanation: “This document supersedes the memorandum prepared by the Office of the Union on the genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs) and sent to the CBD, dated January 10, 2003.” The new version deletes all references to GURT from the body of the document. As such, the new document makes no attempt to respond to the Biodiversity Convention’s original request for analysis of GURT. [Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1/10/2003 pdf file; ETC Group, 4/17/2003]

Entity Tags: Rolf Jördens, Lois Boland, International Seed Federation, International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, says during a televised briefing at the Pentagon that the administration knows about “a number of sites” where Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Clarke refuses to provide any estimate of how many sites the US knows of. [Washington Post, 3/23/2003, pp. A27]

Entity Tags: Victoria (“Torie”) Clarke

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation

Kenneth Adelman.Kenneth Adelman. [Source: Public domain]Kenneth Adelman, a former Reagan arms control official who is close to top Bush military officials and serves on a Pentagon advisory panel, says, “I have no doubt we’re going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction.” Adelman claims these weapons are likeliest to be found near Tikrit and Baghdad, because they’re the most protected places with the best troops. Adelman acknowledges some surprise that they have not been used yet. “One thing we may find is Saddam Hussein ordered them to be used and soldiers didn’t follow the orders. The threat of use goes down every day because adherence to orders goes down.” [Washington Post, 3/23/2003, pp. A27]

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation

St. Louis Federal District Judge Rodney W. Sippel allows an antitrust case against Monsanto Company, Bayer, Syngenta, and Pioneer seed companies to proceed. According to the lawsuit, which was filed in 1999 (see March 15, 2001), documents show that the companies conspired during the late 1990s to fix prices and control the seed market. The second part of the lawsuit—which blames the companies for the huge losses suffered by farmers because of global opposition to genetically modified crops—is dismissed. [New York Times, 9/24/2003] Judge Sippel was once listed as one of three lawyers defending Monsanto in a similar case. [Guardian, 1/10/2004]

Entity Tags: Rodney W. Sippel, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., Syngenta, Monsanto, Bayer

Timeline Tags: Seeds

St. Louis Federal District Judge Rodney W. Sippel denies class-action status to an antitrust case against Monsanto and other companies (see December 14, 1999) . The suit alleges that the companies conspired to fix prices and control the seed market. [AXcess News, 3/8/2005]

Entity Tags: Monsanto, Rodney W. Sippel

Timeline Tags: Seeds

At the ninth meeting of the Scientific Body of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (SBSTTA), held in Montreal, four countries—Canada, New Zealand, Argentina, and Brazil—convince the body to submit a recommendation to the next meeting of the Biodiversity Convention to forego action on an expert panel report. They argued that the report was flawed because it lacked scientific rigor. The report—commissioned by members of the Biodiversity Convention in late 2002—had identified numerous potential negative impacts that terminator technology could have on small farmers, indigenous peoples, and local communities (see February 19, 2003-February 21, 2003). If the member countries of the Biodiversity Convention, scheduled to meet in February 2004, accepts the SBSTTA’s recommendation to forego action, the issue will not be considered again until 2006. “SBSTTA9’s decision is wrong and dangerous,” says Alejandro Argumedo of the Indigenous Peoples Biodiversity Network. “Giving four governments the right to derail a report on the impact of terminator on indigenous peoples and local communities is like saying that the voices of these communities are not important, and that the social and economic impacts of terminator can be dismissed.” The ETC Group, a Canadian-based organization that opposes terminator technology, suggests that the presence of representatives from biotech firms Monsanto and Delta & Pine Land may have had something to do with the four countries’ objection to the expert panel report. The organization notes that industry representatives from these very same companies had been involved in the expert panel discussion and had submitted a report insisting that GURT technologies would benefit small farmers and indigenous peoples by providing them with “more choice.” Both Monsanto and Delta & Pine Land have patents on GURT technology. [Convention on Biodiversity, 11/14/2003; ETC Group, 11/14/2003]

Entity Tags: Canada, Harry B. Collins, Roger Krueger, Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh informs his listeners of a Harris poll showing a majority of those surveyed believe that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction when the war began over a year before (see March 19, 2003). Limbaugh blames the misconception on the “liberal media,” not on the government officials and conservative pundits, including Limbaugh, who pushed the idea of Iraqi WMD on the public before the invasion (see July 30, 2001, Mid-September, 2001, Mid-September-October 2001, October 17, 2001, November 14, 2001, December 20, 2001, 2002, February 11, 2002, Summer 2002, July 30, 2002, August 26, 2002, September 4, 2002, September 8, 2002, September 8, 2002, September 12, 2002, September 12, 2002, September 24, 2002, September 28, 2002, October 7, 2002, December 3, 2002, December 19, 2002, January 2003, January 9, 2003, February 5, 2003, February 17, 2003, March 16-19, 2003, March 23, 2003, May 21, 2003, May 29, 2003, and June 11, 2003), and uses the incident to warn his listeners about getting their news from the “liberal media.” [Jamieson and Cappella, 2008, pp. 151]

Entity Tags: Rush Limbaugh, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The US, Mexico, and Canada enter into a trilateral agreement that allows food and grain shipments to have GM contamination levels as high as 5 percent. Shipments containing less than the five percent level will only have to bear a label indicating that the grain may contain genetically modified organisms. Additionally, accidental contamination of corn shipments into Mexico will not trigger any labeling requirements. Only the distributor will have to be informed of the contamination. The Mexican government enters into the agreement without the Mexican Senate’s approval. [Associated Press, 2/26/2004] Critics of the deal say the US is attempting to protect agricultural biotech companies and US agriculture. A large percentage of the country’s crop is genetically modified and as a result US farmers and biotechs are having a tough time finding markets abroad. Raising the acceptable contamination limits in other countries will help increase US grain exports. Critics also say that the deal could have a dramatically adverse effect on the genetic diversity of Mexico’s maize. It could result in the planting of more genetically modified corn since small farmers have been known to occasionally plant feed as seed. A few years before, maize growing in Oaxaca and Puebla was discovered to contain genetically modified genes (see October 2000; April 18, 2002). It is believed that the contamination was caused in part by farmers who had planted feed from local stores selling grain imported from the US. The ETC Group, a Canadian-based organization that is opposed to genetically modified crops, warns that if Mexico permits the import of grain with such high levels of contamination, the country’s “maize crop would be riddled with foreign DNA from the Rio Grande to Guatemala in less than a decade.” [ETC Group, 2/26/2004] Greenpeace believes that US efforts to convince countries to lower the accepted levels of contamination are aimed at undermining the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (see January 24-29, 2000), which has been set up to regulate transboundary shipments of genetically modified organisms. [Greenpeace, 2/11/2004]

Entity Tags: United States, Mexico

Timeline Tags: Seeds

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