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Context of '1947: Eminent Immunologist Urges Australian Government to Develop Biological Weapons'

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Immunologist Sir Macfarlane Burnet, Nobel prize winner and first winner of the ‘Australian of the Year’ award, urges the Australian government to develop biological and chemical weapons to use against Indonesia and other countries of Southeast Asia. In 1998, Canberra historian Philip Dorling will obtaim a declassified 1947 report from the Australian National Archives which reveals that in his advisory role on biological warfare, Burnet had recommended development of biological and chemical weapons to target food crops and spread infectious diseases in the “overpopulated” tropical countries of Southeast Asia. “Specifically to the Australian situation, the most effective counter-offensive to threatened invasion by overpopulated Asiatic countries would be directed towards the destruction by biological or chemical means of tropical food crops and the dissemination of infectious disease capable of spreading in tropical but not under Australian conditions,” Burnet writes. [Age (Melbourne), 3/10/2002]

Entity Tags: Philip Dorling, Macfarlane Burnet

Timeline Tags: Seeds

Zaab Sethna of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) arranges for Iraqi defector Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri to be interviewed by Judith Miller of the New York Times. Miller, who has known Chalabi for about eight years (see May 1, 2003), immediately flies out to Bangkok for the interview. Her story is published on December 20, just three days after Haideri told his story to a CIA agent who subjected him to a polygraph and determined Haideri’s story was a complete fabrication (see December 17, 2001). Miller’s front-page article, titled “An Iraqi defector tells of work on at least 20 hidden weapons sites,” reports: “An Iraqi defector who described himself as a civil engineer, said he personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas and under the Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad as recently as a year ago.” If verified, Miller notes, “his allegations would provide ammunition to officials within the Bush administration who have been arguing that Mr. Hussein should be driven from power partly because of his unwillingness to stop making weapons of mass destruction, despite his pledges to do so.” Sethna also contacts freelance journalist Paul Moran. Moran is a former employee of the INC and has been employed for years by the Rendon Group, a firm specializing in “perception management” and which helped develop the INC (see May 1991). Moran’s on-camera interview with Haideri is broadcast worldwide by the Australian Broadcasting Corp. [New York Times, 12/20/2001; SBS Dateline, 7/23/2003; New York Review of Books, 2/26/2004; Rolling Stone, 11/17/2005] Reporter Jonathan Landay will later say that he and others were skeptical from the outset: “There were some red flags that the New York Times story threw out immediately, which caught our eye, immediately. The first was the idea that a Kurd—the enemy of Saddam—had been allowed into his most top secret military facilities. I don’t think so. That was, for me, the biggest red flag. And there were others, like the idea that Saddam Hussein would put a biological weapons facility under his residence. I mean, would you put a biological weapons lab under your living room? I don’t think so.” Landay’s partner Warren Strobel will add, “The first rule of being an intelligence agent, or a journalist, and they’re really not that different, is you’re skeptical of defectors, because they have a reason to exaggerate. They want to increase their value to you. They probably want something from you. Doesn’t mean they’re lying, but you should be—journalists are supposed to be skeptical, right? And I’m afraid the New York Times reporter in that case and a lot of other reporters were just not skeptical of what these defectors were saying. Nor was the administration…” [PBS, 4/25/2007]

Entity Tags: Zaab Sethna, Warren Strobel, Jonathan Landay, Judith Miller, Paul Moran, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, Ahmed Chalabi, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Australian Ambassador to the United Nations John Dauth tells Trevor Flugge, chairman of Australian Wheat Board (AWB), that the Australian government intends to participate in a US-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein. At a subsequent AWB board meeting held on February 27, Flugge tells boardmembers that Dauth “believed US military action to depose Saddam Hussein was inevitable and that at this time the Australian Government would support and participate in such action.” Dauth predicted that Baghdad’s offer to permit the return of UN weapons inspectors would be “likely to stave off US action for 12 to 18 months but that some military action was inevitable.” [Board, 2/27/2002, pp. 10 pdf file; Sydney Morning Herald, 11/22/2006]

Entity Tags: Trevor Flugge, John Dauth

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

After seeing photos of the trailers hailed by the CIA as evidence of an Iraqi biological weapons program, former UN weapons inspector Rod Barton tells the Australian government that US intelligence has wrongly concluded that the vessels in the trailers are biological fermenters. [Associated Press, 5/13/2006]

Entity Tags: Rod Barton, Australia

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation

Andrew Wilkie, an analyst for the Australian Office of National Assessments, tells an Australian parliamentary inquiry investigating pre-war claims about Iraq, that the Australian government manipulated intelligence in an effort to build support for the March 2003 US-led invasion. He explains that the government misrepresented intelligence by concealing from the public ambiguities that were present in its intelligence assessments. [Tom Paine (.com), 8/22/2003; Age (Melbourne), 8/23/2003; Independent, 8/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Andrew Wilkie

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

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