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Context of 'October 22, 2007: ACLU Book Documents ‘Systematic’ Torture of Detainees Authorized by Senior Government Officials'

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New York Times reporter Judith Miller again speaks to Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, in regards to the Iraqi WMD controversy and the recent op-ed by former ambassador Joseph Wilson (see July 6, 2003). In Miller’s notes, she writes the words “Victoria Wilson.” Libby has twice informed Miller that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame Wilson, is a CIA agent (see June 23, 2003 and 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2003).
Miller Unsure of Details of Disclosure - In testimony about the interview two years later (see September 30, 2005), Miller will say that “before this [telephone] call, I might have called others about Mr. Wilson’s wife. In my notebook I had written the words ‘Victoria Wilson’ with a box around it, another apparent reference to Ms. Plame, who is also known as Valerie Wilson. I [testified] that I was not sure whether Mr. Libby had used this name or whether I just made a mistake in writing it on my own. Another possibility, I said, is that I gave Mr. Libby the wrong name on purpose to see whether he would correct me and confirm her identity.” In her testimony, Miller will say that at the time, she believed she had heard Wilson’s wife only referred to by her maiden name of Plame. When asked whether Libby gave her the name of Wilson, Miller will decline to speculate.
Criticizing Plame Wilson's Husband - During their conversation, Libby quickly turns the subject to criticism of Wilson, saying he is not sure if Wilson actually spoke to anyone who had knowledge of Iraq’s attempts to negotiate trade agreements with Niger. After Miller agrees to attribute the conversation to “an administration official,” and not Libby himself, Libby explains that the reference to the Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger in President Bush’s State of the Union address—the so-called “sixteen words” (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003)—was the product of what Miller will call “a simple miscommunication between the White House and the CIA.”
'Newsworthy' Disclosure - Miller will later testify that at the time, she felt it “newsworthy” that Wilson’s wife was a CIA agent, and recommended to her editors that the Times pursue the angle. She will write: “I felt that since the Times had run Mr. Wilson’s original essay, it had an obligation to explore any allegation that undercut his credibility. At the same time, I added, I also believed that the newspaper needed to pursue the possibility that the White House was unfairly attacking a critic of the administration.” (US District Court for the District of Columbia 8/27/2004 pdf file; Gerstein 10/4/2005; Miller 10/16/2005; van Natta, Liptak, and Levy 10/16/2005; US District Court for the District of Columbia 10/28/2005 pdf file)

The White House continues to back away from its admission of error concerning President Bush’s claim that Iraq had attempted to buy uranium from Niger (see July 8, 2003 and July 11, 2003). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice appear on the Sunday morning talk shows to assert that the “16 words” in Bush’s January speech (see Mid-January 2003 and 9:01 pm January 28, 2003) were “technically correct” because British intelligence, not American intelligence, was the original source of the claim as worded by Bush. The British still stand by the claim, though they refuse to provide evidence. In the interviews, Rice tries to call the claim a “mistake” and simultaneously vouch for its “accuracy.” (Milbank and Allen 7/26/2003; Rich 2006, pp. 100) “I believe that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction,” she says. In particular, Fox News host Tony Snow gives Rice multiple opportunities to state that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and that the Iraq-Niger uranium claim is probably true. She says that the related claim of the Iraqis buying aluminum tubes for nuclear centrifuges is also supported by the CIA, even though Snow acknowledges that the tubes theory has been “knocked down.” (Fox News 7/13/2003)
Invoking the British, Blaming Tenet - On CBS’s Face the Nation, Rice again blames CIA Director George Tenet for the error (see 3:09 p.m. July 11, 2003), saying: “My only point is that, in retrospect, knowing that some of the documents underneath may have been—were, indeed, forgeries, and knowing that apparently there were concerns swirling around about this, had we known that at the time, we would not have put it in.… And had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of central intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.” (Rice 7/13/2003) On Fox News, Rice says: “[T]he statement that [Bush] made was indeed accurate. The British government did say that. Not only was the statement accurate, there were statements of this kind in the National Intelligence Estimate. And the British themselves stand by that statement to this very day, saying that they had sources other than sources that have now been called into question to back up that claim. We have no reason not to believe them.… We have every reason to believe that the British services are quite reliable.” (Fox News 7/13/2003) On CNN, Rice calls the issue “enormously overblown.… This 16 words has been taken out of context. It’s been blown out of proportion.” She emphasizes that Bush’s claim came “from a whole host of sources.… The British, by the way, still stand by their report to this very day in its accuracy, because they tell us that they had sources that were not compromised in any way by later, in March or April, later reports that there were some forgeries.” She adds: “We’re talking about a sentence, a data point, not the president’s case about reconstitution of weapons of mass destruction, or of nuclear weapons in Iraq.… We’re talking about a single sentence, the consequence of which was not to send America to war. The consequence of which was to state in the State of the Union something that, while accurate, did not meet the standard that we use for the president.” (CNN 7/13/2003)
Denies Involvement in Wilson Mission - Rice also denies that anyone at the White House had any involvement in sending former ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger to investigate the uranium claims (see July 6, 2003). CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer says of the Wilson mission, “Supposedly, it came at the request of the vice president.” Rice replies: “No, this is simply not true, and this is something that’s been perpetuated that we simply have to straighten out. The vice president did not ask that Joe Wilson go to Niger. The vice president did not know. I don’t think he knew who Joe Wilson was, and he certainly didn’t know that he was going. The first that I heard of Joe Wilson mission was when I was doing a Sunday talk show and heard about it (see June 8, 2003 and June 8, 2003)… [T]he Wilson trip was not sent by anyone at a high level. It wasn’t briefed to anyone at high level. And it appears to have been inconclusive in what it found.” Rice is following the White House strategy of denying Vice President Dick Cheney’s involvement in the Wilson mission (see July 6, 2003, 8:45 a.m. July 7, 2003, 9:22 a.m. July 7, 2003, July 7-8, 2003, and July 8, 2003). (CNN 7/13/2003)

In his final press conference before leaving the administration, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer continues to assert the possible validity of the admittedly false Iraq-Niger uranium claim (see Mid-January 2003 and 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). “I think this remains an issue about did Iraq sek uranium in Africa,” he says, “an issue that very well may be true. We don’t know if it’s true (see July 8, 2003), but nobody can say it’s wrong.” (Rich 2006, pp. 100)

The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion produces a memo laying down new “Interrogation Rules of Engagement” (IROE), for use in its new mission in Iraq. (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004) The person apparently mostly responsible for writing the memo is Cpt. Carolyn A. Wood, formerly in charge of military intelligence interrogators at Bagram, which serves as the main screening area in Afghanistan. (Campbell and Goldenberg 6/23/2004) Col. Billy Buckner, the chief public affairs officer at Fort Bragg, home to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, later says that Wood brought the interrogations rules used at Bagram with her to Iraq. (Associated Press 5/24/2004) But the rules are also adapted and made somewhat less aggressive. “Those rules were modified,” according to Buckner, “to make sure the right restraints were in place.” (Campbell and Goldenberg 6/23/2004) The modifications nevertheless fall outside normal military doctrine. According to a classified portion of the later Fay report (see August 25, 2004), the memo allows the “use of stress positions during fear-up harsh interrogation approaches, as well as presence of military working dogs, yelling, loud music,… light control,” sleep management, and isolation. (Danner 10/7/2004) The memo is adopted from interrogation procedures known as “Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility Policy,” in use by a secretive unit called Joint Task Force (JTF) 121 , that is active in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion worked in close cooperation with Special Operations Forces like JTF-121 during its tour in Afghanistan, and “at some point,” according to the Fay report, it “came to possess the JTF-121 interrogation policy.” (Jehl and Schmitt 8/27/2004) Cpt. Wood adopts the JTF-121 policy “almost verbatim.” (Jehl and Schmitt 8/27/2004) Like the highest US command in Iraq, the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion apparently believes the standard Army Field Manual is an insufficient guideline for interrogations. Interrogation techniques falling outside the scope of standard military doctrine have already been devised at the Pentagon, but only for use in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. These “non-doctrinal approaches, techniques, and practices,” according to Gen. George R. Fay, nevertheless, become “confused at Abu Ghraib.” (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004) JTF-121 consists of CIA officials and Special Operations troops, including soldiers from the Army’s Delta Force and Navy Seals. The unit is later alleged to have been instrumental in the capture of Saddam Hussein. (Jehl 5/17/2004)

An organization called Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) writes an open letter to President Bush entitled “Intelligence Unglued,” where they warn that unless Bush takes immediate action, the US intelligence community “will fall apart—with grave consequences for the nation.” They say that it is clear his National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and not CIA Director George Tenet, was responsible for the now-infamous “sixteen words” in his January State of the Union address (see Mid-January 2003 and 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). “But the disingenuousness persists,” they write. “Surely Dr. Rice cannot persist in her insistence that she learned only on June 8, 2003, about former ambassador Joseph Wilson’s mission to Niger in February 2002, when he determined that the Iraq-Niger report was a con-job” (see July 6, 2003). “Rice’s denials are reminiscent of her claim in spring 2002 that there was no reporting suggesting that terrorists were planning to hijack planes and slam them into buildings (see May 16, 2002). In September, the joint Congressional committee on 9/11 came up with a dozen such reports” (see December 24, 1994 and January 6, 1995). It is not only Rice’s credibility that has suffered, they write, but Secretary of State Colin Powell’s as well, “as continued non-discoveries of weapons in Iraq heap doubt on his confident assertions to the UN” (see February 5, 2003). Ultimately, they write, it is Bush’s credibility at stake much more than that of his advisers and cabinet members. They lay the blame for the “disingenuousness” from the various members of the administration at the feet of Vice President Dick Cheney: it was Cheney’s office who sent Wilson to Niger (see (February 13, 2002)), it was Cheney who told the Veterans of Foreign Wars that Saddam Hussein was about to produce a nuclear weapon (see August 26, 2002), all with intelligence he and his staff knew to be either unreliable or outright forgeries—a “deep insult to the integrity of the intelligence process,” they write—it was Cheney and his staff who pressured CIA analysts to produce “cherry-picked” intelligence supporting their desire for war, it was Cheney and his staff who “cooked” the prewar National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see October 1, 2002). Bad enough that false intelligence was used to help craft Bush’s State of the Union address, they write, but that “pales in significance in comparison with how it was used to deceive Congress into voting on October 11 to authorize you to make war on Iraq” (see October 10, 2002). VIPS recommends three things for Bush to implement:
bullet Bring an immediate end to White House attempts to exculpate Cheney from what they write is his obvious guilt and ask for his resignation: “His role has been so transparent that such attempts will only erode further your own credibility. Equally pernicious, from our perspective, is the likelihood that intelligence analysts will conclude that the way to success is to acquiesce in the cooking of their judgments, since those above them will not be held accountable. We strongly recommend that you ask for Cheney’s immediate resignation.”
bullet Appoint General Brent Scowcroft, the chair of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to head “an independent investigation into the use/abuse of intelligence on Iraq.”
bullet Bring UN inspectors back into Iraq. “This would go a long way toward refurbishing your credibility. Equally important, it would help sort out the lessons learned for the intelligence community and be an invaluable help to an investigation of the kind we have suggested you direct Gen. Scowcroft to lead.” (Salon 7/16/2003)

Lieutenant-General Michael Moseley gives a briefing assessing the lessons of the war with Iraq to US and allied military officers at Nellis airbase in Nevada. He says that as part of Operation Southern Focus, US and British aerial attacks on Iraq southern and northern no-fly zones laid the foundations for the invasion of Iraq. He explains that during the nine-month period spanning mid-2002 to early 2003 (see June 2002-March 2003), US and British planes flew 21,736 sorties, dropping 606 bombs on 391 carefully selected targets. The pre-invasion bombing campaign made it possible for the official invasion (see March 19, 2003) to begin without a protracted bombardment of Iraqi positions. “It provided a set of opportunities and options for General Franks,” Mosely says. (Gordon 7/20/2003; Smith 6/27/2005; Alexandrovna and Byrne 6/27/2005)

The Bush administration releases a heavily redacted version of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE—see October 1, 2002). Most of the report is whited out, and most of what remains is selected from the key judgments section; those remnants tend to support the Bush administration’s position that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and therefore posed a threat to the Middle East and perhaps to the US. The redacted version is released days after Vice President Dick Cheney authorized his chief of staff, Lewis Libby, to leak selected portions of the NIE to reporters (see 7:35 a.m. July 8, 2003, July 10, 2003, (July 11, 2003), July 12, 2003, and July 12, 2003). (National Foreign Intelligence Board 10/2002 pdf file; National Foreign Intelligence Board 7/18/2003; National Security Archive 7/9/2004)
Overall Findings - According to the redacted release, the NIE found “that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.… We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad’s vigorous denial and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf War starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.”
Financing through Oil Sales - The NIE maintained that Iraq used illicit oil sales “to finance WMD programs,” that it “has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox, and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.”
Seeking Weapons-Grade Uranium for Nuclear Weapons Program - As for nuclear weapons, “[a]lthough we assess that Saddam [Hussein] does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.… How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material. If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year. Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.” The NIE judgments cited the long-discredited claims that Iraq purchased aluminum tubes as part of its nuclear weapons program (see Late September 2002 and March 7, 2003). In toto, the NIE claimed the existence of “compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program.”
Large, Covert Chemical Weapons Program - It found that Iraq produced between 100 and 500 metric tons “of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX,” all deadly chemical agents, and had succeeded in hiding much of its production facilities “within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry.” And Iraq was capable of filling “a limited number of covertly stored Scud” missiles, “possibly a few with extended ranges,” with chemical weapons.
Significant Biological Weapons Program - The redacted report claimed, “We judge that all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW [biological weapons] program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.” Iraq had “some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives. Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive BW program. Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents. Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability. Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable.”
Delivery Systems - According to the judgments, Iraq possessed several dozen “Scud-variant” short-range ballistic missiles, and is developing other methods of delivering chemical and biological payloads, including unmanned aerial vehicles “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent.” It claimed, “Baghdad’s UAVs could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the United States, the US homeland.” Iraq had attempted to procure commercially available software, including a topographic database, that would allow it to target specific areas within the US, the report said.
Not Conducting Terrorist Attacks - The report found that Iraq was not conducting “terrorist attacks with conventional or” chemical or biological weapons against the US for fear it would trigger American reprisals. However, the report claimed that Iraq “probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the US homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks—more likely with biological than chemical agents—probably would be carried out by Special Forces or intelligence operatives.” More likely were covert attacks by Iraqi intelligence agents against “US and allied interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes action against Iraq. The US probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the US homeland, although we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam’s regime has directed attacks against US territory.” In such a case, Iraq might have allied itself with al-Qaeda to conduct more widespread attacks against American targets within the US itself and/or overseas.
Dissent in a Box - In a small boxed area at the bottom of the redacted report is a summary of some of the dissents filed by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Called “State/INR Alternative View of Iraq’s Nuclear Program,” the dissents actually reiterate much of the conclusions in the main body of the report, but with the INR backing away from claiming Iraq’s “integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.” Neither is the INR sure of the findings about the aluminum tubes. (National Foreign Intelligence Board 10/2002 pdf file; National Foreign Intelligence Board 7/18/2003)
White House Briefing - An unnamed “senior administration official” briefs the Washington press corps on the redacted NIE release, walking the reporters through the contents of the report and reiterating Bush administration claims of the imminent danger posed by the Hussein regime, the Iraqi efforts to dodge UN oversight, and the support for the entire NIE throughout the US intelligence community. The official then quotes extensively from the October 2002 speech by President Bush in Cincinnati, where he made a number of specious and belligerent assertions about Iraq (see October 7, 2002). At the end of the briefing, the official concludes that everything Bush has told the public has been sourced from many different intelligence analyses and findings, and every claim Bush and his officials has made has been based in fact. The official blames “changes in style and tone” for the confusion and groundless claims made by Bush and other officials in earlier settings, particularly Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union address (see Mid-January 2003 and 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). “And as we’ve said all along, that information that we know today is different from information we knew then,” he says.
Questions - The official takes questions from the assembled reporters. The first question of substance concerns the CIA’s warnings to remove the Iraq-Niger claims from the Cincinnati speech (see October 5, 2002 and October 6, 2002) before they were included in the State of the Union address. The official explains that the speechwriters merely chose to be less specific in the Cincinnati speech than in the State of the Union address, because at that time the CIA only had “a single source” on which to base the Iraq-Niger assertion. The official denies that the claim was ever “flawed” or erroneous (see July 8, 2003), merely that it lacked adequate sourcing. He also denies that anyone in the White House knew that the Niger documents “proving” the uranium claim were forged until after the address (see March 8, 2003). The official repeatedly notes that the dubious and fallacious claims were “signed off” by the CIA, and by implication the fault of the CIA and not the White House. The official, responding to a question about the fact-finding trip to Niger by Joseph Wilson (see February 21, 2002-March 4, 2002) and his later repudiation of the Iraq-Niger uranium claims (see July 6, 2003), reiterates that no one at the White House knew of Wilson’s findings (see March 5, 2002 and March 8, 2002), and the report actually bolstered the intelligence community’s suspicions that Iraq was attempting to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger. (White House 7/18/2003)

The New York Times’s Judith Miller, an outlet for information planted in the media by the Bush administration in he run-up to the Iraq war (see December 20, 2001, August 2002, September 8, 2002, and September 18, 2002), now reports the number of suspected WMD sites in Iraq as 578—a figure far lower than the 1,400 she had reported during the first hours of the war (see March 19-20, 2003). Miller blames the US failure to find any WMD on Pentagon ineptitude: “chaos, disorganization, interagency feuds, disputes within and among various military units, and shortages of everything from gasoline to soap.” Deeper in the story, she writes, “To this day, whether Saddam Hussein possessed such weapons when the war began is unknown.” (Schmitt 7/20/2003; Rich 2006, pp. 101)

White House chief of staff Andrew Card (see (July 11, 2003)) holds a late-night meeting of what press secretary Scott McClellan will call “select senior advisers”—Card, McClellan, communications director Dan Bartlett, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, and Gonzales’s subordinate Harriet Miers. One topic of discussion is the recent report that the White House had scrubbed a claim of an Iraq-Niger uranium buy from a speech by President Bush in October 2002 (see October 5, 2002 and October 6, 2002), months before Bush’s State of the Union address where he did make such a claim (see Mid-January 2003 and 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). The media reports that Hadley was warned to delete the claim by CIA Director George Tenet. Hadley confirms receiving the warning, and tells the assemblage that, three months later, he had forgotten Tenet’s warning. “Signing off on these facts is my responsibility,” he says. “And in this case, I blew it. I think the only solution is for me to resign.” Hadley is distressed that Tenet had, in McClellan’s words, “been made to look like the scapegoat, since he believed it was nobody’s fault but his own.” McClellan will call Hadley’s offer to resign “selfless .. [his attempt to] clear the name of someone he felt had taken an unfair degree of blame, and to accept his own responsibility for an honest mistake whose consequences were now playing out before a worldwide audience.” The others quickly reject Hadley’s proffered resignation, and decide, as McClellan will recall, “that an approach of openness, forthrightness, and honesty was now essential.” Bartlett and Hadley are delegated to “inform the world as to what had happened and why,” and Hadley will admit to having forgotten his conversation with Tenet” (see October 6, 2002). (McClellan 2008, pp. 177-178)

As decided the night before (see July 21, 2003), Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and White House communications director Dan Bartlett hold a press conference in which Hadley admits to having forgotten about CIA Director George Tenet’s October warning that the Iraq-Niger claim was not solid. Hadley admits that President Bush should never have made the claim that Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from Niger; he takes responsibility for its inclusion in the president’s State of the Union address (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). His admission and apology follow closely on the heels of Tenet’s acceptance of responsibility for the “error” (see 3:09 p.m. July 11, 2003). Hadley admits that he received two memos from the CIA and a phone call from Tenet in October 2002 that questioned the Iraq-Niger allegations and warned that they should not be made public. The allegations were excised from Bush’s speech in Cincinnati (see October 5, 2002 and October 6, 2002). Hadley says he should have made sure those same allegations were not in Bush’s State of the Union speech: they “should have been taken out of the State of the Union.… There were a number of people who could have raised a hand” to have the passage removed from the draft of Bush’s speech. “And no one raised a hand.… The high standards the president set were not met.” (In reality, author Craig Unger will later write, the White House was reluctant to go back to Tenet because the CIA had already twice rejected the claim. Instead, White House officials had obtained clearance to use the material from a more amenable CIA subordinate—see January 26 or 27, 2003.) Hadley says he has apologized to Bush for the “error.” Bartlett says, “The process failed.” He adds that Bush retains “full confidence in his national security adviser [Condoleezza Rice], his deputy national security adviser [Hadley], and the director of central intelligence [Tenet].” Hadley says he had forgotten about the October CIA memos until they were discovered a few days ago by White House speechwriter Michael Gerson. (Associated Press 7/22/2003; White House 7/22/2003; Sanger and Miller 7/23/2003; Alexandrovna and Leopold 11/16/2005; Unger 2007, pp. 273; Leopold 1/23/2007; McClellan 2008, pp. 178) White House press secretary Scott McClellan will later take some responsibility for the lapse, saying, “The fact is that given the October 5 and 6 memorandum [from Tenet], and my telephone conversation with the DCI Tenet at roughly the same time, I should have recalled at the time of the State of the Union speech that there was controversy associated with the uranium issue.” The press briefing, McClellan will write, “accomplish[es] our goal of putting the 16-word controversy behind us.” (McClellan 2008, pp. 178)

Representative Porter Goss and Senator Bob Graham co-chair the Congressional Inquiry.Representative Porter Goss and Senator Bob Graham co-chair the Congressional Inquiry. [Source: Ken Lambert/ Associated Press]The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report comes out. (US Congress 7/24/2003 pdf file; US Congress 7/24/2003) Officially, the report was written by the 37 members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, but in practice, co-chairmen Bob Graham (D-FL) and Porter Goss (R-FL) exercised “near total control over the panel, forbidding the inquiry’s staff to speak to other lawmakers.” (Jacoby, Adair, and Fritz 9/29/2002) Both Republican and Democrats in the panel complained how the two co-chairmen withheld information and controlled the process. (Lipman 9/21/2002) The report was finished in December 2002 and some findings were released then, but the next seven months were spent in negotiation with the Bush administration over what material had to remain censored. The Inquiry had a very limited mandate, focusing just on the handling of intelligence before 9/11. It also completely ignores or censors out all mentions of intelligence from foreign governments. Thomas Kean, the chairman of 9/11 Commission says the Inquiry’s mandate covered only “one-seventh or one-eighth” of what his newer investigation will hopefully cover. (Schmidt 7/27/2003) The report blames virtually every government agency for failures:
bullet Newsweek’s main conclusion is: “The investigation turned up no damning single piece of evidence that would have led agents directly to the impending attacks. Still, the report makes it chillingly clear that law-enforcement and intelligence agencies might very well have uncovered the plot had it not been for blown signals, sheer bungling—and a general failure to understand the nature of the threat.” (Isikoff and Klaidman 7/28/2003)
bullet According to the New York Times, the report also concludes, “the FBI and CIA had known for years that al-Qaeda sought to strike inside the United States, but focused their attention on the possibility of attacks overseas.” (Johnston 7/26/2003)
bullet CIA Director George Tenet was “either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community resources necessary to combat the growing threat.” (Schmidt and Drehle 7/25/2003)
bullet US military leaders were “reluctant to use… assets to conduct offensive counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan” or to “support or participate in CIA operations directed against al-Qaeda.” (Schmidt and Drehle 7/25/2003)
bullet “There was no coordinated… strategy to track terrorist funding and close down their financial support networks” and the Treasury Department even showed “reluctance” to do so. (Schmidt and Drehle 7/25/2003)
bullet According to the Washington Post, the NSA took “an overly cautious approach to collecting intelligence in the United States and offered ‘insufficient collaboration’ with the FBI’s efforts.” (Schmidt and Drehle 7/25/2003) Many sections remain censored, especially an entire chapter detailing possible Saudi support for the 9/11 attackers. The Bush administration insisted on censoring even information that was already in the public domain. (Isikoff 5/25/2003) The Inquiry attempted to determine “to what extent the president received threat-specific warnings” but received very little information. There was a focus on learning what was in Bush’s briefing on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001), but the White House refused to release this information, citing “executive privilege.” (Priest 7/25/2003; Cocco 8/7/2003)

Slate reporter Jack Shafer lambasts New York Times reporter Judith Miller’s record of error as the Times’s primary chronicler of the claims for Iraqi WMD. Miller has just written an article backing away from her previous claims (see July 20, 2003), but blaming the failure to find WMD on everything from “chaos [and] disorganization” to “flawed intelligence[,] interagency feuds,” and the wrong choice of people to head the US searches. Shafer responds: “Judith Miller finds everybody associated with the failed search theoretically culpable except Judith Miller. This rings peculiar because Miller, more than any other reporter, showcased the WMD speculations and intelligence findings by the Bush administration and the Iraqi defector/dissidents. Our WMD expectations, such as they were, grew largely out of Miller’s stories.” He notes that Miller’s reports were largely based on assertions from sources affiliated with Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC), and writes, “If reporters who live by their sources were obliged to die by their sources… Miller would be stinking up her family tomb right now.” Shafer goes on to note that Miller’s words were always carefully selected to ensure that the sources, not Miller herself, painted a picture of Iraq teeming with WMD. “[I]f Miller got taken by her coveted sources, so did the reading public, and the Times owes its readers a review of Miller’s many credulous pieces,” Shafer writes. Since the Times has yet to provide such a review, Shafer says, he has done some of the initial work for it.
'The Renovator, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri' - Shafer begins with an Iraqi civil engineer, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, who, thanks to the INC (see December 17, 2001), provided Miller with the information required for stories describing the secret renovation of facilities to store and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (see December 20, 2001). Shafer notes that al-Haideri, who now lives in the US, has boasted of his willingness to return to Iraq once Saddam Hussein is out of power; he suggests that the Times send him back to Iraq “where he can lead them on a tour of the 20 sites and 20 installations” that he claims housed WMD.
'The Pseudonymous Ahmed al-Shemri' - In September 2002, Miller and her colleague Michael Gordon wrote that Iraq was continuing to develop, produce, and store chemical agents in secret mobile and fixed weapons laboratories, many underground, in defiance of UN weapons sanctions (see September 8, 2002). The allegations, made as part of a much broader story, were based on the allegations of Ahmed al-Shemri, the admitted pseudonym of an Iraqi who claimed to have been “involved” in chemical weapons production in Iraq before his defection in 2001. “All of Iraq is one large storage facility,” al-Shemri told Miller. He also told her of the existence of large, secret labs in Mosul, those labs’ production of 5 tons of liquid VX nerve agent, and their ability to produce far more if requested. And, he told her that Iraq had created a new solid form of VX that makes decontamination difficult. Russian and North Korean scientists were assisting the Iraqis, al-Shemri asserted, and told of stockpiles of “12,500 gallons of anthrax, 2,500 gallons of gas gangrene, 1,250 gallons of aflotoxin, and 2,000 gallons of botulinum throughout the country.” Shafer suggests that al-Shemri “drop his pseudonym to make his background more transparent and lead the Times to the Mosul lab.”
Making the Case for the White House - On September 13, 2002, Miller and Gordon printed a story titled “White House Lists Iraq Steps to Build Banned Weapons” (see September 13, 2002). The story related the White House’s claims of Iraq’s attempt to purchase aluminum tubes to be used in building nuclear missiles, its development of mobile biological laboratories, its attempt to buy poison gas precursors, and the secret development of chlorine gas at Fallujah and three other locations. Also, the article noted, Iraq was constructing missiles in violation of the 1991 cease-fire agreement, was conducting prohibited missile research, and was rebuilding a destroyed facility once used to build long-range missile engines. Shafer suggests that the Times send a delegation of reporters and experts to the sites noted in the article, saying, “Maybe the Times can find evidence that supports or discredits the administration’s claim.”
'Khidir Hamza, Nuclear Mastermind' - Miller has written extensively of the claims of former Iraqi nuclear bomb expert Khidir Hamza (see July 30, 2002), who defected in 1994. Perhaps her most influential story was printed on September 18, 2002 (see September 18, 2002), where she reported Hamza’s claims that Iraq was within two to three years of mass-producing centrifuges necessary to enrich uranium. Shafer suggests that Hamza “take the Times on an Iraqi atomic tour.”
Proclaiming the Defectors' Accuracy - In October 2002, Miller wrote that al-Haideri and Hamza complained that US intelligence was not taking them seriously. She quoted Chalabi and Pentagon adviser Richard Perle’s enthusiastic support for the two defectors’ claims, along with their vociferous attacks on the CIA, and wrote: “The INC has been without question the single most important source of intelligence about Saddam Hussein.… What the agency has learned in recent months has come largely through the INC’s efforts despite indifference of the CIA.” Shafer writes: “Either the INC was wrong or the CIA was wrong. If the INC was wrong, the Times should feed Perle’s words back to him with a fork and spoon.” Miller wrote another story quoting an administration defender of the defectors in January 2003, this time Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Shafer says “[t]he Times should review the credibility of all the Iraqis who defected to Miller. Who are the defectors? What did they tell the United States? How much of it was true? How much was blarney?”
Atropine Auto-Injectors - In November 2002, Miller wrote that, according to White House officials, Iraq had ordered “large quantities” of atropine auto-injectors (see November 12, 2002). Atropine is an antidote to sarin and VX, two lethal nerve agents. Shafer says “[t]he Times should track the atropine order to the source, if possible, to see if the request was in preparation for a chemical weapons attack.”
Russian Smallpox Allegations - In December 2002, Miller wrote that a Russian scientist may have provided a virulent strain of smallpox to Iraqi scientists (see December 3, 2002). Shafer notes that it is clear Miller does not know who the source for the allegation was, and the Times should now reinvestigate the story.
Miller's Mobile Exploitation Team Scoop - Shafer writes that Miller’s “biggest scoop” was an April 20, 2003 article titled “Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert” (see April 20, 2003 and April-May 2003). Miller reported on an Iraqi scientist in the custody of a US Mobile Exploitation Team (MET) in search of WMD. The scientist said that Iraq destroyed large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons just before the invasion, and he led the MET to buried precursor materials from which illegal weapons can be made. Moreover, the scientist alleged that Iraq sent its remaining stockpiles of WMD to Syria in the mid-1990s, where they remain hidden to this day. Iraq provided some of those weapons to al-Qaeda, and has focused heavily on researching new and more powerful weapons. Miller wasn’t allowed to name the precursor element the scientist had named, but wrote that it could be used to create a toxic agent banned under chemical weapons treaties. She was not allowed to speak to the scientist himself, nor could she reveal his name. And, she noted, she agreed to allow the military to review her story, and held off publishing it for three days. In return, the military allowed her to look at the scientist from a distance, as he pointed at spots in the desert where he said the precursor elements were buried. One day after the article appeared, Miller went on PBS, where she called her reporting the “silver bullet” in the WMD search. The next day, she published another article announcing a “paradigm shift” by investigators as a result of what they’d learned from the Iraqi scientist. But neither Miller nor any of the METs actually found anything concrete as a result of the scientist’s allegations. She later admitted that the “scientist” was actually a military intelligence officer, but continued to stand by his original allegations. Shafer suggests that Miller persuade the military to allow her to identify the so-called “precursor” substance, and explain the deceptive portrayal of a military intelligence officer as a scientist familiar with Iraqi WMD programs.
Impact and Consequences - Shafer says that the most important question about Miller is, “Has she grown too close to her sources to be trusted to get it right or to recant her findings when it’s proved that she got it wrong?” He continues: “Because the Times sets the news agenda for the press and the nation, Miller’s reporting had a great impact on the national debate over the wisdom of the Iraq invasion. If she was reliably wrong about Iraq’s WMD, she might have played a major role in encouraging the United States to attack a nation that posed it little threat. At the very least, Miller’s editors should review her dodgy reporting from the last 18 months, explain her astonishing credulity and lack of accountability, and parse the false from the fact in her WMD reporting. In fact, the Times’ incoming executive editor, Bill Keller, could do no better than to launch such an investigation.” (Slate 7/25/2003)

Hama Hamadou.Hama Hamadou. [Source: Sangonet (.com)]The prime minister of Niger, Hama Hamadou (whose name is sometimes spelled Amadou), denies that Iraq ever attempted to buy uranium from his country (see Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001, Late September 2001-Early October 2001, October 15, 2001, December 2001, February 5, 2002, February 12, 2002, October 9, 2002, October 15, 2002, January 2003, February 17, 2003, and March 7, 2003), and challenges British Prime Minister Tony Blair to produce the evidence that he says proves the claim. Hamadou says Niger is an ally of Britain and the US, since it sent 500 troops to fight against Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. “Is this how Britain and America treat their allies?” he asks. “If Britain has evidence to support its claim then it has only to produce it for everybody to see. Our conscience is clear. We are innocent.” The US has admitted that its claims that Iraq attempted to buy uranium from Niger was based on forged documents (see March 8, 2003 and 3:09 p.m. July 11, 2003), but Britain continues to insist that it has intelligence from “independent sources” that proves the claim. Britain has not shared this intelligence with anyone. Hamadou denies that Iraq and Niger ever entered into any negotiations over uranium. “Officials from the two countries have never met to discuss uranium,” he says, and continues: “We were the first African country to send soldiers to fight against Saddam after the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Would we really send material to somebody whom we had fought against and who could could destroy half the world with a nuclear bomb? It is unthinkable.” Hamadou says no one from either Britain or the US has formally accused Niger of any involvement in any uranium deals with Iraq. “Everybody knows that the claims are untrue,” he says. “We have survived famine in Niger. We can survive this.” (Harrison 7/27/2003)

In a briefing to the president and other top officials, Kay says that he has found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction, and says the disputed trailers (see April 19, 2003 and May 9, 2003) were probably not mobile biological factories, as the CIA and White House had claimed (see May 28, 2003 and May 29, 2003). Present at the briefing are Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Andrew Card, and other White House aides. Kay’s briefing provokes little response from his audience. Describing the president’s reaction, Kay later says: “I’m not sure I’ve spoken to anyone at that level who seemed less inquisitive. He was interested but not pressing any questions. .. I cannot stress too much that the president was the one in the room who was the least unhappy and the least disappointed about the lack of WMDs. I came out of the Oval Office uncertain as to how to read the president. Here was an individual who was oblivious to the problems created by the failure to find WMDs. Or was this an individual who was completely at peace with himself on the decision to go to war, who didn’t question that, and who was totally focused on the here and now of what was to come?” (Isikoff and Corn 2006, pp. 310)

Condoleezza Rice being interviewed by Gwen Ifill.Condoleezza Rice being interviewed by Gwen Ifill. [Source: PBS]After CIA Director George Tenet admits that President Bush should never have made the claim that Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from Niger (see 3:09 p.m. July 11, 2003), and Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley admits the White House also erred in allowing the claim (see July 22, 2003), Hadley’s boss, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, grudgingly admits to her own responsibility in allowing the claim to be made. She tells PBS reporter Gwen Ifill: “What we learned later, and I did not know at the time, and certainly did not know until just before Steve Hadley went out to say what he said last week, was that the director [Tenet] had also sent over to the White House a set of clearance comments that explained why he wanted this out of the speech (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). I either didn’t see the memo, or I don’t remember seeing the memo.” When Ifill asks if she feels any “personal failure or responsibility” over allowing the false claim, Rice responds: “Well, I certainly feel personal responsibility for this entire episode. The president of the United States has every right to believe that what he is saying in his speeches is of [sic] the highest confidence of his staff.” On the same day, Rice continues to insist that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program (see July 30, 2003, July 30, 2003, and July 31, 2003). (Wilson 2004, pp. 352-353)

Defending the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice tells ZDF television that there was “very strong intelligence” that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction “Going into the war against Iraq, we had very strong intelligence. I’ve been in this business for 20 years. And some of the strongest intelligence cases that I’ve seen, key judgments by our intelligence community that Saddam Hussein… had biological and chemical weapons….” (Rice 7/31/2003)

Warren Bass, the 9/11 Commission staffer allocated to review National Security Council documentation, comes to favor an account of events in the Bush administration given by former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke over one given by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Clarke has claimed that the administration did not take the risk of an al-Qaeda attack seriously enough in the summer of 2001, whereas Rice claims the administration did everything it could to prevent one.
Documentation, Speeches, Briefings - Bass comes to this judgment partly because of the small amount of Rice’s e-mails and internal memos about terrorism from the spring and summer of 2001: there is, in author Philip Shenon’s words, “almost nothing to read.” In addition, she made very few references to terrorism in speeches and public appearances. For example, a speech she was to give on 9/11 itself about national security contained only a passing reference to terrorism (see September 11, 2001). On the contrary, Clarke left a pile of documents and a “rich narrative” of events at the White House concerning al-Qaeda, including warnings about an upcoming catastrophic terrorist attack in the summer of 2001. Bass also sees that Clarke was not allowed to brief President Bush on al-Qaeda before 9/11, whereas he repeatedly talked to President Bill Clinton about it.
Memo Warned of Attacks One Week before 9/11 - He is especially astounded to find a memo dated September 4, 2001 warning of a forthcoming attack by Osama bin Laden (see September 4, 2001). However, when he shows this to his team leader, Michael Hurley, they both realize it may be difficult to get this memo included in the commission’s report due to expected opposition from 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow, who the staff suspects is biased towards Rice (see January 3, 2001, Before December 18, 2003, May-June 2004 and February 28, 2005). (Shenon 2008, pp. 146-149)
Memo Called a "Jeremiad" - The September 4 memo is mentioned in the commission’s final report, but is followed by a comment from Rice saying she saw it as a warning “not to get dragged down by bureaucratic inertia.” The report then calls the memo a “jeremiad” (a prolonged lamentation) and attributes it to Clarke’s inability “to persuade [the CIA and Pentagon] to adopt his views, or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or that the whole government could support.” (Shenon 2008, pp. 212-213)

Joseph Wilson, the former US ambassador to Gabon who has played a key part in discrediting the Bush administration’s attempts to claim that Iraq tried to purchase weapons-grade uranium from Niger (see July 6, 2003)), discusses the issue with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer. Wilson affirms that he has always believed Iraq had chemical and biological WMD, but not enough to warrant invading it, and adds that he “disagreed with… the other agendas that were in play that led us to invade, conquer, and now occupy Iraq.” He notes that he accepts the assertions that neither Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, nor CIA Director George Tenet were aware of his 2002 mission to Niger at the time he made the trip (see February 21, 2002-March 4, 2002), but adds that he believes Cheney and his staffers, particularly his chief of staff Lewis Libby, “asked essentially that… the agency follow up on the report. So it was a question that went to the CIA briefer from the Office of the Vice President (see (February 13, 2002)). The CIA, at the operational level, made a determination that the best way to answer this serious question was to send somebody out there who knew something about both the uranium business and those Niger officials that were in office at the time these reported documents were executed.” Wilson refuses to comment on his wife Valerie Plame Wilson (see July 14, 2003), particularly her CIA status, but does say that the attacks on both himself and his wife were “clearly designed to keep others from stepping forward. If you recall, there were any number of analysts who were quoted anonymously as saying that the vice president had seemed to pressure them in his many trips out to the CIA (see 2002-Early 2003). I don’t know if that’s true or not, but you can be sure that a GS-14 or 15 with a couple of kids in college, when he sees the allegations that came from senior administration officials about my family are in the public domain, you can be sure that he’s going to be worried about what might happen if he were to step forward.” The people who leaked the information about his wife, Wilson continues, “are libel or vulnerable to investigation under a 1982 law dealing with the identification of American agents.” He is referring to the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (see July 16, 2003). (CNN 8/3/2003)

A Wall Street Journal op-ed claims that President Bush never claimed the Iraqis posed an “imminent threat” with their putative WMD programs, and that former ambassador Joseph Wilson is unfairly “moving the goalposts” by saying that the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD never passed what they call the “imminent threat test.” As far back as September 2001, after the attacks on New York and Washington, the Bush administration began claiming that Iraq posed a serious threat to the US (see September 11, 2001-March 17, 2003, Shortly After September 11, 2001, September 14, 2001, August 2002, and September 6, 2002). Bush had apparently characterized Iraq as an “imminent threat” even before becoming president (see May 17, 2000). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has used the term “imminent threat” (see September 18, 2002), as have other members of the administration, such as press secretary Ari Fleischer, communications chief Dan Bartlett, and Defense Policy Board chief Richard Perle. Vice President Dick Cheney had publicly threatened Iraq with military action as far back as December 2001 (see December 11, 2001). Bush had included Iraq as one of the now-infamous “Axis of Evil” in early 2002 (see January 29, 2002). And Bush, Cheney, and top White House officials had characterized Iraq and Saddam Hussein as a threat since March 2002 (see March 24, 2002, August 15, 2002, August 20, 2002, August 26, 2002, Fall and Winter 2002, September 7, 2002, September 8, 2002, September 8, 2002, September 12, 2002, September 13, 2002, September 18, 2002, September 19, 2002, September 24, 2002, September 26, 2002, October 1, 2002, October 1, 2002, October 3, 2002, October 7, 2002, October 7, 2002, January 10, 2003, and March 6, 2003). Wilson will later observe, “While the Journal may have been technically correct that the president had not uttered those exact words, he [and his top officials] walked right up to the phrase.” He will note that Bush’s “staff and administration allies, of course, had been less concerned about splitting hairs as they promoted the invasion.” (Wilson 2004, pp. 367-368)

Damage to the front of the Marriott Hotel.Damage to the front of the Marriott Hotel. [Source: CNN]A suicide bomber crashes into the lobby of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 16 people and wounding 150. All of those killed are Indonesian except for one Dutch man. No group takes credit for the bombing, but US and Indonesian officials quickly blame Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in Southeast Asia. The New York Times calls the Marriott “the most visibly American building in the city, [leaving] little doubt about the intentions of the terrorists.” Two weeks before, a militant captured in a raid in central Java revealed that he had recently delivered two carloads of bombmaking materials to Jakarta. Furthermore, drawings were found indicating that JI was planning an attack on one of the following targets: the Grand Hyatt, Mulia, or Marriott hotels, two Jakarta shopping malls, or some Christian sites. Police claim they went on high alert. But the Marriott says they were never given any warning, and there was no public alert of any kind. The US ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, says the US was not given any warning. Time magazine will later comment that “serious questions remain about just how much more police might have done to prevent the attack in the first place.” (Perlez 8/7/2003; Elegant 8/10/2003) One Indonesian later convicted for a role in the bombing, Mohammad Rais, will later testify in court that he had frequently met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in recent years, and the bombing was inspired by bin Laden’s talk about waging war against the US and its allies. “We saw the Marriott attack as a message from Osama bin Laden.” (Associated Press 12/2/2004) US treasury official Stuart Levey will later claim that al-Qaeda funded the attack by having a courier bring $30,000 in cash to Indonesia. (Diamond 6/18/2006) The funds for the bombing allegedly passed through Hambali, an al-Qaeda and JI leader arrested in Thailand several days later (see August 12, 2003). (CNN 8/19/2003) JI leaders Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top are said to have masterminded the bombing, together with Hambali. (Bonner 10/7/2005)

Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie).Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie). [Source: Defense Department]Hambali (a.k.a. Riduan Isamuddin) is arrested in Thailand in a joint US-Thai operation. He has been considered the operational leader of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. He was involved in the Bojinka plot in 1995, attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), and was said to be involved in the 2002 bombing of two nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia (see October 12, 2002), the 2003 bombing of a Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003), and other similar acts. He is taken into US custody and is said to quickly and fully cooperate with his captors. (Simpson 12/7/2003) According to the Washington Post, at some point he will be transferred to the US naval base at the British island colony of Diego Garcia, where the CIA is believed to have a secret interrogation center. (Priest and Higham 12/17/2004; Priest 1/2/2005, pp. A01) Two of Hambali’s associates - Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), and Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) - are arrested with him. Both are Malaysians and are said to be al-Qaeda operatives. Supposedly they were members of a four person suicide squad working for Hambali and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to hijack an airplane (see October 2001-February 2002). (Elegant and Perrin 10/6/2003) The US will later classify both of them, and Hambali, as about a dozen of the top al-Qaeda operatives in US custody (see September 2-3, 2006).

Shortly after he is arrested in Thailand (see August 12, 2003), al-Qaeda leader Hambali is taken to an unknown location and tortured. (Windrem 9/13/2007)

An unnamed military intelligence captain sends an email to military intelligence interrogators explaining the difference between “lawful” and “unlawful combatants.” He indicates that he will provide “an ROE [Rules of Engagement] that addresses the treatment of enemy combatants, specifically, unprivileged belligerents.” The wording implies he believes it is possible for the US armed forces to declare the “privileges” of some adversaries to be removed at will. The use of the word “privilege” is significant in that the Fourth Geneva Convention uses the word only once, namely in Article 5, which is the only part that holds the very small possibility of derogation from the rights of detainees. It is clear the captain thinks detainees have “privileges” that can be taken away from them, instead of rights that must be upheld. The captain then goes on to request that interrogators provide him with “input [on] what techniques would they feel would be effective techniques” and he reminds them to send him their interrogation techniques “wish list” by August 17. He finishes his message with the following remarks: “The gloves are coming off gentlemen regarding these detainees. Col. [Steven] Boltz [deputy to Brig. Gen. Fast] has made it clear that we want these individuals broken. Casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks. I thank you for your hard work and your dedication. MI [Military Intelligence] Always out Front!” (Danner 10/7/2004)

Victor Bout in 2003.Victor Bout in 2003. [Source: James Hill / Contact Press]The New York Times Magazine publishes an article based on an interview with Victor Bout, the world’s biggest illegal arms dealer. Bout worked extensively with the Taliban in the years before 9/11, and because of this, he claims, “I woke up after Sept. 11 and found I was second only to Osama,” in terms of being a wanted criminal. But he hints that he has powerful connections. “My clients, the governments… I keep my mouth shut.” He also points to the middle of his forehead and adds, “If I told you everything I’d get the red hole right here.” When asked about his possible ties to Russian intelligence, he says, “Until now you’ve been digging in a big lake with small spoons. There are huge forces…” He breaks his sentence, and explains to the reporter that he cannot explain too much about what the report calls “the triangulated relationship between him, governments, and his rogue clients.” An unnamed British arms investigator claims, “Bout is encouraged by Western intelligence agencies when it’s politically expedient.” Bout, a Russian, is interviewed in Moscow, where “he lives in plain sight… under the apparent protection of a post-Communist system that has profited from his activities as much as he has.” (Landesman 8/17/2003) It will later be alleged that Bout began working with US intelligence shortly after 9/11, if not before, despite being the main arms dealer to the Taliban (see Shortly After September 11, 2001).

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directs his undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Stephen Cambone, to send Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller to Iraq to review the US military prison system in Iraq and make suggestions on how the prisons can be used to obtain “actionable intelligence” from detainees. Cambone passes the order on to his deputy Lt. Gen. William Boykin who meets with Miller to plan the trip. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004; Barry, Hirsh, and Isikoff 5/24/2004)

The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion authors a memo describing aggressive techniques such as “the use of dogs, stress positions, sleep management, sensory deprivation,… yelling, loud music, and light control.” The memo is possibly the interrogation techniques “wish list” that was requested by a military intelligence captain in a mid-August email (see Mid-August 2003). (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004)

The “Hard Site” at Abu Ghraib is officially opened for use. Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, who much later reports (see August 25, 2004) on what happens at the prison, will say he believes the opening of the Hard Site “marked the beginning of the serious abuse that occurred.” (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004)

The CIA’s Baghdad station chief, Gerry Meyer (see May 18, 2006), files an Aardwolf, or time-critical situation report, about the crisis in the area in the immediate aftermath of the bombing of the UN offices in that city (see August 29, 2003). The report says that the UN bombing was part of a strategy by a new and bold insurgency to discredit and isolate the US-led coalition, and warns that insurgents and terrorists have the capability to carry out many more attacks against “soft targets.” The insurgency is increasingly dangerous, threatens to erase early progress made by the US, and could actually overwhelm occupation forces. The report also says that there are two strands of violence, one from foreign fighters and one from Iraqi insurgents. In addition, it predicts that the capture of Saddam Hussein will not end the violence as he appears not to be in control of it. Some in the Bush administration think the report is too negative and L. Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, attaches a note to it downplaying the worsening conditions in Iraq. (Risen 2006, pp. 141-142; Wilson 2007, pp. 157) Meyer will file another such report in November (see November 10, 2003).

Geoffrey Miller.Geoffrey Miller. [Source: US Army]Major General Geoffrey Miller, who oversees the prison at Guantanamo (see November 4, 2002), flies to Iraq for a 10-day consulting trip (see August 18, 2003). He is part of a team “experienced in strategic interrogation… to review current Iraqi theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence” and to review the arrangements at the US military prisons in Iraq. (Higham, White, and Davenport 5/9/2004; Hersh 5/17/2004; Shadid and Williams 8/24/2004; Savage 2007, pp. 190) The team consists of 17 interrogation experts from Guantanamo Bay, and includes officials from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). (Smith and White 6/12/2004)
Attempt to Increase Flow of 'Actionable Intelligence' - The Pentagon’s decision to dispatch the team on this mission was influenced by the military’s growing concern that the failure of coalition forces to quell resistance against the occupation was linked to a dearth in “actionable intelligence” (see August 2003). (Hersh 5/24/2004) Miller has therefore come to help Brigadier General Barabara Fast improve the results of her interrogation operations. More to the point, he is supposed to introduce her to the techniques being used at Guantanamo. (Hersh 6/21/2004; Worden 7/4/2004) Officials are hoping detainees will provide intelligence on weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein, who is still on the loose. (Smith 5/16/2004)
'Gitmoizing' Abu Ghraib - “[Miller] came up there and told me he was going to ‘Gitmoize’ the detention operation,” Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski, later recalls. (Higham, White, and Davenport 5/9/2004) Miller will later deny he used the word “Gitmoize.” (Smith and White 5/12/2004) During Miller’s visit, a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) is established in order to centralize the intelligence operations at the prison. Captain Carolyn A. Wood is made officer in charge (OIC) of the Interrogation Coordination Element (ICE), within the JIDC. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Before returning to Washington, Miller leaves a list of acceptable interrogation techniques—based on what has been used in Guatanamo—posted on a wall in Abu Ghraib, which says that long term isolation, sleep disruption, “environmental manipulation,” and “stress positions” can be used to facilitate interrogations, but only with the approval of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on a case-by-case basis. (Smith 5/21/2004) The use of dogs is also included, even though the technique was banned at Guantanamo eight months before by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (see January 15, 2003). (Diehl 7/19/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Karpinski later recalls, “He said they are like dogs and if you allow them to believe at any point that they are more than a dog then you’ve lost control of them.” (BBC 6/15/2004) Miller’s visit to Iraq heralds some significant changes, which include, first, the introduction of more coercive interrogation tactics; second, the taking control of parts of the Abu Ghraib facility by military intelligence; and third, the use of MPs in the intelligence collection process. During his visit, Miller discusses interrogation techniques with military intelligence chief Colonel Thomas M. Pappas. (Golden and Schmitt 5/13/2004)
'Snowballing' Effect of Chaos, Brutality - “The operation was snowballing,” Samuel Provance, a US military intelligence officer, will later recall, describing the situation at Abu Ghraib after Miller’s visit. “There were more and more interrogations. The chain of command was putting a lot of resources into the facility.” And Karpinski will later say that she was being shut out of the process at about this time. “They continued to move me farther and farther away from it.” (White and Higham 5/20/2004) Major General Anthony Taguba (see March 9, 2004) will later determine that Miller’s visit helped bring about the complete breakdown of discipline at the prison: “Interrogators actively requested,” at Miller’s behest, “that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogations of witnesses.” In essence, Miller tells guards to “soften up” prisoners so they will not be able to resist their inquisitors. Miller will later deny any responsibility for the Abu Ghraib torture program (see May 4, 2004). (Savage 2007, pp. 190)

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) sends a team to Iraq to train interrogators in harsh, SERE-derived methods of interrogation (see December 2001, January 2002 and After, July 2002, and July 1-2, 2002). JPRA personnel demonstrate a number of methods to Special Military Unit (SMU) personnel, including “walling” (see May 10, 2005) and particular methods of physically striking detainees. JPRA personnel are present at several interrogations where detainees are placed in stress positions and repeatedly slapped. In at least one interrogation, JPRA personnel take part in abusing a prisoner, stripping him naked and giving orders to place him in a stress position for 12 hours. In August 2007, one JRPA official will tell the Senate Armed Services Committee that, in regards to stripping detainees, “we [had] done this 100 times, 1,000 times with our [SERE school] students.” (Levin 4/21/2009)

Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, formerly head of the US Central Command, criticizes the Bush administration’s occupation strategy for Iraq, saying that the administration has never put together a coherent strategy, never created a plan for achieving its goals, and has not allocated the resources needed to achieve those goals. “There is no strategy or mechanism for putting the pieces together,” he says, and so “we’re in danger of failing.” Speaking to several hundred Marine and Navy officers and others, Zinni, who was badly wounded in Vietnam, says: “My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and the lies, and we saw the sacrifice. I ask you, is it happening again?… We can’t go on breaking our military and doing things like we’re doing now.” A focus of his criticism is the choice by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to have the Defense Department, and not the State Department, oversee postwar efforts in Iraq. “Why the hell would the Department of Defense be the organization in our government that deals with the reconstruction of Iraq?” he asks. “Doesn’t make sense.” Another area of criticism is the Bush administration’s cavalier treatment of the United Nations, particularly in failing to secure a UN resolution that several nations said was a prerequisite for their contributing to the peacekeeping force (see October 21, 2002, October 27, 2002, November 8, 2002, December 31, 2002, February 5, 2003, and March 25, 2003). “We certainly blew past the UN,” he says. “Why, I don’t know. Now we’re going back hat in hand.” Zinni is given a warm reception by his audience, some of whom buy recordings of his remarks to share with friends and fellow soldiers. (Ricks 9/5/2003)

Rumsfeld visiting Abu Ghraib (his jacket is held over his back in both pictures). Karpinski is in both pictures as well. Rumsfeld visiting Abu Ghraib (his jacket is held over his back in both pictures). Karpinski is in both pictures as well. [Source: Associated Press (top) and CBC (bottom)]Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visits the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He is guided by Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski. It is not known otherwise who he visits, how long he stays there, or what is discussed. (Shanker 5/14/2004) However, his visit comes exactly at the time (late August-early September 2003) that Rumsfeld expands Operation Copper Green to Iraq, allowing interrogators to use more aggressive techniques, such as sexual humiliation (see (Late August 2003 or September 2003)). Rumsfeld’s visit also comes in the middle of a week-long visit to Abu Ghraib by Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, who is there with a team pushing for more aggressive interrogation techniques in order to get more actionable intelligence out of the detainees (see August 31, 2003-September 9, 2003).

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says there is “absolutely” a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda “[W]e know that there was training of al-Qaeda in chemical and perhaps biological warfare. We know that [Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi was networked out of there, this poisons network that was trying to spread poisons throughout…. And there was an Ansar al-Islam, which appears also to try to be operating in Iraq. So yes, the al-Qaeda link was there.” (Rice 9/7/2003; Nolan 9/26/2003; US House Committee on Government Reform 3/16/2004)

Shortly after Major General Geoffrey Miller’s visit (see August 31, 2003-September 9, 2003) to Iraq, three “Tiger Teams,” consisting of six personnel, arrive at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. Each team consists of an interrogator, analyst, and linguist, who work together as a team. The use of Tiger Teams is an approach that has been successfully used at the Guantanamo detention facility. Gen. George R. Fay, in his later report (see August 25, 2004), will say he believes the Tiger Team concept was not appropriate for Abu Ghraib, because the “method was designed to develop strategic level information,” instead of tactical intelligence. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

A team of military lawyers in Iraq issues a memo detailing a new set of interrogation rules entitled, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (ICRP). The team—headed by the highest legal expert within the US military apparatus in Iraq, Col. Marc Warren, the staff judge advocate for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7—includes Capt. Fitch, the command judge advocate with Col. Thomas M. Pappas’ 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and Maj. Daniel Kazmier and Maj Franklin D. Raab, both from the CJTF-7 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA). In crafting the memo, Fitch “copie[s]” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s April 16, 2003 memo (see April 16, 2003), intended for Guantanamo, “almost verbatim.” The draft is then sent to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion for comment. The 519th adds techniques from its own August 27, 2003 memo (see August 27, 2003), including “the use of dogs, stress positions, sleep management, sensory deprivation,… yelling, loud music, and light control.” The techniques listed in the final version of the memo apply to all categories of detainees. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Sleep management and sensory deprivation are also part of the Guantanamo set of interrogation techniques. The other more aggressive methods—the use of dogs, stress positions, and yelling, loud music, and light control—are extras.

The CIA drafts a report containing statements reportedly made by alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) under interrogation at a black site. According to the report, KSM claims that Zacarias Moussaoui was not handled by al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks, but for a second wave of attacks. KSM also made this claim in an earlier interrogation (see July 2, 2003). The claim appears to be not entirely true, as in an intercepted conversation from July 2001, KSM and his associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh discussed possibly using Moussaoui for 9/11 (see July 20, 2001). The report apparently contains a mention of this call. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 246, 247, 530, 531)

The legal experts at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) issue a memorandum amending the set of interrogation rules included in a September 10 memo (see September 10, 2003) by military legal experts in Iraq. The additional methods included in that memo can only be used with prior approval by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on a case-by-case basis, the OSJA document says. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Like Major General Geoffrey Miller, the OSJA stresses the importance of collaboration between MPs and intelligence personnel. It also provides “safeguards such as legal reviews of the interrogation plans and scrutiny of how they were carried out,” the Washington Post later reports. (Smith and White 6/12/2004) Additionally, the memo discusses how the Arab fear of dogs can be exploited. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to a later report (see August 25, 2004) by General George R. Fay, interrogators at Abu Ghraib immediately adopt the new set of rules. But Staff Judge Advocate Colonel Mark Warren will recall that the memo is not implemented until its approval by the US Central Command (CENTCOM). (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Evidence, however, supports the Fay report. “After mid-September 2003,” Fay will write, “all [s]oldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib had to read a memorandum titled IROE [Interrogations Rules of Engagement], acknowledging they understood the ICRP, and sign a confirmation sheet indicating they had read and understood the ICRP.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to classified documents uncovered by the Senate Armed Services Committee (see April 21, 2009), CENTCOM lawyers begin objecting to the policies almost immediately. One e-mail, from a CENTCOM lawyer to a Staff Judge Advocate, warns, “Many of the techniques appear to violate [Geneva Conventions] III and IV and should not be used.” (Levin 4/21/2009)

In an interview, a key 9/11 Commission staffer, Doug MacEachin, reportedly agrees with an important witness, FBI agent Ali Soufan, that the CIA deliberately withheld from the bureau the knowledge that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash had attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit and was therefore linked to 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. (Soufan 2011, pp. 301-302) However, the Commission’s final report will call the non-passage of this intelligence “an example of how day-to-day gaps in intelligence sharing can emerge even when there is mutual goodwill.” (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 267) This interview appears to be the second time the Commission talks to Soufan, which is on September 15, 2003. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 507; Soufan 2011, pp. 297-302) Soufan discusses the case of “Omar,” a joint FBI-CIA source inside al-Qaeda. At an interview of Omar in January 2001 the CIA learned that bin Attash had attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit in early 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 4, 2001). However, it then failed to share this with the FBI (see January 5, 2001 and After). Soufan tells the Commission’s staff: “This shows that the CIA knew the significance of Malaysia, Khallad, and Almihdhar but actively went out of their way to withhold the information from us. It’s not a case of just not passing on information. This is information the FBI representative working with the source should have been told about. It was a legal requirement. Instead we were deliberately kept out of the loop.” A staffer responds that the CIA claims it shared the information, and Soufan asks whether the Commission checked the “regular cables” between the field and CIA headquarters. After the staffer says they have, Soufan asks whether the Commission has checked the “operational traffic,” and MacEachin responds, “That must be it.” Other staffers are initially puzzled by McEachin’s comment, but he explains it to them. Soufan will comment: “Operational traffic refers to cables sent during an operation. The officer will list procedures, leaving a record in case something goes wrong or something needs to be referred to. Because these cables are strictly procedural and not related to intelligence, they would not be sent to the FBI. If someone wanted to hide something from the FBI, that’s where he would put it. Because Doug had worked for the CIA, he knew what operational cables were, while other members of the team might not have.” The Commission later finds that the information about bin Attash was in an operational cable. (Soufan 2011, pp. 301-302) The reason for the discrepancy between MacEachin’s attitude in the interview of Soufan and the Commission’s final report is unknown.

According to anonymous current and former intelligence officials, the CIA has carried out an in-house investigation of the damage done to the agency by the exposure of covert agent Valerie Plame Wilson (see June 13, 2003, June 23, 2003, July 7, 2003, 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2003, July 8, 2003, 11:00 a.m. July 11, 2003, 8:00 a.m. July 11, 2003, Late Afternoon, July 12, 2003, 1:26 p.m. July 12, 2003, July 12, 2003, and July 14, 2003). That damage is described by the officials as “severe” and potentially far more damaging than has been previously reported, particularly to the agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program (see February 13, 2006). The officials say that while CIA Director Porter Goss has not submitted a formal assessment of the damage caused by Plame Wilson’s exposure to Congressional oversight committees, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations did conduct a serious and aggressive investigation. That investigation, a “counter intelligence assessment to agency operations,” was ordered by the agency’s then-Deputy Director of the Directorate of Operations, James Pavitt. Former CIA counterintelligence officer Larry Johnson says that such an assessment would have had to have been carried out: “An exposure like that required an immediate operational and counter intelligence damage assessment. That was done. The results were written up but not in a form for submission to anyone outside of CIA.” A former counterintelligence officer says that the CIA’s reason for not submitting a report to Congress is that its top officials “made a conscious decision not to do a formal inquiry because they knew it might become public. They referred it [to the Justice Department] instead because they believed a criminal investigation was needed” (see September 16, 2003). According to that official, the assessment found the exposure of Plame Wilson caused “significant damage to operational equities.” Another counterintelligence official explains that “operational equities” includes both people and agency operations that involve the “cover mechanism,” “front companies,” and other CIA officers and assets. The assessment also shows that other CIA non-official cover (NOC) officers (see Fall 1992 - 1996) were compromised by Plame Wilson’s exposure. The officials will not say if American or foreign casualties were incurred as a result of her exposure. Several intelligence officials say it will take up to “10 years” for the agency to recover from the damage done by Plame Wilson’s exposure, and to recover its capability to adequately monitor nuclear proliferation on the level it had achieved prior to the White House’s leak of her identity. (Alexandrovna 2/13/2006)

Steven L. Jordan.Steven L. Jordan. [Source: Associated Press]Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan arrives at the Abu Ghraib prison compound in Iraq and is appointed as the director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JDIC). Jordon, an inexperienced military officer, will leave the “actual management, organization, and leadership of the core of his responsibilities” to Maj. Michael D. Thompson and Capt. Carolyn A. Wood, an investigation will later conclude. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

A mortar attack kills two soldiers at Abu Ghraib, and injures Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan and ten other soldiers. Jordan, who has only just arrived at the prison (see September 17, 2003), is extremely traumatized by the deaths of the two soldiers, one of whom suffered immensely. Two Iraqis, a man and a woman, are quickly apprehended on suspicion of involvement in the mortar attack and brought to the prison where a team of military intelligence soldiers and the MP Internal Reaction Force (IRF) are waiting for them. Two military intelligence soldiers yell at the man and begin hitting him, while he remains passive and handcuffed. MP 1st Lt. David Sutton intervenes and stops the beating. The detainee is released later in the day when his involvement in the attack is determined unlikely. The abuse is subsequently reported to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Commander Lt. Col. Jerry L. Phillabaum. The MPs and five military intelligence soldiers who were present at the incident all provide witness statements. Interestingly, as Maj. Gen. George R. Fay later relates (see August 25, 2004), “While the MP statements all describe abuse at the hands of an unidentified MI [Military Intelliigence] person…, the MI statements all deny any abuse occurred.” Phillabaum reports the incident to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), which determines there are insufficient grounds for prosecution. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

An Associated Press (AP) report provides details of what alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) has apparently told his CIA interrogators. The article, based on “interrogation reports” reviewed by the AP, makes the following claims:
bullet KSM worked on the Bojinka plot in 1994 and 1995 in the Philippines with Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah;
bullet After Yousef and Murad were captured (see January 6, 1995 and February 7, 1995), KSM began to devise a new plot that focused on hijackings on US soil;
bullet KSM first pitched the 9/11 plot to Osama bin Laden in 1996. He wanted bin Laden “to give him money and operatives so he could hijack 10 planes in the United States and fly them into targets”;
bullet After bin Laden agreed in principle, the original plan, which called for hijacking five commercial jets on each US coast, was modified several times. Some versions even had the planes being blown up in mid-air, possibly with the aid of shoe bombs. Bin Laden scrapped various parts of the plan, including attacks on both coasts and hijacking or bombing some planes in East Asia as well;
bullet The original four al-Qaeda operatives bin Laden offered KSM for the plot were eventual hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, as well as Khallad bin Attash and Abu Bara al-Yemeni. “All four operatives only knew that they had volunteered for a martyrdom operation involving planes,” one interrogation report apparently states;
bullet The first major change to the plans occurred in 1999 when the two Yemeni operatives could not get US visas (see April 3, 1999). (Solomon 9/21/2003) (According to the 9/11 Commission Report, KSM actually says Abu Bara al-Yemeni never applied for a US visa); (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 492)
bullet Bin Laden then offered KSM additional operatives, including a member of his personal security detail;
bullet At that time the plot was to hijack a small number of planes in the United States and East Asia and either have them explode or crash into targets simultaneously;
bullet In 1999, the four original operatives picked for the plot traveled to Afghanistan to train at one of bin Laden’s camps, where they received specialized commando training (see Late 1999);
bullet Al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) was, according to the report, a “key event in the plot,” although it does not say whether KSM was physically present. On the other hand, it confirms the presence of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali;
bullet KSM communicated with Alhazmi and Almihdhar while they were in the US using Internet chat software;
bullet KSM has never heard of Omar al-Bayoumi, an apparent Saudi intelligence agent who provided some assistance to future 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi when they arrived in California. Neither did he arrange for anyone else in the US to assist Almihdhar and Alhazmi when they arrived in California. Despite this, Almihdhar and Alhazmi soon made contact with a network of people linked to Saudi intelligence services (see January 15-February 2000 and June 23-July 2001);
bullet Bin Laden canceled the East Asian portion of the attacks in the spring of 2000, because, according to a quote from KSM contained in a report, “it would be too difficult to synchronize” attacks in the United States and Asia;
bullet Around that time, KSM reached out to Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia. He began “recruiting JI operatives for inclusion in the hijacking plot as part of his second wave of hijacking attacks to occur after Sept. 11,” one summary reportedly says;
bullet Zacarias Moussaoui also went to Malaysia in the run-up to 9/11 (see September-October 2000);
bullet In its final stages, the plan called for as many as 22 terrorists and four planes in a first wave, followed by a second wave of suicide hijackings that were to be aided possibly by al-Qaeda allies in Southeast Asia;
bullet The hijacking teams were originally made up of members from different countries where al-Qaeda had recruited, but in the final stages bin Laden chose instead to use a large group of young Saudi men to populate the hijacking teams;
bullet KSM told interrogators about other terror plots that were in various stages of planning or had been temporarily disrupted when he was captured, including one planned for Singapore (see June 2001 and November 15-Late December 2001);
bullet KSM and al-Qaeda were still actively looking to strike US, Western, and Israeli targets across the world as of this year. (Solomon 9/21/2003)
These statements attributed to KSM are similar to later statements attributed to him by the 9/11 Commission Report. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004) The Associated Press article cautions that US authorities are still investigating what KSM is telling them, “to eliminate deliberate misinformation.” (Solomon 9/21/2003) KSM made some or all these statements under torture, leading some to question their reliability (see Shortly After February 29 or March 1, 2003, After March 7, 2003, June 16, 2004, and August 6, 2007).

Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil.Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil. [Source: Joel Nito / Agence France-Presse]An “envoy” of bin Laden’s brother-in-law is accused of running al-Qaeda front companies in the Philippines and is deported. Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil, a Jordanian, was arrested in the Philippines in early 1995 and accused of supporting the Bojinka plot, but then was let go (see January 6, 1995 and April 1, 1995-Early 1996). He is arrested in the Philippines again on this day while attempting to sell some properties owned by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law. (Abuza 12/1/2002; Elegant 10/27/2003) Philippine officials call him a suspected al-Qaeda operative who had been in close contact with militants from the Abu Sayyaf and other groups. He is called an “envoy” or “point man” for Khalifa, and reputedly took over some of Khalifa’s business front companies after Khalifa left the country in 1994 (see December 1, 1994). His house was used as a safe-house and meeting place for al-Qaeda operatives. (Gutierrez 10/23/2003; Associated Press 10/23/2003) However, despite all these serious allegations, Abdeljalil is deported back to Jordan in early 2004. (Associated Press 3/1/2004)

Appearing on Meet the Press, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice presumes to link Hussein to Osama bin Laden. “Saddam Hussein—no one has said that there is evidence that Saddam Hussein directed or controlled 9/11, but let’s be very clear, he had ties to al-Qaeda, he had al-Qaeda operatives who had operated out of Baghdad.” (MSNBC 9/28/2003; US House Committee on Government Reform 3/16/2004)

Conservative columnist Robert Novak, who first publicly outed Valerie Plame Wilson as a CIA agent (see July 14, 2003), denies being fed the information of Plame Wilson’s identity by White House officials (see June 13, 2003, July 7, 2003, July 8, 2003, and Before July 14, 2003). The subject arose when he was inquiring about her husband’s trip to Niger (see July 6, 2003), Novak says. Shortly after the leak, he said of Plame Wilson’s identity, “I didn’t dig it out, it was given to me” by White House officials (see July 21, 2003). However, Novak’s story is now quite different. He says of the outing: “Nobody in the Bush administration called me to leak this. In July, I was interviewing a senior administration official on Ambassador [Joseph] Wilson’s report when he told me the trip was inspired by his wife, a CIA employee working on weapons of mass destruction. Another senior official told me the same thing. When I called the CIA in July, they confirmed Mrs. Wilson’s involvement in a mission for her husband on a secondary basis… they asked me not to use her name, but never indicated it would endanger her or anybody else. According to a confidential source at the CIA, Mrs. Wilson was an analyst, not a spy, not a covert operative (see Before July 14, 2003 and February 2004), and not in charge of undercover operatives. So what is the fuss about, pure Bush-bashing?” (Waas 2/12/2004; New York Times 2006; Waas 5/25/2006) The same day that Novak issues his denial, he tells White House political strategist Karl Rove, one of his sources, that he will protect Rove from the Justice Department’s investigation into the leak (see September 29, 2003).

Fox analyst Paul Vallely.Fox analyst Paul Vallely. [Source: The Intelligence Summit]The Pentagon sends a group of retired military generals and other high-ranking officers—part of its team of “independent military analysts” (see April 20, 2008 and Early 2002 and Beyond) on a carefully arranged tour of Iraq (see Summer 2003). The idea is to have the analysts counter the negative images being reported from Iraq about the upsurge in violence from the burgeoning insurgency. The Pentagon also wants the analysts to present a positive spin on Iraq in time to bolster President Bush’s request to Congress for $87 billion in emergency war financing. The group includes four analysts from Fox News, the Pentagon’s go-to media outlet for promulgating its propaganda and spin, one analyst from CNN and ABC, and several prominent members of research groups whose opinion articles appear regularly in the editorial pages of the largest US newspapers. The Pentagon promises that the analysts will be given a look at “the real situation on the ground in Iraq.”
Two Very Different Views of Reality - While the situation is rapidly deteriorating for the US—the American administrator, L. Paul Bremer, later writes that the US only has “about half the number of soldiers we needed here,” and has told Bush, “We’re up against a growing and sophisticated threat” at a dinner party that takes place on September 24, while the analysts are in Iraq (see September 24, 2003)—the story promoted by the analysts is starkly different. Their official presentation as constructed on a minute-by-minute basis by Pentagon officials includes a tour of a model school, visits to a few refurbished government buildings, a center for women’s rights, a mass grave from the early 1990s, and a tour of Babylon’s gardens. Mostly the analysts attend briefings, where one Pentagon official after another provide them with a very different picture of Iraq. In the briefings, Iraq is portrayed as crackling with political and economic energy. Iraqi security forces are improving by the day. No more US troops are needed to combat the small number of isolated, desperate groups of thugs and petty criminals that are spearheading the ineffective insurgency, which is perpetually on the verge of being eliminated. “We’re winning,” a briefing document proclaims. ABC analyst William Nash, a retired general, later calls the briefings “artificial,” and calls the tour “the George Romney memorial trip to Iraq,” a reference to former Republican governor George Romney’s famous claim that US officials had “brainwashed” him into supporting the Vietnam War during a tour there in 1965. Yet Nash, like the other analysts, will provide the talking points the Pentagon desires to his network’s viewers. Pentagon officials worry, for a time, about whether the analysts will reveal the troubling information they learn even on such a well-groomed and micromanaged junket, including the Army’s use of packing poorly armored Humvees with sandbags and Kevlar blankets, and the almost laughably poor performance of the Iraqi security forces. One Fox analyst, retired Army general Paul Vallely, later says, “I saw immediately in 2003 that things were going south.” But the Pentagon has no need to worry about Vallely or any of the other analysts. “You can’t believe the progress,” Vallely tells Fox News host Alan Colmes upon his return. Vallely predicts that the insurgency would be “down to a few numbers” within months. William Cowan, a retired Marine colonel, tells Fox host Greta Van Susteren, “We could not be more excited, more pleased.” Few speak about armor shortages or poor performances by Iraqi security forces. And all agree with retired general Carlton Shepperd’s conclusion on CNN: “I am so much against adding more troops.”
'Home Run' - The Iraq tour is viewed as what reporter David Barstow will call “a masterpiece in the management of perceptions.” Not only does it successfully promote the administration’s views on Iraq, but it helps fuel complaints that “mainstream” journalists are ignoring what administration officials and war supporters call “the good news” in Iraq. “We’re hitting a home run on this trip,” a senior Pentagon official says in an e-mail to the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers and Peter Pace. The Pentagon quickly begins planning for future trips, not just to Iraq but to Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay (see June 24-25, 2005) as well. These trips, and the orchestrated blitz of public relations events that follow, are strongly supported by the White House.
Countering 'Increasingly Negative View' of Occupation - Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita will later explain that a “conscious decision” was made to use the analysts to counteract what Di Rita calls “the increasingly negative view of the war” coming from journalists in Iraq. The analysts generally have “a more supportive view” of the administration and the war; and the combination of their military expertise and their tremendous visibility make them ideal for battling what Di Rita and other Pentagon and administration see as unfairly negative coverage. On issues such as troop morale, detainee interrogations, inadequate equipment, and poorly trained Iraqi forces, Di Rita will say the analysts “were more likely to be seen as credible spokesmen.”
Business Opportunities - Many of the analysts are not only in Iraq to take part in the Pentagon’s propaganda efforts, but to find out about business opportunities for the firms they represent. They meet with civilian and military leaders in Iraq and Kuwait, including many who will make decisions about how the $87 billion will be spent. The analysts gather inside information about the most pressing needs of the US military, including the acute shortage of “up-armored” Humvees, the billions needed to build new military bases, the dire shortage of translators, and the sprawling and expensive plans to train Iraqi security forces. Analysts Cowan and Sherwood are two of the analysts who have much to gain from this aspect of their tour. Cowan is the CEO of a new military firm, the wvc3 Group. Sherwood is the executive vice president of the firm. The company is seeking contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to supply body armor and counterintelligence services in Iraq. The company has a written agreement to use its influence and connections to help Iraqi tribal leaders in Al-Anbar province win reconstruction contracts from the Americans. “Those sheiks wanted access to the CPA,” Cowen later recalls, referring to the Coalition Provisional Authority. And he is determined to provide that access. “I tried to push hard with some of Bremer’s people to engage these people of Al-Anbar,” he recalls. Fox military analyst Charles Nash, a retired Navy captain, works as a consultant for small companies who want to land fat defense contracts. As a military analyst, he is able to forge ties with senior military leaders, many of whom he had never met before. It is like being “embedded” with the Pentagon leadership, he will recall. He will say, “You start to recognize what’s most important to them…. There’s nothing like seeing stuff firsthand.” An aide to the Pentagon’s chief of public relations, Brent Krueger, will recall that he and other Pentagon officials are well aware of their analysts’ use of their access as a business advantage. Krueger will say, “Of course we realized that. We weren’t na├»ve about that…. They have taken lobbying and the search for contracts to a far higher level. This has been highly honed.” (Di Rita will deny ever thinking that analysts might use their access to their business advantage, and will say that it is the analysts’ responsibility to comply with ethical standards. “We assume they know where the lines are,” he will say.) (Barstow 4/20/2008)

Several military lawyers make a second visit (see May 2003) to Scott Horton, head of the New York State Bar Association’s committee on international law, and ask him to persuade the Pentagon to reverse its policy on using “stress and duress” interrogation techniques (see April 16, 2003). “They were quite blunt,” Horton will say, recalling the two visits. “They were extremely concerned about how the political appointees were dealing with interrogation issues. They said this was a disaster waiting to happen and that they felt shut out” of the rules-drafting process. (Priest and Morgan 5/13/2004; Riley 5/15/2004; Hersh 5/24/2004)

David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group, tells Congress that his investigation has found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Nor has he uncovered anything to support the theory that two trailers discovered in Iraq (see April 19, 2003; May 9, 2003) were mobile biological weapons factories. (US Congress 10/2/2003; Warwick 4/12/2006) After Kay’s testimony, White House officials call George Tenet and John McLaughlin and ask why Kay included such a blunt statement that the Iraq Survey Group had not found any weapons of mass destruction in the beginning of his report. Couldn’t he have buried that statement elsewhere in the report they ask. (Isikoff and Corn 2006, pp. 329)

The 9/11 Family Steering Committee, an organization formed to represent some of the interests of the relatives of victims of the 9/11 attacks, writes a letter to 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton about Philip Zelikow, the Commission’s executive director. The committee has lost its trust in Zelikow, because it has gradually found out more and more about him and his links to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, as well as others the Commission is supposed to be investigating (see 1995, September 20, 2002, and September 16, 2003 or Shortly After). In addition, members of the committee have an extremely poor personal relationship with Zelikow, who they feel is dismissive of them and their concerns. The letter says that Kean and Hamilton should either force Zelikow to resign, or recuse himself from all the parts of the investigation linked to the National Security Council. Kean and Hamilton write back to the committee, saying they are aware of Zelikow’s ties to the administration, although it is unclear if they are aware of all of them at this point (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003). (Shenon 2008, pp. 166-168) However, the Commission will later interview Zelikow about his role in counterterrorism before 9/11 (see October 8, 2003) and he will be recused from dealing with the Bush administration transition (see October 9, 2003 or Shortly After), on which he worked (see January 3, 2001).

Jack Goldsmith succeeds Jay Bybee as the head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The OLC essentially performs two functions: advising the executive branch on the legal limits of presidential power, and crafts legal justifications for the actions of the president and the executive branch. Goldsmith, who along with fellow Justice Department counsel and law professor John Yoo, is seen as one of the department’s newest and brightest conservative stars. But instead of aiding the Bush administration in expanding the power of the executive branch, Goldsmith will spend nine tumultuous months battling the White House on issues such as the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, the administration’s advocacy of torture in the interrogation of terrorism suspects, and the extralegal detention and military tribunals of “enemy combatants.” Goldsmith will find himself at odds with Yoo, the author of two controversial OLC memos that grant the US government wide latitude in torturing terror suspects (see January 9, 2002 and August 1, 2002), with White House counsel and future attorney general Alberto Gonzales, and with the chief aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, David Addington, who along with Cheney is one of the strongest advocates of the so-called “unitary executive” theory of governance, which says the president has virtually unlimited powers, especially in the areas of national security and foreign policy, and is not always subject to Congressional or judicial oversight. Within hours of Goldsmith’s swearing-in, Goldsmith receives a phone call from Gonzales asking if the Fourth Geneva Convention, which protects civilians in war zones such as Iraq, covers terrorists and insurgents as well. Goldsmith, after intensive review with other lawyers in and out of the Justice Department, concludes that the conventions do indeed apply. Ashcroft concurs. The White House does not. Goldsmith’s deputy, Patrick Philbin, says to Goldsmith as they drive to the White House to meet with Gonzales and Addington, “They’re going to be really mad. They’re not going to understand our decision. They’ve never been told no.” Philbin’s prediction is accurate; Addington is, Goldsmith recalls, “livid.” The physically and intellectually imposing Addington thunders, “The president has already decided that terrorists do not receive Geneva Convention protections. You cannot question his decision.” Addington refuses to accept Goldsmith’s explanations. Months later, an unmollified Addington will tell Goldsmith in an argument about another presidential decision, “If you rule that way, the blood of the hundred thousand people who die in the next attack will be on your hands.” These initial encounters set the tone for Goldsmith’s stormy tenure as head of the OLC. Goldsmith will lead a small group of administration lawyers in what New York Times Magazine reporter Jeffrey Rosen calls a “behind-the-scenes revolt against what [Goldsmith] considered the constitutional excesses of the legal policies embraced by his White House superiors in the war on terror,” Goldsmith will resign in June of 2004 (see June 17, 2004). (Rosen 9/9/2007)

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in partnership with the Center for Constitutional Rights, Physicians for Human Rights, Veterans for Common Sense, and Veterans for Peace, file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records concerning the treatment of prisoners and detainees in US custody abroad, most specifically Iraq and Afghanistan. The request is the first spark in a firestorm of legal controversies, FOIA requests, government denials, and lawsuits, as the ACLU and its partners continue to attempt to squeeze documentation out of an uncooperative administration. Although the government will continue to withhold key records, ongoing litigation results in the eventual release of over 100,000 documents, which will be used by ACLU lawyers Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh to compile the book Administration of Torture (see October 22, 2007), which will show that detainees have been (and will be) systematically tortured and abused under the orders of senior government officials. (Union 10/7/2003; American Civil Liberties Union 10/22/2007)

Amjed Isail Waleed arrives at Abu Ghraib and is designated a high-value detainee and assigned number 151365. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) He is immediately taken to the Hard Site and beaten by MPs. (Davidson 7/28/2004) Guards “put me in a dark room and started hitting me in the head and stomach and legs,” he later testifies. (Davidson 7/28/2004) He is then forced to strip and for five days he is left naked in his cell (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) where he is cuffed in stressful positions, a treatment known as “high cuffed.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) He is also forced to kneel with a bag over his head for four hours, denied bedding or blankets, (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) and chained to a window in his cell and forced to wear women’s underwear on his head. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) One time a soldier slams Waleed’s head against the wall, causing the hood he is wearing to fall off. “One of the police was telling me to crawl, in Arabic, so I crawled on my stomach, and the police were spitting on me when I was crawling and hitting me on my back, my head, and my feet. It kept going on until their shift ended at four o’clock in the morning. The same thing would happen in the following days.” Later, one day in November, five soldiers take him into a room, put a bag over his head and begin to beat him up. “I could see their feet, only, from under the bag.… Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, and they would hold the string from the bag, and they made me bark like a dog, and they were laughing at me.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) A civilian interpreter, hired from Titan Corp., at one time hits him so hard, that he cuts his ear badly enough to require stitches. After several beatings that are so severe that he loses consciousness, he is forced to lie on the ground, while MPs jump onto his back and legs. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) “One of the police was pissing on me and laughing at me.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) Another day he is allegedly grabbed by US soldiers who hold him down and spread his legs. Another soldier meanwhile starts to open his trousers. “I started screaming,” he recalls. A soldier steps on his head. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) He is also beaten with a broom. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Someone breaks a chemical light and pours the liquid over his body, which is witnessed by another detainee. “I was glowing and they were laughing,” he says. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) He is then taken to another room where a police baton is used to sodomize him. “And one of the police, he put a part of his stick that he always carries inside my ass, and I felt it going inside me about two centimeters, approximately. And I started screaming, and he pulled it out and he washed it with water inside the room.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) In the meantime, two female MPs are hitting him, throwing a ball at his penis, and taking photographs. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) “And the two American girls that were there when they were beating me, they were hitting me with a ball made of sponge on my dick. And when I was tied up in my room, one of the girls, with blond hair, she is white, she was playing with my dick. I saw inside this facility a lot of punishment just like what they did to me and more. And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) Over the next few months, Waleed is subjected to six interrogations. Maj. George R. Fay (see August 25, 2004) will later conclude after an investigation into treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, “It is highly probable [the detainee’s] allegations are true.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

On camera, PBS producer Martin Smith asks Iraqi National Congress chief Ahmed Chalabi to produce “documentary evidence of any kind” that proves his contention that Iraq and al-Qaeda have ties (see November 6-8, 2001 and February 5, 2003). Chalabi promises to deliver a document showing “money changing hands between Saddam Hussein’s government and al-Qaeda,” but never produces such a document. (Rich 2006, pp. 106)

9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow is recused from some parts of the Commission’s investigation, specifically its examination of the Bush transition, on which he worked (see January 3, 2001), and interviews of senior Bush aides, including his associate, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see September 2003). This follows a complaint by victims’ relatives about Zelikow’s conflicts of interest (see October 3, 2003) and his interview by one of his own subordinates under oath (see October 8, 2003).
Only Recused from Some Aspects - The subordinate, the Commission’s counsel Daniel Marcus, recommended that, due to the conflicts, Zelikow should be recused from the Commission’s work on the transition and anything to do with the National Security Council (NSC). This is what the families wanted and, in the words of author Philip Shenon, “would have effectively ended Zelikow’s involvement in the parts of the investigation that were most important to him.” Zelikow will later say this recusal proposal “would have had the prompt and foreseeable effect of forcing my resignation.” However, Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton water the proposal down, allowing Zelikow to continue to work on most aspects of the NSC investigation.
Decision to Keep Zelikow Already Taken - According to Shenon, the decision to stick with Zelikow had been taken before Marcus interviewed him: “Kean and Hamilton made it clear to Marcus that they wanted to keep Zelikow on, regardless of what Marcus found. It was too late to find a new executive director. Besides, Zelikow had made himself indispensible, if only because he had so tightly controlled the flow of the information within the Commission that only he really knew all that was going on among the teams of investigators.” Marcus will say: “I think [Kean and Hamilton] basically made the decision that they were going to stick with this guy, that it was too late in the game to make a change.… [I]t was pretty clear that my instructions were to do what we needed to do on the recusal front and to make it work.”
Lack of Appreciation of Zelikow's Importance - One reason behind the decision to keep Zelikow may be that Kean and, in particular, Hamilton do not fully appreciate how important Zelikow’s role is in shaping the Commission’s final output. Marcus will comment, “Lee had this view, which was somewhat unrealistic, that the staff was not important.” Shenon will add, “In Hamilton’s view, Marcus thought, Zelikow might be the most important person on the staff, but he was still a ‘staffer’ and was not capable of ‘sneaking something’ by the commissioners.” (Shenon 2008, pp. 168-171)

Knight Ridder reporter Warren Strobel publishes an analysis of the potential damage the Plame Wilson identity leak (see Fall 1992 - 1996 and July 14, 2003) has caused to the CIA and to US national security. According to current and former CIA officials interviewed by Strobel, revealing Plame Wilson’s identity “may have damaged US national security to a much greater extent than generally realized.” Former CIA and State Department official Larry Johnson says flatly, “At the end of the day, [the harm] will be huge and some people potentially may have lost their lives.” Strobel notes that Plame Wilson’s training cost the US “millions of dollars and requires the time-consuming establishment of elaborate fictions, called ‘legends,’ including in this case the creation of a CIA front company that helped lend plausibility to her trips overseas.” Conservative columnist Robert Novak not only outed Plame Wilson, but her front company, Brewster Jennings (see October 2, 2003), a revelation that former CIA counterterrorism chief Vincent Cannistraro says puts other CIA officers at risk as well (see October 3, 2003). Plame Wilson’s career, as a specialist in Iraqi WMD, is now over, costing the agency her expertise, knowledge, and, perhaps most irreplaceably, the network of operatives and sources she has built up over the years. Former CIA agent Jim Marcinkowski, now a prosecutor in Michigan, says: “This is not just another leak. This is an unprecedented exposing of an agent’s identity.” Johnson calls himself “furious, absolutely furious” at the security breach. (Strobel 10/11/2003) According to anonymous intelligence officials, the CIA performed an “aggressive,” in-house assessment of the damage done by her exposure, and found it to have been “severe” (see Before September 16, 2003). It is unlikely that Strobel is aware of this assessment.

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez writes a classified memo calling for a “harmonization” of policing and intelligence tasks at Abu Ghraib in order to ensure “consistency with the interrogation policies… and maximize the efficiency of the interrogation.” (Smith 5/16/2004) The memo instructs that intelligence is to work more closely with military police in order to “manipulate an internee’s emotions and weaknesses” by controlling the detainee’s access to “lighting, heating,… food, clothing, and shelter.” (Smith 5/21/2004) It says that “it is imperative that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary their approach” according to the prisoner’s background, strengths, resistance, and other factors. (Smith 5/16/2004) The memo is a revision of Gen. Geoffrey Miller’s September 9 memo (see September 9, 2003), which included a list of acceptable interrogation techniques. Sanchez’s memo, however, drops the list replacing it with a general statement that “anything not approved, you have to ask for,” and adding that the detainees must be treated humanely and that any dogs used during the interrogations must be muzzled. (Smith 5/16/2004; Smith 5/21/2004) Larry Wilkerson, the chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, later says that such instructions are well understood to be honored on paper only. He will say, “When you read [a memo like this], you read, for example, that dogs can be used but they have to be muzzled. Well, I’m a soldier. I know what that means to an E-6 [noncommissioned officer] that is trying to question a guy and he’s got a German shepherd with a muzzle on there. If that doesn’t work, the muzzle comes off. If that doesn’t work, you kind of let the dog leap at the guy and maybe every now and then take a bite out of him (see November 20, 2003). It’s a very careful crafting of a memo… ” (Dubose and Bernstein 2006, pp. 191-192)

An internal CIA memo detailing the January 2002 meeting in which former ambassador Joseph Wilson was chosen to go to Niger to find out the truth behind the Iraq-Niger uranium allegations (see February 13, 2002) is published by the Wall Street Journal. The memo is due to be turned over to the Department of Justice along with thousands of other documents as part of its investigation into the outing of Wilson’s wife, CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson (see September 26, 2003). The document shows that while Plame Wilson was involved in the decision to send her husband to Niger, she was not responsible for making the final decision, a conclusion already verified by CIA officials (see July 22, 2003). (Cloud 10/17/2003)

Amnesty International publishes a report stating that it believes that “the totality of conditions” in which “most” of the detainees at Guantanamo are being held may itself amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Amnesty notes that the Committee against Torture, established to oversee implementation of the Convention against Torture (see October 21, 1994), “has expressly held that restraining detainees in very painful positions, hooding, threats, and prolonged sleep deprivation are methods of interrogation which violate the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” (Amnesty International 10/20/2003)

Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald testifies before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary about post-9/11 legislative changes, and says that the removal of the “wall” was a significant step forward for US counterintelligence. The wall was a set of procedures which regulated the passage of intelligence information within the FBI and from the FBI to prosecutors (see July 19, 1995). Fitzgerald says the removal of the wall represented “the single greatest change that could be made to protect our country.” He cites four cases that he says are examples of how the wall and other such obstacles have hampered counterterrorism efforts:
bullet The arrest of Ali Mohamed. Fitzgerald claims it would have been “far less difficult” to arrest al-Qaeda operative Ali Mohamed for his involvement in the attacks on US embassies in East Africa (see September 10, 1998) had it not been for the wall. (US Congress 10/21/2003) However, author Peter Lance will point out, “But Fitzgerald neglected to tell the senators that… prosecutors and FBI agents had been monitoring the bombing cell members for two years or that they’d had multiple face-to-face meetings with Mohamed himself.” Mohamed, who was called a “key figure” in the Day of Terror plot in the US press in early 1995 (see February 3, 1995), had actually met Fitzgerald a year before the arrest and told him that he had trained bin Laden’s bodyguards, lived in bin Laden’s house, loved and believed in bin Laden, and that he didn’t need a fatwa to attack the US, as it was obvious the US was the enemy (see After October 1997). (Lance 2006, pp. 274-6, 299-300)
bullet The Day of Terror conspiracy. After the partial success of the World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993), the conspirators planned to attack other targets in New York, but were arrested by the FBI, which had penetrated their cell. All of the arrested plotters were successfully convicted. However, Fitzgerald tells the committee, “Prosecutors were in the dark about the details of the plot until very late in the day.” (US Congress 10/21/2003; Lance 2006, pp. 118-9)
bullet The Millennium Alert. Fitzgerald says that in 1999, investigations into suspected millennium plots were hampered because “criminal prosecutors received information only in part and with lag time so as not to breach the wall.” All attacks planned for the millennium failed, including one plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport (see December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000).
bullet Sharing Wadih El-Hage’s grand jury interview. In 1997, Al-Qaeda operative El-Hage provided information about bin Laden and his associates to a grand jury. Fitzgerald wanted to pass some of this information along to intelligence investigators (see September 24, 1997) but was unable to because grand jury information cannot be shared with intelligence investigators. To get around this restriction, an FBI agent had to get El-Hage to repeat the information outside the grand jury room. (Note: this example is not directly related to the “wall” under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but rather to a similar obstacle governing the passage of information in the opposite direction—from criminal agents to intelligence agents). (US Congress 10/21/2003)

Jim Marcinkowski (left) and Larry Johnson.Jim Marcinkowski (left) and Larry Johnson. [Source: CNN]Former CIA case officer Jim Marcinkowski, a former classmate of outed CIA case officer Valerie Plame Wilson (see Fall 1985), is outraged by the revelation of Plame Wilson’s CIA status and the allegations that the leak of her identity is not a crime (see July 14, 2003 and September 29, 2003). Another former classmate of Plame Wilson’s, former CIA agent Larry Johnson, says: “[W]hat I keep seeing in the newspaper is the spin and leak that this is no big deal. And that’s got to stop.… The problem with this is a lot of the damage that has occurred is not going to be seen. It can’t be photographed. We can’t bring the bodies out because in some cases it’s going to involve protecting sources and methods. And it’s important to keep this before the American people. This was a betrayal of national security.” Marcinkowski concurs: “This is an unprecedented act. This has never been done by the United States government before. The exposure of an undercover intelligence officer by the US government is unprecedented. It’s not the usual leak from Washington. The leak a week scenario is not at play here. This is a very, very serious event.” Plame Wilson was an NOC, or nonofficial cover officer (see Fall 1992 - 1996). “It was the most dangerous assignment you could take. It takes a special sort of person,” says Marcinkowski, who is now a prosecutor in Michigan. Former CIA official Kenneth Pollack agrees, describing an NOC’s identity as the “holiest of holies.” Many believe that the outrage among the rank and file of CIA agents and officials at Plame Wilson’s outing was so strong that CIA Director George Tenet had little choice but to recommend that the Justice Department investigate the leak (see September 16, 2003). Marcinkowski says: “In this particular case, it was so far over the line, I think myself and a lot of us were truly outraged that the government would do this.… I mean, we kept our mouths closed since 1985, when we joined.” Johnson, noting that both he and Marcinkowski are registered Republicans, says: “As a Republican, I think we need to be consistent on this. It doesn’t matter who did it, it didn’t matter which party was involved. This isn’t about partisan politics. This is about protecting national security and national security assets and in this case there has been a betrayal, not only of the CIA officers there, but really a betrayal of those of us who have kept the secrets over the years on this point.” (Borger 10/22/2003; CNN 10/24/2003)

Omar al-Faruq.Omar al-Faruq. [Source: Public domain]In a meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, President Bush falsely promises to let Hambali stand trial in Indonesia. Hambali, an Indonesian citizen wanted for a string of attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), was recently arrested in Thailand and taken in US custody (see August 12, 2003). White House communications director Dan Bartlett tells reporters that Bush has “committed to work with [the Indonesian authorities] at an appropriate time, that he would work to make sure that Hambali was handed over.” An Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman adds: “Absolutely, Bush promised to hand over Hambali to Indonesia for trial. The only condition is that the process of interrogation (by US agents) has to be completed. Bush said that still needed more time.” The US has been sharing some information from Hambali’s interrogation with Indonesian authorities, but does not allow them to question him directly, allegedly for fear of information leaks. (Associated Press 10/24/2003) In 2002, the US did allow Indonesian investigators to directly interrogate another Indonesian in US custody, Omar al-Faruq. Ironically, it appears that extensive details of al-Faruq’s interrogation were leaked to the media, but by US officials, not Indonesian ones (see June 5, 2002). The US will not allow Indonesian officials to directly interrogate Hambali during a 2005 trial of his alleged close associate Abu Bakar Bashir, allowing Bashir to go free (see March 3, 2005). In late 2005, Hank Crumpton, a senior State Department official visiting Indonesia, again makes the promise that the US will eventually turn Hambali over to the Indonesian government. (Bonner 10/19/2005) But in 2006, the US transfers Hambali to the Guantanamo prison with the intention of eventually trying him before a military tribunal (see September 2-3, 2006).

Three Abu Ghraib detainees naked and cuffed together.Three Abu Ghraib detainees naked and cuffed together. [Source: Public domain]Three detainees at Abu Ghraib, suspected of having raped a male teenage detainee, are set aside for punishment and stripped by MPs. Pfc. Lynndie England describes the scene, apparently talking about Spc. Charles Graner and Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick II: “They started to handcuff the two rapist[s] together in odd positions/ways. Once the two were handcuffed together, the third guy was brought over and handcuffed between the other two. Then they were laying on the floor handcuffed together, so all the other prisoners could see them. Cpl. Graner and Staff Sgt. Frederick then asked me to start taking pictures with the camera.” (International Committee of the Red Cross 2/24/2004 pdf file)

Lynndie England drags a detainee known as Gus by a leash around the neck. Megan Ambuhl looks on.Lynndie England drags a detainee known as Gus by a leash around the neck. Megan Ambuhl looks on. [Source: Public domain]At the Abu Ghraib prison, three detainees who were photographed naked the day before (see October 24, 2003), are again striped naked, handcuffed together, placed on the ground, and forced to lie on top of each other and simulate sex acts while they are being photographed. This treatment happens, according to a CID (Criminal Investigation Division) investigation, “on several occasions over several days.” Those present or participating in the abuse are the MPs Spc. Charles Graner, Ivan Frederick, Pfc. Lynndie England, and Spc. Sabrina Harman, all of the 372nd MP Company. Also directly involved are three military intelligence soldiers from the 325th Military Intelligence Battalion. Two of the military intelligence soldiers arrive at the Hard Site when the abuse is already taking place. One appears to have known beforehand that something was going to happen. (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004) When they arrive, one MP is yelling through a megaphone at the naked detainees, who are forced to crawl on their stomachs and are handcuffed together. Gen. George Fay will later conclude in his report (see August 25, 2004) that this incident “was most likely orchestrated by MP personnel.” On the other hand, England says, “MI [Military Intelligence] Soldiers instructed them [MPs] to rough them up.” One of the most clearly humiliating photographs taken at Abu Ghraib is also dated October 25. It depicts an unidentified naked detainee, nicknamed “Gus,” with a leash around his neck and with the end held by Pfc. England. Spc. Megan Ambuhl is also present, watching. According to England, Cpl. Graner put on the leash and then asked her to pose for the photograph. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Former ambassador Joseph Wilson sits down with Jeff Gannon of Talon News to discuss the outing of his wife, Valerie Plame Wilson, as a CIA agent (see July 14, 2003), his trip to Niger that helped debunk the claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium from that country (see February 21, 2002-March 4, 2002 and July 6, 2003), and his concerns over the Iraq war. Wilson is unaware that Gannon is in reality James Guckert, a gay prostitute who moonlights as a fake journalist for the right-wing Talon News (see January 26, 2005 and January 28, 2005). Little of what Gannon/Guckert elicits is new information.
Access to Classified Information? - However, early in the interview, Gannon/Guckert refers to a classified memo when he says, “An internal government memo prepared by US intelligence personnel details a meeting in early 2002 where your wife, a member of the agency for clandestine service working on Iraqi weapons issues, suggested that you could be sent to investigate the reports.” The FBI will investigate Gannon/Guckert’s knowledge of the memo, but he will deny ever having seen it. It is not clear from whom he learned of the memo (Gannon 10/28/2003; Wilson 2007, pp. 216) , though he will insist that he received the information from “confidential sources.” (Raimondo 2/18/2005)
America Did Not Debate Redrawing the Middle East as a Rationale for War - Wilson notes that he considered “the invasion, conquest, and occupation of Iraq for the purpose of disarming Saddam [Hussein] struck me as the highest risk, lowest reward option.… [W]e ought to understand that sending our men and women to kill and to die for our country is the most solemn decision a government has to make and we damn well ought to have that debate before we get them into harm’s way instead of after.” He explains why the idea that his wife selected him for the Niger mission is incorrect. When Gannon/Guckert attempts to pin him down by citing the initial meeting in which Plame Wilson suggested Wilson for the mission (see February 13, 2002), Wilson notes, “[T]hat fact that my wife knows that I know a lot about the uranium business and that I know a lot about Niger and that she happens to be involved in weapons of mass destruction, it should come as no surprise to anyone that we know of each others activities.” Wilson says that the aims of the administration’s neoconservatives—to redraw “the political map of the Middle East,” is something that has not been debated by the nation. The US did not debate the war with Iraq “on the grounds of redrawing the map of the Middle East,” he notes.
Wilson Did Not Violate CIA Secrecy in Revealing Niger Mission - Gannon/Guckert asks if Wilson violated CIA secrecy in going public with the results of his Niger mission, as some on the right have asserted. Wilson reminds Gannon that his was not a clandestine trip, “not a CIA mission,” but an aboveboard fact-finding journey. Those circumstances were well understood by the CIA before he left for Niger.
Implications of French Complicity in Niger Allegations Debunked - Gannon/Guckert tries to insinuate that the French may have had something to do with keeping the alleged uranium sales secret, and Wilson quickly shoots that line of inquiry down, saying, “The fact that you don’t like the French or that the French seem to have favored a different approach on this is far different from the French violating UN Security Council resolutions of which they are signatories, and clandestinely transferring 500 tons of uranium to a rogue country like Iraq is a real reach.” He then describes just how impossible it would have been for the French to have facilitated such a secret uranium transfer even had it wished.
Refuses to Accuse Rove Directly - Wilson refuses to flatly name White House political strategist Karl Rove as the person behind the leaks of his wife’s clandestine identity, though he notes that Rove indeed labeled his wife “fair game” to the press (see July 21, 2003) and that Rove was in a perfect position to have orchestrated the leak. When Gannon/Guckert tells Wilson that conservative columnist Robert Novak, who first published Plame Wilson’s name and occupation, denies that the White House gave him the information on her identity, Wilson retorts, “Novak has changed his story so much that it’s hard for me to understand what he is talking about” (see September 29, 2003).
When a Leak Is Not a Leak - Gannon/Guckert brings up the allegation from New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof that Plame Wilson was revealed as an undercover agent by Russian spy Aldrich Ames in 1994. Because Ames may have revealed Plame Wilson’s identity to the Russians, Gannon/Guckert asks, isn’t it possible that she was no longer an undercover agent? Wilson refuses to validate the Ames speculation, and finally says that the CIA would not be treating this so seriously if it were as frivolous an issue as Gannon/Guckert suggests. “[R]emember this is not a crime that has been committed against my wife or against me,” he says. “If there was a crime, it was committed against our country. The CIA has referred the matter to the Justice Department for further investigation, I don’t believe that’s a frivolous referral.” (Gannon 10/28/2003)

The CIA’s inspector general, John Helgerson, issues a report on the use of a handgun and power drill to intimidate al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri during an interrogation. A CIA officer known only as “Albert” threatened al-Nashiri with the gun and drill at a CIA black site in Poland around late 2002 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). (Central Intelligence Agency 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Goldman 9/7/2010) The incidents have already been referred to the Justice Department, which has declined to prosecute (see September 11, 2003). What conclusions Helgerson comes to in the report are unknown. (Central Intelligence Agency 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file)

The Department of Defense denies expedited processing on the ACLU request (see October 7, 2003) for the release of documents.

Barbara Grewe, the leader of the 9/11 Commission’s team that is investigating law enforcement and intelligence collection inside the US, is moved to another part of the investigation. 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow will say that Grewe is brought “into the CIA part of the work and give[n]… a lead role in developing our draft on some of the specific FBI-CIA operational problems before 9/11 and on the ‘summer of threat.’” Grewe had previously worked on similar aspects of the Justice Department inspector general’s report into the FBI’s pre-9/11 failings (see Between December 2002 and May 2003). Zelikow will add, “She ultimately became our lead drafter for chapter eight of the report.” (Zelikow and Shenon 2007 pdf file) That chapter, entitled “The System Was Blinking Red,” will deal with warnings of a terrorist attack on the US in the summer of 2001, the government’s response to them, and failures to share intelligence at that time. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 254-277)

On NBC’s “Meet the Press”, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denies that Americans were misinformed about Iraqi nuclear arms. Rumsfeld says that no one in the administration ever claimed Iraq had tried to obtain nuclear weapons. Moderator Tim Russert asks: “But, Mr. Secretary, you acknowledge that there was an argument made by the administration that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical and biological weapons, and could have been well on his way to reconstituting his nuclear program. There doesn’t appear to be significant amounts of evidence to document that presentation that was made by the administration.” Rumsfeld says that this administration as well as preceding administrations “all agreed” that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, “and that they had programs relating to nuclear weapons that they were reconstituting—not that they had nuclear weapons—no one said that.” The administration made numerous claims of Iraq possessing “reconstituted” nuclear weapons, including claims made by the CIA (see January 30, 2002), Vice President Dick Cheney (see September 8, 2002), and the entire intelligence community (see October 1, 2002). Russert follows up by asking if it was possible “that the inspections in fact did work, that the enforcement of the no-fly zone did work, and that Saddam in fact no longer had a weapons of mass destruction capability?” Rumsfeld replies that it is possible Saddam Hussein “took his weapons, destroyed them, or moved them to some other country.” (US Department of Defense 11/2/2003)

Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body.Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body. [Source: Public domain]Detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, is brought to Abu Ghraib prison by US Navy SEAL Team 7. The Iraqi, captured during a joint Task Force 121/CIA mission, is suspected of having been involved in an attack against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Members of the Navy SEAL team punch and choke Al-Jamadi and stick their fingers in his eyes. A SEAL lieutenant is involved in the abuse. (Associated Press 1/11/2005) Al-Jamadi resists his arrest, and one SEAL Team member hits him on the head with the butt of a rifle. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) MP Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is on duty when two CIA representatives bring the man to the Hard Site. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Spc. Jason A. Kenner, an MP at Abu Ghraib, will later say the detainee was “in good health” when he was brought in. (Wright 5/20/2004) According to Kenner’s later account, the detainee’s head is covered with an empty sandbag. MPs are then ordered to take him to a shower room, and told not to remove the hood, according to Kenner. (Wright 5/20/2004) The detainee is then interrogated by CIA and military intelligence personnel. Less than an hour later, the detainee will be found dead (see (7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003). (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003.Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is summoned to the shower stall of the Hard Site in Abu Ghraib. When he arrives he discovers that detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, interrogated by the CIA less than an hour before (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), is dead. Jamadi’s body is still shackled to the stall. When the hood is removed, he is found to have severe head wounds. (It is unclear whether these wounds were present when the prisoner was taken in, or whether they were inflicted during the interrogation.) (Serrano 5/18/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Stevanus calls a medic and notifies his superiors. Lt. Col. Steven Jordan arrives at the site at around 7:15 a.m. He finds several MPs and medics in the shower stall. The deceased prisoner is still handcuffed with his hands behind his back, lying on the floor face down. When the body is uncuffed and turned over, Jordan notices a small spot of blood on the floor where his head has lain. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Jason A. Kenner) There is also extensive bruising on the body. (Wright 5/20/2004 Sources: Jason A. Kenner) Jordan alerts Col. Thomas M. Pappas. A CIA supervisor is also notified. He arrives and requests that the Hard Site hold the body until the next day. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to ABC News, Spc. Jason A. Kenner sees the body packed in ice while a “battle” rages between CIA and military intelligence interrogators over who should dispose of the corpse. (Wright 5/20/2004) The body is then put in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. (Hersh 5/10/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II) Photographs are later released of MP Spcs. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman posing next to the dead body wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice, giving a “thumbs up.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) According to MP Spc. Bruce Brown, an MP with the 372nd, they spray “air freshener to cover the scent.” (Serrano 5/18/2004) The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is also alerted. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

After the 9/11 Commission becomes unhappy with the information it is getting from detainees in US custody who may know something about the 9/11 plot (see Summer 2003), it asks CIA Director George Tenet to let it either talk to the detainees itself, or at least view interrogations through a one-way mirror. (Kean and Hamilton 2006, pp. 119-126)
Reasoning - Dieter Snell, the head of the Commission’s plot team and a former prosecutor, is extremely keen that the detainees, such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, be interviewed. According to author Philip Shenon, he is aware that “testimony from key witnesses like the al-Qaeda detainees would have value only if they were questioned in person, with investigators given the chance to test their credibility with follow-up questions. The face-to-face interrogations would be especially important in situations in which the al-Qaeda members were giving conflicting testimony.” (Shenon 2008, pp. 182)
Request Denied - However, Tenet denies the request because he does not want the Commission to know where the detainees are, and he claims questioning by a Commission staffer could apparently damage the “relationship” between interrogator and detainee and “upset the flow of questioning.” In addition, Tenet is worried that if the Commission has access to the detainees, Zacarias Moussaoui might also be able to compel them to testify in court, so he rejects compromise proposals.
Pushback - The Commission decides “to push the issue” and drafts a letter outlining why they should have direct access. Although the draft is seen by Tenet and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, it is never officially sent. At a White House meeting attended by Rumsfeld and commissioners Lee Hamilton and Fred Fielding, Tenet and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales repeat the arguments Tenet made previously, but Tenet says the Commission can submit written questions, and a CIA “project manager” will try to get them answered. After the administration “plead[s]” with the Commission not to use public pressure to get access to detainees, the Commission decides to drop the matter.
Relatives and Media Blamed - Hamilton and Commission Chairman Thomas Kean will later partially blame the victims’ relatives and media for this failure: “Interestingly, there was no pressure from some of the usual sources for us to push for access. For instance, the 9/11 families never pressed us to seek access to detainees, and the media was never engaged on this issue.” Kean and Hamilton will later say that the “project manager” arrangement works “to a degree.”
Report Includes Disclaimer - However, a disclaimer will be inserted into the 9/11 Commission Report in the first of two chapters that draw heavily on detainees’ alleged statements (see After January 2004). It will say that the Commission could not fully judge the credibility of detainee information, so, according to Kean and Hamilton, “it [is] left to the reader to consider the credibility of the source—we had no opportunity to do so.” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, pp. 119-126)
Criticism from Staffer - Commission staffer Ernest May will later criticize the Commission’s “reluctance ever to challenge the CIA’s walling off al-Qaeda detainees.” May will also say: “We never had full confidence in the interrogation reports as historical sources. Often we found more reliable the testimony that had been given in open court by those prosecuted for the East African embassy bombings and other crimes.” (May 5/23/2005) CIA videotapes and transcripts of interrogations are not provided to the Commission (see Summer 2003-January 2004).

An Afghani civilian later identified as Abdul Wahid dies from what his autopsy report calls “multiple blunt force injuries to head, torso, and extremities.” Wahid is being held by US forces at a forward operating base in Helmand province. (American Civil Liberties Union 10/24/2005)

The 9/11 Commission and the White House come to a deal on the Commission’s access to Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) relevant to its work. The Commission and White House had been in dispute about the issue for nearly a year (see Late January 2003, June 2003, Late Summer 2003, October 16, 2003, Shortly Before October 26, 2003, and November 6, 2003).
Arrangement - The deal gives Commission Chairman Thomas Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, plus two others on the Commission to be designated, access to a group of 20 “core” PDBs clearly relevant to the Commission’s work. In addition, two of these four can read all possibly relevant PDBs and insist on the other two being allowed to see anything they think is important. The deal is struck by Kean and Hamilton for the Commission, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, and White House chief of staff Andy Card. The Commission designates commissioner Jamie Gorelick and its executive director, Philip Zelikow, as the two who will help Kean and Hamilton and also review all the other PDBs. The other seven commissioners and the rest of the staff cannot see the PDBs.
Criticism - Two of the commissioners, Democrats Tim Roemer and Max Cleland, are extremely angry with the deal and complain the Commission cannot function properly without all the commissioners seeing all the relevant documents. The victims’ relatives are also extremely unhappy, and the Family Steering Committee releases a statement saying, “A limited number of commissioners will have restricted access to a limited number of PDB documents,” adding, “The Commission has seriously compromised its ability to conduct an independent, full, and unfettered investigation.” They are also unhappy that Zelikow is one of the two handling the main review, because they are concerned about his ties to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, among other issues (see March 21, 2004). One of the victim’s relatives, Kristen Breitweiser, says, “How much more of Zelikow do we have to take?” The Commission’s counsel, Daniel Marcus will agree with the families, saying, “If we were going to have a staff person do this, Philip was not the right person.” (Shenon 2008, pp. 218-219)

Top: Charles Garner punches one of the seven detainees. Bottom: Lynndie England points at the word “Rapeist” written on the leg of another one of the seven detainees. Other detainees are forced to sit naked on each other in the background.Top: Charles Garner punches one of the seven detainees. Bottom: Lynndie England points at the word “Rapeist” written on the leg of another one of the seven detainees. Other detainees are forced to sit naked on each other in the background. [Source: Public domain]At Abu Ghraib, seven Iraqi detainees are brought to Cellblock 1A from one of the tent camps escorted by MPs. The seven Iraqis are suspected of having taken part in a fight. They include Nori al-Yasseri, detainee number 7787; Hussein Mohssein Mata al-Zayiadi, detainee number 19446; and four others known only by their first names: Haidar, Ahmed, Ahzem, Hashiem and Mustafa. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) At least one of them was detained on suspicion of car theft. (Morin 10/21/2004) When they arrive, they all have their hands tied behind their backs with plastic handcuffs. Empty sandbags (“gunnysacks”) are put over their heads. (Davidson 7/28/2004) According to an account later provided by MP Spc. Matthew Wisdom, the other MPs suddenly begin striking at the prisoners. Spc. Charles Graner, Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick and Sgt. Javal Davis “rotate around the detainees and abuse and hit them,” Wisdom later testifies. Graner poses for a photograph with his fist, clenched as if about to strike, close to a detainee’s head. “Right after the picture [is] taken, he actually hit[s] him,” Wisdom says in his testimony. (Serrano 8/5/2004) The MPs then throw the tied-up Iraqi men against the walls until they fall on the floor. Wisdom later recounts, “Sfc [Sgt. First Class] Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) Pfc. Lynndie England, who had her birthday the day before and has come to the cellblock to visit her boyfriend Spc. Graner, says the prisoners fall in what she calls a “dog pile.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) According to Wisdom, he sees “Staff Sgt. Frederic, Davis and Cpl. Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) Several guards take turns leaping on top of the pile. Also present is Spc. Jeremy Sivits, who later testifies: “That is when Sgt. Davis ran across the room and lunged in the air and landed in the middle of where the detainees were. I believe Davis ran across the room a total of two times and landed in the middle of the pile of detainees.” (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004) “A couple of the detainees kind of made an ‘ah’ sound, as if this hurt them or caused them some type of pain.” In the meanwhile Pfc. England and Sgt. Javal Davis stomped on the lying prisoners’ fingers and feet. Sivits heard them scream because of it. (Davidson 7/28/2004) The alleged car thief later testified during Frederick’s trial, he felt someone putting his foot on his head when he was thrown into the pile of men. “He put his whole weight on my head and on my knee. I was screaming and crying.” (Morin 10/21/2004) At this point, MP Sgt. Shannon K. Snider of the 372nd MP Company, who is working in an office on the top floor, hearing the cries of pain, leans over the railing and angrily yells at Sgt. Davis to stop abusing the prisoners. When Davis steps away from the pile of men, Snider leaves. “I believe that Sgt. Snider thought it was an isolated incident,” Sivits says, “and that when he ordered Sgt. Davis to stop, it was over.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) It was not. Testimony by Spc. Wisdom suggests some ringleaders among the MPs pressured the others to join in with the abuse. According to Wisdom, he too asked Davis not to stomp on toes. Davis then allegedly tells Wisdom: “Who are you to tell me to stop?” (Serrano 8/5/2004) Wisdom witnesses Frederick hitting a prisoner “in the side of his chest.” (Hersh 5/10/2004; Serrano 8/5/2004) Frederick then takes notice of Wisdom looking on. Wisdom testifies that Frederick “looked at me and said: ‘Wisdom, you’ve got to get some of this,’ meaning I should hit the detainees as well.” (Serrano 8/5/2004) According to Wisdom’s account, he goes outside after this incident, (Hersh 5/10/2004) and proceeds to alert his team leader Sgt. Robert Jones. (Serrano 8/5/2004) After Snider has left the scene, and possibly Wisdom as well, the MPs put the prisoners back to their feet and remove their handcuffs. Graner orders the detainees in Arabic to take their clothes off. Graner takes the head of one of the naked but hooded prisoners in one arm and smashes his free fist into his temple, causing the prisoner to sag down on the floor. “Damn, that hurt!” Graner says jokingly. Sivits walks over to see if the detainee is still alive. “I could tell that the detainee was unconscious, because his eyes were closed and he was not moving, but I could see his chest rise and fall, so I knew he was still alive.” Maybe this is the same incident witnessed by Wisdom, as perhaps is the following. Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick writes an X on another detainee’s chest with his finger and says, “Watch this.” Then he punches the prisoner on the indicated spot so massively that the hooded prisoner sways backward, falls to his knees and is gasping for air. (Davidson 7/28/2004) Frederick has singled out the alleged car thief for extra punishment. “I stood him up and punched him in the chest. I was angry. They told me he was the ringleader. He hit a female soldier in the face with a rock.” (Morin 10/21/2004) Sivits testifies that Frederick says that “he thought he put the detainee in cardiac arrest.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) When the detainee subsequently collapses, he is checked by a female medic. She says he is “faking.” (Morin 10/21/2004) The seven detainees will continue to be abused into the night and will be forced to form naked human pyramids (see Evening November 7, 2003).

Top: the seven detainees are forced to form a human pyramid. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman stand behind them smiling and giving thumbs up signs. Bottom: Some of the same detainees are forced to simulate oral sex on each other. Top: the seven detainees are forced to form a human pyramid. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman stand behind them smiling and giving thumbs up signs. Bottom: Some of the same detainees are forced to simulate oral sex on each other. [Source: Public domain]At Abu Ghraib, seven Iraqi detainees are brought to Cellblock 1A from one of the tent camps escorted by MPs. The seven Iraqis are suspected of having taken part in a fight. They include Nori al-Yasseri, Hussein Mohssein Mata al-Zayiadi, and four others known only by their first names: Haidar, Ahmed, Ahzem, Hashiem and Mustafa. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) They are repeatedly punched and attacked by Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick, Spc. Charles Graner, and other MPs (see Evening November 7, 2003). The MPs then take out their cameras to take pictures of the seven naked men and begin putting them in humiliating poses, often placing themselves in the picture as well, smiling. Graner makes them climb on top of each other to form a human pyramid, as is reported by Spc. Sabrina Harman. (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004; Davidson 7/28/2004) “They put us two on the bottom, two on top of them, and two on top of those and on top,” Al-Zayiadi will say. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) “The pyramid lasted about 15 to 20 minutes,” according to Harman. (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004) The prisoners are also made to crawl on hands and knees with MPs riding on their backs. (Davidson 7/28/2004) “They were sitting on our backs like riding animals,” Al-Zayiadi says. Meanwhile, others are taking photographs. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) Frederick then takes hold of the prisoner whom he has singled out for additional punishment and motions him to masturbate. “I grabbed his arm by the elbow, put it on his genitals and moved it back and forth with an arm motion, and he did it.” (Morin 10/21/2004) He makes another detainee do the same. “I lifted his hood and gave him a hand gesture, telling him to keep doing it himself.” (Oppel 10/21/2004) Spc. Matthew Wisdom, who complained to his team leader Sgt. Robert Jones earlier in the evening about the treatment of the detainees, returns to Tier 1A to find a naked detainee being forced to masturbate in front of another naked detainee on his knees before him. “I saw two naked detainees,” Wisdom will later recall, “one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) According to Wisdom, Frederick says to him: “Look what these animals do when we leave them alone for two seconds.” (Hersh 5/10/2004; Serrano 8/5/2004) Meanwhile, Pfc. Lynndie England makes sexually suggestive comments “in a somewhat sarcastic, fun tone of voice,” according to Wisdom. (Serrano 8/5/2004) “I heard Pfc. England shout out, ‘He’s getting hard.’” (Hersh 5/10/2004) Again Wisdom leaves the building to tell Sgt. Jones, who assures him the “problem [will] be addressed and dealt with,” (Serrano 8/5/2004) and Wisdom assumes that the problem will be taken care of. (Hersh 5/10/2004) Others, meanwhile, are lined up and forced to masturbate. These facts are corroborated by photographs that show the MPs laughing as they look on. (Davidson 7/28/2004) Al-Zayiadi later identifies himself in one of these pictures. “They told my friend to masturbate and told me to masturbate also, while they were taking pictures,” he says. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) In the end, Al-Zayiadi says they are tossed naked but still hooded into a cell. “They opened the water in the cell and told us to lay face down in the water and we stayed like that until the morning, in the water, naked, without clothes.” (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) One of the seven prisoners is likely Haydar Sabbar Abed who says he was originally arrested for not carrying his ID card. After being involved in a fight with an Iraqi prison employee in one of the tent camps, he is taken to the Hard Site. He later recalls: “They cut off our clothes and… told us to masturbate towards this female soldier. But we didn’t agree to do it, so they beat us.” He also says: “They made us act like dogs, putting leashes around our necks. They’d whistle and we’d have to bark like dogs. We thought they were going to kill us.” (Asser 8/4/2004) The next day, Wisdom asks for and is granted a transfer to a job elsewhere in the prison. Although he and Sgt. Jones say they have been angered by the abuse, they do little more than mildly confront their colleagues with their objections. (Serrano 8/5/2004) To the detainees, the experience has been harrowing. Al-Yasseri will later call it a “night which we felt like 1,000 nights.” “I was trying to kill myself,” says Al-Zayiadi, “but I didn’t have any way of doing it.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) Gen. George Fay will also describe these incidents in his report (see August 25, 2004), which he concludes was an the affair of MPs alone. He states that military intelligence “involvement in this abuse has not been alleged nor is it likely.” However, one of the pictures taken that night, depicting the “human pyramid,” is later used as a screen saver for a computer in the Hard Site. The screen saver is later seen by a female military intelligence interrogator, but she states, according to Gen. Fay, that she did not report the picture because she did not see it again. The same interrogator, Fay will report, had a “close personal relationship” with Staff Sgt. Frederick, (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) one of the main instigators of the abuse that night.

Lynndie England smiling at pointing at the penis of one of the Abu Ghraib detainees.Lynndie England smiling at pointing at the penis of one of the Abu Ghraib detainees. [Source: Public domain]Seven Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison have been punched, attacked, and humiliated all evening long on November 7, 2003, by their US captors (see Evening November 7, 2003 and Evening November 7, 2003). This abuse continues into the early morning hours of November 8. Pfc. Lynndie England is photographed pointing at the penises of several of the same seven detainees while Charles Graner and other MPs look on. (Scherer and Benjamin 3/14/2006)

The chief of the CIA station in Baghdad sends a high-profile “Aardworf” cable entitled “The Expanding Insurgency in Iraq” warning of the deteriorating situation in the country. The chief, whose name is apparently Gerry Meyer (see May 18, 2006), sent a similar cable in August (see August 30, 2003), but is inspired to write a follow-up by a recent conversation with a US officer (see Early November 2003). According to author James Risen, Meyer believes that the US is “in danger of losing a war that it thought it had already won,” and so writes this “painfully honest account of the worsening situation.” The report states that the insurgency in central and northern Iraq is gaining momentum, and the insurgents are “self-confident and believe they will ultimately succeed in returning to power as they have in the past.” The rebels can sense the American will is “wavering,” and feel very little pressure from the US military. Politically, the insurgents are taking advantage of the fact that the US has not developed a clear message that resonates with the Iraqi people. Therefore, locals see the insurgents as powerful and “largely unchallenged” because of the political drift in Baghdad—current Iraqi political leaders have not been able to govern the country, draft a constitution, or hold an election. The US has therefore lost its best chance to stabilize Iraq, and the Baathists, surprised by the ferocity of the initial onslaught, have now regrouped. The report adds: “By the end of the summer, the continued sense of isolation in the Sunni heartland, the complete dissolution of the army and other institutions of security, rigid de-Baathification, and the lack of economic opportunities or political direction gave these regime elements the confidence they needed to repair their networks and reestablish themselves. The ease with which the insurgents move and exist in Baghdad and the Sunni heartland is bolstering their self-confidence further.” The report also says that there is no way to completely seal Iraq’s borders with its neighbors and prevent foreign jihadis entering the country, that majority Shiite Muslims could join rebel Sunnis, and that this would doom the occupation to failure. Unless the US takes corrective actions, the country’s rebuilding could collapse. (Landay 11/11/2003; Risen 2006, pp. 127-128, 145-147) The report will soon be leaked to the press (see November 11, 2003) and may lead to Meyer’s firing (see (Late December 2003)).

Saudi Defense and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz.
Saudi Defense and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. [Source: Public domain]In a series of rulings, a number of defendants are removed from a 9/11 lawsuit filed in August 2002 (see August 15, 2002). The lawsuit, filed on behalf of 9/11 victims’ relatives, accuses a number of individuals and organizations of funding and supporting al-Qaeda and thus helping the 9/11 attacks to occur. A number of Saudi princes are dropped because they work for the Saudi government. One judge writes in a ruling, “Whatever their actions, they were performed in their official (government) capacities.” According to the court ruling, only the US president, not the courts, has the authority to label a foreign nation as a terrorist supporter. Judges rule that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient facts to overcome the kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s immunity. Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi ambassador to Britain Prince Turki al-Faisal, and Prince Mohammed Al-Faisal Al-Saud, among others, are dismissed from the lawsuit, but the lawsuit is allowed to proceed against many more defendants, including the Saudi Binladin Group, the multibillion dollar bin Laden family company. (Associated Press 11/16/2003; Bartelme 11/18/2003; Associated Press 1/19/2005; Hamblett 9/28/2005) A judge writes in a ruling that “the Saudi Binladin Group maintained close relationships with Osama bin Laden at certain times” and that it remains “unclear” whether these ties continued since bin Laden became involved in terrorism. (Follath and Mascolo 6/6/2005) The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is allowed to remain as a defendant, even though this charity has considerable ties to the Saudi government. (Hamblett 9/28/2005) Some of the Saudi princes, such as Prince Sultan and Prince Salman, are represented in the case by the prestigious Dallas-based law firm of Baker Botts. James Baker, former Secretary of State and close associate of the Bush family, is one of the senior partners of the law firm. (Isikoff and Hosenball 4/16/2003; Hamblett 9/28/2005)

Thomas Pappas.Thomas Pappas. [Source: US Army]The office of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez formally puts Col. Thomas M. Pappas of 205th Military Intelligence Brigade in charge of cell blocks 1A and 1B in the Abu Ghraib prison. As Gen. Antonio Taguba will note in his February 26, 2004 (see February 26, 2004) report, the order “effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agenda assigned to each of these respective specialties.” (Schmitt 5/12/2004; Smith 5/16/2004; Hersh 5/17/2004; Barry, Hirsh, and Isikoff 5/24/2004) Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba will also note: “[T]he intelligence value of detainees held at… Guantanamo is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities in Iraq…. There are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib. These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of al-Qaeda.” The report will say also that the order was in conflict with existing military regulations and suggests that Sanchez’s recommendation had influenced the conditions at Abu Ghraib.

An Abu Ghraib detainee bleeding after being biting by a dog on December 12, 2003.An Abu Ghraib detainee bleeding after being biting by a dog on December 12, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Dog teams arrive at Abu Ghraib and “almost immediately” are used against the detainees (see November 24, 2003). Gen. George Fay’s investigation (see August 25, 2004) of Abu Ghraib abuses will conclude that, “The use of dogs in interrogations to ‘fear up’ detainees was generally unquestioned.” Most military intelligence personnel apparently believe dogs can be used in interrogations with specific approval from Col. Thomas M. Pappas. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to Sgt. Michael J. Smith and Sgt. Santos A. Cardona, they are acting under instructions from Col. Thomas M. Pappas when they use unmuzzled dogs to intimidate prisoners. (Jehl and Schmitt 5/22/2004) And Pappas himself believes, “incorrectly,” Gen. Fay notes, that Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez has delegated this authority to him. Pappas, concludes Gen. Fay, “[i]mproperly authorized the use of dogs during interrogations.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Nevertheless, Gen. Fay also believes, “there were early indications that MP and MI [Military Intelligence] personnel knew the use of dog teams in interrogations was abusive.” Only the Army dog teams join in with the abuse. Three Navy dog teams, who arrive simultaneously at Abu Ghraib, refuse to lend their dogs for interrogation purposes. The Navy dog handlers always ask for what specific purpose the dog is required, and when they are told “for interrogation,” they refuse to comply. “Over the next few weeks, the Navy dog teams received about eight similar calls, none of which [are] fulfilled.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

The first incident of abuse involving guard dogs reportedly occurs at Abu Ghraib. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Abed Hamed Mowhoush.Abed Hamed Mowhoush. [Source: New York Times]At the Al Qaim detention facility northwest of Baghdad, Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is interrogated by two officers of the 66th Military Intelligence Company. They force him head-first into a sleeping bag and question him as they roll him back and forth. One of the soldiers, Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, sits on the Iraqi general’s chest and covers his mouth. (Human Rights Watch 6/2004) The prisoner dies of asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression. (Moffeit 5/18/2004) Later in the day, US military officials issue a statement saying that a prisoner has died of natural causes during questioning. “Mowhoush said he didn’t feel well and subsequently lost consciousness,” the statement reads. “The soldier questioning him found no pulse, then conducted CPR and called for medical authorities. According to the on-site surgeon, it appeared Mowhouse died of natural causes.” (Moffeit 5/18/2004; Jehl and Schmitt 5/22/2004) But the autopsy report will say there is “evidence of blunt force trauma to the chest and legs.” (Human Rights Watch 6/2004) The incident is investigated and a report is issued in early 2004 (see Late January 2004).

Peter Bergen.Peter Bergen. [Source: Peter Bergen]Author and former war correspondent Peter Bergen writes that in the run-up to the Iraq war, most Americans believed wholeheartedly that Saddam Hussein and Iraq were behind the 9/11 attacks. Bergen writes: “[T]he belief that Saddam posed an imminent threat to the United States amounted to a theological conviction within the administration, a conviction successfully sold to the American public. So it’s fair to ask: Where did this faith come from?” One source is the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a neoconservative think tank who has placed many of its fellows in the Bush administration, including Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and John Bolton. But, Bergen notes, none of the AEI analysts and writers are experts on either Iraq or the Middle East. None have ever served in the region. And most actual Middle East experts both in and out of government don’t believe that Iraq had any connection to the 9/11 attacks. The impetus for the belief in a 9/11-Iraq connection in part comes from neoconservative academic Laurie Mylroie.
Mylroie Supplies Neoconservatives with Desired Rationale - A noted author with an impressive academic resume, Mylroie, Bergen writes, “was an apologist for Saddam’s regime, but reversed her position upon his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and, with the zeal of the academic spurned, became rabidly anti-Saddam.” In 1993, Mylroie decided that Saddam Hussein was behind the World Trade Center bombings, and made her case in a 2000 AEI-published book, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America (see October 2000). Mylroie’s message was evidently quite popular with AEI’s neoconservatives. In her book, Mylroie blamed every terrorist event of the decade on Hussein, from the 1993 WTC bombings (a theory Bergen calls “risible”) to the 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800 into Long Island Sound (see July 17, 1996-September 1996), the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), the 2000 attack on the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000), and even the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings (see 8:35 a.m. - 9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995). Bergen calls her a “crackpot,” and notes that it “would not be significant if she were merely advising say, [conservative conspiracy theorist] Lyndon LaRouche. But her neocon friends who went on to run the war in Iraq believed her theories, bringing her on as a consultant at the Pentagon, and they seem to continue to entertain her eccentric belief that Saddam is the fount of the entire shadow war against America.”
Complete Discrediting - Bergen, after detailing how Mylroie ignored conclusive evidence that both the 1993 and 9/11 attacks were planned by al-Qaeda terrorists and not Saddam Hussein, quotes former CIA counterterrorism chief Vincent Cannistraro, who says Mylroie “has an obsession with Iraq and trying to link Saddam to global terrorism.” Cannistraro is joined by author and former CIA analyst Ken Pollack; Mary Jo White, the US attorney who prosecuted the 1993 WTC bombings and 1998 embassy attacks; and Neil Herman, the FBI official who headed the 1993 WTC investigation, who all dismiss Mylroie’s theories as absolutely baseless and thoroughly disproven by the evidence.
Belief or Convenience? - Apparently such thorough debunking did not matter to the AEI neoconservatives. Bergen writes that they were “formulating an alternative vision of US foreign policy to challenge what they saw as the feckless and weak policies of the Clinton administration. Mylroie’s research and expertise on Iraq complemented the big-think strategizing of the neocons, and a symbiotic relationship developed between them.” Whether the neoconservatives actually believed Mylroie’s work, or if “her findings simply fit conveniently into their own desire to overthrow Saddam,” Bergen isn’t sure. Perle later backed off of supporting Mylroie’s theories, calling them less than convincing and downplaying her role in developing arguments for overthrowing Hussein even as he suggests she should be placed in a position of power at the CIA. It is known that after 9/11, former CIA Director James Woolsey, a prominent neoconservative, went to Britain to investigate some of Mylroie’s claims (see Mid-September-October 2001). And in September 2003, Vice President Cheney called Iraq “the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault for many years, but most especially on 9/11,” an echoing of Mylroie’s own theories. Mylroie’s latest book, Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror, accuses those agencies of suppressing information about Iraq’s role in 9/11, again contradicting all known intelligence and plain common sense (see July 2003).
Zeitgeist - Bergen concludes that in part because of Mylroie’s theories and their promulgation by Bush, Cheney, and prominent neoconservatives in and out of the administration, the US has been led into a disastrous war while 70 percent of Americans believe that Hussein had a role in the 9/11 attacks. “[H]er specious theories of Iraq’s involvement in anti-American terrorism have now become part of the American zeitgeist.” Perhaps the most telling statement from Mylroie comes from a recent interview in Newsweek, where she said: “I take satisfaction that we went to war with Iraq and got rid of Saddam Hussein. The rest is details.” Bergen retorts sourly, “Now she tells us.” (Bergen 12/2003; Unger 2007, pp. 216)

The single source for the controversial claim that Iraq could launch a strike with its weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes (see September 28, 2002 and March 12, 2007) is identified as “Lieutenant Colonel al-Dabbagh,” an Iraqi who has allegedly spied on Saddam Hussein’s government for British and US intelligence for over seven years. Al-Dabbagh, who does not allow his first name to be used or his photograph taken, is interviewed in Baghdad by journalist and author Con Coughlin. Al-Dabbagh, identified as an adviser to the Iraqi Governing Council, is later revealed to be an Iraqi defector who was brought to US and British attention by Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. Coughlin is apparently unaware of this. He portrays al-Dabbagh as a heroic risk-taker, “not a man who is easily frightened,” he writes. “[D]eath threats from Saddam’s loyalists” do not deter him from “revealing details of the former Iraqi dictator’s deployment of weapons of mass destruction”; his determination “remain[s] undiminished.”
WMD Remain Hidden - These selfsame loyalists are the reason why US forces cannot find the weapons of mass destruction, al-Dabbagh tells Coughlin. “Saddam’s people are doing this all the time,” he says. “That is why it is so difficult to find the weapons of mass destruction. I am sure the weapons are hidden in Iraq just like I see you now. I am concerned that the chemical and biological weapons are there.” Al-Dabbagh says he is proud to risk his life in divulging Hussein’s secrets: “If Saddam’s people kill me for saying this, I do not mind. I have done my duty to my country and we have got rid of Saddam. And if the British government wants me to come to London to tell the truth about Saddam’s secret weapons program, I am ready to help in any way I can.”
Claim '200 Percent Accurate' - The 45-minute claim is “200 percent accurate!” al-Dabbagh exclaims. “And forget 45 minutes. We could have fired them within half an hour.” Is he the original source of the intelligence? Coughlin asks. Al-Dabbagh replies, “I am the one responsible for providing this information.” A member of the Iraqi Governing Council, General A. J. M. Muhie, al-Dabbagh’s supposed brother-in-law, confirms that al-Dabbagh is the sole source of the claim: “We only had one source for this information and that was Dabbagh,” says the general. Fellow council member Iyad Allawi says he was the one who funnelled al-Dabbagh’s reports to Western intelligence agencies. Muhie is the one who set up the meeting between Coughlin and al-Dabbagh.
Plans to Use WMD against US Invading Forces - Al-Dabbagh tells a detailed story of how the weapons were to be deployed against the American invaders, saying that he and other officers were ordered to use specially designated four-wheel drive Isuzus and only to deploy them if Iraqi forces were in danger of being overrun. Al-Dabbagh and others were then to drive the Isuzus towards American troop emplacements and fire the weapons, presumably chemical and biological weapons tipping hand-held rockets. But the weapons were never deployed, al-Dabbagh claims, because the majority of Iraqi soldiers refused to fight against the Americans. “The West should thank God that the Iraqi army decided not to fight,” he says. “If the army had fought for Saddam, and used these weapons, there would have been terrible consequences.” Whatever became of those fearsome weapons, al-Dabbagh does not know. He believes they were hidden away by Hussein’s Fedayeen loyalists. The weapons will be found, al-Dabbagh predicts, when Hussein is caught or killed: “Only when Saddam is captured will these people talk openly about these weapons. Then they will reveal where they are.” (Coughlin 12/7/2003)
Claims Proven False - Weeks after Coughlin’s interview, al-Dabbagh’s claims will be proven entirely false, and both al-Dabbagh and Allawi will deny any responsibility for their claims (see January 27, 2004).

Senior CIA official Robert Grenier, who, as the agency’s mission manager, inquired about the Joseph Wilson mission to Niger on behalf of the vice president’s office (see 4:30 p.m. June 10, 2003), and told Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis Libby, that Valerie Plame Wilson was a CIA official (see 2:00 p.m. June 11, 2003), is interviewed by the FBI as part of the Plame Wilson investigation. Grenier tells FBI investigators of his June 11, 2003 conversation with Libby, regarding Wilson’s Niger trip and the CIA status of Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame Wilson (see 2:00 p.m. June 11, 2003). Grenier says that he is not sure whether Plame Wilson’s name came up during the conversation, a story he will tell again to the grand jury investigating the Plame Wilson leak in January 2004, but will change when he testifies for the prosecution in the Libby perjury trial (see January 24, 2007). (Marcy Wheeler 1/24/2007; Schulman 1/25/2007; Hossein 3/2007)

A detainee is attacked by a dog on December 12, 2003.A detainee is attacked by a dog on December 12, 2003. [Source: Public domain]A detainee, who appears to be mentally unstable, is bitten by a dog in the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib. The incident is photographed, and according to the later report (see August 25, 2004) by Gen. George Fay, “appears to be the result of MP harassment and amusement.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

President Musharraf’s car damaged in one of the  assassination attempts.President Musharraf’s car damaged in one of the assassination attempts. [Source: Mian Khursheed / Reuters]On December 14, 2003, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf survives an assassination attempt when a powerful bomb goes off 30 seconds after his highly-guarded convoy crosses a bridge in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The heavily guarded bridge is just a mile from Musharraf’s house, yet militants were able to spend severals days tying explosives to the pylons below it. His life is saved by a jamming device in his car given to him by the FBI, which temporarily jams all telephone signals and thus delays the explosion. On December 25, 2003, two suicide bombers launch another attempt to assassinate Musharraf, driving car bombs into his convoy a short distance from the location of the previous attack. Their car bombs fail to kill him and he escapes with only a cracked windscreen on his car, but 16 others nearby are killed.
Investigation - The identities of the two suicide bombers are soon discovered. One is Mohammed Jamil, a member of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) militant group who fought with the Taliban. The other is Hazir Sultan, who also fought with the Taliban. The memory chip from Jamil’s phone is found in the debris, and it is discovered he talked to a policeman who told him the timing of Musharraf’s convoy. Only a handful of military officers knew the route and timing of Musharraf’s travels and which of several identical cars he would be using at any given time, suggesting that elements within the military were involved in the attacks. Investigators also discover that the explosives used in the attacks came from an al-Qaeda camp in the Pakistani tribal area of South Waziristan. (Rashid 2008, pp. 230-232)
Militant Leaders against Musharraf - Osama bin Laden apparently called for Musharraf’s overthrow in October 2002 (see October 9, 2002), and Ayman al-Zawahiri apparently did the same in September 2003 (see September 28, 2003). In the months prior to the assassination attempts, Maulana Masood Azhar, head of JEM, gave a speech at a prominent mosque calling for Musharraf’s assassination. (Hasan 7/27/2007)
Limited Crackdown - Musharraf responds by reshuffling positions in the military high command. More than 150 military and security personnel will eventually be arrested and interrogated. Twelve suspects are eventually found guilty and sentenced to death for roles in the attacks; at least six are military officers. It is believed the suicide bombers and these officers were recruited and trained by Amjad Farooqi, a JEM leader also closely linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Al-Qaeda leader Abu Faraj al-Libbi, said to be Farooqi’s superior, is also allegedly involved. A massive manhunt for Farooqi and al-Libbi will ensue. Farooqi will eventually be killed in September 2004 (see September 27, 2004) and al-Libbi captured in May 2005 and taken into US custody (see May 2, 2005). However, Musharraf’s response is relatively restrained. He avoids calls to launch a crackdown on the entire Islamist militant movement in Pakistan. He does not ban any militant groups, nor does he arrest militant leaders, not even Azhar, the head of JEM who had publicly called for his assassination. (JEM had been banned in Pakistan for a second time the month before (see November 2003).) He does allow the Pakistani Army to attack the safe haven of South Waziristan several months later, but only after the US gives him an ultimatum, essentially forcing him to do so (see March 18- April 24, 2004). (BBC 9/27/2004; Rashid 2008, pp. 230-232)

A United Nations report criticizes Switzerland for failing to prevent support from reaching al-Qaeda and the Taliban. UN observers claim there is weapons smuggling passing through Switzerland to Afghanistan. The report further claims that the leaders of the banned Al Taqwa Bank (see November 7, 2001) are continuing to do business with new and renamed financial entities. They continue to maintain commercial interests and properties in Italy and Switzerland, despite being on US and UN blacklists. Switzerland is also failing to enforce travel bans. For instance, Al Taqwa leader Youssef Nada was able to travel through Switzerland to Liechtenstein and back in January 2003. (Swissinfo 12/16/2003) Salon noted in 2002 that, for many years, Al Taqwa has benefited from political connections in Switzerland. Al Taqwa directors have ties to some European far right wing politicians such as French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, and even neo-Nazi groups (see 1988). (Bushinsky 3/12/2002; Komisar 3/15/2002) Newsweek will later report that in 2004, the UN will not convince its members to plug loopholes in the sanctions against Al Taqwa related entities. Instead, the UN Security Council will abolish its own monitoring group. (Isikoff and Hosenball 3/3/2004; Isikoff and Hosenball 12/24/2004) In late 2004, the Washington Post will report that although Al Taqwa “was supposedly shut down, US and European officials say they still find Nada moving funds under new corporate names.” (Mintz and Fatah 9/11/2004) Additional reports of entities connected to Al Taqwa directors continuing to do business will appear in 2005 (see June-October 2005).

9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow says that former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke must be placed under oath when he is interviewed by the commission.
'I Know Dick Clarke' - Usually, former and current government officials being interviewed by the commission are not placed under oath; this only happens when there is, in author Philip Shenon’s words, “a substantial reason to doubt their truthfulness.” Zelikow tells the staff, “I know Dick Clarke,” and, according to Shenon, argues that “Clarke was a braggart who would try to rewrite history to justify his errors and slander his enemies, [National Security Adviser Condoleezza] Rice in particular.” Zelikow is close to Rice (see January 3, 2001, May-June 2004, and February 28, 2005). Zelikow had also previously told Warren Bass, the commission staffer responsible for the National Security Council, that Clarke should not be believed and that his testimony was suspect.
Staff Cannot Talk to Zelikow about Rice - Due to Zelikow’s constant disparagement of Clarke and for other reasons, the staff come to realize that, in Shenon’s words, “they could not have an open discussion in front of Zelikow about Condoleezza Rice and her performance as national security adviser.” In addition, “They could not say openly, certainly not to Zelikow’s face, what many on the staff came to believe: that Rice’s performance in the spring and summer of 2001 amounted to incompetence, or something not far from it.”
Effect of Recusal Agreement - Zelikow has concluded a recusal agreement in the commission, as he was involved in counterterrorism on the Bush administration transition team. As a consequence of this agreement, he cannot be involved in questioning Clarke on any issue involving the transition. Shenon will comment: “[Zelikow] had reason to dread what Clarke was about to tell the commission: It was Zelikow, after all, who had been the architect of Clarke’s demotion in the early weeks of the Bush administration, a fact that had never been aired publicly.”
First Interview - Clarke is first interviewed by the commission on December 18, and the interview is mostly conducted by Daniel Marcus, the commission’s lawyer. Marcus and the other staffers present at the interview realize within minutes what an important witness Clarke will be and what damage he could do to Bush and Rice. Marcus will later comment, “Here was a guy who is totally unknown outside the Beltway, who had been a Washington bureaucrat all of his life, who turns out to be a dynamite witness.” Clarke tells the commission of charges he will later repeat publicly (see March 21, 2004 and March 24, 2004), saying that Bush and Rice did not take terrorism seriously enough in the run-up to the attacks, that they were more focused on issues left over from the Cold War, and that Bush tried to get him to link the attacks to Iraq. (Shenon 2008, pp. 145-146, 196-199)

A three-judge panel of the Second US Circuit Court of Appeals in New York votes two to one that the military must either charge alleged al-Qaeda terrorist Jose Padilla with a crime, or release him within 30 days. “The government,” the court says, “can transfer Padilla to appropriate civilian authorities who can bring criminal charges against him.” Until now, no court in the US has ruled against the government’s contention that even American citizens arrested on US soil can be held indefinitely based on wartime government prerogatives. Neither the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (see September 14-18, 2001) nor the president’s “inherent power” as commander in chief is enough to hold Padilla without a trial, the court finds: “The president, acting alone, possesses no inherent constitutional authority to detain American citizens seized within the United States, away from a zone of combat, as enemy combatants.” The two judges in the majority are a 1998 Clinton appointee and a 2001 Bush appointee; the dissenter, who advocates granting the president new and sweeping powers, is a 2003 Bush appointee. “So far,” Office of Legal Counsel lawyer John Yoo comments, “the Second Circuit is the only court that has rejected the idea that the war on terrorism is, in fact, a war.” Because this ruling conflicts with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the Bush administration, the Supreme Court will be forced to resolve the issue (see June 28, 2004); in light of the appeal, the court later agrees to suspend its 30-day ruling. (Montgomery 12/29/2003; Savage 2007, pp. 153)

Neoconservative Michael Ledeen, in an op-ed piece published by the Wall Street Journal, makes numerous charges against the Iranian government, saying it supports terrorism and is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon. He asserts that the Bush administration must therefore act soon against Iran. He says Iran is the “ultimate litmus test of the seriousness of the Bush administration” and that the administration’s “ability to conduct an effective campaign against the mullahs in Tehran will determine the outcome of the war against the terror masters.” Ledeen asserts that the US does not need to invade Iran to “liberate it,” rather it only needs to support the “enthusiastically pro-American” people, as the US did the “Serbs against Slobodan Milosovic, the Filipinos against the Marcoses, the Poles against Soviet Communism.” (Ledeen 12/19/2003)

Shayna Steinger, a consular official who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers at the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (see July 1, 2000), is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, represented by staffers Thomas Eldridge and Joanne Accolla. Regarding the issue of a visa to alleged Flight 77 pilot Hani Hanjour, where Steinger initially refused the visa and then granted it (see September 10, 2000 and September 25, 2000), Steinger says Hanjour was “typical of many Saudi students” in that he switched between schools in the US. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2003) The Commission is aware that Steinger made incorrect statements about the issue of the visa to Hanjour to a Congressional committee (see August 1, 2002), but apparently it does not ask her about this, although these statements will be mentioned in its Terrorist Travel Monograph. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 13-14, 37-38 pdf file) Steinger also says she remembers “press accounts of the ‘chatter’ surrounding a possible impending attack” before 9/11, but thought it was more likely to be carried out by Egyptians or Yemenis. Before 9/11 she was “never aware of the level of disaffected extremism in Saudi society,” she says. She knew Saudis were al-Qaeda members, but, according to a memo of the interview drafted by the Commission, “she never made the connection between this fact, and the idea that the Saudis applying for visas were possible terrorists.” Despite the fact that Steinger was unaware Saudis could be terrorists, on some occasions she sent Security Advisory Opinion cables warning about a visa application in connection with terrorism. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2003)

The chief of the CIA’s station in Baghdad, Iraq, is removed from his position. (Miller and Drogin 2/20/2004; Jehl and Johnston 2/27/2005) At this time the chief, whose name is apparently Gerry Meyer (see May 18, 2006), is not in Iraq, but reporting to superiors in Washington. He is simply told not to return to his station. (Risen 2006, pp. 147) However, the reason for the chief’s removal is unclear and three contradictory accounts will be given. The first account, put about by anonymous officials, is that Meyer does not have the management skills to administer the station, one of the largest the CIA has ever had. (Jehl and Johnston 2/27/2005; Risen 2006, pp. 128) One unnamed official will comment, “There was just a belief that it was a huge operation and we needed a very senior, very experienced person to run it.” A second version holds that Meyer is fired for drafting two pessimistic “Aardwolf” reports about the US’s prospects in Iraq (see August 30, 2003 and November 10, 2003). (Miller and Drogin 2/20/2004) According to a Harper’s magazine post, White House officials ask for “dirt” on Meyer, including his political affiliation. “He was a good guy,” an anonymous CIA official will comment, “well-wired in Baghdad, and he wrote a good report. But any time this administration gets bad news, they say the critics are assholes and defeatists, and off we go down the same path with more pressure on the accelerator.” (Silverstein 5/18/2006) However, a third version will later emerge. In this account, the firing is due to concern over the deaths of two Iraqis questioned by CIA officials shortly before Meyer’s removal. After senior agency officials learn of the deaths of Abed Hamed Mowhoush (see November 26, 2003) and Manadel al-Jamadi (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), in which CIA personnel were involved, they become unhappy with Meyer and have him removed. (Jehl and Johnston 2/27/2005; Risen 2006, pp. 127-128) This version will apparently be supported by a document released subsequent to a Freedom of Information Act request in 2009. The document is a redacted set of May 2004 talking points to be used by a senior CIA official in a briefing of the House Intelligence Committee. The talking points do not say specifically why Meyer was fired, but do say he committed errors in detainee treatment. This will be confirmed by an anonymous former official, who will say that Meyer “wasn’t paying enough attention to the detainee situation,” as well as the issue of “ghost detainees.” (Strobel 8/25/2009) Whatever the reason for his firing, Meyer soon leaves the CIA. (Jehl and Johnston 2/27/2005; Silverstein 5/18/2006) According to author James Risen, his departure comes after he faces “piercing questions from CIA officials stemming from a series of inflammatory accusations about his personal behavior, all of which he flatly denied.” Risen will add that Meyer leaves the CIA “in disgust.” Whatever the reason, some CIA officials come to believe that Meyer ran into trouble because of the candid report. “When I read that November aardwolf,” a CIA official who knows Meyer will comment, “I thought that he was committing career suicide.” (Risen 2006, pp. 127-128)

9/11 Commission staffer Lorry Fenner.9/11 Commission staffer Lorry Fenner. [Source: Public domain]9/11 Commission staffer Lorry Fenner, who is reading through NSA material related to al-Qaeda on her own initiative (see January 2004), finds material possibly linking Iran and Hezbollah to al-Qaeda. (Shenon 2008, pp. 157, 370-1) The material indicates that between eight and ten of the future hijackers traveled between Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and other destinations via Iran. For example, in November 2000, one of the hijackers, Ahmed Alghamdi, took the same flight as a senior Hezbollah official (see November 2000), although the 9/11 Commission report will say this may be a “coincidence.” An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative took the same flight as another three of the hijackers in November 2000, and Hezbollah officials were expecting an undefined group to arrive at the same time. However, the hijackers’ families will say they were in Saudi Arabia at this time (see Mid-November, 2000). Based on information such as this, the commission will conclude that Iran helped al-Qaeda operatives transit Iran by not stamping their passports, but that neither it nor Hezbollah had any knowledge of the 9/11 plot. Under interrogation, detainees Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh say that some of the hijackers did transit Iran, but that they had no assistance from the Iranian authorities. However, such statements were apparently made after they were tortured, bringing their reliability into question (see June 16, 2004 and August 6, 2007). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 240-1) The NSA intelligence reports the information about Iranian and Hezbollah is based on were mostly drafted between October and December 2001, so it is possible that the NSA was monitoring Hezbollah in 2000 and then matched up travel by that organization’s operatives with the 9/11 hijackers’ travel, ascertained from airlines, for example, after 9/11. One of the reports, entitled “operative’s claimed identification of photos of two Sept. 11 hijackers,” is dated August 9, 2002. It is unclear who the operative is or how he allegedly came into contact with the alleged 9/11 hijackers. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 529)

In response to a question at a news conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell says, “I have not seen a smoking gun, concrete evidence about the connection [between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda], but I think the possibility of such connections did exist and it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did.” (Associated Press 1/8/2004; Whitaker 1/11/2004) Former ambassador Joseph Wilson will later write, “The second justification for war—ties to ‘terrorism with a global reach,’ to use the president’s own words—had now been discredited by one of the most senior officials in his own administration.” (Wilson 2004, pp. 413)

Vice President Dick Cheney tells Rocky Mountain News that a November 2003 article published in the conservative Weekly Standard (see November 14, 2003) represents “the best source of information” on cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The article was based on a leaked intelligence memo that had been written by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in 2002 and was the product of the Office of Special Plans (see August 2002). Cheney also insists that the administration’s decision to invade Iraq was “perfectly justified.” (Sprengelmeyer 1/10/2004; Landay 3/9/2004)

The 9/11 Commission first learns that the US had a program to assassinate Osama bin Laden before 9/11 (see December 24, 1998). The program, which is disclosed to the commission’s staff by former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, was a response to the African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). The commission was not previously aware of the order and when Berger tells them about it they are confused, because the CIA has been telling them there was no such order for months. When the commission tells Berger what the CIA has said, he assures them that there is an explicit document, a memorandum of notification concerning Afghanistan, that gives the CIA the authority to kill bin Laden, not just capture him. It is unclear why CIA managers repeatedly told the commission there was no such order (see Before January 14, 2004). (Shenon 2008, pp. 253-254)

In an interview with Time magazine, former US Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill says he never saw or heard of any real evidence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. “In the 23 months I was there, I never saw anything that I would characterize as evidence of weapons of mass destruction,” he explains. “There were allegations and assertions by people…. But I’ve been around a hell of a long time, and I know the difference between evidence and assertions and illusions or allusions and conclusions that one could draw from a set of assumptions. To me there is a difference between real evidence and everything else. And I never saw anything in the intelligence that I would characterize as real evidence.” (Dickerson 1/11/2004)

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez orders a high level administrative investigation into the 800th Military Police Brigade apart from the criminal investigation that was announced three days earlier (see January 16, 2004). He appoints Major General Antonio M. Taguba to conduct the inquiry and limits the scope of the investigation to the conduct of the military police brigade. Taguba’s report will be filed on February 26 (see February 26, 2004). (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004; Sydney Morning Herald 5/4/2004; Jehl 5/10/2004) As preparations for investigation are underway, investigators reportedly give the MPs at Abu Ghraib “a week’s notice before inspecting their possessions.” ( [Sources: Several unnamed soldiers) Whether it is an attempt to sabotage the investigation, or a matter of clumsiness on the part of the military leadership or the CID, the result may well be that evidence of abuse is deliberately destroyed. “That shows you how lax they are about discipline. ‘We are going to look for contraband in here, so hint, hint, get rid of the stuff,’ that’s the way things work in the Guard,” MP Ramone Leal will say. (Reuters 5/6/2004)

George W. Bush gives the third state of the union address of his presidency. He states that the Iraq Survey Group found “weapons of mass destruction-related program activities” in Iraq and claims that had his administration “failed to act, the dictator’s weapons of mass destruction program would continue to this day.” (Drogin and Goetz 11/20/2005) Throughout his address, Bush plays down the WMD issue, which had driven his rhetoric before the invasion (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). Now he focuses on the “liberation” of Iraq. He also challenges those who, like Democratic presidential frontrunner John Kerry (D-MA), advocate using law enforcement methodologies over military methods to combat terrorism. “I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all,” he says. “After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.” Author and media critic Frank Rich will later write that this speech is the opening salvo in the Republicans’ strategy of “characterizing political opponents as less manly than the Top Gun president.” (Rich 2006, pp. 114)

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