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Profile: County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

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County of Miami-Dade (Florida) was a participant or observer in the following events:

Part of the ‘voter purge’ lists that illegally disenfranchised thousands of Florida voters.Part of the ‘voter purge’ lists that illegally disenfranchised thousands of Florida voters. [Source: Salon]Soon after Jeb Bush (R-FL) becomes governor of Florida minority voters are increasingly purged from the Florida voting rolls. In his unsuccessful 1994 run for governor, Bush had won the animus of African-American voters by showing a lack of interest in their concerns; during one debate, when asked what he would do for Florida’s black community, he answered, “Probably nothing.” He avoided such comments in his 1998 campaign, and won the election though he secured only 10 percent of the black vote. In his first year as governor, Bush eliminates many affirmative action programs and replaces them with what he calls the “One Florida Initiative,” which in effect grants state contracts almost exclusively to white male business owners. Black legislators, led by Democratic State Senator Kendrick Meek among others and joined by the NAACP, decide that they will mount a voter registration drive—“We’ll Remember in November”—to defeat Governor Bush and his allies, and to challenge Bush’s brother, Texas Governor George W. Bush, in his drive to the presidency (see 9:54 p.m. December 12, 2000). Veteran civil rights leader Elmore Bryant later says, “We didn’t need George W. doing to the whole nation what Jeb was doing to Florida.” Some Florida NAACP officials have a nickname for the governor: “Jeb Crow.” Black voters begin registering in unprecedented numbers.
Removing Black 'Felons' from the Rolls, Keeping Other Blacks Off - Bush and his allies decide to begin focusing on convicted felons (see June 24, 1974), pivoting off of a 1997 discovery that 105 convicted felons had illegally voted in a Miami mayoral election. Under Florida law, convicted felons are ineligible to vote. Seventy-one percent of convicted felons found on county voting rolls are registered Democrats, and the majority of those are black. Bush and the Republican-led Florida legislature pushes through a sweeping voter fraud bill opposed by almost every county elections supervisor in Florida. It mandates the strict enforcement of an obsolete 1868 law that took the vote away from all former prisoners who had not received clemency from the governor’s office no matter what their crimes or their circumstances. Only 14 states do not automatically restore a convicted citizen’s civil rights upon the completion of their prison sentence; Florida is one of those states. Florida’s population is only 15 percent black, but its prison population is 54 percent black—a huge disproportion. Convicted felons who ask for clemency usually are denied such clemency, no matter how much they had managed to clean up their lives—by 2000, less than 0.5 percent of former prisoners have regained their rights to vote. Meek later says that he has helped 175 former felons apply for clemency; only nine, he will say, succeed in regaining their voting rights. 17 percent of Florida’s black voting-age males are disenfranchised as of 2000. Florida leads the nation in its number of disenfranchised voters. Moreover, Florida leads the nation in charging juveniles with felonies, thusly depriving young citizens of their rights to vote even before they are old enough to exercise them. Democratic State Senator Daryl Jones says: “And every year the Florida legislature is trying to make more crimes felonies. Why? So they can eliminate more people from the voter rolls.… It’s been going on in Tallahassee for years.” By April 1998, as Jeb Bush’s campaign for governor is in full swing, the legislature mandated a statewide push to “purge” voter rolls of a wide variety of ineligible voters—those who have moved and registered in a different county or state, those considered mentally unstable, those who are deceased, and most significantly, convicted felons who have not had their rights restored. Voters such as Willie David Whiting, a Tallahassee pastor who has never been convicted of a crime, testified that they were denied their rights to vote because the lists conflated him with felon Willie J. Whiting. The purge list parameters considered him a “derived,” or approximate, match (see November 7, 2000). Whiting had to threaten to bring his lawyer to the precinct before being allowed to vote. “I felt like I was slingshotted back into slavery,” he testified. He tried to understand why he and so many others were denied their right to vote. “Does someone have a formula for stealing this election?” he says he asked himself. Overall, the new purge lists are hugely disproportionate in including black citizens. Hillsborough County’s voting population is 15 percent black, but 54 percent of its purged voters are black. Miami-Dade County’s voting population is 20 percent black, but 66 percent of its purged voters are black. Leon County’s voting population is 29 percent black, but 55 percent of its purged voters are black (see Early Afternoon, November 7, 2000).
Privatizing the Purge - The legislature contracts out the task of providing a “purge list” to a Tallahassee firm, Professional Analytical Services and Systems, using state databases. The results are riddled with errors that would cost huge numbers of Florida voters their right to vote. In August 1998. Ethel Baxter, the Director of the Florida Division of Elections, orders county elections supervisors not to release the list to the press in order to keep the list from generating negative publicity. Instead, the state awards a second contract, this time to Boca Raton’s Database Technologies (DBT). (DBT later merges with ChoicePoint, an Atlanta firm.) DBT produces two separate lists, one in 1999 and another in 2000, that included a total of 174,583 alleged felons. Later, a small number of convicts who had been granted clemency are removed from the list. The majority of the people on the lists were black, and presumably Democrats. DBT employees referred to the people on the list as “dirtbags,” among other epithets. When citizens begin learning that they are on the lists, and begin filing complaints, DBT product manager Marlene Thorogood expresses surprise. In an email, she says, “There are just some people that feel when you mess with their ‘right to vote’ your [sic] messing with their life.” By late 1999, it becomes apparent that the DBT lists are as riddled with errors as the first lists. Thousands of Florida citizens who had never been convicted of felonies, and in many cases no crimes at all, are on the lists. Some people’s conviction dates were given as being in the future. Angry complaints by the thousands inundated county elections supervisors, who in turn complain to Tallahassee.
Handling the Complaints - The person designated to compile the list is Emmett “Bucky” Mitchell IV, an assistant general counsel to the Florida Division of Elections. Mitchell, who is later promoted to a senior position in the Department of Education a week after the November 2000 elections, claims he tries to “err on the side of caution” in listing voters to be purged. But testimony and statements from county supervisors, state officials, DBT employees, and others paint a different picture. When warned in March 1999 of the likelihood of tens of thousands of “false positives”—names that should not be on the list but are because of similarities in names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, and the like—Mitchell tells Thorogood that the primary purpose of the lists is to include as many people as possible, false positives or not. It is the job of the county supervisors, he says, to weed out the legitimate voters from the lists. When told by DBT personnel that loose parameters for the names were causing an inordinate number of false positives, Mitchell, as directed by senior government officials, actually loosens the parameters instead of tightening them, ensuring tens of thousands more names on the list, and resultingly more false positives. DBT also includes names of convicted felons from other states in making up its lists, though 36 states automatically restore their prisoners’ rights upon completion of sentences. Thusly, over 2,000 residents of other states who had served their sentences, had their rights restored, and moved to Florida now find their voting rights illegally stripped by the purge list. In May 2000, some 8,000 names, mostly those of former Texas prisoners included on a DBT list, are found to have never committed anything more than a misdemeanor. Their names are eventually removed from the lists. (Subsequent investigations find that at least one of the Texas lists came from a company headed by a heavy Republican and Bush campaign donor.) Mitchell later admits that other such lists, equally erroneous, are incorporated into the purge lists, and those names are not removed. Before the 2000 elections, an appeals process is instituted, but it is tortuously slow and inefficient. Civil Rights Commission attorney Bernard Quarterman says in February 2001 that the people who filed appeals are, in essence, “guilty until proven innocent.” In its contract, DBT promises to check every name on the list before including it by both mail and telephone verifications, but it does not, and later contracts omit that procedure. Asked by Nation reporter John Lantigua about concerns with the lists, Mitchell dismisses them, saying: “Just as some people might have been removed from the list who shouldn’t have been, some voted who shouldn’t have.” Lantigua writes: “In other words, because an ineligible person may have voted somewhere else, it was acceptable to deny a legitimate voter the right to vote.” Mitchell verifies that he himself did not set the loose parameters for the lists, but that they came from Baxter in consultation with Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After).
County Supervisors Battle the Lists - Some county elections supervisors work diligently to comb through their lists and restore legitimate citizens’ voting rights. Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion Sancho testifies after the elections, “Our experience with the lists is that they are frequently erroneous.” He tells the Civil Rights Commission that he received one list with 690 names on it; after detailed checking by himself and his staff, 657 of those names were removed. Mitchell actually tells elections supervisors not to bother with such checks. Linda Howell, the elections supervisor for Madison County, later says: “Mr. Mitchell said we shouldn’t call people on the phone, we should send letters. The best and fastest way to check these matters was by phone, personal contact, but he didn’t want that.… We shouldn’t have had to do any of this. Elections supervisors are not investigators, and we don’t have investigators. It wasn’t our responsibility at all.” The process for unfairly purged voters to clear their names is slow and inefficient, and the backlog of voters waiting to have their names cleared by the Office of Executive Clemency was anywhere from six months to a year in duration. [Tapper, 3/2001; Nation, 4/24/2001]
Subsequent Investigation - A later investigation by the progressive news magazine The Nation will document widespread voter disenfranchisement efforts in Florida (see April 24, 2001).

Entity Tags: Emmett (“Bucky”) Mitchell, Willie D. Whiting, Elmore Bryant, Daryl Jones, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Hillsborough (Florida), US Commission on Civil Rights, Bernard Quarterman, ChoicePoint, Professional Analytical Services and Systems, Kendrick Meek, Marlene Thorogood, John Ellis (“Jeb”) Bush, Ion Sancho, George W. Bush, Florida Division of Elections, Ethel Baxter, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Database Technologies, Katherine Harris, John Lantigua

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections, Civil Liberties

Florida, already using controversial and error-ridden “purge lists” to remove tens of thousands of minority voters from the voting rolls (see 1998 and After), uses voting machines and voting procedures to disenfranchise eligible voters. The Florida elections system is grossly underfunded, resulting in the use of obsolete and error-prone machines (disproportionately used in counties with large minority populations), and elections officials lacking fundamental training and even information about their jobs. During most of 2000, county supervisors warn Tallahassee that Florida could expect an unprecedented number of voters on November 7, especially among the black voting community. But Secretary of State Katherine Harris (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After) and Division of Elections chief Clay Roberts, by their own subsequent testimony, fail to address the problem. Roberts tells Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion Sancho, “It’s not that bad.” Thusly on November 7, 2000, many polling places experience massive difficulties. An investigation by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) turns up thousands of voters who are turned away for a number of reasons, including but not limited to being on the purge lists. Some voters who registered are not listed on the voting rolls—many of whom were registered through NAACP efforts to register voters via the “motor voter” procedures (see May 20, 1993). County supervisors calling Tallahassee with questions and problems routinely find themselves unable to get through. Many precincts lack access to central voter rolls to verify questionable registrations. Some voters who are in line to vote at the 7:00 p.m. closing time are told to leave, even though the law mandates that any voter standing in line to vote can vote even if closing time occurs. Florida law also allows voters whose status is questionable to complete affidavit votes that will be counted later after their eligibility is confirmed, but many election workers know nothing of these procedures, and thusly many voters who are eligible to vote via affidavit are not given that opportunity. Many disabled voters find no procedures in place to allow them access to voting machines. Many precincts lack procedures to assist Spanish-speaking voters, including failing to provide bilingual ballots or bilingual poll workers. (The Voting Rights Act of 1965—see August 6, 1965—mandates that such provisions be made at every polling place without exception.) The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund later concludes that several thousand Hispanic voters are disenfranchised because of these failures. Black voters in Leon County complain that the Florida Highway Patrol set up a roadblock that denied them access to their polling place (see 11:30 a.m. November 7, 2000); Highway Patrol authorities later admit the existence of the roadblock, but say that it was a routine vehicle inspection checkpoint.
Punch Card Voting - Florida generally uses two voting systems—the more sophisticated computer “optiscan” system, which features ballots where choices are made by “bubbling in” an oval with a pencil and then feeding into a scanner, and the obsolete “punch card” system, which uses “punch cards” where choices are made by a voter “punching” a hole in a card with a stylus and then feeding the card into a scanner. Counties with large African-American populations are disproportionate in having to use the obsolete punch card machines. In four of these counties—Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Duval—over 100,000 votes are discarded due to problems with punching the holes correctly (see November 9, 2000). This total is more than half the discards in the entire state. Of the 19 precincts in the state with the highest rate of discard, 18 are majority-black. Seventy percent of black Floridian voters are forced to use the punch card machines, a percentage far higher than that of other ethnic groups. The NAACP later sues to force Florida to discard punch card machines entirely. The Florida government’s response to the punch-card disenfranchisement can perhaps be best summed up by a statement made by Republican House Speaker Tom Feeney, who responds to a question about the infamous “butterfly ballot” in Palm Beach County (see November 9, 2000) by saying: “Voter confusion is not a reason for whining or crying or having a revote. It may be a reason to require literacy tests.” Literacy tests, a legacy of the Jim Crow era of massive voter discrimination, are unconstitutional (see 1896 and June 8, 1959). [Tapper, 3/2001; Nation, 4/24/2001]
Subsequent Investigation - A later investigation by the progressive news magazine The Nation will document widespread voter disenfranchisement efforts in Florida (see April 24, 2001).

Entity Tags: County of Palm Beach (Florida), County of Madison (Florida), County of Leon (Florida), County of Duval (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), Clay Roberts, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Florida Highway Patrol, Ion Sancho, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Tom Feeney, Linda Howell, Katherine Harris, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections, Civil Liberties

Hundreds of thousands of voters in Miami-Dade County go to the polls to cast their votes for president. Two of its precincts, 255 and 535, are over 88 percent Democrat and over 90 percent African-American. The 20 punch-card machines designated for the two precincts were tested beforehand and certified as working properly, but in the hours before the polls open, a worker at Precinct 255 does a test and finds that seven of the 10 machines do not accept punch-card votes for president. Precinct clerk Donna Rogers will later claim that no one tells her of the problems with the machines, but by the end of the day, 113 of the 868 ballots cast do not register a vote for president. Of the votes that do register in the precinct, over 99 percent of them go to Democrat Al Gore. At Precinct 535, six of the 10 machines fail to register votes for president during test runs. Of the 820 ballots cast in this precinct, 105 do not register a vote for president. Gore wins over 98 percent of this precinct’s votes. The 13 percent “discarded ballot,” or “undervote,” rate for these two precincts is by far the largest in Miami-Dade. [Tapper, 3/2001] A later attempt to hand-count the ballots in question is forcibly prevented by an orchestrated “riot” by conservative activists and political aides at the Miami-Dade elections office (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000).

Entity Tags: Donna Rogers, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections, Civil Liberties

Based on Voter News Service (VNS) projections from exit polling, the Associated Press projects Vice President Al Gore, the Democratic presidential candidate, as the winner of the Florida elections over Governor George W. Bush (R-TX). Gore’s victory, if confirmed, would give him the electoral votes he needs to win the US presidency. The major television networks—ABC News, CBS News, Fox News, and NBC News—call Florida for Gore between 7:50 and 8:00 p.m. [Leip, 2008] In light of the predictions of a Gore victory, Bush decides to abandon his plans to watch the rest of the returns from a suite in the Austin, Texas, Four Seasons Hotel, and instead returns to the relative privacy of the governor’s mansion in Austin. [Tapper, 3/2001] Florida polling places in the Central Time Zone do not close until 8:00 p.m., so the networks’ projection that Florida is going to Gore comes out 10 minutes before those polling places—all in Florida’s “Panhandle” region, a Republican stronghold—close. Bush campaign officials will later allege that the networks called Florida for Gore an hour before the polls closed, potentially discouraging some Bush voters from casting their votes. The liberal news Web site Consortium News will later observe: “Though the networks certainly could have and obviously should have waited, it is unclear that any Bush voter decided not to go to the polls because of a projection that occurred only minutes before the polls closed. It’s unlikely that more than a few late-arriving voters were even aware of Gore’s projected victory.” [Consortium News, 11/22/2000] Many Florida lawmakers and officials are shocked by the pronouncement. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) will later recall feeling that the networks are “stretching it” to make such a prediction. Broward County elections supervisor Jane Carroll will say acidly, “That’s very kind of [the networks] to just give this away.” Broward has yet to tally a single vote. Broward canvassing board chairman Judge Robert Lee is incredulous at the announcement, and like Graham and others, is disturbed that the networks would call the election before the polls are closed. As the evening goes on and the returns begin to come in, Lee wonders, “Why are they calling Florida for Gore when it’s so close?” Bush campaign strategist Karl Rove goes on the air to argue that Florida is still in play, and to complain about the networks’ choice to project Florida for Gore before the Panhandle counties have concluded their polling. The VNS voting predictions are later shown to be badly flawed, with a number of erroneous estimates, a drastic overestimation of African-American (Democratic) votes in Miami-Dade and a corresponding underestimation of Cuban-American (Republican) votes in that county, and poorly managed exit polling. [Tapper, 3/2001]

Entity Tags: County of Broward (Florida), Consortium News, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., ABC News, Voter News Service, Robert Lee, Karl C. Rove, CBS News, Fox News, Daniel Robert (“Bob”) Graham, George W. Bush, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Jane Carroll, NBC News

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Vice President Al Gore, the Democratic presidential candidate, calls Republican contender George W. Bush to concede the US presidential election, based on the news networks’ projection of Bush’s slim “victory” in Florida (see 2:15 a.m. November 8, 2000). According to Bush campaign advisor Karen Hughes, Gore tells Bush, “We gave them a cliffhanger.” Bush responds: “You’re a formidable opponent and a good man. I know it’s hard. I know it’s hard for your family. Give my best to Tipper [Gore’s wife] and your children.” Gore’s motorcade drives to the War Memorial Plaza in Nashville, where Gore plans to address his supporters. But by 3:15 a.m., Gore’s advisors tell him that Bush’s lead in Florida has dropped dramatically, leaving Bush with a lead of only 6,000 votes or less, well within the 0.5 percent margin that will trigger an automatic machine recount. Votes in three Democratic strongholds—Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties—are still outstanding. And a computer error in Volusia County tallies shows Gore with a total of negative 16,000 votes. The numbers continue to drop; by the time Gore’s motorcade is approaching the Plaza, the tallies show a Bush lead of less than 1,000 votes. Gore returns to his Nashville hotel without addressing his supporters. Speechwriter Eli Attie later recalls, “I stopped him from going out onstage, and said, ‘With 99 percent of the vote counted, you’re only 600 votes behind.’” [National Journal, 11/9/2000; New York Times, 11/9/2000; Tapper, 3/2001; Vanity Fair, 10/2004; Leip, 2008] Minutes later, Gore calls Bush to retract his concession (see 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000).

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., County of Palm Beach (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), Karen Hughes, Eli Attie, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

James Baker and Warren Christopher.James Baker and Warren Christopher. [Source: Slate / Metrolic]The Gore campaign sends a quick-response team led by Al Gore’s former chief of staff, lawyer Ron Klain, to Florida to deal with the uncertainty of the Florida presidential race (see Early Morning, November 8, 2000). Almost immediately, Klain and his group are inundated with rumors of voting irregularities—understaffed polling places in Democratic strongholds, Democratic voters sent on “wild goose chases” to find their proper polling places, African-Americans illegally prevented from voting (see November 7, 2000), police roadblocks set up to keep voters from reaching their polls (see 11:30 a.m. November 7, 2000). Klain and his group are unable to ascertain the truth or fiction behind some of the rumors, though they learn about one that is verifiable—the problems surrounding Palm Beach County’s “butterfly ballot” that seem to have cost Gore some 2,600 votes (see November 9, 2000). Klain and the Gore campaign’s Florida head, Nick Baldick, learn that 10,000 votes for both candidates in Palm Beach have been set aside, uncounted, because of their classification as “undervotes”—votes that record no choice for president. Some 4 percent of Palm Beach voters cast their votes for senator but not for president, according to the machine scoring, a conclusion Klain and Baldick find hard to believe. They soon learn that many more “undervotes” were set aside in Miami-Dade County, like Palm Beach a Democratic stronghold. Broward County, which includes the heavily Democratic Fort Lauderdale region, is the source of a number of rumors concerning missing ballot boxes and unbelievable precinct totals. And Volusia County, another expected mine of Gore voters, initially reported a total of negative 16,000 votes for Gore. The automatic recount triggered by Florida law would not address any of these issues; manual recounts and human examination of ballots would be required to sort through the inconsistencies. Klain asks a number of Florida lawyers for legal advice and finds little help: the lawyers he contacts tell him that they are reluctant to give too much aid to the Gore campaign. “All the establishment firms knew they couldn’t cross Governor [Jeb] Bush [brother of presidential candidate George W. Bush] and do business in Florida,” Klain will later recall. Klain instead pulls together an ad hoc team to be led by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, now a lawyer in Los Angeles. Gore chooses Christopher because he believes Christopher will lend the team an image of decorous, law-abiding respectability. But, according to a 2004 Vanity Fair report, “Christopher set a different tone, one that would characterize the Democrats’ efforts over the next 35 days: hesitancy and trepidation.” One of Christopher’s first statements on the situation is given to Gore’s running mate Joseph Lieberman, with Christopher saying: “I think we should be aggressive in asserting our position. But we’ve got to temper what we do with the realization that the nation is focused on us and is expecting to act responsibly.” The Bush campaign’s approach is very different from that taken by the sometimes-timorous Christopher. Their quick-response campaign team is headed by Texas lawyer James Baker, a close Bush family friend and another former secretary of state. As Vanity Fair will write, the Bush team “dug in like a pit bull,” issuing frequent press statements that hew to the same line: Bush won the vote on the morning of November 8 (see 2:15 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000) and therefore is the legitimate president. Any attempts to alter that “fact” amount to “mischief.” Privately, Baker worries that the narrative is untenable, telling his team: “We’re getting killed on ‘count all the votes.’ Who the hell could be against that?” The Gore campaign will ask for manual recounts in four counties, Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Volusia (see November 9, 2000), and the choice of selective recounts, as opposed to asking for statewide recounts, gives Baker the opening he is looking for. [National Journal, 11/9/2000; Tapper, 3/2001; Vanity Fair, 10/2004]

Entity Tags: County of Palm Beach (Florida), Warren Christopher, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Ron Klain, Vanity Fair, Joseph Lieberman, George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, George W. Bush, County of Volusia (Florida), Nick Baldick, John Ellis (“Jeb”) Bush, James A. Baker, County of Broward (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

An example of a ballot with so-called ‘hanging chads,’ ‘chads’ punched partially through the ballot but still ‘hanging’ on to the back of the ballot. Punch-card voting machines often do not read these as votes.An example of a ballot with so-called ‘hanging chads,’ ‘chads’ punched partially through the ballot but still ‘hanging’ on to the back of the ballot. Punch-card voting machines often do not read these as votes. [Source: Authentic History]The presidential campaign team of Vice President Al Gore asks for a hand count of presidential ballots in four Florida counties, as allowed under Florida Election Code 102.166. Gore’s recount request covers four Florida Democratic strongholds: Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia. Between them, the four counties recorded about 1.8 million votes cast. All four counties seem to have serious issues surrounding their vote totals (see November 7, 2000 and Mid-Morning, November 8, 2000).
Florida Has No Legal Provision for Statewide Recounts This Early - The Gore decision to ask for the specific recounts in four counties is necessary, as Florida state law has no provision for a statewide recount request at this stage: a candidate has 72 hours after an election to request manual recounts on a county-by-county basis, and such requests must be based on perceived errors. Otherwise the candidate must wait until the election is formally certified and then make a request for a statewide recount—a request the Gore team felt certain would be refused by Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, who is also the co-chair for the Florida Bush campaign (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After).
Accusations of 'Cherry-Picking' - However, the Bush team uses the Gore request of “selective recounts” to launch a press narrative that Gore wants to “cherry-pick” counties for recounts that he thinks will give him an advantage, regardless of Gore’s claims that he wants “all votes counted.” As Vanity Fair will observe in 2004: “Proper as this was by Florida election law, the Democrats’ strategy gave [Bush lawyer James] Baker the sound bite he’d been seeking: Gore was just cherry-picking Democratic strongholds. It was a charge the Bush team wielded to devastating effect in the media, stunning the Gore team, which thought its strategy would be viewed as modest and fair.” The Gore campaign, shocked by what it perceives as the patent unfairness of the Bush response and by the media’s apparent acceptance of it, responds poorly, giving the Bush campaign the opportunity to set the narrative. [Vanity Fair, 10/2004; Leip, 2008]
Bush Threatens More Recounts - The Bush campaign threatens to demand recounts in Wisconsin, Iowa, and New Mexico if Gore does not withdraw his challenges in Florida. [Authentic History, 7/31/2011]
Swapping Accusations - Former Republican Party chairman Haley Barbour accuses the Democrats of “trying to to take the election of the president out of the election process, which is controlled by voters, and put it in the court process, which is controlled by lawyers.” Former Representative Bill Paxon (R-FL) accuses the Gore campaign of using “legal action to undermine this vote. They know that their chances to win are slim to none.” Bush campaign chairman Donald Evans says, “Vice President Gore’s campaign didn’t like the outcome of Election Day, and it seems they’re worried that they won’t like the official recount result either.” Gore’s campaign chairman William Daley says of the Bush campaign, “I believe that their actions to try to presumptively crown themselves the victors, to try to put in place a transition (see November 9, 2000), run the risk of dividing the American people and creating a sense of confusion.” Gore spokesman Chris Kehane tells a CNN audience: “This is a nation of laws, we ought to respect our laws. But we think that our victory is going to be sweet. We think we have won the popular vote. That’s pretty clear. And we believe we are going to win the popular vote within the state of Florida and thereby win the electoral vote as well.” Gore himself “pledge[s]” to honor the results of the election should the recounts show that Bush is the legitimate winner, saying that the recount “must be resolved in a way that satisfied the public and honors the office of the presidency.” [National Journal, 11/9/2000; New York Times, 11/9/2000]

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), Bill Paxon, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, William Michael (“Bill”) Daley, Vanity Fair, Katherine Harris, James A. Baker, George W. Bush, Donald L. Evans, George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, Haley Barbour, County of Volusia (Florida), Chris Kehane, County of Palm Beach (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Unpunched ‘chads’ from punch-card ballots. The voter uses a pencil or stylus to ‘punch’ the chad entirely out of the ballot, leaving a rectangular hole that is read by the voting machine.Unpunched ‘chads’ from punch-card ballots. The voter uses a pencil or stylus to ‘punch’ the chad entirely out of the ballot, leaving a rectangular hole that is read by the voting machine. [Source: Authentic History]The mandated machine recount in Florida’s 67 counties (see 5:00 p.m. November 9, 2000) is completed by all but one county. George W. Bush (R-TX) holds a 327-vote lead. The Gore presidential campaign has requested manual recounts for Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties, where ballot totals are in dispute (see November 9, 2000). Miami-Dade (see November 7, 2000), Broward, and Palm Beach, all of which use obsolete punch-card voting machines, are weighing whether to conduct manual recounts of, firstly, 1 percent of their ballots (sample recounts), and if the results warrant, moving to full recounts. One of the biggest questions is that of so-called “undervotes,” ballots that have no choice registered for a candidate. When a voter attempts to punch through a hole to register a choice but fails to do so completely, that vote is not counted, and instead is classified as an “undervote.” (“Overvotes” are an issue as well with “optiscan” machines, where voters use pencils to fill in ovals corresponding to their choices and feed the ballots into a machine scanner. Sometimes voters fill in votes for both candidates—say, both Bush and Gore—and in such cases voter intent cannot be determined. The machine records no choice. But sometimes voters accidentally “bubble in” both choices, then write “Gore” and an arrow or some other indication of their selection on the ballot. These votes are also not counted, though a manual recount can quickly determine voter intent in these cases. Even stray pencil marks can cause an optiscan ballot to be rejected. Forty-one of Florida’s 67 counties use optiscan machines.) Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, the co-chair of Florida’s Bush campaign team (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After), sends young lawyer Kerey Carpenter to Palm Beach to lend her “assistance” in resolving its recount question. Elections board chairman Judge Charles Burton will later recall that while Carpenter identifies herself as a lawyer, she does not inform them that she works for Harris. Instead of assisting in the sample recount process, Carpenter interferes. At one point, after the sample recount has produced some 50 additional votes for Gore, Carpenter objects to the standard of decision; the punch cards have small rectangular holes filled with detachable “chads,” small portions of paper that are pushed through and discarded. The board is using the criteria that a “chad” that is detached at one corner can indicate a vote. Carpenter convinces Burton to change the standard to two detached corners. This decision reduces Gore’s 50 new votes to six. Carpenter, still not revealing her status as a Harris employee, convinces Burton to ask Harris for a “formal opinion” as to what grounds justify a full recount. Burton does so. Harris will set an impossibly high standard for recounts, but will almost immediately be overruled by a judge (see 9:00 a.m. November 13, 2000). [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Vanity Fair, 10/2004]

Entity Tags: County of Palm Beach (Florida), Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, Charles Burton, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Volusia (Florida), Kerey Carpenter, County of Broward (Florida), George W. Bush, George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, Katherine Harris

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, the co-chair of Florida’s Bush campaign team (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After), announces she is refusing requests to extend the 5:00 p.m. November 14 deadline for certifying election results (see 5:00 p.m. November 9, 2000) in the interest of what she calls “the public’s right to clarity and finality.” This is her prerogative as secretary of state under Florida Election Code 102.112, though she has the option to extend the deadline. Absentee ballots, by law, can be counted through November 17. Neither Palm Beach nor Miami-Dade Counties have even decided to start recounts yet (see November 7, 2000 and November 10, 2000), and Broward County has not finished the recount it began. Volusia County, also attempting to finish manually recounting all of its ballots (see November 11-12, 2000), sues to extend the November 14 deadline. Lawyers for the Gore campaign join Volusia in the suit, while Bush lawyers file briefs opposing the suit. [Salon, 11/13/2000; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Vanity Fair, 10/2004; Leip, 2008] In light of Harris’s decision, Broward will choose to abandon its recount (see Evening, November 13, 2000); Palm Beach will decide to delay the recount until it can receive clarification (see 8:20 a.m. November 14, 2000), and resume the recounting shortly thereafter (see 4:30 p.m. November 14, 2000). Miami-Dade, in contrast, will begin recounting (see November 14, 2000). Later in the day, Harris issues what she considers a legal opinion concerning the recounts, but her opinion conflicts with a decision issued by Florida’s attorney general. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000] Harris says that no manual recounts should take place unless the voting machines are broken. Judge Terry Lewis finds that opinion not backed by any state law and overrules her opinion. [Vanity Fair, 10/2004] Harris has drawn criticism for her apparent partisanship before now. Warren Christopher, a lead advisor for the Gore campaign, calls Harris’s decision “arbitrary and unreasonable.” Representative Peter Deutsch (D-FL) calls her decision “bizarre,” adding, “I honestly think what’s going on is a strategic decision by the Bush campaign to hurt the litigation efforts.” Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) says: “The only reason to certify the elections at 5 p.m. tomorrow is a partisan one. If she does what she says she’s going to do—certify the elections at 5 p.m. tomorrow—she will have proven her critics correct; she will have proven that she is an emissary of the Bush campaign who is willing to steal an election.” [Salon, 11/13/2000]

Entity Tags: Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., County of Palm Beach (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Volusia (Florida), George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, George W. Bush, Peter R. Deutsch, Robert Wexler, Warren Christopher

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

The Miami-Dade County canvassing board unanimously votes to begin manually recounting its election ballots in three precincts (see November 7, 2000), complying with a request from the Gore campaign (see November 9, 2000). [Leip, 2008] The recount is of sample ballots only. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000]

Entity Tags: Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Contradicting her previous statement that she would comply with a judicial order to consider the post-election recount tallies from several counties (see Evening, November 14, 2000), Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, the co-chair of Florida’s Bush campaign team (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After), asks the Florida Supreme Court to force Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties to end their manual recounts (see November 14, 2000, 3:40 p.m. November 15, 2000, and 4:30 p.m. November 14, 2000) “pending resolution as to whether any basis exists to modify the certified results” after the November 14, 2000 deadline. Harris argues that manual recounts threaten “the integrity of the ballots.” Harris previously imposed a November 14 deadline for all ballots to be counted and results certified (see 9:00 a.m. November 13, 2000). Palm Beach County officials ask the Florida Supreme Court to decide if they can manually recount their ballots. At 5:00 p.m., the Court rejects Harris’s request to stop the recounts. [Consortium News, 11/19/2000; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Leip, 2008] A judge has already ruled that Harris can refuse to consider recount results submitted after her deadline (see Afternoon, November 14, 2000). A Gore campaign spokesman later says that considering the obstacles Harris has placed in the way of the hand recounts, the situation is analogous to a policeman forcing a motorist to pull over, then blaming him for the traffic piling up behind him. Bush spokeswoman Karen Hughes counters with the accusation that the counties still engaged in recounts are “no longer counting ballots; they are ‘reinventing’ them.” And James Baker, the head of the Bush “quick response” recount team, accuses the manual recounters of “subjective” attempts to “divine the intent of the voter.” Such recounts, Baker says, present “tremendous opportunities for human error and… mischief.” Both Hughes’s and Baker’s remarks are apparently intended to imply deliberate falsification of vote tallies, and echo similar charges made by Rush Limbaugh and other conservative media figures. Gore officials note that George W. Bush has picked up 418 votes in manual recounts in six counties: Franklin, Hamilton, Seminole, Washington, Taylor, and Lafayette. The Bush campaign, the Gore officials say, was eager to have those votes added in with the totals. Baker’s counterpart on the Gore team, Warren Christopher, says the fact that “Republicans have hand counted in many of the counties themselves” (see November 19, 2000) belies Republican charges that “we have picked out a certain few counties.” The Bush campaign has also picked up 143 votes from recounting in Volusia County. [Consortium News, 11/19/2000; Consortium News, 11/27/2000]

The presidential campaign of Vice President Al Gore (D-TN) suggests that all 67 Florida counties conduct manual recounts of their ballots if Republicans object to recounts in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties (see November 9, 2000). Gore himself says he will eschew any further legal challenges if Republicans will accept the three counties’ recounts. He also proposes a face-to-face meeting with his opponent, George W. Bush (R-TX). [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Leip, 2008]

Entity Tags: County of Broward (Florida), Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., County of Palm Beach (Florida), George W. Bush, County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, the co-chair of Florida’s Bush campaign team (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After), announces that she will not consider any further submissions of recounted election ballots from any Florida counties (see Evening, November 14, 2000). She has already accepted submissions from three counties still conducting recounts (see November 14, 2000, 3:40 p.m. November 15, 2000, and 4:30 p.m. November 14, 2000), and has received written explanations from three counties—Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach—explaining why they need additional time to complete their recounts. Palm Beach explained that it had found serious discrepancies between the results of its machine and sample manual recounts. Broward told of a large voter turnout and accompanying logistical problems. Miami-Dade said it had reason to believe that a manual recount would provide significant differences in its results (see November 7, 2000). Harris announces that she finds all three counties’ explanations insufficient and will not include their recount tallies in her final election numbers. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Vanity Fair, 10/2004; Leip, 2008]

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), Katherine Harris, County of Palm Beach (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Apparently emboldened by a judge’s halt to Florida declaring a winner in its presidential race (see 5:00 p.m. November 17, 2000), Miami-Dade County election officials vote to conduct a full manual recount of their county’s presidential ballots. [Leip, 2008] Initial figures in the recount show a significant number of “undervotes” going to Democrat Al Gore (see November 7, 2000). In response, Republican lawyers attempt to challenge vote after vote that is tallied to Gore, with corresponding counter-challenges from Democratic lawyers. Kendall Coffey, a Gore campaign lawyer, later recalls that as the Gore totals begin to accumulate, “panic buttons were being pushed” among the Republicans. Days later, a mob of Republican activists will descend on the Miami-Dade election board and force the shutdown of the recounts (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000). [Vanity Fair, 10/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Kendall Coffey

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

The online news Web site Salon reports that while the Bush campaign opposes the Gore campaign’s requests for manual recounts in four heavily Democratic counties (see Mid-Morning, November 8, 2000, November 8, 2000, November 9, 2000, 11:35 p.m. November 9, 2000, November 10, 2000, November 11-13, 2000, 9:00 a.m. November 13, 2000, 12:00 p.m., November 15, 2000, 10:15 p.m., November 15, 2000, Early Morning, November 16, 2000, 5:00 p.m. November 17, 2000, and 12:36 p.m. November 19, 2000), it quietly accepted voluntary manual recounts from four Florida counties that contributed 185 votes to the Bush tally. According to Salon, in those four counties—Seminole, Polk, Taylor, and Hamilton—elections officials took it upon themselves to manually count ballots that could not be read by machine, so-called “undervotes.” Those recounts are entirely legal. The Seminole recount garnered 98 votes for George W. Bush. Al Gore lost 90 votes in Polk County because the votes had apparently been counted twice. The Taylor recount garnered four votes for Bush. The Hamilton recount garnered 10 votes for Gore. (A similar report by the online news site Consortium News uses different counties—Franklin, Hamilton, Seminole, Washington, Taylor, and Lafayette—to note that Bush has garnered some 418 votes in those counties’ recounts.) Bush campaign spokeswoman Mindy Tucker says that under Florida law, county canvassing boards have the discretion as to whether to inspect uncounted ballots by hand, and says that the Gore campaign’s calls for recounts of undervotes in Miami-Dade County (see November 7, 2000) is another in its attempt to “continually try to change the rules in the middle of the game. The ballots were inspected by hand in some cases but not all, and under Florida law it’s the canvassing board’s decision legally. It’s our belief that these votes have been counted.” Gore spokesman Chris Lehane says the Gore campaign wants the same consideration given to Miami-Dade votes as given to votes in other counties. Moreover, Miami-Dade uses punch-card ballots, which yield far more errors than the “optiscan” balloting systems used in Seminole, Polk, Taylor, and Hamilton. “Keep in mind, punch cards are used in poorer areas,” he says. “Most of these other ballots were optical ones where the reliability was much, much higher. And in poorer areas, you have bad machines or flawed ballots. We think we have a pretty clear and compelling argument.” Senior Bush campaign adviser James Baker says that manually recounting votes in Democratic-leaning counties was comprised of “subjective” attempts to “divine the intent of the voter,” and that hand-counting votes provides “tremendous opportunities for human error and… mischief.” Democrats retort that Baker’s statement is hypocritical, and point to Bush’s gain in Republican-leaning counties as proof of both the accuracy of recounting and the need to count each vote. [Consortium News, 11/19/2000; Salon, 11/28/2000]

Entity Tags: County of Polk (Florida), County of Franklin (Florida), Chris Lehane, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., County of Hamilton (Florida), County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Washington (Florida), James A. Baker, County of Seminole (Florida), County of Taylor (Florida), County of Lafayette (Florida), George W. Bush, George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, Mindy Tucker

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Florida’s Miami-Dade County begins a manual recount of its presidential ballots (see November 7, 2000 and November 17, 2000). Bush campaign lawyers and local Republicans tried and failed to get a judge to stop the recounts, arguing that using machines to sort ballots to find votes would damage ballots and, presumably, give Democrat Al Gore more votes. The judge refuses to rule in the Republicans’ favor, and Miami-Dade election officials begin hunting for questionable ballots for recounting. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008] On November 22, after Bush operatives and local Bush supporters stage a riot outside the elections offices, the Miami-Dade elections board will cancel the recount, saying it does not have enough time to complete the recount by the November 26 deadline (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000).

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr.

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Florida’s Miami-Dade County begins its actual recount of its presidential election votes (see November 7, 2000 and Before 10:00 a.m. November 19, 2000). Perhaps because the number of votes to recount is so large, the electors will soon decide to only count some 10,750 “undervotes,” or ballots lacking a clear presidential choice. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000]

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

A photograph of the Republican operatives mobbing the Miami-Dade elections offices. Those identified in the photograph include Thomas Pyle, Garry Malphrus, Rory Cooper, Kevin Smith, Steven Brady, Matt Schlapp, Roger Morse, Duane Gibson, Chuck Royal, and Layna McConkey.A photograph of the Republican operatives mobbing the Miami-Dade elections offices. Those identified in the photograph include Thomas Pyle, Garry Malphrus, Rory Cooper, Kevin Smith, Steven Brady, Matt Schlapp, Roger Morse, Duane Gibson, Chuck Royal, and Layna McConkey. [Source: Pensito Review]Miami-Dade County election officials vote unanimously to halt the county’s manual recount of presidential ballots (see November 7, 2000 and Before 10:00 a.m. November 19, 2000), saying the county does not have enough time to complete its recount by the November 26 deadline. Instead, they vote to recount only 10,750 “undervotes,” ballots that don’t clearly indicate a presidential choice. The decision costs Democratic candidate Al Gore a 157-vote gain from the halted recount process. That evening, a Florida State appeals court denies a motion by Democrats to force Miami-Dade County to restart the manual recount. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008]
Opposing Beliefs - The next day, the Florida Supreme Court will also refuse to order Miami-Dade to restart the recount (see 2:45 p.m. November 23, 2000). Press reports say that the decision “dramatically reverse[s] the chances of Al Gore gathering enough votes to defeat George W. Bush.” Gore’s senior campaign advisor William Daley calls the recounts “mandatory” and calls for “the rule of law” to be upheld. For his part, Bush says: “I believe Secretary Cheney and I won the vote in Florida (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000). And I believe some are determined to keep counting in an effort to change the legitimate result.” In light of the Miami-Dade decision, the Bush campaign’s chief legal advisor James Baker invites the Republican-controlled Florida Legislature to unilaterally declare Bush the victor, saying, “One should not now be surprised if the Florida legislature seeks to affirm the original rules.”
Agitators Disrupt Recount Proceedings - The recount proceedings are disrupted and ultimately ended by a mob of Republicans, some local and some bussed and flown in from Washington by the Bush campaign. The agitators are protesting outside the Miami-Dade County election offices, shouting and attempting to interfere with the proceedings of the canvassing board. Republicans have accused a Democratic lawyer of stealing a ballot. [Guardian, 11/23/2000; Guardian, 11/25/2000]
Rioters Made Up of Republican Staffers, Others - Democrats accuse Republican protesters of intimidating the Miami-Dade County officials into stopping the recount. Democratic vice-presidential candidate Joe Lieberman says the demonstrations in Miami have been orchestrated by Republicans “to intimidate and to prevent a simple count of votes from going forward.” Six Democratic members of the US Congress demand the Justice Department investigate the claims, saying that civil rights have been violated in “a shocking case of undermining the right to vote through intimidation and threats of violence.” Jenny Backus, a spokeswoman for the Democratic National Committee (DNC), says, “The Republicans are out of control,” and accuses them of using paid agitators to “create mob rule in Miami.” [Guardian, 11/25/2000] Later investigations show that the “spontaneous protests” by Republican protesters were far more orchestrated and violent than generally reported by the press at the time. Investigative journalist Robert Parry will write that the protests, called the “Brooks Brothers Riot” because of the wealthy, “preppie” makeup of the “protesters,” helped stop the recount, “and showed how far Bush’s supporters were ready to go to put their man in the White House.” He will write that the protests should be more accurately termed a riot. At least six of the rioters were paid by the Bush recount committee, payments documented in Bush committee records only released to the IRS in July 2002 (see July 15, 2002). Twelve Republican staffers will later be identified in photographs of the rioters. The six who can be confirmed as being paid are: Bush staffer Matt Schlapp from Austin, Texas; Thomas Pyle, a staff aide to House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX); DeLay fundraiser Michael Murphy; Garry Malphrus, House majority chief counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice; Charles Royal, a legislative aide to Representative Jim DeMint (R-SC); and former Republican House staffer Kevin Smith. Another Republican is identified as Doug Heye, a staffer for Representative Richard Pombo (R-CA). At least three of the rioters—Schlapp, Malphrus, and Joel Kaplan—will later join the Bush White House. Many of the rioters were brought in on planes and buses from Washington as early as mid-November, with promises of expenses payments. On November 18, 2000, the Bush campaign told activists, “We now need to send reinforcements” to rush to Florida. “The campaign will pay airfare and hotel expenses for people willing to go.” Many of the respondents are low-level Republican staffers from Congress. “These reinforcements… added an angrier tone to the dueling street protests already underway between supporters of Bush and Gore,” Parry will write. Quoting ABC reporter Jake Tapper, Parry will write, “The new wave of Republican activists injected ‘venom and volatility into an already edgy situation.’” Signifying the tone, before the Miami riot, Brad Blakeman, Bush’s campaign director of advance travel logistics, screamed down a CNN correspondent attempting to interview a Democratic Congressman: “This is the new Republican Party, sir! We’re not going to take it anymore!” [Consortium News, 11/27/2000; Consortium News, 8/5/2002; Vanity Fair, 10/2004] Some of the local protesters are summoned to the Miami-Dade electoral offices by angry broadcasts over radio stations with largely Cuban-American audiences; over these radio stations, listeners hear Bush campaign lawyer Roger Stone, coordinating the radio response, say that the recounts intend to disenfranchise Hispanic voters. Republican operatives coordinate the protests by shouting orders through megaphones. [Consortium News, 11/24/2000; Center for American Progress, 12/9/2010] Cuban-Americans voted heavily for Bush in the November 7 election. [Tapper, 3/2001]
Details of the Riot; Staffers Assaulted and Beaten - After learning that the Miami-Dade County canvassing board was beginning to examine 10,750 disputed ballots that had not previously been counted, US Representative John Sweeney (R-NY) issues the order to “Shut it down!” (Sweeney is coordinating his efforts with a local Cuban congressman who himself is coordinating the Cuban-American mob response.) Brendan Quinn, the executive director of the New York Republican Party, tells some two dozen Republican operatives outside the Miami-Dade County election offices to storm the room on the 19th floor where the canvassing board is meeting. Tapper later writes: “Emotional and angry, they immediately make their way outside the larger room in which the tabulating room is contained. The mass of ‘angry voters’ on the 19th floor swells to maybe 80 people,” including many of the Republican activists from outside Florida, and joined by local protesters. As news organizations videotape the scene, the protesters reach the board offices and begin shouting slogans such as “Stop the count! Stop the fraud!” “Three Blind Mice!” and “Fraud, fraud, fraud!” and banging on doors and walls. The protesters also shout that a thousand potentially violent Cuban-Americans are on the way. Official observers and reporters are unable to force their way through the shouting crowd of Republican operatives and their cohorts. Miami-Dade spokesman Mayco Villafena is physically assaulted, being pushed and shoved by an unknown number of assailants. Security officials, badly outmanned, fear the confrontation will swell into a full-scale riot. Miami-Dade elections supervisor David Leahy orders the recounts stopped, saying, “Until the demonstration stops, nobody can do anything.” (Although board members will later insist that they were not intimidated into stopping, the recounts will never begin again. Leahy will later say: “This was perceived as not being an open and fair process. That weighed heavy on our minds.”) Meanwhile, unaware of the rioting, county Democratic chairman Joe Geller stops at another office in search of a sample ballot. He wants to prove his theory that some voters had intended to vote for Gore, but instead marked an adjoining number indicating no choice. He finds one and leaves the office. Some of the rioters spot Geller with the sample ballot, and one shouts, “This guy’s got a ballot!” Tapper will later write: “The masses swarm around him, yelling, getting in his face, pushing him, grabbing him. ‘Arrest him!’ they cry. ‘Arrest him!’ With the help of a diminutive DNC [Democratic National Committee] aide, Luis Rosero, and the political director of the Miami Gore campaign, Joe Fraga, Geller manages to wrench himself into the elevator.” Rosero stays behind to attempt to talk with a reporter, and instead is kicked and punched by rioters. A woman shoves Rosero into a much larger man in what Tapper will later theorize was an attempt to start a fight between Rosero and the other person. In the building lobby, some 50 Republican protesters and activists swarm Geller, surrounding him. Police escort Geller back to the 19th floor in both an attempt to save him from harm and to ascertain what is happening. The crowd attempts to pull Geller away from the police. Some of the protesters even accost 73-year-old Representative Carrie Meek (D-FL). Democratic operatives decide to leave the area completely. When the mob learns that the recounts have been terminated, they break forth in lusty cheers.
After-Party - After the riots, the Bush campaign pays $35,501.52 for a celebration at Fort Lauderdale’s Hyatt Regency, where the rioters and campaign officials party, enjoy free food and drink, receive congratulatory calls from Bush and Dick Cheney, and are serenaded by Las Vegas crooner Wayne Newton, singing “Danke Schoen,” German for “thank you very much.” Other expenses at the party include lighting, sound system, and even costumes.
Media Reportage - Bush and his campaign officials say little publicly about the riot. Some press outlets report the details behind the riots. The Washington Post later reports that “even as the Bush campaign and the Republicans portray themselves as above the fray,” national Republicans actually had joined in and helped finance the riot. The Wall Street Journal tells readers that Bush offered personal words of encouragement to the rioters after the melee, writing, “The night’s highlight was a conference call from Mr. Bush and running mate Dick Cheney, which included joking reference by both running mates to the incident in Miami, two [Republican] staffers in attendance say.” The Journal also observes that the riot was led by national Republican operatives “on all expense-paid trips, courtesy of the Bush campaign.” And, the Journal will note, the rioters went on to attempt to disrupt the recounts in Broward County, but failed there to stop the proceedings. The Journal will write that “behind the rowdy rallies in South Florida this past weekend was a well-organized effort by Republican operatives to entice supporters to South Florida,” with DeLay’s Capitol Hill office taking charge of the recruitment. No similar effort was made by the Gore campaign, the Journal will note: “This has allowed the Republicans to quickly gain the upper hand, protest-wise.” And the Journal will write that the Bush campaign worked to keep its distance from the riots: “Staffers who joined the effort say there has been an air of mystery to the operation. ‘To tell you the truth, nobody knows who is calling the shots,’ says one aide. Many nights, often very late, a memo is slipped underneath the hotel-room doors outlining coming events.” But soon, media reports begin echoing Bush campaign talking points, which call the “protests” “fitting, proper,” and the fault of the canvassing board: “The board made a series of bad decisions and the reaction to it was inevitable and well justified.” The Bush campaign says the mob attack on the elections office was justified because civil rights leader Jesse Jackson had led peaceful, non-violent protests in favor of the recounts in Miami the day before. The campaign also insists that the protests were spontaneous and made up entirely of local citizens. On November 26, Governor Marc Racicot (R-MT), a Bush campaign spokesman, will tell NBC viewers: “Clearly there are Americans on both sides of these issues reflecting very strong viewpoints. But to suggest that somehow this was a threatening situation, in my view, is hyperbolic rhetoric.”
Effect of the Riot - According to Parry, the riot, broadcast live on CNN and other networks, “marked a turning point in the recount battle. At the time, Bush clung to a lead that had dwindled to several hundred votes and Gore was pressing for recounts (see November 20-21, 2000). The riot in Miami and the prospects of spreading violence were among the arguments later cited by defenders of the 5-to-4 US Supreme Court ruling (see 9:54 p.m. December 12, 2000)… that stopped a statewide Florida recount and handed Bush the presidency. Backed by the $13.8 million war chest, the Bush operation made clear in Miami and in other protests that it was ready to kick up plenty of political dust if it didn’t get its way.” In the hours after the riot, conservative pundits led by Rush Limbaugh will engage in orchestrated assaults on the recount process as fraudulent and an attempt by the Gore campaign to “invent” votes. No one is ever charged with any criminal behaviors as a result of the riot. [Consortium News, 11/24/2000; Washington Post, 11/27/2000; Village Voice, 12/19/2000; Consortium News, 8/5/2002; Vanity Fair, 10/2004; Center for American Progress, 12/9/2010]

The Gore presidential campaign files an emergency petition with the Florida Supreme Court asking the Court to force Miami-Dade County to resume its manual recount of presidential ballots (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000). Gore lawyers unsuccessfully argue that Miami-Dade “[v]oters had their votes inexplicably erased” (see November 7, 2000). The Court rejects the request. [Supreme Court of Florida, 11/23/2000 pdf file; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008]

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Florida Supreme Court

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Richard Cohen.Richard Cohen. [Source: Washington Post]Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen, a self-described moderate liberal, says that although he voted for Vice President Al Gore (D-TN) in the presidential elections, he believes that for the good of the country, Gore should stop pushing for recounts in Florida and concede the election to George W. Bush (R-TX). “I now think that under current circumstances he would not be the right man for the presidency,” he writes. “If I could, I would withdraw my vote.” Cohen says his considered opinion is based in part on the recent mob riot in Miami, where Bush campaign operatives orchestrated a violent confrontation that forced Miami-Dade County election officials to prematurely shut down their attempts to recount that county’s votes (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000). Cohen writes that in light of the Florida circumstances: “Given the present bitterness, given the angry irresponsible charges being hurled by both camps, the nation will be in dire need of a conciliator, a likable guy who will make things better and not worse. That man is not Al Gore. That man is George W. Bush.” Cohen says that he believes Bush’s claims to be “a uniter, not a divider,” citing as proof Bush’s popularity among Republican governors, “each of whom probably thought the next president should be none other than himself.” Bush also has a reputation for affability from his days in private enterprise, Cohen writes: “I talked with one of them once, a Democrat who disagreed with Bush on many issues. Yet he, too, praised Bush’s leadership abilities, his talent for bringing order out of chaos and for reaching some sort of consensus. That man’s testimony impressed me. His disagreements with Bush were real, his admiration for him profound.” Gore is not a uniter, Cohen asserts. “His own party is sore at him for taking the one-two punch of peace and prosperity and running a race that is still not concluded. His performance was as erratic as his uniform-of-the-day: earth tones on Tuesday, business suit on Wednesday. The country sensed that either he did not know himself, or what he did know the country would not like.” Cohen calls Gore “stiff, robotic,” and appearing “insincere even when he is not… unable to mask his ambition.” Unlike Bush, he does not give the impression of being someone’s “good buddy.” Bush will rally the nation behind him, Cohen opines, where Gore is likely to further divide it. Besides, Cohen writes, having a Republican in the White House may work to “restrain… GOP Dobermans like Reps. Tom DeLay (R-TX) and J.C. Watts Jr. (R-OK),” who presumably would behave in an uncontrollable manner if a Republican is not in the White House to keep them in line. While Bush and Gore have profoundly different approaches to governance, Cohen says, “what matters at the moment is the moment itself—a mere tick of the historic clock that could, if things continue, just stop it dead where it is. History does not guarantee that things will be as they have been. The first and most daunting task of the next president is not a tax bill or a Social Security plan but—as it was when Jerry Ford succeeded Richard Nixon—the healing of the country. I voted for Gore because he was the better man for the job. I can’t help thinking that he no longer is.” [Washington Post, 11/24/2000] The liberal news Web site Consortium News writes that Cohen’s column is “[t]ypical of th[e] Democratic desire to submit to angry Republicans.… Cohen reached his conclusion although Gore has been the one to temper his rhetoric while Bush and the Republicans have escalated their public denunciations of Gore and the Florida Supreme Court.” [Consortium News, 11/24/2000]

Entity Tags: J.C. Watts, Jr, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Consortium News, George W. Bush, Richard Cohen, Tom DeLay, County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections, Domestic Propaganda

Bush supporters in Florida celebrate Katherine Harris’s decision to certify Bush as the winner of the 2000 election.Bush supporters in Florida celebrate Katherine Harris’s decision to certify Bush as the winner of the 2000 election. [Source: Salon]Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, the co-chair of Florida’s Bush campaign team (see After 3:30 a.m. November 8, 2000 and After), certifies George W. Bush (R-TX) the winner of Florida’s presidential election, though according to a Florida Supreme Court ruling she can choose to accept recount tallies through November 27 (see November 20-21, 2000). She chooses not to do so. Harris says Bush has a 537-vote lead. Her totals are: Bush, 2,912,790; Vice President Al Gore (D-TN), 2,912,253. The totals include none of the recounted ballots from either Palm Beach or Miami-Date Counties, both of which did not complete their recounts by Harris’s deadline (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000 and 2:45 p.m. November 26, 2000). Ongoing legal actions by both parties keep the election in doubt. Regardless, Governor Jeb Bush, George W. Bush’s brother, signs the Certificate of Ascertainment designating 25 Florida electors pledged to George W. Bush and transmits the document to the National Archives as required by Title 3, US Code, Section 6. Three days later, a Florida legislative committee will recommend a special session to name the state’s 25 representatives to the Electoral College, where they will presumably cast their votes for Bush. [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008] If Bush is indeed the winner of the Florida presidential election, he has enough electoral votes to assume the presidency (see November 9, 2000). The Gore campaign refuses to accept Harris’s certification, and says it will ask Florida courts to order recounts of thousands of disputed votes. Gore’s running mate Joe Lieberman says, “This evening, the secretary of state of Florida has decided to certify what—by any reasonable standard—is an incomplete and inaccurate count of the votes cast in the state of Florida.” The Gore campaign is working out details of what will be a formal “contest” of the results, and will ask a state judge to order court-appointed “special masters” to complete interrupted recounts of about 2,000 uncounted votes in Palm Beach County and 10,700 uncounted votes in Miami-Dade County. They also want an inquiry into the Nassau County returns, where Gore officials believe Bush was wrongly credited with some 51 votes, and are considering challenging the legality of Palm Beach’s controversial “butterfly ballots.” Gore’s chief lawyer David Boies says: “We’re preparing contest papers that will be filed Monday, as early in the day as we can get them done. Until these votes are counted, this election cannot be over.” Republicans intend to use Harris’s ruling to publicly pressure Gore into conceding the election, pressure the Gore campaign says it is prepared to combat. Miami-Dade County, expected to yield enough votes in a recount to swing the election in favor of Gore, called off its recount under pressure from Republican protesters and due to time constraints (see 9:00 a.m. and after, November 22, 2000). [Salon, 11/25/2000; Guardian, 11/27/2000; Guardian, 11/28/2000] Investigative reporter Robert Parry will later write that Harris deliberately allowed Nassau County to throw out its recounted figures that gave Gore the 51 votes. [Consortium News, 8/5/2002] A brief furor ensues when some media outlets mistakenly report that 500 absentee ballots “not previously counted” were discovered in Broward County. The story is not true. [Salon, 11/25/2000] According to state law, it is only now that Gore can ask for a statewide recount. [Vanity Fair, 10/2004] Former President Jimmy Carter tells a reporter: “More than two weeks will remain before Florida’s 25 electors will have to be named, and then two more months before a new president will be sworn into office. We must not sacrifice speed for accuracy in deciding who has been chosen by the voters to take that oath.” [Salon, 11/25/2000]

Entity Tags: Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, Florida Supreme Court, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), George W. Bush, County of Palm Beach (Florida), Katherine Harris, Robert Parry, James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, Joseph Lieberman, John Ellis (“Jeb”) Bush

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Refusing to accept the certification of George W. Bush as the winner of the Florida presidential election (see 7:30 p.m. November 26, 2000), Vice President Al Gore’s campaign files an election contest action challenging the election results in Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Nassau Counties. Gore campaign officials believe Gore was denied a net gain of over 1,100 uncounted votes in Palm Beach and 750 in Miami-Dade (see November 7, 2000). In Nassau, Gore officials believe Bush was wrongly credited with 51 votes. “The vote totals reported in the election canvassing commission’s certification of November 26, 2000, are wrong,” Gore lawyers allege in court filings. It is the first formal contest challenge in the history of US presidential elections. The case is assigned by random computer selection to Judge N. Saunders Sauls. Gore lawyers also challenge vote totals in three Florida counties, and ask a state judge to order a manual recount of some 13,000 ballots in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties that showed no votes for president on machine runs (so-called “undervotes”). Gore lawyers also file an emergency motion to accelerate the contest proceedings, a motion that Bush lawyers will challenge the next day. Bush campaign lawyers file an appeals court motion seeking to delay oral arguments in a pending federal case challenging Florida’s hand recounts. A Seminole County lawsuit seeking to throw out some 4,700 absentee ballots for technical reasons (see November 12, 2000, November 15-17, 2000, and November 17, 2000) is moved to a state court in Leon County, which is also hearing the Gore campaign’s certification challenges. And a lawsuit challenging the validity of Palm Beach County’s “butterfly ballot” (see 10:46 a.m. November 20 - November 22, 2000) goes to the Florida Supreme Court, which will reject the suit on December 1. [Guardian, 11/28/2000; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008]

Entity Tags: County of Seminole (Florida), County of Leon (Florida), Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Palm Beach (Florida), George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, N. Saunders Sauls, George W. Bush, County of Nassau (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

The Gore presidential campaign asks Leon County Circuit Court Judge N. Saunders Sauls to authorize an immediate recount of about 14,000 disputed “undervote” ballots. Instead of ordering an immediate recount, Sauls orders the disputed ballots, sample voting booths, and voting machines from Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties brought to his courtroom in Tallahassee by Friday, December 1—a total of 1.1 million ballots, posing a tremendous logistical challenge to election boards in the two counties. On November 30, a truck carrying more than 460,000 presidential ballots from Palm Beach County leaves on its way to Tallahassee as ordered by Sauls. On December 1, two more trucks carrying over 654,000 ballots begin the long drive to Tallahassee from Miami. On December 1, the Bush campaign asks Sauls to have another 1.2 million ballots trucked in from Volusia, Broward, and Pinellas Counties; Bush campaign spokesman Scott McClellan says, “We believe there were a number of illegal votes for Gore in those counties.” Sauls does not grant this request. The trial begins on December 2, with Gore’s lawyers arguing, “There is no reason to delay counting ballots even one day.” Bush’s lawyers advance a number of arguments against expediting or even conducting the recounts, including the position that the dispute is not between Bush and Gore, but between two disparate groups of Florida electors. Bush lawyers also say that Gore’s lawyers missed a 10-day deadline to file such challenges; manually recounting only some ballots is illegal; and the recounts the Gore campaign wants are “illegal, inappropriate, and manifestly unfair.” On December 4, Sauls rules against the Gore campaign (see 4:43 p.m. December 4, 2000). [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008; Guardian, 11/30/2008; Guardian, 12/1/2008]

Entity Tags: County of Pinellas (Florida), County of Broward (Florida), Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Leon (Florida), County of Palm Beach (Florida), George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, N. Saunders Sauls, Scott McClellan, George W. Bush, County of Volusia (Florida), County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Democrats for the presidential campaign of Al Gore file papers in the Florida Supreme Court asking the Court to order an immediate hand recount of some 14,000 disputed “undervote” ballots in two heavily Democratic Florida counties, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach (see November 28 - December 2, 2000). Any delay, the Gore lawyers argue, would make it a “virtual impossibility” to resolve the issue by the December 12 deadline for presidential certification. On December 1, the Court will reject the request. [Supreme Court of Florida, 12/1/2000 pdf file; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Leip, 2008]

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Palm Beach (Florida), Al Gore presidential campaign 2000

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

The Florida Supreme Court dismisses a petition from the Gore campaign to order an immediate recount of over 12,000 “undervotes” from Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties. “Undervotes” are ballots that did not register a choice for president when run through the machine counter. An hour later, the same court rules that Palm Beach’s controversial “butterfly ballot” is legal (see 7:00 a.m. November 7, 2000 and After and November 27, 2000). [US News and World Report, 12/13/2000]

Entity Tags: Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, Florida Supreme Court, County of Palm Beach (Florida), County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

Leon County, Florida, Judge N. Saunders Sauls rules against the Gore campaign in the recount issue (see November 28 - December 2, 2000), saying that manual recounts in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties are not warranted, and the Nassau County vote totals should stand. Sauls also refuses to block Florida’s certification of George W. Bush as the Florida presidential winner (see 7:30 p.m. November 26, 2000). The London Guardian calls the ruling a “crushing blow” to Al Gore’s chances of winning the disputed election. Sauls rules that there is “no credible statistical evidence and no other competent substantial evidence” to establish a reasonable probability that Gore might win if granted a hand recount of the undervotes. “This court… concludes the evidence does not establish any illegality, dishonesty, improper influence, coercion, or fraud in the balloting and counting processes,” Sauls rules. The ruling also restores Bush’s 930-vote lead that existed before recount numbers were taken into account (see November 18, 2000). After Saul’s ruling, Gore’s lead attorney David Boies says the campaign will appeal the ruling to the Florida Supreme Court, and that the campaign had always assumed the case would end up in that court. “What has happened today is that we have moved one step closer to having this finally resolved,” he tells reporters, but admits that in this instance, “They won, we lost.” Boies notes that after the incredible effort expended to bring over a million ballots to Sauls’s courtroom, the judge never looked at them. “The ballots were the best evidence of the intents of the voters,” Boies says. “This was the first court in an election contest where the court has refused to look at the ballots.” The Florida high court will hear the appeal on December 7. [Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, In and For Leon County, Florida, 12/4/2000 pdf file; Guardian, 12/5/2000; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008]

Entity Tags: Florida Supreme Court, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Leon (Florida), County of Palm Beach (Florida), George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, N. Saunders Sauls, George W. Bush, County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

David Boies.David Boies. [Source: BBC]The Florida Supreme Court hears arguments from both the Gore and Bush presidential campaigns in Al Gore’s appeal of a ruling that rejected his campaign’s request to mandate recounts in three Florida counties (see 9:00 a.m. November 30, 2000 and After). Bush campaign lawyer Barry Richard argues that there is no “evidence to show that any voter was denied the right to vote” and calls the Gore campaign’s contest “a garden-variety appeal.” Gore lawyer David Boies contends that while time is running out, “the ballots can be counted” before the December 12 deadline for naming electors. In a 4-3 decision, the Court reverses the decisions of Judge N. Saunders Sauls (see 4:43 p.m. December 4, 2000), ordering recounts of “undervotes” in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties as well as all other Florida counties that have not yet manually recounted undervotes. “Undervotes” are noted on ballots that were not recorded by voting machines as making a choice for president. The Court also directs the lower court to add 168 votes from Miami-Dade and 215 votes from Palm Beach to Gore’s state totals, narrowing the George W. Bush lead to a mere 154 votes. London’s Guardian observes, “That margin could easily be overturned with a recount of the disputed ballots which mainly came from Democratic precincts in Miami-Dade.” Perhaps 45,000 undervotes statewide remain to be counted. Bush campaign attorney James Baker says the Court’s ruling may “disenfranchise Florida’s votes in the Electoral College.” Congressional Democrats Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and Tom Daschle (D-SD) release a joint statement calling for a “full, fair, and accurate vote count,” and saying there is “more than enough time to count ballots cast but never counted.” Within hours, Bush lawyers ask the US Supreme Court for an emergency stay of the decision, which will be granted (see December 8-9, 2000). [Supreme Court of Florida, 12/8/2000 pdf file; Guardian, 12/9/2000; US News and World Report, 12/13/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008] The Court decision is also seen as something of a repudiation of the Supreme Court’s earlier decision for clarification (see 10:00 a.m. December 1 - 4, 2000). Clerks for the Supreme Court justices are now certain that their Court will decide the presidential election. Justice Antonin Scalia, the most implacable of the conservative justices determined to overturn the Florida high court and give the election to Bush, wants to grant the Bush request for a stay even before receiving the Gore lawyers’ response, a highly unusual request that is not granted. He argues that the manual recounts are in and of themselves illegitimate, and says the recounts will cast “a needless and unjustified cloud” over Bush’s legitimacy. It is essential, he says, to shut down the process immediately. Clerks for both the liberal and conservative justices are amazed, and some appalled, at how bluntly Scalia is pushing what appears to be a partisan agenda. [Vanity Fair, 10/2004]

Entity Tags: David Boies, Barry Richard, Antonin Scalia, Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, County of Palm Beach (Florida), US Supreme Court, Richard Gephardt, The Guardian, N. Saunders Sauls, Tom Daschle, James A. Baker, George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, Florida Supreme Court, County of Miami-Dade (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

The Bush campaign seeks stays in the Florida Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the US Supreme Court regarding the acceptance of 43,852 “undervote” recounts in Florida counties. Most importantly, the Bush campaign also asks the US Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which would declare its candidate the winner of the Florida presidential election. Both the Florida Supreme Court and Eleventh Appeals Court refuse to issue the stay. Most observers believe that if the recounts are completed and their vote totals tabulated, Democrat Al Gore will win enough votes to win Florida, and thusly become president. Currently Republican George W. Bush has a mere 193-vote lead (see December 7-8, 2000), and recount totals from Miami-Dade County alone are expected to give Gore more than this amount. One example of the problematic situation in Florida is with Duval County, which includes the city of Jacksonville, where claims of massive African-American disenfranchsement and discrimination (see November 7, 2000) have already tainted the balloting. Duval has 4,967 undervotes, but they are mixed in with 291,000 others, all stored in boxes in a vault. The all-Republican electoral board, as seen on national television, has begun examining ballots, but as The Guardian observes, “with such painstaking reluctance to proceed, it amounted to an effective filibuster.” Democratic spokeswoman Jenny Backus tells reporters, “What we’ve heard is that they’re going to try to slow this down by every means they can.” However, the US Supreme Court issues the requested stay and the undervote tabulation stops. The Court does not issue the requested writ of certiorari. [Supreme Court of the United States, 12/8/2000 pdf file; Supreme Court of the United States, 12/9/2000 pdf file; Guardian, 12/10/2000; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/17/2000; Leip, 2008] The divide among the nine US Supreme Court justices is plain. The five conservative justices, led by Antonin Scalia, have since December 4 been circulating memos among themselves and their clerks, bouncing various arguments off one another in what the liberal justices’ clerks feel is an attempt to audition and solidify their arguments in favor of overturning the Florida high court’s decision and giving the presidency to Bush. The four liberal justices, led by John Paul Stevens, have long felt that the Court had no business being involved in the issue, that it was instead up to the Florida judiciary and legislature to settle the matter. Stevens, writing the anticipated dissent for the minority, has to ask the majority for more time to complete his dissent, so eager are they to issue their ruling. When Scalia sees in Stevens’s dissent the line that says, “counting every legally cast vote cannot constitute irreparable harm”—a direct rebuke to Scalia’s earlier argument that the Florida recounts would do “irreparable harm” to a Bush presidency—Scalia inadvertently delays the proceedings to write his own angry rejoinder, which reads in part, “Count first, and rule upon legality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election results that have the public acceptance democratic stability requires.” Scalia’s nakedly partisan stance discomfits even some of the other conservative justices’ clerks and angers the liberal clerks. “The Court had worked hard to claim a moral high ground, but at that moment he pissed it away,” one later recalls. “And there was a certain amount of glee. He’d made our case for us to the public about how crassly partisan the whole thing was.” After Scalia finishes his rejoinder, the Court issues its stay, stopping all further recounts. Gore himself, unaware of the arguments and partisanship dividing the Court, still holds out hope that one of the conservatives—O’Connor or Anthony Kennedy, perhaps (see After 7:50 p.m. November 7, 2000 and (November 29, 2000))—can be reached. “Please be sure that no one trashes the Court,” he admonishes his staffers. Gore decides to have campaign lawyer David Boies instead of Laurence Tribe argue the campaign’s case in the upcoming arguments, perhaps hoping that Boies, more moderate than the outspokenly liberal Tribe, might win some support from either Kennedy or O’Connor. Boies has also been representing Gore in Florida, and can presumably reassure the justices of the fundamental fairness of what is happening there. The liberal clerks have no such illusions. What hopes they have now are pinned on the press. One has heard a rumor that the Wall Street Journal is preparing to publish a story reporting that O’Connor had been overheard at a dinner party expressing her opposition to a Gore presidency; that report, the clerks hope, might force O’Connor to recuse herself from the decision and tie the court at 4-4. However, O’Connor has no such intention. Gore’s lawyers, aware of O’Connor’s statements, consider asking her to recuse herself, but decide instead to restrain themselves in hopes that she will, according to a 2004 Vanity Fair article, “now lean toward them to prove her fairness.” [Vanity Fair, 10/2004]

Entity Tags: County of Miami-Dade (Florida), Wall Street Journal, County of Duval (Florida), Anthony Kennedy, Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., Al Gore presidential campaign 2000, US Supreme Court, The Guardian, John Paul Stevens, Laurence Tribe, George W. Bush presidential campaign 2000, George W. Bush, Sandra Day O’Connor, Florida Supreme Court, Jenny Backus, Antonin Scalia, David Boies

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections

The state of Florida settles a voter discrimination suit filed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the wake of allegations of massive and widespread discrimination during the November 2000 elections (see November 7, 2000 and April 24, 2001). The class-action suit charged Database Technologies (DBT), a private firm hired by the Florida government, and Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris with deliberately attempting to disenfranchise black voters. Florida agrees to provisions that nominally settle the problem, but by 2004 will have implemented virtually none of the corrective procedures mandated by the settlement. Miami-Dade, Broward, Leon, Volusia, and Duval Counties settled earlier rather than face trial. [Center for American Progress, 12/9/2010]

Entity Tags: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, County of Broward (Florida), County of Duval (Florida), Katherine Harris, County of Leon (Florida), Database Technologies, County of Miami-Dade (Florida), County of Volusia (Florida)

Timeline Tags: 2000 Elections, Civil Liberties

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