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Iraq was a participant or observer in the following events:
Three years after Britain declared victory in Iraq (see 1917), their occupational forces are locked in fierce fighting with an Iraqi insurgency that had grown up in the Iraqi city of Fallujah. The British begin a campaign of aerial bombing against Fallujah and Baghdad, and heavy urban assaults in Samarra. [Kolb, 2007, pp. 94]
British generals announce that the insurgency in Iraq (see Early 1920) has been defeated. But former British Army intelligence officer T. E. Lawrence—“Lawrence of Arabia”—disagrees, in a dispatch published by the London Times. “The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor,” Lawrence writes. “Things have been far worse than we have told. We are today not far from a disaster.” Lawrence knows the insurgents—indeed, he had helped train them in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. [Kolb, 2007, pp. 94]
Iraq begins developing “Zippe-type” centrifuges (see 1950s). The centrifuges use rotors made from maraging steel and carbon fiber, which are more advanced than aluminum and allow the rotor to spin at significantly higher speeds. But Iraq has problems building centrifuges—even with considerable assistance from German experts. [Albright, 10/9/2003]
Iraq publicly accuses Kuwait of stealing oil by “slant drilling” from Iraq’s Rumaylah oil field on the Iraq-Kuwait border (see May 28-30, 1990). Iraqi government officials warn Kuwait that if the alleged theft of oil does not stop, Iraq will take military action. [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996; NationMaster, 12/23/2007]
Two days of intense fighting follow Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990); Kuwait’s small military is overrun by Iraq’s much larger ground forces. Many Kuwaiti military units flee to Saudi Arabia rather than fight the Iraqis. [NationMaster, 12/23/2007] The invasion is such a surprise to the Kuwaitis that the Emir and the royal family barely escape with their lives. [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996; Wilson, 2004, pp. 98]
Iraq announces that it intends to “annex” Kuwait, in essence forcing it to become a part of Iraq instead of a sovereign nation. Kuwait City is renamed al-Kadhima. The next day, the US will declare the annexation null and void. [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996; Wilson, 2004, pp. 126] Iraq plans for part of Kuwait to become a portion of Iraq’s southernmost Basra province, and the rest is to be Iraq’s 19th province. Iraq’s claim that Kuwait is part of Iraq is rooted in history as well as current events. For centuries, Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman Empire province of Basra, which included much of modern-day Iraq. Iraq has not recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty since 1899, and the border between Iraq and Kuwait has never been clearly defined to both sides’ satisfaction. According to Iraqi officials, the annexation of Kuwait merely rights a historical wrong. [NationMaster, 12/23/2007] The US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, will protest that when she gave Iraq indications that the US would not oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (see July 25, 1990), she did not expect Iraq to take “all of Kuwait” (see Late August 1990).
After three days of relentless ground assaults from US and coalition forces (see February 25, 1991), Iraq informally surrenders. Hostilities officially cease at 8:01 a.m. local time. [American Forces Press Service, 8/8/2000] US Army forces begin surveying chemical and biological weapons storage units in their respective areas. [Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, 1/20/2008] Reflecting on the war, the former Deputy Chief of Mission to the US Embassy in Baghdad, Joseph Wilson, will later write that the war had been necessary: “The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was a brazen case of armed robbery, pure and simple,” and nothing short of military intervention would end it. [Wilson, 2004, pp. 178]
Iraq officially accepts the terms of the negotiated cease-fire between its forces and those of the US-led “Desert Storm” coalition (see March 1, 1991). The cease-fire takes official effect five days later, on April 11. [American Forces Press Service, 8/8/2000]
The US fires 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles at intelligence sites in Baghdad, in response to allegations of an Iraqi plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April. [Barletta and Jorgensen, 5/1999; Roberts, 2008, pp. 121]
Iraq masses its armored forces on its southern border, obviously threatening another incursion into Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). The Clinton administration responds forcefully, warning the Iraqis that it will deploy 40,000 US troops inside Kuwait within a week if the Iraqis remain in place. The US also increases its Air Force presence inside Kuwait. In response, Iraq withdraws its forces. However, the Iraqi threat impels the US to steadily increase its military presence in Kuwait. By 2000, the US will have increased its Kuwaiti troop deployment from 8,000 to 30,000. [GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/27/2005; Roberts, 2008, pp. 121]
Hans Blix. [Source: Dean Calma / IAEA]Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, writes in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that there is no evidence that Iraq has an active nuclear weapons program. Blix says that the agency now has a “technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program,” despite some missing evidence and gaps in knowledge. He states with certainty the following: [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
“There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq’s explanation of its progress towards the finalization of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available program documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the program was interrupted.” [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
“Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU [high-enriched uranium] through the EMIS [electromagnetic isotope separation] process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.” [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
“There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more that a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.” [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
“There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.” [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
“All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its ‘crash program,’ was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.” [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
“There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.” [Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/6/1997]
Daniel Benjamin. [Source: Publicity photo]The National Security Council (NSC) completes a review of Iraq and terrorism. In an interview with journalist Robert Dreyfuss four years later, Daniel Benjamin, then-director of counterterrorism at the NSC, summarizes the report’s conclusions: “[W]e went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a link [between] al-Qaeda and Iraq. We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact. No other issue has been as closely scrutinized as this one.” [American Prospect, 12/16/2002]
Iraq announces that it no longer recognizes the UN-mandated “no-fly zones” in its northern and southern sectors, and begins acting more aggressively towards US and British aircraft enforcing those zones. In return, the US revises its rules of engagement so that pilots have broader discretion to respond to actual or threatened attacks. By August 1999, US aircraft have launched over 1,000 missiles at Iraqi targets. Iraqi locations are bombed on virtually a daily basis. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 122]
A study by the US Institute of Peace finds that “the Iraq problem” has transformed from “a multilateral conflict between Iraq and the United Nations to a bilateral one between Iraq and the United States.” [Roberts, 2008, pp. 122]
The five fatal victims of the anthrax attacks, from to right: Josep Curseen Jr., Thomas Morris, Ottilie Lundgren, Robert Stevens, and Kathy Nguyen. [Source: Reuters and Associated Press] (click image to enlarge)Two waves of letters containing anthrax are received by media outlets including NBC and the New York Post (see September 17-18, 2001), and Democratic senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy (see October 6-9, 2001). The letters sent to the senators both contain the words “Death to America, Death to Israel, Allah is Great.” Five people die:
October 5: Robert Stevens, 63, an employee at the Sun, a tabloid based in Florida.
October 21: Thomas Morris Jr., 55, a postal worker in Washington, DC.
October 22: Joseph Curseen Jr., 47, a postal worker in Washington, DC.
October 31: Kathy Nguyen, 61, a hospital employee in New York City.
November 21: Ottilie Lundgren, 94, of Oxford, Connecticut.
At least 22 more people get sick but survive. Thirty-one others test positive for exposure. As a result of these deaths and injuries, panic sweeps the nation. On October 16, the Senate office buildings are shut down, followed by the House of Representatives, after 28 congressional staffers test positive for exposure to anthrax (see October 16-17, 2001). A number of hoax letters containing harmless powder turn up, spreading the panic further. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 12/8/2001; Associated Press, 8/7/2008] Initially it is suspected that either al-Qaeda or Iraq are behind the anthrax letters (see October 14, 2001, October 15, 2001, October 17, 2001, and October 18, 2001). [Observer, 10/14/2001; BBC, 10/16/2001] However, by November, further investigation leads the US government to conclude that, “everything seems to lean toward a domestic source.… Nothing seems to fit with an overseas terrorist type operation (see November 10, 2001).” [Washington Post, 10/27/2001; St. Petersburg Times, 11/10/2001]
Khalid Khawaja. [Source: CNN]Ex-CIA Director James Woolsey, as part of his attempt to gather evidence that could tie Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, contacts the Taliban. He works with Mansoor Ijaz, a US businessman of Pakistani origin, who is a lobbyist for Pakistan in the US, an occasional Fox News commentator, and has extensive political ties in the US. Woolsey is also vice chairman of the board of Ijaz’s company. Woolsey and Ijaz work with Khalid Khawaja, a friend of Osama bin Laden and ex-ISI operative. The three plus an unnamed US journalist arrange to meet with Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on October 8. The Taliban agree to tell Woolsey about a meeting between Iraqi and al-Qaeda officials that took place in 1997, and possibly other similar information. Apparently in return they hope to avert the US invasion of Afghanistan. However, the US bombing begins on October 7, and the meeting is called off. [Dawn (Karachi), 2/15/2002; Financial Times, 3/6/2003] At least part of this team will later play another behind-the-scenes role. After being given a tip that Mansoor Ijaz is connected to leading militant Muslims in Pakistan, reporter Daniel Pearl will connect with Khalid Khawaja, who in turn connects him with militant Muslims who kidnap and eventually kill him. A leading Pakistani newspaper will claim that at one point Newsweek is about to accuse Khawaja of involvement in the plot to kidnap Pearl, but Ijaz vouches for Khawaja and convinces Newsweek to pull back its accusations. [Dawn (Karachi), 2/15/2002; Vanity Fair, 8/2002]
Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley convenes a meeting in the White House Situation Room to discuss Iraq with Colin Powell, George Tenet, and Donald Rumsfeld. The White House wants to be sure they are all on the same page when they testify before Congress next week. When a CIA officer notes that the alleged ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda are not supported by current intelligence, Douglas Feith cuts in insisting that Mohamed Atta had met an Iraqi agent in Prague, and that the director of Iraqi intelligence had met with Osama bin Laden in 1996. Both theories have been dismissed by the intelligence community. After a few minutes, Hadley cuts him off and tells him to sit down. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 113-114]
Iraq agrees to destroy all the equipment associated with its Al Samoud missile program, including warheads, SA-2 missile engines, machinery to produce missile motors, fuel, launchers, testing equipment, components as well as all software and documentation. The UN had earlier concluded that the missile program was in violation of UN resolutions because the range of the missiles exceeds the 150km limit imposed in 1991 after the Gulf War (see February 12, 2003). Responding to news of Iraq’s decision, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer dismisses any suggestion that it is an example of Iraqi cooperation. Instead he describes it as “deception.” He says, “This is the deception the president predicted. We do expect that they will destroy at least some of their missiles.” He also says that Iraq’s actions constitute “propaganda, wrapped in a lie, inside a falsehood.” And Donald Rumsfeld offers a similar interpretation of Iraq’s actions. He says: “I don’t see a change in the pattern at all. You know, this is exactly what’s been going to for years…. They refuse to cooperate, don’t cooperate, drag it out, wait until someone finally nails them with one little piece of the whole puzzle and refuse to do anything about it and then finally when they see the pressure building, they say well, maybe we’ll do some of that.” Bush similarly states: “The discussion about these rockets is part of [Saddam’s] campaign of deception. See, he’ll say, ‘I’m not going to destroy the rockets,’ and then he’ll have a change of mind this weekend and destroy the rockets and say, ‘I’ve disarmed.’” And Powell says: “I think it’s just more indication of the reality that we have been trying to convey to the world, that Saddam Hussein is trying to string it out, trying to divert attention, trying to pretend he is cooperating when he is not cooperating, try[ing] to use process as an excuse for not cooperating and not complying with the will of the international community.” [BBC, 1/28/2003; Associated Press, 2/28/2003; Fox News, 2/28/2003; New York Times, 3/1/2003]
[Source: Public domain]Former CIA Director James Woolsey says the US is engaged in a world war, and that it could continue for years: “As we move toward a new Middle East, over the years and, I think, over the decades to come… we will make a lot of people very nervous.” He calls it World War IV (World War III being the Cold War according to neoconservatives like himself ), and says it will be fought against the religious rulers of Iran, the “fascists” of Iraq and Syria, and Islamic extremists like al-Qaeda. He singles out the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, saying, “We want you nervous.” This echoes the rhetoric of the PNAC, of which Woolsey is a supporter, and the singling out of Egypt and Saudi Arabia echoes the rhetoric of the Defense Policy Board, of which he is a member. In July 2002 (see July 10, 2002), a presentation to that board concluded, “Grand strategy for the Middle East: Iraq is the tactical pivot. Saudi Arabia the strategic pivot. Egypt the prize.”
[CNN, 4/3/2003; CNN, 4/3/2003]
At the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq, prisoners are reportedly barefoot and have symptoms of untreated illnesses. [New York Times, 5/13/2004]
Nine men are arrested in a hotel in Basra, Iraq, by Coalition Forces. According to a later report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), they are “made to kneel, face and hands against the ground, as if in a prayer position.” Soldiers stump on the necks of those daring to raise their heads. The soldiers take the prisoners’ money and send the nine Iraqis to Al-Hakimiya, a former office of the mukhabarat, the old Iraqi secret police, in Basra. There, soldiers beat them severely. One of the detainees, a 28-year-old, dies. Prior to his death, the other prisoners heard him screaming. The death certificate will say he died of “Cardio-respiratory arrest—asphyxia,” cause “unknown.” Someone who identifies the body, tells the ICRC the man had a broken nose, several broken ribs and skin lesions on the face. Two of the other captives are hospitalized with severe injuries. [International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 ]
Cash shipments to Iraq by month [Source: US Congress. House Committee on Government Reform] (click image to enlarge)The US Federal Reserve sends the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad $1.6 billion on giant pallets aboard military C-130 cargo planes. This is the last of a series of several shipments that began in April 2003 (see April 2003). The money was drawn from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)and special US Treasury accounts containing revenues from sales of Iraqi oil exports, surplus dollars from the UN-run oil-for-food program, and frozen assets that belonged to the government of Saddam Hussein. Most shipments were under $1 billion, except for this one and two others, one in December, and one just three days before (see December 12, 2003 and June 22, 2004). Together these shipments amount to $12 billion, some 363 tons of palleted cash. This shipment and the other June shipment of $2.4 billion (see June 22, 2004) account for almost half of the total amount shipped to Iraq. There will be no more shipments to the CPA after this date because on June 28, authority to govern Iraq, and hence the authority to manage Iraq’s funds, will be transferred to Iraq’s new Interim Government (see June 28, 2004). [US Congress, 2/6/2007 ; Reuters, 2/7/2007]
The US-Iraq Joint Commission on Reconstruction and Economic Development meets in Amman, Jordan, to discuss Iraq’s progress in implementing a number of reforms that will help transition the country to a market-based economy (see, e.g., September 29, 2004). During the two-day meeting, Iraqi representatives reconfirm their commitment to scaling back fuel and food subsidies. They also announce the opening of a USAID-backed Investment Promotion Agency that will help Iraqi and foreign investors open businesses in Iraq. [US Department of State, 7/13/2005]
The Iraqi government cuts subsidies on gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and cooking fuel in order to meet an IMF requirement that Iraq allow fuel prices to increase to levels on par with prices elsewhere in the Middle East. The Iraq government agreed to implement this reform, and a number of others, in exchange for having as much as 80 percent of its debts forgiven (see September 29, 2004 and November 22, 2004). The debts had accumulated during the rule of Saddam Hussein. Iraq’s rolling back of the fuel subsidies is followed by violent protests across the country. The price of cooking fuel immediately increases by about three-fold, while gasoline prices increase by a factor of five. Diesel fuel prices rise about nine-fold. [Associated Press, 12/19/2005; BBC, 12/30/2005; New York Times, 12/31/2005]
The IMF’s 24-member executive board approves a standby arrangement for a new $685 million loan for Iraq. The IMF previously provided the country with a $436.3 million emergency post-conflict loan in September 2004 (see September 29, 2004). The approval means that creditor nations will forgive an additional 30 percent of Iraq’s debt, all of which was incurred under the rule of Saddam Hussein. If Iraq fulfills the requirements in the standby arrangement, another 20 percent of its debt will be forgiven (see November 22, 2004). [Associated Press, 12/23/2005; Agence France-Presse, 12/23/2005] One of the reforms required by the stand-by arrangement is that Iraq work with the IMF on the drafting of an oil law to be implemented by the end of 2006. [Bretton Woods Project, 1/23/2006] The agreement states that Iraq needs to “draft a new petroleum law in line with the new constitution and international best practices, thereby defining the fiscal regime for oil and establishing the contractual framework for private investment in the sector.” It adds that IMF staff have underscored “the need to press ahead with structural fiscal reforms,” which include “the move forward toward the commercialization of oil-related state enterprises, and the drafting of a new petroleum law.” [International Monetary Fund, 12/7/2005, pp. 18 ]
A committee made up of ministers and politicians from the main Shiite, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish blocs begins final negotiations on a proposed oil law that will govern the development of Iraq’s oil sector. The latest draft of the oil law was completed several months ago (see July 2006). While Iraqi legislators have yet to see law, it has already been reviewed by the US government and major oil companies (see July 2006), as well as the International Monetary Fund (see September 2006). According to the New York Times, “Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander here, and Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, have urged Iraqi politicians to put the oil law at the top of their agendas, saying it must be passed before the year’s end.” The major issue of contention concerns how oil revenue will be distributed. Most Sunni communities are located in provinces where there is little or no oil. Consequently, they are arguing that revenue should be controlled by the central government and then distributed equitably among Iraq’s provinces. Their position is supported by the Shiites. But the Kurds, who live in the oil-rich north, strongly disagree arguing that the constitution guarantees the regions absolute authority in those matters. [New York Times, 12/9/2006]
Changes are again made to the draft of the proposed Iraqi oil law. [Asia Times, 2/28/2007] According to this draft:
Foreign corporations would have access to nearly every sector of Iraq’s oil and natural gas industry, including service contracts on existing fields that are already being managed and operated by the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). For fields that have been discovered, but which are not currently being developed, the law would require INOC to be a partner in developing these fields. But the new oil law does not require participation of the INOC or any private Iraqi companies in contracts for fields that have not yet been discovered. In such cases, the new law would permit foreign companies to have full access. [Iraqi Council of Ministers, 2/2007; Inter Press Service, 2/28/2007; Asia Times, 2/28/2007]
Companies contracted to develop oil fields would be given exclusive control of fields for up to 35 years, and would be guaranteed profits for 25 years. Foreign companies would not be required to partner with an Iraqi company or reinvest any of its profits in the Iraqi economy. Nor would they have to employ or train Iraqi workers, or engage in any other effort to transfer technology and skills to the Iraqis. [Iraqi Council of Ministers, 2/2007; Asia Times, 2/28/2007]
An Iraqi Federal Oil and Gas Council would be established and given the ultimate decision-making authority in determining what kinds of contracts could be used to develop Iraq’s oil and what would be done with the existing exploration and production contracts already signed with French, Chinese, Russian, and other foreign companies. The law states that council members would include, among others, “executive managers from important related petroleum companies.” As an article in the Asian Times notes, “[I]t is possible that foreign oil-company executives could sit on the council. It would be unprecedented for a sovereign country to have, for instance, an executive of ExxonMobil on the board of its key oil-and-gas decision-making body.” There is no language in the law that would prevent foreign corporate executives sitting on the council from making decisions about their own contracts. And there is no requirement that a quorum be present when making decisions. The Asian Times article notes, “Thus, if only five members of the Federal Oil and Gas Council met—one from ExxonMobil, Shell, ChevronTexaco and two Iraqis—the foreign company representatives would apparently be permitted to approve contacts for themselves.” The new law does not specify what kind of oil agreements could be signed between Iraq and private firms to develop Iraq’s oil. Rather it leaves this question to the council, which would be permitted to approve and rewrite contracts using whatever type is agreed upon by a “two-thirds majority of the members in attendance.” Previous drafts of the law had specifically mentioned production sharing agreements (PSAs), a controversial type of contract that is favored by the oil companies. [Asia Times, 2/28/2007] That model, favored by the US and by oil companies, was opposed by many Iraqis, including Iraqi oil professionals, engineers, and technicians in the unions. The Iraqis prefer technical service contracts, like the ones used in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Under such contracts foreign companies would be allowed to participate in the development of oil fields, but only for a limited time. [Democracy Now!, 2/20/2007] The companies would be paid to build a refinery, lay a pipeline, or offer consultancy services, but then would leave afterwards. This type of arrangement would help transfer technical expertise and skills to Iraqis. “It is a much more equitable relationship because the control of production, development of oil will stay with the Iraqi state,” notes Ewa Jasiewicz, a researcher at PLATFORM, a British human rights and environmental group that monitors the oil industry. She notes that no other country in the Middle East that is a large oil producer would ever sign a PSA because it’s “a form of privatization and… it’s not in their interests.” Critics also note that the signing of PSA agreements with US oil companies would add fuel to the unrest in Iraq and that the US would attempt to legitimize its continuing presence in Iraq with assertions about the need to safeguard US business interests. [Inter Press Service, 2/28/2007]
Iraq’s national government would not have control over production levels. Rather, the contractee developing a field—e.g., the INOC, or a foreign or domestic company—would be able to decide how much oil to produce. However, the document does say: “In the event that, for national policy considerations, there is a need to introduce limitations on the national level of petroleum production, such limitations shall be applied in a fair and equitable manner and on a pro rata basis for each contract area on the basis of approved field-development plans.” But it does not specify who has the authority to introduce such nation-wide limitations or how production levels might be lowered in a “fair and equitable manner.” The language appears to signify that Iraq would no longer work with OPEC or other similar organizations. [Iraqi Council of Ministers, 2/2007; Asia Times, 2/28/2007]
Oil revenues would be distributed to all of Iraq’s 18 provinces according to their population sizes. Regional administrations, not Iraq’s central government, would have the authority to negotiate contracts with foreign oil companies, monitor contracts, and deal with small disputes. But the ultimate authority would lie with the Federal Oil and Gas Council which would be able to veto decisions made by regional authorities. Critics say this arrangement almost encourages the split of Iraq into three different regions or even three different states. According to Raed Jarrar, Iraq Project Director for Global Exchange, a situation like this would mean that “Iraqis in different provinces will start signing contracts directly with foreign companies and competing between themselves, among themselves, among different Iraqi provinces, to get the oil companies to go… there without any centralized way in controlling this and thinking of the Iraqi interest and protecting Iraq as a country.” [Iraqi Council of Ministers, 2/2007; Inter Press Service, 2/28/2007]
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