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Profile: Judith Yaphe

Positions that Judith Yaphe has held:

Quotes

Early February 2003

“You’re left to just hear the nouns, and put them together. It doesn’t take me yet to the point where I can say I’ve seen evidence which convinces me that Saddam Hussein supports al-Qaeda.” [Washington Post, 2/6/2003]

Associated Events

April 2003

“[The Office of the Secretary of Defense] has no interest in what I do. They’ve brought in their own stable of people from AEI, and the people at the State Department who worked with the Iraqi exiles are being kept from Garner.”

Associated Events

Judith Yaphe was a participant or observer in the following events:

The Future of Iraq dossier cover.The Future of Iraq dossier cover. [Source: Representational Pictures]The US State Department begins the “Future of Iraq” project aimed at developing plans for post-Saddam Iraq. The project eventually evolves into the collaborative effort of some 17 working groups involving more than 200 exiled Iraqi opposition figures and professionals including jurists, academics, engineers, scientists, and technical experts. These groups meet on numerous occasions over the next eight to ten months, preparing plans to address a wide range of issues. The 17 working groups include: Public Health and Humanitarian Needs; Water, Agriculture and the Environment; Public Finance and Accounts; Transitional Justice; Economy and Infrastructure; Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, and Migration Policy; Foreign and National Security Policy; Defense Institutions and Policy; Civil Society Capacity-Building; Public and Media Outreach; Economic and Infrastructure; Local Government; Anti-Corruption Measures; Oil and Energy; Education; Free Media; and Democratic Principles. (US Department of State 1/22/2002; Lake 6/5/2002; US Department of State 10/4/2002; US Department of State 10/11/2002; US Department of State 10/11/2002; Assyrian International News Agency 10/31/2002; Sideek 12/16/2002; Washington File 12/16/2002; US Department of State 12/19/2002; McIntosh 2/3/2003; Warikoo 2/10/2003; US Department of State 2/12/2003; US Department of State 4/23/2003 pdf file; Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003; Whitelaw 11/25/2003)
Problems and Setbacks - The project suffers from a serious lack of interest and funds. In July, The Guardian reports: “Deep in the bowels of the US State Department, not far from the cafeteria, there is a small office identified only by a handwritten sign on the door reading: ‘The Future of Iraq Project.‘… [T]he understaffed and underfunded Future of Iraq Project has been spending more effort struggling with other government departments than plotting Saddam’s downfall.” (Borger 7/10/2002) More than a month after the invasion, several of the project’s 17 working groups will still have not met. (Roberts 2008, pp. 126)
Achievements - The $5 million project ultimately produces 13 volumes of reports consisting of some 2,000 pages of what is described as varying quality. The New York Times will later report, “A review of the work shows a wide range of quality and industriousness.” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003) The newspaper cites several examples:
bullet “[T]he transitional justice working group, made up of Iraqi judges, law professors, and legal experts… met four times and drafted more than 600 pages of proposed reforms in the Iraqi criminal code, civil code, nationality laws and military procedure.” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)
bullet “The group studying defense policy and institutions expected problems if the Iraqi Army was disbanded quickly.… The working group recommended that jobs be found for demobilized troops to avoid having them turn against allied forces.” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)
bullet “The democratic principles working group wrestled with myriad complicated issues from reinvigorating a dormant political system to forming special tribunals for trying war criminals to laying out principles of a new Iraqi bill of rights.” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)
bullet “The transparency and anticorruption working group warned that ‘actions regarding anticorruption must start immediately; it cannot wait until the legal, legislative and executive systems are reformed.’” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)
bullet “The economy and infrastructure working group warned of the deep investments needed to repair Iraq’s water, electrical, and sewage systems.” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)
bullet “The free media working group noted the potential to use Iraq’s television and radio capabilities to promote the goals of a post-Hussein Iraq.” (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)
Impact of the Project's Work - After the US and British invasion of Iraq, Knight Ridder will report, “Virtually none of the ‘Future of Iraq’ project’s work was used.” (Landay and Strobel 7/12/2003) It was “ignored by Pentagon officials,” the New York Times will also observe. (Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003) Iraq expert and former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, who is one of the American experts involved in the “Future of Iraq” project, will tell American Prospect magazine in May 2003: “[The Office of the Secretary of Defense] has no interest in what I do.” She will also complain about how the Defense Department prevented the State Department from getting involved in the post-war administration of Iraq. “They’ve brought in their own stable of people from AEI [American Enterprise Institute], and the people at the State Department who worked with the Iraqi exiles are being kept from [Jay] Garner,” she will explain. (Dreyfuss 5/1/2003) One of those people is Tom Warrick, the “Future of Iraq” project director. When retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the first US administrator in Iraq, requests that Warrick join his staff, Pentagon civilians veto the appointment. (Landay and Strobel 7/12/2003; Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003) Other sources will also say that the Pentagon purposefully ignored the work of the “Future of Iraq” project. Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, who retires from the Pentagon’s Near East/South Asia bureau on July 1, will tell Knight Ridder Newspapers that she and her colleagues were instructed by Pentagon officials in the Office of Special Plans to ignore the State Department’s concerns and views. “We almost disemboweled State,” Kwiatkowski will recall. (Landay and Strobel 7/12/2003) After the fall of Saddam Hussein, critics will say that several of the post-war problems encountered could have been avoided had the Pentagon considered the warnings and recommendations of the “Future of Iraq” project. (Dreyfuss 5/1/2003; Schmitt and Brinkley 10/19/2003)

An article in the Boston Globe suggests that neoconservatives in the Bush administration see war in Iraq as “merely a first step” in transforming the entire Middle East. Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, John Hannah, I. Lewis Libby, and John Bolton are said to be some of the top officials pushing this view. “Iraq, [they] argue, is just the first piece of the puzzle. After an ouster of Hussein, they say, the United States will have more leverage to act against Syria and Iran, will be in a better position to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and will be able to rely less on Saudi oil.” Vice President Dick Cheney also mentioned this motive in a speech in August, saying, “When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace” (see August 26, 2002). The article also says: “A powerful corollary of the strategy is that a pro-US Iraq would make the region safer for Israel and, indeed, its staunchest proponents are ardent supporters of the Israeli right-wing. Administration officials, meanwhile, have increasingly argued that the onset of an Iraq allied to the US would give the administration more sway in bringing about a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though Cheney and others have offered few details on precisely how.” One US official says, “Maybe we do stir the pot and see what comes up.” Former CIA analyst and Iraq expert Judith Yaphe is critical, saying: “There are some people who religiously believe that Iraq is the beginning of this great new adventure of remapping the Middle East and all these countries. I think that’s a simplistic view.” Jessica T. Mathews, president of Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, a Washington policy group, is also critical. “The argument we would be starting a democratic wave in Iraq is pure blowing smoke,” Mathews says. “You have 22 Arab governments and not one has made any progress toward democracy, not one. It’s one of the great issues before us, but the very last place you’d suspect to turn the tide is Iraq. You don’t go from an authoritarian dictatorship to a democracy overnight, not even quickly.” But one anonymous senior US official says: “There are people invested in this philosophy all throughout the administration. Some of the strongest voices are in [the State Department].” (Donnelly and Shadid 9/10/2002)

Judith Yaphe testifies before the 9/11 Commission. Yaphe, a CIA veteran who now teaches at the Pentagon’s National Defense University, is considered one of the agency’s most experienced and knowledgeable Iraq analysts. Yaphe states that while Saddam Hussein was indeed a sponsor of terrorism, it is improbable, based on what is currently known, that Hussein and Iraq had any connections to the 9/11 attacks, nor that a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda is believable. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 7/9/2003) Yaphe is disturbed by the commission’s apparent acceptance of the testimony of Laurie Mylroie (see July 9, 2003), whose theories about connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda have long been discredited by both intelligence analysts and outside experts. She wonders why Mylroie’s “crazed theories” were being heard at all, and why the commission would risk its credibility by giving Mylroie this kind of exposure. She even speculates that Mylroie’s testimony is some sort of setup by the commission or the staff, and hopes that her own testimony can offset Mylroie’s theories and help discredit Mylroie before the commission. (Shenon 2008, pp. 130-134) Yaphe tells the commission, in apparent reference to Mylroie, that the use of circumstantial evidence is “troubling” and that there is a “lack of credible evidence to jump to extraordinary conclusions on Iraqi support for al-Qaeda.” She also calls Mylroie’s theories of Iraqi spies using false identities to help execute the 1993 World Trade Center bombings (see February 26, 1993) worthy of a fiction novel and completely unsupported by fact. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 7/9/2003)


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