Profile: Kizam Hamdoon

During a meeting in Jordan, Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon and US diplomat James Placke discuss a proposed draft resolution that Iran presented to the UN Security Council (see Mid-March 1984) calling on the international body to condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Hamdoon tells Placke that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement in lieu of a resolution, adding that the statement should (1) “mention former resolutions of the war”; (2) include a “strong call for progress toward ending the war through ceasefire or negotiations”; and (3) not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke says that he will honor the request but asks that Iraq halt its purchasing of chemical weapons from US suppliers so as not to “embarrass” the US. Placke also warns that the US would be implementing licensing requirements on five chemical compounds for both Iraq and Iran. Placke says that the US does not want to be the “source of supply for anything that could contribute to the production of CW,” but adds reassuringly that the US does “not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship.” [US Department of State, 4/6/1984 ; Vallette, 3/24/2003]

The United Nations Security Council issues a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons without a specific reference to Iraq, despite Iran’s insistence that the Security Council pass a binding resolution condemning Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran. Interestingly, the previous day (see March 29, 1984), Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon and US diplomat James Placke had met and Hamdoon had stated Iraq’s preference that no resolution be passed and that any statement avoid referring directly to Iraq. As a State Department memo by James Placke notes, “The statement, by the way contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted.” [US Department of State, 3/30/1984 ; Battle, 2/25/2003]

CIA Director William J. Casey meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Iraq’s ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, to make sure the new Washington-Baghdad intelligence link (see August 1986) is helping the Iraqis and to encourage more attacks on Iranian economic targets. [Washington Post, 12/15/1986 Sources: Unnamed sources with first hand knowledge]

Shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal is first revealed in the press, CIA Director William J. Casey meets with Iraq’s ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, a second time (see October 1986) and assures him that the new Washington-Baghdad intelligence link (see August 1986) will remain open. [Washington Post, 12/15/1986]

Secretary of State James Baker receives a memo from the State Department informing him that Iraq is aggressively developing chemical and biological weapons, as well as new missiles. In spite of this disturbing intelligence, the memo also instructs Baker to express the administration’s “interest in broadening US-Iraqi ties” to Iraqi Undersecretary Kizam Hamdoon. [US Department of State, 3/24/1989]