Profile: Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
Office of the Inspector General (CIA) was a participant or observer in the following events:
A combined inquiry by the inspectors general of the Defense Department, CIA, and State Department finds that numerous charges made against Richard Barlow (see 1981-1982 and August 4, 1989), a former analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for all three agencies, are without merit. However, the report is re-written before it is published. Lead inspector Sherman Funk finds that the accusation that Barlow is a traitor is “an error not supported by a scintilla of evidence,” adding, “The truth about Barlow’s termination is, simply put, that it was unfair and unwarranted.” Funk calls the whole affair “Kafka-like” and says Barlow was fired for “refusing to accede to policies which he knew to be wrong.” Despite this, the report is rewritten before it is published. The new version exonerates the Pentagon and says that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons, although the US is well aware it does (see July 1987 or Shortly After). [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Funk will comment: “Yesterday, I received a copy of the Barlow report I had co-signed. Reviewing it I was startled and dismayed to realize that the summary of conclusions had not been revised to reflect the changes we had made.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 233, 507]
Fabricated Evidence - Commenting on an earlier version of the Pentagon inspector general’s report, one of Barlow’s former bosses, Gerald Oplinger, said that it contained evidence fabricated by the inspector general’s office. The report alleges that Oplinger deliberately inflated his annual evaluation of Barlow in order to avoid “an unpleasant personnel situation.” However, in a sworn affidavit Oplinger says this charge is “devoid of merit,” and also denies ever having spoken to anyone from the inspector general’s office, even though an interview with him is listed as one of the sources for the report.
'Many' Colleagues Support Barlow - Journalist Seymour Hersh previously interviewed “many” of Barlow’s former CIA and State Department colleagues and they confirmed Barlow’s essential allegation—that the full story of the Pakistani purchases was deliberately withheld from Congress, for fear of provoking a cut-off in military and economic aid that would adversely affect the Soviet-Afghan War. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993]
A later review by the CIA’s inspector general will find that the CIA’s counterterrorism resources are not properly administered during this period. The review will comment that “during the same period [CIA counterterrorism managers] were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not effectively managing the Agency’s counterterrorism funds.”
Although counterterrorism funding increases from 1998, funds are moved from the base budget of the Counterterrorist Center to other CIA units. Some of the funds moved are “used to cover nonspecific corporate ‘taxes’ and for a variety of purposes that… were unrelated to terrorism”;
No funds are moved from other programs to support counterterrorism, even after CIA Director George Tenet issues a “declaration of war” against al-Qaeda in December 1998 and says he wants no resources spared in the fight against terrorism (see December 4, 1998);
Little use of reserve CIA funds is made to fight terrorism;
Counterterrorism managers do not spend all the money they have, even after their funding has been reduced by diversions to other programs. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. x-xi ]
The CIA’s inspector general will recommend that accountability boards be convened to review the performance of the following officials for these failings:
The executive director (David Carey from July 1997, A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard from March 2001);
The deputy director for operations (Jack Downing from 1997, James Pavitt from 1999); and
The chief of the Counterterrorist Center (Jeff O’Connell from 1997, Cofer Black from summer 1999). [Central Intelligence Agency, 3/16/2001; Coll, 2004, pp. xiv, 456; Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. x-xi ]
Following the issue of another directive governing a set of operations against Osama bin Laden, the CIA is said to become confused over whether it can mount an operation to assassinate him. In December, President Bill Clinton authorized the CIA to kill bin Laden using a group of tribal leaders in Afghanistan (see December 24, 1998), but a few weeks later he issued another memo governing relations between the CIA and the Northern Alliance that did not contain authorization to kill bin Laden (see February 1999). The CIA will later say that the reason it does not take advantage of the authorization to kill him using the tribal leaders is because it is confused by the second memo. The CIA’s inspector general will comment: “Given the law, executive order, and past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist.” The 9/11 Commission will also say that “the limits of the available authority were not tested.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 133; Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xxi ]
The CIA sends an officer from its Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to the NSA to review raw transcripts of intercepted communications between terrorists. However, the officer is only there for a “brief period” and is subsequently withdrawn and not replaced, damaging the CIA’s ability to exploit the information gleaned from the intercepts. The CIA only previously received summaries of intercepted calls, not the transcripts themselves, and had been arguing for years that it needed the actual transcripts to better understand the material (see February 1996-May 1998, December 1996, After December 1996, After December 1996, and Late August 1998). After the single officer leaves the NSA, which intercepts calls between the US-based 9/11 hijackers and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen around this time (see Early 2000-Summer 2001), the reason the CIA gives for not replacing him is “resource constraints.” In 2005, the CIA’s Office of Inspector General will regard this failure as so serious that it will recommend an accountability board be convened to review the performance of the CTC managers responsible, and will suggest that officers should have been detailed to the NSA “on a consistent, full-time basis.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xxiii ] The CIA and NSA are obtaining information about people in the US from phone companies to support “black ops” at this time (see After July 11, 1997).
Victims’ family members Lorie Van Auken (right) and Kristen Breitweiser (left) are shocked to learn Tom Wilshire blocked a cable to the FBI about Khalid Almihdhar’s visa. [Source: Banded Artists]Doug Miller, an FBI agent assigned to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, reads CIA cables reporting that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa and drafts a cable to the FBI to inform it of this. The CIA obtained the information through a tap on Almihdhar’s phone in Yemen (see December 29, 1999) and by monitoring him as he passed through Dubai (see January 2-5, 2000) on his way to an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
Draft Cable - Miller writes that Almihdhar has a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999) and that the visa application states his destination is New York and he intends to stay for three months. The draft cable mentions the tap on Almihdhar’s phone, his planned travel to Malaysia, and the links between his phone and the 1998 East African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001). It also says that the CIA has obtained photographs of Almihdhar and these will be sent separately. Miller asks the FBI for feedback resulting from an FBI investigation.
Blocked - Another CIA officer named Michael Anne Casey accesses Miller’s draft about an hour after he writes it. The cable is then blocked on the orders of the station’s deputy chief, Tom Wilshire, as a few hours after Miller drafts the cable Casey attaches a message to it saying, “pls hold off on [cable] for now per [Tom Wilshire].” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 240 ] Miller is also told, “This is not a matter for the FBI.” [Wright, 2006, pp. 311]
'No Reason to Kill the Message' - Author James Bamford will later comment: “A potential terrorist and member of al-Qaeda was heading for the US, the FBI’s jurisdiction—its turf—and he [Miller] was putting the FBI on notice so it could take action. There was no reason to kill the message.” [Bamford, 2008, pp. 19] Miller will later say he has no “rational answer” as to why the cable was blocked, but will speculate that Alec Station officers were annoyed he had encroached on their territory. [Congressional Quarterly, 10/1/2008] Casey drafts a cable falsely saying that the information about Almihdhar’s visa has been shared with the FBI (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and there will be a discussion the next day about whether the cable should be sent (see January 6, 2000). The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a “significant failure” but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 250 ] The 9/11 Commission will know of the incident, but will relegate it to an endnote in its final report, omitting Wilshire’s role entirely. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502] The CIA inspector general will falsely claim that the cable is not sent, “[a]pparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xv ]
Although the CIA passes information to the FBI about the attendance of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi at al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, it repeatedly fails to mention that Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 6, 2000, 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, January 5-6, 2000). It also fails to check that the FBI has received this information. The CIA’s inspector general will say it “found no indication that anyone in [the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center] checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few [Osama bin Laden] Station officers said, should have been routine practice.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xv ]
Fifty to sixty CIA officers read cables reporting on travel by 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. The cables are generated in connection with al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, which Almihdhar and Alhazmi attend and the CIA monitors (see January 5-8, 2000). Even though some of the cables state that Almihdhar has a US visa and Alhazmi has arrived in the US, the FBI is not informed of this (see, for example, January 6, 2000 and March 5, 2000), and the two men are not watchlisted until the summer of 2001 (see August 23, 2001). The cables are drafted at four field offices and at headquarters and are read by overseas officers, headquarters personnel, operations officers, analysts, managers, junior employees, CIA staff, and officers on attachment from the NSA and FBI. The CIA’s inspector general will comment: “Over an 18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to review the information on multiple occasions, when they might have recognized its significance and shared it appropriately with other components and agencies.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xiv ]
The CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt, informs the agency’s inspector general, John Helgerson, that the CIA Counterterrorist Center has established a program to detain and interrogate terrorists at foreign sites. At the same time, Pavitt also informs Helgerson that he has just learned of an apparently controversial incident and sent a team to investigate it. It appears that the incident triggered the notification to the inspector general about the program. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1 ] The incident is the killing of detainee Gul Rahman at the Salt Pit prison in Afghanistan (see After October 2001 and November 20, 2002). [Associated Press, 3/28/2010] The detention and interrogation program has been in operation since March at the latest, as high-value detainee Abu Zubaida was arrested and then taken to a CIA black site at that time (see March 28, 2002 and April - June 2002). However, it is unclear whether Helgerson was aware of the program prior to being informed by Pavitt.
The CIA’s office of the inspector general begins an investigation of the killing of detainee Gul Rahman at the agency’s Salt Pit black site in Afghanistan (see November 20, 2002). The investigation begins after the agency’s inspector general, John Helgerson, is notified of the incident by management (see Shortly After November 20, 2002). It is unclear whether the inspector general issues a separate report on this incident or whether his office’s conclusions about it are contained in a general report on the effectiveness of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program (see May 7, 2004). Whatever the case, the inspector general’s conclusions focus on two agency officials, an officer named Matthew Zirbel, who caused Rahman’s death, and his boss, the CIA’s station chief in Afghanistan, known only as Paul P. The investigation finds that Zirbel displayed poor judgement in leaving Rahman to die, but that he made repeated requests for guidance that were largely ignored. [Associated Press, 3/28/2010]
CIA inspector general John Helgerson, who is investigating some aspects of the CIA’s performance before 9/11, recuses himself from part of the investigation concerning alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). According to the report’s executive summary, the reason for the recusal is a “conflict of interest,” although the precise nature of this conflict is unknown. This part of the investigation is handled by two deputy inspectors general. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xiii ] Some of the senior positions held by Helgerson at the CIA are known; there appears to be an approximately five-year period between 1993 and 1998 when Helgerson’s positions are mostly unknown. [Helgerson, 1996; Central Intelligence Agency, 5/22/1996; Central Intelligence Agency, 8/3/2001; Washington Post, 5/14/2006; Washington Post, 5/14/2006; Ignet(.gov), 5/17/2007 ] The statement about the conflict of interest appears to indicate that Helgerson must have been involved in activities related to KSM in the mid-1990s, but this is not certain.
When the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry finishes its final report (see December 11, 2002), it asks the CIA’s office of inspector general (OIG) to review its findings and to perform any additional investigations that are required. The purpose of this is to determine whether any CIA employees deserve awards for outstanding services, or whether some should be held accountable for not performing their responsibilities satisfactorily. But these are the only 9/11-related issues the OIG investigates. It does not perform a full review of the CIA’s performance before 9/11, and does not specifically focus on systemic issues. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. v-vi ]
The CIA’s inspector general, which is reviewing some aspects of the CIA’s performance with respect to 9/11, examines the agency’s analysis of Osama bin Laden-related matters before the attacks and finds it was wanting. The executive summary of the inspector general’s report will state that the US intelligence community’s understanding of al-Qaeda “was hampered by insufficient analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis.” The inspector general also asks three former senior analysts to review what was produced about bin Laden. They find that there were some shortcomings, and that some important elements, such as discussions of the implications of information, were ignored. In addition they find there was:
No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qaeda by any unit at the CIA;
No comprehensive report focused on bin Laden after 1993;
No examination of the possible use of planes as weapons;
Limited analytic focus on the US as a target;
No comprehensive analysis putting the increased threat reporting in the summer of 2001 into context;
Not much strategic analysis in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, where the analytical unit focused on current and tactical issues.
In addition, the National Intelligence Council produced its last terrorist threat assessment before 9/11 in 1995, although it was updated in 1997. Work on a new assessment began in early 2001, but was not completed by 9/11. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xvii-xviii ]
The CIA’s Office of the Inspector General, headed by John Helgerson, receives information that some CIA employees are concerned about the agency’s interrogation program. Specifically, they are worried that certain covert CIA activities at an overseas black site where detainees are held may involve violations of human rights. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 2 ] The identity of the CIA black site and the type of abuse is not publicly known. However, around this time, some new officers arrive at a CIA black site in Poland and report abuse there to the agency’s management (see January 2003).
The CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt, asks the agency’s office of inspector general, headed by John Helgerson, to investigate allegations that a high-value detainee, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, has been abused. Apparently, Pavitt has just learned of the abuse of al-Nashiri, who was captured in October or November the previous year (see Early October 2002). [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1-2 ] The abuse took place at a black site in Poland and was apparently carried out by a CIA officer known only as “Albert,” with the approval of his superior, “Mike.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1-2 ; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] The inspector general will issue a report on the incidents later in the year (see October 29, 2003).
The CIA’s Office of Inspector General begins an investigation of the agency’s torture and interrogation practices. The investigation is spurred by three stimuli: notification of a controversial incident in November 2002 (see Shortly After November 20, 2002); concerns over the interrogation of high-value detainee Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see January 2003); and other concerns about human rights abuses at a black site (see (January 2003)). The investigation will cover the period between September 2001 and mid-October 2003. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 2 ] The inspector general, John Helgerson, will issue his office’s final, classified report on the investigation in May 2004 (see May 7, 2004).
The CIA’s Office of the Inspector General reviews videotapes of the interrogation and custody of militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida. The tapes, made in 2002 (see Spring-Late 2002), show 83 applications of the waterboarding technique, most of which last for less than 10 seconds. However, 11 of the interrogation videos turn out to be blank, two others are blank except for one or two minutes, and two more are broken and cannot be reviewed. The Inspector General then compares the tapes to logs and cables about the interrogations and identifies a 21-hour period, including two waterboarding sessions, that is not captured on the tapes. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 36-37 ]
Senators Pat Roberts (R-KS) and John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), respectively the chairman and the ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, send a joint letter asking the CIA and State Department inspectors general to review issues related to the Iraq-Niger forgeries. [CounterPunch, 11/9/2005]
The CIA’s inspector general interviews a female CIA officer about the efficacy of the agency’s custody and interrogation practices for high value detainees. The officer is not identified, but as the topic discussed is the involvement of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) in the practices, and the highest known female officer at the CTC at this time is Alfreda Frances Bikowsky, it may be her. (Note: Bikowsky is involved in rendition—see Before January 23, 2004—and torture—see After March 7, 2003). The officer says that the value of the program is taking terrorists off the streets, and if the CIA gets unique valuable information from a detainee then an operation is judged a success. The officer also makes a number of statements about information provided by detainees:
Training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida provided information about al-Qaeda’s modus operandi and that led to the arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an associate of the 9/11 hijackers;
Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) provided information that led to the arrest of a truck driver in Ohio named Iyman Faris, a smuggler named Uzair Paracha, a sleeper operative in New York named Saleh Almari, an operative named Majid Khan, and Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, KSM’s nephew, who was involved in financing 9/11;
Detainees have also provided a wealth of information about al-Qaeda plots, including potential attacks on the US consulate in Karachi, a plan to fly planes into Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London, a plot where spikes in track would be loosened in an attempt to derail a train, a plot to blow up some gas stations, a plot to fly planes into the Library Tower in California, and a plot to collapse a suspension bridge by cutting lines.
The manager adds that as some operatives potentially involved in these plots have been arrested and the plans have not come to fruition, then the operations must have been thwarted by the CIA. [Central Intelligence Agency, 7/17/2003 ]
The CIA’s inspector general, John Helgerson, issues a report on the use of a handgun and power drill to intimidate al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri during an interrogation. A CIA officer known only as “Albert” threatened al-Nashiri with the gun and drill at a CIA black site in Poland around late 2002 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 ; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] The incidents have already been referred to the Justice Department, which has declined to prosecute (see September 11, 2003). What conclusions Helgerson comes to in the report are unknown. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 ]
The CIA’s inspector general conducts an internal investigation of the treatment of CIA detainees in Afghanistan. As part of that investigation, the use of drugs on detainees is raised. When the inspector interviews the commanding officer of a secret detention facility in eastern Afghanistan shared by US military and intelligence teams, the inspector asks if the “OGA”—an acronym standing for “other government agency” and used to refer to the CIA—had been able to “practice their TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] at your facility.” The commander replies, “No, they can’t use drugs or prolonged sensory deprivation in our facility.” It is unclear whether the commander is referring to interrogations. A senior US official will say in 2008 that the commander’s mention of drugs was either a mistake or a reference to am agency other than the CIA. [Washington Post, 4/22/2008]
The Justice Department’s inspector general, which is reviewing the FBI’s performance before 9/11, finds a reference to a key document it was not previously aware of. The document is a draft cable written by Doug Miller, an FBI agent who was loaned to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, before 9/11. The draft cable stated that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar had a US visa, but its sending to the FBI had been blocked by a female CIA officer known only as “Michael” and Alec Station’s deputy chief, Tom Wilshire (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). The CIA inspector general had previously passed on numerous documents relevant to the review by the Justice Department’s inspector general, but had failed to pass this one on, although the two inspectors general had been working together since at least mid-2003. The Justice Department inspector general finds a reference to the draft cable in a list of CIA documents accessed by FBI employees assigned to the CIA. As a result of this discovery, the Justice Department inspector general has to re-interview several witnesses (see (February 12, 2004)) and the completion of his report is delayed. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 227 ]
The New York Times reports that, according to current and former government officials, there is “widening unease within the Central Intelligence Agency over the possibility that career officers could be prosecuted or otherwise punished for their conduct during interrogations and detentions of terrorism suspects.” The conduct is questionable because it is said to amount to torture in some cases (see Mid-May 2002 and After, Shortly After September 6, 2006 and March 10-April 15, 2007). At this time, only one CIA contractor has been charged with a crime, after a prisoner died in Afghanistan. However, at least half a dozen other investigations by the Justice Department and the CIA’s Inspector General are ongoing, and involve actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly “black sites” in other countries. An official says, “There’s a lot more out there than has generally been recognized, and people at the agency are worried.” [New York Times, 2/27/2005] Apparently due to these fears, some officers purchase legal insurance policies. [ABC News, 12/15/2007]
Jay Rockefeller. [Source: US Senate]Ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) requests “over a hundred documents” from the CIA’s Inspector General. The documents are referenced in or pertain to a report the Inspector General drafted in May 2004 about the CIA’s detention and interrogation activities. Rockefeller also requests a report drafted by the CIA’s Office of General Counsel (see 2003) on the examination of videotapes of detainee interrogations stating whether the techniques they show comply with an August 2002 Justice Department opinion on interrogation (see August 1, 2002). However, the CIA refuses to provide these documents, as well as others, even after a second request is sent to CIA Director Porter Goss in September 2005. [US Congress, 12/7/2007] The videotapes Rockefeller is asking about will be destroyed by the CIA just two months after his second request (see November 2005).
A revised version of the CIA inspector general’s report into some of the agency’s failings before 9/11 is finished and sent to CIA management. A version of the report had been completed a year earlier, but it had to be revised due to criticism (see June-November 2004). It recommends accountability boards be convened to assess the performance of several officers. Although not all the officers are named, it is sometimes possible to deduce who they are based on the circumstances. The convening of accountability boards is recommended for:
CIA Director George Tenet, for failing to personally resolve differences between the CIA and NSA that impeded counterterrorism efforts;
CIA Executive Director David Carey (July 1997-March 2001), CIA Executive Director A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard (March 2001-9/11), CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jack Downing (1997-1999), and CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt (1999-9/11) for failing to properly manage CIA counterterrorism funds (see 1997-2001);
CIA Counterterrorist Center Chief Jeff O’Connell (1997-1999) for failing to properly manage CIA counterterrorism funds (see 1997-2001), for staffing Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, with officers lacking experience, expertise and training, for failing to ensure units under him coordinated coverage of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), for poor leadership of the CIA’s watchlisting program, for poor management of a program where officers were loaned between the CIA and other agencies, and for failing to send officers to the NSA to review its material;
CIA Counterterrorist Center Chief Cofer Black (Summer 1999-9/11) for failing to properly manage CIA counterterrorism funds (see 1997-2001), for staffing Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, with officers lacking experience, expertise and training, for failing to ensure units under him coordinated coverage of KSM, for poor leadership of the CIA’s watchlisting program, possibly for failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, possibly for failing to do anything about Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 2001, for poor management of a program where officers were loaned between the CIA and other agencies, and for failing to send officers to the NSA to review its material;
Chief of Alec Station Richard Blee. Some sections of the report appear to refer to Blee, but are redacted. It seems to criticize him for failing to properly oversee operations related to KSM, failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, and failing to do anything about Alhazmi and Almihdhar in 2001;
Deputy Chief of Alec Station Tom Wilshire. Some sections of the report appear to refer to Tom Wilshire, but are redacted. It seems to criticize him for failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, and for failing to do anything about Alhazmi and Almihdhar in 2001;
Unnamed officer, possibly head of the CIA’s renditions branch, for failing to properly oversee operations related to KSM;
Unnamed officer, for failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, and for failing to do anything about Alhazmi and Almihdhar in 2001;
Unnamed officer(s), for failure to produce any coverage of KSM from 1997 to 2001. The type of coverage that should have been provided is redacted in the publicly released executive summary of the report.
The report may recommend accountability boards for other officers, but this is not known due to redactions and the publication of only the executive summary. CIA Director Porter Goss will decide not to convene any accountability boards (see October 10, 2005), and the report will remain secret until the executive summary is released in 2007 (see August 21, 2007). [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005 ]
Entity Tags: Jeff O’Connell, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), James Pavitt, Tom Wilshire, Jack Downing, David Carey, A.B. (“Buzzy”) Krongard, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, George J. Tenet, Richard Blee
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
After media begin to report on the CIA’s rendition from Italy of Islamist extremist Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (see Noon February 17, 2003 and June 23, 2005 and After), the agency’s Director Porter Goss asks its inspector general to review the case. According to the New York Times, the review is to focus on the “amateurish tradecraft in the case, like operatives staying in five-star hotels and using traceable credit cards and cellphones.” However, CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jose Rodriguez says that there is no need for a review by the inspector general and that the directorate of operations, which is soon to be renamed the National Clandestine Service, will investigate itself. [New York Times, 2/20/2008] Rodriguez was the head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center at the time of the rendition (see May 2002), but his role in approving the operation is unclear.
Four statements based on the CIA inspector general’s report on some aspects of the agency’s performance before 9/11 are introduced as evidence at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui by the defense. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), but rewritten and is still secret (see January 7, 2005). The four passages say:
“Numerous” CIA officers accessed cables reporting that Khalid Almihdhar’s passport contained a US visa and Nawaf Alhazmi had flown from Thailand to Los Angeles (see Mid-January-March 2000); [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria District, 3/28/2006 ]
FBI Director Louis Freeh was briefed about Almihdhar in January 2000, but not told that Almihdhar had a US visa (see January 6-9, 2000); [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/28/2006 ]
Nobody at Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, notified CIA personnel authorized to collect foreign intelligence in the US together with the FBI about Almihdhar’s US visa (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000); [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/28/2006 ]
The CIA was unaware of the Phoenix memo until after 9/11 (note: this may not actually be true—see (July 27, 2001)). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/28/2005 ]
Two sections of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report are also introduced as evidence as substitutes for the CIA inspector general’s report. They cover the use of aircraft as weapons and US knowledge of bin Laden’s intentions to strike inside the US in the summer of 2001. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/28/2006 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/28/2006 ]
The CIA announces that it has fired one of its officers, Mary McCarthy, who, it claims, “knowingly and willfully shared classified intelligence” with a newspaper reporter. McCarthy is alleged to have leaked information about the CIA’s network of secret overseas prisons to Washington Post reporter Dana Priest. The Post recently published a Pulitzer Prize-winning series of stories on the secret prison network; Priest was one of the main reporters for that series. McCarthy worked at the CIA’s Office of the Inspector General, which was investigating allegations that the CIA was torturing detainees at Iraqi prisons. The CIA claims McCarthy has admitted to the leaks, though it will not acknowledge that she was one of Priest’s sources for the prison stories. But McCarthy’s attorney, Ty Cobb, says that his client “emphatically denies she leaked any classified information and the facts would demonstrate that she would not even have access to any of the information attributed to her leaking to anyone.” She is “devastated,” Cobb says, that her long career will “forever be linked with misinformation about the reasons for her termination,” and that her firing was “certainly not for the reasons attributed to the agency.” Cobb notes that McCarthy is only 10 days short of retirement, and says, “Her hope had been to leave with her dignity and reputation intact, which obviously did not happen.” McCarthy has planned for some time to leave the agency and become a public interest lawyer. Her retirement process began well before the CIA began investigating the Post leaks. [New York Daily News, 4/22/2006; National Journal, 4/25/2006; Washington Post, 4/25/2006]
Aggressive Internal Probe - The CIA has conducted an aggressive internal investigation, administering polygraph tests to McCarthy and numerous other officials. “This was a very aggressive internal investigation,” says a former CIA officer. “[CIA Director Porter] Goss was determined to find the source of the secret jails story.” [New York Times, 4/21/2006] The agency has not asked the Justice Department to open a formal probe into the allegations against McCarthy, and resultingly, few expect that criminal charges will be filed against her or any others who may be accused of leaking information. [Washington Post, 4/25/2006] The Justice Department has already opened a probe of the leaks surrounding the Post stories, but no word of the results of that probe has been revealed. No reporters have been interviewed about the leaks: Post spokesman Eric Grant says, “No Post reporter has been subpoenaed or talked to investigators in connection with this matter.” Post executive editor Leonard Downie Jr. says that he cannot comment on the firing, but “[a]s a general principle, obviously I am opposed to criminalizing the dissemination of government information to the press.” [New York Times, 4/21/2006]
McCarthy Often Spoke to Reporters - A former CIA official tells a reporter that part of McCarthy’s job was to talk to the press in authorized interviews. “It is not uncommon for an officer, when they are designated to talk to the press, to let something slip, or not report every contact.” Former Deputy CIA Director Richard Kerr says of McCarthy: “She was a very qualified analyst in a variety of jobs. She had strong views sometimes, but I don’t know anyone who would describe her as a zealot or ideologue.”
CIA Officials Often 'Ignored' When Attempting to Bring Up Issues - Kerr adds that if McCarthy did leak classified information to the press, she behaved wrongly and should be held accountable. “If she believed there was something morally wrong or illegal going on, there were mechanisms within the system to go up the line, or complain,” he says. “The other possibility for her or anyone else is to quit and speak once you are outside.” Former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official Larry Johnson disagrees, saying: “During this administration, there have been any number of CIA officers who have brought up issues through channels internally. There have been intelligence officers who have brought up things within their own agencies, and even spoken to Congressional intelligence committees or presidential commissions. But they have found themselves completely ignored.” [National Journal, 4/25/2006] A former intelligence official who knows McCarthy says: “Firing someone who was days away from retirement is the least serious action they could have taken. That’s certainly enough to frighten those who remain in the agency.” [Washington Post, 4/25/2006]
Senator Praises Firing - Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, praises the CIA’s action. However, he is allegedly guilty of a far worse intelligence leak (see April 21, 2006).
Critics Claim Partisan Basis for Leaked Information - Some supporters of the Bush administration will claim that McCarthy’s leaks were politically motivated, and will point to the fact that in 2004, McCarthy contributed $2,000 to the presidential campaign of Democrat John Kerry (D-MA). [Washington Post, 4/25/2006] Columnist Melanie Morgan will accuse McCarthy of having “leftist ties,” and calls her a “revolting… liberal Democrat [sic] activist” who colluded with Priest, another “leftist,” to publish information that would “undermine America’s fight against terrorism.” She will also accuse McCarthy and Priest of working to help defeat Senator Curt Weldon (R-PA) in his 2006 re-election bid, and of having “suspicious” ties to Sandy Berger, the Clinton administration’s national security adviser, and former counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke. She concludes: “The Clintonites are so desperate to regain power that they are willing to sell out our national security to do it. And the reporters who serve as agents for this effort are rewarded for executing their role in the effort.… And the people who are hurting America are being rewarded.” [WorldNetDaily, 4/28/2006]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), John Kerry, Leonard Downie, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency, Eric Grant, Larry C. Johnson, Dana Priest, US Department of Justice, Washington Post, Sandy Berger, Ty Cobb, Melanie Morgan, Mary McCarthy, Pat Roberts, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Richard A. Clarke, Richard Kerr, Porter J. Goss
Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties
A bipartisan group of senators headed by Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Kit Bond (R-MI) campaign to force the CIA to release the executive summary of a report by its inspector general about some aspects of its performance before 9/11. Wyden says, “It’s amazing the efforts the administration is going to stonewall this,” adding that he is considering linking acceptance of President Bush’s nominations for national security positions to the report’s release. Wyden also says that the report is not being kept secret for national security reasons, but merely to protect individuals from embarrassment. Apparently, some of the officials criticized in the report are still in “senior government positions.” The idea of releasing the executive summary is twice approved by the Senate before being made law in August 2007 (see August 8, 2007). [Associated Press, 5/18/2007]
Relatives of some of the victims of the 9/11 attacks call on the CIA to release a report drafted by its inspector general into some aspects of the agency’s failings before 9/11. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was not then released (see October 10, 2005). The call is backed by 15,000 signatures on a petition calling for the release. The victims’ relatives, Patty Casazza, Monica Gabrielle, Mindy Kleinberg, and Lorie Van Auken, say the report “is the only major 9/11 government review that has still not been made publicly available,” and quote Newsweek journalist Michael Isikoff saying that the main reason for the report’s non-release is “a desire to protect the reputations of some of the main figures [named in the report].” [Raw Story, 6/18/2007] This coincides with efforts by lawmakers to get part of the report published (see Spring-Summer 2007) and is eventually partially successful (see August 21, 2007).
Congressional legislation forces the CIA to declassify and release the executive summary of its inspector general’s report into some of its pre-9/11 failings. The legislation follows a long campaign by senators (see Spring-Summer 2007) and victims’ relatives (see June 18, 2007), and orders the CIA to release the summary within 30 days, together with a classified annex for Congress explaining the report’s redactions. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was then not released (see October 10, 2005). Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) says, “All I can say is that it’s an extraordinarily important, independent assessment, written with a specific purpose to learn how we can improve our security.” Senator Kit Bond (R-MI) points out that “this should have been declassified a long time ago.” [The Hill, 8/8/2007] The report is released two weeks later (see August 21, 2007).
CIA Director Michael Hayden releases a statement attacking the publication of the executive summary of a report by the CIA’s inspector general about some aspects of the agency’s performance before 9/11 (see August 21, 2007). Hayden lambasts the decision to publish it, saying it will “distract officers serving their country on the frontlines of a global conflict,” “consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed,” and have a “chilling effect” on officers. Hayden also says that the officers criticized in the report and others “took strong exception to its focus, methodology, and conclusions,” and that neither he nor his predecessor Porter Goss implemented the report’s main finding (see October 10, 2005)—accountability boards to assess the performance of the officers who performed poorly before 9/11. Instead, Hayden praises these officers, saying they “worked flat out” and that their “skill, wisdom, energy, and leadership” made “powerful contributions to our national security.” Despite refusing to convene the accountability boards or even name most of the employees who performed poorly, Hayden remarks, “This is not about avoiding responsibility,” arguing that the CIA has already discussed failings in some of its programs before 9/11. [Central Intelligence Agency, 8/21/2007]
The media’s reaction to the release of a redacted summary of a report by the CIA’s inspector general about some aspects of the agency’s performance before 9/11 is mixed. Different outlets highlight different aspects of the story, for example:
Newsweek calls it “withering” and says that it shows that “the CIA under [Director George] Tenet’s leadership repeatedly blew opportunities to disrupt the al-Qaeda network—and possibly even penetrate the 9/11 plot itself—because of ‘mismanagement,’ a lack of strategic direction and a ‘systemic breakdown’ within the agency’s Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC).” Newsweek also points out the report is bad for current CIA Director Michael Hayden, also a former NSA director, as the NSA did not work well with the CIA before 9/11, and former president Bill Clinton, whose instruction to assassinate bin Laden was allegedly unclear. [Newsweek, 8/21/2007]
The New York Times’ story starts with problems understanding intelligence about alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see 1997 or After), followed by the revelation that dozens of CIA officers read cables about travel by two of the hijackers to the US in 2000 (see Mid-January-March 2000), and the proposal that accountability boards be convened to review the performance of some employees, including Tenet. [New York Times, 8/22/2007]
ABC focuses on the report’s criticism of Tenet, saying that he “‘bears ultimate responsibility’ for failing to create a strategic plan to stop al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.” [ABC News, 8/21/2007]
The Guardian leads with the story about the cables reporting the hijackers’ travel being read by dozens of officers. [Guardian, 8/22/2007]
Former CIA Director George Tenet attacks a report by the CIA’s inspector general into the agency’s failings related to al-Qaeda prior to 9/11, a classified summary of which has just been released (see August 21, 2007). Tenet, who was both praised and criticized in the report, compares it unfavorably to a previous inspector general’s report on the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, and says the inspector general’s statement that he did not have a strategic plan to fight terrorism and did not use resources correctly is “flat wrong.” Tenet also says that an effort by one of his subordinates to collect information about Osama bin Laden that was praised by the inspector general was done at his request. In addition, Tenet says he worked hard to obtain money for counterterrorism at the CIA—although the inspector general found that not all the money obtained was actually spent on counterterrorism (see 1997-2001)—and that the report “vastly under appreciates the challenges faced and heroic performance of the hard working men and women of the CIA in general and CTC in specific.” [George J. Tenet, 8/21/2007]
A redacted summary of a report by the CIA’s inspector general into some aspects of the agency’s pre-9/11 performance is released. The report’s main points are:
No CIA employees violated the law or were guilty of misconduct in the run-up to 9/11;
However, some officials did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner. The report recommended accountability boards be convened to review their performance, but former CIA Director Porter Goss decided against this recommendation in 2005 (see October 10, 2005);
There was no “silver bullet” that could have prevented 9/11, but if officers had performed satisfactorily, they would have had a better chance of stopping the attacks;
The CIA had no comprehensive strategy to combat al-Qaeda before 9/11 (see After December 4, 1998 and Between Mid-December 2002 and June 2004);
Management of counterterrorism funds was poor (see 1997-2001);
Arguments between the CIA and NSA negatively impacted counterterrorism efforts (see December 1996, Late August 1998, and 2000);
Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was well-known to the CIA before 9/11, but his case was badly handled (see 1997 or After);
There were numerous failures related to the CIA’s monitoring of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see Mid-January-March 2000, 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, Mid-July 2004, (After January 6, 2000), and March 5, 2000);
The CIA also missed “several additional opportunities” to watchlist Pentagon hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 8, 2000 and August 23, 2001). Such watchlisting could have led to them being denied entry, or being placed under surveillance in the US;
The CIA was confused about whether it was authorized to assassinate Osama bin Laden or not (see Mid-August 1998, December 24, 1998, December 26, 1998 and After, February 1999, February 1999, and December 1999);
There were various problems with assets and operations linked to foreign services. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005 ]
The media picks various angles in commenting on the report (see August 21, 2007), which is criticized by current CIA Director Michael Hayden (see August 21, 2007) and former Director George Tenet (see August 21, 2007).
CIA Director Michael Hayden orders an unusual internal investigation of the agency’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the press will later learn. The OIG, led by Inspector General John Helgerson, has conducted aggressive investigations of the CIA’s detention and interrogation programs (see May 7, 2004). Current and former government officials say that Hayden’s probe has created anxiety and anger in the OIG, and has sparked questions in Congress of possible conflicts of interest. The review is focusing on complaints that the OIG has not been, as the New York Times reports, a “fair and impartial judge of agency operations,” but instead has “begun a crusade against those who have participated in controversial detention programs.” Some current and former officials say that such a probe threatens to undermine the independence of the office. Former CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz, who served from 1990 through 1998, says any move by Hayden to conduct a probe into the OIG would “not be proper.” Hitz calls it “a terrible idea,” and adds: “Under the statute, the inspector general has the right to investigate the director. How can you do that and have the director turn around and investigate the IG?” A CIA spokesman says Hayden’s only motive is “to help this office, like any office at the agency, do its vital work even better.” The investigation is being overseen by Robert Deitz, a trusted aide to Hayden who served with him when he ran the National Security Agency. Another member of the investigating group is Associate Deputy Director Michael Morrell. Under the law, the proper procedure for Hayden would be to file complaints with the Integrity Committee of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which oversees all the inspectors general, or to go directly to the White House. For an internal inquiry to be launched against an agency’s OIG by the agency head violates the independence and the position of the OIG. Critics say that the timing of Hayden’s investigation is more than coincidental, as Helgerson’s office is readying a number of reports on CIA detention, interrogation, and rendition practices. [New York Times, 10/11/2007]
The Justice Department’s National Security Division and the CIA’s inspector general conclude their preliminary inquiry into the destruction of CIA videotapes showing the interrogation of detainees Abu Zubaida and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see December 7, 2007 and Shortly After). They report that there is enough evidence to start a criminal investigation, but do not say for certain that a crime has been committed. [Salon, 1/2/2008] A prosecutor is appointed to head the investigation (see January 2, 2008).
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