Profile: Office of the Inspector General (US Army )
Office of the Inspector General (US Army ) was a participant or observer in the following events:
Members of the Army Inspector General’s Office travel to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to investigate indications of corruption within the highly secretive Continuity of Government (COG) program, commonly referred to as the Doomsday project, which is designed to keep the government functioning in times of emergency. The investigators approach veteran Army intelligence officer Tom Golden, who was assigned to a watchdog position within the secret program in 1984 (see January 1984). Golden informs the Army Inspector General’s Office of several instances of waste, fraud, and abuse inside his unit at the base (see July 1987). He speaks personally with chief of the inspector general’s intelligence oversight division, Colonel Ned Bacheldor, who assures Golden his status as a whistleblower will be kept confidential. Bacheldor will in fact leak Golden’s name to members of the COG program, who will in turn launch a retaliatory smear campaign against Golden (see After July 1987). Bacheldor leaves the Army Inspector General’s Office midway through the investigation to join the COG unit at Fort Huachuca. The Army Inspector General’s Office expands its investigation to include the leak, but word of the new investigation is released to those on the base. Before investigators can be dispatched, members involved with the COG project at Fort Huachuca destroy documents pertaining to the probe. Despite facing several obstacles, the investigation concludes that two recently awarded no-bid contracts are illegal and whistleblower Tom Golden has been targeted for retaliation. The contracts are canceled and a high-ranking general is reprimanded, but questionable practices will continue within the program and the smear campaign against Golden will last for years (see After July 1987). “The Army couldn’t even stop what was going on,” Golden will tell CNN in 1991. “It was a program the Army did not have jurisdiction over.” The House Armed Services Committee will have similar troubles investigating Golden’s case, but will reach conclusions similar to the Army (see Summer 1988-1989). [Emerson, 8/7/1989; CNN Special Assignment, 11/17/1991]
Longtime US Army intelligence officer Tom Golden, who is currently acting as a watchdog within the ultra-secretive Continuity of Government (COG) program (see January 1984), notifies the Army Inspector General’s Office of several instances of waste, fraud, and abuse within the highly classified COG project. Golden additionally speaks in confidence about his findings to the chief of the inspector general’s intelligence oversight division, Colonel Ned Bacheldor. Golden tells the Inspector General’s Office that contracts are being awarded based on personal relationships among military officials and company employees. He says government personnel have rotating careers at contracted companies and some are being hired at excessive rates for limited work. Golden says the multi-billion dollar communication system at the heart of the COG program does not function properly and is costing exorbitant amounts of money to fix, and alleges the problems are being covered up by military officials (see Late 1985 and December 1990). Golden reports a high-ranking officer within the COG program, Brigadier General Eugene Renzi, who was awarded a multimillion-dollar no-bid contract to the BETAC Corporation, which employed the general’s son. US News and World Report describes BETAC as a “consulting firm composed of former intelligence and communications specialists from the Pentagon.” Golden also notes the BETAC contract included $400-a-day consultant jobs for several COG officials, including one of Renzi’s aides. As a result of Golden’s report, two contracts will be found to be illegal and will be subsequently canceled. Renzi will also be reprimanded. The Army assures Golden his name will remain confidential, but his status as a whistleblower will be leaked weeks later by Bacheldor, who will soon leave the Inspector General’s Office to join the COG program. Golden will soon become the target of a retaliatory smear campaign led by members of the secret project, including Renzi and Bacheldor (see After July 1987). [Philadelphia Inquirer, 12/16/1990; Knight Ridder, 12/18/1990; CNN Special Assignment, 11/17/1991]
Members of the House Armed Services Committee investigate a smear campaign against veteran US Army intelligence officer and whistleblower Tom Golden, who was assigned to a watchdog post within the highly secretive Continuity of Government (COG) program in 1984 (see January 1984) and informed the Army Inspector General’s Office of several instances of waste, fraud, and abuse within his unit at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in July 1987 (see July 1987). Golden was removed from his position shortly after speaking to Army investigators and has since been targeted by members of the COG program for further retaliation (see After July 1987). Attempts by the committee to investigate claims of retaliation against Golden are thwarted by the secrecy of the program. Most of the congressmen lack the necessary security clearances to hear testimony on the COG project. Still, in a classified 1989 report, the House Armed Services Committee will conclude that Golden is the target of a lengthy and deliberate smear campaign. The Army Inspector General’s Office has reached a similar conclusion (see Summer 1987), as will the Justice Department (see January-November 1990). Despite the findings, the effort to discredit Golden will continue for years (see August 1990). During the investigation, the Congressional committee learns enough to fear for Golden’s safety and urges the Army to transfer him to Huntsville, Alabama, which it does. [Philadelphia Inquirer, 12/16/1990; Knight Ridder, 12/18/1990; CNN Special Assignment, 11/17/1991]
US Representative Lester Aspin (D-WI), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, sends a letter to Army Secretary John Marsh criticizing the Army Inspector General’s Office for failing to keep the identity of a key whistleblower confidential and for botching an investigation into corruption within the highly secretive Continuity of Government (COG) program (see Summer 1987). The House Armed Services Committee is currently investigating the case of Army intelligence officer Tom Golden, who was retaliated against after revealing to Army investigators several instances of waste, fraud, and abuse within the COG unit stationed at Fort Hauchuca, Arizona (see July 1987 and After July 1987). Aspin expresses “concern about the objectivity and competence of the investigation,” noting that “confidentiality was breached almost immediately by the head of the inspector general inspection team,” referring to Colonel Ned Bacheldor, formally the chief of the inspector general’s intelligence oversight division, who spoke with Golden personally and later leaked his identity to the very officers Golden had implicated. Bacheldor left the inspector general’s office midway through the investigation of Golden’s case to join the COG unit at Fort Hauchuca. Aspin’s committee will conclude that Golden is the victim of a retaliatory smear campign led in part by Bacheldor. The Army Inspector General’s Office has reached a similar conclusion (see Summer 1987), as will the Justice Department (see January-November 1990), but the effort to discredit Golden will continue (see August 1990). [Emerson, 8/7/1989; Philadelphia Inquirer, 12/16/1990; Knight Ridder, 12/18/1990]
Security is extremely poor at USAMRIID, the Fort Detrick, Maryland, laboratory linked to the 2001 anthrax attacks, as well as other bio-weapons facilities, in the years prior to the anthrax attacks. The security flaws are documented in two reports that will be completed in 2002. One report will be produced by Sandia National Laboratories, which focused on USAMRIID, and the other by the US Army Inspector General’s office, which examined security at Fort Detrick, as well as other locations, including Battelle Memorial Institute. The existence of these reports will first be disclosed in a joint news report by McClatchy Newspapers, ProPublica, and PBS’s Frontline. According to the McClatchy/ProPublica/PBS article, the reports “describe a haphazard system in which personnel lists included dozens of former employees, where new hires were allowed to work with deadly germs before background checks were done, and where stocks of anthrax and other pathogens weren’t adequately controlled.” Additionally, “The existing security procedures… were so lax they would have allowed any researcher, aide, or temporary worker to walk out of the Army bio-weapons lab at Fort Detrick, Md., with a few drops of anthrax.” The FBI will later claim to have identified, and eliminated as suspects, 419 people at Fort Detrick and other locations who either had access to the lab where Bruce Ivins worked, or who had received samples from anthrax flask RMR-1029. The FBI and Justice Department will claim that RMR-1029 was the source of the anthrax used in the attacks, and that Ivins was the sole perpetrator of the attacks (see August 6, 2008). Both of these claims will be called into question (see August 1-10, 2008, August 3-18, 2008, August 5, 2008, August 9, 2008, April 22, 2010, and February 15, 2011). [Propublica, 10/24/2011]
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) releases documents that provide evidence of a possible cover-up of Iraqi prisoner abuse by American personnel in 2003. The documents detail US Army Office of Inspector General investigations by three high-ranking Army officials: Major General Barbara Fast, then the top intelligence officer in Iraq (see December 2003); Major General Walter Wojdakowski; and former CENTCOM head Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. The documents suggest that these three flag officers failed to act promptly when informed of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. They also show that an Army investigator found that the conditions of prisoners held in isolation at the Iraqi prison qualified as torture. “These documents make clear that prisoners were abused in US custody not only at Abu Ghraib, but also in other locations in Iraq,” says ACLU official Amrit Singh. “Rather than putting a stop to these abuses, senior officials appear to have turned a blind eye to them.” The documents also show that Major General George Fay (see August 25, 2004) found the conditions of prisoners held in isolation at Abu Ghraib to be torture: “[W]hat was actually being done at Abu Ghraib was they were placing people in their cells naked and they were—those cells they were placing them in, in many instances were unlit. No light whatsoever. And they were like a refrigerator in the wintertime and an oven in the summertime because they had no outside form of ventilation. And you actually had to go outside the building to get to this place they called the ‘hole,’ and were literally placing people into it. So, what they thought was just isolation was actually abuse because it’s—actually in some instances, it was torturous. Because they were putting a naked person into an oven or a naked person into a refrigerator. That qualifies in my opinion as torture. Not just abuse.” Fay also noted in the document that a memo from then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorizing removal of clothing created a ‘mindset’ in which that kind of humiliation was considered an “acceptable technique.” He noted that even though Rumsfeld later rescinded the memo (see August 25, 2004), not everyone received notice that the interrogation of naked prisoners was no longer permissible. [American Civil Liberties Union, 8/15/2007]
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