Profile: US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office
US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office was a participant or observer in the following events:  Michael Springmann. [Source: Michael Springmann]Michael Springmann, head US consular official in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, later claims that during this period he is “repeatedly ordered… to issue [more than 100] visas to unqualified applicants.” He turns them down, but is repeatedly overruled by superiors. [BBC, 11/6/2001; St. Petersburg Times, 11/25/2001] In one case, two Pakistanis apply for visas to attend a trade show in the US, but they are unable to name the trade show or city in which it will be held. When Springmann denies them a visa, he gets “an almost immediate call from a CIA case officer, hidden in the commercial section [of the consulate], that I should reverse myself and grant these guys a visa.” Springmann refuses, but the decision is reversed by the chief of the consular section. Springmann realizes that even the ambassador, Walter Cutler, is aware of the situation, which becomes “more brazen and blatant” as time goes on. On one occasion Springmann is even told, “If you want a job in the State Department in future, you will change your mind.” [CBC Radio One, 7/3/2002; Trento, 2005, pp. 344-6] Springmann loudly complains to numerous government offices, but no action is taken. He is fired and his files on these applicants are destroyed. He later learns that recruits from many countries fighting for bin Laden against Russia in Afghanistan were funneled through the Jeddah office to get visas to come to the US, where the recruits would travel to train for the Afghan war. According to Springmann, the Jeddah consulate was run by the CIA and staffed almost entirely by intelligence agents. This visa system may have continued at least through 9/11, and 11 of the 19 9/11 hijackers received their visas through Jeddah (see November 2, 1997-June 20, 2001), possibly as part of this program (see October 9, 2002 and October 21, 2002). [BBC, 11/6/2001; St. Petersburg Times, 11/25/2001; CBC Radio One, 7/3/2002; Associated Press, 7/17/2002  ; Fox News, 7/18/2002]
The 19 hijackers apply and receive a total of 23 visas at five different posts from November 1997 through June 2001. Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alnami, Saudi citizens, apply twice at Jeddah. Only Hanjour applies for a student visa, others for tourist/business visa. [United States General Accounting Office, 10/21/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 7-45 ]
 The fifteen Saudi hijackers apply for their visas in their home country. Four at the embassy in Riyadh: Hamza Alghamdi (10/17/2000), Mohand Alshehri (10/23/2000), Majed Moqed (11/20/2000) and Satam Al Suqami (11/21/2000). Eleven at the US consulate in Jeddah: Hani Hanjour (11/2/1997 and 9/25/2000), Khalid Almihdhar (4/7/1999 and 6/13/2001), Saeed Alghamdi (9/4/2000 and 6/12/2001), and Ahmed Alnami (10/28/2000 and 4/28/2001), Nawaf Alhazmi (4/3/1999), Ahmed Alghamdi (9/3/2000), Wail Alshehri (10/24/2000), Waleed M. Alshehri (10/24/2000), Abdulaziz Alomari (6/18/2001), Salem Alhazmi (6/20/2001), and Ahmed Alhaznawi (11/12/2000).
Fayez Ahmed Banihammad and Marwan Alshehhi apply in their home country, the United Arab Emirates, respectively at the US embassy in Abu Dhabi on 6/18/2001 and at consulate in Dubai on 1/18/2000.
Mohamed Atta (Egyptian) and Ziad Jarrah (Lebanese) apply, as third-country national applicants, at the US embassy in Berlin, respectively, on May 18 and 25, 2000. Entity Tags: US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office, US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, US Embassy in Berlin, Ziad Jarrah, Wail Alshehri, US Embassy in Riyadh, Salem Alhazmi, Waleed M. Alshehri, Saeed Alghamdi, US Consulate, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Office, Mohand Alshehri, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Ahmed Alnami, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Nawaf Alhazmi, Government Accountability Office, Satam Al Suqami, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Hamza Alghamdi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
  Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar’s US visas. [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge)9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar obtain US visas through the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [US Congress, 7/24/2003] Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi are already “al-Qaeda veterans” and battle-hardened killers. Almihdhar’s visa is issued on April 7, and he can thereafter leave and return to the US multiple times until April 6, 2000. [Stern, 8/13/2003] Nawaf Alhazmi gets the same kind of visa; details about Salem are unknown. All three men have indicators in their passports marking them as Islamist radicals (see March 21, 1999, April 4, 1999, and April 6, 1999). These indicators are used to track them by the Saudi authorities, but are apparently not noticed by US officials. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 9, 33 ] The CIA claims the hijackers then travel to Afghanistan to participate in “special training” with at least one other suicide bomber on a different mission. The training is led by Khallad bin Attash, who applies for a US visa on April 3 from Yemen, but fails to get one (see April 3, 1999). The CIA will learn about Almihdhar’s visa in January 2000 (see January 2-5, 2000). The Jeddah Consulate records the fact that Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi obtain US visas a couple of days before Almihdhar, but apparently these records are never searched before 9/11. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ]
A consular official who issues the hijackers with at least 11 US visas probably begins working at the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, before this date. The 9/11 hijackers will obtain at least 15 visas from this consulate, three in April 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999), seven in the fall of 2000 (see September 3, 2000, September 4, 2000, September 25, 2000, October 24, 2000, October 28, 2000, November 12, 2000), and five in the spring of 2001 (see April 23, 2001, May 2001, June 12, 2001, June 18, 2001, June 13, 2001, and June 20, 2001). At least 11 of these visas are issued by the same consular official. It is possible that the visa issued to Ahmed Alghamdi on September 3, 2000 is the first he issues to any of the hijackers. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 ] This consular official will not be named after 9/11 and it is not clear exactly which visas he issues, although the visas issued to Nawaf Alhazmi in April 1999 and Hani Hanjour in September 2000 are issued by different officials, who are interviewed after 9/11, so they cannot both be from him. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 36-7 ] It is possible that he issues the six visas given to the “muscle” hijackers in the fall of 2000 and the five more issued to them in the spring of 2001. In any case, the official(s) who issue these visas will apparently not be interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, which does, however, cite interviews with 14 other consular officials in its Terrorist Travel monograph. For example, interviews with the officers who issued non-Jeddah visas to Hamza Alghamdi, Satam al Suqami, Mohand Alshehri (all Riyadh), Marwan Alshehhi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad (both United Arab Emirates), Mohamed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah (both Berlin) are cited in the monograph. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 10-11, 14, 16, 25, 36-38, 41, 62, 145-7 ] During the Soviet-Afghan war, CIA officers posing as consular officers at the US consulate in Jeddah issued visas to unqualified applicants who appear to have been radical Islamist fighters (see September 1987-March 1989). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004 ] 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alghamdi obtains a visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, using a passport that is only 13 days old. It appears he is not interviewed. However, most young male Saudi visa applicants are interviewed around this time, because, according to a consular official who served there in late 1998, officials “[know] who Osama bin Laden is, they [know] he is dangerous, and they [are] concerned about the possibility that Saudi visa applicants might be intending to go to the United States to participate in terrorist attacks.” [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 13, 124 ] The visa may be issued by a consular official who issues the 9/11 hijackers with at least 11 US visas, although this is not certain (see Before September 3, 2000). 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi obtains a visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is likely that his visa is issued by the same consular official that issues at least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah (see Before September 3, 2000). However, Alghamdi will later get another visa using a different passport (see June 12, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will say that one or possibly both of his passports may have fraudulent features, presumably related to travel stamps, although it is not certain of this. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 525, 564; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24 ]  Hani Hanjour’s September 10 US visa application, which was rejected. The fact he requested permission to stay in the US for three years is highlighted on the right. [Source: National Review] (click image to enlarge)9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour applies for a US visa at the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Hanjour, who has already spent a good deal of time in the US (see October 3, 1991-February 1992, Spring 1996, October 1996-December 1997, and 1998), uses a passport issued on July 24, 2000. His application is incomplete, as he says he is a student, but fails to give his school’s name and address. His application is denied as he says he wants to stay for three years, raising concerns he might become an immigrant. After his application is screened, he is referred to a consular officer for an interview. Hanjour says he wants to attend flight school in the US, changing his status from “student” to “tourist” after arrival. However, the officer denies the visa application “because he has been in the States long enough to decide what he wanted.” Hanjour will return to the consulate two weeks later and successfully obtain a visa with a different application (see September 25, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 13, 174-5 ] The consular officer who denies this visa will later give mistaken testimony about it to the House Committee on Government Reform. He will claim that the application was made under the Visa Express program, and that he refused to issue the visa immediately because Hanjour applied for a tourist visa, but wanted to go to the US to study. He will say that the denial is “for administrative reasons” so that Hanjour has to come in for an interview. However, the 9/11 Commission will find that the date the application is made is the same date that it is rejected, so this consular officer must be mistaken about the application being made under the Visa Express program, which will not start until 2001 (see May 2001), as well as the reason for the denial. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 37-38 ]
9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour again applies for a US visa. An application two weeks earlier was rejected (see September 10, 2000), but he is successful this time. Hanjour apparently applies for a student visa, not a tourist visa, as he had done previously, saying he wishes to attend a language school in California. The consulate notes that Hanjour had previously been denied a visa, and the application is forwarded to the officer who issued the denial. The officer will later recall that Hanjour, or someone acting on his behalf, submits an I-20 INS school enrollment form, the documentation required for the visa: “It came to me, you know, at the end of the day to look at it. I saw he had an I-20 and it [his visa] was issued.” This allows Hanjour to overcome his previous rejection, as the two applications are treated as one case. The INS had approved a change of status for Hanjour to attend the same school in 1996, but the officer does not know of this. The officer will later say that, if he had known, he might have denied the visa. For some reason, the visa is incorrectly entered in the State Department’s records as a business/tourist visa, although a student visa is printed in Hanjour’s passport. Some change appears to be made in regard of the records upon Hanjour’s entry to the US later in the year (see December 8, 2000), and the 9/11 Commission will attempt to interview the primary inspector who makes this change. However, it will be unable to do so. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 13-14, 38 ] 9/11 hijacker Hamza Alghamdi obtains a US visa in Saudi Arabia. His application is incomplete, as he lists his occupation as student but fails to give his school’s address. It is also possible, but not certain, that he presents a passport containing fraudulent travel stamps associated with al-Qaeda. However, this is not recognized. He is not interviewed. The place in which the visa is issued is uncertain. The 9/11 Commission’s Terrorist Travel monograph will say that the visa was issued in Riyadh, but then say that the consular officer that issued the visa “told us that because of the workload in Jeddah, he rarely had time to thumb through passports.” [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 14 ] A stipulation about the hijackers submitted as evidence at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui will say that the visa was issued in Jeddah. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 32 ] A General Accountability Office review of the hijackers’ visas will say that the visa was issued in Riyadh. [United States General Accounting Office, 10/21/2002, pp. 46 ] At least 11 other visas issued to the hijackers were issued by a single consular official in Jeddah (see Before September 3, 2000). Using new passports obtained three weeks previously (see October 3, 2000), 9/11 hijackers Waleed and Wail Alshehri obtain tourist visas to the US. It is likely that the visas are issued by the same consular official that issues at least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah (see Before September 3, 2000). They make several errors in the applications, which should normally lead to them being rejected. They only give their employer’s/school’s address as “South city” and the address they will be staying at is “Wasantwn,” although they do not specify whether this is the city or the state. They also say they will stay for four to six months, although it is unclear how they will support themselves during this time and on Wail’s application form the consular official does not even bother to complete the section on checking the applicant has the necessary funds. In addition, they say they will arrive in the US “after two weeks”—presumably meaning two weeks after the visa’s application was filed. However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Waleed will arrive on April 23, 2001 and Wail will arrive on June 8, 2001 (see April 23-June 29, 2001). They appear to receive their visas on the same day they apply for them. [US Department of State, 10/24/2000; US Department of State, 10/24/2000; National Review, 10/9/2002] The 9/11 Commission will say that their passports may have fraudulent features, presumably related to travel stamps, although this is not certain. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4] 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami and candidate hijacker Mushabib al-Hamlan obtain US visas from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Alnami’s application is incomplete, as he lists his occupation as “student,” but does not provide a complete address for his school. He also gives his US address as “in Los Angeles” and writes that “my friend Moshibab” will be travelling with him. The 9/11 Commission will later suggest that his passport may contain fraudulent travel stamps associated with al-Qaeda, although this is not certain and is apparently not noticed at this time. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 ] The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alnami’s passports may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism, but this is not certain (see November 6, 1999 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 ] At least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether Alnami’s visa is issued by that officer or another one (see Before September 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 ] Before obtaining the visa, Alnami and al-Hamlan followed instructions given them by al-Qaeda leaders Mohammed Atef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and contacted future 9/11 hijacker Waleed Alshehri in Jeddah. They briefly share an apartment with Alshehri, who provides them with directions to the consulate and shows them how to fill out visa applications. Al-Hamlan will soon drop out of the plot after contacting his family. Alnami will later be said to fly to Beirut with the Alshehris (see Mid-November, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 526] 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alhaznawi obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is likely that the visa is issued by the same consular official that issues at least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah (see Before September 3, 2000). Alhaznawi may present a passport with fraudulent travel stamps and does not fully complete his application form, leaving blank the address of his school. He is not interviewed, although most Saudi males in his age group are interviewed at this time in Jeddah. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 15, 36, 180-1 ] The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that Alhaznawi’s passport may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism, but this is not certain (see Before November 12, 2000 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 ] After acquiring a new Saudi passport (see April 21, 2001), 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami obtains a new US visa in Jeddah, even though he already has a valid US visa in his old passport (see October 28, 2000). A handwritten note on his application indicates that Alnami is interviewed briefly, either by a consular officer or staff member.
Previous Visa - He also marks the “no” box in response to a question asking if he has ever applied for a US visa previously, but changes his answer to “yes,” possibly due to the brief interaction with the consular official. However, he fails to specify where he applied for the visa. Had he done so, it would have been clear that he was applying for another visa long before his previous visa had expired, which would have raised questions. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issuances, only refusals.
Not Interviewed - The 9/11 Commission will later say that Saudis were rarely interviewed at this time. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 21, 184-5 ] However, according to a consular officer serving in Jeddah at the time, while most Saudis may not have been interviewed, “the majority” of males traveling alone aged between 16 and 40 are interviewed and officers are “not shy” of turning them down on security grounds. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 36 ]
Suspicious Indicator in Passport - The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alnami’s passports may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism, but this is not certain (see April 21, 2001 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 ]
Possibly Same Consular Officer as Several Other Hijackers - At least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether Alnami’s visa is issued by that officer or another one (see Before September 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 ]  Saeed Algahdmi, in a video apparently made in the spring of 2001. [Source: As-Sahab]9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The application is made through the Visa Express program (see May 2001), using a passport issued two days earlier.
Lies on Application - He lies on his application form, claiming that he has never before applied for a US visa, when in fact he obtained one the previous year (see September 4, 2000). Fellow hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Ahmed Alnami make similar false statements on their visa applications around this time (see April 23, 2001 and June 13, 2001), although Alnami corrects his application. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issuances, only refusals. The 9/11 Commission will speculate that he lied on purpose to conceal the previous application. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24 ]
Fraudulent Features - The Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alghamdi’s passports may contain fraudulent features, but will claim that this is not certain as Alghamdi’s passport was not recovered after 9/11. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 42 ] This is an error by the Commission, as Alghamdi’s passport will actually be found after 9/11 and the Commission will be aware of this (see Shortly After September 11, 2001).
Same Consular Official - At least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether Alghamdi’s visa is issued by that officer or another one (see Before September 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 ]
KSM's Travel Agent - The travel agency used for the Visa Express application is Minhal Travel, which will also later be used by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to obtain a US visa (see July 23, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24, 29 ]
9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar obtains a second US visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His passport, which was issued two weeks previously (see June 1, 2001), lacks an expiry date, but contains an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation used by the Saudi authorities to track suspected radicals (see November 2, 2007). His application form is incomplete, as it lists his occupation as “businessman,” but does not give his employer’s name and address.
Lies on Application Form - The form, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001) meaning he is not interviewed, contains two lies: he says he has never received an American visa or traveled to the US, whereas he received a visa in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999) and traveled to the US on it in 2000 (see January 15, 2000). As Almihdhar’s first visa was also issued by the Jeddah consulate, through which the CIA sent radical Arabs to the US for training during the Soviet-Afghan war (see September 1987-March 1989), consular officials could discover he is lying, but information about prior visas issuances is not automatically displayed to them. At least eleven of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether this visa is issued by that officer or another one.
Known Terrorist - By this time several intelligence agencies are aware that Almihdhar is an al-Qaeda operative; for example, the CIA (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000), NSA (see December 29, 1999), FBI (see January 5-6, 2000), a US army intelligence program (see January-February 2000), the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (see 1997), Malaysian Special Branch (see January 5-8, 2000), and an intelligence service in the United Arab Emirates (see January 2-5, 2000)).
Parallels to Case of Blind Sheikh - Almihdhar re-enters the US on the visa three weeks later (see July 4, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will find that the series of missteps preceding the issuance of visas to Almihdhar and the other 9/11 hijackers has some “eerie parallels” to the “series of exceptional failures” that led to US visas being issued to Blind Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see December 15, 1986-1989 and July 1990). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24-27, 33, 49 ] 9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 525] His application is incomplete, as he lists his home address as the Alqudos hotel in Jeddah. He is not interviewed and the application is submitted by Attar Travel as a part of the Visa Express program (see May 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 25 ] Further, he leaves blank the fields for his sex, his wife’s name, and his school’s address, although he says he is a student. He claims to be a tourist, that he wants to stay two months from June 25, and that he will first stay at the JKK Whyndam hotel. [US Department of State, 6/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission will say Alomari’s passport contains fraudulent travel stamps whose use will subsequently be associated with al-Qaeda. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 25 ] At least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether Alomari’s visa is issued by that officer or another one (see Before September 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 ] 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There are some problems with his visa application, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001):
The application is incomplete;
He gives his occupation as “unemployed,” but this does not concern consular staff because Saudi Arabia is a rich country;
His passport is only four days old;
The passport contains a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism placed their by Saudi intelligence in order to track him (see June 16, 2001 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993); [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 25-6 ]
Some of the other hijackers who apply for visas around this time lie on their applications, claiming never to have received a US visa before, although the opposite is true (see April 23, 2001, June 12, 2001, and June 13, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will not discuss whether Alhazmi claims on this application to have received a US visa before or not, as the Commission will appear not to be aware of any such previous application by Alhazmi. However, according to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Alhazmi did previously obtain a US visa, in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999); [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004 ]
The NSA has been intercepting calls between Alhazmi and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen for at least two years (see Early 1999, Shortly Before December 29, 1999, and Summer 2000);
At least 11 of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether Alhazmi’s visa is issued by that officer or another one (see Before September 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 ] 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar reenters the US. The CIA and FBI have recently been showing interest in him, but have still failed to place him on a watch list of US-designated terrorists. Had he been placed on a watch list by this date, he would have been stopped and possibly detained as he tried to enter the US. He enters on a new US visa obtained in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on June 13, 2001. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 169 ]
Invalid Passport, Indicator of Terrorist Affiliation - His passport is invalid, as it lacks an expiry date. However, his passport does contain an indicator that he is a terrorist, an indicator used by the Saudi authorities to track his movements (see June 1, 2001 and July 4, 2001), but this indicator is not recognized by US officials. The precise state of US knowledge about the indicator at this time is not known (see Around February 1993). The CIA will learn of it no later than 2003, but will still not inform immigration officials then (see February 14, 2003). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 27 ] His visa application said that he had not previously been to the US, which is not true (see January 15, 2000), so his entry is illegal. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 351 ]
'Muscle' Have Already Arrived - The FBI will note that he returns just days after the last of the hijacker “muscle” has entered the US, and will speculate that he returns because his job in bringing them over is finished. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 169 ]
Source: Lists WTC as Destination - According to a stipulation introduced at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, he lists the Marriot Hotel in the World Trade Center complex as his destination, but does not stay there that night. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 52 ] Abdulla Noman, a former employee of the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers got their visas, says that he took money and gifts to provide fraudulent visas to foreigners. He pleads guilty and is convicted. About 50 to 100 visas were improperly issued by Noman from September 1996 until November 2001, when he was arrested. However, a former visa officer in Jeddah, Michael Springmann, has claimed in the past that the Jeddah office was notorious for purposefully giving visas to terrorists to train in the US (see September 1987-March 1989). [Associated Press, 5/21/2002] Visa applications for the 15 Saudi Arabian hijackers are made public, and six separate experts agree: “All of them should have been denied entry [into the US].” Joel Mowbray, who first breaks the story for the conservative National Review, says he is shocked by what he saw: “I really was expecting al-Qaeda to have trained their operatives well, to beat the system. They didn’t have to beat the system, the system was rigged in their favor from the get-go.” A former US consular officer says the visas show a pattern of criminal negligence. Some examples: “Abdulaziz Alomari claimed to be a student but didn’t name a school; claimed to be married but didn’t name a spouse; under nationality and gender, he didn’t list anything.”
“Khalid Almihdhar… simply listed ‘Hotel’ as his US destination—no name, no city, no state but no problem getting a visa.” Only one actually gave a US destination, and one stated his destination as “no.” Only Hani Hanjour had a slight delay in acquiring his visa. His first application was flagged because he wrote he wanted to visit for three years when the legal limit is two. When he returned two weeks later, he simply changed the form to read “one year” and was accepted. The experts agree that even allowing for chance, incompetence, and human error, the odds were that only a few should have been approved. [National Review, 10/9/2002; New York Post, 10/9/2002; ABC News, 10/23/2002] In response to the revelation, the State Department says, “The fact is that with 20/20 hindsight, I’m sure one can always find a reason that you might have turned down a visa.” [Nation Review Online, 10/10/2002; State Department, 10/10/2002]
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