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President Bush is told that Flight 93 crashed a few minutes after it happened, but the exact timing of this notice is unclear. Because of Vice President Cheney’s earlier order, he asks, “Did we shoot it down or did it crash?” Several hours later, he is assured that it crashed. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush
According to Newsweek, “shortly after the suicide attacks,” US intelligence picks up communications among bin Laden associates relaying the message: “we’ve hit the targets.” [Newsweek, 9/13/2001]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US intelligence
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Armed agents deploy around the White House. [CNN, 9/12/2001]
Lt. Col. Steve O’Brien standing in front of a C-130. [Source: CBC]Cleveland Center air traffic controller Stacey Taylor has asked a nearby C-130 pilot to look at Flight 93’s last position and see if he can find anything. Remarkably, this C-130 pilot, Lt. Col. Steve O’Brien, is the same pilot who was asked by air traffic control to observe Flight 77 as it crashed into the Pentagon earlier on (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001). O’Brien tells Taylor that he saw smoke from the crash shortly after the hijacked plane went down. [Guardian, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] An article in the London Independent will later suggest that Flight 93 might have been brought down by the US military using “electronic warfare applications” that can disrupt the mechanisms of an airplane (See August 13, 2002); it will refer to this C-130, since “in 1995 the Air Force installed ‘electronic suites’ in at least 28 of its C-130s—capable, among other things, of emitting lethal jamming signals.” [Independent, 8/13/2002]
Entity Tags: Stacey Taylor, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Steve O’Brien
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania
According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center reports to FAA headquarters at this time that Flight 93 has crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside. “It hit the ground. That’s what they’re speculating, that’s speculation only.” The Command Center confirms that Flight 93 crashed at 10:17 a.m. [Guardian, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration
Two senior NORAD officials, Colonel Robert Marr and Major General Larry Arnold, have to address the possibility of issuing shootdown authorization to fighter jets under their command, after a report is received about an aircraft over the White House. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 224-225] Aircraft over White House - Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York, is in the NEADS battle cab. On the NEADS operations floor, mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany has just learned of a report of an aircraft flying over the White House (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001), and now talks to Marr over the phone. Nasypany asks: “Okay, did you hear that? Aircraft over the White House. What’s the word? Intercept and what else?” Marr has a phone to each ear and does not hear what Nasypany says. Nasypany therefore repeats, “Aircraft… over… the White House!” pausing on each word for emphasis. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 224] Commanders Discuss Shootdown Order - The news of an aircraft over the White House forces Marr and Arnold, with whom he has been communicating, to address the issue of authorizing the shooting down of aircraft. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 225] Arnold, the commander of NORAD’s Continental US Region (CONR), is at the CONR air operations center at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. [Code One Magazine, 1/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, he has not yet received any instructions from his higher-ups regarding shootdown authorization. “He talked to Major General Rick Findley,” who is at NORAD’s operations center in Colorado, “and asked him to get shootdown authority from the vice president, but he’s still heard nothing back.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 225] Arnold Possibly Authorizes Shootdown - Arnold will later tell author Leslie Filson that he has “the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 75] But according to Vanity Fair, he only passes the current request for rules of engagement further up his chain of command. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] However, Spencer will claim otherwise, stating, “In light of the imminent attack on the White House,” Arnold “decides he will exercise the authority he has to protect the nation in an emergency.” He tells Marr: “We will intercept and attempt to divert. If we can’t, then we’ll shoot it down.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 225] Alleged Shootdown Authorization Not Passed On - Minutes later, though, Nasypany will tell his staff that the pilots that took off from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington (see 10:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 31] And according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS only learns that NORAD has been given clearance to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then it does not pass this order along to the fighter pilots under its command (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42-43]
Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events
The mission crew commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) tells members of his staff that the fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 226-227] Marr Does Not Pass on Authorization - NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr has just been talking on the phone with Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of NORAD’s Continental US Region, and the two men have discussed whether fighters should be authorized to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (10:08 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to author Lynn Spencer, Arnold told Marr that if a suspicious aircraft cannot be diverted, “then we’ll shoot it down.” However, this is not the instruction that Marr then passes on to Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 225-227] Marr will later tell the 9/11 Commission that at this time, he “may have had the authority” to order a plane shot down, “but he never gave [Nasypany] clearance to fire.” Marr “does not believe at this point there was a clearance to ‘kill.’” [9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004 ] Order Issued: 'Negative Clearance to Fire' - Nasypany relays the instructions Marr gives him to those on the operations floor, saying: “Negative. Negative clearance to shoot.” He then adds: “ID. Type. Tail.” This means the orders are for fighter jets to identify aircraft by their type and tail number, and nothing more. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 46-47 ; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] About a minute later, Nasypany’s instructions will be passed to the Langley pilots (see 10:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003]
Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Kevin Nasypany
Dick Cheney in the White House bunker, speaking to administration officials including (from left) Joshua Bolten, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin (standing), Condoleezza Rice and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby. [Source: David Bohrer / White House] (click image to enlarge)The Secret Service, viewing projected path information about Flight 93, rather than actual radar returns, does not realize that Flight 93 has already crashed. Based on this erroneous information, a military aide tells Vice President Dick Cheney and others in the White House bunker that the plane is 80 miles away from Washington. Cheney is asked for authority to engage the plane, and he quickly provides it. The aide returns a few minutes later and says the plane is 60 miles out. Cheney again gives authorization to engage. A few minutes later and presumably after the flight has crashed or been shot down, deputy White House chief of staff Josh Bolten suggests Cheney contact President Bush to confirm the engage order. Bolten later tells the 9/11 Commission that he had not heard any prior discussion on the topic with Bush, and wanted to make sure Bush knew. Apparently, Cheney calls Bush and obtains confirmation (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] However, there is controversy over whether Bush approved a shootdown before this incident or whether Cheney gave himself the authority to make the decision on the spot. As Newsweek notes, it is a moot point in one sense, since the decision was made on false data and there is no plane to shoot down. [Newsweek, 6/20/2004]
Entity Tags: Secret Service, Joshua Bolten, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney
Unaware the aircraft has crashed, United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger instructs Flight 93 not to divert to Washington. At 10:10, he sends a text message to Flight 93, stating: “Don’t divert to DC. Not an option.” A minute later, he resends this same message to it. [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 46 ] Someone on Flight 93 had contacted the FAA at 9:30, requesting a new flight plan with the destination of Washington (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001), and at 9:55 the pilot hijacker reprogrammed the plane’s navigational system for the new destination of Washington’s Reagan National Airport (see 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). United Airlines will not confirm that Flight 93 has crashed until around 10:15 (see (10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and will notify its employees of this at 10:17 (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger
All US military forces are ordered to Defcon Three (or Defcon Delta), “The highest alert for the nuclear arsenal in 30 years.” [Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; CNN, 9/4/2002; ABC News, 9/11/2002; Clarke, 2004, pp. 15] Rumsfeld claims that he makes the recommendation, but it is hard to see how he can do this, at least at this time. He later asserts that he discusses the issue with acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers in the NMCC first. However, they do not arrive at the PEOC until about 10:30 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] At 10:15 a.m., the massive blast doors to US Strategic Command, headquarters for NORAD in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, are closed for the first time in response to the high alert. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002] In another account, acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers gives the Defcon order by himself. President Bush later contradicts both accounts, asserting that he gives the order. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ] According to the 9/11 Commission’s final report, though, the decision to go to Defcon Three takes place about 35 minutes later (see (10:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, National Military Command Center, Richard B. Myers, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Donald Rumsfeld, 9/11 Commission, US Strategic Command
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld
A weapons director at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) informs the fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) that they do not have permission to shoot down aircraft over Washington, though he is delayed in giving this instruction due to communications problems. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 45; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 227] Citino Cannot Reach Borgstrom - Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, has just told his staff that the Langley fighters have “negative clearance to shoot,” and the orders from higher headquarters are that the jets are to identify aircraft by their type and tail number, and nothing more (see 10:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). Now Master Sergeant Steve Citino, a NEADS weapons director, tries relaying these instructions to Captain Craig Borgstrom, one of the three Langley pilots. However, he cannot get through to him over the radio. According to author Lynn Spencer, this is because the “reception is weak over the Washington area, and NEADS loses the ability to communicate whenever [Borgstrom] flies below a certain altitude.” Citino complains to Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team: “I can’t talk to ‘em. They’re too low.” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 227] Citino Issues Instructions - Finally, about a minute after receiving the instructions from Nasypany, Citino reaches Borgstrom. He tells him, “Reiterating, mission is ID by type… divert if necessary.” Borgstrom acknowledges this instruction, telling Citino, “Quit 2-6 copies.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003] When two of the Langley pilots later discuss this day’s events at a news conference, they will say they “never received explicit orders to fire on incoming planes perceived to be hostile.” [New York Times, 11/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Steve Citino, James Fox, Craig Borgstrom
Someone from the 174th Fighter Wing, which is based at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base near Syracuse, NY, calls NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and speaks with Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander there. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001] Earlier on, shortly after seeing the second plane hitting the World Trade Center at 9:03, a commander of the 174th Fighter Wing called NEADS to offer fighter jets to help (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). They’d said: “Give me ten [minutes] and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 [minutes] and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; News 10 Now, 9/12/2006] Yet, now, more than an hour after the second attack, these fighters have still not been launched. Syracuse tells Nasypany, “I’ve got guys that’ll be launching in about 15 minutes.” Despite the earlier promise to have heat-seekers and slammers on the planes, Syracuse says: “We’ve got hot guns. That’s all I’ve got.” Nasypany says: “I’ve got another possible aircraft with a bomb on board. It’s in Pennsylvania, York, approximate area.” He adds that there is “another one, that’s possibly at Cleveland area.” These aircraft, he says, are United Airlines Flight 93 and Delta ‘89, respectively. (Although Flight 93 has already crashed, NEADS apparently does not learn of this until 10:15 (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001).) NEADS was alerted to Delta Flight 1989 at 9:41, and mistakenly suspects it has been hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Syracuse says: “I’ve got two jets right now. Do you need more than two?” After NEADS requests another two, Syracuse replies, “Get four set up, yep.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001] According to the Syracuse Post-Standard, the first fighters to launch from Hancock Field are two F-16s that take off at 10:42 a.m. A further three take off at about 1:30 p.m., and two more launch around 3:55 p.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/12/2001]
Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, 174th Fighter Wing
More prominent buildings in Washington begin evacuation. The United Nations building in New York City evacuates first; many federal buildings follow later. [CNN, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke apparently began arranging these evacuations a short time before this. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 14-15]
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, United Nations
The 9/11 Commission later concludes that if Flight 93 had not crashed, it would probably have reached Washington around this time. The commission notes that there are only three fighters over Washington at this time, all from Langley, Virginia. However, the pilots of these fighters were never briefed about why they were scrambled. As the lead pilot explained, “I reverted to the Russian threat… I’m thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know, you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the b_stards snuck one by us.… You couldn’t see any airplanes, and no one told us anything.” The pilots knew their mission was to identify and divert aircraft flying within a certain radius of Washington, but did not know that the threat came from hijacked planes. In addition, the commission notes that NEADS did not know where Flight 93 was when it crashed, and wonders if they would have determined its location and passed it on the pilots before the plane reached Washington. They conclude, “NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector
According to the 9/11 Commission, beginning at this time, the White House repeatedly conveys to the NMCC that Vice President Cheney confirmed fighters were cleared to engage the inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked. However, the authorization fails to reach the pilots. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, National Military Command Center
The wall where the Pentagon was hit before and after its collapsed at 10:15. [Source: Jason Ingersoll, public domain] (click image to enlarge)The front section of the Pentagon that had been hit by Flight 77 collapses. [CNN, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001] A few minutes prior to its collapse, firefighters saw warning signs and sounded a general evacuation tone. No firefighters were injured. [NFPA Journal, 11/1/2001]
Entity Tags: Pentagon
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon
According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS calls Washington flight control at this time. Asked about Flight 93, flight control responds, “He’s down.” It is clarified that the plane crashed “somewhere up northeast of Camp David.… That’s the last report. They don’t know exactly where.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The crash site is in fact about 85 miles northwest of Camp David. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001]
Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector
A message is put out on NORAD’s computer chat system, notifying its three air defense sectors in the US that peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) still apply, which means fighter jets are not permitted to shoot down hostile aircraft. As a 9/11 Commission memorandum will later describe, on the chat log it is reiterated at this time “that the defensive posture [is] still peacetime ROE.” The person or organization that issues this message is unstated. NORAD’s computer chat system allows those with the proper access to communicate with each other, similarly to the way members of the public do in Internet chat rooms. The NORAD system includes three main chat rooms. The message about the current rules of engagement goes out in the chat room for the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR). This is where CONR’s three sectors—including the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), which has been coordinating the military’s response to the hijackings—communicate with each other. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 ; Spencer, 2008, pp. 139] It is not until 10:31 a.m. that Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will issue an instruction over the chat system, stating that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42]
Blast doors at NORAD headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. [Source: Eugene Chavez]The FBI has issued a warning that a plane originating in San Diego might be hijacked and specifically targeting Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, where NORAD’s operations center is located. In response, the massive steel doors designed to protect the mountain from a nuclear blast are closed for the first time in its history. One report suggests, however, that these doors are closed in response to the US military being put on high alert (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The NORAD operations center is also informed that a Ryder rental truck driven by “Arab-looking men” and packed with explosives is heading their way. Lt. Col. William Glover, chief of NORAD’s air defense operations, says, “It didn’t make sense, but those phone calls were happening.” [Toronto Star, 12/9/2001; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; BBC, 9/1/2002]
Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command
With reports of another airplane headed toward Washingon, fire and rescue workers were directed to temporarily move away from the Pentagon. [Source: Jon Culberson] (click image to enlarge)At around 10:15 a.m., fire and rescue workers at the Pentagon in response to the attack there are evacuated away from the site, due to a warning of another hijacked aircraft flying towards Washington, DC, currently 20 minutes away. The warning is passed on by Special Agent Chris Combs, the FBI’s representative at the Pentagon crash site. Assistant Fire Chief James Schwartz then orders the fire and rescue personnel to evacuate to a highway overpass several hundred yards from the Pentagon. Combs receives the information about the inbound aircraft from the FBI’s Washington Field Office, which is in direct contact with the FAA. He then confirms it with the control tower at Washington’s Reagan National Airport. According to a report put out by the government of Arlington County, Virginia, updates are announced of the approaching aircraft “until the last warning when [it] went below radar coverage in Pennsylvania, an estimated 4 minutes flying time from the Pentagon.” [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A16 and A30; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 315] Yet if the timing of this account is correct, the approaching plane could not have been Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania considerably earlier (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Finally, Combs is informed by Jim Rice, his boss at the Washington Field Office, “You’re all clear.” Rice adds, incorrectly, “The plane hit Camp David.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 131] At 10:38, firefighters and rescue workers are allowed to return to the Pentagon and resume their activities. [Fire Engineering, 11/2002] There will be two more evacuations of the Pentagon site in the following 24 hours, also due to false alarms over reports of unidentified inbound aircraft (see (2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:00 a.m.) September 12, 2001).
Entity Tags: Chris Combs, Jim Rice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, James Schwartz
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Pentagon
Less than 30 seconds after hearing that Flight 93 has crashed, NEADS receives a call informing it of yet another suspected hijacking in its area. Although the skies will be clear of all commercial and private aircraft soon after midday, false reports of hijackings will continue well into the afternoon. For hours, fighters above New York and Washington DC (and later Chicago and Boston) will race around intercepting suspicious aircraft. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
In the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta track numerous suspicious aircraft. Mineta will recall that, even after the time Flight 93 went down in Pennsylvania: “we still had these unaccounted for aircraft. So the question was where are they and who are the targets for that?” He says that, at “about 10:30, 11 o’clock in the morning,” they are aware of “about seven or eight unaccounted-for aircraft.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Rice will describe: “There were false reports of planes, unidentified planes, squawking all over the place. We were doing many, many things, but we would write down on a yellow pad that these numbers are still out there.” [Bumiller, 2007, pp. xv] She recalls, “[F]or several hours the most difficult thing is that we didn’t know what else was coming because there were planes still in the air, we were trying to ground civil aviation, there were still planes in the air, some were supposedly not responding properly to command to go to the ground.” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/11/2002]
Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Norman Mineta
Two Pentagon police officers see people—some of them members of the military—stealing crash debris from in front of the Pentagon. After the Pentagon was hit, Lt. Robbie Turner had been helping the injured at a triage area. When, at around 10:15 a.m., reports are received of a possible second plane heading for the Pentagon (see (10:15 a.m.-10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he sets about evacuating people away from there. As this is going on, he later recalls: “[W]e had to try to collect up evidence, as much of the evidence as we possibly could. Take pictures of it or whatever.” However, some people are apparently trying to steal plane debris from the road in front of the Pentagon. According to Turner, “[W]e had to try to stop other people from pilfering the wreckage because, believe it or not, there were people—military personnel involved—you know, included, rather, that was picking up the wreckage of the plane from off the highway as we were running away.” [Library of Congress, 12/3/2001] Later on in the day, around 3:00 p.m., another Pentagon police officer, Roosevelt Roberts Jr., is called to the heliport near where the Pentagon was hit, and remains there for the next 13 hours. He will recall that, during this time, “we had a lot of people vandalizing, stealing evidence.” He does not specify who these people are, or what this “evidence” is that is being stolen and vandalized. [Library of Congress, 11/30/2001]
Entity Tags: Robbie Turner, Roosevelt Roberts Jr.
F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft at the 180th Fighter Wing. [Source: Jodi Joice / US Air Force]Two F-16 fighter jets take off from a military unit in Toledo, Ohio, in response to the morning’s attacks, but accounts will conflict over what their mission is and who the pilots are. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; Filson, 2003, pp. 71; WTOL, 9/11/2006] The 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard is based at Toledo Express Airport. Although the unit is not one of NORAD’s seven alert facilities around the US, it has recently received a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), requesting that it launch two of its fighters (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Airman, 12/1999; Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-179] The 180th Maintenance Squadron, which is responsible for maintaining the unit’s aircraft and equipment, was also contacted, and has loaded the F-16s’ guns with 500 rounds of 20-caliber ammunition. [180th Fighter Wing, 9/19/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006] Jets Head East - The two F-16s, which were being set up for training missions, now take off and head east. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] According to author Lynn Spencer, they are piloted by Scott Reed and Ed Rinke. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 179] However, a local television station will report that the pilots are Scott Reed and Keith Newell. [WTOL, 9/11/2006] Mission Unclear - It is unclear what role the two jets play in defending the nation. Toledo Air National Guard officials will later refuse to talk about this morning’s events, even in the general terms permitted by the military. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] According to Spencer, NEADS wanted the 180th FW jets to respond to Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is incorrectly thought to have been hijacked and will land in Cleveland at around 10:18 (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will similarly say the Toledo jets are ordered to intercept Delta 1989. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28; Spencer, 2008, pp. 177-178] But Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say the 180th FW was contacted “because we thought [Flight] 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 71] NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr will say the two F-16s “never had a track close enough that they were directed to engage. [But] if a valid direction had come from the appropriate level to engage a target, or shoot down a target at some time, they could have done that.” Response Is 'Very Quick' - Marr will describe the 180th FW’s response to NEADS’s request for assistance as “very, very, very quick.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] However, the fourth hijacked aircraft, Flight 93, has already crashed by the time the two jets take off (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30]
Entity Tags: Ed Rinke, Keith Newell, 180th Fighter Wing, Robert Marr, Scott Reed, Larry Arnold
Andy Studdert, the chief operating officer of United Airlines, sends out an operational alert message to the airline’s personnel, informing them of the crash of Flight 93. The message states: “UAL 93-11 EWR-SFO has been involved in an accident. Crisis center has been activated.” [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 47 ] Along with other United Airlines managers, Studdert watched Flight 93’s radar track as it came to a halt on a screen in the airline’s crisis center, at its headquarters outside Chicago (see (9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). By 10:15, United had learned from the manager of the Johnstown airport in Pennsylvania of a plume of smoke rising up in the area where Flight 93 crashed (see (10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Longman, 2002, pp. 77 and 214]
Entity Tags: Andy Studdert, United Airlines
The FAA finally joins an emergency teleconference being conducted by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon. The NMCC has been holding this teleconference since 9:29 a.m. It began as a “significant event” conference, but after eight minutes continued as an air threat conference call (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA has not been included in it until this time, because operators have had “equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers.” NORAD asked three times before 10:03 a.m., when the last hijacked plane crashed, to confirm the presence of FAA on the teleconference, to provide an update on hijackings, but without success. Furthermore, the FAA representative who now joins the teleconference has “no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials.” The highest level Defense Department officials rely on this teleconference to coordinate with their counterparts at the FAA. As a result of the FAA’s absence from it, the leaders of NORAD and the FAA have effectively been out of contact with each other. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37-38] General Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later write that the lack of communication with the FAA has contributed to confusion at the NMCC over the flight numbers of the aircraft that were hijacked. However, according to Myers, the NMCC could not contact the FAA over ordinary phone lines because “[t]errorists who could hijack aircraft so readily could probably also eavesdrop on unsecured phone lines.” [Myers, 2009, pp. 153]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Richard B. Myers, Federal Aviation Administration, National Military Command Center
An aircraft at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. [Source: Cleveland Plain Dealer]Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, a Boeing 767 out of Boston that is wrongly suspected of being hijacked (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), lands at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in Ohio, and is directed to a remote area of the airport. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001; USA Today, 8/13/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006] Plane Flies Long Path toward Airport - Delta Air Lines had been concerned about Flight 1989, and ordered it to land as soon as possible in Cleveland (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 167; USA Today, 9/11/2008] As it was heading in to land, air traffic controllers instructed Delta 1989 to follow a trajectory that initially took it far past Cleveland Airport. Unknown to the plane’s pilots, the controllers incorrectly believe the flight has been hijacked and contains a bomb, and they were therefore making time to evacuate the airport before the plane landed (see (9:50 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 191] Plane Directed to Remote Area - Once Delta 1989 is on the ground, the Cleveland Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) informs the FAA’s Cleveland Center that Delta 1989 is “on the ground at 1418,” where “1418” means 10:18 a.m. Cleveland Center asks, “Very safely too, I hope?” The TRACON responds that the plane is being taken to the bomb area to check. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001] Delta 1989 is directed to “taxi left onto taxiway Bravo and wait there.” This taxiway leads to a remote part of the airport that is far away from the terminal. The pilot does as instructed. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 229] Passengers Not Allowed Off - The pilots radio the airport’s air traffic control tower and say: “Just to make sure we don’t have any misunderstandings here, our flaps are up, we are landing only as a precaution at the company’s request. You understand that?” They ask if they are going to get to their gate soon, but the controller responds that city authorities are in charge and he believes people will be coming to search the aircraft. The controller advises that city authorities have said to keep the plane’s passengers on the aircraft for now. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001] The passengers and crew will have to remain on board for perhaps a couple of hours, until FBI agents allow them off (see 11:28 a.m.-12:23 p.m. September 11, 2001). [WKYC, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 270-271] Conflicting Reports of Landing Time - Subsequent accounts will give conflicting times for when Delta 1989 lands at Cleveland Airport. According to a detailed timeline provided by the airport’s control tower, the aircraft is “on the ground” at 10:18 a.m. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001] Several accounts will give similar landing times of between 10:05 a.m. and 10:10 a.m. [Federal Aviation Administration, 1/2/2002 ; USA Today, 8/13/2002] But a NORAD official will tell the 9/11 Commission that Delta 1989 landed at 9:47 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Other accounts will say it lands at between 10:33 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ]
Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Cleveland Terminal Radar Approach Control, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, David Dunlap, Paul Werner
In a phone call with Vice President Dick Cheney, President Bush authorizes the military to shoot down hostile aircraft. Minutes earlier, in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, a military aide had asked Cheney for the authority to engage what appeared to be an inbound aircraft, and Cheney had promptly given it (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). During a subsequent quiet moment, deputy White House chief of staff Josh Bolten, who is also in the PEOC, suggested to Cheney that he contact the president to confirm the engage order. Therefore at 10:18 a.m., according to White House logs, Cheney calls Bush, who is on board Air Force One, and speaks with him for two minutes. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer notes that at 10:20 a.m., Bush informs him that he has authorized the shootdown of aircraft, if necessary. According to the 9/11 Commission, “Fleischer’s 10:20 note is the first mention of shootdown authority.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41 and 465] Bush’s senior adviser Karl Rove, who is also on Air Force One, gives a similar account, later telling NBC News that “at about 10:20,” Bush goes from his office into the private cabin in front of it, “and took a phone call, and came back in and said that he had talked to the vice president and to the secretary of defense and gave the authorization that [the] military could shoot down any planes not under control of their crews that were gearing critical targets.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But other accounts indicate the president gives the shootdown authorization earlier than this. Bush and Cheney will claim that Bush gives the authorization during a call estimated to occur between about 10:00 and 10:15 (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40] Similarly, according to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, Bush gives it in a call with Cheney soon after 9:56, when Air Force One takes off (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 102; Woodward, 2002, pp. 17-18; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says it is given even earlier. He states that, at some point between about 9:38 and 9:56, he is instructed to tell the Pentagon it has authorization from the president to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC News, 11/29/2003; Clarke, 2004, pp. 8]
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Ari Fleischer
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney
Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, receives the order from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to launch all its available fighter jets. Commander Briefs Pilots - Six Otis pilots that were recalled from a training mission about an hour earlier (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and other pilots that have recently come to the base from their homes are gathered in front of the operations desk. Squadron commander Lt. Col. Jon Treacy tells them: “This is what we know. This is clearly a national emergency. Two aircraft have been hijacked and flown into the World Trade Center. The Pentagon has been attacked. We need to get all our jets ready to go because we’re not sure where this is heading. We have information that there are more coming.” He instructs the pilots: “You must be prepared to meet any surprise.… You may be taking out an airliner. You must engage. You cannot fail. Our nation is relying on us.” He gives them their assignments, saying whether they are required to fly now or whether they will be needed later on, to take over when other pilots have landed. Launch Order Received - Just after Treacy finishes giving his briefing, someone comes into the room yelling out that NEADS has called the base with important orders. The person says, “We have to get everything we have airborne now!” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 244-245] NEADS started contacting Air National Guard bases around the Northeast US by about 10:00 a.m., with the instruction to get their fighters airborne (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 180] Pilots Head out, but Most Jets Not Yet Armed - Treacy yells at his men, “Go, go, go!” and then the pilots run out to their aircraft. But, according to author Lynn Spencer, since the time the six pilots returned from their training mission, “there has not been time to do much more than fuel their jets.” Most of the base’s fighters “are still unarmed. Despite the furious pace of the weapons handlers, only a handful of jets have been uploaded with some armament.” The first two F-15s that take off in response to the NEADS order will both be unarmed (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 245-246] Two F-15s that are kept on alert at Otis Air Base took off at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20]
Entity Tags: Otis Air National Guard Base, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Jon Treacy
Fighter jets start taking off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, after NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) ordered the base to launch all its available aircraft (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the first of these jets are unarmed. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 245-246] The 102nd Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard operates from Otis, and is responsible for defending the northeastern US against various threats, including terrorist attacks. [Cape Cod Times, 9/12/2001; Cape Cod Times, 9/12/2001] The aircraft maintenance squadron officer started preparing the base’s F-15s for combat less than 15 minutes after the second attack in New York (see (9:15 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 155] But despite the reportedly “furious pace of the weapons handlers” who “hurried to fix all available jets with live weapons,” only a few jets have so far been loaded with any armament. [Cape Cod Times, 9/8/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 245] First Jets Have No Weapons - The first two fighter jets to take off are piloted by Dennis Doonan and Joe McGrady. As they are the first pilots to start their F-15s and taxi off the flight line (the parking and servicing area for aircraft), they are paired up. But Doonan suddenly realizes that, though he is being sent into a combat situation, his jet is unarmed. He radios McGrady and tells him, “I’m Winchester!” (“Winchester” is the code word for having no weapons.) McGrady’s aircraft is also unarmed, so he immediately radios squadron commander Lt. Col. Jon Treacy and in a panic tells him: “We’re Winchester, SOF [supervisor of flying]! We’re Winchester!” But Treacy instructs him: “Just go! You need to get airborne now!” McGrady and Doonan head out for takeoff, not knowing where they are going or what they will have to do, but realizing that if they have to take out a target, they must do so with their own aircraft. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 245-246] Another fighter jet, that of pilot Marty Richard, will subsequently take off with only one missile loaded instead of two. [Cape Cod Times, 9/11/2006] Takeoff Time Unclear - The exact time when Doonan and McGrady take off is unclear. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, it appears to be shortly after 10:20 a.m. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 244-246] One local resident will recall noticing increased activity around Otis Air Base at about 10:00 or 10:30 a.m., with fighter jets taking off in pairs. Another local resident sees “jets leaving all day long.” [Cape Cod Times, 9/12/2001] By 6:00 p.m., 21 of the 24 F-15s that are stationed at Otis will be airborne. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 281] The base’s two F-15s that are kept on alert took off at 8:46 a.m. in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20]
Entity Tags: Joe McGrady, Jon Treacy, Dennis Doonan, Otis Air National Guard Base
Patrick Madigan, the commander of the Somerset Barracks of the Pennsylvania State Police, arrives at the Flight 93 crash scene around 10:20 a.m. [Department of the Army and the Air Force National Guard Bureau, 2002 ] He says that at some point later in the day (he does not specify a time), a “strange incident” occurs: “We were there at the site and an airplane started circling. It was a jetliner circling the crash site very low. No one knew what to expect because we knew that all of the planes were supposedly grounded.” (The FAA had, at about 9:45 a.m., ordered that all aircraft be instructed to land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) After a few minutes of uncertainty, it is announced that the plane is carrying United Airlines executives, who are circling the site to view it before they land in nearby Johnstown. [Kashurba, 2002, pp. 63] Another low-flying jet plane was witnessed over the site earlier on, around the time Flight 93 went down (see (Before and After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Patrick Madigan, United Airlines
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania
The exterior wall on the south side of the World Trade Center’s North Tower apparently bows before the building collapses. The first inquiry into the collapse, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Society of Civil Engineers, states that the perimeter walls bow outward (see (9:21 a.m.-9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001)). However, a subsequent report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology states that the south wall of the North Tower bows inward. In places the wall is said to bow inward by approximately 55 inches at floor 97, and NIST interprets this bowing to mean that the floors must be sagging. NIST will find that the sagging and bowing are two of the seven major factors that led to the collapse of each tower, as the bowing walls are no longer able to support their share of the buildings’ weight, causing the buildings to tilt and the upper sections to fall. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 32-34, 87 ]
Entity Tags: World Trade Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center
Jane Garvey, head of the FAA, orders the diversion of all international flights with US destinations. Most flights are diverted to Canada. [CNN, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001; Time, 9/14/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001]
Entity Tags: Jane Garvey
Vice President Cheney pointing a finger inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center. Footage of the World Trade Center plays on the televisions in the background (exact time is unknown). [Source: White House]Those inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House learn that an aircraft is down in Pennsylvania. (This turns out to be Flight 93.) Many of the people in the PEOC wonder whether military fighters shot it down. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41] National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice later claims that, like her, Vice President Dick Cheney initially thinks, “it must have been shot down by the fighters.” [Hayes, 2007, pp. 339] However, Eric Edelman—Cheney’s national security adviser, who is also in the PEOC—will later recall: “The vice president was a little bit ahead of us.… He said, sort of softly, and to nobody in particular, ‘I think an act of heroism just took place on that plane.’” [CNN, 9/11/2002; CNN, 9/14/2002] Yet the Pentagon does not confirm that Flight 93 was not shot down until after midday (see (Shortly After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/31/2001] And the phone calls from Flight 93 that indicated a passenger revolt took place are only reported later on. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Eric Edelman
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney
United Airlines contacts American Airlines and notifies it of the crash of Flight 93. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 47 ] Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania shortly after 10:00 a.m. (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). United Airlines received confirmation of this by 10:15 (see (10:07 a.m.-10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: United Airlines, American Airlines
Almost all the occupants of the North Tower who are able to evacuate the building have done so. Only 107 occupants who were below the impact floors remain in the building, while around 7,400 have escaped. However, 1,355 building occupants in or above the impact zone have either already died or perish in the collapse, as do many emergency workers. Overall, 99 percent of building occupants below the impact floors escape to safety. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. xxxviii, 32 ] Most workers in the South Tower also left the building before it collapsed (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: World Trade Center
Some witnesses feel the ground shaking just before the north WTC tower starts collapsing: Fire Patrolman Paul Curran is in front of the US Customs House (WTC 6), next to the North Tower. He says, “all of a sudden the ground just started shaking. It felt like a train was running under my feet.… The next thing we know, we look up and the tower is collapsing.” [City of New York, 12/18/2001] EMS Lieutenant Bradley Mann is heading toward the EMS staging area on Vesey Street. He’d felt the ground shaking prior to the first collapse (see Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). He says, “The ground shook again, and we heard another terrible noise and the next thing we knew the second tower was coming down.” [City of New York, 11/7/2001] Jay Jonas is actually inside the North Tower, on its fourth floor. Seconds before the collapse he feels “a tremendous vibration and shaking; the floor began waving.” [Providence Journal, 9/11/2002]
Entity Tags: Jay Jonas, Bradley Mann, Paul Curran
Some witnesses to the collapse of the North Tower think it resembles a demolition using explosives: Fire Captain Dennis Tardio: “I hear an explosion and I look up. It is as if the building is being imploded, from the top floor down, one after another, boom, boom, boom.” [Smith, 2002, pp. 18] Assistant Fire Commissioner James Drury: “[P]eople in the street and myself included thought that the roar was so loud that the explosive—bombs were going off inside the building.” [City of New York, 10/16/2001] Firefighter James Curran: “I heard like every floor went chu-chu-chu. Looked back and from the pressure everything was getting blown out of the floors before it actually collapsed.” [City of New York, 12/30/2001] EMS Captain Karin Deshore: “Somewhere around the middle of the World Trade Center, there was this orange and red flash coming out. Initially it was just one flash. Then this flash just kept popping all the way around the building and that building had started to explode. The popping sound, and with each popping sound it was initially an orange and then a red flash came out of the building and then it would just go all around the building on both sides as far as I could see. These popping sounds and the explosions were getting bigger, going both up and down and then all around the building. I went inside… and I said I think we have another major explosion.” [City of New York, 11/7/2001] The National Institute of Standards and Technology, in its report on the towers’ collapse, will reject suggestions that the Twin Towers were brought down with explosives (see August 30, 2006). [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 8/30/2006]
Entity Tags: Karin Deshore, James Drury, World Trade Center, Dennis Tardio, James Curran
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation
The North Tower collapses in a matter of seconds. [Source: Ray Stubblebine/ Reuters/ Landov] (click image to enlarge)The North Tower of the World Trade Center tilts to the south and then collapses. Its north side was hit by Flight 11 at 8:46, 102 minutes earlier. [CNN, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; Kim and Baum, 2002 ; Associated Press, 8/21/2002; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 33 ] After the antenna starts to move (see (10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001)), the next sign that the top section of the building is moving downward is on floor 98, at the top of the impact zone. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 22, 87 ] The angle of the tilt will be disputed after 9/11 (see September-November 2005), as will the time it takes the towers to fall to the ground (see September 12, 2001-September 2005). [Scientific American, 10/9/2001; Eagar and Musso, 12/2001; PBS Nova, 5/2002; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 8/30/2006] The death toll could have been much worse—an estimated 15,000 people made it out of the WTC to safety after 8:46 a.m. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/8/2002]
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, Key Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center
Carol Marin. [Source: Columbia Journalism Review]CBS News correspondent Carol Marin witnesses what she describes as a “gigantic fireball” coming from the base of the North Tower as it starts to collapse. [USA Today, 9/11/2001; Chicago Sun-Times, 9/12/2001; Daily Herald (Arlington Heights), 9/11/2002] Marin headed to the scene of the attacks and arrived on West Street after the South Tower collapsed. She then sees the second tower come down, later describing, “I was only a block or two away from the North Tower when the street trembled under my feet, a fireball of pooled jet fuel exploded out of the building’s base, and it too, unbelievably, started to collapse right in front of me.” [Chicago Sun-Times, 9/10/2006] (However, the explosion could not be due to “pooled jet fuel,” as, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “The jet fuel” from the planes “was mostly consumed within the first few minutes after impact.” [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 6/18/2004; New York Times, 4/5/2005] ) In one telling, Marin describes, “a roar seemed to come out of the earth,” causing the fireball. [Gilbert et al., 2002] In another, she says, “there was a roar, an explosion, and we could see coming toward us a ball of flame, stories high.” She runs, and a firefighter throws her against a building to protect her. She recalls, “The flame somehow stopped short of us.” [CBS News, 2002, pp. 54] Other witnesses also describe the ground shaking before the North Tower collapse (see Shortly Before 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). And some witnesses similarly report seeing a fireball at ground level coming from the South Tower when it collapsed (see Shortly Before 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Carol Marin
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center
Fire Lieutenant Gregg Hansson [Source: BBC]Many witnesses hear explosions during the collapse of the north WTC tower. Some report hearing a single explosion: Reporter Mike Sheehan hears “another deafening explosion. I looked up and saw the top of the North Tower, the mast, begin to fall.” [Gilbert et al., 2002, pp. 126] Fire Lieutenant William Wall: “[W]e heard an explosion. We looked up and the building was coming down right on top of us.” [City of New York, 12/10/2001] Firefighter Roy Chelsen: “All of a sudden we heard this huge explosion, and that’s when the tower started coming down.” [City of New York, 1/18/2002] EMT Jason Charles: “I heard a ground level explosion and I’m like holy shit, and then you heard that twisting metal wreckage again.” [City of New York, 1/23/2002] Firefighter Kevin Murray: “When the tower started—there was a big explosion that I heard and someone screamed that it was coming down.” [City of New York, 10/9/2001] Firefighter James Ippolito: “I heard an explosion and turned around and the building was coming down.” [City of New York, 12/13/2001] Fire Lieutenant Gregg Hansson: “[A] large explosion took place. In my estimation that was the tower coming down, but at that time I did not know what that was. I thought some type of bomb had gone off.” [City of New York, 10/9/2001] Firefighter Kevin Gorman: “I heard the explosion, looked up, and saw like three floors explode, saw the antenna coming down.” [City of New York, 1/9/2002] Others report hearing multiple explosions: EMT Gregg Brady: “I heard 3 loud explosions. I look up and the North Tower is coming down now.” [City of New York, 11/1/2001] Firefighter Richard Carletti: “I remember seeing the antenna do a little rock back and forth and I could just hear the floors pancaking. I heard it for about 30 pancakes, just boom, boom, boom, boom.” [City of New York, 1/2/2002] Fire Lieutenant Michael Cahill: “That’s when the second collapse started to come down. All kinds of noise. Boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, very loud.” [City of New York, 10/17/2001] Firefighter Sal D’Agostino is actually inside the North Tower, around its fourth floor, when the collapse occurs. He says, “It’s pancaking from the top down, and there were these huge explosions—I mean huge, gigantic explosions.” [Providence Journal, 9/11/2002; Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 241-242] Firefighter Bill Butler, who is with D’Agostino inside the tower, says, “It was like a train going two inches away from your head: bang-bang, bang-bang, bang-bang.” [Providence Journal, 9/11/2002] EMT David Timothy: “[Y]ou started hearing more explosions. I guess this is when the second tower started coming down.” [City of New York, 10/25/2001] CTV will later assert, “When eyewitnesses claim to have heard explosions prior to the collapse, those were just the sounds of a massive building contorting and crushing anything inside.” [CTV, 9/12/2006]
Entity Tags: Jason Charles, Roy Chelsen, James Ippolito, Bill Butler, David Timothy, Kevin Gorman, Kevin Murray, Mike Sheehan, Gregg Brady, World Trade Center, Michael Cahill, William Wall, Richard Carletti, Gregg Hansson, Sal D’Agostino
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, WTC Investigation
The team studying the WTC collapses for the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will later observe that the antenna on WTC 1 began to fall before the exterior of the building: “Review of videotape recordings of the collapse taken from various angles indicates that the transmission tower on top of the structure began to move downward and laterally slightly before movement was evident at the exterior wall. This suggests that collapse began with one or more failures in the central core area of the building.” [Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5/1/2002, pp. 2-27] In a program featuring some members of the FEMA/ASCE team, the BBC will comment: “The mast was directly supported by the tower’s inner core. The way it fell suggests it was failure of the inner core that began the collapse, whereas in the South Tower it had been the outer walls.” [BBC, 3/7/2002]
Entity Tags: American Society of Civil Engineers, World Trade Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency
According to an editorial written in the Black Agenda Report by executive editor Glen Ford written in 2008, Ford claims that he observes two presumably Israeli witnesses to the collapse of the second World Trade Center tower who exhibit suspicious behavior. They are already positioned at the river bank when he arrives at the scene on foot after having rushed past police, who had blocked all vehicular entrance to the park. They are thus the apparent owners of the only vehicle in the lot, having arrived prior to its closure, at an unknown time. The so-described athletic, military-aged duo is clicking away with two very expensive-looking cameras. They speak excitedly to each other in Hebrew—a language Mr. Ford instantly recognizes from his two decades as a Manhattanite—but clumsily claim to be “Polish” when asked where they are from. Informed by Ford that he is a reporter, they claim, “Yes, we are reporters, too!” They display two laminated New Jersey press cards that appear genuine except they are the wrong color, and cheerfully admit they are phony. “They are easy to make,” one says, laughing. When prompted, one states with pleasure that “yes, everything has changed” by the events just witnessed. [Ford, 10/8/2008]
Entity Tags: Glen Ford
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Israel
According to Captain Michael Currid, the sergeant at arms for the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, some time after the collapse of the North Tower, he sees four or five fire companies trying to extinguish fires in Building 7 of the WTC. Someone from the city’s Office of Emergency Management tells him that WTC 7 is in serious danger of collapse. Currid says, “The consensus was that it was basically a lost cause and we should not lose anyone else trying to save it.” Along with some others, he goes inside WTC 7 and yells up the stairwells to the fire fighters, “Drop everything and get out!” [Murphy, 2002, pp. 175-176] However, other accounts contradict this, claiming that no attempt is made to fight the fires in WTC 7 (see (11:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). One report later claims, “Given the limited water supply and the first strategic priority, which was to search for survivors in the rubble, FDNY did not fight the fires [in WTC 7].” [Fire Engineering, 9/2002] And a 2002 government report says, “the firefighters made the decision fairly early on not to attempt to fight the fires, due in part to the damage to WTC 7 from the collapsing towers.” [Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5/1/2002, pp. 5-21] Building 7 eventually collapses late in the afternoon of 9/11 (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Office of Emergency Management, Michael Currid
Bernard Kerik. [Source: Publicity photo]After leaving 75 Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Mayor Giuliani and the group accompanying him search for somewhere to establish a new temporary headquarters. Soon after the North Tower’s collapse, they break into a vacant firehouse at the corner of Houston Street and Sixth Avenue. Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, who is part of the group, wants the location kept secret. He gives out the order, “Okay, we’re going to establish a command center [here]. We’re not going to let anybody know. I don’t want it over the radio. We don’t know what’s happening. We don’t want them [presumably meaning the attackers] to know where we’re all going to be.” Giuliani is able to find a phone, and speaks with New York Governor George Pataki, the White House, and the Defense Department. At around 10:57, he speaks to the television channel New York 1 and offers a message of reassurance to the people of New York City. [Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 108; Giuliani, 2002, pp. 15-16; 9/11 Commission, 5/19/2004; Barrett and Collins, 2006, pp. 13] Deciding that they need to be somewhere larger and more secure, Kerik suggests they move to the Police Academy on East 20th Street. [Kerik, 2001, pp. 342] Thus, Giuliani’s group—which now numbers more than twenty people plus a press contingent—gets into cars and drives to the academy, arriving around midday. [Giuliani, 2002, pp. 18-19; Barrett and Collins, 2006, pp. 13] This will remain as the city’s command center for several days, until it is replaced later in the week by a larger space at Pier 92 on the Hudson River. [Center for Biosecurity, 2/3/2003; 9/11 Commission, 5/19/2004]
Entity Tags: Bernard Kerik, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani
During a phone call with Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to the United States, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice suggests the possibility of Iraqi complicity in the attacks on New York and Washington. Following the strike on the Pentagon, Meyer held an emergency meeting of his staff at the British Embassy. He then calls Rice to offer condolences and support. He asks her who does she think was responsible for the attacks? In his 2005 memoirs, Meyer will recall: “The names al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were already in circulation. She said that the early evidence suggested that it was them. But there could also be a connection with Iraq. That would need investigating.” [BBC Radio 4, 2002 ; Meyer, 2005, pp. 188 and 190] However, in a 2007 interview, he will suggest Rice might have made this reference to possible Iraqi complicity in a later call, saying, “I think it was in the same conversation [I had with Rice on the morning of September 11], or it may have been the next one we had very soon after, she said, ‘Well, one thing we need to look into is to see whether Iraq’s had anything to do with this.’” [PBS Frontline, 12/20/2007]
Entity Tags: Christopher Meyer, Condoleezza Rice
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, missing for at least 30 minutes, finally enters the NMCC, where the military’s response to the 9/11 attacks is being coordinated. [CNN, 9/4/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld later claims that he only started to gain a situational awareness of what was happening after arriving at the NMCC. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld was in his office only 200 feet away from the NMCC until the Pentagon crash at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). His activities during this period are unclear. He went outside to the Flight 77 crash site and then stayed somewhere else in the Pentagon until his arrival at the NMCC. Brigadier General Montague Winfield later says, “For 30 minutes we couldn’t find him. And just as we began to worry, he walked into the door of the [NMCC].” [ABC News, 9/11/2002] Winfield himself apparently only shows up at the NMCC around 10:30 a.m. as well.
Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, National Military Command Center, Montague Winfield
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon
Vice President Cheney and others in the White House bunker are given a report of another airplane heading toward Washington. Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, later states, “We learn that a plane is five miles out and has dropped below 500 feet and can’t be found; it’s missing.” Believing they only have a minute or two before the plane crashes into Washington, Cheney orders fighters to engage the plane, saying, “Take it out.” However, reports that this is another hijacking are mistaken. It is learned later that day that a Medevac helicopter five miles away was mistaken for a hijacked plane. [Newsweek, 12/31/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby
According to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD Commander Major General Larry Arnold instructs his staff to broadcast the following message over a NORAD chat log: “10:31 Vice President [Cheney] has cleared us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down (see 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001) if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold].” NEADS first learns of the shootdown order from this message. However, NEADS does not pass the order to the fighter pilots in New York City and Washington. NEADS leaders later say they do not pass it on because they are unsure how the pilots should proceed with this guidance. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The pilots flying over New York City claim they are never given a formal shootdown order that day.
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold
After he finally arrives at the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Donald Rumsfeld’s primary concern, according to the 9/11 Commission, is “ensuring that the [military fighter] pilots [have] a clear understanding of their rules of engagement.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 44] Rumsfeld later recalls, “It was clear they needed rules of engagement telling them what they should and should not do. They needed clarity. And there were no rules of engagement on the books for this first-time situation where civilian aircraft were seized and were being used as missiles.” By this time, the president has supposedly already given authorization for the military to shoot down hijacked aircraft (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Dick Cheney informs Rumsfeld of this over the air threat conference at 10:39 (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Rumsfeld says that, “Throughout the course of the day,” along with acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, he “returned to further refine those rules.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] As journalist Andrew Cockburn will later remark though, Rumsfeld’s work on the rules of engagement “was an irrelevant exercise for he did not complete and issue them until 1:00 p.m., hours after the last hijacker had died.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7]
Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Richard B. Myers
Terri Rizzuto. [Source: ReclaimingTheSky.com]A United Airlines manager finds that a gate agent has already singled out boarding passes belonging to four suspicious passengers who were on Flight 93. Terri Rizzuto is the United Airlines station manager at Newark Airport, from where Flight 93 departed. Some time after hearing that this plane has crashed, she speaks on the phone with the FBI, which is requesting the plane’s manifest and its Passenger Name Record (PNR). After arranging permission to release these, she goes to Gate 17, from where she knows Flight 93 departed, wanting to talk to her staff there. When she arrives, a supervisor hands her four boarding passes. The supervisor tells her they are “The men, who did this maybe,” and points her toward one of the gate agents who had boarded the passengers onto the flight. When Rizzuto asks the gate agent, “How do you know?” he replies: “They were too well-dressed. Too well-dressed for that early in the morning. And their muscles rippled below their suits.… [A]nd their eyes.” [Murphy, 2006, pp. 71-73] However, this report of men with rippling muscles contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s description of the so-called “muscle” hijackers (i.e. the non-pilot hijackers) on the four targeted planes: They “were not physically imposing,” with the majority of them being “slender in build.” [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004]
Entity Tags: Terri Rizzuto
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation
The FAA allows “military and law enforcement flights to resume (and some flights that the FAA can’t reveal that were already airborne).” All civilian, military, and law enforcement flights were ordered at 9:26 a.m. to land as soon as reasonably possible. [Time, 9/14/2001] Civilian flights remain banned until September 13. Note that the C-130 cargo plane that witnessed the Flight 77 crash (see 9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001) and which came upon the Flight 93 crash site (see 10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001) right after it had crashed was apparently not subject to the grounding order issued about an hour earlier.
Russian President Vladimir Putin phones the White House, wanting to speak with the US president. With Bush not there, Condoleezza Rice takes the call. Putin tells her that the Russians are voluntarily standing down a military exercise they are conducting, as a gesture of solidarity with the United States. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] The Russian exercise began on September 10 in the Russian arctic and North Pacific oceans, and was scheduled to last until September 14. [NORAD, 9/9/2001; Washington Times, 9/11/2001] It involved Russian bombers staging a mock attack against NATO planes that are supposedly planning an assault on Russia. [BBC, 2001, pp. 161] Subsequently, Putin manages to talk to Bush while he is aboard Air Force One (see (After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin
Vice President Cheney reportedly calls President Bush and tells him of a threat to Air Force One and that it will take 40-90 minutes to get a protective fighter escort in place. Later, many will express doubt about the existence of this threat. For instance, Representative Martin Meehan (D) says, “I don’t buy the notion Air Force One was a target. That’s just PR, that’s just spin.” [Washington Times, 10/8/2002] A later account will call the threat “completely untrue,” and say Cheney probably made the story up. A well-informed, anonymous Washington official says, “It did two things for [Cheney]. It reinforced his argument that the president should stay out of town, and it gave George W. an excellent reason for doing so.” [Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001] In 2004, the Wall Street Journal will investigate the alleged threat and report two differing accounts of this episode, one from White House spokesman Dan Bartlett, and the other from the office of Vice-President Cheney. No Actual Threat - Bartlett will say there had not been any actual threat, but that word of a threat results from confusion in the White House bunker, as multiple conversations go on simultaneously. Many of these exchanges apparently relate to rumors that turn out to be false, such as reports of attacks on the president’s ranch in Texas and the State Department. Bartlett will say, “Somebody was using the word ‘angel,’ [a code word for Air Force One and] that got interpreted as a threat based on the word ‘angel.’” Cheney's Account Changes - The vice president’s office will say it still could not rule out that a threat to Air Force One actually had been made. Cheney initially says word of the threat had been passed to him by Secret Service agents, but two former senior Secret Service agents on duty that day will deny their agency played any role in receiving or passing on the threat. An official in Cheney’s office will then say that Cheney was mistaken and that he had received word of the threat from “a uniformed military person” manning the underground bunker. Apparently, nobody knows the identity of this person. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ]
Entity Tags: Martin Meehan, George W. Bush, Dan Bartlett, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Secret Service
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Dick Cheney
General David Wherley. [Source: US Air Force]A Secret Service agent again contacts Andrews Air Force Base and commands, “Get in the air now!” It’s not clear if this is treated as an official scramble order, or how quickly fighters respond to it. According to fighter pilot Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville, almost simultaneously, a call from someone else in the White House declares the Washington area “a free-fire zone. That meant we were given authority to use force, if the situation required it, in defense of the nation’s capital, its property, and people.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002] Discussions with Secret Service - Apparently, this second call is made to General David Wherley, flight commander of the Air National Guard at Andrews, who has made several phone calls this morning, seeking airborne authorization for his fighters. Wherley had contacted the Secret Service after hearing reports that it wanted fighters airborne. One Secret Service agent, using two telephones at once, relays instructions to Wherley from another Secret Service agent in the White House who has been given the instructions from Vice President Dick Cheney. [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The identity of all the secret service agents is not known, but one of them is Becky Ediger. She is apparently told by Cheney to pass along an order from President Bush to shoot down hijacked civilian jets, if that is necessary to keep them from hitting any building near the White House. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ] Wherley's Account - Wherley gives lead pilot Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville the authority to decide whether to execute a shootdown. According to a different account, during this call Wherley is speaking with a woman (presumably Ediger) in the Secret Service’s command and control center at the White House. Wherley will recall: “She was standing next to the vice president (Dick Cheney) and she said, ‘They want you to put a CAP up.’ Basically what they told me, and this is another one of those things that’s clear in my mind… ‘We want you to intercept any airplane that attempts to fly closer than 20 miles around any airport around the Washington area.… Attempt to turn them away, do whatever you can to turn them away and if they won’t turn away use whatever force is necessary… to keep them from hitting a building downtown.’” Denial - President Bush and Vice President Cheney will later claim they were not aware that any fighters had scrambled from Andrews at the request of the Secret Service. [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The anonymous White House officials will later say that the Secret Service acted on its own initiative in getting the aircraft launched. However, the Secret Service will deny this in a written statement: “The Secret Service is not authorized to, nor did it, direct the activation or launch of Department of Defense aviation assets.” Current senior Secret Service officials will say that the agents’ actions on 9/11 are ordered by Cheney. An official speaking for Cheney will say he does know whether he directed the agents to call the fighter wing and will not be able to find out. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ] Sasseville and the Capt. Heather Penney Garcia will take off at 10:42 a.m. (see (10:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Secret Service, George W. Bush, David Wherley, Andrews Air Force Base, Marc Sasseville, Becky Ediger, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney
It is incorrectly reported that an airliner has crashed on or near Camp David. [Daily Record (Baltimore), 9/12/2001; US Department of Transportation, 3/2002] Camp David is the presidential retreat, located about 70 miles north of Washington, DC, in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland. [Federation of American Scientists, 10/2/2000; Associated Press, 7/30/2007] On Air Force One, at 10:37, White House chief of staff Andrew Card relays to the president the incorrect report of the crash. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 108] At around 11:09, CBS News reports that “a plane apparently has crashed at or near Camp David.” [Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002] An early article by Forbes states, “There are reports of a fourth airliner [having] been brought down near Camp David… by US military fighters.” [Forbes, 9/11/2001] And an early report by the Northwestern Chronicle similarly states, “Air Force officials say an airliner has been forced down by F-16 fighter jets near Camp David.” [Northwestern Chronicle, 9/11/2001] Theresa Hahn, the catering manager for a restaurant in the Camp David area, hears the erroneous report. She subsequently describes, “Lots of fire trucks were on the road and no one can get up there.” But J. Mel Poole, the Catoctin Mountain Park superintendent, states there has been “no crash at Camp David.” [Daily Record (Baltimore), 9/12/2001] At some point, the FAA calls the military to confirm the crash, and is reassured that no crash occurred at Camp David. [Freni, 2003, pp. 42] The actual Flight 93 crash site is about 85 miles northwest of Camp David. [PBS, 9/11/2001] The Secret Service reportedly tells the White House that Flight 93 may have been on a course for Camp David. [Pittsburgh Channel, 9/11/2001] And, following a military briefing, Virginia Rep. James Moran (D) tells reporters that Flight 93 was apparently heading for Camp David. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Wall Street Journal, 9/12/2001] (However, the 9/11 Commission will later state that its intended target was either the White House or the Capitol building. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 14] ) The source of the incorrect report of the Camp David crash is unclear. However, when the FAA’s Washington Center first informed NEADS that Flight 93 had crashed, at 10:15, it simply reported that it had gone down “somewhere up northeast of Camp David” (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), so this may have created some of the confusion. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] There are also numerous false reports of terrorist attacks having taken place in Washington, DC around this time (see (Between 9:50-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Some commentators make the connection that the 9/11 attacks come 23 years after the signing of the Camp David accords—a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt—on September 17, 1978. [Forbes, 9/11/2001; Village Voice, 9/11/2001; Daily Record (Baltimore), 9/12/2001] WCBS reports, “[T]here is speculation that perhaps, perhaps, this may be in retaliation for those accords.” [Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002]
Entity Tags: Andrew Card, Theresa Hahn, J. Mel Poole, Federal Aviation Administration, James Moran, Secret Service
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush
Vice President Dick Cheney tries to bring Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld up to date over the National Military Command Center’s (NMCC) conference call (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), as Rumsfeld arrived at the NMCC just minutes earlier (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Cheney explains that he has given authorization for hijacked planes to be shot down and that this has been passed on to the fighter pilots. Rumsfeld asks, “So we’ve got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at the present time?” Cheney replies: “That is correct. And it’s my understanding they’ve already taken a couple of aircraft out.” Then Rumsfeld says: “We can’t confirm that. We’re told that one aircraft is down but we do not have a pilot report that they did it.” Cheney is incorrect about his authorization having reached the pilots (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld refuses to leave the Pentagon, despite the smoke leaking into the National Military Command Center (NMCC) where he is currently working, the danger of a second attack on the Pentagon, and a White House request to begin implementing Continuity of Government (COG) measures. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132] After being out of touch with his colleagues at the Pentagon since the time of the attack there (see (9:38 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), Rumsfeld finally entered the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 2-6] It is now noticed that smoke is seeping into the center. With people beginning to cough, aides suggest Rumsfeld should leave the building, but he is uninterested in their advice. Even when they warn that the smoke might be toxic, he still ignores them. Rumsfeld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, tells him he should leave the Pentagon. But Rumsfeld instead orders Wolfowitz to leave the NMCC and fly to Site R, the alternate command center outside Washington (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to journalist and author Steve Vogel, this is “contrary to the established Continuity of Government plan, which called for the secretary of defense to relocate to the alternate command center.… The secretary figured the 45 minutes to an hour it would take to evacuate to Site R would leave him out of touch for too long.” Rumsfeld will later explain: “That’s life. That’s what deputies are for.” [Vogel, 2007, pp. 441]
Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld
Mike Walter. [Source: CNN]According to a number of witnesses on the ground, a US Air Force F-16 flies low over the Pentagon at this time; apparently becoming the first fighter to arrive over the scene of the third attack. [American Forces Press Service, 10/11/2001; Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 130-131] Firefighters and other emergency responders at the Pentagon recently evacuated away from the crash site, due to reports of another supposedly hijacked aircraft flying toward Washington (see (10:15 a.m.-10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A30] Steve Carter, the assistant building manager, is in the Pentagon’s center courtyard, expecting this plane to hit the building. He then sees an F-16 zoom “low and fast over the courtyard.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 130] On Washington Boulevard, where many fire and rescue personnel relocated during the evacuation, cheers go up when the F-16 flies over. Firefighter Mike Smith shouts out: “Thank God that guy’s there! Where has he been?” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 130-131] Lieutenant Commander Dale Rielage will recall that an “arriving combat air patrol F-16 thundered overhead” after the alleged second hijacked plane was said to be approaching the Pentagon. [Fire Engineering, 11/1/2002] John Jester, the chief of the Defense Protective Service, which guards the Pentagon, says that, following the evacuation, “It wasn’t until an F-15 fighter jet crossed in the sky that we realized the danger had passed.” [Murphy, 2002, pp. 246-247] USA Today reporter Mike Walter, who has been at the Pentagon since the attack there, recalls that, after the evacuation, an “F-16 came screaming by the Pentagon, and people cheered.” [People, 9/24/2001] Staff Sergeant Edwin Rotger Jr. will also describe seeing fighters arriving over the Pentagon at this time. However, he says there are two of them, not one. [Office of Medical History, 9/2004, pp. 49] According to the New York Times, “witnesses, including a reporter for the New York Times who was headed toward the building, did not see any [fighter jets over the Pentagon] until closer to 11 [o’clock].” [New York Times, 9/16/2001] According to some accounts, the fighter that flies over the Pentagon at this time is Major Billy Hutchison’s F-16 from Andrews Air Force Base (see (Between 9:55 a.m. and 10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 235] Hutchison will recall, “I circled at a couple of hundred feet at the most just to, one, investigate, and two, give the people on the ground some semblance of security of an American fighter coming by.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 81-82] However, some accounts contradict this. Major Dean Eckmann, from Langley Air Force Base, suggests his F-16 is the first to fly over the Pentagon, and this was at some time shortly after 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will say: “I heard stories that people went back in [the Pentagon] after seeing me fly over to help others out.… Now they knew they were safe.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 66] Other accounts similarly suggest that the first fighter jet (or jets) arrived over the Pentagon significantly earlier than is described by the witnesses on the ground, between 9:49 and 10:00 a.m. (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 34 ]
Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Billy Hutchison, Edwin Rotger Jr., Dale Rielage, Mike Walter, John Jester, Steve Carter, Mike Smith
Two F-16 fighters take off from Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, near Syracuse, NY. The fighters belong to the 174th Fighter Wing, a unit of the New York Air National Guard. A commander from Syracuse had called NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) offering to help earlier in the morning (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Although at that time they’d promised: “Give me 30 minutes and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers,” the fighters now launching have bullets but no missiles. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/12/2001; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; Post-Standard (Syracuse), 10/18/2002] The Hancock pilots are ordered to “Identify all aircraft… Intercept them. Tell them to land. ‘Engage’ them if they [don’t].” [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/25/2001] Also at some time this morning, following the attacks, 174th FW officials form a command center to monitor the situation across the US. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/11/2001; Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/12/2001] A hundred of the 174th FW’s staff have spent the last month deployed to Saudi Arabia and are due back this afternoon. However, they are diverted to Canada and arrive back at the base later in the week (see Mid-August-September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: 174th Fighter Wing
Capt. Heather Penney Garcia. [Source: ABC]Two F-16s take off from Andrews Air Force Base armed with nothing more than “hot” guns and non-explosive training rounds. Lead pilot Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville flies one; the other pilot is Capt. Heather Penney Garcia, also known by the codename Lucky. These fighters had been waiting to be armed with AIM-9 missiles, a process that takes about an hour. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002] Since they take off without the missiles, presumably they could have taken off unarmed much earlier. (The first call for them to scramble came not long after 9:00 a.m.). Two more F-16s, armed with AIM-9 missiles, will take off ten minutes later, at 10:52 a.m. These are piloted by Major Dan Caine and Captain Brandon Rasmussen. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Vogel, 2007, pp. 446] F-16s from Richmond, Virginia, and Atlantic City, New Jersey, will arrive over Washington a short time later. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002] The Andrews fighters are apparently the only fighters in the US scrambled before 11:00 with official shootdown authorization, but the first Andrews fighters into the air have no missiles. It is unclear if the Andrews fighters relaunching a few minutes earlier had shootdown orders, but they had no weapons either. It appears the Andrews fighters launching at 10:52 a.m. are the first fighters in the US with both shootdown orders and missiles to use.
Entity Tags: Andrews Air Force Base, Brandon Rasmussen, Dan Caine, Marc Sasseville, 121st Fighter Squadron, Heather Penney Garcia
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events
Around this time (roughly), the FAA tells the White House that it still cannot account for three planes in addition to the four that have crashed. It takes the FAA another hour and a half to account for these three aircraft. [Time, 9/14/2001] Vice President Cheney later says, “That’s what we started working off of, that list of six, and we could account for two of them in New York. The third one we didn’t know what had happened to. It turned out it had hit the Pentagon, but the first reports on the Pentagon attack suggested a helicopter and then later a private jet.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/17/2001] Amongst false rumors during the day are reports of a bomb aboard a United Airlines jet that just landed in Rockford, Illinois. “Another plane disappears from radar and might have crashed in Kentucky. The reports are so serious that [FAA head Jane] Garvey notifies the White House that there has been another crash. Only later does she learn the reports are erroneous.” [USA Today, 8/13/2002]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Jane Garvey
According to the 9/11 Commission, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld makes the decision to go to Defcon Three, the “highest alert for the nuclear arsenal in 30 years.” [ABC News, 9/11/2002] His decision is broadcast on the air threat conference call. Then, according to the Commission, “A minute later, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the Vice President, and he asked Rumsfeld to run the issue by the President. At 10:45 conferees were told to ‘hold off’ on Defcon 3, but a minute later the order was reinstated. Rumsfeld believed the matter was urgent and, having consulted [Defense Department] directives, concluded he had the authority to issue the order and would brief the President. Rumsfeld briefed the President on the decision at 11:15.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326 and 554] According to other accounts, the US military is put on high alert about 35 minutes earlier than the 9/11 Commission states (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld
Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville. [Source: CBC]After taking off from Andrews Air Force Base, Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville and Captain Heather Penney Garcia (also known by the codename Lucky) are flying at low altitudes over Washington, DC. The three fighters launched from Langley Air Force Base at 9:30 a.m. are flying above them at around 20,000 feet. The Langley pilots are communicating with controllers at NEADS, while the Andrews pilots are communicating with civilian controllers at the FAA. However, both sets of pilots hear a message over a shared channel: “Attention all aircraft monitoring Andrews tower frequency. Andrews and Class Bravo airspace is closed. No general aviation aircraft are permitted to enter Class Bravo airspace. Any infractions will be shot down.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 82]
Entity Tags: Marc Sasseville, Federal Aviation Administration, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Heather Penney Garcia
Wallace Miller. [Source: Steve Mellon / Pittsburgh Post-Gazette]Wallace Miller, the coroner of Somerset County, is one of the first people to arrive at the Flight 93 crash scene. However, he is surprised by the absence of human remains there. He later says, “If you didn’t know, you would have thought no one was on the plane. You would have thought they dropped them off somewhere.” [Longman, 2002, pp. 217] The only recognizable body part he sees is a piece of spinal cord with five vertebrae attached. He will later tell Australian newspaper The Age, “I’ve seen a lot of highway fatalities where there’s fragmentation. The interesting thing about this particular case is that I haven’t, to this day, 11 months later, seen any single drop of blood. Not a drop.” [Age (Melbourne), 9/9/2002] Dave Fox, a former firefighter, also arrives early at the crash scene, but sees just three chunks of human tissue. He says, “You knew there were people there, but you couldn’t see them.” [Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 9/11/2002] Yet, in the following weeks, hundreds of searchers are able to find about 1,500 scorched human tissue samples, weighing less than 600 pounds—approximately eight percent of the total body mass on Flight 93. Months after 9/11, more remains are found in a secluded cabin, several hundred yards from the crash site. [Washington Post, 5/12/2002]
Entity Tags: Dave Fox, Wallace Miller
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Shanksville, Pennsylvania, FBI 9/11 Investigation
Bush’s travels on 9/11. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGrapix.com]After Vice President Dick Cheney had alerted the president to a possible threat to Air Force One (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001), Bush and his aides had begun discussing whether to change directions. They are currently flying off the coast of South Carolina, about half way on their 900-mile journey from Florida back to Washington, DC. Bush had suggested diverting to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, but Cheney favored him heading to a military base, such as Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. At 10:41, Cheney had called the president again, telling him that both National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and himself agreed that Washington was no longer safe enough for Bush’s return. The president therefore gives the order for his plane to divert. Within minutes, Air Force One turns sharply to the left, and heads toward Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, Louisiana, a distance of about 800 miles away. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106-109; Washington Post, 1/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush
James K. Will. [Source: WTAE-TV]After hearing a plane has crashed in his area, a farmer flies over the Flight 93 crash site to take photos of the wreckage. James K. Will, who is an aerial photographer as well as a farmer, had just landed his Cessna on a private airstrip at his farm in Berlin, Pennsylvania, after visiting nearby Altoona. His mother rushed out and told him there were reports of a plane having crashed near Shanksville. He’d grabbed his camera and set off in his plane for the site, to take photos of the wreckage. He later recalls that he circles the Flight 93 crash scene around 45 minutes after the crash occurred. He says, “I thought it was just an accident.” He is then intercepted by a state police helicopter, which escorts him to the Johnstown airport. He will be questioned and briefly detained there before being released. His plane will be searched and then released. [Pittsburgh Channel, 9/15/2001; Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 9/15/2001] At around 9:45 a.m., all FAA facilities had been ordered to instruct every aircraft to land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). About 20 minutes earlier, the FAA had initiated a nationwide ground stop, which prohibited takeoffs and required planes in the air to land as soon as reasonable (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Time, 9/14/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 25 and 29]
Entity Tags: James K. Will
New York’s primary elections, already in progress, are postponed. [CNN, 9/12/2001]
President Bush (center, bending) and others look out the windows of Air Force One as their fighter escort arrives. [Source: White House]No fighters escort President Bush’s Air Force One until around this time, but accounts conflict. At 10:32 a.m., Vice President Dick Cheney said it would take until about 11:10 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. to get a fighter escort to Air Force One. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] However, according to one account, around 10:00 a.m., Air Force One “is joined by an escort of F-16 fighters from a base near Jacksonville, Florida.” [Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001] Another report states, “At 10:41 [a.m.]… Air Force One headed toward Jacksonville to meet jets scrambled to give the presidential jet its own air cover.” [New York Times, 9/16/2001] But apparently, when Air Force One takes evasive action around 10:55 a.m., there is still no fighter escort. NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold later says, “We scrambled available airplanes from Tyndall [near Tallahassee and not near Jacksonville, Florida] and then from Ellington in Houston, Texas,” but he does not say when this occurs. [Code One Magazine, 1/2002 Sources: Larry Arnold] In yet another account, two F-16s eventually arrive, piloted by Shane Brotherton and Randy Roberts, from Ellington, not from any Florida base. [CBS News, 9/11/2002] The St. Petersburg Times, after interviewing people on Air Force One, estimate the first fighters, from Texas, arrive between 11:00 and 11:20. [St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] By 11:30 a.m., there are six fighters protecting Air Force One. [Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/2001] The BBC, however, reports that the Ellington, Texas, fighters are scrambled at 11:30 a.m., and quotes ABC reporter Ann Compton, inside Air Force One, saying fighters appear out the windows at 11:41 a.m. [BBC, 9/1/2002] Given that two of the seven bases said to have fighters on alert on 9/11 are in Florida (Homestead Air Station, 185 miles from Sarasota; and Tyndall Air Station, 235 miles from Sarasota), why a fighter escort does not reach Air Force One earlier remains unclear. Philip Melanson, author of a book on the Secret Service, comments, “I can’t imagine by what glitch the protection was not provided to Air Force One as soon as it took off. I would have thought there’d be something in place whereby one phone call from the head of the security would get the fighters in the air immediately.” [St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004]
Entity Tags: Randy Roberts, Secret Service, George W. Bush, Shane Brotherton, Ann Compton
Colonel Mark Tillman in the cockpit of Air Force One. [Source: CBS News]Col. Mark Tillman, pilot of Air Force One, is told there is a threat to President Bush’s plane. Tillman has an armed guard placed at his cockpit door while the Secret Service double-checks the identity of everyone on board. Air traffic controllers warn that a suspect airliner is dead ahead, according to Tillman: “Coming out of Sarasota there was one call that said there was an airliner off our nose that they did not have contact with.” Tillman takes evasive action, pulling his plane high above normal traffic. [CBS News, 9/11/2002] Reporters on board notice the rise in elevation. [Salon, 9/11/2001; Dallas Morning News, 8/28/2002] The report is apparently a false alarm.
Entity Tags: Secret Service, Mark Tillman
A mysterious fire crew is witnessed inside the Pentagon, behaving completely at odds with how firefighters are trained to act. [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 137] Chad Stamps is a firefighter with Rescue 104 of the Arlington County Fire Department. [National Fire and Rescue, 5/2002] Along with his crew, he has been fighting fires on the second floor of the Pentagon’s outer E Ring. With fires burning around him, he is astonished to see another crew walk past, carrying two packs of hose line, apparently on its way to fight fires elsewhere in the Pentagon. Describing this incident, authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman will point out: “Firefighters are trained never to go through a fire without putting it out, since it might seal off your exit. You might as well walk into a burning room and lock the door behind you. Yet there they went.” Seeing the crew passing by, Stamps thinks, “This is totally disjointed.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 137] The odd behavior of this crew is perhaps notable because there is at least one reported incident of fake firefighters being caught at the Pentagon following the attack there: On September 12, three people will be arrested who are not firefighters, yet who are dressed in firefighting gear (see September 12, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 170]
Entity Tags: Chad Stamps
An INS employee tells journalist Seymour Hersh that the 9/11 hijackings were accomplished with guns put on the planes by airport employees. Hersh then calls Rear Admiral Cathal Flynn, associate administrator of security at the Federal Aviation Administration, and tells him, “The guns were put onto the plane by the ramp workers.” When Flynn argues that there are no reports of this, Hersh replies that, “Those ramp workers aren’t even checked,” and insists, “There were pistols and they were put onto the plane by the ramp workers.” [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 47-8] Although there are some reports of guns being used on the flights (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the 9/11 Commission, for example, will not say that guns were used. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004]
Entity Tags: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Seymour Hersh, Cathal Flynn
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Other 9/11 Investigations
Two pages from Moussaoui’s notebooks mentioning Ahad Sabet (Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s alias), plus phone number and mention of his residence in Germany. [Source: FBI]Within an hour of the attacks of 9/11, the Minnesota FBI uses a memo written to FBI headquarters shortly after Moussaoui’s arrest to ask permission from a judge for the search warrant they have been desperately seeking. After the WTC is hit for the first time, Mike Maltbie of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters calls the Minneapolis field office and talks to Coleen Rowley. When Rowley says it is essential they get a warrant to search Moussaoui’s belongings, Maltbie instructs her to take no action, because it could have an impact on matters of which she is not aware. Rowley replies that it would have to be the “hugest coincidence” if Moussaoui were not related to the attack. She says that Maltbie replies that coincidence is the right word. Maltbie will later say he does not recall using the word “coincidence” in the conversation. Maltbie then consults an FBI attorney, who says Minneapolis should seek the warrant. While Rowley is waiting for Maltbie to call back, one of her colleagues, Chris Briese, talks to RFU chief Dave Frasca. According to Briese, Frasca initially says there is not enough evidence for a criminal warrant, but when they find out the Pentagon has been hit Frasca consents. Frasca says that he consents immediately. [Time, 5/21/2002; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 178-9 ] Briese later tells Samit that Frasca also initially claims it was just “a coincidence.” [Minneapolis Star Tribune, 6/4/2006] A federal judge approves a criminal search warrant that afternoon. [New Yorker, 9/30/2002; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/9/2006] The Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters had previously blocked requests for criminal and intelligence search warrants (see August 21, 2001 and August 28, 2001). Minnesota FBI Agent Coleen Rowley notes that this very memo was previously deemed insufficient by FBI headquarters to get a search warrant, and the fact that they are immediately granted one when finally allowed to ask shows “the missing piece of probable cause was only the [FBI headquarters’] failure to appreciate that such an event could occur.” [Time, 5/21/2002] After the warrant is granted, the belongings are then rushed to an evidence response team, which discovers documents linking Moussaoui to eleven of the hijackers (see August 16, 2001). Rowley later suggests that if they had received the search warrant sooner, “There is at least some chance that… may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss of life.” [Time, 5/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Michael Maltbie, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Harry Samit, FBI Minnesota field office, Coleen Rowley, David Frasca, FBI Headquarters, Chris Briese, Zacarias Moussaoui
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz leaves the Pentagon and relocates to the alternate military command center outside Washington. Wolfowitz had evacuated from his office to an area in front of the Pentagon after the building was hit, but then went back inside and joined Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others in the National Military Command Center (NMCC). [Vanity Fair, 5/9/2003] With smoke seeping into the center, Wolfowitz advises Rumsfeld to leave the NMCC (see (10:40 a.m.-11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But instead Rumsfeld orders Wolfowitz to leave and fly to Site R, the alternate command center, which is located inside Raven Rock Mountain, about six miles north of Camp David, on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001; Vogel, 2007, pp. 441] Wolfowitz will later recall that he “was not happy about” receiving this order. [Vanity Fair, 5/9/2003] Minutes later, a helicopter lands outside the Pentagon, and carries Wolfowitz and several others off to the alternate command center. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132] Site R was designed as a duplicate of the NMCC, and if the NMCC were ever destroyed in an attack or needs to be evacuated, it would serve as the Pentagon’s primary command center. [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 174] It has “more than 700,000 square feet of floor space, sophisticated computer and communications equipment, and room for more than 3,000 people.” [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001] Others who will relocate to Site R on this day include Army Secretary Thomas White and personnel from the office of the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though White will return to the Pentagon later on. [Washington Post, 1/9/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 135] According to journalist and author James Mann, Rumsfeld’s decision to order Wolfowitz to leave Washington has its roots in a top secret program Rumsfeld was involved in during the 1980s, which serves to ensure the “Continuity of Government” (COG) in the event of an attack on the US (see 1981-1992). [Mann, 2004, pp. 138-139] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activated the COG plan shortly before 10:00 a.m. this morning (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8]
Entity Tags: Site R, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties
At the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, NORAD Commander-in-Chief Ralph Eberhart orders a limited version of a little known plan to clear the skies and give the military control over US airspace. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The plan, Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aids (SCATANA), was developed in the 1960s as a way to clear airspace above the US and off the US coast in the event of a confirmed warning of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Once it is activated a wartime air traffic priority list is established, allowing essential aircraft and personnel to use the airspace. Among others, this list includes the US president, essential national security staff, aircraft involved in continental defense missions, and airborne command posts. [Schwartz, 1998] Eberhart and his staff suggest implementing the limited version of SCATANA over the air threat conference call. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta immediately concurs. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; Filson, 2003, pp. 73] Unlike a full SCATANA, this modified version allows ground navigation aids to stay on, for the benefit of aircraft that are still airborne. Under the plan, for about the next three days all flights other than military, law enforcement, fire fighters, and medevac, will require approval from the national Defense Dept./FAA Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC), located within the FAA’s Herndon Command Center. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/10/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The SCATANA order is issued over an hour after the FAA ordered all planes down (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and after at least three-quarters of them have already landed. [USA Today, 8/13/2002] Eberhart says the delay is due to safety concerns, because NORAD would have been unable to control US airspace—with over four thousand planes airborne at the time of the attacks—with its radar capabilities. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Defense Week magazine suggests SCATANA is not implemented until even later, at around 2 p.m. It says NORAD issues a “notice to airmen” implementing the modified version of SCATANA about five hours after Flight 11 hit the WTC. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001]
Entity Tags: Ralph Eberhart, Norman Mineta, North American Aerospace Defense Command
The FAA’s Boston Center, located in Nashua, New Hampshire, is evacuated. The center manages air traffic above New England, and had monitored Flight 11 and Flight 175 earlier on. Reportedly, someone spotted an unidentified aircraft heading toward the facility and managers had subsequently ordered the evacuation. However, FAA officials will later state that there was a telephoned threat, falsely reporting that a plane would crash into the center. After about an hour in a nearby Holiday Inn, some of the center’s personnel return to work. [Washington Post, 9/27/2001; USA Today, 8/11/2002; Associated Press, 8/12/2002; New Hampshire Union Leader, 9/11/2006]
Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center
More skyscrapers and tourist attractions are evacuated, including Walt Disney World, Philadelphia’s Liberty Bell and Independence Hall, Seattle’s Space Needle, and the Gateway Arch in St. Louis. [Times Union (Albany), 9/11/2001]
The FAA Command Center is told that all the flights over the United States are accounted for and pilots are complying with controllers. There are 923 planes still in the air over the US. Every commercial flight in US airspace—about a quarter of the planes still in the air—is within 40 miles of its destination. Others are still over the oceans, and many are heading toward Canada. [USA Today, 8/13/2002]
Robert Bonner, the head of Customs and Border Protection, later testifies, “We ran passenger manifests through the system used by Customs—two were hits on our watch list of August 2001.” (This is presumably a reference to hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, watch-listed on August 23, 2001.) “And by looking at the Arab names and their seat locations, ticket purchases and other passenger information, it didn’t take a lot to do a rudimentary link analysis. Customs officers were able to ID 19 probable hijackers within 45 minutes. I saw the sheet by 11 a.m. And that analysis did indeed correctly identify the terrorists.” [New York Observer, 2/15/2004] However, Bonner appears to be at least somewhat incorrect: for two days after the attacks (see September 13, 2001-September 14, 2001), the FBI believes there are only 18 hijackers, and the original list contains some erroneous Arab-sounding names on the flight manifests, such as Adnan Bukhari and Ameer Bukhari. [CNN, 9/13/2001] Some hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta’s, were identified on a reservations computer around 8:30 a.m. (see (Before 8:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Richard Clarke was told some of the names were al-Qaeda around 10:00 a.m. (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
Entity Tags: Robert Bonner, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Adnan Bukhari, Ameer Bukhari
Additional measures are taken to increase the level of security at the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. [Freni, 2003, pp. 65] After the second attack on the World Trade Center, the Command Center’s doors were locked, and all non-FAA personnel were ordered to leave the premises immediately (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Freni, 2003, pp. 64; Spencer, 2008, pp. 81] Linda Schuessler, the deputy director of system operations, is still concerned about the security of the center, and calls the building owner to request additional protection. Soon, armed guards are stationed at all entrances and roaming the floor there. The exact time when this happens is unstated. [Freni, 2003, pp. 65] It is unclear whether the increase in security is a general precaution, or is in response to specific threats against the Command Center.
Entity Tags: Linda Schuessler, Federal Aviation Administration
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urges New Yorkers to stay at home and orders the evacuation of the area south of Canal Street. [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001]
Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani
Timeline Tags: Environmental Impact of 9/11, 9/11 Timeline
Allan Dodds Frank. [Source: CNN]A CNN correspondent incorrectly suggests that a third skyscraper may have recently collapsed in New York. Reporting from Lower Manhattan, Allan Dodds Frank describes: “[J]ust two or three minutes ago there was yet another collapse or explosion. I’m now out of sight, a Good Samaritan has taken me in on Duane Street. But at a quarter to 11, there was another collapse or explosion following the 10:30 collapse of the second tower. And a firefighter who rushed by us estimated that 50 stories went down. The street filled with smoke. It was like a forest fire roaring down a canyon.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] A third tower—the 47-story World Trade Center Building 7—does collapse on this day. It will not come down, however, until 5:20 in the afternoon (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 11/29/2001]
Entity Tags: Allan Dodds Frank
A message sent from Korean Air Flight 85 is misinterpreted to indicate a possible hijacking. At 1:24 p.m., the pilots accidentally issue a hijacking alert as the plane nears Alaska on its way to Anchorage. Two fighters tail the plane, and notify it that it will be shot down unless it avoids populated areas. Strategic sites are evacuated across Alaska. The plane eventually lands safely in Whitehorse, Canada, at 2:54 p.m. [USA Today, 8/12/2002]
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld speaks with President Bush, and tells him that the Department of Defense is working on refining the rules of engagement, so pilots will have a better understanding of the circumstances under which an aircraft can be shot down. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] He also briefs the president on the earlier decision to go to Defcon Three (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554]
Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush
Russian President Vladimir Putin phones President Bush while he is aboard Air Force One. Putin is the first foreign leader to call Bush following the attacks. He earlier called the White House to speak with the president, but had to speak with Condoleezza Rice instead (see Between 10:32 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). Putin tells Bush he recognizes that the US has put troops on alert, and makes it clear that he will stand down Russian troops. US forces were ordered to high alert some time between 10:10 and 10:46 a.m. (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001) Bush later describes, “In the past… had the President put the—raised the DEF CON levels of our troops, Russia would have responded accordingly. There would have been inevitable tension.” Bush therefore describes this phone call as “a moment where it clearly said to me, [President Putin] understands the Cold War is over.” [US President, 10/1/2001; US President, 11/19/2001; CNN, 9/10/2002] Putin also sends a telegram to Bush today, stating: “The series of barbaric terrorist acts, directed against innocent people, has evoked our anger and indignation.… The whole international community must rally in the fight against terrorism.” [Russian Embassy, 9/17/2001]
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin
CNN reports that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is preparing emergency-response teams as a precaution. [CNN, 9/12/2001]
Entity Tags: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Helicopters belonging to the 12th Aviation Battalion. [Source: United States Army]Helicopter crews with an Army aviation unit based near the Pentagon are initially unable to launch after returning from weapons training, because, they are told, they are “locked down until further notice.” [Army Center of Military History, 11/14/2001 ] The 12th Aviation Battalion is stationed at Davison Army Airfield, which is at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon. It is the Military District of Washington’s aviation support unit, and includes three helicopter companies that fly UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. [Military District of Washington, 8/2000] But at the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, an unspecified number of the battalion’s members were away at the shooting range at Fort AP Hill, for their annual weapons training (see 8:46 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). They only set out on the one and a half to two hours drive back to base after the Pentagon was hit. One of the battalion’s helicopter pilots, who says the Pentagon is “basically one of our missions,” will later recall that after arriving back at Davison Airfield, his company commander “pretty much had us all get together, and he broke us down into aviation crews… and then he briefed us on what to expect.” The battalion’s helicopters are put “online,” meaning “we preflight our aircraft, got ready, and we went ahead and took everything out.” But, the pilot will say: “then basically we were locked down until further notice. That’s what we were told. And at that point, aviation got hit the hardest, so nobody was flying anywhere unless we had specific permission.… It was a waiting game.” The first helicopter to take off from Davison Airfield transports some engineers to the Pentagon, though the time it launches at is unstated. The 12th Aviation Battalion helicopters will subsequently be involved with supporting Operation Noble Eagle, the new homeland defense mission after 9/11. [Army Center of Military History, 11/14/2001 ]
Entity Tags: 12th Aviation Battalion
United Airlines issues a press release confirming that Flight 93 has crashed. Flight 93 went down in Pennsylvania shortly after 10:00 a.m. (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The release states: “United Airlines has confirmed one of its flights has crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. United Flight 93, a Boeing 757 aircraft, is the flight number involved. The flight originated in Newark and was bound for San Francisco.” The release adds, “United is deeply concerned about a further flight, United Flight 175, a Boeing 767, which was bound from Boston to Los Angeles.” [United Airlines, 9/11/2001] Although Flight 175 hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), United Airlines will not publicly confirm it has crashed until 11:53 a.m. (see 11:53 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: United Airlines
American Airlines issues a statement confirming that it has lost two of its aircraft in “tragic incidents this morning.” The statement identifies the aircraft as “Flight 11, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles,” and “Flight 77, a Boeing 757 operating from Washington Dulles to Los Angeles.” The statement adds, “Because of the heightened security due to the nature of today’s events, American said it is working closely with US government authorities and will not release more information at this time.” [Associated Press, 2001 ; Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: American Airlines
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight AA 77
Several early news reports suggest that US military fighter jets may have shot down an aircraft, perhaps Flight 93. Ireland’s Thomas Crosbie Media reports, “A Boeing 767 has crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.… US anti-aircraft fighters are in place—unconfirmed reports say this plane was shot out of the sky by US defense.” [TCM Breaking News, 9/11/2001] Forbes states, “There are reports of a fourth airliner [having] been brought down near Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, by US military fighters.” [Forbes, 9/11/2001] And the Northwestern Chronicle states, “Air Force officials say an airliner has been forced down by F-16 fighter jets near Camp David.” [Northwestern Chronicle, 9/11/2001] However, according to later reports, military officials say US aircraft did not shoot down any of the hijacked planes. [CNN, 9/11/2001]
Entity Tags: US Department of the Air Force
Passengers and crew members on board Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which was wrongly suspected to have been hijacked, are finally allowed to get off their plane and are taken to be interviewed by the FBI. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ; WKYC, 9/11/2006] Delta 1989 made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins Airport in Ohio after FAA and military personnel mistakenly thought it was hijacked and might have a bomb on board (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 167-169] The plane was directed to a remote part of the airport, far away from the terminal, and the pilots were told not to allow passengers off. No Evidence of Hijacking or Bomb - At 11:28 a.m., Cleveland Airport’s air traffic manager calls city officials and says he has no apparent reason to believe Delta 1989 has been hijacked, and he does not have any specific bomb threats. He says he has just received clearance from the FAA headquarters, which told him the airport had no reason to hold the aircraft unless city officials have other information from the FBI. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 229] SWAT Team and FBI Approach Plane - Delta 1989’s pilots, Captain Paul Werner and First Officer David Dunlap, are finally informed that the Cleveland Police SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team and a team of FBI agents are coming out to their aircraft. While the FBI agents approach the plane, the SWAT team takes up a position about 50 yards behind it. Lt. Bernie Barabas, the leader of the SWAT team, will later recall, “If there had been some sort of problem and this turned into a situation where this was a live hijacking, or if they started killing Americans, we were going to act.” SWAT Team Sees Pilot with Bloodied Face - Suspicion is aroused when Werner accidentally knocks his head and cuts it while returning to his seat, after going to the cabin to speak to the plane’s passengers. The members of the SWAT team outside are perplexed when they see him leaning out of the window to give the “all clear” signal, with blood running down his face. They then board the plane. [WKYC, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 270] Passengers Taken off Plane - By 11:34 a.m., according to an FAA chronology, the FBI has commenced a controlled debarkation of Delta 1989. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ] The FBI agents slowly and carefully remove the passengers in small groups. [WKYC, 9/11/2006] According to some accounts, there are 78 people on the plane. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001] But other accounts say there are about 200 on it. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Newsnet 5, 9/11/2001; WCPN, 9/12/2001] The FBI then instructs everyone that has got off to gather their belongings and line them up on the tarmac. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 270] Every piece of luggage and carry-on baggage will be opened and examined by security agents. [WKYC, 9/11/2006] Bomb-sniffing dogs board the aircraft, which is then searched, but no explosives will be found. Passengers Taken Away and Interviewed - The SWAT team gathers the plane’s crew and passengers onto nearby buses. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 271] According to a timeline provided by the Cleveland Airport air traffic control tower, at 12:23 p.m. the passengers are taken to the Federal Facilities Building, located on the opposite side of the airfield to the terminal, where they are debriefed by the FBI. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001] But the Associated Press will report that they are taken to a nearby NASA facility, presumably the Glenn Research Center, which is located next to the Cleveland airport. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; National Journal's Technology Daily, 11/27/2002] After being interviewed separately by FBI agents, the passengers will be put up at a local Holiday Inn. [Portland Press Herald, 9/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Cleveland Police Department, Bernie Barabas, Paul Werner, David Dunlap, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport
General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Commander of NATO, says on television, “This is clearly a coordinated effort. It hasn’t been announced that it’s over.… Only one group has this kind of ability and that is Osama bin Laden’s.” [Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/2001]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Wesley Clark
Within two hours of the attacks the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) based at Hill Air Force Base, Utah begins reviewing the radar trails of the four earlier hijacked aircraft, after Pentagon officials have turned to them to find out exactly what happened. Using their own software, the unit has the unique ability to create a “track of interest analysis,” singling out and zooming in on each of the planes. The unit has captured most of the flights of the four planes, but lost sight of Flight 93 at some point. [Airman, 12/2003] The FBI also contacts RADES within hours of the attacks, requesting detailed information on the hijacked planes. [Hilltop Times, 4/15/2004] NORAD official Colonel Alan Scott later will tell the 9/11 Commission that much of his radar data for the “primary targets” on 9/11 was not seen that day. He will say, “It was reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, and other agencies like it who are professionals at going back and looking at radar tapes and then given that they are loaded with knowledge after the fact, they can go and find things that perhaps were not visible during the event itself.” [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Data reconstructed by RADES will be used as a source several times in the account of the hijackings and military response to them in the 9/11 Commission’s final report. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 457-459]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Defense, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron
Two congressmen, Dan Miller (R) and Adam Putnam (R), are on Air Force One. they’ve been receiving periodic updates on the crisis from President Bush’s adviser Karl Rove. At this time, they’re summoned forward to meet with the president. Bush points out the fighter escort, F-16s from a base in Texas, has now arrived. He says that a threat had been received from someone who knew the plane’s code name. However, there are doubts that any such threat ever occurred (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004]
Entity Tags: Adam Putnam, George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Dan Miller
The New York Fire Department (FDNY) assigns a chief officer to take charge of operations at WTC Building 7. The chief is initially ordered to put out the fires there. It is determined around this time that there are fires on floors 6-8, 17, 21 and 30. However, there are problems with the water supply: There is no water coming out of the hydrant system nearby, and an FDNY chief officer who has been in WTC 7 says he opened a standpipe on the 4th floor of one stairway, but found no water in the standpipe system. This should not be a problem though, as two or three FDNY fireboats have been tied up on the Hudson shore, specifically to provide water to the site, and lines are already being stretched up to the WTC area. However, as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will later report, “According to the FDNY first-person interviews, water was never an issue at WTC 7 since firefighting was never started in the building. When the Chief Officer in charge of WTC 7 got to Barclay Street and West Broadway, numerous firefighters and officers were coming out of WTC 7. These firefighters indicated that several blocks needed to be cleared around WTC 7 because they thought that the building was going to collapse.” [Firehouse (.com), 9/17/2001; Time Out New York, 9/27/2001; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 110-111 ] However, one fire captain later claims to have seen numerous firefighters trying to extinguish fires in WTC 7 at some unspecified time after the North Tower collapsed, until they were instructed to stop doing so (see After 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: New York City Fire Department
Logo of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. [Source: National Air Traffic Controllers Association]Several air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center and a union official representing them express concern that the controllers are going to be recorded recalling their experiences of the morning’s attacks, but are persuaded to go ahead with the recording. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Washington Post, 5/7/2004] Mike McCormick, the New York Center manager, has directed that six controllers who communicated with, or tracked, the first two hijacked aircraft participate in a session where they are recorded giving their personal accounts of what happened. [Washington Post, 5/6/2004; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004] Controllers Apprehensive - According to McCormick, before the session commences there is a general concern among these controllers. He will later tell the 9/11 Commission that they “didn’t want to put things in a formal way that would be used in an investigation. There was also some worry about who would receive the tape.” Local Union President Concerned - McCormick consults with Mark DiPalmo, the local president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)—the air traffic controllers’ union. DiPalmo is concerned because the tape recording of statements is not a standard procedure. McCormick assures him that the tape will be available only to law enforcement officers, will only serve as a temporary measure until written statements have been prepared, and the controllers will be able to use their taped statements to help them prepare written ones. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; New York Times, 5/6/2004] Ruth E. Marlin, the executive vice president of NATCA, will later say she cannot address the question of why DiPalmo wants the tape to be “temporary.” She will say, however, that if she were in his position, “my concern would be that if tapes were saved permanently, they might be subject to FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] request, and then controllers would be subject to hearing their own voices recounted on television over and over again.” [Washington Post, 5/7/2004] Controllers and Union President Consent - The controllers are reassured that the tape with their recorded statements on will not be used for disciplinary purposes, and will be strictly for use only by law enforcement personnel. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ] DiPalmo agrees to the recording of the controllers on the condition that the tape is only a temporary record until written statements are obtained, after which it should be destroyed. The recording session commences at 11:40 a.m. (see 11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001) and the resulting tape will be destroyed several months later (see Between December 2001 and February 2002). [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ]
Entity Tags: Mike McCormick, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Mark DiPalmo, Ruth E. Marlin
A number of air traffic controllers at the FAA’s New York Center provide accounts of their experiences of interacting with, or tracking, two of the hijacked aircraft, on a tape recording that will later be destroyed by one of the center’s managers. [New York Times, 5/6/2004; Washington Post, 5/7/2004; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004] Manager Directs Colleague to Record Controllers - Mike McCormick, the New York Center manager, directs the taping. He will later say he does so because he wants a contemporaneous recording of the controllers’ accounts that will be immediately available for law enforcement efforts, in case agencies like the FBI show up at the center. He is also concerned that the controllers might be taking stress-induced sickness leave in response to the attacks. They would therefore be unavailable to give conventional written witness statements in a timely manner, and their recollections would be less clear when they returned from leave. McCormick tells Kevin Delaney, the center’s quality assurance manager, to record the controllers’ statements, and a tape recorder is then set up to do this. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004] Controllers Gathered Together - At least six of the center’s air traffic controllers are gathered in a room at the center nicknamed the “Bat Cave” for the fact-finding session. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; New York Times, 5/6/2004] These controllers and a union official representing them were concerned about the controllers being recorded, but have been persuaded to go ahead with the session (see (Shortly Before 11:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Washington Post, 5/7/2004] Controllers Describe Experiences - Beginning at 11:40 a.m., a recording is made on a single, standard cassette tape. The controllers, who were involved in working radar positions during the hijackings and crashes of the first two targeted aircraft, Flight 11 and Flight 175, are asked to make statements. According to Mark DiPalmo, the local president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, “We sat everyone in a room, went around the room, said, ‘What do you remember?’” The controllers give their statements in the group setting, with a microphone being passed from one of them to the next. They describe their actions interacting with, or tracking, the two hijacked aircraft. According to DiPalmo, the session is informal, and sometimes more than one person is speaking at a time. The resulting tape lasts about an hour, with each recorded statement lasting about five to 10 minutes. Other Employees Present - As well as the six controllers, approximately 10 other FAA employees are present during the session. (A signing-in sheet will show that about 16 center personnel are there. However, some witnesses will later indicate there may be additional individuals who do not sign in.) Two quality assurance specialists take notes, but these are sketchy, amounting to just three pages in total. After the tape of the session has been made, it is logged into the New York Center’s formal record of evidence. Recording Controllers Not Standard Procedure - Audio taping of witness statements following an accident or incident has not previously been conducted at the New York Center. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; New York Times, 5/6/2004] However, David LaCates, the deputy operations manager there, will tell the 9/11 Commission that, “Since this was an unusual situation,” he believes McCormick wants “an immediate and accurate record of what had happened.” [9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 ] FBI Does Not Come to Center - Although McCormick is expecting law enforcement authorities to come to the New York Center quickly, none do. Yet, even though he will later claim he wanted the tape made for the benefit of these authorities, McCormick will not reach out to the FBI himself, nor tell FAA headquarters or regional headquarters that no one has come. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004] Tape Later Destroyed - Despite its evidential value, Delaney will deliberately destroy the tape of the controllers’ statements several months later (see Between December 2001 and February 2002), before anyone has listened to, transcribed, or made a duplicate of it. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Washington Post, 5/7/2004] Even McCormick will say he never listens to the tape. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ] Prior to an investigation by the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General in late 2003 and early 2004 (see May 6, 2004), apparently no one outside the New York Center will be aware of the tape’s existence or its destruction. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ]
Entity Tags: Kevin Delaney, Mark DiPalmo, David LaCates, Mike McCormick
Air Force One at Barksdale Air Force Base. [Source: Win McNamee/ Reuters]Air Force One lands at Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, Louisiana. “The official reason for landing at Barksdale was that President Bush felt it necessary to make a further statement, but it isn’t unreasonable to assume that—as there was no agreement as to what the president’s movements should be—it was felt he might as well be on the ground as in the air.” [Salon, 9/11/2001; New York Times, 9/16/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; CBS News, 9/11/2002]
Entity Tags: Barksdale Air Force Base, George W. Bush
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events
Raven Rock Mountain, the location of ‘Site R.’ [Source: Unknown]After arriving at the alternate military command center outside Washington, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reports that the computer and communications systems there are hardly functioning. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered Wolfowitz to leave the Pentagon and relocate to the alternate command center—“Site R”—earlier on, and Wolfowitz was transported there by helicopter (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Vogel, 2007, pp. 441] Site R is located inside Raven Rock Mountain, about six miles north of Camp David, on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001] According to authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, it “was designed as a duplicate of the NMCC” (the National Military Command Center, inside the Pentagon). “If an attack took out the NMCC, or it needed to be evacuated for any reason, Site R would become the Pentagon’s primary command center.” Since joining the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1998 as its director of operations, Vice Admiral Scott Fry had “instituted regular drills and other measures to make sure Site R could rapidly get up to speed in an emergency, without glitches that might be fatal in a war setting.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 174] Yet when he calls the Pentagon from this alternate command center, Wolfowitz reports that “the computer and communication systems there functioned poorly or not at all.” He is, however, able to participate in video teleconference calls. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132] These problems are not reported as causing any significant hindrance in the emergency response to the attacks. But Creed and Newman will comment: “The authority to order major military action rested jointly with the senior civilian leaders at both the White House and the Defense Department. Only they, together, could order troops to move, or missiles to fly. If the NMCC went down before Site R was up and running, the communications link required to utilize the nation’s military might be severed, for the first time since the system was put in place in 1947.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 174-175]
Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz, Site R
United Airlines finally issues a press release confirming that Flight 175 has crashed, nearly three hours after this aircraft hit the World Trade Center (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). The release states, “United Airlines has now confirmed that two of its aircraft have crashed.” These include “United Flight 175, a Boeing 767 aircraft, [that] departed from Boston at 7:58 a.m. local time, bound for Los Angeles, with 56 passengers onboard, two pilots and seven flight attendants.” [United Airlines, 9/11/2001] United Airlines previously issued a press release, at 11:17, confirming the crash of Flight 93 (see 11:17 a.m. September 11, 2001), but this had stated that the airline was, at that time, only “deeply concerned” about Flight 175. [United Airlines, 9/11/2001] However, at 9:22, the United Airlines System Operations Control manager had issued an advisory to all the airline’s facilities, stating that Flight 175 had been in an accident in New York (see 9:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 26 ] And Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, will later claim that United confirmed to the center that Flight 175 was down, “within two or three minutes” (see (9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175
Key Events
Day of 9/11
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases
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