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A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network

Israeli Attitude to Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons

Project: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Open-Content project managed by Paul, KJF

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Israel considers attacking a key part of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The idea is sparked when the Indian intelligence service Research and Analysis Wing intercepts a US cable saying that Pakistan will be able to explode a bomb within two or three years (see 1979). The Israelis knew that Pakistan was working on a nuclear weapons project, but thought it was not close to making such progress. Shocked by the Pakistani advances, they begin to plan a pre-emptive strike against one of the Pakistani facilities, the laboratory of scientist A. Q. Khan in Kahuta. However, the US learns of the plan and pressures the Israelis to put it on ice, which they do. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 86]

Entity Tags: Research and Analysis Wing (Indian external intelligence agency)

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

At some time in 1981, Pakistan begins digging some tunnels under the Ras Koh mountains. The work is apparently related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which begins preparation for a cold test of a nuclear weapon this year (see Shortly After May 1, 1981). This work is noticed by both India and Israel, who also see other signs that work is continuing on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Tunnels in these mountains will be used when Pakistan tests nuclear weapons in 1998 (see May 28, 1998). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 86, 275]

Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

1981: A. Q. Khan Supplier Threatened in Bonn

A. Q. Khan supplier Peter Griffin is threatened in Bonn, Germany. This threat may be part of a campaign by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad targeting Khan’s European suppliers, which is ongoing at this time (see Early 1981). Griffin, who is in Bonn to collect money for shipments of equipment to Khan’s nuclear program in Pakistan from Britain, will later say: “I was in a bar when a stranger sat down next to me. ‘You’re Peter Griffin,’ he said. ‘We don’t like what you’re doing, so stop it.” Griffin does not stop doing business with Khan, but begins keeping records of all his business dealings and movements, puts his company records in a bank vault, and tells his wife that if anything should happen to him, she should give everything to their son. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 88]

Entity Tags: Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Peter Griffin

Category Tags: Other Countries, Britain, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

Alcom Engineering, an Italian company that is supplying metal components to the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, receives a threatening letter, warning it to stop doing so. Alcom then stops trading with the Khan network. This is apparently part of a campaign by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad to hamper Khan’s network in Europe (see Early 1981). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 87]

Entity Tags: Alcom Engineering, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad)

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad attacks a German man named Heinz Mebus, who is part of A. Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. The attack is in the form of a letter bomb, sent to Mebus’ home in Erlangen, West Germany. Mebus, who had helped build fluoride and uranium conversion plants for Pakistan in 1979, is not injured, but his dog is killed. This is part of a campaign by Mossad against Khan’s European associates (see Early 1981), and police soon link it to another similar attack (see February 20, 1981). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 87]

Entity Tags: Heinz Mebus, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad)

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

The Israeli intelligence service Mossad begins a bombing and intimidation campaign in Europe targeting people linked to A. Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation network, which is helping Pakistan build a nuclear weapon. After Israel bombs an Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osirak in June 1981, the campaign intensifies. Attacks are carried out and warnings given in Europe against Khan’s suppliers and middlemen (see Early 1981, February 20, 1981, Early 1981, November 1981, and 1981). The bombings are investigated by the police forces in the countries in which they occur and are traced to a group of apparent fronts for Mossad: the Group for Non-Proliferation in South Asia, the Committee to Safeguard the Islamic Revolution, and the League for Protecting the Sub-Continent. European police realize that a state-backed group is probably behind the bombings and suspect Mossad, due to the problematic relations between Israel and the Islamic world. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will also say that Mossad was behind the bombings, partly based on interviews of “senior intelligence sources” in Israel in 2006. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 87-8, 476]

Entity Tags: Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad)

Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

A bomb planted by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad goes off outside the home of Eduard German in Berne, Switzerland. German is the managing director of CORA engineering, which had exported a gasification and solidification unit to Pakistan in 1979 to help A. Q. Khan’s efforts to build a nuclear bomb, and is soon planning to supply another such unit. The bombing is one of a series by Mossad against Khan’s suppliers in Europe (see Early 1981). The company also receives an anonymous call saying it should stop trading with Pakistan, and this threat is followed by a similar one two months later. At this point the company realizes US intelligence knows everything about its operations (see April 1981), and so halts its dealings with Pakistan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 87]

Entity Tags: CORA Engineering, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Eduard German

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

The Israeli intelligence service Mossad bombs a German company that supplies parts for A. Q. Khan’s nuclear weapons program in Pakistan. The company had been doing business with Khan through one of his representatives in Paris since 1976 and had sold Pakistan lead shielding and remote-controlled equipment to maneuver radioactive substances. The bomb is part of a campaign by Mossad targeting members of Khan’s nuclear proliferation network (see Early 1981). The company also receives three threatening calls, and another such call is made to the local Reuters office. However, the company continues to supply equipment to help Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 88]

Entity Tags: Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad)

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

In response to information it has received about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (see June 2, 1981), Israel begins planning a pre-emptive strike against one of Pakistan’s main nuclear facilities. The complex to be targeted is in Kahuta, near Islamabad, and houses Pakistan’s uranium enrichment centrifuges. However, the plan is not implemented due to US pressure, applied due to friendly US relations with Pakistan and Pakistani co-operation on anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 86]

Category Tags: Soviet-Afghan War Connections, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

Israel’s permanent representative to the UN, Yehuda Blum, tells the UN General Assembly that “there is abundant evidence indicating that [Pakistan] is producing nuclear weapons.” He adds that “at the Engineering Research Labs… Pakistan is secretly constructing a plant for the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium by centrifuges” based on a technology “stolen from the URENCO plant in the Netherlands.” He also says that Pakistan has established front companies in 14 countries to acquire components, and that Pakistan is close to building a cascade of at least 1,000 centrifuges. In addition, the Pakistanis intend to build more than 10,000 of them, “which in turn could produce about 150 kg of enriched uranium a year, sufficient for seven nuclear explosive devices every year.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will write that this information is “what the US had known for several years but had chosen not to share with the rest of the world.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 85-86]

Entity Tags: Adrian Levy, Yehuda Blum, Catherine Scott-Clark, United Nations

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

The US State Department writes a cable to Israel to allay Israeli fears about Pakistan’s nuclear program (see June 2, 1981). However, the communication contains information the US must know to be untrue. The cable says, “We believe that the Pakistanis have so far been unable to make their centrifuge machines work and that they have not yet produced any significant quantities of enriched uranium.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will say this is a “blatant lie,” as the US knows the opposite is true. The cable concludes, “Even if the Pakistanis do manage to eventually overcome their problems in the enrichment area, it would likely take them a few years of successful operations to produce sufficient fissile material to fabricate a single device.” It also estimates that it will take Pakistan another decade before it has a suitable missile system to go with warheads. Levy and Scott-Clark will add, “Not only was the US misrepresenting the available intelligence, but it was also ignoring several articles published by Khan himself in Western nuclear gazettes in which he had explicitly laid out the hurdles his centrifuge construction program had overcome.” Moshe Ya’alon, later head of Israeli military intelligence, will say that the Israelis are stunned by this response. “The US was glib on Pakistan,” he will add. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 85-86]

Entity Tags: Adrian Levy, US Department of State, Moshe Ya’alon, Catherine Scott-Clark

Category Tags: Cover-up of US Intelligence, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad sends a letter bomb to Albrecht Migule, an associate of A. Q. Khan who had helped build fluoride and uranium conversion plants for Pakistani in 1979. It is not known whether the bomb explodes or what damage it does, but Migule survives, only to be fined by the German authorities for his dealings with Khan. The bomb is part of a campaign by Mossad targeting members of Khan’s nuclear proliferation network (see Early 1981). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 88, 118]

Entity Tags: Albrecht Migule, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad)

Category Tags: Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

Soon after people involved in the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation ring start to meet with Iranian representatives (see 1987 and 1987), Israeli intelligence becomes aware of these contacts. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment that the Israeli intelligence community studies “the Pakistan-Iran nuclear pact since its inception in 1987.” One of the key elements in the Israeli effort is Unit 8200, an intelligence component of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which will crack the encryption used in communications between Pakistan and Iran at some point in the next few years. The intercepts suggest that Pakistan may have given the Iranians what Levy and Scott-Clark will call “a nuclear weapons factory.” Future IDF chief Moshe Ya’alon will say of the period in the mid-90s: “Pakistan was broke. Khan was flying around the world alongside his military escort. Our people overheard him dealing and many of these deals came back to Iran, to whom he was offering KRL stock.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 256]

Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Unit 8200, Moshe Ya’alon, Israeli Defense Forces

Category Tags: Iran, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan visits Syria. According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, he meets with “a senior Syrian government official” and is accompanied by a Pakistani army officer, apparently Brigadier Sajawal Khan Malik. The visit is monitored by Israeli intelligence. Moshe Ya’alon, later head of Israeli military intelligence, will say: “Khan had a menu with him. He was offering nuclear assistance. But we do not know if the deal went through. What we determined was that although Khan was intent on selling to Damascus, he was also keen to use Syria as a conduit to deliver nuclear assistance to Iran. Nobody was looking at Syria in those days from a nuclear perspective.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 256]

Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Sajawal Khan Malik, Moshe Ya’alon

Category Tags: Other Countries, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

Pakistan, which owes North Korea US$ 40 million for No-dong missiles it has purchased (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After and November 19-24, 1995), tells the North Koreans it does not have the money and cannot pay for them. Instead, the Pakistanis offer North Korea a uranium enrichment plant, a proposal first discussed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and North Korea’s foreign minister Kim Yong-nam in 1992 (see August 1992). Israeli intelligence is monitoring Khan’s procurement network and learns of the proposal. It informs the US government, but the US does not show any special interest. General Moshe Ya’alon, who will later be chief of staff in the Israeli Defense Force, will comment: “I remember saying to the Americans some time in 1995 or 1996, ‘How to do think Pakistan is going to pay for all those No-dong missiles?’ But I was shouting myself hoarse. Nobody wanted to know.” According to North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop (see 1997), the deal between Pakistan and North Korea is concluded in the summer of 1996 during a visit to Korea by a technical delegation from Khan Research Laboratories. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 256-257, 281]

Entity Tags: Moshe Ya’alon, Hwang Jang-yop

Category Tags: North Korea, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

An unnamed high-ranking State Department official helps a nuclear smuggling ring connected to Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and Pakistan’s ISI to plant “moles” in US military and academic institutions that handle nuclear technology, according to FBI translator Sibel Edmonds. Edmonds will later leave the FBI, becoming a whistleblower, and say she knows this based on telephone conversations she translated shortly after 9/11. The moles, mostly Ph.D students, are planted by Turkish and Israeli elements in the network, which obtains nuclear technology for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and for re-sale by Khan. Edmonds will later say she thinks there are several transactions of nuclear material every month: “I heard at least three transactions like this over a period of 2½ years. There are almost certainly more.” She will also say that the network appears to obtain information “from every nuclear agency in the United States.” The State Department official apparently arranges security clearance for some of the moles, enabling them to work in sensitive nuclear research facilities, including the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory in New Mexico, which is responsible for the security of the US nuclear deterrent. [Sunday Times (London), 1/6/2008] The high-ranking State Department official who is not named by Britain’s Sunday Times is said to be Marc Grossman by both Larisa Alexandrovna of Raw Story and former CIA officer Philip Giraldi, writing in the American Conservative. [Raw Story, 1/20/2008; American Conservative, 1/28/2008; American Conservative, 11/1/2009]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Sibel Edmonds, Philip Giraldi, Larisa Alexandrovna, Marc Grossman, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Turkey / Sibel Edmonds Allegations, Assistance to Khan Network in US, Pakistani ISI Links, USA, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes, Turkey / Sibel Edmonds Allegations, Assistance to Khan Network in US, Pakistani ISI Links, USA, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

A nuclear proliferation network operating in the US penetrates the Pentagon and related institutions, according to FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. Edmonds will later leave the FBI and say she knows this based on telephone conversations she translated as a part of an FBI investigation. The network, which is run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, but also includes Turkish and Israeli elements, is allegedly helped by a number of senior officials in the Pentagon. Edmonds will later say: “The [senior officials] provided lists of potential moles from Pentagon-related institutions who had access to databases concerning this information. The handlers, who were part of the diplomatic community, would then try to recruit those people to become moles for the network. The lists contained all their ‘hooking points,’ which could be financial or sexual pressure points, their exact job in the Pentagon and what stuff they had access to.” One of the Pentagon figures that is a target of the FBI investigation is Larry Franklin, an analyst who will be jailed in 2006 for passing US defense information to lobbyists and sharing classified information with an Israeli diplomat. According to Edmonds, Franklin is “one of the top people providing information and packages during 2000 and 2001.” [Sunday Times (London), 1/6/2008]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Larry Franklin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Sibel Edmonds, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Assistance to Khan Network in US, Turkey / Sibel Edmonds Allegations, USA, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

A covert recording made by the FBI indicates that a Turkish agent is trying to sell nuclear information that he stole from an air force base in Alabama, according to FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. Edmonds will later say that he meets two Saudi Arabian businessmen in Detroit to sell the information. When she listens to the recording, she hears the agent saying, “We have a package and we’re going to sell it for $250,000.” The agent is connected to a ring fronted by Turkish and Israeli elements that arranges the illicit transfer of nuclear information and technology to Pakistan via Turkey (see Mid-Late 1990s and (1997-2002)). [Sunday Times (London), 1/6/2008]

Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Assistance to Khan Network in US, USA, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

Marc Grossman at an American-Turkish Council meeting in 2005.Marc Grossman at an American-Turkish Council meeting in 2005. [Source: Canal+]An unnamed high-ranking State Department official tips off members of a nuclear smuggling ring about a CIA operation to penetrate it, according to FBI translator Sibel Edmonds. Edmonds will later leave the FBI, becoming a whistleblower, and will say she knows this based on telephone conversations she translated. The ring is headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, and includes Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency, as well as Turkish and Israeli representatives. The official is said to tell a member of the ring that a company the ring wants to do business with, Brewster Jennings & Associates, is a CIA front company. Brewster Jennings & Associates is a front for Valerie Plame Wilson, who will later be outed as a CIA officer in 2003, and possibly other operatives. A group of Turkish agents come to the US on the pretext of researching alternative energy sources and are introduced to Brewster Jennings through a lobby group, the American Turkish Council (ATC). The Turks apparently believe Brewster Jennings are energy consultants and plan to hire them. According to Edmonds, the State Department official finds out about this and contacts a foreign target under FBI surveillance, telling him, “[Y]ou need to stay away from Brewster Jennings because they are a cover for the government.” The FBI target then warns several people about Brewster Jennings, including a person at the ATC and an ISI agent, and Plame Wilson is moved to another operation.
Comments and Denial - The Sunday Times will comment: “If the ISI was made aware of the CIA front company, then this would almost certainly have damaged the investigation into the activities of Khan. Plame [Wilson]‘s cover would also have been compromised, although Edmonds never heard her name mentioned on the intercepts.” The unnamed State Department official will deny the allegations, calling them “false and malicious.” Former CIA officer Philip Giraldi will comment: “It’s pretty clear Plame [Wilson] was targeting the Turks. If indeed that [State Department] official was working with the Turks to violate US law on nuclear exports, it would have been in his interest to alert them to the fact that this woman’s company was affiliated to the CIA. I don’t know if that’s treason legally but many people would consider it to be.” [Sunday Times (London), 1/27/2008]
Official Said to be Marc Grossman - The high-ranking State Department official who is not named in the Sunday Times is said to be Marc Grossman by both Larisa Alexandrovna of Raw Story and Giraldi, writing in the American Conservative. [Raw Story, 1/20/2008; American Conservative, 1/28/2008]

Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Valerie Plame Wilson, Philip Giraldi, US Department of State, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Larisa Alexandrovna, Brewster Jennings & Associates, American-Turkish Council, Marc Grossman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Valerie Plame Wilson, Turkey / Sibel Edmonds Allegations, Assistance to Khan Network in US, Pakistani ISI Links, USA, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

According to Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker, a few days after 9/11 members of the elite Israeli counterterrorism unit Sayeret Matkal arrive in the US and begin training with US Special Forces in a secret location. The two groups are developing contingency plans to attack Pakistan’s military bases and remove its nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government or the nuclear weapons fall into the wrong hands. [New Yorker, 10/29/2001] There may have been threats to enact this plan on September 13, 2001. The Japan Times later notes that this “threat to divest Pakistan of its ‘crown jewels’ was cleverly used by the US, first to force [Pakistani President] Musharraf to support its military campaign in Afghanistan, and then to warn would-be coup plotters against Musharraf.” [Japan Times, 11/10/2001]

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan, Sayeret Matkal

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Other US Politics, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

The Sunday Times runs a series of articles about FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, detailing allegations made by Edmonds about Turkish and US involvement in the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring, as well as money laundering, drugs, and conventional weapons. Some allegations made by Edmonds were previously discussed in the press, but many remained secret; she divulges more to Sunday Times now because, after having unsuccessfully attempted to pursue her case through the courts and Congress, she has become “disillusioned with the US authorities’ failure to act.”
Allegations against State Department and Pentagon Officials - The allegations center on an unnamed former high-ranking State Department official, who is said to have received money from Turkish nuclear smugglers, and on other household names who served at the Pentagon. Edmonds says, “He [the State Department official] was aiding foreign operatives against US interests by passing them highly classified information, not only from the State Department but also from the Pentagon, in exchange for money, position and political objectives.” She adds, “If you made public all the information that the FBI have on this case, you will see very high-level people going through criminal trials.” The former State Department official says: “If you are calling me to say somebody said that I took money, that’s outrageous… I do not have anything to say about such stupid ridiculous things as this.”
"Overlapping Corroboration" - The Sunday Times says that it spoke to two FBI agents and two CIA officers who worked on nuclear proliferation while researching the story, and, “While none was aware of specific allegations against officials she names, they did provide overlapping corroboration of Edmonds’s story.” One of the CIA sources confirms that Turkey did acquire nuclear secrets from the US and shared them with Pakistan and Israel, saying: “We have no indication that Turkey has its own nuclear ambitions. But the Turks are traders. To my knowledge they became big players in the late 1990s.” [Sunday Times (London), 1/6/2008; Sunday Times (London), 1/20/2008; Sunday Times (London), 1/27/2008]
Official Said to be Marc Grossman - The high-ranking State Department official who is not named in the Sunday Times articles, possibly due to libel law considerations, is said to be Marc Grossman by both Larisa Alexandrovna of Raw Story and former CIA officer Phillip Giraldi, writing in the American Conservative. [Raw Story, 1/20/2008; American Conservative, 1/28/2008]

Entity Tags: Philip Giraldi, Marc Grossman, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of State, Larisa Alexandrovna, Sibel Edmonds

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Turkey / Sibel Edmonds Allegations, Assistance to Khan Network in US, USA, Israeli Attitude to Pakistan Nukes

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