!! History Commons Alert, Exciting News

Follow Us!

We are planning some big changes! Please follow us to stay updated and be part of our community.

Twitter Facebook

Complete 911 Timeline

Before 9/11

Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by matt, Derek, Paul, KJF, mtuck, paxvector

add event | references

Page 9 of 9 (841 events)
previous | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 | next

In an interview with the Washington Post, President Bush says that, in contrast to the period before 9/11, “there was a significant difference in my attitude after September 11” about al-Qaeda and the threat it posed to the United States. Before the attacks: “I was not on point, but I knew [Osama bin Laden] was a menace and I knew he was a problem. I knew he was responsible, or we felt he was responsible, for the previous bombings that killed Americans. I was prepared to look at a plan that would be a thoughtful plan that would bring him to justice, and would have given the order to do that. I have no hesitancy about going after him. But I didn’t feel that sense of urgency, and my blood was not nearly as boiling.” Author Philip Shenon will comment that this interview is something Bush “almost certainly regretted later.” Shenon will also comment on who should have imparted such a sense of urgency, “If anyone on the White House staff had responsibility for making Bush’s blood ‘boil’ that summer about Osama bin Laden, it was [National Security Adviser] Condoleezza Rice.” [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Shenon, 2008, pp. 154-155]

Entity Tags: Philip Shenon, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Hamid Karzai.
Hamid Karzai. [Source: United States Agency for International Development]Afghan Prime Minister Hamid Karzai and his transitional government assume power in Afghanistan. The press reported a few weeks before that Karzai had been a paid consultant for Unocal at one time (Karzai and Unocal both deny this), as well as the Deputy Foreign Minister for the Taliban. [Le Monde (Paris), 12/13/2001; CNN, 12/22/2001]

Entity Tags: Unocal, Hamid Karzai, Taliban

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, Afghanistan

Zalmay Khalilzad, already Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues, and a prominent neoconversative (see May 23, 2001), is appointed by President Bush as a special envoy to Afghanistan. [BBC, 1/1/2002] In his former role as Unocal adviser, Khalilzad participated in negotiations with the Taliban to build a pipeline through Afghanistan. He also wrote op-eds in the Washington Post in 1997 (see October 7, 1996) supporting the Taliban regime, back when Unocal was hoping to work with the Taliban. [Independent, 1/10/2002] He will be appointed US ambassador to Afghanistan in 2003 (see November 2003).

Entity Tags: Unocal, Taliban, Zalmay M. Khalilzad

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, Afghanistan

CIA Director George Tenet tells a Senate hearing that there was no 9/11 intelligence failure. When asked about the CIA record on 9/11, he says, “We are proud of that record.” He also states that the 9/11 plot was “in the heads of three or four people” and thus nearly impossible to prevent. [USA Today, 2/7/2002]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

Pakistani President Musharraf and Afghan leader Hamid Karzai announce their agreement to “cooperate in all spheres of activity” including the proposed Central Asian pipeline, which they call “in the interest of both countries.” [Irish Times, 2/9/2002; Gulf News, 9/2/2002]

Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, Pervez Musharraf

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, Afghanistan

The Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv notes: “If one looks at the map of the big American bases created [in the Afghan war], one is struck by the fact that they are completely identical to the route of the projected oil pipeline to the Indian Ocean.” Ma’ariv also states, “Osama bin Laden did not comprehend that his actions serve American interests… If I were a believer in conspiracy theory, I would think that bin Laden is an American agent. Not being one I can only wonder at the coincidence.” [Chicago Tribune, 3/18/2002]

Entity Tags: United States, Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance, Afghanistan

An al-Qaeda operations leader gives American al-Qaeda member Jose Padilla (see September-October 2000) an assignment: target high-rise buildings in the US that use natural gas. Padilla and al-Qaeda leaders consider buildings in Florida, Washington, DC, and New York City as potential targets. Though al-Qaeda leaders consider Padilla an incompetent (see Mid-April 2002), they give him $15,000 to begin putting together a plan. [Associated Press, 6/2004] Instead, Padilla will be captured by FBI agents as he comes into Chicago (see May 8, 2002).

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jose Padilla

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt says of the hijackers: “The terror cells that we’re going up against are typically small and all terrorist personnel… were carefully screened. The number of personnel who know vital information, targets, timing, the exact methods to be used had to be smaller still.… Against that degree of control, that kind of compartmentalization, that depth of discipline and fanaticism, I personally doubt—and I draw again upon my thirty years of experience in this business—that anything short of one of the knowledgeable inner-circle personnel or hijackers turning himself in to us would have given us sufficient foreknowledge to have prevented [9/11].” An FBI official calls this “the superman scenario.” [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] The media repeats this notion. For instance, later in the year, the Chicago Tribune will comment, “The operational discipline surrounding Sept. 11 was so professional, and impenetrable, that intercepted telephone conversations, or even well-placed spies, might not have made a difference.” [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/2002] But even in the same article that quotes Pavitt, a senior FBI official states that serious and potentially fatal errors were made by the hijackers. The article also notes that the hijackers did not maintain tight compartmentalization and discipline. [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] Eventually, more and more details will come out proving the “superman” notion false. The hijackers even told vital details of their plot to complete strangers (see April-May 2000; Late April-Mid-May 2000).

Entity Tags: James Pavitt

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations, Warning Signs, 9/11 Investigations

FBI Director Robert Mueller states, “[T]here was nothing the agency could have done to anticipate and prevent the [9/11] attacks.” [US Congress, 9/18/2002]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

The New York Post has a banner headline on May 16, 2002.The New York Post has a banner headline on May 16, 2002. [Source: New York Post]The Bush administration is embarrassed when the CBS Evening News reveals that President Bush had been warned about al-Qaeda domestic attacks in August 2001 (see August 6, 2001). [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Washington Post, 5/16/2002] CBS’s David Martin reports: “The president’s daily intelligence brief is delivered to the president each morning, often by the director of central intelligence himself. In the weeks before 9/11 it warned that an attack by Osama bin Laden could involve the hijacking of a US aircraft.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 113] Bush had repeatedly said that he had “no warning” of any kind. Press secretary Ari Fleischer states unequivocally that while Bush had been warned of possible hijackings, “[t]he president did not—not—receive information about the use of airplanes as missiles by suicide bombers.” [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Washington Post, 5/16/2002] “Until the attack took place, I think it’s fair to say that no one envisioned that as a possibility.” [MSNBC, 9/18/2002] Fleischer claims the August memo was titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike the US,” but the real title is soon found to end with “Strike in US” [Washington Post, 5/18/2002] The Guardian will state a few days later, “[T]he memo left little doubt that the hijacked airliners were intended for use as missiles and that intended targets were to be inside the US.” It further states that, “now, as the columnist Joe Conason points out in the current edition of the New York Observer, ‘conspiracy’ begins to take over from ‘incompetence’ as a likely explanation for the failure to heed—and then inform the public about—warnings that might have averted the worst disaster in the nation’s history.” [Guardian, 5/19/2002] Current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will point out in 2008: “The [CBS] report left much open to question. Was it suggesting that the president had received info that should have led him to act? Was it just a possible warning sign, like many others that may have gone unheeded? Or was it something else, possibly a nonspecific bit of intelligence from years earlier?” McClellan will write that the uncertainty “mattered little to Democratic leaders in Congress. They saw an opportunity to attack the president’s strong suit—his leadership in the war on terrorism—and cut into his enormous popularity ahead of the midterm elections that coming November.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 113]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), David Martin, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush, Scott McClellan, Ari Fleischer, Joe Conason

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Denials, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice holds a press conference to respond to the public leak (see May 15, 2002) of the title of President Bush’s August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief item entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001).
Presidential Daily Brief - She asserts: “It was an analytic report that talked about [Osama bin Laden]‘s methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically, in 1997, in 1998.… I want to reiterate, it was not a warning. There was no specific time, place, or method mentioned.” [White House, 5/16/2002] In April 2004, Rice will testify under oath before the 9/11 Commission and repeatedly assert that it was “a historical memo… not threat reporting” (see April 8, 2004).
Comment by Philip Shenon - Author Philip Shenon will later comment, “She failed to mention, as would later be clear, that the PDB focused entirely on the possibility that al-Qaeda intended to strike within the United States; it cited relatively recent FBI reports of possible terrorist surveillance of government buildings in New York.” After rereading the transcript of the press conference, Shenon will call it a “remarkable document,” because “To many of the Commission’s staff, it offered proof of how, to Condoleezza Rice, everything is semantics. A threat is not a threat, a warning is not a warning, unless she says it is. The word historical appeared to have an especially broad definition to Rice. To her, a warning that was a few weeks or months old was of relatively little value because it was ‘historical.’”
Aircraft as Weapons - Rice also says, “I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon—that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.” However, various government agencies were well aware of the concept of planes as missiles, including the FBI (see August 27, 2001), the Defense Department (see April 17-26, 2001), and the White House itself (see June 20, 2001). Shenon will point out that this news conference occurs eight months after the attacks, yet Rice is “suggesting that in all that time, no one had bothered to tell her [of these reports].” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 213, 237-239]

Entity Tags: Philip Shenon, Condoleezza Rice

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Denials

National Security Adviser Rice tries to explain what Bush knew and when in her May 16, 2002 press conference.National Security Adviser Rice tries to explain what Bush knew and when in her May 16, 2002 press conference. [Source: CNN]National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice states, “I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile,” adding that “even in retrospect” there was “nothing” to suggest that. [White House, 5/16/2002] Contradicting Rice’s claims, former CIA Deputy Director John Gannon acknowledges that such a scenario has long been taken seriously by US intelligence: “If you ask anybody could terrorists convert a plane into a missile? [N]obody would have ruled that out.” Rice also states, “The overwhelming bulk of the evidence was that this was an attack that was likely to take place overseas.” [MSNBC, 5/17/2002] Slate awards Rice the “Whopper of the Week” when the title of Bush’s August 6 briefing is revealed: “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” [Slate, 5/23/2002] Rice later will concede that “somebody did imagine it” but will say she did not know about such intelligence until well after this conference. [Associated Press, 9/21/2002]

Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, World Trade Center, John Gannon, Pentagon

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

President Bush says of 9/11 in a speech, “Had I known that the enemy was going to use airplanes to kill on that fateful morning, I would have done everything in my power to protect the American people.” [US President, 5/20/2002]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

Walid Arkeh.Walid Arkeh. [Source: Orlando Sentinel / Bureau of Prisons]Walid Arkeh, a prisoner in Florida, is interviewed by a group of FBI agents in New York City. The agents seek information regarding the 1988 US embassy bombings and are there to interview him about information he learned from three al-Qaeda prisoners he had befriended. During the interview, Arkeh claims that, in August 2001, he told the FBI that al-Qaeda was likely to attack the WTC and other targets soon, but he was dismissed (see August 21, 2001). After 9/11, his warning still was not taken seriously by the local FBI. The New York FBI agents are stunned. One says to him: “Let me tell you something. If you know what happened in New York, we are all in deep sh_t. We are in deep trouble.” Arkeh tells the agents that these prisoners hinted that the WTC would be attacked, and targets in Washington were mentioned as well. However, they did not tell him a date or that airplanes would be used. The New York FBI later will inform him that they find his information credible. [Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/2002] Arkeh is later deported to Jordan despite a Responsible Cooperators Program promising visas to those who provided important information to US-designated terrorist groups. (It is unclear whether any one ever has been given a reward through this program.) [Orlando Sentinel, 11/10/2002; Orlando Sentinel, 1/11/2003; Orlando Sentinel, 3/12/2003]

Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Walid Arkeh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

Leaders sign the pipeline agreement.Leaders sign the pipeline agreement. [Source: Associated Press]Afghanistan’s interim leader, Hamid Karzai, Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov, and Pakistani President Musharraf meet in Islamabad and sign a memorandum of understanding on the trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline project. [Dawn (Karachi), 5/31/2002; Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, 6/8/2002] Afghan leader Hamid Karzai (who formerly worked for Unocal) calls Unocal the “lead company” in building the pipeline. [BBC, 5/13/2002] The Los Angeles Times comments, “To some here, it looked like the fix was in for Unocal when President Bush named a former Unocal consultant, Zalmay Khalilzad, as his special envoy to Afghanistan late last year .” [Los Angeles Times, 5/30/2002] Unocal claims that it has no interest in any Afghanistan pipeline after 9/11. However, Afghan officials say that Unocal will be the lead company in funding the pipeline. The Afghan deputy minister of mines comments on Unocal’s claim of disinterest: “Business has its secrets and mysteries. Maybe… they don’t want it to be disclosed in the media.” [Toronto Star, 3/2/2003]

Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, Saparmurat Niyazov, Unocal, Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush, Zalmay M. Khalilzad

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

A rare follow-up article about insider trading based on 9/11 foreknowledge confirms that numerous inquiries in the US and around the world are still ongoing. However, “all are treating these inquiries as if they were state secrets.” The author speculates: “The silence from the investigating camps could mean any of several things: Either terrorists are responsible for the puts on the airline stocks; others besides terrorists had foreknowledge; the puts were just lucky bets by credible investors; or, there is nothing whatsoever to support the insider-trading rumors.” [Insight, 6/3/2002] Another article notes that Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, the American investment banking arm of German giant Deutsche Bank, purchased at least some of these options. Deutsche Bank Alex Brown was once headed by “Buzzy” Krongard, who quit that company in March 2001 and became Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “This fact may not be significant. And then again, it may. After all, there has traditionally been a close link between the CIA, big banks, and the brokerage business.” [Business Line, 2/11/2002]

Entity Tags: A.B. (“Buzzy”) Krongard, Deutsche Bank, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Other 9/11 Investigations

For the first time, Bush concedes that his intelligence agencies had problems: “In terms of whether or not the FBI and the CIA were communicating properly, I think it is clear that they weren’t.” [London Times, 6/5/2002] However, in an address to the nation three days later, President Bush still maintains, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 6/8/2002] Days earlier, Newsweek reported that the FBI had prepared a detailed chart showing how agents could have uncovered the 9/11 plot if the CIA had told them what it knew about the hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar sooner. (FBI Director Mueller denies the existence of such a chart. [Washington Post, 6/3/2002] ) One FBI official says, “There’s no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together.” [Newsweek, 6/2/2002] Attorney General Ashcroft also says it is unlikely better intelligence could have stopped the attacks. [Washington Post, 6/3/2002]

Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, John Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Robert S. Mueller III

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar

FBI Director Robert Mueller testifies before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. His testimony will be made public in September 2002. [Associated Press, 9/26/2002]
Mueller Says Hijackers Operated Alone - Mueller claims that with the possible exception of Zacarias Moussaoui, “[t]o this day we have found no one in the United States except the actual hijackers who knew of the [9/11] plot and we have found nothing they did while in the United States that triggered a specific response about them.” He also claims, “As far as we know, they contacted no known terrorist sympathizers in the United States.” [US Congress, 9/26/2002]
Mueller Contradicted by 9/11 Inquiry - The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will conclude near the end of 2002 that some hijackers had contact inside the US with individuals known to the FBI, and the hijackers “were not as isolated during their time in the United States as has been previously suggested.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/12/2002]
Mueller Contradicted by FBI Report - Also, a classified FBI report from November 2001 asserted that the hijackers had a “web of contacts” in the US and abroad who “were known from [Osama bin Laden]-related activities or training” (see November 2001). [Sperry, 2005, pp. 67-68]
Muller: 'No Slip-Ups' - Mueller also claims: “While here, the hijackers effectively operated without suspicion, triggering nothing that alerted law enforcement and doing nothing that exposed them to domestic coverage.… There were no slip-ups. Discipline never broke down. They gave no hint to those around them what they were about.” [US Congress, 9/26/2002]

Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

British Prime Minister Tony Blair states, “We knew about al-Qaeda for a long time. They were committing terrorist acts, they were planning, they were organizing. Everybody knew, we all knew, that Afghanistan was a failed state living on drugs and terror. We did not act.… To be truthful about it, there was no way we could have got the public consent to have suddenly launched a campaign on Afghanistan but for what happened on September 11.” [London Times, 7/17/2002] In a book released one month later, Clinton’s former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger will similarly state, “You show me one reporter, one commentator, one member of Congress who thought we should invade Afghanistan before September 11 and I’ll buy you dinner in the best restaurant in New York City.” [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 219]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Sandy Berger, Tony Blair

Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pipeline Politics

Testifying before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, former FBI Director Louis Freeh says, “I am aware of nothing that to me demonstrates that the FBI and the intelligence community had the type of information or tactical intelligence which could have prevented September 11th. In terms of the FBI’s capability to identify, investigate and prevent the nineteen hijackers from carrying out their attacks, the facts so far on the public record do not support the conclusion that these tragic events could have been prevented by the FBI and intelligence community acting by themselves.” [US Congress, 10/8/2002]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis J. Freeh

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

In sworn testimony to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, CIA Director George Tenet repeatedly claims that a March 2000 cable sent to CIA headquarters reporting that hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi had entered the US was not read by anybody. He says, “I know that nobody read that cable,” “Nobody read that cable in the March timeframe,” and “[N]obody read that information only cable.” [New York Times, 10/17/2002] Former Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black will also claim that the cable was not read. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 pdf file] However, a later investigation by the CIA Office of Inspector General will find that numerous CIA officers had actually read the cable shortly after it was sent (see March 6, 2000 and After). Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission will later assert that, “No-one outside the Counterterrorist Center was told any of this” (about Alhazmi’s arrival in the US) and neglect to mention that Tenet had previously misstated the CIA’s knowledge of the hijackers. Neither will the 9/11 Commission investigate the cause of the CIA’s apparent inaction. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, Nawaf Alhazmi, Cofer Black, George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Key Hijacker Events, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, 9/11 Investigations

NSA Director Michael Hayden.
NSA Director Michael Hayden. [Source: NSA]NSA Director Michael Hayden testifies before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that the “NSA had no [indications] that al-Qaeda was specifically targeting New York and Washington… or even that it was planning an attack on US soil.” Before 9/11, the “NSA had no knowledge… that any of the attackers were in the United States.” Supposedly, a post-9/11 NSA review found no intercepts of calls involving any of the 19 hijackers. [Reuters, 10/17/2002; US Congress, 10/17/2002; USA Today, 10/18/2002] Yet, in the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), the NSA intercepted communications between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and hijacker Mohamed Atta, when he was in charge of operations in the US. [Independent, 6/6/2002; Independent, 9/15/2002] What was said between the two has not been revealed. The NSA also intercepted multiple phone calls from al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida to the US in the days before 9/11 (see Early September 2001). But who was called or what was said has not been revealed. [ABC News, 2/18/2002] In addition, Hayden testified three times in secret on June 18, June 19, and July 18, but little is known about what he said, as not much information is disclosed in the media and many sections of the Inquiry’s final report about the NSA are heavily redacted. The main revelations at the time of the summer hearings are that the NSA intercepted two messages apparently pertaining to the forthcoming attack one day before 9/11, and this sparks a controversial leak inquiry by the FBI (see August 2, 2002). [CNN, 6/18/2002; CBS News, 6/19/2002; CNN, 6/20/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Michael Hayden

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Investigations

Steven Mann, Director of the State Department’s Caspian Basin Energy Policy Office, points out that the Caspian Sea nations contain 50 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. [Associated Press, 11/1/2002] “Caspian oil represents four percent of the world reserves. It will never dominate the world markets, but it will have an important role to play,” said Mann. He concludes that the Caspian Sea energy “will not be a second Persian Gulf.” [Associated Press, 11/1/2002] In late 1995, the American Petroleum Institute asserted that the states bordering the Caspian Sea contained 659 billion barrels of oil (see December 1995).

Entity Tags: Steven Mann

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan reach an agreement in principle to build the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, a $3.2 billion project that has been delayed for many years. Skeptics say the project would require an indefinite foreign military presence in Afghanistan. [BBC, 5/30/2002; Associated Press, 12/26/2002; BBC, 12/27/2002] As of mid-2004, construction has yet to begin.

Entity Tags: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt says he is convinced that all the intelligence the CIA had on September 11, 2001, could not have prevented the 9/11 attacks. “It was not as some have suggested, a simple matter of connecting the dots,” he claims. [Reuters, 1/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, James Pavitt

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

Slate reports that two years after the 9/11 attacks, neither the Chicago Board Options Exchange nor the Securities and Exchange Commission will make any comment about their investigations into insider trading before 9/11. “Neither has announced any conclusion. The SEC has not filed any complaint alleging illegal activity, nor has the Justice Department announced any investigation or prosecution.… So, unless the SEC decides to file a complaint—unlikely at this late stage—we may never know what they learned about terror trading.” [Slate, 9/10/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, US Securities and Exchange Commission, Chicago Board Options Exchange

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

Spokesperson Paul Bresson announces that the FBI has concluded that there was no insider trading in US securities markets by people with advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. According to Bresson, the “vast majority” of a pre-attack surge of trading in options that bet on a drop in the stock of AMR Corp., which owns American Airlines, and UAL Corp., which owns United Airlines, was conducted by investment hedge funds implementing bearish investment strategies or hedging a line position of common stock, and was not linked to terrorists. [9/11 Commission, 8/18/2003 pdf file; St. Petersburg Times, 9/19/2003; Washington Post, 9/19/2003] However, seven months later, a paper by a professor of finance at the University of Illinois will conclude that “there is evidence of unusual option market activity in the days leading up to September 11” (see April 25, 2004). [Poteshman, 3/10/2004]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines, Paul Bresson, United Airlines

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

President Bush talks about the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) he was given on August 6, 2001, entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” He claims, “There was nothing in this report to me that said, ‘Oh, by the way, we’ve got intelligence that says something is about to happen in America.‘… There was nothing in there that said, you know, ‘There is an imminent attack.’ That wasn’t what the report said. The report was kind of a history of Osama’s intentions.” [Associated Press, 4/12/2004] He adds, “[T]he PDB was no indication of a terrorist threat. There was not a time and place of an attack. It said Osama bin Laden had designs on America. Well, I knew that. What I wanted to know was, is there anything specifically going to take place in America that we needed to react to.… I was satisfied that some of the matters were being looked into. But that PDB said nothing about an attack on America. It talked about intentions, about somebody who hated America—well, we knew that.… Had I known there was going to be an attack on America, I would have moved mountains to stop the attack.” [US President, 4/19/2004] The complete text of the PDB was released the day before Bush’s comments and in fact the PDB does very clearly discuss an imminent attack on the US. For instance, it says that FBI information “indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” And it discusses a call to a US “embassy in the UAE in May [2001] saying that a group of bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives” (see August 6, 2001).

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, 2004 Elections

Category Tags: 9/11 Denials, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Warning Signs, Presidential Level Warnings

In a press conference, President Bush states, “We knew he [Osama bin Laden] had designs on us, we knew he hated us. But there was nobody in our government, and I don’t think [in] the prior government, that could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale.” [Guardian, 4/15/2004] He also says, “Had I any inkling whatsoever that the people were going to fly airplanes into buildings, we would have moved heaven and earth to save the country.” [New York Times, 4/18/2004; US President, 4/19/2004] Bush made similar comments two days earlier (see April 11, 2004). In July 2004, he will claim even more generally, “Had we had any inkling whatsoever that terrorists were about to attack our country, we would have moved heaven and earth to protect America.” [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 7/22/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, 2004 Elections

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

Allen Poteshman, a professor of finance at the University of Illinois, publishes a paper demonstrating that the insider trading in options on United and American airline stocks indicates someone profited from foreknowledge of 9/11. Poteshman concludes, “There is evidence of unusual option market activity in the days leading up to September 11.” [Poteshman, 3/10/2004; Chicago Tribune, 4/25/2004]

Entity Tags: Allen Poteshman

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld says the US would have stopped 9/11, but “We lacked the intelligence that might have prevented it.” He blames the lack of “a source inside the group of people that had planned and executed those attacks.… Had we had a source inside there, we undoubtedly would have been able to stop it. We did not.” [Newsday, 6/4/2004]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

The 9/11 Commission dismisses allegations of insider trading in the days preceding 9/11, in a footnote contained in its final report. According to the report, the put options for the parent companies of United Airlines were placed by a “US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al-Qaeda as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10.” With respect to the highly suspicious trading in the parent company of American Airlines, the Commission states that many of the trades were “traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades.” According to the Commission: “The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 499]

Entity Tags: United Airlines, US Securities and Exchange Commission, 9/11 Commission, American Airlines, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

James Pavitt.
James Pavitt. [Source: Publicity photo]James Pavitt, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Operations, states, “Given what we now know, in all the hindsight of the year 2004, I still do not believe we could have stopped the [9/11] attacks.” [New York Times, 10/27/2004] Pavitt is said to be heavily criticized in a still-classified CIA report about that agency’s failures to stop the 9/11 attacks (see January 7, 2005).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, James Pavitt

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

Michael Rolince, head of counterintelligence at the FBI’s Washington office, says of the 9/11 hijackers, “These guys were pros. For us to have done anything, these guys had to make a mistake. And they didn’t. Could we have generated enough information-ever-to keep them off those planes? I doubt it.” [Vanity Fair, 11/2004] In 2002, an FBI agent called this kind of argument “the Superman scenario.” The notion that the hijackers made no mistakes had been discredited well before Rolince’s comments (see April 2002).

Entity Tags: Michael Rolince

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials

The US ambassador to Turkmenistan states that US companies might join a long-delayed trans-Afghan natural gas pipeline project. The Turkmenistan government says a feasibility study for the $3.5 billion pipeline is complete and construction will begin in 2006. The project’s main sponsor is the Asian Development Bank. The pipeline is to run from Turkmenistan through Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan, through the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Multan, and on to India. [Associated Press, 1/18/2005] However, in August 2005 it will be reported that security concerns are still causing delays in approval of the project. A NATO representative will say, “People here are able to see what the Iraqi insurgency can do despite the presence of 150,000 foreign troops. Why not do the same in Afghanistan?” [Sydney Morning Herald, 8/25/2005]

Entity Tags: Asian Development Bank, Turkmenistan

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

Asian News International reports that according to official Pakistani sources the US government is reconsidering its opposition to the $4.2 billion dollar Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (see 1993). The Bush administration has been opposed to the proposed pipeline on grounds that it would help Iran, a potential target of future US military strikes. But since the consortium is hoping to involve US corporations, these companies are apparently putting pressure on the White House to back the pipeline. Without the approval of the US government, the companies would be barred from participating in the pipeline’s construction. According to sources, the US is considering pursuing a strategy that would leverage its possible support for the pipeline against Iran in its disagreement over the country’s nuclear program. [News (Islamabad), 4/2/2005]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

The first oil pumped from Baku, by the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, arrives in Ceyhan, on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, and is loaded onto a ship. The 1,770 km pipeline, which passes through the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, bypasses Russia and Iran for geopolitical reasons. The main shareholder is British Petroleum, and other significant shareholders include the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Statoil of Norway, and the US company Unocal, which has an 8.9% interest and became interested in the project no later than 1998. Unocal begins losing interest in a pipeline across Afghanistan around the same time (see December 5, 1998). Substantial amounts to finance the $3-4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline were arranged by the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The consortium members put up the remaining 30%. [US Congress, 2/12/1998; Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, 7/12/2002; Guardian, 12/1/2003; Guardian, 5/26/2005; Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5/31/2005; Turkish Weekly, 5/29/2006] Journalist Pepe Escobar comments: “In terms of no-holds-barred power politics and oil geopolitics, BTC is the real deal—a key component in the US’s overall strategy of wrestling the Caucasus and Central Asia away from Russia—and bypassing Iranian oil and gas routes… BTC makes little sense in economic terms. Oil experts know that the most cost-effective routes from the Caspian would be south through Iran or north through Russia. But BTC is a designer masterpiece of power politics—from the point of view of Washington and its corporate allies. US Vice President Dick Cheney, already in his previous incarnation as Halliburton chief, has always been a huge cheerleader for the ‘strategically significant’ BTC.” Escobar also mentions that the amount of Caspian oil was overestimated (see November 1, 2002), “the Caspian may hold only 32 billion barrels of oil—not much more than the reserves of Qatar, a small Gulf producer.” [Asia Times, 5/26/2005] However, the Caspian area is still believed to hold considerable amounts of natural gas. The construction of this pipeline does not halt plans for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean (see January 18, 2005).

Entity Tags: Pepe Escobar, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, British Petroleum, Statoil, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, Unocal

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance

Secretary of State Rice says that she does not recall the meeting on July 10, 2001, when CIA Director Tenet and other officials briefed her about the al-Qaeda threat (see July 10, 2001). “What I am quite certain of is that I would remember if I was told, as this account apparently says, that there was about to be an attack in the United States, and the idea that I would somehow have ignored that I find incomprehensible.” [Associated Press, 10/2/2006] Rice says she has no recollection of what she variously calls “the supposed meeting” and “the emergency so-called meeting.” [Editor & Publisher, 10/1/2006; McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] The Washington Post comments that “Rice added to the confusion… by strongly suggesting that the meeting may never have occurred at all—even though administration officials had conceded for several days that it had.” Hours after Rice’s latest denial, the State Department confirms that documents show Rice did attend such a meeting on that date. However, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack then says, “The briefing was a summary of the threat reporting from the previous weeks. There was nothing new.” The Washington Post notes that when it was pointed out to McCormack that Rice asked for the briefing to be shown to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft (see July 11-17, 2001), “McCormack was unable to explain why Rice felt the briefing should be repeated if it did not include new material.” [Washington Post, 10/3/2006]

Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Sean McCormack, Condoleezza Rice, US Department of State, Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Denials, Other 9/11 Investigations, Warning Signs, 9/11 Investigations

French investigative journalist Guillaume Dasquie writes an article for Le Monde detailing the extensive knowledge obtained by the French intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) about al-Qaeda between July 2000 and October 2001. The article is based on a series of DGSE reports leaked to Dasquie about al-Qaeda’s funding (see July 24, 2000), aerial photographs of Osama bin Laden (see August 28, 2000), and al-Qaeda threats against the US (see Between September 2000 and August 2001), including aircraft piracy. [Le Monde (Paris), 4/15/2007; Le Monde (Paris), 7/4/2007]

Entity Tags: Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Guillaume Dasquie

Category Tags: Warning Signs

Speaking before a public hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Robert Gates says, “We were attacked from Afghanistan in 2001 and we are at war in Afghanistan today in no small measure because of mistakes this government made—mistakes I, among others, made—in the end game of the anti-Soviet war there some 20 years ago.” [US Department of Defense, 4/10/2008]

Entity Tags: Robert M. Gates

Category Tags: Soviet-Afghan War

FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds testifies under oath in a deposition for the Schmidt v. Krikorian case. David Krikorian, a 2010 Democratic candidate for US Representative of Ohio, had been sued by Jean Schmidt (R-OH) in response to his claim that she had accepted “blood money” from the Turkish lobby in exchange for opposing an Armenian genocide resolution. As part of his defense against Schmidt’s charge that he had libeled her, Krikorian subpoenaed Edmonds’s testimony, as she had previously spoken and written about corruption of members of Congress by the Turkish Lobby. In two unrelated lawsuits prior to this one, Edmonds had been blocked from testifying by former Attorney General John Ashcroft, under the State Secrets Act. In Schmidt v. Krikorian, however, the Department of Justice under Attorney General Eric Holder does not reinvoke the claim of “state secrets” or otherwise move to block the testimony, and does not dispatch legal counsel to raise objections during the deposition. At the deposition, Krikorian is represented by Dan Marino of Mark Geragos’ law firm, Schmidt is represented by Bruce Fein, and Edmonds has retained Stephen M. Kohn of the National Whistleblower Center. Kohn says he has “asked [Sibel Edmonds] to limit her responses only to the information that she believes to be publicly available or she has learned from sources outside of her employment.” Marino begins his examination of Edmonds by asking basic questions about her background and work with the FBI, then works through a lengthy series of questions based on public statements Edmonds had made regarding events she witnessed. Much of this information has previously been reported, but for the first time, Edmonds is swearing to it under oath. [Edmonds, 8/8/2009] The following subjects were covered in attorney Dan Marino’s initial examination of Sibel Edmonds:
Edmonds' Experience with Her FBI Co-worker Melek Can Dickerson and Her Husband, Major Douglas Dickerson - Edmonds and her husband Matthew Edmonds had previously said former FBI colleague Melek Can Dickerson and her husband, Major Douglas Dickerson, attempted to bribe her to pass on sensitive information (see December 2, 2001), and she confirms this. Edmonds had also previously reported to Congress and the Justice Department Inspector General that Melek Can Dickerson was spying for subjects of the FBI’s investigations (see (Late October 2001)), and she confirms this as well. [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 22-34, 38]
Turkish Entities Targeted by FBI Investigations of Influence and Espionage - When asked if the American Turkish Council was a target of FBI investigations (see Late 1990s-Early 2001, Edmonds confirms it, but when asked to identify others, she declines to specifically name any. When asked about the “Turkish Lobby”, Edmonds says there is an overt and a covert lobby. The covert lobby involves “trying to obtain very sensitive, classified, highly classified US intelligence information, weapons technology information, classified congressional records, recruiting—recruiting key US individuals with access to highly sensitive information, blackmailing, bribery.” She testifies the Turkish government is indirectly involved, and that its concerns include access to US aid and weapons, as well as preventing Congress from passing a resolution acknowledging the Turkish genocide of the Armenians. [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 26-41]
Edmonds' 'State Secrets Privilege Gallery' - Marino asks the meaning of the ‘State Secrets Privilege Gallery’ at her website, justacitizen.com (see January 6, 2008). The gallery is a collection of photos without names; Edmonds explains it features the subjects of FBI investigations Edmonds was part of during her time as an FBI translator, whose names and criminal activities were being protected by claims of State Secrets and the gag orders she had been placed under. The twenty-one photos (including three place holders with question marks) feature current and former State and Defense Dept. officials; current and former members of Congress; and lobbyists and members of think tanks. Marino then names nine of the people listed in the gallery, and asks why they’re listed. As it had been reported by others that Marc Grossman was the person involved, Edmonds discusses, in some detail, her knowledge of his involvement with a criminal network stealing and selling US nuclear secrets (see January 6, 2008 and After), as well as his disclosure to a Turkish agent that Brewster Jennings was a CIA front company investigating nuclear trafficking (see Summer-Autumn 2001). Edmonds discusses the others in more general terms; Dennis Hastert (R-IL), Dan Burton (R-IN), Stephen Solarz (D-NY), Bob Livingston (R-LA) and Tom Lantos (D-CA) are all variously accused of accepting bribes in exchange for serving the interests of foreign governments, as well as involvement in blackmail and money laundering. Lantos is also accused of “disclosing highest level protected US intelligence and weapons technology information both to Israel and to Turkey.” Edmonds indicates the question mark in the Congressional group is a bisexual woman and a current member of Congress. Turkish agents wanted her to oppose an Armenian genocide resolution, and because her husband was an influential businessman. Edmonds did not include her photo in the gallery, and declines to name her in the deposition, as she is unaware if the congresswoman had actually been blackmailed, or done anything illegal. However, in an interview published in the November 2008 American Conservative, Edmonds names her as Jan Schakowsky (D-IL). [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 42-84]
Indirect Knowledge of Illicit Israeli Influence on Congress - Asked if she is “aware of the Israeli government or Israeli organizations influencing members of Congress,” Edmonds responds, “Indirectly, based on how they work, some of the largest Israeli lobby groups with the entities such as ATC and also the Turkish diplomatic community and how they actually trained and make it possible for the Turkish lobby and these entities to do it. [T]hey had training period in ‘96 and ‘98 from individuals that were sent to them from both [AIPAC] and JINSA, both the lobbying, but also on… covering up the money track.” [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 64]
Behrooz Sarshar's Testimony regarding FBI 9/11 Foreknowledge - Marino asks Edmonds about an entry on her Wikipedia page that said, “[Edmonds] claims that the FBI received information in April 2001 from a reliable Iranian intelligence asset that Osama bin Ladin was planning attacks on four to five cities with planes. Some of the people were already in the country, and the attacks would happen in a few months.” Edmonds clarifies that she knew of this incident from FBI translator Behrooz Sarshar (see April 2001), and her role was that she, “facilitated Mr. Sharshar’s meeting with 9/11Commission and also with the Glenn Fine, Department of Justice Inspector General’s Office, and… put him in touch with the members of media.” [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 66-67]
How Blackmail Operations Are Conducted by Turkish Operatives - Sibel Edmonds explains how blackmail operations were conducted by Turkish agents. “[E]veryone was taught in [FBI] counterintelligence—that the target[,] US persons, whether they are in Congress or executive branch or whatever, first go by foreign entities to what they refer to as hooking period, and it was very common; it’s a very common way of trying to find vulnerability, and that is sexual, financial, any other kinds of greeds, and it was… being done a lot, and in some cases certain people from Pentagon would send a list of individuals with access to sensitive data, whether weapons technology or nuclear technology, and this information would include all their sexual preference, how much they owed on their homes, if they have gambling issues, and the State Department, high level State Department person would provide it to these foreign operatives, and those foreign operatives then would go and hook those Pentagon people, whether they were at RAND or some other Air Force base. And then the hooking period would take some times. Sometimes it takes months, sometimes one year. They would ask for small favor, but eventually after they reviewed the targets… then they would go blackmail and that person would give them everything, nuclear related information, weapons related information. It always worked for them. So it was not always money.” [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 72-74]
The Historical Reality and Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide - Edmonds acknowledges the Ottoman genocide of Armenians as historical fact. She also notes that in Turkish society acknowledgment of the genocide is not permitted, and there are active efforts to suppress and dispute information and views related to it. [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 78-81]
The Revolving Door between the US Government and the Turkish Lobby - Asked if she was aware that members of Congress have left office and become lobbyists for Turkey, Edmonds affirms her knowledge of Hastert, Solarz and Livingston having done so. She also adds, “But then there are people who work for these lobbying firms who are not the top, but they have received their share while they were working, whether they are in Pentagon. One person was Defense Intelligence Agency person, Dana Bauer, and now she works for Bob Livingston, but this individual, Ms. Bauer, did a lot of favors and illegal favors… for [the] government of Turkey and others, and then was hired by Livingston and put on a big salary to represent Turkish government. So it’s not only top tier of the lobbying firm, but then the people who work for them later and the various layers of those people.” [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 83]
Quid Pro Quo: Congress and the Turkish Lobby - Attorney Marino solicits Edmonds understanding of Congress, lobbyists and ‘quid pro quo’, with a hypothetical example he deems “particularly relevant to our case”, saying: “You have a hypothetical Congresswoman from State X. Her district has no Turkish population to speak of or Armenian population to speak of. She’s the largest recipient of Turkish PAC money in the 2008 election cycle. All right? She meets with Livingston and Rogers or Livingston Group when they’re escorting members of the Turkish parliament to a reception. She receives fact sheets from the Livingston Group talking about Turkish relations; goes to luncheons in honor of the Turkish Foreign Minister, and she opposes Armenian genocide resolution and, in fact, refuses to even recognize the genocide as a historical fact.” Edmonds responds, “Based on several that I personally know about in terms of how they conduct and how they behave, those elected officials who are serving the foreign government’s interest, I would say that’s modus operandi that you describe. It’s a classic fit of how individuals who happen to owe their position and favors to a foreign government, in this particular case Turkey, behave… and the kinds of people they associate with. That modus operandi classically matches of the individuals I know who were serving Turkish government’s and other Turkish entities’ interest.” [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 84-87]
Turkish Practices and Policies 'Inimical to American Interests' that Resulted in 'Lost Lives' - Edmonds is asked about a deposition-related declaration in which she stated that she had, “obtained evidence that the government of Turkey had engaged in practices and policies that were inimical to American interests and had, in fact, resulted in both the direct and indirect loss of American lives.” As examples, Edmonds refers to the setting up of Madrassahs in order to radicalize Muslims to be Mujahedeen and use them as proxies in conflicts and terrorism; trafficking in heroin; “illegally obtaining and selling” US military weapons and technology including nuclear secrets, as well as other top secret information, including foreign policy secrets; and the exposure of Brewster-Jennings as a CIA front company investigating nuclear trafficking (see Summer-Autumn 2001). [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 88-94]
Fethullah Gulen, US-Protected Madrassah Financier - When asked who Fethullah Gulen (spelled Fetullah Gulan in the transcript) is, Edmonds states his network controlled around $25 billion and had set up 300 Madrassahs in Central Asia. She says he fled Turkey when Turkish authorities linked him to plans to overthrow the secular Turkish government, and he was permitted to enter and remain in the US without a visa. Edmonds states he is establishing Madrassah’s in the US that are allegedly moderate but are in fact radicalizing Muslims, and that Gulen is being protected by US authorities because US entities consider his network useful for waging proxy wars over Central Asian energy resources. As an analogy, Edmonds says the “Cold War is not over”. [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 94-98] After Marino’s examination, Bruce Fein cross-examines Edmonds, then Marino re-examines and Fein cross-examines her again. The entire deposition lasts about four and a half hours. [Edmonds, 8/8/2009, pp. 104-216]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tom Lantos, Douglas Dickerson, Bruce Fein, Bob Livingston, American Turkish Council, Stephen Solarz, Sibel Edmonds, Dan Burton, Richard Gephardt, John Ashcroft, Jan Schakowsky, Fethullah Gulen, Dennis Hastert, Roy Blunt, Melek Can Dickerson, Michael Kohn, Marc Grossman

Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance, Terrorism Financing, Other Government-Militant Collusion

Page 9 of 9 (841 events)
previous | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 | next

Ordering 

Time period


Categories

Key Events

Key Day of 9/11 Events (101)Key Hijacker Events (145)Key Warnings (95)

Day of 9/11

All Day of 9/11 Events (1312)Dick Cheney (55)Donald Rumsfeld (33)Flight AA 11 (145)Flight AA 77 (145)Flight UA 175 (87)Flight UA 93 (242)George Bush (130)Passenger Phone Calls (67)Pentagon (127)Richard Clarke (32)Shanksville, Pennsylvania (23)Training Exercises (56)World Trade Center (89)

The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers

Alhazmi and Almihdhar (343)Marwan Alshehhi (134)Mohamed Atta (206)Hani Hanjour (72)Ziad Jarrah (74)Other 9/11 Hijackers (172)Possible Hijacker Associates in US (79)Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training (73)Hijacker Contact w Government in US (33)Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding (42)Hijacker Visas and Immigration (135)

Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases

Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection (51)CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar (120)Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US (39)

Projects and Programs

Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit (172)Able Danger (60)Sibel Edmonds (61)Phoenix Memo (27)Randy Glass/ Diamondback (8)Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal (67)Remote Surveillance (241)Yemen Hub (75)

Before 9/11

Soviet-Afghan War (105)Warning Signs (452)Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge (53)US Air Security (75)Military Exercises (83)Pipeline Politics (67)Other Pre-9/11 Events (56)

Counterterrorism before 9/11

Hunt for Bin Laden (158)Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11 (225)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (252)

Warning Signs: Specific Cases

Foreign Intelligence Warnings (35)Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB (39)Presidential Level Warnings (31)

The Post-9/11 World

9/11 Investigations (657)9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings (22)9/11 Denials (29)US Government and 9/11 Criticism (67)9/11 Related Lawsuits (24)Media (47)Other Post-9/11 Events (77)

Investigations: Specific Cases

9/11 Commission (257)Role of Philip Zelikow (87)9/11 Congressional Inquiry (41)CIA OIG 9/11 Report (16)FBI 9/11 Investigation (146)WTC Investigation (112)Other 9/11 Investigations (135)

Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked Moles or Informants

Abu Hamza Al-Masri (102)Abu Qatada (36)Ali Mohamed (78)Haroon Rashid Aswat (17)Khalil Deek (20)Luai Sakra (12)Mamoun Darkazanli (36)Nabil Al-Marabh (41)Omar Bakri & Al-Muhajiroun (25)Reda Hassaine (23)Other Possible Moles or Informants (169)

Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures

Abu Zubaida (99)Anwar Al-Awlaki (17)Ayman Al-Zawahiri (81)Hambali (39)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (139)Mohammed Haydar Zammar (44)Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (47)Osama Bin Laden (228)Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh (105)Ramzi Yousef (67)Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (57)Victor Bout (23)Wadih El-Hage (45)Zacarias Moussaoui (159)

Al-Qaeda by Region

"Lackawanna Six" (13)Al-Qaeda in Balkans (168)Al-Qaeda in Germany (189)Al-Qaeda in Italy (55)Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia (149)Al-Qaeda in Spain (121)Islamist Militancy in Chechnya (50)

Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks or Plots

1993 WTC Bombing (73)1993 Somalia Fighting (13)1995 Bojinka Plot (78)1998 US Embassy Bombings (121)Millennium Bomb Plots (43)2000 USS Cole Bombing (114)2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing (23)2002 Bali Bombings (36)2004 Madrid Train Bombings (82)2005 7/7 London Bombings (87)

Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda Issues

Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks (89)Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements (102)Key Captures and Deaths (124)

Geopolitics and Islamic Militancy

US Dominance (112)Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links (255)Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism (83)Israel (61)Pakistan and the ISI (470)Saudi Arabia (249)Terrorism Financing (312)Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism (322)US Intel Links to Islamic Militancy (69)Algerian Militant Collusion (41)Indonesian Militant Collusion (20)Philippine Militant Collusion (74)Yemeni Militant Collusion (47)Other Government-Militant Collusion (23)

Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases

Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy (37)Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11 (73)Saeed Sheikh (59)Mahmood Ahmed (30)Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region (179)2008 Kabul Indian Embassy Bombing (10)Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan (154)

Terrorism Financing: Specific Cases

Al Taqwa Bank (29)Al-Kifah/MAK (54)BCCI (37)BIF (28)BMI and Ptech (21)Bin Laden Family (62)Drugs (71)

'War on Terrorism' Outside Iraq

Afghanistan (299)Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan (49)Destruction of CIA Tapes (92)Escape From Afghanistan (61)High Value Detainees (179)Terror Alerts (50)Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 (353)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (432)Internal US Security After 9/11 (125)
Email Updates

Receive weekly email updates summarizing what contributors have added to the History Commons database

 
Donate

Developing and maintaining this site is very labor intensive. If you find it useful, please give us a hand and donate what you can.
Donate Now

Volunteer

If you would like to help us with this effort, please contact us. We need help with programming (Java, JDO, mysql, and xml), design, networking, and publicity. If you want to contribute information to this site, click the register link at the top of the page, and start contributing.
Contact Us

Creative Commons License Except where otherwise noted, the textual content of each timeline is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike