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Complete 911 Timeline

Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by matt, Derek, Paul, KJF, mtuck, paxvector

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Medical workers at the first triage area set up outside the Pentagon after it is attacked.Medical workers at the first triage area set up outside the Pentagon after it is attacked. [Source: Mark D. Faram / US Navy]Soon after the Pentagon is hit, medical workers initiate their mass casualty plan (MASCAL) for dealing with disasters. Sergeant Matthew Rosenberg, a medic at the Pentagon’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, arrives at the center courtyard. Seeing smoke rising from the side of the building and patients staggering out, he radios the clinic: “You need to initiate MASCAL right now! We have mass casualties! I need medical assets to the courtyard!” Major Lorie Brown, chief nurse of the DiLorenzo Clinic, says that as soon as she sees people running down the corridor to evacuate, “we initiated the MASCAL, started galvanizing all of our assets and put our plan in action.” [Washington Post, 9/16/2001; Office of Medical History, 9/2004, pp. 7, 39] The Pentagon has actually conducted at least three MASCAL training exercises in the previous 12 months, based around a plane crashing into the place (see October 24-26, 2000)(see May 2001)(see Early August 2001). Lieutenant Colonel John Felicio, the deputy commander for administration of the DiLorenzo Clinic, says, “The saving grace to our efforts was the two MASCAL exercises we previously had conducted.… Our scenario for both MASCALS was a plane flying into the Pentagon courtyard.” Furthermore, the nearby Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), which sends ambulances in response to the attack, has recently recovered from a four-day power loss (see August 27-31, 2001). A military report will later state: “Many believe that [this] extended emergency… helped WRAMC in its response on September 11.” [Office of Medical History, 9/2004, pp. 18, 146]

Entity Tags: Pentagon, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Lorie Brown, John Felicio, DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, Matt Rosenberg

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends two messages to Flight 93, which he is monitoring, warning its pilots (who in fact are no longer in control of the plane) to secure the cockpit. At 9:40, he sends the text message to Flight 93: “High security alert. Secure cockpit. Two airliner hit NY Trade Center. And 1 aircraft in IAD missing. And one in EWR missing… too. UAL 175/93 missing.” A minute later, he again sends this message to Flight 93, but with “UAL 175/93 found” added at the end. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 43] “IAD” is the code for Washington’s Dulles International Airport, from where Flight 77 took off, while “EWR” is the code for Newark Airport, from where Flight 93 took off, so presumably it is these missing aircraft that Ballinger is referring to. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file] Ballinger sent previous warning messages to Flight 93 earlier on, telling it to “Beware any cockpit intrusion” at 9:23 (see 9:23 a.m.-9:26 a.m. September 11, 2001), and to “Secure cockpit” at 9:33 (see 9:32 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 37 and 39]

Entity Tags: Ed Ballinger

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Johnstown-Cambria County Airport.Johnstown-Cambria County Airport. [Source: JMSA Today]At some time shortly before 10 a.m.—as early as 9:40 a.m. according to one report—air traffic manager Dennis Fritz, in the control tower at Johnstown-Cambria County Airport, 70 miles east of Pittsburgh, receives a call from Cleveland Air Traffic Control reporting a large, suspicious aircraft about 20 miles south of them, descending below six thousand feet. Despite the clear day, Fritz and his colleagues can see no plane approaching through binoculars. Soon afterwards, in response to another call from Cleveland, Fritz orders trainees and custodial staff to evacuate the tower, yet he is still unable to see any plane approaching. Less than a minute later, though, Cleveland calls a third time, saying to disregard the evacuation: The plane has turned south and they have lost radar contact with it. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/12/2001; Knight Ridder, 9/13/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Longman, 2002, pp. 197] Wells Morrison is the agent in charge of the FBI’s Mon Valley Resident Agency, a satellite of its Pittsburgh field office. He too receives a phone call informing him of this flight, though he doesn’t say whom it is from. He contacts the Johnstown FBI office and instructs its agents to head to the Johnstown Airport. [Kashurba, 2002, pp. 109-110] Flight 93 crashes around 10:03 a.m. or soon thereafter (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), going down in a field just 14 miles south of Johnstown. [Washington Post, 9/13/2001]

Entity Tags: Dennis Fritz, Wells Morrison

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) issues coordinates to the three F-16 fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), sending them to Washington. However, the fighters head off in the wrong direction, reportedly because NEADS has accidentally given them incorrect coordinates. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 180-181]
Communications Problems - The Langley AFB jets have already mistakenly been sent east over the ocean (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). At 9:36 a.m., the NEADS mission crew commander ordered that they be directed toward the White House (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27] However, weapons director Master Sergeant Steve Citino has been having difficulty communicating with the jets. According to author Lynn Spencer, “NEADS radio coverage east of Washington is poor, and the noise level on the [NEADS] operations floor has only been exacerbating the problem.”
NEADS Issues Wrong Coordinates - Citino now forwards coordinates to the Langley jets, telling them to establish a combat air patrol over Washington. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 180] Apparently, it is Tech. Sgt. Ronald Belluscio, a senior weapons director technician, who contacts the jets at this time, although he will claim he orders them specifically toward the Pentagon. He will say: “I jumped on a frequency, per the senior director, and was told to ask the Langley birds to vector over the Pentagon. I didn’t know it had been hit.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 65] However, Citino has apparently given out the wrong coordinates. According to Spencer, “He inadvertently transposed two of the coordinates, and the F-16s turned onto a flight path that would take them 60 miles southwest of Washington.”
Aircraft Instrument Malfunctioning - What is more, as soon as the Langley jets turn onto their new heading, lead pilot Major Dean Eckmann has a problem with his aircraft. The bearing pointer on its horizontal situation indicator (HSI)—the instrument that shows a plane’s position relative to its intended destination—freezes. Eckmann therefore has to get the heading from one of the other Langley pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom. Shortly after sending the three jets in the wrong direction, Citino will contact them again with the correct coordinates (see (Between 9:41 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 180-181]

Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom, Ronald Belluscio, Dean Eckmann, Steve Citino

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Marc Sasseville.Marc Sasseville. [Source: CBC]Four pilots with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, finally receive authorization to get airborne in their fighter jets, and are given instructions on their mission. The pilots are Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville, Lieutenant Heather Penney Garcia, Captain Brandon Rasmussen, and Major Daniel Caine.
Pilot Waiting 'for Somebody to Task Me with Something' - Rasmussen will later recall that, although he and his colleagues at the unit had been aware of the attacks in New York, it is only after the Pentagon is hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001) that “we knew that we were going to be sticking around home and being quite busy.” And until the pilots are authorized to take off, he is “just kind of standing back, waiting for somebody to task me with something.” He will recall, “I was just waiting at the ops desk for someone to say, ‘Okay, we’ve been cleared to take off and go.’”
Sasseville Briefs Other Pilots - Rasmussen says that, after Sasseville and Caine receive authorization from their wing commander to get airborne and to use missiles, Sasseville, who is the acting operations group commander, looks at Penney Garcia and says, “You’re flying with me, and [Caine] you’re flying with [Rasmussen], do suit up and get out there as quick as possible.” According to another account, Sasseville gives his three fellow pilots a short briefing, telling them: “I have no idea what’s going on, but we’re flying. Here’s our frequency. We’ll split up the area as we have to. Just defend as required. We’ll talk about the rest in the air.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; Filson, 2003, pp. 82-84; Rasmussen, 9/18/2003] Sasseville will recall, “There wasn’t a whole hell of a lot to talk about, because we didn’t know what was going on.” [Vogel, 2007, pp. 446]
Pilots Prepare to Fly - According to Rasmussen: “We were relieved to actually be given permission to go up and do something instead of feeling totally helpless. I mean we are fighter pilots, just like guard dogs chomping at the bit ready to go.” The four pilots run down the hallway and throw on their gear, grabbing their helmets, g-suits, and parachute harnesses, before heading to the operations desk to get their aircraft assignments. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; Rasmussen, 9/18/2003]
Commander Gives Instructions - According to author Leslie Filson, before Sasseville and Penney Garcia head to their jets, Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, gives them instructions, regarding their mission. As Wherley will later recall, “My translation of the rules [of engagement] to [Sasseville] was, ‘You have weapons free flight-lead control.’” [Filson, 2003, pp. 82] “Weapons free” means the decision whether to shoot at a hostile aircraft rests with the lead pilot. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 44] Wherley says, “Do you understand what I’m asking you to do?” and both pilots respond, “Yes.” Wherley then tells them to be careful. “It was important for them to understand that this was weapons free,” he will recall. [Filson, 2003, pp. 82] However, Sasseville will tell the 9/11 Commission that he does not remember receiving the rules of engagement he is supposed to follow until later on, after he has taken off. [9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 pdf file]
Jets Don't Launch until 10:42 and After - The exact times when the four pilots are authorized to get airborne and receive their mission instructions are unclear. But Sasseville and Penney Garcia will take off from Andrews at 10:42 a.m., with their planes armed only with guns, and no missiles (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). Rasmussen and Caine take off at 11:11 a.m., by which time their jets have been armed with missiles (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 82-84; 9/11 Commission, 2004]

Entity Tags: David Wherley, Daniel Caine, Heather Penney Garcia, Leslie Filson, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Marc Sasseville, Brandon Rasmussen

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Initial firefighting efforts after the attack on the Pentagon.Initial firefighting efforts after the attack on the Pentagon. [Source: US Department of Defense] (click image to enlarge)Numerous area firefighters and other emergency workers promptly learn of the Pentagon crash and are able to arrive at the crash scene within 5 or 6 minutes of the attack. These responders include members of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) and the Fort Myer Fire Department, plus units belonging to the Fire and Rescue Department of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 66] ACFD’s training officer, Captain Chuck Gibbs, reaches the crash site within 3 minutes of the attack, followed a minute later by Battalion Chief Bob Cornwell, who assumes initial incident command responsibilities. ACFD Captain Edward Blunt arrives at 9:42 and establishes Emergency Medical Services control. ACFD Truck 105 is the first unit to arrive, reaching the scene at 9:41. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A5-A6 and 1-1 pdf file] A minute after it, Rescue Engines 161 and 162 of the Fort Myer Fire Department arrive, followed by a reserve pumper, Engine 163. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 68] MWAA fire and medical units, and the first contingent of the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad, also arrive within 5 minutes of the crash. By 10:00 a.m., most of the ACFD duty shift will be engaged at the Pentagon. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A7 pdf file] Federal, state, and local civilian police officers also arrive within minutes of the attack. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 161] Most Arlington County Police Department officers will have reached the scene within 3 hours. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C6 pdf file] Several factors have contributed to the prompt emergency response:
bullet The Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC), which is the focal point of all police and fire 911 calls for the county, received several calls from emergency workers who saw the low-flying plane approaching the Pentagon (see (9:36 a.m.-9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 66]
bullet Some fire and rescue units responded after hearing the radio message of Fire Captain Steve McCoy, reporting the crash. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A4 pdf file]
bullet Numerous emergency units were already on the road near the Pentagon, and were able to quickly respond, after being called out to an apartment fire that was found to have already gone out (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Fire Engineering, 11/2002]
bullet And MWAA firefighters were already responding to a car crash at nearby Reagan National Airport, had heard the sound of the crash, and saw the resulting smoke rising into the air (see (9:20 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 69-70]

Entity Tags: Chuck Gibbs, Arlington County Fire Department, National Capital Response Squad, Bob Cornwell, Fort Myer Fire Department, Edward Blunt, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Royce Lamberth, head of the FISA court which grants warrants for intelligence cases, grants five warrantless surveillance requests minutes after the Pentagon attack. Lamberth will later report being stuck in a carpool lane near the Pentagon when it is hit. With his car enveloped in smoke, he calls US marshals to help him get to his office. Lamberth will later say that by the time officers reached him, “I had approved five FISA coverages [warrants] on my cellphone.” [Associated Press, 6/24/2007] Presumably this represents the start of a flurry of surveillance activity in response to the 9/11 attacks, but it is not known who was to be monitored or how their names were learned and acted on so quickly.

Entity Tags: Royce Lamberth

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

The FAA’s Cleveland Center notifies the FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center about the screams and statements it heard from an unknown origin, but that are believed to have come from Flight 93. These transmissions were heard between 9:28 and 9:39 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file] The FAA’s Herndon Command Center and Washington headquarters were alerted to Flight 93 several minutes earlier (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 39]

Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

The transponder signal from Flight 93 ceases. [CNN, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] However, the plane can be—and is—tracked using primary radar by Cleveland flight controllers and at United headquarters. Altitude can no longer be determined, except by visual sightings from other aircraft. The plane’s speed begins to vary wildly, fluctuating between 600 and 400 mph before eventually settling around 400 mph. [Longman, 2002, pp. 77, 214; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

Entity Tags: United Airlines, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Newark, New Jersey, air traffic controller Bob Varcadipane is talking on the phone with the FAA Command Center. He is told that the Command Center is still suspicious of at least ten planes for one reason or another, all possible hijackings. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bob Varcadipane

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Laura Bush with Senators Edward Kennedy and Judd Gregg.Laura Bush with Senators Edward Kennedy and Judd Gregg. [Source: CNN]First Lady Laura Bush, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) appear before reporters and television cameras to announce that a planned Senate education committee hearing has been postponed, and to comment on the terrorist attacks in New York. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2001; Bush, 2010, pp. 199] Bush was scheduled to testify before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, which Kennedy chairs, at 10:00 a.m. [USA Today, 9/10/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] She now goes with Kennedy and Gregg to the Caucus Room in the Russell Senate Office Building, to tell reporters there that the hearing has been called off. [Time, 12/31/2001; Bush, 2010, pp. 199] The beginning of their appearance is shown live on CNN.
Hearing Has Been Postponed, Not Canceled - Kennedy starts by emphasizing that today’s hearing has been postponed, rather than canceled, and then says, “We are not going to see the business of America deferred because of terrorism, whether it’s in education or another area of public policy.” [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2001]
First Lady Becomes 'Comforter in Chief' - After Kennedy asks her if she would like to say anything, Bush says to the reporters: “Our hearts and our prayers go out to the victims of this act of terrorism and… our support goes to the rescue workers. And all of our prayers are with everyone there right now.” Then, as she and the senators turn to leave, Laurence McQuillan of USA Today says to her: “Children are kind of struck by all this. Is there a message you could tell to the nation’s…” Before he can finish the sentence, Bush replies, “Parents need to reassure their children everywhere in our country that they’re safe.” [CNN, 9/11/2002; Gerhart, 2004, pp. 163; Bush, 2010, pp. 199] With these words, journalist and author Ronald Kessler will later write, Bush “became the comforter in chief, calmly reassuring the nation and dispensing advice on how parents should deal with the tragedy.” [Kessler, 2006, pp. 136] Noelia Rodriguez, the first lady’s press secretary, will later comment that Bush’s response to McQuillan is “what people remember her for that day.” [National Journal, 8/31/2002] As Bush, Kennedy, and Gregg are leaving the room, Bush’s advance man will receive a call informing him of the attack at the Pentagon (see (9:45 a.m.-9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Bush, 2010, pp. 200]

Entity Tags: Judd Gregg, Larry McQuillan, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Laura Bush, Noelia Rodriguez

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Bill Keaton.Bill Keaton. [Source: Kevin Niedermier]Cleveland Center air traffic controller Bill Keaton is responsible for guiding high-altitude flights in the airspace where Flight 93 turned off its transponder (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After its transponder goes off, he follows Flight 93 on his radar scope as it travels across his sector, headed toward Washington, DC, and is instructed not to let any other aircraft come within 20 miles of it. Because its transponder is off, Keaton cannot tell the plane’s altitude. He sees it disappear from his scope at the time it crashes. [USA Today, 8/11/2002; Cleveland Free Times, 9/6/2006]

Entity Tags: Bill Keaton

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

The ‘white jet’ seen circling above the White House and Capitol. The ‘white jet’ seen circling above the White House and Capitol. [Source: Discovery Channel]Several television networks interrupt their coverage of events in New York to report that a mysterious white aircraft is circling over the White House and the Capitol.
bullet At 9:41 a.m., Peter Jennings of ABC News reports that “there is a plane circling the White House at the moment. And they’re clearing the grounds there.… And this plane circling the White House adds to the trauma that people are feeling today, but we have no idea precisely what the means.” [ABC News, 9/11/2001]
bullet At 9:52 a.m., CNN correspondent John King, who is standing about 200 yards from the White House, says: “About 10 minutes ago, there was a white jet circling overhead. Now, you generally don’t see planes in the area over the White House. That is restricted air space. No reason to believe that this jet was there for any nefarious purposes, but the Secret Service was very concerned, pointing up at the jet in the sky. It is out of sight now, best we can tell.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] Another CNN correspondent, Kate Snow, also reports seeing a plane at around this time, “circling over the Capitol.” She says: “Now whether that may have been an Air Force plane, it’s unclear. But that seemed to be the reason, according to security guards that I talked with, towards the evacuation of the Capitol.” [CNN, 9/11/2001] (The Capitol is reportedly evacuated at 9:48 a.m. (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Fox News, 9/11/2003] )
bullet At 9:55 a.m., NBC News turns to a live report from its correspondent Bob Kur, who recalls: “And in the most surreal of this morning’s scenes here at the White House, a white plane, a very big jet, was flying an unusual pattern near the White House over Lafayette Park, very slowly. It made one circle and then we have not seen it since. There was a lot of concern about what that plane might be. But, again, it’s only speculation, but most people say that since flights have been cleared from US air space, and it was a totally white plane, looked unusual to all of us, that it was a government plane of some kind.” [NBC 4, 9/11/2001]
A CNN comparison between video footage of this plane and an official Air Force photograph will suggest it is an E-4B. This is a militarized version of a Boeing 747 that is used as a flying command post. An E-4B has in fact just been launched from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC (see (9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001), so this could plausibly be the same plane as is witnessed by the reporters. Two government sources familiar with the incident will later tell CNN the plane was a military aircraft, but that its details are classified. Even by 2007, the Pentagon, FAA, and Secret Service will have offered no public explanation for this plane over the White House. [Verton, 2003, pp. 143-144; CNN, 9/12/2007] In 2009, John Farmer, the former senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will claim that this “mystery plane” is an E-4B with the call sign “Venus 77” that takes off from Andrews Air Force Base at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Farmer, 2009, pp. 206-207, 372]

Entity Tags: Bob Kur, Kate Snow, John Farmer, E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, John King, Peter Jennings

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

A weapons director at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) notices that the three F-16s launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) are going in the wrong direction, and so he contacts them to get them on the correct course.
Citino Thinks FAA Has Redirected Fighters - The weapons director, Master Sergeant Steve Citino, recently forwarded coordinates to the jets, sending them to Washington, DC. However, according to author Lynn Spencer, he inadvertently gave them incorrect coordinates (see 9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). Now, shortly afterwards, Citino notices that the jets are going in the wrong direction. However, he does not realize his mistake with the coordinates, and instead assumes that the FAA’s Washington Center has redirected the jets so as to avoid air traffic. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 180-181] He makes this assumption even though NEADS recently declared AFIO (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for Washington airspace, thereby giving the military authority over the FAA for that airspace (see 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 113, 150]
Fighters Given Correct Destination - Citino radios one of the three Langley AFB pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom, and gives him the correct course heading. Citino adds: “Just to reiterate. You are under AFIO control! Take all direction from Huntress!” (“Huntress” is the call sign for NEADS.) Borgstrom acknowledges the order, but mentions that the new heading conflicts with the coordinates he has just been given. He says, “We’re showing a CAP [combat air patrol] point of 250 [heading], 20 miles.” Citino snaps back at him: “Negative! That’s incorrect! The CAP is 312, 20 miles!” Borgstrom then relays the correct coordinates to his lead pilot, Major Dean Eckmann, and the three Langley jets set off toward their new destination. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 181]

Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Craig Borgstrom, Steve Citino, Dean Eckmann

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Anna Perez.Anna Perez. [Source: Paul Drinkwater / NBC Universal]Government officials in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House are frustrated at technical problems they have with the televisions in the center, which mean they are unable to get audio from both the TV broadcast channels and the videoconferencing system at the same time. [White House, 11/1/2001; Newsweek, 12/30/2001] Two large television screens are built into a wall of the PEOC conference room, and, according to journalist and author Stephen Hayes, for most of the day one of them is tuned to CNN and the other to the Fox News Channel. Hayes will write, “Watching the uninterrupted news coverage not only provided new and timely information; it also allowed officials in the shelter [i.e. the PEOC] to understand, as they designed their public response, what exactly the American people were seeing.” [Hayes, 2007, pp. 337, 342]
Officials Have Problems with Television and Video Conference Audio - But, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will later recall, the “only frustration” among those in the PEOC is “that we kept having trouble getting the TV to work.… [W]e were having trouble with the, some of the video link.” Therefore, “if you were trying to do the video conference, you had trouble doing TV.” [White House, 11/1/2001] The “video conference” Rice refers to is presumably the White House video teleconference being conducted by counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke (see (9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36] Anna Perez, Rice’s communications counselor, will add, “[Y]ou couldn’t do the SVTS [secure video teleconference system] at the same time you could do the CNN.” [White House, 11/1/2001] Eric Edelman, a member of Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff, will recall: “[T]he video conference that Dick Clarke was chairing was going on.… [W]e could see that, so that was on the screen, we could follow that. Not always with audio… sometimes with audio, sometimes not.” [White House, 10/25/2001] According to Hayes, however, the problem is in fact that “[a]lthough the two televisions on the wall could be tuned to different channels, they could get audio from only one.” Consequently, “On several occasions, the officials could see notices of ‘breaking news’ without being able to hear the details of those updates.” [Hayes, 2007, pp. 342]
'Everybody' in PEOC Frustrated by TV Problem - Rice will recall that the problem with the televisions is “kind of frustrating to everybody.” [White House, 11/1/2001] One unnamed official will recall that Cheney, who is in the PEOC for much of the day, is “cranked up” about the problem and repeatedly demands that it be fixed. [Hayes, 2007, pp. 342] Mary Matalin, a counselor to Cheney, will recall, “You can have sound on one or the other [i.e. the TV broadcasts or the video teleconference], and [Cheney] found that technically imperfect.” [CNN, 9/11/2002; CNN, 9/14/2002] According to Newsweek, this is the only thing that causes Cheney’s composure to break and leads to him showing any irritation while he is in the PEOC. [Newsweek, 12/30/2001]
Accounts Conflict over Whether Problem Is Fixed - It is unclear whether this technical problem with the televisions gets fixed. According to Perez, PEOC personnel are able to fix it. “It took them a little while, but they did get it together. They got it right,” she will say. [White House, 11/1/2001] But according to Hayes, the problem remains unfixed. [Hayes, 2007, pp. 342] Clarke will later give a different account of the problem with getting audio from television broadcasts and the video conference simultaneously. He will write that when he goes down to the PEOC sometime around midday (see (Shortly Before 12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Army Major Mike Fenzel complains to him, “I can’t hear the crisis conference because Mrs. Cheney [Lynne Cheney, the wife of the vice president] keeps turning down the volume on you so she can hear CNN.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 18]

Entity Tags: Lynne Cheney, Anna Perez, Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke, Eric Edelman, Presidential Emergency Operation Center, Mike Fenzel, Mary Matalin, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG), speaks to a Secret Service agent over the phone, but declines the agent’s request to launch DCANG fighter jets without first receiving an order to do so from someone more senior. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 184]
Wherley Takes over Call - Wherley has just arrived at the headquarters of the DCANG’s 121st Fighter Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At the operations desk there, Major Daniel Caine passed Wherley a phone he was talking over, before heading off to prepare to get airborne. [Filson, 2003, pp. 78; Vogel, 2007, pp. 445]
Caller Wants Jets over Washington - Wherley finds that the caller Caine was speaking with is from the Secret Service. They want the DCANG to put up a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington. But, according to author Lynn Spencer: “Wherley knows that there has never been a CAP anywhere over this country, much less over Washington. Such a request—coming from someone not even in the military—is unheard of.” Wherley understands the power of the Secret Service, and knows that with its responsibility to protect the president it clearly has some authority over other agencies, including the military. “But still, such an order from a Secret Service agent seems rather far-reaching.” He therefore tells the caller, “I would feel more comfortable receiving such an order from someone higher in the chain of command, preferably in the military.”
Wherley Told to Call 'Operations Center' - According to Spencer, the agent gives Wherley “a phone number and tells him to call over to the White House Operations Center, where Vice President [Dick] Cheney has been ushered.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 184] Presumably the “Operations Center” is the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, where Cheney is evacuated to by his Secret Service agents (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC News, 9/14/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39-40] However, other accounts, including Wherley’s interview with the 9/11 Commission, will state that Wherley subsequently calls someone at the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center (JOC), not the PEOC (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; 9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003] (Wherley’s current call is also with an agent at the JOC. [9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 3/11/2004 pdf file] )

Entity Tags: District of Columbia Air National Guard, David Wherley, US Secret Service

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

The FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, provides updates to FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, about the problems with Flight 93. At 9:41 a.m., John White, a manager at the Command Center, is talking to Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters. White says that Flight 93 has reversed course from its intended flight path (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), its transponder signal has been lost (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and it is now descending and heading east. From 9:42 a.m., one of the Command Center managers (exactly who is unstated) gives the headquarters several updates on Flight 93’s progress and location. At 9:46 a.m., White tells Jeff Griffith, the FAA’s deputy director of air traffic, that Flight 93 is “29 minutes out of Washington, DC, and tracking toward us.” Two minutes later, in another conversation with Griffith, White confirms that Flight 93 has reversed course and is heading toward Washington. [Federal Aviation Administration, 10/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 43-44]

Entity Tags: Doug Davis, Federal Aviation Administration, Jeff Griffith, John White

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Greg Callahan.Greg Callahan. [Source: NBC News]Newark, New Jersey, flight controller Greg Callahan is talking on the phone to an FBI agent. The agent says about Flight 93: “We suspect that this aircraft has now been taken over by hostile forces.” The agent describes the sharp turn it has made over eastern Ohio and that it is now heading back over southwestern Pennsylvania. Callahan says he could tell the plane is on a course for Washington. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The FBI has been in contact with Deena Burnett and informed of what her husband, Flight 93 passenger Tom Burnett, has been saying since at least 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) [Longman, 2002, pp. 110] It is unclear where in the chain of command details of these Flight 93 calls reach, and the 9/11 Commission has not clarified the issue of what the FBI knew and when.

Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Deena Burnett, Greg Callahan

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

After learning that Delta flight 1989 may have been hijacked from Boston flight control (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), NEADS calls Cleveland flight control, which is handling the flight, to discuss this. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 14] Although Cleveland flight control has been aware that United 93 has been hijacked since before 9:30, it apparently fails to mention this to NEADS. According to the 9/11 Commission, the NMCC is not notified of United 93’s hijacking until 10:03 (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

An F-16C Fighting Falcon of the 148th Fighter Wing.An F-16C Fighting Falcon of the 148th Fighter Wing. [Source: Brett R. Ewald / US Air Force]NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) tries to get fighter jets from a military unit in Duluth, Minnesota, sent after Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, but the unit is unable to respond. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 pdf file] NEADS has been contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center and incorrectly told that Delta 1989 is a possible hijacking (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). The aircraft is just south of Toledo, Ohio, and Colonel Robert Marr and Major Kevin Nasypany order the troops at NEADS to call Air National Guard bases in that area to see if any of them can launch fighters. [9/11 Commission, 2004; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
NEADS Calls Duluth - The staff attempts to get a unit in Duluth to send jets toward the Delta flight. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004 pdf file] Presumably the unit they call is the 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard, which is located at the Duluth International Airport and flies the F-16 Fighting Falcon. [GlobalSecurity (.org), 8/21/2005] Unlike Otis Air National Guard Base and Langley Air Force Base, the 148th FW at Duluth is not one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US. However, its mission does include “air superiority and air defense functions.” [Airman, 12/1999; US Air Force, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17]
Duluth Has 'Nobody Available' - The Duluth unit is unable to respond to NEADS’s request for help. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 pdf file] The reason for this is unclear. At 9:46 a.m., a member of staff on the NEADS operations floor will report that “Duluth has night flying, so there’s nobody available.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; Donaldson and Johnson, 6/2008, pp. 47 pdf file] Marr will subsequently instruct NEADS personnel to contact every Air National Guard unit in the Northeast US with instructions to get their fighters airborne (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). NEADS will also order Air National Guard jets from Selfridge and Toledo to intercept Delta 1989 (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28; Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-180]

Entity Tags: 148th Fighter Wing, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Robert Marr

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Logo of the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad.Logo of the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad. [Source: FBI]Within five minutes of the Pentagon being hit, the first group from the FBI’s National Capital Response Squad arrives there. Due to this being a terrorist attack, the Pentagon and its grounds are immediately declared a federal crime scene. Under the terms of a 1995 presidential directive, this makes them the exclusive responsibility of the FBI. The FBI immediately begins collecting evidence and is also responsible for recovering bodies. Its agents are able to confiscate security videos from a nearby gas station within minutes of the crash (see (After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). More than 700 FBI agents, assisted by hundreds of individuals from other organizations, will participate in the recovery operation. [US President, 6/21/1995; Washington Times, 9/12/2001; US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A-7, A-23, C-1, C-54 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pentagon

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Pentagon, 9/11 Investigations

The Delta Air Lines operations control center in Atlanta, Georgia.The Delta Air Lines operations control center in Atlanta, Georgia. [Source: Public domain]Delta Air Lines instructs one of its aircraft, Flight 1989, to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, but the FAA’s Cleveland Center, which is handling the aircraft, is not notified of this. [USA Today, 8/13/2002; Associated Press, 8/15/2002]
Pilots Instructed to Land - The pilots of Delta 1989 receive an ACARS text message from their airline’s dispatch office in Atlanta, Georgia, instructing them to “Land immediately in Cleveland.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 167] According to USA Today, “Since early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard” Delta 1989, Delta Air Lines’ headquarters in Atlanta has been tracking the flight, and receiving reports on it every five minutes. [USA Today, 8/13/2002] The plane’s pilot, Captain Paul Werner, quickly types a response to the message, “ok.” But, a couple of minutes later, he receives another ACARS message from the airline. It says: “Confirm landing in Cleveland. Use correct phraseology.” Werner and First Officer David Dunlap are puzzled. According to author Lynn Spencer: “There’s such a thing as correct phraseology on the radio, but there is no such thing when typing back and forth with dispatch on ACARS. Those messages are usually casual.” Werner carefully types a response: “Roger. Affirmative. Delta 1989 is diverting to Cleveland.” He calls the Cleveland Center at 9:44 a.m. and requests a diversion to Cleveland Airport. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 167-168; USA Today, 9/11/2008]
Cleveland Center Not Informed - About 15 minutes earlier, Cleveland Center heard the sounds from Flight 93 as it was being hijacked, but initially thought these came from Delta 1989, and mistakenly believed the Delta flight was being taken over (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/13/2002] But the Delta pilots’ normal responses to radio transmissions soon led air traffic controller John Werth, who is handling Delta 1989, to conclude that this aircraft was fine. [USA Today, 9/11/2008] However, controllers at the Cleveland Center are unaware that Delta Air Lines has instructed Flight 1989 to land, and so Werner’s request for a change of course will make them suspicious of it again (see (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/13/2002]

Entity Tags: David Dunlap, Delta Airlines, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Paul Werner

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Mark Bingham.
Mark Bingham. [Source: Family photo]From Flight 93, Mark Bingham calls his mother and says, “I’m on a flight from Newark to San Francisco and there are three guys who have taken over the plane and they say they have a bomb.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] In an alternate version, he says, “I’m in the air, I’m calling you on the Airfone. I’m calling you from the plane. We’ve been taken over. There are three men that say they have a bomb.” [Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001; Boston Globe, 11/23/2001]

Entity Tags: Mark Bingham

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events, Passenger Phone Calls

A US Park Police helicopter that is responding to the attack on the Pentagon and flying above the building transmits a live video feed of the crash scene to the FBI and other agencies, providing them with instant information about the extent of the damage and destruction at the Pentagon. [US Congress. House, 9/11/2002; National Park Service, 9/21/2002] The helicopter, which has the call sign “Eagle I,” is one of two helicopters belonging to the Park Police Aviation Unit that arrived at the Pentagon minutes after the attack there (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Rotor and Wing, 11/2001] It has microwave “downlink” capability, which enables its crew to fly over a particular location and transmit instantaneous video images to the Park Police chief’s command post and other locations.
FBI Requests Video of Crash Scene - Shortly after Eagle I arrives over the Pentagon, the crew receives a request from the FBI to send it information using the downlink on their helicopter’s video camera. [McDonnell, 2004, pp. 22 pdf file] According to Sergeant Ronald Galey, the pilot of Eagle I, the FBI arrives on the scene “within 10 minutes or 15 minutes” of his helicopter reaching the Pentagon. Galey will later recall: “We heard from them immediately: ‘Start your downlink, we want to capture everything that we can.’” [US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001] The downlink capability then enables the crew of Eagle I “to transmit real-time images and information to people who needed them to make decisions,” according to the National Park Service’s account of 9/11. As well as the FBI, the images are sent to the Secret Service, the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police, and Park Police headquarters. Eagle I spends “the next four or five hours flying overhead and transmitting video images to the FBI.” [National Park Service, 9/21/2002; McDonnell, 2004, pp. 23 pdf file]
Fire Department Chief Goes Up in Helicopter - The Park Police’s two Bell 412 helicopters are packed with sophisticated equipment. As well as the microwave downlink, they have an infrared heat detection system known as FLIR (forward looking infrared). When the Arlington County Fire Department later has difficulty getting its equipment to the proper locations to fight the fires in the Pentagon, its chief will be taken up in Eagle I and flown low over the building. The infrared imagery will help him locate the fires under the roof so he can better position his firefighting crews and equipment. [National Park Service, 1/17/2002; Rotor and Wing, 2/2002; McDonnell, 2004, pp. 23-24 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Arlington County Fire Department, United States Park Police, Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, Ronald A. Galey, US Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Lisa Jefferson.Lisa Jefferson. [Source: Lisa Jefferson]Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer reaches a GTE operator using one of the plane’s seatback phones. He had tried using his credit card on the phone, but been unable to get authorization, so his call is routed to a customer service center in the Chicago area. [Newsweek, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Longman, 2002, pp. 198-199; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 11 pdf file] Beamer initially reaches operator Phyllis Johnson, who calls customer service supervisor Lisa Jefferson over and informs her of the call. As Jefferson later recalls, “I asked [Johnson] information that I needed to report to our surveillance center. And by the time I came back, she appeared to be traumatized, and that’s when I told her I would take the call over… She was just dazed.” Having immediately contacted the FBI, airline security, and GTE operations personnel, Jefferson gets on the line and speaks to Beamer for the next 13 minutes (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001; Orlando Sentinel, 9/5/2002; Beliefnet (.com), 2006] She later informs Beamer’s wife Lisa, “[I]t was a miracle that Todd’s call hadn’t been disconnected. Because of the enormous number of calls that day, the GTE systems overloaded and lines were being disconnected all around her… She kept thinking, This call is going to get dropped! Yet Todd stayed connected… all the way to the end.” [Beamer and Abraham, 2002, pp. 217] According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “GTE-Verizon [does] not routinely tape its telephone calls. As a supervisor, [Jefferson] would have been the one to monitor the taping, but she did not want to risk losing the call.” [Longman, 2002, pp. 199] Yet an early article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette will claim that, “because it was to an operator,” Beamer’s call “was tape-recorded.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/19/2001] Lisa Beamer will only be informed of her husband’s call from Flight 93 three days later, and be read a summary of it written by Jefferson (see September 14, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/3/2001]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Phyllis Johnson, Lisa Jefferson, Todd Beamer

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Passenger Phone Calls

John Keane.John Keane. [Source: US Army]The Army’s Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon is “formally stood up” and its members respond to the terrorist attacks. [Rossow, 2003, pp. 66; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 135; St. Louis Jewish Light, 9/8/2011] Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Stramara activated the CAT after the second hijacked aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center, at 9:03 a.m., on the orders of Major General Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s director of operations, readiness, and mobilization (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 96-97] Chiarelli’s intention was, he said, “to respond to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials.” [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 134] The CAT is now “formally stood up,” according to author Robert Rossow, although exactly what this means is unstated.
Senior Officials Come to Operations Center - When the CAT is activated, its members assemble in the Army Operations Center (AOC) in the basement of the Pentagon. [Rossow, 2003, pp. 64, 66] Numerous senior officials now start arriving in the AOC. These include General John Keane, vice chief of staff of the Army; Brigadier General Clyde Vaughn, deputy director of operations, readiness, and mobilization; Major General Philip Kensinger, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations and plans; and Thomas White, the secretary of the Army. More senior officers come to the AOC than would usually be the case in a crisis, according to Chiarelli, “because a large portion of the Army section of the building had been destroyed” in the attack on the Pentagon. “People had been forced out of their space,” he will later say, and “were looking for some place to go.” [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; US Army Center of Military History, 2/12/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 135; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 98-101; Fox News, 9/12/2011]
Operations Center Personnel Unaware that a Plane Hit the Pentagon - Chiarelli arrived at the AOC shortly before the Pentagon was hit (see (Shortly Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and, he will recall, heard a “muffled noise” when the attack occurred, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 98-99] Colonel Henry Huntley, who also arrived at the AOC around the time of the Pentagon attack, will recall, “Alarms started going off and there was an announcement that an explosion had gone off in the building.” [Daily American, 7/8/2008] However, those in the AOC are apparently initially unaware that a plane has hit their building. Vaughn, who witnessed the attack from the road outside the Pentagon, calls Major George Sterling, the AOC commandant, and says to him, “You know that you’ve been hit by an airplane?” Sterling responds, “Is that what happened?” Vaughn will comment that “many people… didn’t find out for some time” that the Pentagon had been hit by an airplane. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/12/2002; Rossow, 2003, pp. 15-16; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 3-4]
Support Agency Commander Unaware that the US Is under Attack - Colonel Bruce Bachus, commander of the Command and Control Support Agency, who is responsible for keeping the AOC operating, arrived at the Pentagon around the time the attack there occurred and yet he is unaware of the crisis taking place in the US when he gets to the AOC. In the AOC, Dick Mansfield, deputy director of the Command and Control Support Agency, says to him: “We’ve been hit! The CAT has been stood up!” But Bachus appears to be puzzled. Mansfield therefore asks him, “Sir, do you know what’s going on?” Bachus says no and that he had not been listening to the radio—like he usually does—while he drove to work. He says he heard a loud sound while he was in the Pentagon’s A-E Drive, and saw people shouting and running down the corridors, but he’d had no idea what was going on. Mansfield therefore has to quickly brief him on the catastrophic events of the past hour. [Rossow, 2003, pp. 9, 68]
Crisis Team Assesses How Many Army Staffers Are Missing - The “first big task” for the CAT, according to Vaughn, is “to get a count on how many people were missing on the Army staff.” Chiarelli instructs Vaughn to focus on this assignment. Vaughn then announces on the CAT floor that he wants each section “to start that process of figuring out who was missing and who was not.” “For a long time, our number one priority was locating and identifying and taking care of… our soldiers and civilians,” Vaughn will say. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/12/2002] Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kotch, who is working in the AOC this morning, will recall that those in the operations center also “assured continuity of operations after the impact [i.e. the attack on the Pentagon].” [St. Louis Jewish Light, 9/8/2011]
Intelligence Officers Give Inaccurate Reports of Hijackings - Meanwhile, after he arrives at the AOC, Chiarelli receives reports from his intelligence officers informing him, inaccurately, about additional hijacked aircraft. He is told there are “a minimum of four aircraft that were hijacked and a possibility, at one time, [of] as high as seven.” [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 99]
Operations Center Has Sophisticated Equipment - The CAT, according to Soldiers magazine, “consists of a dedicated ‘hot’ desk with classified and unclassified computers, and secure telephones for 24 separate Army staff sections.” [Soldiers, 9/2004] The AOC, where its members assemble, is equipped with state-of-the-art communications equipment and has television sets for monitoring news coverage. [Washington Post, 8/25/1995] A glassed-in balcony overlooks the main floor and four giant screens are on the wall above the computer workstations. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 99-100]
Watch Team Regularly Communicates with Government Agencies - AOC personnel usually work around the clock to keep senior Army leaders aware of issues and events around the world. A watch team monitors the world constantly and is ready to sound the alarm if a crisis erupts somewhere. The watch team also “directs hundreds of communications daily to the FBI, the State Department, the White House command center, local law enforcement agencies, and others,” according to Soldiers magazine. The AOC is equipped with an “emergency action console,” which is a switchboard with a sophisticated communications system that allows watch team members to contact, at the touch of a button, the White House, the secretary of defense’s office, and Army commands around the world. [Washington Post, 8/25/1995; Soldiers, 9/2004] The CAT will become “a focal point for all Pentagon activities” in response to the terrorist attacks, according to Kotch. [St. Louis Jewish Light, 9/8/2011] It will continue working around the clock in the aftermath of the attacks. [US Army Center of Military History, 2/5/2002]

Entity Tags: Bruce Bachus, George Sterling, Clyde A. Vaughn, Dick Mansfield, US Army Crisis Action Team, US Department of the Army, Richard A. Kotch, Henry Huntley, Thomas E. White, John Keane, Philip R. Kensinger Jr., Peter W. Chiarelli

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

An Associated Press news alert at 9:43 a.m. states, “An aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon, witnesses say.” [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002] This is apparently the first news of the crash. Initial television reports stated there had been an explosion at the Pentagon, but not that a plane caused it (see 9:39 a.m.-9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001). Minutes later, there is still uncertainty over what caused the explosion. At 9:49, CNN’s Chris Plant reports from the Pentagon, “[I]nitial reports from witnesses indicate that there was in fact a helicopter circling the building, contrary to what the AP reported, according to the witnesses I’ve spoken to anyway, and that this helicopter disappeared behind the building, and that there was then an explosion” (see (9:35 a.m.-9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001] It is not until 9:53 that CNN confirms, “it was a plane that crashed into the Pentagon.” [CNN, 9/11/2001]

Entity Tags: CNN, Associated Press

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Bush boards Air Force One in Sarasota, Florida, waving to people below as if the day were like any other.Bush boards Air Force One in Sarasota, Florida, waving to people below as if the day were like any other. [Source: Agence France-Presse]President Bush’s motorcade arrives at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, racing across the tarmac there and pulling up close to Air Force One. Bush ascends the stairs by the left wing onto the plane. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 98-99; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39] He pauses in the doorway to wave to photographers. The St. Petersburg Times will later note that this raises “further questions about security [on 9/11].” [St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] Meanwhile, 13 members of the press, and others such as US Representatives Dan Miller (R-FL) and Adam Putnam (R-FL), hurry onto the plane through its rear entrance. [Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/2001; BBC, 9/1/2002] Secret Service agents with dogs hurriedly check people’s luggage. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/8/2002] Even White House employees who are wearing special lapel pins identifying themselves as such have their belongings checked by the bomb-sniffing dogs. According to journalist and author Bill Sammon, the mood is “extraordinarily tense.” A military aide snaps: “We gotta hurry up and get out of here. Let’s go!” [Sammon, 2002, pp. 99] Secret Service agents are yelling, “Move it, move it, move it!” [BBC, 9/1/2002] But White House chief of staff Andrew Card is reportedly “frustrated because so many guests [have] come on the plane and [are] delaying the takeoff.” [St. Petersburg Times, 9/8/2002] Air Force One will not take off until about 9:56 (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/27/2002]

Entity Tags: Adam Putnam, Andrew Card, George W. Bush, US Secret Service, Dan Miller

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

The air traffic control tower at Pittsburgh International Airport is evacuated, because of concerns that Flight 93, which is heading in the direction of the airport, could crash into it. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/23/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002, pp. 11-13 pdf file; Lancaster New Era, 11/3/2006]
Cleveland Center Notifies Pittsburgh Tower - At 9:44 a.m., an air traffic controller at the FAA’s Cleveland Center calls the Pittsburgh Airport control tower and notifies it of the loss of radio contact with Flight 93, and the loss of a secondary radar return from that aircraft (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Cleveland Center controller also says Flight 93 has made an unanticipated turn (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and its flight path will take it close to Pittsburgh Airport, if not directly over it. [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002, pp. 11-12 pdf file] The controller at the Pittsburgh tower who answers the call, apparently Paul Delfine, begins tracking Flight 93’s primary target on radar, and calls over his operations supervisor, Mal Fuller. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file; Lancaster New Era, 11/3/2006]
Supervisor Orders Evacuation - Delfine points to a plane—which Fuller only later learns is Flight 93—on a radar scope. He tells Fuller it was hijacked over Cleveland, and controllers don’t know where it is heading. Fuller will later recall: “In two sweeps of the radar, I could tell it was going very fast. It was headed directly for the control tower.” Fuller is aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and, at 9:49, gives the order, “Evacuate the facility.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/23/2001; Lancaster New Era, 11/3/2006] By 9:51, the facility has been evacuated. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file] However, one controller refuses to leave his post and remains in the tower. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 193-194]
Employees Do Not See Flight 93 Overhead - Some of the evacuated employees are so upset that they immediately head home. Others mill around in a parking lot. Fuller will later guess that Flight 93 passed directly overhead as he was heading outside, but he assumes it was too high for anyone to see it. He will recall: “We watched and watched and watched. We never saw anything.” [Lancaster New Era, 11/3/2006]
Controllers Return to Facility - Minutes after evacuating, at 9:56 a small number of tower controllers will volunteer to return to their facility. Once back inside, they find that Flight 93’s track is no longer visible on their radar screens. At 10:05 a.m., tower personnel will contact the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to explain why they evacuated. They say they did so because there had been an aircraft, thought to be Flight 93, which appeared to be on a collision course with the tower, and this aircraft allegedly had a bomb on board. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file; Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002, pp. 12-13 pdf file] Around the time the Pittsburgh Airport control tower evacuates, while Flight 93 is heading east, NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr hears that the FAA’s Cleveland Center is being evacuated (see (10:17 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 73]

Entity Tags: Paul Delfine, Pittsburgh International Airport, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Mal Fuller

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

The White House mess.The White House mess. [Source: Unknown]People at the White House are ordered to go to the “mess,” the senior staff dining room. David Kuo, a special assistant to the president, and John Bridgeland, the director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, will later recall being ordered to go downstairs to the mess by armed Secret Service agents. Meanwhile, Anita McBride, the acting director of White House personnel, is instructed by members of the Secret Service to “go through West Wing offices and tell everyone to ‘get out’ and stay put” in the mess. [Kuo, 2006, pp. 185; Politico, 9/9/2011; Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 3] Mary Matalin, a counselor to Vice President Dick Cheney, will recall, “Everyone still remaining in the West Wing was shepherded to the White House mess, where we were to await further instructions.” [Carville and Matalin, 2014, pp. 138]
Mess Is a 'Tiny, Unsecure' Facility - The White House mess is an exclusive dining facility run by the US Navy, located in the basement of the West Wing, just under the Oval Office. [All Hands, 12/1/2001; National Review, 10/8/2013] Bridgeland will recall thinking “how odd it was” for White House staffers to all be evacuated to this “tiny, unsecure” facility. [Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 4] People in the mess are watching television or just waiting. [White House, 8/29/2002] Kuo will describe: “All the tables had been tossed onto their sides to make room for as many people as possible. Fifty people stood there, shocked, quiet, confused.” [Kuo, 2006, pp. 185]
People Ordered to the Mess after the Pentagon Attack - The exact time at which staffers are ordered to go to the mess is unclear. Matalin will recall being told to go there “moments” after she sees Cheney being evacuated from his office, which would be some time shortly after 9:36 a.m. (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [National Review, 9/8/2011; Carville and Matalin, 2014, pp. 137-138] Bridgeland and Kuo will recall being ordered to go there shortly after they learn the Pentagon has been hit, which would be some time after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon attack occurred (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Kuo, 2006, pp. 184-185; Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 3]
People in the Mess Ordered to Leave the Building - People will only spend a short time in the mess before they are told to get out of the building. The Secret Service will reportedly order them to evacuate the White House at 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Bridgeland will describe: “[A]n alarmed police officer came into the White House mess and instructed us to leave. Another officer outside was receiving the latest communications by wire (apparently alerted that United Airlines Flight 93 was headed toward the White House or US Capitol building) and commanded us, ‘Take off your shoes and run as fast as you can.’” [Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 4] Matalin will recall that the order she hears, which is delivered “in a weirdly calm manner,” is: “Run for your lives. A plane is going to hit the White House.” [Carville and Matalin, 2014, pp. 138]

Entity Tags: Anita McBride, John Bridgeland, Mary Matalin, David Kuo, US Secret Service

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

President Bush’s daughters Barbara and Jenna.President Bush’s daughters Barbara and Jenna. [Source: ABC News]After boarding Air Force One, President Bush is concerned about the safety of his wife and daughters. He heads directly to his private cabin near the front of the plane, and then his first act is to order his Secret Service agents to get additional protection for his twin daughters, Barbara and Jenna, who are both at university, and his wife Laura, who is on Capitol Hill (see 9:16 a.m.-9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:41 a.m. September 11, 2001). At about 10:37 a.m., Bush will be informed that all three have successfully been moved to safe locations (see (10:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New Yorker, 9/25/2001; Woodward, 2002, pp. 16; Sammon, 2002, pp. 99-100, 108]

Entity Tags: US Secret Service, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

NORAD briefs the NMCC teleconference on the possible hijacking of Delta Flight 1989. Four minutes later, a representative from the White House bunker containing Vice President Cheney asks if there are any indications of other hijacked planes. Captain Charles Leidig, temporarily in charge of the NMCC, mentions the Delta Flight and comments, “that would be the fourth possible hijack.” Flight 1989 is in the same general Ohio region as Flight 93, but NORAD doesn’t scramble fighters toward either plane at this time. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Charles Leidig, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

United Airlines headquarters receives a report that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon. They learn it is Flight 77. [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004]

Entity Tags: United Airlines

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

The Eisenhower Executive Office Building.The Eisenhower Executive Office Building. [Source: White House]The Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB), a government building located next to the West Wing of the White House, is evacuated. [CNN, 9/11/2001; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] The EEOB is where most of the president’s staff works. [New York Times, 1/8/2009] It is evacuated on the orders of the Secret Service. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, recently learned that a suspicious aircraft was flying toward the White House, and as a result said he would initiate the evacuations of the White House and the EEOB (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He then instructed a “White House security representative” to evacuate the White House. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]
Guards Scream at People to Leave Building - Lloyd Blanchard, who works for the Office of Management and Budget in the EEOB, will later describe the evacuation. He will recall seeing “security personnel… moving frantically through the building, telling everyone to evacuate.” Blanchard and his colleagues are unaware of why, specifically, they are being ordered to leave the building. [IEM, 9/11/2011] Cesar Conda, a domestic policy adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, whose office is in the EEOB, will recall seeing guards “screaming to everyone to ‘move’ and ‘run’ out of the White House complex.” [Politico, 4/23/2009] The New York Times will describe bomb squads “racing through the upper floors of the [EEOB], screaming, ‘Get out, get out, this is real!’” [New York Times, 9/16/2001] And Ron Christie, the deputy assistant to the vice president for domestic policy, will describe the scene on the second floor of the EEOB, writing: “[T]he offices containing the vice president’s Secret Service detail were flung open. Men and women I’d never seen before ran out with automatic weapons. They began to shout: ‘Everybody evacuate the building. Get out now!’” [Christie, 2006, pp. 129]
Some People Hear Recorded Evacuation Order - Apparently, some people in the EEOB hear an announcement instructing them to evacuate, but others do not. Time magazine will describe a recorded announcement going off. It will report: “Staff members in the [EEOB]… were huddled in front of their TV screens when they heard from TV reporters that they were being evacuated. Then the tape loop began. ‘The building is being evacuated. Please walk to the nearest exit.’” [Time, 9/14/2001] According to White House spokesman Scott Stanzel, who is in the EEOB, “[A]larms sounded, a steady, electronic beep, followed by a recorded male voice [saying,] ‘Evacuate the White House.’” [Knight Ridder, 9/16/2001] And Major Robert Darling, who is in the White House Airlift Operations office on the fourth floor of the EEOB, will recall, “The building’s intercom suddenly came to life and ordered all personnel to evacuate the White House and the adjoining Eisenhower Executive Office Building.” The announcement states: “Evacuate the White House complex! All personnel are to evacuate the White House complex immediately!” [Darling, 2010, pp. 46]
Some People Hear 'No Alarm Bells' - However, Yvonne Boulding, who works for the Office of Management and Budget, hears no announcement. “There was no announcement to evacuate,” she will recall. “Everybody just started yelling, ‘Get out, get out.’” [Boston Globe, 9/11/2001] And according to Mitch Daniels, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, “There was some confusion” but “no alarm bells went off.” Daniels will say that people instead decide to leave the building based on “word of mouth.” [New York Times, 9/12/2001]
Commotion, but No Evacuation Order Earlier On - Apparently no order was given to evacuate the EEOB earlier on, even when the nearby Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Conda will recall that at the time he heard the boom in the distance from the Pentagon attack, the EEOB had not yet been evacuated. He had, however, already noticed “a lot of commotion, with the Secret Service agents scurrying up and down the marbled hallway” outside his office. [Politico, 4/23/2009] Just before the evacuation begins, Christie saw a Secret Service officer he is friends with outside the office of Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, on the second floor of the EEOB. The agent waved frantically when he noticed Christie and then told him: “Ron, you need to get out of here. I’ve heard there’s another plane inbound to the White House and it could get here in less than two minutes. You need to get your staff, get out, and stay away from the windows.” [Christie, 2006, pp. 128-129] The EEOB will be mostly empty by 10:05 a.m., according to a Secret Service timeline. [United States Secret Service, 9/12/2001] The White House is evacuated around the same time as the EEOB is (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; CNN, 9/12/2001]

Entity Tags: Yvonne Boulding, Lloyd Blanchard, Eisenhower Executive Offices Building, US Secret Service, Cesar Conda, Ron Christie, Mitch Daniels, Scott Stanzel, Robert J. Darling

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Flight 93 passenger Tom Burnett calls his wife Deena Burnett for the third time. She is able to determine that he is using his cell phone, as the caller identification shows his number. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001 pdf file] She had just seen the television reports about the Pentagon being hit, and mistakenly thought Tom’s plane had crashed into it. [Longman, 2002, pp. 111] She asks, “Tom, you’re okay?” but he replies, “No, I’m not.” Deena tells him, “They just hit the Pentagon.” She hears him repeating this information to people around him. She continues: “They think five airplanes have been hijacked. One is still on the ground. They believe all of them are commercial planes. I haven’t heard them say which airline, but all of them have originated on the East Coast.” She doesn’t know who is involved in the attacks. [Sacramento Bee, 9/11/2002; Burnett and Giombetti, 2006, pp. 65-66] The hijackers had earlier told the passengers there was a bomb on Flight 93 (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001 pdf file; Longman, 2002, pp. 107] But now Tom appears to doubt this. He asks Deena, “What is the probability of them having a bomb on board?” He then answers himself: “I don’t think they have one. I think they’re just telling us that for crowd control.” Based on her experience as a former flight attendant, Deena says, “A plane can survive a bomb if it’s in the right place.” Tom continues: “[The hijackers are] talking about crashing this plane into the ground. We have to do something. I’m putting a plan together.” He says “several people” are helping him. “There’s a group of us.” Deena is surprised, but reassured, at her husband’s calmness. She will recall that it is as if he were at work, “sitting at his desk, and we were having a regular conversation.” He tells her he will call back, and then hangs up. A policeman then arrives at Deena Burnett’s house, no doubt in response to her earlier 911 call (see 9:31 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), and follows her inside. [Sacramento Bee, 9/11/2002; Burnett and Giombetti, 2006, pp. 66]

Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Passenger Phone Calls

Lynne Cheney, the wife of Vice President Dick Cheney, arrives at the gate of the White House, but guards initially try to prevent her car from entering the grounds. [Newsweek, 12/30/2001; Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7/2/2002; Hayes, 2007, pp. 334] Cheney learned of the plane crashes at the World Trade Center while she was at a hair salon in Washington, DC (see (8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but her Secret Service agents only evacuated her from there after they learned an unidentified aircraft was flying toward the White House (see (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After initially driving toward the vice president’s residence, the agents changed direction to instead take Cheney to the White House. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; White House, 11/9/2001] The White House is being evacuated when Cheney’s car arrives at its gate. [Newsweek, 12/30/2001] (It begins evacuating at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; CNN, 9/12/2001] ) Cheney will later describe: “This was not the scene I’ve seen on camera, where people are now starting to run or anything.… [P]eople were all going in the other direction [to us] in a rather calm way when I arrived.” However, the guards at the gate will not let Cheney’s car enter the grounds. Cheney will say they have “no idea who we [are] and [are] confused that somebody would want to be coming in” when everybody else is leaving. Cheney’s driver takes the car over the curb and onto the sidewalk, to try and get Cheney to the White House, but a fire engine is driven in front of the car, to block its path. Eventually, though, Cheney’s car is allowed onto the grounds. [White House, 11/9/2001; Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7/2/2002; Hayes, 2007, pp. 334] Cheney will enter the White House at 9:52 a.m. (see 9:52 a.m. September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40]

Entity Tags: Lynne Cheney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Todd Beamer.
Todd Beamer. [Source: Family photo]After having trouble getting authorization on an Airfone to call his family (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001), Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer is able to speak to GTE customer service supervisor Lisa Jefferson. Jefferson, who quickly alerts the FBI about Beamer’s call, talks to him for 13 minutes. According to a report in the London Observer, she has the FBI simultaneously on another line, offering guidance. She immediately asks Beamer for details of the flight, like “What is your flight number? What is the situation? Where are the crew members?” With the help of a flight attendant sitting next to him, Beamer details the numbers of passengers and crew on the plane. He says the hijackers have divided the passengers into two groups, with ten of them in first class at the front of the plane, and 27 in the back. (Jefferson’s written summary of the conversation will say that the larger number of passengers was in the front. However, Beamer’s wife later says that Jefferson informed her it was in fact the other way around.) According to some reports, Beamer says three people have hijacked the plane. Two of them, armed with knives, are in the cockpit and have locked the door; the third is in first class with what appears to be a bomb strapped around his waist. A curtain has been closed separating first class from the coach section of the plane. Other accounts claim the hijacker with the bomb is in fact in the rear of the plane. According to one report in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Beamer describes four hijackers in total: the two in the cockpit, the one with the bomb guarding the passengers in the back of the plane, and a fourth in first class. But the Orlando Sentinel says Beamer tells Jefferson he is free to talk because the hijacker in first class has closed the curtain, indicating there is no hijacker at the back of the plane. (Beamer himself is at the back of plane, calling from a phone in row 32.) According to an early article in Newsweek, he says that one passenger is dead and he doesn’t know about the pilots. However, journalist and author Jere Longman later writes that Beamer describes to Jefferson two people on the floor in fist class, possibly dead. The flight attendant next to him can be overheard saying these are the plane’s captain and co-pilot. The attendant does not mention their names or say they are wearing uniforms, but she sounds certain. Beamer then repeats what the attendant has told him. At some point in the call, Beamer asks, “Do you know what [the hijackers] want? Money or ransom or what?” He seems unaware of the other hijackings that have occurred. Jefferson informs him of the two planes crashing in New York. [Chicago Tribune, 9/16/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/19/2001; Newsweek, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Observer, 12/2/2001; Longman, 2002, pp. 198-200; Orlando Sentinel, 9/5/2002; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 11 pdf file] Beamer says of the hijackers, “It doesn’t seem like they know how to fly the plane.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 9/17/2001] He also tells Jefferson about himself, including where he is from, that he has two sons, and that his wife is expecting a third child in January. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001] He tells her, “I just want to talk to somebody and just let someone know that this is happening.” [Longman, 2002, pp. 204]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lisa Jefferson, Todd Beamer

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Passenger Phone Calls

An E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, with the call sign “Venus 77,” takes off from Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, DC, in response to the attack on the Pentagon. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004; Farmer, 2009, pp. 206] The E-4B is a highly modified Boeing 747, fitted with sophisticated communications equipment, which can serve as a flying military command post during a national emergency. The US military has four of these planes. [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Dayton Daily News, 9/12/2001; Verton, 2003, pp. 143] Venus 77 takes off at 9:43 a.m., according to John Farmer, who will be senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission. [Farmer, 2009, pp. 206] But the flight tracking strip from Andrews Air Force Base will record it as having taken off at 9:45 a.m. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004] The plane is initially directed toward Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. But shortly after taking off, its pilot tells air traffic control that he wants to fly to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. [Farmer, 2009, pp. 206] Wright-Patterson is one of the few designated bases for the E-4B. Another E-4B has actually been on the ground there and takes off around this time (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Dayton Daily News, 9/12/2001] The pilot of Venus 77 is cleared to head to Wright-Patterson and so he turns west. But he then says he wants to turn back east and hold south of Washington. He will be cleared to do so at 9:47 a.m. and his plane will eventually settle into a holding pattern over Richmond, Virginia. [Farmer, 2009, pp. 206-207] Farmer will claim that Venus 77 is the “mystery plane”—an unidentified white aircraft—seen over Washington around this time (see (9:41 a.m.-9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Farmer, 2009, pp. 372] However, that plane was reported to be “circling the White House” at 9:41 a.m., before Venus 77 takes off. [ABC News, 9/11/2001] Another E-4B, with the call sign “Word 31,” took off from Andrews Air Force Base at around 9:27 a.m. (see (9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001), so that aircraft might be the “mystery plane” seen flying over Washington. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 pdf file; Verton, 2003, pp. 143-144; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004]

Entity Tags: John Farmer, E-4B National Airborne Operations Center

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Secret Service with automatic weapons directing people away from the White House.Secret Service with automatic weapons directing people away from the White House. [Source: Associated Press]The White House is evacuated after the Secret Service receives what the Associated Press describes as a credible threat of a terrorist attack against it. [Associated Press, 2001 pdf file; CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001] Minutes earlier, in the White House Situation Room, Secret Service Director Brian Stafford informed counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke that an aircraft was heading in their direction, and said he was going to order the evacuation of the White House (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 7] The Secret Service learned of this aircraft by monitoring radar and over an open line with the FAA (the “hijack net”), which enable them to receive real time information about the hijacked aircraft. The Secret Service, which has been using an air surveillance system called Tigerwall for some time (see (September 2000 and after)), tracks both American 77 and United 93 as they approach Washington and assumes the White House is a target. Secret Service agent Barbara Riggs will later say, “The Secret Service prepared to defend the facility,” although the precise nature of the preparations is unclear. [New York Times, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; Washington Post, 1/27/2002; Associated Press, 8/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; PCCW Newsletter, 3/2006] A slow and orderly evacuation of the White House had in fact begun earlier on (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But now the Secret Service orders people to run so as to evacuate faster. [CNN, 9/11/2001; ABC News, 9/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Barbara Riggs, US Secret Service

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is escorted toward the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), the bunker below the White House, by Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; White House, 11/1/2001; Felix, 2002, pp. 227] Rice was in the White House Situation Room when the Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m., according to her own later recollections, and had subsequently looked up and seen the television footage of the burning building. [White House, 11/1/2001; Bumiller, 2007, pp. xiii]
Rice Told She Must Go to the PEOC - “[T]he picture had just come up on television of the plane lodged in the side of the Pentagon,” Rice will recall. “And no one had told me. I literally turned and looked at the picture and saw it.” She will say: “And then there were incoming reports that there had been a car bomb at the State Department, that there was a large fire on the Mall near the Washington Monument, and [I was] just trying to sort through the information when a Secret Service agent [i.e. Truscott] came and said: ‘You have to go to the bunker. The vice president is already there. There may be planes heading for the White House.’” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Rice will say Truscott is “quite firm” when he talks to her. [White House, 8/7/2002]
Secret Service Agent Is Heading to the PEOC from Nearby Building - Truscott has just come from his office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House, where he was meeting with other Secret Service agents to discuss security matters. One issue the agents discussed was providing protection for Rice (see (9:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). During the meeting, Truscott learned that a suspicious aircraft was flying toward Washington, DC (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and instructed a “security representative” to evacuate the White House. He then left his office and headed toward the PEOC, meeting Rice on his way there. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]
Rice Is 'Pushed Along' toward the PEOC - Rice briefly talks on the phone with President Bush and warns him not to return to Washington before she leaves the Situation Room (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Felix, 2002, pp. 227; White House, 8/2/2002; White House, 8/6/2002] She is then escorted down toward the PEOC. [White House, 11/1/2001] She will recall being “pushed along” the corridors by Truscott as she heads there. [White House, 8/2/2002] Truscott and Rice will encounter Vice President Dick Cheney and his wife, Lynne Cheney, in the underground tunnel leading to the PEOC, and then enter the PEOC shortly before 10:00 a.m. (see (Shortly Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; Bumiller, 2007, pp. xiii] White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will contradict Rice’s account, however, indicating that Rice headed to the PEOC significantly earlier, roughly around 9:15 a.m. (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 3-4]

Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Carl Truscott

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Secret Service agents inspecting the luggage of members of the media travel pool at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport.Secret Service agents inspecting the luggage of members of the media travel pool at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. [Source: Steve Nesius / Associated Press]Secret Service agents subject reporters and other individuals who are traveling with President Bush to a strict security check as they are getting onto Air Force One. Bush’s motorcade has now arrived at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport in Florida, where Air Force One is waiting (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 99; Rochester Review, 9/2004] The plane’s crew members have been told there is a “great potential that we are going to be under attack sitting on the ramp” at the airport, according to Colonel Mark Tillman, the pilot. They have also been told there are “unidentified people all around the airport,” and that there is a “possibility that we were subject to the plan to go ahead and assassinate the president” (see (9:04 a.m.-9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United Services Automobile Association, 9/11/2011] Reporters who are heading for the rear entrance to Air Force One are stopped by Secret Service agents and ordered to drop whatever they are carrying for a security sweep. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 99] One reporter, White House correspondent Richard Keil, will later recall seeing “a dozen additional Secret Service agents” at the airport, “each with bomb-sniffing dogs.” “We usually have our bags inspected only once in the morning, as long as we remain inside the secure ‘bubble’ in which the president travels,” Keil will write. But now, “everyone’s bag had to be re-swept.” [Rochester Review, 9/2004] Even staffers who are wearing special lapel pins showing they are White House employees have their belongings checked by the bomb-sniffing dogs. Meanwhile, a military aide standing at the foot of the rear entrance to the plane snaps: “If you’re not essential, you’re not getting on the airplane! We gotta hurry up and get out of here.” [Sammon, 2002, pp. 99] Tillman will recall that Secret Service agents and the plane’s own security staffers are “double, triple-checking the manifest,” and the bomb-sniffing dogs “search everything” that comes onto Air Force One. “We didn’t want to take any chances,” he will comment. [United Services Automobile Association, 9/11/2011; US Air Force, 2/29/2012 pdf file] The mood, according to journalist and author Bill Sammon, is “extraordinarily tense.” [Sammon, 2002, pp. 99]

Entity Tags: US Secret Service, Mark Tillman, Richard Keil

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Personnel at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas, are panicked when they temporarily lose communication with a third American Airlines flight, and they also receive a text message from the plane mistakenly signaling that it has been hijacked. At 9:45 a.m., according to the Wall Street Journal, the airline loses radio contact with the plane, which is flying from Boston to Seattle. SOC personnel are therefore “convinced it [is] a third hijacking,” following American Airlines Flights 11 and 77.
Pilots Send Message Indicating a Hijacking - The plane with which communication is lost appears to be American Airlines Flight 189. According to Donald Robinson, a dispatcher at the SOC who is currently dealing with transcontinental flights, the airline receives a text message from Flight 189 signaling it has been hijacked. Robinson will later tell the FBI that Flight 189 is the “only known flight that sent a hijack message back to the dispatchers.” This “hijack message” is sent using ACARS, an e-mail system that enables airline personnel on the ground to communicate with those in the cockpit of an in-flight aircraft. After receiving the message, Robinson sends a message back to Flight 189, asking the pilots if they are “squawking” the universal code signifying a hijacking. The normal procedure in these circumstances is to send a series of ACARS messages to the plane so as to verify whether a hijacking is indeed in progress and, if so, to obtain information about it.
Dispatcher Later Suggests Message Was Sent Accidentally - Robinson will tell the FBI he believes the crew of Flight 189 mistakenly sent the message that includes the hijack code because a warning message they received from American Airlines made them fear an impending hijacking. (After it learned of the two plane crashes at the World Trade Center, American Airlines had become concerned for its remaining transcontinental flights, and sent them all a message instructing them to keep their cockpit doors shut.) Robinson says that when pilots type the hijack code into an ACARS message, the message is sent automatically, whereas normally it is necessary to press the send key to transmit an ACARS message. He says he suspects the crew did not realize this, and probably keyed in the code “in order to be ready for a possible problem.” Alternatively, he suggests, “the code was squawked by mistake.” However, this is just speculation, and Robinson says it is “unknown why the cockpit sent this message.”
Communication Restored after 10 Minutes - The loss of communication with the aircraft is due to a “radio glitch,” according to the Wall Street Journal, and everyone at the SOC calms down when radio contact with the flight is restored 10 minutes after it is lost. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001; Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001]

Entity Tags: American Airlines, Donald A. Robinson Jr.

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice briefly talks on the phone with President Bush and warns him against returning to Washington, DC, before she is escorted to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), the bunker below the White House. [White House, 11/1/2001; BBC Radio 4, 8/1/2002 pdf file; White House, 8/2/2002] Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, has just come into the White House Situation Room and told Rice she must go to the PEOC because a plane may be heading toward the White House (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; White House, 8/6/2002] But before she goes to the PEOC, Rice wants to talk to the president.
President Told that Washington Is 'under Attack' - Bush has now arrived at the Sarasota airport after leaving the Booker Elementary School (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [White House, 8/2/2002; New York Times, 9/11/2002] Rice calls him and says: “Mr. President, here’s what’s going on. The Pentagon has been hit.” He tells her, “I’m getting ready to come back [to Washington].” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Bush is “very calm” as he talks, Rice will later recall. Franklin Miller, a senior national security official who “does defense policy” for Rice, is with the national security adviser. [White House, 10/24/2001; White House, 11/1/2001] He whispers to her, “Tell him that it may not be wise to come back here, because Washington is under attack.” [White House, 8/2/2002] Rice therefore tells Bush: “Sir, you can’t come back here. Washington’s under attack.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]
Rice Is Being 'Pushed' to Go to the Bunker - The call between Bush and Rice is only short. Rice will say this is because she is “being pushed” by Truscott “to get off the phone and get out of the West Wing.” [White House, 8/2/2002; CBS News, 9/11/2002] “I had people pulling at my arm, saying, ‘You have to go to the bunker,’” she will recall. [White House, 11/1/2001] After she has finished speaking to Bush, Rice heads toward the PEOC. She will enter it shortly before 10:00 a.m. (see (Shortly Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [White House, 8/2/2002; Bumiller, 2007, pp. xiii]

Entity Tags: Franklin Miller, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Carl Truscott

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Having earlier concluded that it was not hijacked, air traffic controllers at the FAA’s Cleveland Center again become suspicious of Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, after its pilot requests a change of course and then fails to respond to a message.
Pilot Requests Diversion - Cleveland Center controllers initially thought the sounds from Flight 93 as it was being hijacked had come from Delta 1989, but soon decided they had come from Flight 93 (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/13/2002] However, without notifying the Cleveland Center, Delta Air Lines has just instructed Delta 1989 to land at Cleveland Hopkins Airport (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After the plane’s pilot, Captain Paul Werner, calls the Cleveland Center at 9:44 a.m., requesting an immediate diversion, controllers there become suspicious. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 167-168; USA Today, 9/11/2008]
Supervisor Reports Concerns over Teleconference - USA Today will later describe: “The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain’s request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency? Controllers don’t know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland.” After Delta 1989 makes an abrupt 30-degree turn back toward Cleveland Airport, a supervisor at the Cleveland Center announces the apparently suspicious development on an FAA teleconference.
Coded Message Confirms No Hijacking - As Delta 1989 begins its descent toward Cleveland, a Cleveland Center controller radios Werner with a coded message to check whether his plane has been hijacked. The controller says, “Delta 1989, I hear you’re ‘late’ today.” (The controller is using the code word for a hijack, which has been replaced with the word ‘late’ in subsequent accounts of this incident, for security reasons. Pilots can use this code word to alert controllers to their situation if they are unable to do so openly because hijackers are in the cockpit.) Werner reassures the controller that all is okay, saying: “Negative. Delta 1989 is not a ‘late.’”
Lack of Response Causes More Suspicion - Then, as the plane descends, it receives another message from the Cleveland Center. But Werner, who is busy, fails to respond to it. This arouses further suspicion. According to USA Today: “On the ground, controllers in Cleveland Center grow alarmed. Why didn’t he respond? Have both jets—the United [Flight 93] and the Delta flights—been hijacked?” [USA Today, 8/13/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 168-169]

Entity Tags: Paul Werner, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Mike Grojean.Mike Grojean. [Source: Rice University]A meeting was originally scheduled to take place at this time in an area of the Pentagon that was destroyed when the building was hit and that was, ironically, intended to discuss what to do if a disaster should hit the Pentagon. The meeting was apparently going to take place in the office of Lieutenant General Timothy Maude, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for personnel, on the second floor of the Pentagon. Its participants were going “to discuss contingency plans in the event of a disaster at the headquarters of the US military,” according to the Birmingham Post. “Planners had envisaged a major flood or a hurricane strike on the Pentagon,” the Post will report, but “[n]o one had considered a suicide bombing involving a passenger aircraft.” Those who would have been at the meeting were “supposed to discuss deployment of their small team in times of national emergency, natural or otherwise.” They were also going “to consider the emergency relocation of staff.” The meeting would have been attended by Maude and Major Mike Grojean, leadership policy officer at the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Whether any other individuals were scheduled to attend is unstated. The meeting, though, was canceled at around 9:30 a.m. due to the attacks on the World Trade Center. At that time, Grojean had been walking down a corridor on his way to the meeting. A colleague of his received a call, informing him that the meeting had been called off, and then shouted down the corridor to Grojean, “Your meeting is canceled.” Grojean therefore turned around and headed back toward his office. [Birmingham Post, 9/11/2003; Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, 9/9/2011] The time the meeting was scheduled to start at—9:45 a.m.—is just eight minutes after the Pentagon attack took place (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10] Maude’s office was destroyed in the attack. [CNN, 9/6/2002] Maude was meeting there with eight members of his staff when the building was hit and all nine men died in the attack. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 36-37] He was the highest-ranking military officer killed in the Pentagon attack. [USA Today, 9/25/2001] Grojean headed to the Army Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon after the attack and will spend the rest of the day there. [Birmingham Post, 9/11/2003; Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, 9/9/2011]

Entity Tags: Timothy J. Maude, Michael Grojean

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Chris Braman.Chris Braman. [Source: California State University, Fullerton]A number of witnesses hear secondary explosions inside the Pentagon in the immediate aftermath of the attack there. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Washington Post, 9/11/2001] Some possible explanations are later suggested for these explosions, though their exact causes are unclear.
bullet Captain William Toti, the special assistant to the vice chief of naval operations, hears and feels numerous explosions while he assists in the rescue efforts at the crash site. [Proceedings, 9/2002; Washington Post, 11/17/2006; McKinney Courier-Gazette, 9/12/2008] A month later, Toti will recall, “One of the things I haven’t seen reported in any of the papers was that periodically, for about the next hour [after he arrives at the crash site], there were secondary explosions going off in the hole in the Pentagon.” While he is standing about 30 yards from the point of impact, Toti hears “pop… pop, pop… pop, pop, pop… pop.” He will say these explosions are “loud. Scary, absolutely scary. The make-you-jump kind of explosions.” [US Naval Historical Center, 10/10/2001] Toti and two Army officers that assist him with the rescue efforts fear the explosions, which come from “the fissure” in the building, “are bombs.” [Washington Post, 11/17/2006] But, Toti will recall, about an hour after he arrives at the crash site, he is “standing with some FBI guys and we were musing as to what the source of the explosions was, and we concluded that they were the oxygen canisters from the airplane. You know, the things [that] produce oxygen for the passengers in an emergency.” Toti will say this possible explanation is the “best thing we could think of.” [US Naval Historical Center, 10/10/2001]
bullet Army Lieutenant Colonel Ted Anderson and Army Staff Sergeant Chris Braman go into the Pentagon near the crash site to rescue injured victims. They are reportedly “stunned by secondary explosions.” One of these is a “fire department car exploding,” according to Anderson. The causes of the other explosions are unclear. [Newsweek, 9/28/2001; Washington Post, 9/8/2002]
bullet Lieutenant Commander David Tarantino, a Navy flight surgeon, and Navy Captain David Thomas go into the Pentagon to search for survivors. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 54-55] They feel “secondary explosions and wondered whether the whole building would cave in or if they were under more attacks,” according to The Washingtonian. [Washingtonian, 12/2001] Tarantino will later recall that there are “secondary explosions going on.” [US Naval Historical Center, 9/25/2001]
bullet Colonel Jonathan Fruendt, an Army physician, is heading toward the Pentagon’s center courtyard shortly after the crash when he hears an explosion. “I heard another loud boom,” he will later recall. As soon as the explosion occurs, people in the corridor with Fruendt “instantly froze in position, and then they turned around and started running back, away from the exit.” Fruendt will later comment: “No one has really explained to me exactly what that noise was. Some people said, later, maybe it was some fuel or one of these vehicles, something around the original crash site that blew up.… Other people said it was a sonic boom from the fighters that were flying over the Pentagon.” But, he will add, “No one has ever confirmed [the cause of the explosion] with me.” [Office of Medical History, 9/2004, pp. 73-74]
bullet Some witnesses say the crash at the Pentagon is “followed by an explosion about 15 minutes later that could be heard miles away,” according to the New York Times. This is “apparently the sound of a large portion of the Pentagon collapsing,” the Times will report. [New York Times, 9/12/2001] However, that section of the Pentagon collapses at 10:15 a.m., more than 35 minutes after the crash (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 19]

Entity Tags: David Thomas, Christopher D. Braman, Jonathan Fruendt, David Tarantino, Ted Anderson, William J. Toti, Pentagon

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

The Russell Senate Office Building Caucus Room.The Russell Senate Office Building Caucus Room. [Source: Architect of the Capitol]First Lady Laura Bush and those accompanying her head toward the office of Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) after they learn of the attack on the Pentagon and Bush’s Secret Service agents instruct them to go to the basement of the building they are in. [CNN, 9/11/2002; Bush, 2010, pp. 200] Bush has just appeared before reporters in the Caucus Room of the Russell Senate Office Building, on Capitol Hill, alongside Gregg and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) (see 9:41 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Advance Man Told of Pentagon Attack - As Bush and the senators are walking out of the Caucus Room, John Meyers, the first lady’s advance man, receives a call on his cell phone. The caller, a friend of his, says that “CNN was reporting that an airplane had crashed into the Pentagon,” Bush will later write. [Time, 12/31/2001; Bush, 2010, pp. 199-200]
Secret Service Says First Lady and Staff Cannot Leave Yet - Before going to the Caucus Room, Bush spent time in Kennedy’s office (see 9:16 a.m.-9:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [National Journal, 8/31/2002; CNN, 9/11/2002] She now goes back there. Then, she will recall, she begins “moving quickly toward the stairs, to reach my car to return to the White House.” But suddenly, Ron Sprinkle, Bush’s lead Secret Service agent, turns toward the first lady and her staff and tells them they need to head immediately to the basement of the Russell Senate Office Building, Bush will recall. [Bush, 2010, pp. 200] Andi Ball, the first lady’s chief of staff, who is with Bush at this time, will give a slightly different account. She will say that as Bush and her staff are walking down the corridor, on their way to the cars that will take them to the White House, Bush’s Secret Service agents tell them, “[W]e can’t go right now.” The agents say they all “need to go back and wait a few minutes.” Ball will add: “Our agents thought another plane was coming toward Washington. The Capitol was being evacuated.” [Kessler, 2006, pp. 136] (The Russell Senate Office Building and the nearby Capitol building are evacuated at 9:48 a.m., apparently due to concerns that a plane is heading toward Capitol Hill (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Associated Press, 8/21/2002; CNN, 9/11/2006] )
First Lady and Entourage Go to Senator's Office - The group then takes off “at a run,” according to Bush. Gregg suggests they all go to his office, which is on a lower floor and is an interior room. Bush’s Secret Service agents then tell Meyers that they are waiting for the emergency response team to arrive. They say the team will take the first lady away but leave her staff behind. Overhearing this conversation, Bush turns back and says, “No, everyone is coming.” Bush and her entourage then reach Gregg’s office, where they will remain until the Secret Service takes them away to a “secure location” at around 10:10 a.m. (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (Shortly After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001, and (10:10 a.m.-10:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [National Journal, 8/31/2002; Bush, 2010, pp. 200]

Entity Tags: John Meyers, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, US Secret Service, Andrea Ball, Laura Bush, Judd Gregg, Ron Sprinkle

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

An F-16 launched from Langley Air Force Base is directed toward two unidentified aircraft and then asked to inspect and report on the damage to the Pentagon. Major Dean Eckmann, one of the three F-16 pilots who took off from Langley at 9:30 (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), is reportedly flying in the Washington area. He will later recall, “I set up a combat air patrol with air traffic controllers,” and then, at around 9:45, “they come back to me and say there are a couple [of] unknowns heading north on the Potomac River toward the White House.” He is flying above 20,000 feet but heads straight down and reaches his target in “no time,” he says. The unknowns turn out to be a military helicopter and a law enforcement helicopter apparently heading towards the Pentagon to assist there. Eckmann flies over the Capitol and Mall area, he recalls, “to clear the area and make sure nothing else was coming in.”
Instructions to Inspect the Pentagon - Then Captain Craig Borgstrom, one of the other two Langley pilots, calls him and says that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) wants to know the extent of the damage at the Pentagon. Eckmann flies over it and reports that the two outer rings have been damaged. NEADS wants to know if he can tell what has happened. He guesses it was “a big fuel tanker truck because of the amount of smoke and flames coming up and nobody indicated anything about an airplane. And there was no airplane wreckage off to the side.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 66] But he will give a different account to the 9/11 Commission, telling it: “I reverted to the Russian threat.… I’m thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us.… [N]o one told us anything.” According to the Commission, the Langley pilots have not been briefed about why they were scrambled. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 45 and 465] Eckmann will in fact say, “[W]e didn’t actually find out it was an airliner [that hit the Pentagon] until the next day.” [Associated Press, 8/19/2002]
Conflicting Times - Eckmann’s F-16 is presumably the first fighter to arrive over the Pentagon following the attack there. When precisely this occurs is unclear (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, according to numerous witnesses on the ground, the first fighter does not fly over the Pentagon until significantly later than Eckmann describes, at around 10:40 a.m. (see (10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 130-131] And according to some accounts, this is not Eckmann’s plane, but an F-16 from Andrews Air Force Base, piloted by Major Billy Hutchison. [Filson, 2003, pp. 81-82; Spencer, 2008, pp. 235-236]

Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

At some point after the White House is ordered to evacuate and while Air Force One is preparing to take off in Florida, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activates the Continuity of Government (COG) plan. The coordinator for Continuity of Government has joined Clarke in the White House Situation Room. Clarke asks, “How do I activate COG?” Recalling this conversation, he will later comment, “In the exercises we had done, the person playing the president had always given that order.” But the coordinator replies, “You tell me to do it.” Soon after, Clarke instructs him, “Go.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8]
First Time COG Plan Activated - The Continuity of Government plan, which dates back to the Reagan administration, had originally prepared to set up a new leadership for the US in the event of a nuclear war. This is apparently the first time it has ever been put into effect. Clarke will recall, “Every federal agency was ordered… to activate an alternative command post, an alternative headquarters outside of Washington, DC, and to staff it as soon as possible.” Cabinet officers are dispatched around the country, and people in Congress are taken to alternative locations.
Clarke Regularly Particiated in COG Exercises - Since the 1980s, Clarke has in fact been a regular participant in secret COG exercises that rehearsed this plan (see (1984-2004)). [Washington Post, 4/7/2004; ABC News, 4/25/2004] Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also participated (see 1981-1992). [Atlantic Monthly, 3/2004] Kenneth Duberstein, formerly President Reagan’s White House chief of staff, who took part in the exercises as well, will recall: “I said to myself, as we proceeded through the day [of 9/11], ‘It’s working.’ All those days of patriotic duty were coming back and they were working.” According to ABC News, “If executive branch leaders and large numbers of congressmen had been killed in an attack on the United States, the plan could have gone further, officials suggest, perhaps even with non-elected leaders of the United States taking control and declaring martial law.” [ABC News, 4/25/2004] According to a White House timeline of the events of 9/11, it is in fact Cheney that “orders implementation of Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations procedures,” at 9:55 a.m., although, according to the Washington Post, Cheney only “officially implemented the emergency Continuity of Government orders,” rather than activating the plan. [White House, 2001; Washington Post, 1/27/2002]

Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Continuity of Government, White House, Kenneth Duberstein

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

Shortly after boarding Air Force One, President Bush speaks by phone with Vice President Dick Cheney for approximately 10 minutes. [Hayes, 2007, pp. 335-336] According to the 9/11 Commission, Cheney had reached the underground tunnel leading to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House at 9:37 a.m. (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He and the Secret Service agents escorting him had paused in an area of the tunnel with a secure phone and a television. He’d then asked to speak to the president, but it had taken a while for his call to be connected. However, elsewhere in its final report, the Commission will indicate that Bush, not Cheney, makes this phone call, saying that after he’d boarded Air Force One, the president “called the vice president.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39-40] Cheney will later recall making “one phone call [to the president] from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we [at the White House] were a target and I strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what the hell was going on.” [Newsweek, 12/30/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 464] He will recall, “What I was immediately thinking about was sort of continuity of government.” [Hayes, 2007, pp. 335-336] According to notes made by White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, who is with the president on Air Force One, at about 9:45 a.m. Bush tells Cheney: “Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon. We’re at war… somebody’s going to pay.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39 and 463; Fleischer, 2005, pp. 141] Bush instructs Cheney to call the congressional leadership and give them a briefing. [New Yorker, 9/25/2001] (However, around this time, Capitol Hill is being evacuated (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001).) The 9/11 Commission will state that, according to “contemporaneous notes,” at 9:55 a.m. “the vice president [is] still on the phone with the president advising that three planes [are] missing and one had hit the Pentagon.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40] In his book Against All Enemies, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will indicate that it is around the time this call occurs that he is informed that the president has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8] Yet various accounts of Bush and Cheney’s call will make no mention of the president and vice president discussing any orders or making any decisions. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 101; Woodward, 2002, pp. 16; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39-40; Hayes, 2007, pp. 335-336] Their call apparently ends around 9:56 a.m.-9:57 a.m., as, according to the 9/11 Commission, Cheney enters the PEOC “shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40] (However, some accounts will indicate that he enters the PEOC significantly earlier than this (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).) After hanging up, Bush turns to the men who are with him at his desk: his chief of staff Andrew Card, his senior adviser Karl Rove, military aide Lieutenant Colonel Tom Gould, and Fleischer. He tells them: “That’s what we’re paid for, boys. We’re gonna take care of this. When we find out who did this, they’re not gonna like me as president. Somebody’s going to pay.” [Sammon, 2002, pp. 101; Woodward, 2002, pp. 17] According to some accounts, shortly after finishing this call, the president and vice president will be back on the phone with each other (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney, George Bush

According to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is informed that President Bush has authorized the military to shoot down threatening aircraft. Clarke had requested that this authorization be given at around 9:36 (see (Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). In his 2004 book Against all Enemies he will state that he receives a response shortly after the time people begin rapidly evacuating from the White House, and while Air Force One is getting ready to take off. This would therefore be sometime between 9:45 and 9:56. He gets a phone call from the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, where Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are located. On the other end is Army Major Mike Fenzel. Fenzel tells Clarke: “Air Force One is getting ready to take off, with some press still on board. He’ll divert to an air base. Fighter escort is authorized. And… tell the Pentagon they have authority from the president to shoot down hostile aircraft, repeat, they have authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.” Clarke replies, “Roger that.” In his recollection of this call, Clarke comments, “I was amazed at the speed of the decisions coming from Cheney and, through him, from Bush.” Clarke then gets the attention of those on the video conference screen for the Pentagon, and informs them, “the president has ordered the use of force against aircraft deemed to be hostile.” [CNN, 9/12/2001; Clarke, 2004, pp. 7-8] This description contradicts several other accounts of when the president gives the shootdown authorization. In late 2003, Clarke tells ABC News he gets the go-ahead from the vice president “within two minutes” after he requested shootdown authorization, meaning therefore around 9:37-9:38 (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC News, 11/29/2003] Some accounts say that Bush gives the authorization later, at shortly after 9:56 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 102; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] According to the 9/11 Commission, it is not given until around 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41]

Entity Tags: Mike Fenzel, Richard A. Clarke

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Richard Clarke

Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, calls the Secret Service at the White House, seeking instructions from someone senior—preferably a military person—to launch his fighter jets, but the only people available are Secret Service agents. [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; Spencer, 2008, pp. 184-185]
Wherley Calls Joint Operations Center - Wherley has just spoken over the phone with a Secret Service agent. After he asked to talk to “someone higher in the chain of command, preferably in the military,” the agent gave him a number at the White House to call (see (Shortly After 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 184] Wherley now calls the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center. He will later recall making this call “while watching TV footage of employees evacuating the White House complex.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; 9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003] This would mean he makes it at around 9:45 a.m., when people start running from the White House, or shortly after (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001]
Delay before Call Answered - It takes some time before anyone answers the call. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 184] According to Wherley, “the phone rings about eight times before somebody picks up.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 79] The Secret Service agent that answers is Kenneth Beauchamp. Wherley knows Beauchamp from other routine work with the DC Air National Guard. [9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003] Beauchamp had spoken to DCANG officer Major Daniel Caine earlier on and told him the Secret Service did not require help from his unit (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 pdf file; Spencer, 2008, pp. 124]
Beauchamp Requests Fighters - But now Beauchamp asks Wherley to launch aircraft to protect Washington. He implores: “We want you to put a CAP [combat air patrol] up over the city. We need some fighters now.” However, Wherley is reportedly “not very comfortable taking orders from a Secret Service agent. That’s just not how things are done.” He wants to “speak to someone a little higher up the food chain,” and asks, “Is there anybody else there from the military available to talk?” [9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003; Spencer, 2008, pp. 185] But, as Wherley will later comment, “[T]hey have nobody in uniform, it was all Secret Service people and a team communicating with the president.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 79] Wherley therefore decides he will accept orders from the Secret Service, and says to Beauchamp: “Okay, then. What exactly do they want me to do?” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 185]
Wherley Wants Precise Instructions - Wherley wants specific instructions about setting up a CAP over Washington, and Secret Service agents at the White House will work hard to get these for him. He will wait until senior agent Becky Ediger comes on the line and gives him the information he needs (see (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; 9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003; Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004; Spencer, 2008, pp. 218] Wherley will reportedly receive the instructions for his pilots “within a half-hour.” [Washington Post, 4/8/2002]

Entity Tags: US Secret Service, Kenneth Beauchamp, District of Columbia Air National Guard, David Wherley

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

The FAA’s Cleveland Center receives a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), incorrectly notifying it that Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 is a confirmed hijacking. A supervisor then rushes around the center, informing all the controllers and managers of this. [9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
Cleveland Realized Delta 1989 Not Hijacked - At around 9:30 a.m., Cleveland Center air traffic controllers heard the sounds from Flight 93 as it was being hijacked, but initially thought these came from Delta 1989 (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/13/2002] Due to the Delta pilots’ normal responses to subsequent radio transmissions, John Werth—the controller monitoring both flights—concluded that the hijacked aircraft was in fact Flight 93. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 pdf file; USA Today, 9/11/2008] However, at around 9:39, the FAA’s Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might be hijacked and called NEADS to report the plane as a possible hijacking (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28] NEADS then begins alerting FAA centers of this. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
NEADS Calls Cleveland Center - Greg Dukeman, the military operations specialist in the traffic management unit at Cleveland Center, receives a call from a female member of staff at NEADS, one of its ID technicians. He passes the call on to supervisor Kim Wernica. The caller says Delta 1989 is “a confirmed hijack.” Wernica then goes “running back and forth” around the center, informing controllers and managers of what she has been told. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
Controller Disputes NEADS's Information - Wernica rushes up to John Werth and tells him, “It’s the Delta, it’s the Delta!” She says a military liaison on the phone has confirmed that the Delta jet has been hijacked. Werth responds that he is pretty sure that Flight 93, not Delta 1989, has been hijacked. When Wernica returns a few moments later, Werth tells her that Delta 1989 is “fine—at least for now.” Wernica consults again on the phone and then comes back, saying, “They said it’s a confirmed hijack and a bomb threat.” Werth thinks to himself that the bomb threats had come from Flight 93 (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and is therefore convinced the caller must be confusing the two flights. He tells Wernica, “Tell them they’re full of it!” [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 pdf file; USA Today, 9/11/2008]

Entity Tags: John Werth, Kim Wernica, Greg Dukeman, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

United Airlines orders all its flights to land at the nearest airport. Andy Studdert, the airline’s chief operating officer, will tell the 9/11 Commission, “At approximately 9:45 I order the entire United fleet grounded, for the first time in United history.” He will add, “Even before this, some individual dispatchers were already grounding their flights.” [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004] Studdert gives the instruction, “Tell them to get to the nearest airport they can.” [USA Today, 8/13/2002] The FAA gives out a similar order to all its facilities around this time (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29] American Airlines ordered its aircraft to land earlier on, at around 9:15 (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 31] United Airlines has already ordered a ground stop, preventing any new takeoffs of its aircraft (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10]

Entity Tags: Andrew P. Studdert, United Airlines

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

According to the later-recovered Flight 93 cockpit voice recording, around this time one hijacker in the cockpit says to another, “Let the guys in now.” A hijacker says, “Should we let the guys in?” and another says, “Inform them, and tell him to talk to the pilot. Bring the pilot back.” It’s not clear if this is a reference to an original pilot or a hijacker pilot. According to one description of passenger Todd Beamer’s call from the plane, a flight attendant can be overheard in the background saying that two men lying on the floor in first class are the plane’s captain and co-pilot, indicating that they are already dead (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). But it is not possible to determine the fate of the two pilots from the cockpit voice recording, and investigators will be unsure as to whether they were killed or allowed to live. [Longman, 2002, pp. 199 and 208-209; Associated Press, 4/12/2006]

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Ann Gerhart.Ann Gerhart. [Source: Simon & Schuster]Ann Gerhart, a Washington Post reporter, is warned by a Capitol Police officer to stay away from a window of the Russell Senate Office Building in Washington, DC, because, the officer says, a suspicious plane is heading their way, and yet the first lady is allowed to remain in the building at this time and is only evacuated later on. [National Journal, 8/31/2002; Gerhart, 2004, pp. 163] Gerhart is in the Russell Senate Office Building, just north of the Capitol building, where she has been watching Laura Bush, the president’s wife, appearing before reporters and cameras alongside Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Judd Gregg (R-NH) (see 9:41 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Gerhart, 2004, pp. 160-163; Bush, 2010, pp. 199]
Officer Says, 'We're under Attack' - After Bush’s appearance has ended, Gerhart hurries to phone her newspaper and file the quotes. But, Gerhart will later recall, “As I moved closer to one of the building’s tall, beautiful leaded glass windows to get better cell phone reception, a Capitol Police officer practically tackled me.” The officer yells at her, “Get away from the window!” Gerhart asks, “Why?” and the officer replies: “Because we’re under attack! There’s still one plane up there and it’s headed right for us!” Gerhart then glances through the window and sees “huge clouds of thick smoke billowing up from the south.” She asks the officer what this is and is told, “A plane’s gone into the Pentagon.” [Gerhart, 2004, pp. 163-164]
First Lady Not Evacuated, despite Concerns - The Capitol building will be evacuated at 9:48 a.m., apparently because of the concern that a plane is heading toward it (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Associated Press, 8/21/2002; CNN, 9/11/2006] The Russell Senate Office Building will also be evacuated. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001] However, despite the fear that a plane is heading toward Capitol Hill, the first lady remains in the Russell Office Building at this time. She goes to Gregg’s office (see (9:45 a.m.-9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and will only be taken from the building to a “secure location” at 10:10 a.m. (see (10:10 a.m.-10:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [National Journal, 8/31/2002; Kessler, 2006, pp. 136; Bush, 2010, pp. 200]

Entity Tags: US Capitol Police, Laura Bush, Ann Gerhart

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

According to the accounts of numerous witnesses on the ground near the World Trade Center, military fighter jets are first noticed flying over Manhattan either shortly before or soon after the second collapse, at 10:28 a.m. Some witnesses recall fighters arriving just before this collapse:
bullet Emergency medical technicians Dulce McCorvey and Michael D’Angelo hear fighters flying over Manhattan at unspecified times after the first tower’s collapse. [City of New York, 10/3/2001; City of New York, 10/24/2001]
bullet Fire Lieutenant Sean O’Malley and firefighters Pete Giudetti and Dan Potter notice jet fighters flying overhead soon before the second collapse. [City of New York, 10/12/2001; City of New York, 12/6/2001; Smith, 2002, pp. 49-50]
Other witnesses say the fighters arrive soon after this collapse:
bullet Deputy Fire Chief Robert Browne, police officer Peter Moog, and emergency medical technicians Richard Zarrillo and Jason Katz notice fighters overhead immediately after, or fairly soon after, the second tower’s collapse. [City of New York, 10/24/2001; City of New York, 10/25/2001; City of New York, 12/20/2001; Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 79-80]
bullet Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, and Office of Emergency Management Director Richard Sheirer are heading north together after leaving their temporary command post on Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). In some accounts, all three of them recollect hearing the first military jets overhead soon after the second tower’s collapse. [Kerik, 2001, pp. 339-340; Giuliani, 2002, pp. 14; 9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 pdf file] However, according to another account, Giuliani hears the first jet slightly earlier, at around 10:20 a.m. And, in his private testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Kerik claims to have heard a fighter jet coming when he was heading to the temporary command post on Barclay Street, i.e. shortly before 9:50 a.m. [Barrett and Collins, 2006, pp. 348-349]
A few witnesses claim the fighters arrive earlier on, before the first collapse at 9:59 a.m.:
bullet Emergency medical technician Frank Puma and Port Authority Freedom of Information Administrator Cathy Pavelec say they see fighter jets overhead at unspecified times before the first collapse. [City of New York, 12/12/2001; Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 68]
The fighter(s) are presumably the F-15s launched from Otis Air Force Base at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will claim that these arrived over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), which is significantly earlier than most of the witnesses on the ground recall.

Entity Tags: Dulce McCorvey, Jason Katz, Frank Puma, Dan Potter, Sean O’Malley, Pete Giudetti, Peter Moog, Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Robert Browne, Richard Sheirer, Michael D’Angelo, Cathy Pavelec, Richard Zarrillo, Bernard Kerik

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

Mark Rosenker, the director of the White House Military Office, who is traveling with President Bush in Florida, is advised by the White House Situation Room not to bring the president back to Washington, DC. Air Force One’s flight plan currently has Washington as the destination of the president’s plane. [White House, 8/29/2002] And while he was being driven to Air Force One from the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Bush had been “itching to get back to Washington,” according to Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, who was with the president in his limousine. [White House, 8/12/2002] But as he was traveling in the president’s motorcade, shortly before it arrived at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, Rosenker learned that a secure phone call from the Situation Room was holding for him. After the motorcade reaches the airport (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001), therefore, Rosenker enters Air Force One and goes to an area at the back of the plane where he takes the call. The identity of the person in the Situation Room he speaks with is unstated. Rosenker will later recall that the person “indicated that it would be best if we did not come back to Washington, and that we should try to find some escort aircraft for us.” Rosenker then heads to the to the communications area of the plane and waits for takeoff, so he can then discuss these matters with the pilot, the president’s military aide, and Card. [White House, 8/29/2002] Air Force One will divert from its original course and head west at around 10:10 a.m. (see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and then at around 10:20 a.m., Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana will be chosen as its new destination (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 325]

Entity Tags: Mark Rosenker

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

According to a fireman’s account, firefighting efforts at the Pentagon are hampered by smoke and small explosions coming out of a construction trailer near the impact site. On the morning of 9/11, Russell “Rusty” Dodge, Jr., an assistant chief with the Fort Belvoir Fire Department, is at Fort Meyer, about a mile from the Pentagon, for a training exercise (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). He is one of the first to arrive on the scene. He tries to put out the fires, but a construction trailer is a serious obstacle. He will later recall, “[T]hat trailer was the main producer of smoke on the outside of the building….” The trailer “was producing some severe fires and subsequent mini explosions due to highly flammable chemicals in it…. Luckily the chemical containers were caged. Otherwise the fires would have been worse.” [MDW News Service, 10/4/2001]

Entity Tags: Russell “Rusty” Dodge, Jr., Pentagon, Fort Belvoir Fire Department

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

FAA National Operations Manager Ben Sliney.FAA National Operations Manager Ben Sliney. [Source: Publicity photo]Ben Sliney, FAA’s National Operations Manager, orders the entire nationwide air traffic system shut down. All flights at US airports are stopped. Around 3,950 flights are still in the air. Sliney makes the decision without consulting FAA head Jane Garvey, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, or other bosses, but they quickly approve his actions. It’s Sliney’s first day on the job. [CNN, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001; Washington Post, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001; Associated Press, 8/12/2002; USA Today, 8/13/2002; USA Today, 8/13/2002; USA Today, 8/13/2002; Associated Press, 8/21/2002; Newsday, 9/10/2002] Seventy-five percent of the planes land within one hour of the order. [USA Today, 8/12/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later remark that this “was an unprecedented order” that the “air traffic control system handled… with great skill.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29] The Washington Post has reported that Mineta told Monte Belger at the FAA: “Monte, bring all the planes down,” even adding, “[Expletive] pilot discretion.” [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] However, it is later reported by a different Post reporter that Mineta did not even know of the order until 15 minutes later. This reporter “says FAA officials had begged him to maintain the fiction.” [Slate, 4/2/2002]

Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, Federal Aviation Administration, Jane Garvey, Monte Belger, Norman Mineta

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Key Day of 9/11 Events

The White House Situation Room.The White House Situation Room. [Source: Chuck Kennedy / White House]Staffers in the White House Situation Room remain where they are despite being advised to evacuate and a list of their names is sent out, in case an aircraft should crash into the White House. At 9:33 a.m., a supervisor at Washington’s Reagan National Airport called the Secret Service Joint Operations Center at the White House to report that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House. The supervisor warned, “[I]f you’ve got people [at the White House], you’d better get them out of there” (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/14/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 9; McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011] Most personnel evacuated from the White House at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001]
Situation Room Personnel Decline the Advice to Leave - Meanwhile, Rob Hargis, the senior duty officer in the Situation Room, receives a call from a National Security Council official, who urges him and his colleagues to get out of the White House. Hargis turns to the others in the Situation Room and says: “We have been ordered to evacuate. If you want to go, go now.” However, everyone stays silent and no one gets up to leave. Hargis therefore tells the caller, “We’re staying.” He thinks the White House would be disconnected from the crisis if the Situation Room stopped operating at such a critical time. [McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011] According to Franklin Miller, a senior aide to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, at some point Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley gives the instruction to keep the Situation Room running and there is in fact never any question about its personnel leaving. [New York Times, 3/30/2004]
Counterterrorism Chief Allegedly Asks the Staffers to Evacuate - White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will later claim that, apparently around this time, he is concerned for the safety of those with him in the Situation Room, and so he huddles them together and asks them to leave. He tells them: “We will be the next target. It’s no shame to relocate. Some of you have kids too. Think about them.” But the staffers all decline his request. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 12] However, Miller will dispute whether Clarke makes this offer, calling his claim “a complete fiction” (see March 30, 2004). [New York Times, 3/30/2004]
List of the Staffers' Names Is Sent to the CIA - All the same, Miller is concerned for the safety of those in the Situation Room. “The White House could be hit; we could be going down,” he thinks. He therefore quietly compiles a list of the names of everyone in the room, he will recall, “so that when and if we died, someone would know who was in there.” The list is passed to Scott Heyer, a communications officer in the Situation Room, and Heyer e-mails it to the CIA operations center. [New York Times, 12/30/2001; McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011] For the rest of the day, about a dozen staffers will remain in the Situation Room, working frantically to keep information flowing to President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and key White House personnel. [Daily Telegraph, 9/10/2010; McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Richard A. Clarke, Franklin Miller, Scott Heyer, Rob Hargis, Stephen J. Hadley

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

The three pilots launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia start receiving confusing communications over their radios. Apparently, shortly after one of them first sees the Pentagon on fire (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the pilots’ radio frequencies become cluttered with orders and chatter. One of them will later describe: “It was like getting 10 hours of conversation in about 10 minutes. No one knew what was going on.” [New York Times, 11/15/2001] Journalist and author Jere Longman will refer to the pilots receiving a “jumble of radio communications.” [Longman, 2002, pp. 76] According to one of the pilots, Craig Borgstrom, he and the two others are on different frequencies but share a common intra-flight channel, and are “hearing a lot of chatter but nothing about airliners crashing into buildings.” He will later recall: “There was some confusion for us, this was very abnormal. We were all three on different frequencies… and were getting orders from a lot of different people.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 66]

Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Anita McBride.Anita McBride. [Source: American University]A large number of government employees gather at the office of DaimlerChrysler in Washington, DC, after being evacuated from the White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, and continue their operations there. [Automotive News, 10/8/2001; Politico, 9/9/2011] The White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next to it were evacuated at 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] After they left these buildings, many staffers went north to Lafayette Park, across from the White House, but were unsure what to do.
DaimlerChrysler Manager Wants Staffers to Come to His Building - Anita McBride, the acting director of White House personnel, calls her husband, Timothy McBride, who is vice president of Washington affairs for DaimlerChrysler and works at the company’s office a couple of blocks from the White House. “I knew he would know what to do even more than I,” Anita McBride will later comment, “and his immediate instinct was to bring everybody there” to the DaimlerChrysler building. Anita McBride tells her husband she is on the way to his office. She then gathers together the White House staffers who are around her and heads there. [Politico, 9/9/2011; National, 9/11/2011]
Equipment Set Up for Staffers to Use - Most of the DaimlerChrysler employees are leaving the building as the White House staffers are arriving. But before they go, they set up their computers, phones, televisions, and other resources for the White House staffers to use, and also order food for the staffers. Timothy McBride served as assistant to the president for management and administration during the administration of former President George H. W. Bush and, in that position, was responsible for many emergency procedures. “So I did have the benefit of being able to anticipate some of what the [White House] staff might need to carry on their functions,” he will comment.
Secret Service Secures the Building - After the first staffers arrive, other White House employees learn that their colleagues have assembled at the DaimlerChrysler building and go to join them. [National Journal, 8/31/2002] Soon, 72 members of the White House staff have made it to the building, the largest number of White House employees currently gathered in a single location. [Politico, 9/9/2011] They include speechwriters, photographers, and people from communications, the National Economic Council, Cabinet affairs, and legislative affairs. [National Journal, 8/31/2002] Members of the Secret Service lock down the building and ensure that only people with White House passes are able to gain access. Anita McBride calls the White House Situation Room and lets officials there know who is at the DaimlerChrysler building. Arrangements are then made for a few senior staffers to return to the White House (see (12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001).
White House Employees Continue Their Work - The staffers who remain at the DaimlerChrysler building quickly set up operations and continue their work. The building becomes “a White House annex,” Anita McBride will comment. [Politico, 9/9/2011; National, 9/11/2011] Some of the staffers discuss how the government can continue to function, and put together checklists of the things various federal departments and agencies should do. [Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 5] Speechwriters David Frum, John McConnell, Matthew Rees, and Matthew Scully work on a speech for President Bush to deliver from the Oval Office this evening. They are assisted by another speechwriter, Michael Gerson, who is at his home in Alexandria, Virginia, but is able to communicate with them by phone. [Frum, 2003, pp. 117, 120; PBS Frontline, 7/7/2004; Draper, 2007, pp. 140]
Officials Consider How Previous Crises Were Managed - Ken Mehlman, the White House political director, instructs Brad Blakeman, the deputy assistant to the president for appointments and scheduling, and Barry Jackson, the director of the Office of Strategic Initiatives, to go on the Internet and research what, if any, significance the date of September 11 has in the Muslim world. Mehlman also instructs Blakeman and Jackson to research how former Presidents Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan responded to crises during their presidencies. And he directs Logan Walters, the president’s personal aide, and Ashley Estes, the president’s personal secretary, to come up with a schedule based on how crises were managed during past presidencies. [Draper, 2007, pp. 140-141]
Staffers Stay at Building until Late Afternoon - Secret Service agents periodically brief the White House staffers on what is happening in Washington and elsewhere. The staffers will remain at the DaimlerChrysler building until about 5:30 p.m., after word is received that the president is heading back to Washington. The speechwriters will then go to the White House while the other staffers will go home. [National Journal, 8/31/2002; Politico, 9/9/2011]

Entity Tags: Michael Gerson, Barry Jackson, Timothy McBride, Anita McBride, Matthew Scully, Matthew Rees, US Secret Service, Ken Mehlman, Brad Blakeman, Logan Walters, DaimlerChrysler, Ashley Estes, David Frum, John McConnell

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

The plane that has been flying General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the Atlantic Ocean has to spend two hours in a “holding pattern” near Greenland and then more time in a holding pattern over Canada before it is cleared to fly back into the United States. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] Shelton was flying toward Europe for a NATO conference (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), but, after he learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center, ordered that his plane turn around and return to the US (see (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, air traffic controllers have denied the request to do so because US airspace has been shut down (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002, pp. G-1 pdf file; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-432]
Plane Has to Fly in a Holding Pattern near Greenland - Therefore, although Shelton’s plane, nicknamed “Speckled Trout,” does turn around, it doesn’t initially fly back to the United States. For a couple of hours, since its crew doesn’t have clearance to return to the US and it doesn’t have a destination, the plane goes into a “holding pattern” near Greenland. Captain Rob Pedersen, the flight navigator, comes up with a list of alternative landing sites, which include Thule Air Base in Greenland and Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland. Although the crew decides to head back to the US, Pedersen will later recall, it is still difficult to get a security clearance, even for such a high-profile passenger as Shelton.
Plane Goes into Another Holding Pattern over Canada - Speckled Trout eventually reaches Canada, but the plane is still refused entry into US airspace and so it goes into a holding pattern again. “In the beginning we had a few problems convincing [the air traffic controller] to allow us back into the country, [even though] we were ordered at a significantly high level to come back,” Pedersen will recall. “You can’t say over the radio who you are carrying because they don’t have secure communications at the FAA.… We had to tell them over an open line that we had a DV Code 2, which is a ranking that a lot of DVs [distinguished visitors] fall under.” Eventually, the crew receives permission to fly into the US, although the time when this occurs is unstated. “It took a little bit of time, and I’m sure there were a lot of phone calls made, before they let us back in,” Pedersen will say. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] Shelton, however, will contradict this account and claim his plane is cleared to enter US airspace significantly earlier. He will recall that those on the plane are told they have permission to enter US airspace 10 minutes after he talks on the phone with General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see (Shortly After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean they receive clearance possibly as early as around 10:15 a.m. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432-433]
Myers Takes Shelton's Place as Chairman While Shelton Is outside the US - After flying over New York, Speckled Trout will land at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, at 4:40 p.m. (see 4:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 pdf file; UNC-TV, 1/27/2013] While the plane is being denied permission to enter US airspace, Myers remains as the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Shelton’s place. This is “how the law reads whenever the chairman is out of the country,” Shelton will write. “Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be Dick’s to make, in conjunction with Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and the president.” [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432]

Entity Tags: Rob Pedersen, Henry Hugh Shelton

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s office, and acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers’ office, report to the NMCC teleconference that they are still trying to track down Rumsfeld and Myers, respectively, and bring them into the conference. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld is apparently outside the Pentagon looking at the Flight 77 crash site (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001), though counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke suggests Rumsfeld is elsewhere in the Pentagon for much of the time (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Myers’ whereabouts in the period after the Pentagon crash have not been fully explained (see (Between 9:55 a.m. and 10:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Rumsfeld and Myers do not enter the NMCC until about 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, National Military Command Center, Richard B. Myers

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon

A man who is on the 105th floor of the South Tower calls emergency 9-1-1 to report that floors below his location, “in the 90-something floor,” have collapsed. The 9-1-1 operator types a record of this call into the Special Police Radio Inquiry Network (SPRINT) data link, which will be passed on to the New York fire department’s Emergency Medical Service (EMS). It isn’t known when the call is made exactly, but the EMS Dispatch computer apparently receives the call record at this time. However, because it is classified as a “supplement message,” it is not yet read by anyone. The police dispatcher dealing with the area around the WTC also receives the call record, but misinterprets it as meaning that the floor the person is on has collapsed. EMS dispatchers are dealing with an enormous volume of calls as well as performing many other tasks under extreme pressure during the crisis, so a report later concludes that the EMS operators didn’t have the time to review the information before the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), and the fire chiefs never received the information. [New York City Fire Department, 8/19/2002]

Entity Tags: World Trade Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

On Flight 93, Jeremy Glick is still on the phone with his wife, Lyz. He tells her that the passengers are taking a vote if they should try to take over the plane or not. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] He later says that all the men on the plane have voted to attack the hijackers. [Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001] When asked about weapons, he says they don’t have guns, just knives. This appears to contradict an earlier mention of guns. His wife gets the impression from him that the hijacker standing nearby, claiming to hold the bomb, would be easy to overwhelm. [Longman, 2002, pp. 153-154]

Entity Tags: Jeremy Glick, Lyz Glick

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Passenger Phone Calls

Senator John Kerry looks up to the sky as he and others evacuate.Senator John Kerry looks up to the sky as he and others evacuate. [Source: CBC]The Capitol building in Washington, DC is evacuated. [Associated Press, 8/21/2002] It is the first time in US history this has ever happened. [Chicago Tribune, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001] Both the Senate and the House are in session at the time. [CNN, 8/17/2002] Capitol Police officers go through the building and order people to leave at once. [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/11/2002]
Reports of Plane Approaching the Capitol - The evacuation appears to be in response to reports of a plane heading toward the Capitol. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 8/17/2002; Bamford, 2004, pp. 80-81] According to CNN congressional correspondent Dana Bash, “the Capitol Police were hearing, in their radio, that there was a plane—another plane in the air, likely headed for the Capitol.” [CNN, 9/11/2006] When a Capitol Police officer instructs Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) to leave the building, he says: “We have word that an airplane is heading this way and could hit the building anytime. You need to evacuate.”
'Nothing Orderly' about Evacuation - However, there are problems with the evacuation. According to Daschle, “The fire alarm system, which was working in the nearby Senate office buildings, was never activated in the Capitol, so there were people who weren’t aware that an evacuation was taking place.” Also, some individuals are reluctant to leave. [Daschle and D'Orso, 2003, pp. 109-110] Rep. Bob Stump (R-AZ) will recall: “They tried to throw me out three times, but they didn’t succeed. I figured I was safer in the building than out on the street.” [Associated Press, 9/11/2001] Daschle will recall that there is “nothing orderly” about the evacuation. Outside the building “No one knew what to do or where to go. People congregated on the grass and in the parking lot. Senators and staff were mixed in with tourists, all staring up at the sky, wondering what might be headed our way.” [Daschle and D'Orso, 2003, pp. 110] CNN will report, “[S]ome of the most high ranking officials in the United States government were just kind of scattered around this area without a gathering point.” [CNN, 9/11/2006]
Sergeant at Arms Concerned over Poor Security - Al Lenhardt, the Senate’s sergeant at arms, will later say how alarmed he was “to see members of Congress and their staffs mixed in with visitors and passersby wandering in the open around the Capitol grounds. One of the tactics that terrorists have been known to employ is to create a diversion to move their intended target to the area where the actual attack will take place. Al imagined a bomb or gunfire erupting right there on the lawn outside the Capitol.” [Daschle and D'Orso, 2003, pp. 111] Eventually, many of the members of Congress go to the Capitol Police headquarters, which then serves as their command center for the day (see (9:55 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001 and (10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2002; Daschle and D'Orso, 2003, pp. 112]

Entity Tags: Al Lenhardt, Robert Lee Stump, US Capitol Police, Tom Daschle

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Marion Britton.Marion Britton. [Source: US Census Bureau]Flight 93 passenger Marion Britton calls her longtime friend Fred Fiumano at his auto repair shop in New York City, and talks to him for just under four minutes. According to the Chicago Tribune, she is using a cell phone. [Chicago Tribune, 9/30/2001; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006] Journalist and author Jere Longman writes that, because her own cell phone is not working, Britton is using a borrowed phone (i.e. a cell phone). She gives Fiumano the phone number belonging to another passenger and tells him to write it down. [Longman, 2002, pp. 162 and 166] However, during the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, the prosecution claims that Britton, who had been assigned a seat in row 12 of the plane, makes her call from a phone in row 33, presumably meaning a seatback phone rather than a cell phone. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 12 pdf file] Britton is crying. She tells Fiumano her plane has been hijacked and has made a U-turn. When he tells her that the World Trade Center is on fire, she replies, “I know, and we’re going to go down.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] Britton says, “They’re gonna kill us, you know, we’re gonna die.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Fiumano tries to reassure her, but she responds, “Two passengers have had their throats cut.” [New York Times, 4/13/2006] (In passenger Todd Beamer’s call from Flight 93 (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), a flight attendant is reportedly heard in the background saying that two men lying on the floor in first class, possibly dead, are the plane’s pilot and co-pilot. It is unclear if these are the two people that Britton refers to as having had their throats cut, and she’d simply mistaken them for passengers. [Longman, 2002, pp. 199] ) Fiumano hears a lot of yelling and screaming, and then the line goes dead. He tries calling Britton back but is unable to get through. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001]

Entity Tags: Marion Britton, Fred Fiumano

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Passenger Phone Calls

Doug Davis.Doug Davis. [Source: Federal Aviation Administration]John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center, suggests to Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters, that fighter jets should be launched in response to Flight 93. However, FAA headquarters is apparently unable to act on this suggestion. [Federal Aviation Administration, 10/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] In the last few minutes, the Command Center has warned headquarters that Flight 93 is “29 minutes out of Washington” and approaching the city (see 9:41 a.m.-9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 44]
Command Center Asks about Launching Fighters - Davis now tells White, “They’re pulling Jeff [Griffith, the FAA’s deputy director of air traffic] away to go talk about United 93.” White asks, “Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?” Davis replies, “Oh, God, I don’t know.” White says, “Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next 10 minutes.” However, Davis only responds, “Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 10/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29] This conversation takes place 13 minutes after the FAA’s Cleveland Center asked the Command Center whether anyone had asked the military to launch fighter jets to intercept Flight 93 (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40]
Person Who Could Request Fighters Is Unavailable - Apparently there is only one person at FAA headquarters who is authorized to request military assistance, and Ben Sliney, the Command Center’s national operations manager, is told that no one can find him. Sliney will later recount: “I said something like, ‘That’s incredible. There’s only one person. There must be someone designated or someone who will assume the responsibility of issuing an order, you know.’ We were becoming frustrated in our attempts to get some information. What was the military response?” [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] This lack of response to Flight 93 contrasts with the FAA’s earlier reaction to Flight 11, when Boston Center air traffic controllers contacted NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) themselves (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and even called military bases directly (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20]

Entity Tags: Ben Sliney, John White, Doug Davis, Federal Aviation Administration

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

A fighter and helicopter both fly directly above the Pentagon on 9/11 on the morning of 9/11. Exact time is unknown.A fighter and helicopter both fly directly above the Pentagon on 9/11 on the morning of 9/11. Exact time is unknown. [Source: Agence France-Presse]The three F-16s scrambled from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, at 9:30 a.m. finally reach Washington and the burning Pentagon. The 129 mile distance could theoretically have been covered by the fighters in six minutes, but they’ve taken a wide detour over the ocean (see 9:30 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). The exact time they arrive is unclear. An early timeline laid out to CNN by senior Defense Department officials will claim they arrive as early as 9:49 a.m., but the 9/11 Commission later claims they only establish “a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington” at “approximately 10:00 a.m.” [CBS News, 9/14/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 34]
Conflicting Press Accounts - Press accounts of when the first fighters reach Washington are highly contradictory. Early news accounts describe fighters arriving from Andrews Air Force Base, not Langley, “within minutes,” “a few moments,” or “just moments” after the Pentagon crash. [Denver Post, 9/11/2001; Daily Telegraph, 9/16/2001; ABC News, 9/11/2002] Other newspaper accounts inaccurately deny that fighters from Andrews are deployed [USA Today, 9/16/2001] , and some deny Andrews even has fighters available. [USA Today, 9/16/2001] Defense officials will initially claim, “There were no military planes in the skies over Washington until 15 to 20 minutes after the Pentagon was hit”—in other words, 9:53 a.m. to 9:58 a.m. [Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9/14/2001] But an ABC News report will suggest that by around 10:00 a.m., “Dozens of fighters are buzzing in the sky” over Washington. [ABC News, 9/11/2002]
Fighter Jets Don't Arrive until Later? - In contrast, the New York Times reports: “In the White House Situation Room and at the Pentagon, the response seemed agonizingly slow. One military official recalls hearing words to the effect of, ‘Where are the planes?’” The Pentagon will insist it had air cover over its own building by 10 a.m. However, numerous witnesses on the ground, including a reporter for the New York Times who is headed toward the building, will say they did not see any fighters until around 10:40 a.m., or “closer to 11” (see (10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 9/16/2001; Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 130-131] According to some accounts, the plane that flies over the Pentagon at that time is Major Billy Hutchison’s F-16, launched from Andrews Air Force Base. [Filson, 2003, pp. 81-82; Spencer, 2008, pp. 235-236] NORAD will initially claim the Langley fighters were about 105 miles from the Pentagon when it was hit at 9:37, and the 9/11 Commission will later claim they were 150 miles away (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27]

Entity Tags: Pentagon, North American Aerospace Defense Command, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Pentagon

General Ralph Eberhart.General Ralph Eberhart. [Source: NORAD]As the 9/11 Commission will later describe, the commander of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhart, now directs “all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] Being at “battle stations” means the pilots have to suit up into their flight gear and get into their planes, ready to start the engines and taxi out if a scramble order follows. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 27] Senior NORAD officials will subsequently give the order to launch available fighter jets across the nation (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 178, 180]
Clarke Requested Combat Air Patrols - A few minutes earlier, according to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, learned of an aircraft hitting the Pentagon and instructed his deputy: “Find out where the fighter planes are. I want combat air patrol over every major city in this country” (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Whether Clarke’s actions influenced Eberhart to issue his order is unknown. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 7-8]
Fighter Units Possibly Offered Help Much Earlier - The Toledo Blade will state that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) only begins calling bases across the US to request help “[b]y 10:01 a.m.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] But an article in Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine will indicate that NORAD and NEADS began receiving calls from various fighter units, asking, “What can we do to help?” right after the second World Trade Center tower was hit at 9:03, when it had become obvious the US was under attack (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002] It is therefore unclear why the instruction to put available fighters on battle stations—or to scramble them—was not issued significantly earlier.

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Richard A. Clarke, Ralph Eberhart, Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

NORAD fails to notify the Pentagon’s air threat conference call that its fighter jets have set up a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington, DC, until at least 50 minutes after the CAP has been established. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/9/2004] The National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon commenced an air threat conference call at 9:37 a.m. in response to the terrorist attacks (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). A NORAD representative has been on the conference from the outset. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37-38] However, an after-action report produced by the NMCC will state that NORAD is “unable to provide accurate updates on [the] CAP status in [the] air threat conference.” It takes “50 minutes from the time the CAP [is] established overhead DC for NORAD to report it in the conference.” [9/11 Commission, 6/9/2004]
Combat Air Patrol Is Established by 10:00 a.m. - F-16 fighters that were scrambled from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, at 9:24 a.m. (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001) reach Washington and set up a CAP over the city at 9:49 a.m., according to a timeline provided to CNN by “informed defense officials.” [CNN, 9/17/2001] The 9/11 Commission, however, will conclude that the F-16s establish the CAP at “approximately 10:00 a.m.” (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 34] This would mean that NORAD informs the air threat conference call that a CAP has been established over Washington at around 10:39 a.m. to 10:50 a.m., according to the NMCC’s after-action report.
Transcripts Suggest NORAD Reports the CAP at a Later Time - However, transcripts of the air threat conference call will indicate that NORAD reports that a CAP has been established over Washington even later than this, at 10:55 a.m. At about 10:08 a.m., the NORAD representative on the conference is asked if they can provide “information on fighter coverage over the Washington area.” The NORAD representative says, “We have no further information at this point.” At 10:40 a.m., the NORAD representative indicates that a CAP has not yet been established, but will be soon. They report: “We have confirmation currently of two fighters… currently inbound. Estimate time 10 minutes overhead at CAP point north of Langley [Air Force Base] for protection of the Washington, DC, area.”
NORAD Says the CAP Has Been Established at 10:55 a.m. - But 13 minutes later, at 10:53 a.m., the NORAD representative says there is still no CAP over Washington. They report, “We have two F-16s scrambling out of Andrews Air Force Base,” just outside Washington (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001), but add that there is “no airborne CAP at this time.” Two minutes later, the NORAD representative indicates that a CAP has at last been set up over Washington. “We have a report of two fighters airborne over DC,” they say. At around 11:05 a.m., the NORAD representative will be asked to confirm “that two F-16s are still on CAP in the vicinity of Washington” and they will reply, “That is affirmative.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 pdf file; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001]

Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Candy Crowley.Candy Crowley. [Source: CNN]After the Capitol building in Washington is evacuated (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001), those located around it—including members of Congress—experience serious problems communicating by phone and other means. CNN senior political correspondent Candy Crowley will describe: “Nobody knew anything.… Nobody had any way to communicate.… The cell phones went down. Eventually… the personal BlackBerrys that bring your e-mail to you, they went down. And inside the Capitol, remember [there are] still switchboard operators there. Inside the Capitol, the phones worked only on and off.” According to Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), there is “no communication whatsoever going on.” [CNN, 9/11/2002] Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) will recall: “People were punching their cell phones to no avail. The lines were jammed.” [Daschle and D'Orso, 2003, pp. 110] Consequently, for more than an hour Daschle’s own staff is unable to establish where he is. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) was experiencing communications problems even before he was evacuated from the Capitol, while trying to contact Vice President Dick Cheney by phone (see (9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Hastert, 2004, pp. 6; Hayes, 2007, pp. 336] Whether others at the Capitol also experienced similar difficulties prior to the evacuation is unclear. What causes these problems is uncertain. However, numerous other people in the Washington area, including senior government officials, also experience serious communications problems throughout the day (see (After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Tom Daschle, Dennis Hastert

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

About ten minutes prior to its collapse, a New York Police Department (NYPD) helicopter unit reports over the Special Operations Division radio channel that “large pieces” are falling from the South Tower. While police hear this transmission, the fire department does not, and there is no police representative at the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) command post to pass the information on. [Fire Engineering, 9/2002; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 95] None of the NYPD helicopter pilots predict the South Tower collapse in advance. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 304]

Entity Tags: New York City Police Department, World Trade Center, New York City Fire Department

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

By 9:50 a.m., CIA Director George Tenet is in his office on the seventh floor of the agency’s Langley headquarters. He later describes: “[E]veryone was wondering, what next? Reports came in of several airplanes that were not responding to communications from the ground and perhaps heading toward Washington. Several [Counterterrorist Center] officers reminded us that al-Qaeda members had once discussed flying an airplane into CIA headquarters, the top floor of which we were presently occupying.” Tenet himself later recalls that, in the minutes after he’d learned of the first attack, he’d “thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters” (see (8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Woodward, 2002, pp. 7-8; Tenet, 2007, pp. 162 and 164] According to CIA contractor Billy Waugh, people at the headquarters are aware that Flight 93 is currently unaccounted for, and it is “a widespread assumption within the building that this flight [is] headed straight for us in the CIA headquarters” (see (Before 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Waugh and Keown, 2004, pp. 293-294] Tenet asks Mike Hohlfelder, the chief of his security detail, for his recommendation, and is advised, “Let’s evacuate.” Though he later claims he was “reluctant” about this, Tenet tells his senior leadership: “We have to save our people. We have to evacuate the building.” Therefore, at about 10 a.m., the word goes out for a large number of the CIA’s thousands of employees to go home. Initially, the senior leadership team moves from Tenet’s seventh-floor conference room to another room on the first floor, but it then exits the headquarters building and heads across the campus to the CIA’s printing plant, where a crude operational capability has been set up. However, due to the objections of CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black, those in the Counterterrorist Center and the Global Response Center are allowed to stay in place in the headquarters (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Tenet and his staff will leave the printing plant and return to the headquarters at around 1 p.m., by which time they will consider the danger to be over. [Woodward, 2002, pp. 8-9; Tenet, 2007, pp. 164-165 and 168] The CIA headquarters evacuation is aided by the fact that a fire had occurred there just over a month earlier. Consequently, new evacuation procedures had been laid out, which Tenet follows on this day (see August 7-September 10, 2001). [Kessler, 2003, pp. 222-223]

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Hohlfelder, Billy Waugh

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Judd Gregg.Judd Gregg. [Source: US Congress]Laura Bush, the president’s wife, and her entourage stay in the office of Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) as they wait for the Secret Service emergency response team to arrive and take them away from Capitol Hill. Bush and those with her in the Russell Senate Office Building headed to Gregg’s office after they learned of the attack on the Pentagon and Bush’s Secret Service agents told them to go to the basement (see (9:45 a.m.-9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Gregg’s office is on a lower floor of the building, though whether it is in the basement is unclear.)
First Lady Unable to Contact Daughters - From Gregg’s office, Bush tries calling her daughters, Barbara and Jenna, who are both at university. [Bush, 2010, pp. 200] She is unable to reach them at this time. According to journalist and author Christopher Andersen, she is told that “they had both already been hustled off to what the Secret Service called ‘secure locations.’” [Newsweek, 12/3/2001; Andersen, 2002, pp. 6]
First Lady and Senator Talk about Families - The first lady then sits with Gregg, who is a longtime Bush family friend, and, she will later recall, they talk “quietly about our families and our worries for them, and the overwhelming shock we both felt.” [New York Times, 10/4/2004; Bush, 2010, pp. 200] Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who is also in Gregg’s office at this time, will recall, “We kept the television set off and simply talked for a while.” [Kennedy, 2009, pp. 492]
Reporters Cannot Travel with First Lady - Noelia Rodriguez, the first lady’s press secretary, is worried about the pool reporters who are with them. She will describe, “We put them all in a room,” but Bush’s Secret Service agents tell her, “We have to leave here and we can’t take [the pool reporters] with us.” Laurence McQuillan, of USA Today, reassures Rodriguez, telling her, “Don’t worry about us.” [National Journal, 8/31/2002] Bush remains in Gregg’s office until members of the Secret Service, including the emergency response team, collect her from there (see (Shortly After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Bush, 2010, pp. 200] She and her staff leave the Russell Senate Office Building at around 10:10 a.m., and are then driven to a “secure location” (see (10:10 a.m.-10:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [National Journal, 8/31/2002]

Entity Tags: Jenna Bush, Barbara Pierce Bush, Noelia Rodriguez, US Secret Service, Larry McQuillan, Laura Bush, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Judd Gregg

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After spending about 40 minutes at the disaster scene, on the World Trade Center site, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani relocates to a small office building at 75 Barclay Street, about two blocks from the WTC, hoping to establish a command post there. His usual command center, in WTC 7, was evacuated at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). With him are several colleagues, including Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik and Office of Emergency Management Director Richard Sheirer. [Kerik, 2001, pp. 334; Giuliani, 2002, pp. 10; 9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 5/19/2004; Barrett and Collins, 2006, pp. 10] While at Barclay Street, Giuliani is able to get in touch with the White House, and speaks to Chris Henick, the deputy political director to President Bush (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Immediately afterwards, he receives a phone call from Vice President Cheney, though this is cut off before either one is able to speak. Giuliani also claims he is given advance warning of the South Tower’s collapse while at this command post (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After the South Tower collapses outside, Giuliani and his colleagues all decide to evacuate, going through the basement into a neighboring building, 100 Church Street. They will then leave this and head north, being joined by cameras and press. [Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 112; 9/11 Commission, 5/19/2004; Barrett and Collins, 2006, pp. 348]

Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, Richard Sheirer

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

In the battle cab at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Colonel Robert Marr instructs his troops to contact every Air National Guard unit in the Northeast US and tell them to get their fighter jets airborne. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 180] NEADS has already launched the four fighters in the Northeast US that are kept on alert, ready to take off at a moment’s notice: Two F-15s were scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and two F-16s were scrambled from Langley Air Force Base at 9:24 (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17, 20, 27]
NEADS Calls Air National Guard Units - Marr now realizes these four jets are not enough, and tells his troops: “The nation is under attack. Get ‘em in the air!” Officers in the NEADS battle cab and on its operations floor begin calling Air National Guard units, one after another. The NEADS officers are surprised to find that wing commanders have been anticipating their call for help, and have already started arming fighter jets. According to author Lynn Spencer: “Although wing commanders do not necessarily have the authority to arm their planes with live missiles, nor Marr the authority to call them into action, these are not ordinary times. Marr can’t help but think that the incredible response is due to the fact that the Guard units are Title 32, or state-owned. They report to the governors of their respective states, and the wing commanders have every confidence that their governors will support them.” [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 pdf file; Spencer, 2008, pp. 180]
Time of Order Unclear - Exactly when Marr instructs his officers to contact the Air National Guard units is unclear. It appears to be at around 9:50 a.m., or some time shortly after. At the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, CONR commander Major General Larry Arnold began contacting all three CONR sectors (which includes NEADS) at around 9:45 a.m., after learning the Pentagon had been hit and realizing the attacks were no longer isolated to New York. His instruction to the sectors was, “Generate, generate, generate!” meaning, “Get as many fighters as you can into the sky now!” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 177-178] General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, directed “all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed,” at 9:49 a.m. (see 9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] But “battle stations” means only that pilots get into their aircraft with the engines turned off, so they are ready to launch if a scramble order follows. [Filson, 2003, pp. 55; Spencer, 2008, pp. 27] The Toledo Blade will report, “By 10:01 a.m., [NEADS] began calling several bases across the country for help.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] According to the Newhouse News Service, though, Marr apparently gave his order significantly earlier. It will report that, when the South Tower was hit at 9:03, NEADS personnel “looked to Col. Robert Marr, who rallied the operation: Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack” (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Newhouse News Service, 1/25/2002] Air National Guard jets will reportedly take off from Toledo Express Airport in Ohio at 10:17 a.m., in response to NEADS’s call for help, and, according to Spencer, NEADS instructs Otis Air Base to launch all its available aircraft at around 10:20 a.m. (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 244-245]

Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Air National Guard

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Three F-16 fighter jets that are on their way back from a training mission over North Carolina finally make contact with their supervisor of flying (SOF) and are instructed to return to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland as quickly as possible. [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; Spencer, 2008, pp. 216-217] The jets belong to the 121st Fighter Squadron, part of the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews AFB, 10 miles from Washington, DC. [District of Columbia Air National Guard, 7/24/2001; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; GlobalSecurity (.org), 8/21/2005; GlobalSecurity (.org), 1/21/2006] They left Andrews at 8:36 for a routine training mission on a range about 200 miles away from there, in North Carolina (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; 9/11 Commission, 2/27/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 pdf file]
Supervisor Wants Jets Back Immediately - Major Daniel Caine, who is the SOF with their unit, had been concerned about the three F-16s since the time of the second crash in New York. He’d felt certain that airspace restrictions would be implemented around Washington, and realized he needed to get the jets back to base right away before the Washington airspace was closed. Because the jets were outside his radio range, he called a refueling plane they were scheduled to meet, and asked its pilot to tell them to return to Andrews. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 122-124]
Pilots Told to Return as Fast as Possible - Having met with the refueling plane (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the lead pilot of the F-16s, Major Billy Hutchison, is now about half way back from the training mission and finally in radio range of Andrews, so he calls the SOF there. [Filson, 2003, pp. 79; Spencer, 2008, pp. 216-217] By this time, Caine has left his post, as he intends to take off in a jet himself (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson has replaced him as SOF. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 184] Thompson says to Hutchison: “[W]e need you here now! You need to return to base ‘buster’!” The code word “buster” means Hutchison is to push his thrust lever into afterburner and fly as fast as his plane will go. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 217] Thompson does not tell Hutchison anything about the terrorist attacks. Hutchison’s only awareness of the morning’s crisis is what little he’d been told by the pilot of the refueling plane. [9/11 Commission, 2/27/2004] But he has never heard the code word “buster” used before, and realizes something very bad is going on. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 217]
Hutchison Sees Burning Pentagon - Hutchison will later recall: “So we light afterburners and we are coming back at Mach as quick as we can get back.… As I get back, I cross the Potomac River on the south end of Maryland and Virginia, and I see a big column of smoke. It was so clear and there was no haze in the air.” He again talks over the radio with Thompson. Hutchison says: “It looks like there’s been an explosion near [Washington’s Reagan] National Airport. What’s going on?’” Thompson replies: “We know. Just keep coming.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 79] The first of the three F-16s returning from the training mission will land back at Andrews AFB at 10:14 a.m. (see 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). The other two land at 10:36 a.m., but Hutchison will be instructed to take off again immediately (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004]

Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Billy Hutchison, Phil Thompson

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, asks Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to confirm which airplane has hit the Pentagon, but is frustrated when Mineta cannot provide a definite answer. Carty, who is at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Texas, and Mineta, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, are participating in a phone conference call (see (Between 9:22 a.m. and 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Carty asks Mineta what type of plane hit the Pentagon, to see if it belongs to American Airlines. Receiving no firm answer, he exclaims: “For God’s sake, it’s in the Pentagon. Can’t somebody go look at it and see whose plane it is?” Mineta replies: “They have. You can’t tell.” [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 186] American Airlines will not learn until later on that the plane that hit the Pentagon was its Flight 77. [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004] At around 11:18 a.m., it will issue a statement in which it mentions Flight 77 (see (11:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but this statement will only say that Flight 77 is one of two planes the airline has “lost” in “tragic incidents this morning.” [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001]

Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Don Carty, American Airlines

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

United Airlines dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends messages to the flights he is responsible for, telling them to land, and is also informed that Flight 93 is possibly hijacked. At 9:50, Ballinger sends a text message to Flight 93 and United’s other transcontinental flights, instructing them to “land ASP at nearest UAL airport—ORD terrorist.” (“ASP” is presumably short for “as soon as possible”; what “ORD” stands for is unreported.) The message also warns to beware of cockpit intrusion, stating, “No one in to cockpit—Land asp.” Over the next minute, Ballinger sends two more text messages to his flights, advising them to land as soon as possible. He still receives no response from Flight 93. United Airlines ordered that all its aircraft be grounded about five minutes earlier (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 44] However, Ballinger will later say that United dispatchers are told by their superiors, “Don’t tell the pilots why we want them to land.” [Chicago Daily Herald, 4/14/2004] Also around this time, Rich Miles, the manager at United’s System Operations Control center, informs Ballinger about a call recently received by United’s maintenance facility in San Francisco, from an attendant on Flight 93, who reported that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 43]

Entity Tags: Rich Miles, Ed Ballinger

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

An F/A-18A Hornet belonging to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321.An F/A-18A Hornet belonging to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321. [Source: Robert Carlson / Naval Aviation News]A US Marine with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 (VMFA-321) calls a friend of his at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to ask what his unit can do to assist the military response to the attacks. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 188]
Former Marine Heads to NEADS - Trey Murphy is a former Marine who now works as a weapons controller at NEADS. He learned of the first crash in New York while still at home. After seeing the second crash on television, he realized it was a coordinated attack and hurried to work. When he arrived on the NEADS operations floor at around 9:45, the head of the weapons team, Major James Fox, informed him that fighter jets were coming up from Selfridge and Toledo; both sets of jets had been told to contact NEADS and would require instructions. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 179-180]
Marine Calls Murphy - After Murphy reportedly checks in the F-16 pilots from Selfridge Air National Guard Base and gives them orders (see (9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), his cell phone rings. On the other end is a friend of his from VMFA-321, a Marine Corps Reserve squadron at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland that flies the sophisticated F/A-18 Hornet fighter jet. Murphy’s friend says: “Dude, get us in the war. I’ve got wrench-turners on our planes uploading weapons.” He then asks, “What can we do?” Normally, Murphy would not issue orders to the Marine squadron. As author Lynn Spencer will explain, VMFA-321 trains “to deploy overseas and they respond only to the US Joint Forces Command, commonly known as JiffyCom, and based in Norfolk, Virginia.” However, with the day’s unprecedented circumstances, Murphy instructs, “Convince your higher-ups at JiffyCom to get you transferred over to us!” Minutes later, Murphy is called by a general from VMFA-321. By this time, his attention is devoted to dealing with the possibly hijacked aircraft, Delta 1989. But before hanging up, he exclaims: “General! Can’t talk! But we could use your airplanes.” [DC Military (.com), 6/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 188]

Entity Tags: Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Trey Murphy

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center outside Chicago, tries to initiate the “lockout” procedure for Flight 93, which would acknowledge an emergency on the flight and safeguard information about it, but he is unable to do so. At some time between 9:45 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco contacted Miles about a call it had just received from an attendant on Flight 93, reporting that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). In response, Miles attempts to initiate a lockout of Flight 93. Lockout is a standard procedure for airlines in safety and security incidents, which isolates information about a flight so the case can be managed by the airline’s top leadership, and protects the identities of the passengers and crew. But Miles is unable activate this procedure. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is because United Airlines has already conducted a lockout of Flight 175 (see (9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and its computer system is not presently set up to deal simultaneously with two such procedures. [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 12-13 and 43]

Entity Tags: United Airlines, Rich Miles

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Andy Studdert, United Airlines’ chief operating officer, tries to devise a plan on how a non-pilot could land a Boeing 757, in case the passengers and crew on Flight 93 are able to retake control of their plane from its hijackers. [Center for Values-Driven Leadership, 4/23/2012] At around 9:35 a.m., a flight attendant, later determined to be Sandy Bradshaw, called the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco, California, from Flight 93 and reported that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40; United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, Defendant., 4/11/2006 pdf file] Sometime between 9:45 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., the maintenance office called Rich Miles, a manager working in the crisis center at United Airlines’ headquarters, near Chicago, and told him about Bradshaw’s call. Miles immediately passed on the information to others in the crisis center. [9/11 Commission, 11/21/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 43]
Manager and Pilots Discuss How Flight 93 Might Be Landed - The information about Bradshaw’s call apparently prompts Studdert to start developing a plan on how Flight 93 might be landed if its passengers and crew are able to regain control of the aircraft from the hijackers. After he learns about the call, he will later describe, “My mind immediately said, ‘Okay, so if they’re successful, I gotta land them.’” He therefore thinks, “I gotta get some guys working on a protocol on how a non-pilot can land a 757.” He grabs a couple of the airline’s chief pilots who are in the crisis center with him and says to them: “Guys, we may get this plane back. Which one of the flight attendants do you wanna have land this thing?” Studdert will recall that he and the chief pilots then work “on a protocol, which would work as a, what’s called a Cat III [category three] airplane, which means it could land itself if pointed to the right airport.” However, a few minutes later, Studdert and the chief pilots find out that Flight 93 has crashed and so have to abandon their plan. [Center for Values-Driven Leadership, 4/23/2012] (Flight 93 reportedly crashes at 10:03 a.m. (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and by 10:15 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission, personnel at United Airlines’ headquarters have “confirmed that an aircraft had crashed” in Pennsylvania and “believed that this was Flight 93.” Studdert is therefore presumably alerted to the crash shortly after it occurs. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 46-47] )
Manager Claims His Airline Was Told about the Plan to Take Back Flight 93 - According to Studdert, Bradshaw told the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco that “the crew [of Flight 93] had been killed and that the passengers and the… remaining crew were gonna try to take the flight back.” This is presumably why he works on a plan for how a non-pilot might land the plane. [Center for Values-Driven Leadership, 4/23/2012] However, the two employees Bradshaw talked to at the maintenance office will apparently contradict Studdert’s account. They will tell investigators that Bradshaw said her plane had been hijacked and stated where on the plane the hijackers were, that the hijackers had said they had a bomb, had carried knives, and had attacked and killed a flight attendant. The two employees will make no mention, though, of Bradshaw saying the passengers and crew were going to try and retake control of the plane. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 11/21/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40] A few calls are made from Flight 93 in which the caller mentions the plan to try and retake control of the plane (see (9:47 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 9:50 a.m. September 11, 2001, 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001, Shortly Before 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001, and (Between 9:58 a.m. and 10:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, these are made to the callers’ relatives and a supervisor for GTE Airfone, so Studdert is presumably unaware of them at present. [Longman, 2002, pp. 118, 153-154, 172, 176, 203; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 42, 44-45]

Entity Tags: Andrew P. Studdert

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Sandra Bradshaw.
Sandra Bradshaw. [Source: Family photo]Sandy Bradshaw calls her husband from Flight 93. She says, “Have you heard what’s going on? My flight has been hijacked. My flight has been hijacked with three guys with knives.” [Boston Globe, 11/23/2001] She tells him that some passengers are in the rear galley filling pitchers with hot water to use against the hijackers. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001]

Entity Tags: Sandy Bradshaw

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Passenger Phone Calls

Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers wants clear rules of engagement for military fighter pilots, according to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke. In his book Against All Enemies, Clarke will describe hearing that the president has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft some time between about 9:45 and 9:56 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). From the White House Situation Room, where he is located, he then gets the attention of those on the video conference screen for the Pentagon, and informs them of this decision. Myers asks, “Okay, shoot down aircraft, but what are the ROE [rules of engagement]?” As Clarke will comment, “It was one thing to say it’s okay to shoot down a hijacked aircraft threatening to kill people on the ground, but we needed to give pilots more specific guidelines than that.” Clarke asks his colleague Franklin Miller and Marine Colonel Tom Greenwood—a member of Miller’s staff—to ensure that the Defense Department has “an answer to that question quickly.” He tells them, “I don’t want them delaying while they lawyer that to death.” Clarke recalls that he is then informed: “CNN says car bomb at the State Department. Fire on the Mall near the Capitol.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8-9] It is therefore unclear exactly what time he is describing, as CNN first makes the incorrect report of the State Department car bomb at 10:33, but it reports the fire on the Mall at 9:45. [CNN, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2001; Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that he works on fashioning the rules of engagement for fighter pilots, in collaboration with Myers, after he enters the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) at around 10:30 (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] Yet he does not complete and issue these rules until 1:00 p.m. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7; Myers, 2009, pp. 157-158]

Entity Tags: Tom Greenwood, Richard B. Myers, Franklin Miller, Richard A. Clarke

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL), who is third in line for the presidency, is evacuated from the US Capitol building and flown to a secret underground bunker in Virginia, where he remains until late in the afternoon. [ABC News, 9/11/2001; ABC News, 9/15/2002] Around 9:48, the Capitol building had begun evacuating (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). At that time, Hastert was on the House floor. Two members of his security detail now enter the chamber and tell him, “We’re going to evacuate the Capitol, and you’re going to a secure location.” They take him out of the building and drive him hurriedly to Andrews Air Force Base, ten miles southeast of Washington. After he arrives there, Hastert is finally able to communicate with Vice President Dick Cheney, who is at the White House. (Hastert had been trying to contact Cheney earlier on, but without success (see (9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001.) Cheney tells Hastert: “There’s a real danger. I want you to go to a secure location.” [Hastert, 2004, pp. 8-9] Hastert gets on a helicopter and is flown to the secret underground bunker at Mount Weather in Bluemont, Virginia, 48 miles outside Washington—about 20 minutes journey by air. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001; ABC News, 9/15/2002; Bamford, 2004, pp. 81] In the following hours, other top members of the House and Senate leaderships will join him there (see (Between Late Morning and Early Afternoon) September 11, 2001). [ABC News, 9/11/2001; Hastert, 2004, pp. 10] Hastert remains at the secure facility for several hours, and will return to Washington late in the afternoon (see (Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Daily Herald (Arlington Heights), 9/11/2002] Hastert’s evacuation to Mount Weather is the result of “Continuity of Government” (COG) orders, which provide for evacuating the third and fourth in the line of presidential succession during a national emergency, in order to protect the nation’s constitutional leadership. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke activated the COG plan shortly before 10:00 a.m. this morning (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8]

Entity Tags: Mount Weather, Dennis Hastert, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney

Leo Mullin.Leo Mullin. [Source: Publicity photo]Leo Mullin, the CEO of Delta Air Lines, calls FAA Administrator Jane Garvey at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, and reports that four Delta aircraft are missing. Mullin, who is at his company’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, tells Garvey: “We can’t find four of our planes. Four of our transponders are off.” [USA Today, 8/13/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 186] The identities of these aircraft are unstated. Whether they include Delta Flight 1989, which FAA air traffic controllers have mistakenly reported as being a possible hijacking (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), is unclear. At 9:27 a.m., the FAA’s Boston Center reported that this plane was missing (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] But, according to the 9/11 Commission, Delta 1989 “never turned off its transponder.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28] USA Today will report that, after “early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard, Delta CEO Leo Mullin, 58, had nervously tracked [Delta 1989] from the company’s headquarters in Atlanta. Every five minutes, a new report came in. None seemed clear.” [USA Today, 8/13/2002]

Entity Tags: Leo Mullin, Jane Garvey, Delta Airlines

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Michael White.Michael White. [Source: Publicity photo]Cleveland Hopkins Airport and numerous buildings in the city of Cleveland are evacuated, following the decision to land Delta Air Lines Flight 1989—which is wrongly thought to be hijacked and with a bomb on board—at the Cleveland airport. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; WKYC, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 191-192]
Airport Concerned about Delta 1989 - Delta Air Lines was concerned about Flight 1989, and instructed it to land as soon as possible in Cleveland (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 167; USA Today, 9/11/2008] FAA and military personnel have mistakenly suspected that this aircraft has been hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001, and (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and their concerns have reached personnel at Cleveland Airport. Fred Szabo, the airport commissioner, will later recall: “There was an indication that this might be a terrorist plane. We didn’t know if there were bombs on board, or if it was a hijacked plane.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 167-168]
Airport Evacuated as Plane Approaches - As Delta 1989 heads in to land, air traffic controllers instruct it to follow a long path that initially takes it far past the airport. According to author Lynn Spencer, the “controllers are giving themselves time to evacuate the airport since [Delta 1989] has been confirmed hijacked and since they believe it contains a bomb intended to detonate when the aircraft crashes into the terminal.” Even FAA personnel at the airport evacuate their building and make their way to a huge NASA hangar next door. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 191-192] After Delta 1989 lands, police block off all entrances to the airport terminal, and bomb-sniffing dogs are brought to baggage pickup areas. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001]
City Buildings Evacuated - Furthermore, for the first time in his administration, Cleveland Mayor Michael White orders the evacuation of all federal and city buildings. [WCPN, 9/20/2001] Schools are closed and a parking ban is issued downtown. [WCPN, 9/12/2001] White also asks owners of large commercial high-rises to evacuate. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001] These evacuation efforts presumably benefit from the fact that Cleveland is one of six major Ohio cities that has, for a number of years, been part of a federal program to help defend against domestic terrorism. [WCPN, 9/20/2001]
NASA Facility Evacuated - Even the 3,500 employees at the NASA Glenn Research Center, which is located adjacent to the Cleveland airport, are ordered to evacuate their facility. Directors there had in fact met and decided to evacuate the center after seeing the television coverage of the second attack on the World Trade Center. It takes about an hour and a half to get everyone out of the building. [Cleveland Free Times, 9/6/2006]

Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Fred Szabo, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Michael R. White

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Molten metal pouring out of the side of the World Trade Center.Molten metal pouring out of the side of the World Trade Center. [Source: Cameraplanet]Video footage later reveals that in the minutes immediately before the collapse of the WTC’s South Tower, a stream of molten metal starts pouring out of a window opening around the northeast corner of its 80th floor. FEMA later suggests that this is “possibly aluminum from the airliner,” and comments, “This is of particular interest because, although the building collapse appears to have initiated at this floor level, the initiation seems to have occurred at the southeast rather than the northeast corner.” [Civil Engineering, 5/2002; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5/1/2002, pp. 2-34; Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 207] According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “The composition of the flowing material can only be the subject of speculation, but its behavior suggests it could have been molten aluminum.” [Pitts, Butler, and Junker, 9/2005, pp. 375] However physics professor Steven E. Jones will in 2006 dispute this, saying that molten aluminum is silvery and never turns yellow, like what is in the video footage. He will instead claim the presence of this molten metal supports the theory that explosives, specifically thermite, are what caused the Twin Towers to collapse. He says thermite can cause steel to melt and become yellowish. [Deseret Morning News, 4/10/2006]

Entity Tags: World Trade Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

A television broadcast falsely describes smoke coming from Washington Mall instead of its true source, the Pentagon.A television broadcast falsely describes smoke coming from Washington Mall instead of its true source, the Pentagon. [Source: CNN]There are numerous false reports of additional terror attacks. Before 10:00 a.m., some hear reports on television of a fire at the State Department. At 10:20 a.m., and apparently again at 10:33 a.m., it is publicly reported this was caused by a car bomb. [Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002] At 10:23 a.m., the Associated Press reports, “A car bomb explodes outside the State Department, senior law enforcement officials say.” [Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke hears these reports at this time and asks Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in the State Department to see if the building he’s in has been hit. Armitage goes outside the building, finds out there’s no bomb, and calls his colleagues to inform them that the reports are false. Reports of a fire on the Capitol Mall also appear and are quickly found to be false. [ABC News, 9/15/2002; Clarke, 2004, pp. 8-9] There are numerous other false reports over the next hour, including explosions at the Capitol building and USA Today headquarters. [Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/2002] For instance, CNN reports an explosion on Capitol Hill at 10:12 a.m. CNN then announces this is untrue 12 minutes later. [Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/2001]

Entity Tags: Richard Armitage, Richard A. Clarke, US Department of State

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke

Controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center.Controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center. [Source: FAA]The three F-16 fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) that have been directed toward Washington request and are given permission to fly at high altitude over the city. After the Langley AFB pilots are given the correct coordinates they are to head to (see (Between 9:41 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001), at 9:51 lead pilot Major Dean Eckmann looks on his radar screen and sees that the area where he has been directed to set up a combat air patrol is filled with air traffic. He therefore contacts the FAA’s Washington Center and tells the controller, “I need 3,000 feet of altitude in a 20-mile ring around DC.” When the controller asks the reason, Eckmann replies, “Higher headquarters’ request!” The controller gives him an altitude range of 25,000 to 27,000 feet. Eckmann radios the other two Langley pilots and gives them their altitude assignments: he’ll fly at 25,000 feet, Major Brad Derrig will be at 26,000 feet, and Captain Craig Borgstrom at 27,000 feet. According to author Lynn Spencer, the jets then head toward Washington at 700 miles per hour, just under the speed of sound. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 180-182] However, Spencer’s account of this incident conflicts with the 1st Air Force’s book about the 9/11 attacks. According to that account, several minutes before Eckmann reportedly asks for altitude clearance—at around 9:45 a.m.—he had been directed to drop to lower altitude to check out two unidentified aircraft, and was then told to inspect the Pentagon (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 66]

Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, Brad Derrig

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

Lynne Cheney.Lynne Cheney. [Source: David Bohrer / White House]Lynne Cheney, the wife of Vice President Dick Cheney, enters the White House, but the Secret Service agent who accompanies her is initially confused about where he should take her. [White House, 11/14/2001; United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40] Cheney has been driven to the White House by her Secret Service agents after they evacuated her from a hair salon in Washington, DC (see (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Cheney and her agents are met at the White House by a senior Secret Service agent—an assistant special agent in charge—who then accompanies Cheney through the building. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] Cheney and the agent run into I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the vice president’s chief of staff, who is on his way to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), a bunker below the East Wing of the White House. Libby will later recall that the Secret Service agent with Cheney appears uncertain about where he should be going. “The agent was a little confused about where [Cheney] should be,” he will say. “[H]e somehow had the impression that she was supposed to be in the mess area [i.e. the cafeteria in the West Wing].” Libby tells the agent, “I think we’re—Mrs. Cheney and I—are supposed to be in the PEOC.” He will comment, “I’m aware that [Cheney] would be safer if we could get her down to the PEOC.” But, according to Libby, the agent thinks “we were supposed to be somewhere else.” The agent has a wire in his ear; Libby will comment, “I think he was getting some instructions off of that.” Finally, after “probably a minute or so,” Libby will say, the problem of where to take Cheney “got clarified” and the agent receives “the proper instruction.” Cheney, the Secret Service agent, and Libby then head toward the PEOC. [White House, 11/14/2001] The three of them go downstairs and Cheney will then join the vice president in the tunnel leading to the PEOC (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [White House, 11/9/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40]

Entity Tags: US Secret Service, Lynne Cheney, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Ronald Bucca.
Ronald Bucca. [Source: Public domain]Two firefighters climbing up the South Tower, Orio Palmer and Ronald Bucca, have reached its 78th floor, the lower end of the impact zone where Flight 175 hit. [New York Times, 8/4/2002] They are just two floors below the level where, minutes later, its collapse initiates. [Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5/1/2002, pp. 2-34] Over radio, Palmer tells firefighter Joseph Leavey, “We’ve got two isolated pockets of fire. We should be able to knock it down with two lines.” [Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 206] The fact that they reached so high up the tower only comes to light almost a year later, when a tape of radio communications from 9/11 is made public (see August 4, 2002). The New York Times will report “[N]owhere on the tape is there any indication that firefighters had the slightest indication that the tower had become unstable or that it could fall.” [New York Times, 11/9/2002] Palmer’s communication appears to contradict claims that “extreme fires” contributed to the tower’s collapse. [BBC, 9/13/2001; New York Times, 10/20/2004] Ronald Bucca, a Special Forces veteran, had actually conducted his own private research into Islamic militancy following the 1993 WTC bombing. He’d even taken time, in 1996, to attend the beginning of the trial of Ramzi Yousef, a mastermind of the bombing (see September 5, 1996). [Lance, 2003, pp. 180-183, 333-334]

Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Orio Palmer, Ronald Bucca

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center, 9/11 Investigations

According to Flight 93’s cockpit voice recording, the hijackers grow concerned that the passengers might retaliate. One urges that the plane’s fire axe be held up to the cockpit door’s peephole to scare the passengers. [Longman, 2002, pp. 209-210]

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

According to the 9/11 Commission, FAA headquarters informs the FAA Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services is talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft after Flight 93. Yet in interviews with the commission, neither Belger nor the deputy director recall this discussion, and Belger subsequently e-mails the commission saying he does not believe the conversation took place. However, tape recordings reveal a staff person from headquarters at this time telling the Command Center, “Peter’s talking to Monte now about scrambling.” FAA headquarters is also informed that the flight is 20 miles northwest of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 461] When questioned about this, Belger will point out that there are military people on duty at the FAA Command Center and in a situation room at the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, and that they are participating in what is going on. In addition, Belger will later tell the commission that he thought the NMCC was on the hijack net and would therefore have received notification on this channel at the same time as all other agencies. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Incredibly, FAA headquarters has known since 9:34 A.M. about hijackers talking about a bomb on board the flight, and more evidence has since been passed on confirming a hijacking in progress. Still, reportedly, no one tells NORAD anything about the plane.

Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Monte Belger

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93

A radio transmitter carried by aircraft that is designed to go off automatically if a plane crashes is activated in the vicinity of the city of Ann Arbor in southeast Michigan, although the distress signal is presumably a false alarm. Details of the distress signal will be described when an unidentified individual calls the FAA’s Cleveland Center at around 10:19 a.m. and tells an air traffic controller there, “I’ve got an ELT reported over Ann Arbor.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 10/14/2003] An “ELT” is an emergency locator transmitter, a device carried on most general aviation aircraft in the US that is designed to automatically begin transmitting a distress signal if a plane should crash, so as to help search and rescue efforts in locating the downed aircraft. [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/23/1990; Federal Aviation Administration, 7/12/2001; Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 1/22/2009] The caller will not say who reported the ELT signal to him. But he will say the signal “started at 13:53” Zulu time, which is 9:53 a.m. Eastern time. Presumably realizing the signal was therefore activated over 25 minutes earlier, the caller will add, “Wait a minute, that don’t make any sense.” But the Cleveland Center controller will tell him: “Yeah, it does. It might have been late to be…” The caller will then say, “Okay, well I’ve got an ELT reported over Ann Arbor,” before the call ends. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001] Further details of the ELT signal and what might have caused it are unknown. Flight 93 will crash in rural Pennsylvania about 10 minutes after the signal over Ann Arbor is activated (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30] However, apparently no ELT signal will go off when it crashes (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001] According to Major Allan Knox, who works at the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, most ELT signals are false alarms. [9/11 Commission, 10/6/2003 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Allan Knox, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

NORAD’s Continental United States Region (CONR) is told it will not need to provide fighter jets to escort Air Force One when the plane takes off from Sarasota, Florida. [National Guard Bureau, 11/19/2001] While President Bush is visiting the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota (see (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Air Force One is on the ground at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004; US Air Force, 2/29/2012 pdf file] Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will later recall that around this time, CONR “knew that the president was down in Florida” but it “didn’t know what he was going to do.” “Eventually,” he will say, “we asked the question: If he takes off, do we need to escort?” Arnold will not state who CONR, which is based at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, asks this question to. But the person or agency says no. CONR will only be asked to provide fighters to escort Air Force One after 9:54 a.m., when the plane takes off from Sarasota (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). “[T]he airplane took off and we got immediate word that the Secret Service had asked us to escort [it],” Arnold will recall. [National Guard Bureau, 11/19/2001] He will say that CONR “received tasking from the Secret Service through the Joint [Chiefs of] Staff and NORAD to follow the president and protect him.” [Code One Magazine, 1/2002] In Florida, NORAD has two fighters on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base and two fighters on alert at Tyndall Air Force Base. [Airman, 12/1999; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] However, its Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) will scramble fighters from Ellington Field in Texas to escort Air Force One (see (After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Your Houston News, 9/19/2001; Rosenfeld and Gross, 2007, pp. 40] Furthermore, these fighters will only reach Air Force One at around 11:29 a.m., more than 90 minutes after the plane takes off (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 9/11/2001; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004]

Entity Tags: Continental US NORAD Region, Larry Arnold

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Mark Tillman.Mark Tillman. [Source: US Air Force]Colonel Mark Tillman, the pilot of Air Force One, is warned about an unidentified man, possibly carrying a gun, who is standing at the end of the runway at the airport in Sarasota, Florida, as he is preparing to take off with President Bush on the plane. [Fox News, 9/6/2011; US Air Force, 2/29/2012 pdf file] Bush arrived at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport after being driven away from the Emma E. Booker Elementary School and is now on Air Force One (see 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 98-99; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] While the plane’s crew members were waiting for him to arrive, they were told there was “great potential that we are going to be under attack sitting on the ramp” and they received “reports of unidentified people all around the airport,” according to Tillman (see (9:04 a.m.-9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United Services Automobile Association, 9/11/2011]
Secret Service Alerts Pilot to Man Carrying a 'Long Gun' - Now, as Air Force One is taxiing out for takeoff, Tillman receives a warning from the Secret Service about an unidentified man who is standing by the fence at the end of the runway and carrying some type of device. The Secret Service “didn’t know what the gentleman had, but he had something in his hand; they thought it might have been a long gun,” Tillman will later recall. [Fox News, 9/6/2011] “It is almost impossible to defend against a long gun if he’s going to shoot me on the ground,” Tillman will note. He is told that “shooters have [the unidentified man] in sight” and “will take him down if he moves.” He is instructed, “[P]lease, do not taxi by him and take off,” even though the direction of the prevailing wind would normally lead to the plane going by the man while taking off. [US Air Force, 2/29/2012 pdf file] Tillman therefore has to launch in the opposite direction, with a tail wind, in order to stay away from the man. [Wichita Eagle, 11/13/2012]
Plane Takes Off 'Like a Rocket' - Air Force One will take off at about 9:54 a.m. (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39] Tillman will climb the plane steeply. This, he will say, is “what we needed to do to make sure that [the man] didn’t have a correct line of sight to fire at the aircraft.” [Peter Schnall, 1/25/2009] “I start hauling down the runway,” he will describe. “Pull back, went up at about 8,000 feet per minute, and just put the plane on its tail, rolled it off towards the Gulf of Mexico, because I didn’t want the shooter to get us.” [US Air Force, 2/29/2012 pdf file] White House communications director Dan Bartlett, who is on Air Force One, will note that the plane takes off “like a rocket.” He will recall that “for a good 10 minutes, the plane was going almost straight up.” [White House, 8/12/2002] White House adviser Karl Rove, who is also on Air Force One, will comment that he has not previously “been in a jet at such a steep incline.” He will also say the Secret Service is “concerned about the possibility of terrorists with shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles” and it therefore wants the plane “out of range quickly.” [Rove, 2010, pp. 252-253]
Suspicious Man Found to Be Not a Threat - The fear over the unidentified man at the end of the runway will turn out to be unfounded. The man, according to Tillman, is just someone who has come to the airport with his children to see Air Force One leaving Sarasota, and the device he is carrying is just a video camera. [US Air Force, 2/29/2012 pdf file; Wichita Eagle, 11/13/2012]

Entity Tags: Mark Tillman, Karl C. Rove, US Secret Service, Dan Bartlett

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Page 38 of 72 (7144 events)
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Ordering 

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Categories

Key Events

Key Day of 9/11 Events (101)Key Hijacker Events (145)Key Warnings (95)

Day of 9/11

All Day of 9/11 Events (1282)Dick Cheney (55)Donald Rumsfeld (33)Flight AA 11 (145)Flight AA 77 (145)Flight UA 175 (88)Flight UA 93 (242)George Bush (120)Passenger Phone Calls (67)Pentagon (127)Richard Clarke (32)Shanksville, Pennsylvania (23)Training Exercises (57)World Trade Center (88)

The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers

Alhazmi and Almihdhar (343)Marwan Alshehhi (134)Mohamed Atta (206)Hani Hanjour (72)Ziad Jarrah (74)Other 9/11 Hijackers (172)Possible Hijacker Associates in US (79)Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training (73)Hijacker Contact w Government in US (33)Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding (42)Hijacker Visas and Immigration (135)

Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases

Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection (51)CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar (120)Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US (39)

Projects and Programs

Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit (172)Able Danger (60)Sibel Edmonds (61)Phoenix Memo (27)Randy Glass/ Diamondback (8)Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal (67)Remote Surveillance (241)Yemen Hub (75)

Before 9/11

Soviet-Afghan War (105)Warning Signs (447)Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge (53)US Air Security (74)Military Exercises (74)Pipeline Politics (67)Other Pre-9/11 Events (55)

Counterterrorism before 9/11

Hunt for Bin Laden (158)Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11 (225)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (252)

Warning Signs: Specific Cases

Foreign Intelligence Warnings (35)Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB (39)Presidential Level Warnings (31)

The Post-9/11 World

9/11 Investigations (656)9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings (22)9/11 Denials (29)US Government and 9/11 Criticism (67)9/11 Related Lawsuits (24)Media (47)Other Post-9/11 Events (76)

Investigations: Specific Cases

9/11 Commission (257)Role of Philip Zelikow (87)9/11 Congressional Inquiry (41)CIA OIG 9/11 Report (16)FBI 9/11 Investigation (145)WTC Investigation (112)Other 9/11 Investigations (133)

Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked Moles or Informants

Abu Hamza Al-Masri (102)Abu Qatada (36)Ali Mohamed (78)Haroon Rashid Aswat (17)Khalil Deek (20)Luai Sakra (12)Mamoun Darkazanli (36)Nabil Al-Marabh (41)Omar Bakri & Al-Muhajiroun (25)Reda Hassaine (23)Other Possible Moles or Informants (169)

Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures

Abu Zubaida (99)Anwar Al-Awlaki (17)Ayman Al-Zawahiri (81)Hambali (39)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (139)Mohammed Haydar Zammar (44)Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (47)Osama Bin Laden (228)Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh (105)Ramzi Yousef (67)Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (57)Victor Bout (23)Wadih El-Hage (45)Zacarias Moussaoui (159)

Al-Qaeda by Region

"Lackawanna Six" (13)Al-Qaeda in Balkans (168)Al-Qaeda in Germany (189)Al-Qaeda in Italy (55)Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia (149)Al-Qaeda in Spain (121)Islamist Militancy in Chechnya (50)

Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks or Plots

1993 WTC Bombing (73)1993 Somalia Fighting (13)1995 Bojinka Plot (78)1998 US Embassy Bombings (121)Millennium Bomb Plots (43)2000 USS Cole Bombing (114)2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing (23)2002 Bali Bombings (36)2004 Madrid Train Bombings (82)2005 7/7 London Bombings (87)

Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda Issues

Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks (89)Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements (102)Key Captures and Deaths (124)

Geopolitics and Islamic Militancy

US Dominance (112)Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links (255)Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism (83)Israel (61)Pakistan and the ISI (470)Saudi Arabia (249)Terrorism Financing (312)Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism (322)US Intel Links to Islamic Militancy (69)Algerian Militant Collusion (41)Indonesian Militant Collusion (20)Philippine Militant Collusion (74)Yemeni Militant Collusion (47)Other Government-Militant Collusion (23)

Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases

Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy (37)Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11 (73)Saeed Sheikh (59)Mahmood Ahmed (30)Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region (179)2008 Kabul Indian Embassy Bombing (10)Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan (154)

Terrorism Financing: Specific Cases

Al Taqwa Bank (29)Al-Kifah/MAK (54)BCCI (37)BIF (28)BMI and Ptech (21)Bin Laden Family (62)Drugs (71)

'War on Terrorism' Outside Iraq

Afghanistan (299)Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan (49)Destruction of CIA Tapes (92)Escape From Afghanistan (61)High Value Detainees (179)Terror Alerts (50)Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 (352)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (432)Internal US Security After 9/11 (125)
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