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Complete 911 Timeline

Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by matt, Paul, KJF, mtuck, paxvector

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Harun Shirzad al-Afghani.Harun Shirzad al-Afghani. [Source: Defense Department]Harun Shirzad al-Afghani is an alleged veteran Islamist militant held in Guanatanamo prison starting in 2007. His Guantanamo file will later be leaked to the public, and it states that he is believed to have attended an important meeting of militant groups on August 11, 2006. A letter found with al-Afghani explains that the meeting is meant to bring together senior figures in the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba (a Pakistani militant group), and Hezb-i-Islami (another militant group, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). But most interestingly, the file claims that senior Pakistani military and ISI (intelligence) officials also attend the meeting. The meeting discusses coordination of attacks against US-led forces in Afghanistan. Plans are made to “increase terrorist operations” in certain Afghanistan provinces, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and mines. Al-Afghani also allegedly tells his Guantanamo interrogators that in 2006 an unnamed ISI officer pays an Islamist militant a large sum of money to transport ammunition into Afghanistan to help al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezb-e-Islami. Al-Afghani’s file describes him as a leader both in al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami, with links to important leaders in both groups predating the 9/11 attacks. He is captured in Afghanistan in February 2007 and transferred to Guantanamo several months later. [Joint Task Force Guantanamo, 8/2/2007 pdf file; Guardian, 4/25/2011]

Entity Tags: Hezb-i-Islami, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, US intelligence, Taliban, Lashkar-e-Toiba

Category Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan

Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the former chairman and vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, release a book giving a behind-the-scenes look at their 20-month investigation of the September 11 attacks. [Associated Press, 8/4/2006] They begin their book, titled Without Precedent, saying that, because their investigation started late, had a very short time frame, and had inadequate funding, they both felt, from the beginning, that they “were set up to fail.” [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/21/2006; Rocky Mountain News, 8/25/2006] They explain the difficulties they faced in obtaining certain government documents and describe how the commission almost splintered over whether to investigate the Bush administration’s use of 9/11 as a reason for going to war. It says that if original member Max Cleland—a strong proponent of this line of inquiry—had not resigned (see December 9, 2003), the commission probably would not have reached unanimity. It also calls their gentle questioning of former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani during his May 2004 testimony, “a low point” in the commission’s handling of witnesses at its public hearings (see May 19, 2004). [Associated Press, 8/4/2006; New York Daily News, 8/5/2006; New York Times, 8/6/2006] Despite the problems it faced, when discussing his book with the CBC, Hamilton says he thinks the commission has “been reasonably successful in telling the story” of 9/11. [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/21/2006] Without Precedent, however, contains little new information about the events of 9/11. Intelligence expert James Bamford says there is “an overabundance of self-censorship by the authors.” [New York Times, 8/20/2006]

Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

Former 9/11 Commission co-chair Lee Hamilton.Former 9/11 Commission co-chair Lee Hamilton. [Source: CBC]Lee Hamilton, the former co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, gives a wide-ranging interview to the CBC about Without Precedent, a book he recently co-authored about his time on the 9/11 Commission (see August 15, 2006). In the interview he discusses the various “conspiracy theories” surrounding the events of 9/11. The interviewer, Evan Solomon, mentions to him a recent Zogby poll (see May 17, 2006) that found that 42% of Americans agreed that “the US government, and its 9/11 Commission, concealed or refused to investigate critical evidence that contradicts the official explanation of September 11th.” Hamilton calls this lack of trust in the Commission’s report “dispiriting,” but attacks the “conspiracy theory people,” saying, “when they make an assertion they do it often on very flimsy evidence.” He addresses some of the various “conspiracy theories” that have been put forward about 9/11:
bullet In order to contradict the allegation that the Twin Towers were brought down deliberately with pre-planted explosives, Hamilton says the WTC collapsed (see 8:57 a.m. September 11, 2001) because “the super-heated jet fuel melted the steel super-structure of these buildings and caused their collapse.” He adds, “There’s a powerful lot of evidence to sustain that point of view, including the pictures of the airplanes flying into the building.”
bullet With regard to the collapse of WTC Building 7 (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001), which some people claim was also caused by explosives, he argues, “[W]e believe that it was the aftershocks of these two huge buildings in the very near vicinity collapsing. And in the Building 7 case, we think that it was a case of flames setting off a fuel container, which started the fire in Building 7, and that was our theory on Building 7.” However, the interviewer points out that the 9/11 Commission’s final report does not actually mention the collapse of Building 7, and Hamilton says he does not recall whether the Commission made a specific decision to leave it out.
bullet In reply to a question about why the debris of Building 7 were moved quickly from the scene without a thorough investigation, even though nobody died in Building 7 and there was no need for rescue operations there, Hamilton responds, “You can’t answer every question when you conduct an investigation.”
bullet When asked whether Saeed Sheikh sent Mohamed Atta $100,000 for the 9/11 plot (see Early August 2001 and Summer 2001 and before), Hamilton replies, “I don’t know anything about it.” When the interviewer presses him about whether the Commission investigated a possible Pakistani Secret Service (ISI) connection to the attacks, Hamilton replies, “They may have; I do not recall us writing anything about it in the report. We may have but I don’t recall it.”
bullet Asked about Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta’s claim that Vice President Dick Cheney was in the presidential bunker beneath the White House at 9:20 a.m. on 9/11 (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001), almost 40 minutes earlier than the Commission claimed he had arrived there, Hamilton replies, “I do not recall.” When pressed, he expands, “Well, we think that Vice President Cheney entered the bunker shortly before 10 o’clock. And there is a gap of several minutes there, where we do not really know what the Vice President really did. There is the famous phone call between the President and the Vice President. We could find no documentary evidence of that phone call.”
bullet When the interviewer points out that Richard Clarke’s account conflicts with the Commission’s over what time authorization was received from Dick Cheney to shoot down Flight 93 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Hamilton retorts, “Look, you’ve obviously gone through the report with a fine-toothed comb, you’re raising a lot of questions—I can do the same thing.”
The interviewer also asks Hamilton whether he has any unanswered questions of his own about 9/11. Hamilton’s response is: “I could never figure out why these 19 fellas did what they did. We looked into their backgrounds. In one or two cases, they were apparently happy, well-adjusted, not particularly religious - in one case quite well-to-do, had a girlfriend. We just couldn’t figure out why he did it. I still don’t know.” [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/21/2006]

Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, World Trade Center, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission, Richard A. Clarke, Mohamed Atta, Norman Mineta

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

The Washington Post notes that Osama bin Laden has still not been indicted for his alleged role in 9/11 and that his entry in the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list only mentions his involvement in the 1998 African embassy bombings. The FBI says the reason bin Laden is not officially wanted for 9/11 or the bombing of the USS Cole is that he has not yet been charged with involvement in the operations by the US. Bin Laden’s entry on a separate list, of the 25 most wanted terrorists, also fails to mention his alleged involvement in 9/11. According to the Post, “The curious omission underscores the Justice Department’s decision, so far, to not seek formal criminal charges against bin Laden” for 9/11. [Washington Post, 8/28/2006]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

One of the ‘puffs of smoke’ observed during the Twin Towers collapses.One of the ‘puffs of smoke’ observed during the Twin Towers collapses. [Source: Richard Lethin]The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issues a seven-page fact sheet to counter alternative theories about the WTC collapses. NIST conducted a three-year study of the collapses, and concluded they were caused by the damage when the planes hit combined with the effects of the ensuing fires. However, many people—what the New York Times calls an “angry minority”—believe there was US government complicity in 9/11, and a recent poll (see July 6-24, 2006) found 16 percent of Americans believe the WTC towers were brought down with explosives. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 8/31/2006; New York Times, 9/2/2006; Reuters, 9/2/2006] The fact sheet responds to 14 “Frequently Asked Questions.” Some of its key points include the following:
bullet Regarding whether NIST considered a controlled demolition hypothesis: “NIST found no corroborating evidence for alternative hypotheses suggesting that the WTC towers were brought down… using explosives… Instead, photographs and videos from several angles clearly show that the collapse initiated at the fire and impact floors and that the collapse progressed from the initiating floors downward until the dust clouds obscured the view.” However, it admits, “NIST did not test for the residue” of explosives in the remaining steel from the towers.
bullet Its explanation for puffs of smoke seen coming from each tower as it collapsed: “[T]he falling mass of the building compressed the air ahead of it—much like the action of a piston—forcing smoke and debris out the windows as the stories below failed sequentially.”
bullet Its explanation for a stream of yellow molten metal that poured down the side of the South Tower shortly before it collapsed (see (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). NIST previously claimed it was aluminum, but this should not have been yellow in color: “Pure liquid aluminum would be expected to appear silvery. However, the molten metal was very likely mixed with large amounts of hot, partially burned, solid organic materials (e.g., furniture, carpets, partitions and computers) which can display an orange glow.”
bullet Regarding reports of molten steel in the wreckage at Ground Zero (see September 12, 2001-February 2002): “Any molten steel in the wreckage was more likely due to the high temperature resulting from long exposure to combustion within the pile than to short exposure to fires or explosions while the buildings were standing.”
bullet Regarding the collapse of WTC 7 (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001): “While NIST has found no evidence of a blast or controlled demolition event, NIST would like to determine the magnitude of hypothetical blast scenarios that could have led to the structural failure of one or more critical elements.” [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 8/30/2006] In response to the fact sheet, Kevin Ryan, the coeditor of the online Journal of 9/11 Studies, says, “The list of answers NIST has provided is generating more questions, and more skepticism, than ever before.” He says, “NIST is a group of government scientists whose leaders are Bush appointees, and therefore their report is not likely to veer from the political story.” [New York Times, 9/2/2006; Reuters, 9/2/2006]

Entity Tags: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Kevin Ryan

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi.Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi. [Source: FBI]Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, said to be an adviser to Osama bin Laden, is captured and detained in a secret CIA prison. President Bush announced on September 6, 2006 that the secret CIA prisons have just been emptied, at least temporarily (see September 2-3, 2006 and September 6, 2006). Nonetheless, Al-Hadi is put in the CIA’s secret prison system (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). Very little is known about al-Hadi’s arrest, which will not even be announced until late April 2007, shortly after he is transferred to the Guantanamo prison. It is unknown whether he is captured before Bush’s announcement (in which case he should have been sent to Guantanamo with other high-ranking prisoners), or after. [Salon, 5/22/2007] Prior to Al-Hadi’s arrest, the US government had posted a $1 million reward for his capture. His reward announcement calls him “one of Osama bin Laden’s top global deputies, personally chosen by bin Laden to monitor al-Qaeda operations in Iraq.… He has been associated with numerous attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and has been known to facilitate communication between al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda.” The announcement notes that al-Hadi once served as a major in the Iraqi army, and he may still be in contact with bin Laden. [Rewards for Justice, 1/4/2007] In 2005, Newsweek reported that al-Hadi had been the main liaison between bin Laden and the independent minded Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. [Newsweek, 4/4/2005]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

On September 15, 2006, the Daily Telegraph reports that the Pakistani government has recently released thousands of Islamist militants. Pakistani lawyers involved in court cases say that 2,500 foreigners who were originally held on suspicion of having links to al-Qaeda or the Taliban have been freed. Many are released in the wake of a peace accord was signed between the Pakistani government and militants in Pakistan’s tribal regions in early September (see September 5, 2006), but some are released in the months before that accord. A US diplomat based in Pakistan complains, “We have repeatedly warned Pakistan over arresting and then releasing suspects. We are monitoring their response with great concern.” [Daily Telegraph, 9/15/2006]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Karl Eikenberry.Karl Eikenberry. [Source: NATO]In autumn 2006, President Bush declares in a White House news conference that al-Qaeda is “on the run,” but in fact intelligence reports are indicating that al-Qaeda is gaining strength in its safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal region. The New York Times will later comment, “with senior Bush administration officials consumed for much of that year with the spiraling violence in Iraq, the al-Qaeda threat in Pakistan was not at the top of the White House agenda.” Frustrated, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the top US commander in Afghanistan, orders military officers, CIA, and US special forces to assemble a dossier documenting the Pakistani government’s role in allowing militants to establish their safe haven in the tribal region. According to the Times, “Behind the general’s order was a broader feeling of outrage within the military—at a terrorist war that had been outsourced to an unreliable ally, and at the grim fact that America’s most deadly enemy had become stronger.” When Eikenberry finally presents his dossier to several members of Bush’s cabinet, some inside the State Department and the CIA dismiss his warning as exaggerated and simplistic. [New York Times, 6/30/2008] On February 13, 2007, Eikenberry states publicly before a Congressional committee that NATO cannot win in Afghanistan without addressing the safe haven across the border in Pakistan. He does not publicly discuss Pakistan’s support for the militants, but he does say, “A steady, direct attack against the command and control in Pakistan in sanctuary areas is essential for us to achieve success.” He also warns that the US is facing a “reconstituted enemy” and “growing narcotics trafficking” in Afghanistan, which could lead to “the loss of legitimacy” of the government there. Eikenberry is already due to be replaced as commander of US forces in Afghanistan by the time he makes these blunt comments. [Washington Post, 2/14/2007; Rashid, 2008, pp. 383] The White House responds by sending Vice President Dick Cheney and CIA Deputy Director Stephen Kappes to Islamabad, Pakistan, later in February (see February 26, 2007). But there is little apparent change in Pakistan’s behavior. [New York Times, 6/30/2008]

Entity Tags: Karl Eikenberry, US Department of State, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, US Military, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Stephen Kappes, US Special Forces

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Michael Tabman, the Minneapolis FBI field office’s special agent in charge, prevents Harry Samit from speaking at a national security forum about the Moussaoui case and removes him from counterterrorism investigations. Samit was an important figure in the Zacarias Moussaoui investigation just before 9/11 (see August 15-September 10, 2001, August 16, 2001 and August 20-September 11, 2001). Unlike his former colleague Coleen Rowley (see May 21, 2002 and February 26, 2003), Samit has never gone public with his criticism of the FBI’s handling of the case. Tabman has been working at the Minneapolis office only since 2005. After Samit files a complaint, FBI headquarters will reassign him to counterterrorism and send Tabman back to headquarters. [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 9/23/2006; Associated Press, 1/10/2007]

Entity Tags: Harry Samit, Hamis, FBI Headquarters

Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui

By autumn 2006, al-Qaeda’s central leadership based in Pakistan’s tribal region near the border of Afghanistan appears to be short on funds. But a peace treaty signed between the Pakistani government and Islamist militants in the tribal region of North Waziristan in early September 2006 (see September 5, 2006) gives al-Qaeda’s leaders breathing room and allows them to receive money from new sources abroad. US intelligence determines that al-Qaeda in Pakistan is increasingly funded by the Iraq war. Operatives in Iraq are raising considerable sums from donations to the anti-US insurgency there, as well as criminal activity such as kidnappings for ransom common in the chaos of the Iraq war zone. Al-Qaeda’s central command had previously sent money outward to Iraq and elsewhere. A senior US counterterrorism official will say in 2007, “Iraq is a big moneymaker for them.” The Pakistani peace deal with militants results in tens of thousands of Pakistani soldiers withdrawing from the tribal regions. This in turn allows militants to move between Pakistan and Iraq much easier than before. This official will say there are “lots of indications they can move people in and out easier,” and that operatives from Iraq often bring money. “A year ago we were saying they were having serious money problems. That seems to have eased up.” It is also believed that Taliban forces in Afghanistan are now being taught by al-Qaeda operatives experienced with fighting US forces in Iraq. [Los Angeles Times, 5/20/2007]

Entity Tags: US intelligence, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Pakistan and the ISI, Terrorism Financing, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

In early September 2006, Anwar al-Awlaki is arrested in Yemen at the request of the US government. Al-Awlaki served as imam to several of the 9/11 hijackers when they lived in the US (see March 2001 and After). [Australian, 11/4/2006] However, al-Awlaki is released in December 2007. The US was limited in how much it could pressure the government of Yemen to keep holding him, because he has never been formally charged with any crime. In a taped interview shortly after his release, he claims that while he was imprisoned in Yemen, he was interrogated by the FBI multiple times and asked about his dealings with the 9/11 hijackers. [Washington Post, 2/27/2008] According to the New York Times, “by the end of 2007, American officials, some of whom were disturbed at the imprisonment without charges of a United States citizen, signaled that they no longer insisted on al-Awlaki’s incarceration, and he was released.” [New York Times, 5/8/2010] By February 2008, just two months after US officials approved his release, US intelligence will conclude that al-Awlaki is linked to al-Qaeda (see February 27, 2008).

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anwar al-Awlaki

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Yemeni Militant Collusion, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Anwar Al-Awlaki

The Transportation Department’s inspector general issues a report clearing FAA executives of deliberately misleading the 9/11 Commission. The commission had been frustrated over inaccurate statements made by the FAA and NORAD, and referred the matter to the relevant inspectors general (see Shortly before July 22, 2004). [Associated Press, 9/1/2006] Military and civil aviation officials had initially portrayed their responses on 9/11 as fast and efficient. Yet according to evidence found by the commission, the military never had any of the hijacked aircraft in its sights. [Washington Post, 9/2/2006] Among other things, the FAA claimed that an Air Force liaison had joined its teleconference and established contact with NORAD immediately after the first WTC tower was hit. According to the inspector general’s report though, this liaison only joined the teleconference after the Pentagon was struck at 9:37 a.m. [US Department of Transportation, 8/31/2006 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/1/2006] The report says the inspector general’s office found no evidence that FAA executives deliberately made false statements or purposely omitted accurate information from any statements, regarding their notifications about the hijackings to the military on 9/11. It blames their incorrect statements on innocent mistakes, such as an erroneous entry in an early FAA timeline and a false assumption that others would correct the record. However, it recommends that the FAA “consider appropriate administrative action” against two unnamed executives for their failure to correct false information provided to the 9/11 Commission. [US Department of Transportation, 8/31/2006 pdf file; New York Times, 9/2/2006; Washington Post, 9/2/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2005. Based on satellite surveys and other analysis by the UN. Redder provinces produce more.Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2005. Based on satellite surveys and other analysis by the UN. Redder provinces produce more. [Source: UNODC/MCN] (click image to enlarge)The United Nations says Afghanistan’s latest opium harvest is the biggest ever. The harvest was 6,100 metric tons (enough for 610 tons of heroin), an increase of nearly 50 percent from the year before. This is 92 percent of the world total and 30 percent more than global consumption. Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN’s drug office, says, “It is indeed very bad, you can say it is out of control.” He says the Taliban have profited from the drug trade, and they promise protection to growers who expand their operations. 400,000 acres were planted with poppies in 2006; about ten percent of these poppy fields were destroyed by the Afghan government’s eradication program. About five percent was destroyed in the previous year. [New York Times, 9/2/2006; Associated Press, 9/3/2006]

Entity Tags: Antonio Maria Costa, United Nations

Category Tags: Drugs, Afghanistan

Mohamad Farik Amin.Mohamad Farik Amin. [Source: FBI]The US temporarily closes a network of secret CIA prisons around the world and transfers the most valuable prisoners to the US prison in Guantanamo, Cuba, for eventual military tribunals. The prison network will be reopened a short time later (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). There were reportedly fewer than 100 suspects in the CIA prisons; most of them are apparently sent back to their home countries while fourteen are sent to Guantanamo. All fourteen have some connection to al-Qaeda. Seven of them reportedly had some connection to the 9/11 attacks. Here are their names, nationalities, and the allegations against them.
bullet Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) (Pakistani, raised in Kuwait). He is the suspected mastermind of 9/11 attacks and many other al-Qaeda attacks. A CIA biography of KSM calls him “one of history’s most infamous terrorists.”
bullet Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (Saudi). He allegedly helped finance the 9/11 attacks.
bullet Hambali (Indonesian). He attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and is accused of involvement in many other plots, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002).
bullet Khallad bin Attash (a.k.a. Tawfiq bin Attash) (Yemeni). He also attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and had a role in other plots such as the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000).
bullet Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (Pakistani, raised in Kuwait). He allegedly helped finance the 9/11 attacks and arranged transportation for some hijackers. His uncle is KSM.
bullet Ramzi bin al-Shibh (Yemeni). A member of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell with Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers. The CIA calls him the “primary communications intermediary” between the hijackers and KSM. He also attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
bullet Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (Saudi). He is said to have been one of the masterminds of the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). He also attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
The remaining seven suspects are alleged to have been involved in other al-Qaeda plots:
bullet Abu Zubaida (Palestinian, raised in Saudi Arabia). He is said to be a facilitator who helped make travel arrangements for al-Qaeda operatives. He is also alleged to have organized a series of planned millennium attacks.
bullet Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (Tanzanian). He was indicted for a role in the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He is also said to be an expert document forger.
bullet Majid Khan (Pakistani). He lived in the US since 1996 and is said to have worked with KSM on some US bomb plots (see March 5, 2003).
bullet Abu Faraj al-Libbi (a.k.a. Mustafa al-‘Uzayti) (Libyan). He allegedly became al-Qaeda’s top operations officer after KSM was captured.
bullet Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair) (Malaysian). He is a key Hambali associate and was allegedly tapped for a suicide mission targeting Los Angeles.
bullet Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) (Malaysian). He is a key Hambali associate. He is accused of providing funds for the 2003 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003). He was allegedly tapped for a suicide mission targeting Los Angeles.
bullet Gouled Hassan Dourad (Somali). He allegedly scouted a US military base in Djibouti for a planned terrorist attack.
The fourteen are expected to go on trial in 2007. [Knight Ridder, 9/6/2006; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006; USA Today, 9/7/2006]

Entity Tags: Majid Khan, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Mohamad Farik Amin, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hambali, Gouled Hassan Dourad, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Khallad bin Attash, Abu Zubaida, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Hambali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

The government of Pakistan signs an agreement known as the Waziristan Accord with rebels in the tribal area of Pakistan near the border of Afghanistan known as Waziristan. This is the area where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have a strong influence and many believe al-Qaeda’s top leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are hiding there. The accord effectively puts an end to fighting between the Pakistani army and the rebels. Details of the accord are published in a Pakistani newspaper the next day. The main points include:
bullet The Pakistani government agrees to stop attacks in Waziristan.
bullet Militants are to cease cross-border movement into and out of Afghanistan.
bullet Foreign jihadists will have to leave Pakistan, but “those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement.”
bullet Area check-points and border patrols will be manned by a tribal force and the Pakistan army will withdraw from control points.
bullet No parallel administration will be established in the area, but Pakistan law will remain in force.
bullet Tribal leaders will ensure that no one attacks government personnel or damages state property.
bullet The Pakistani government will release captured militants and will pay compensation for property damage and the deaths of innocent civilians. [Dawn (Karachi), 9/6/2006] The deal is negotiated and signed by Gen. Ali Jan Orakzai, who had become the governor of the nearby North-West Frontier Province some months earlier. Orakzai, a close friend of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, is known to hate the US and NATO and admire militant groups such as the Taliban (see Late 2002-Late 2003). [New York Times, 6/30/2008] Two days later, President Bush publicly supports the deal (see September 7, 2006). The Wall Street Journal comments that Musharraf decided to approve the deal in order to take care of “an even bigger security problem: a growing rebellion in the resource-rich province of Baluchistan.” He does not have the forces to deal with widespread violence in both regions. [Wall Street Journal, 9/8/2006]
A similar deal was made with South Waziristan in February 2005 (see February 7, 2005). The agreement will soon be seen as a big success for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In July 2007, the Washington Post will report that senior US intelligence officials attribute “the resurgence of bin Laden’s organization almost entirely to its protected safe haven among tribal groups in North Waziristan…” (see July 18, 2007). The same month, the Bush administration will publicly call the accord a failure as it collapses amidst an all out fight between the government and militants in Pakistan (see July 11-Late July, 2007). [Washington Post, 7/18/2007]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Pervez Musharraf, Ali Jan Orakzai, Pakistan

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The US military issues “a new manual on the treatment of prisoners that explicitly prohibits waterboarding, sexual humiliation, electric shocks, the threatening use of dogs, and other degrading or painful tactics.” This comes the same day President Bush gives a speech acknowledging the existence of a network of secret CIA prisons (see June 16, 2004). Both moves are believed to have been made in an effort to protect US officials from prosecution for possible war crimes. [Knight Ridder, 9/6/2006] Lt. Gen. John Kimmons, the Army’s chief intelligence officer, says, “No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices.” Newly approved questioning techniques involve mainly psychological approaches, such as making a prisoner fear he may never see his family. [USA Today, 9/6/2006]

Entity Tags: John Kimmons

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Abu Zubaida circa 2008.Abu Zubaida circa 2008. [Source: Defense Department.]In a speech defending the US treatment of high-level al-Qaeda prisoners, President Bush apparently makes some false claims about how valuable the intelligence from some prisoners was. He says that Abu Zubaida, who was captured in March 2002 (see March 28, 2002), revealed that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) used the alias ‘Mukhtar.’ “This was a vital piece of intelligence that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM.” However, the 9/11 Commission’s final report published in 2004 revealed that the fact that KSM had that alias was known to US intelligence before 9/11 (see August 28, 2001). Bush also claims that Zubaida’s interrogation identified Ramzi bin al-Shibh as an accomplice in the 9/11 attacks. [New York Times, 9/8/2006] However, this was known months before Zubaida’s capture, and reported in the US press as early as September 2001. A CBS News report from that time said bin al-Shibh was “believed to have provided logistics backup for the hijackers.” [CBS News, 9/29/2001] Bush also describes the interrogation techniques used on the prisoners as “safe, lawful and effective,” and he claims torture was not used. However, the New York Times notes that “the Bush administration has yet to make public the legal papers prepared by government lawyers that served as the basis for its determination that those procedures did not violate American or international law.” [New York Times, 9/8/2006] Both the New York Times and Washington Post publish prominent stories pointing out the factual errors in Bush’s statements, but this does not become a big political issue. [Washington Post, 9/7/2006; New York Times, 9/8/2006] Bush repeatedly exaggerated the importance of Zubaida in the months after his capture as well (see Shortly After March 28, 2002).

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida, George W. Bush, Ramzi bin al-Shibh

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

Bush acknowledging the secret CIA prison network.Bush acknowledging the secret CIA prison network. [Source: Gerald Herbert / Associated Press]In a speech, President Bush acknowledges a network of secret CIA prisons and announces plans to try 14 top al-Qaeda terrorist suspects in military tribunals. [Knight Ridder, 9/6/2006]
Admits Existence of Detainees in CIA Custody - Bush tells his listeners: “In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.… Many specifics of this program, including where these detainees have been held and the details of their confinement, cannot be divulged.… We knew that Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002) had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking.… As his questioning proceeded, it became clear that he had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures… The procedures were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary.… These procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods used—I think you understand why.” Bush then adds that Zubaida “began to provide information on key al-Qaeda operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September 11” (see June 2002). Another high-value detainee, 9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see Shortly After February 29 or March 1, 2003), provided “many details of other plots to kill innocent Americans” (see March 7 - Mid-April, 2003 and August 6, 2007). [Vanity Fair, 12/16/2008; New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] The 14 prisoners will be put on trial as soon as Congress enacts the Military Commissions Act (MCA—see October 17, 2006), which he is sending to Congress for its approval today. [Savage, 2007, pp. 308-309]
Political Reasons to Acknowledge CIA Prisons - The US government has never officially acknowledged the existence of the CIA prisons before, despite numerous media accounts about them. Bush’s speech comes less than two months before midterm Congressional elections and also comes as the White House is preparing new legislation to legalize the CIA’s detention program and shield US officials from prosecution for possible war crimes. Knight Ridder comments that the speech “appeared to be intended to give him more leverage in his negotiations with Congress over how to try suspected terrorists.… In addition to the potential political benefits, Bush had other reasons to make the program public. A Supreme Court ruling in June struck down the administration’s plan to bring terrorist suspects before military tribunals and called into question the legality of secret CIA detentions.” [Knight Ridder, 9/6/2006]
Sites Closed Down? - Other administration officials say the CIA prison network has been closed down, at least for the time being. (In fact, it will be reopened a short time later (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007).) Reportedly, “fewer than 100” suspects had ever been in CIA custody. It is not known who they were or what happened to all of them, but most of them reportedly were returned to their home countries for prosecution. Fourteen “high-value” suspects, including accused 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, were transferred from the secret CIA prisons to the prison in Guantanamo, Cuba in the days just prior to Bush’s speech (see September 2-3, 2006).
Torture is 'against [US] Values' - Bush says: “I want to be absolutely clear with our people and the world: The United States does not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it—and I will not authorize it.” However, he says the Geneva Conventions’ prohibition against “humiliating and degrading treatment” could potentially cause legal problems for CIA interrogators. Other administration officials say harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding were used in the CIA prisons. Such techniques are considered by many to be forms of torture. Bush claims that information gleaned from interrogations in the secret prisons helped thwart attacks on the US and provided valuable information about al-Qaeda operations around the world. [Knight Ridder, 9/6/2006; Washington Post, 9/7/2006]

Entity Tags: Geneva Conventions, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Military Commissions Act, Abu Zubaida, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Top: Ramzi bin al-Shibh (left) shaking hands with Mohammed Atef (right). Bottom: Bin al-Shibh (left) with bin Laden (right).Top: Ramzi bin al-Shibh (left) shaking hands with Mohammed Atef (right). Bottom: Bin al-Shibh (left) with bin Laden (right). [Source: Al Jazeera]Al Jazeera television broadcasts previously unseen footage of Osama bin Laden meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was a roommate and close associate of some of the 9/11 hijackers. The footage is said to have been released by al-Qaeda’s production company, As-Sahab, in time for the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Bin al-Shibh is seen sitting and talking with bin Laden and al-Qaeda military leader Mohammed Atef. Atef was killed in November 2001 (see November 15, 2001), so the footage has to be from before then, but it is unknown if it was filmed before or after 9/11. Bin Laden is also shown strolling through an Afghanistan training camp meeting followers. Al Jazeera says some of these followers include some of the 9/11 hijackers, but their faces are not seen so it is unclear if this is the case. But bin Laden addresses the camera at one point and says of his followers preparing for missions, “I ask you to pray for them and to ask God to make them successful, aim their shots well, set their feet strong, and strengthen their hearts.” The video also includes the last testaments of two of the hijackers, Wail Alshehri and Hamza Alghamdi filmed in Kandahar, Afghanistan in March 2001 (see September 7, 2006 and (December 2000-March 2001)). [Associated Press, 9/7/2006; CNN, 9/8/2006]

Entity Tags: Wail Alshehri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hamza Alghamdi, Mohammed Atef, As-Sahab, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Ali Jan Orakzai.Ali Jan Orakzai. [Source: Farooq Naeem/ Agence France-Presse]On September 5, 2006, the government of Pakistan signs an agreement known as the Waziristan Accord with militants in the tribal area of Pakistan near the border of Afghanistan known as Waziristan (see September 5, 2006). Two days later, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Lt. Gen. Ali Jan Orakzai come to the White House to meet with President Bush about the deal. Orakzai is the military commander of the region encompassing the region. He reportedly hates the US and sympathizes with the Taliban, calling them a “national liberation movement” (see Late 2002-Late 2003). In a presentation to Bush, Orakzai advocates a strategy that would rely even more heavily on cease-fires, and says striking deals with the Taliban inside Afghanistan could allow US forces to withdraw from Afghanistan within seven years. Bush supports the deal, saying in public that same day that it would not create safe havens for the Taliban and could even offer “alternatives to violence and terror.” He does add the cautionary note, “You know we are watching this very carefully, obviously.” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 277; New York Times, 6/30/2008] But three months later, the US State Department will publicly deem the deal a failure for US policy (see November-December 2006). Some US officials will begin to refer to Orakzai as a “snake oil salesman.” [New York Times, 6/30/2008]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Ali Jan Orakzai, Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Hamza Alghamdi, top, and Wail Alshehri, bottom, in their martyr videos.Hamza Alghamdi, top, and Wail Alshehri, bottom, in their martyr videos. [Source: Al Jazeera]Two more martyr videos of 9/11 hijackers are broadcast on the Al Jazeera satellite network. Al-Qaeda has released some hijacker martyr videos before, usually around 9/11 anniversaries. One of the new videos is of Wail Alshehri. In it he says: “If struggle and jihad is not mandatory now, then when is it mandatory?… When is it time to help Muslims who are under fire in Chechnya? And what about Kashmir and the Philippines? Blood continues to flow. When will it be?” [CNN, 9/8/2006] The other video is of Hamza Alghamdi. In it he says, “If we are content with being humiliated and inclined to comfort, the tooth of the enemy will stretch from Jerusalem to Mecca, and then everyone will regret on a day when regret is of no use.” The videos were made by As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm. Footage of 9/11 destruction has been digitally added to the backgrounds of the videos after 9/11. [Associated Press, 9/7/2006] Both videos were probably recorded around March 2001, when most of the 9/11 hijackers recorded martyr videos (see (December 2000-March 2001)). The two videos are released at the same time as previously unknown footage of Osama bin Laden with 9/11 hijacker associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see September 7, 2006).

Entity Tags: Al Jazeera, Wail Alshehri, As-Sahab, Hamza Alghamdi

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Shortly after 14 high-ranking al-Qaeda prisoners are transferred from secret CIA prisons to the US-controlled Guantanamo prison in Cuba (see September 2-3, 2006), the International Committee of the Red Cross is finally allowed to interview them. The prisoners include 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hambali, and Abu Zubaida. The Red Cross has a policy of not publicizing or commenting its findings. However, some US officials are shown the report on the interviews with these prisoners and apparently some of these officials leak information to the New Yorker about one year later. The New Yorker will report, “Congressional and other Washington sources familiar with the report said that it harshly criticized the CIA’s practices. One of the sources said that the Red Cross described the agency’s detention and interrogation methods as tantamount to torture, and declared that American officials responsible for the abusive treatment could have committed serious crimes. The source said the report warned that these officials may have committed ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions, and may have violated the US Torture Act, which Congress passed in 1994. The conclusions of the Red Cross, which is known for its credibility and caution, could have potentially devastating legal ramifications.” [New Yorker, 8/6/2007]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Zubaida, Mohamad Farik Amin, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Central Intelligence Agency, Majid Khan, International Committee of the Red Cross, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Hambali, Gouled Hassan Dourad

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Hambali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

The Senate Intelligence Committee, reporting on the pre-invasion intelligence on Iraq, finds that the US intelligence community had no evidence whatsoever of terrorist training facilities or activities at Iraq’s Salman Pak military base. The report says, “Postwar findings support the April 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment that there was no credible reporting on al-Qaeda training at Salman Pak or anywhere else in Iraq. There have been no credible reports since the war that Iraq trained al-Qaeda operatives at Salman Pak to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations.” The report will note testimony from both CIA and DIA officials that found “no indications that training of al-Qaeda linked individuals took place there.” The DIA told the committee in June 2006 that it has “no credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 1991.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/8/2006 pdf file] The base was found to be just what the Iraqis said it was: a training camp for counterterrorism operations, focused on foiling terrorist hijackings of jetliners (see April 6, 2003).

Entity Tags: Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Senate Intelligence Committee, Al-Qaeda

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

A bipartisan Senate report concludes that “Post-war findings… confirm that no such meeting ever occurred” between Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi agent in Prague. It notes that “Post-war debriefings of [the alleged Iraqi agent, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani,] indicate that he had never seen or heard of Atta until after September 11, 2001, when Atta’s face appeared on the news.” [US Senate and Intelligence Committee, 9/8/2006 pdf file] But two days later Vice President Cheney is asked if the meeting ever took place and he still maintains that it could have (see September 10, 2006).

Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

A leading current affairs program on Dutch television says that 9/11 was a governmental conspiracy. The program is entitled “Zembla: Het complot van 11 september.” Zembla is a weekly investigative report shown on the public broadcasting network VARA. (A version of the program with English subtitles is available on Zembla’s website.) The program’s highlight is an interview with Danny Jowenko, a Dutch expert and industry professional in demolition. When shown a video of the collapse of Building 7 of the World Trade Center, he concludes that it is undoubtedly the work of a professional demolition team. [Vara, 9/10/2006]

Entity Tags: Danny Jowenko, Zembla

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, WTC Investigation

Vice President Cheney appears on Meet the Press two days after a bipartisan Senate report asserts that there was no link of any sort between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda before 9/11, except for one meeting held in 1995. Cheney claims he has not read the report yet, but he says, “whether or not there was a historic relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The basis for that is probably best captured in George Tenet’s testimony before the Senate Intel Commission, an open session, where he said specifically that there was a pattern of relationship that went back at least a decade between Iraq and al-Qaeda.… [Militant leader Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad after we took Afghanistan and before we went into Iraq. You had the facility up at Kermal, poisons facility, ran by Ansar al-Islam, an affiliate of al-Qaeda.… [The Iraqi government] was a state sponsor of terror. [Saddam Hussein] had a relationship with terror groups. No question about it. Nobody denies that.” [Meet the Press, 9/10/2006] In fact, the Senate report determined that although al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad, the Iraqi government tried hard to find him and catch him, and that Ansar al-Islam was in a part of Iraq outside the control of the Iraq government and the government was actively opposed to them as well. The report claims there was no meeting between hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi agent in Prague in April 2001. [US Senate and Intelligence Committee, 9/8/2006 pdf file] But regarding that meeting, Cheney still does not deny it took place, even though it has been widely discredited. “We don’t know. I mean, we’ve never been able to, to, to link it, and the FBI and CIA have worked it aggressively. I would say, at this point, nobody has been able to confirm…” [Meet the Press, 9/10/2006] Earlier in the year, Cheney had conceded that the meeting “has been pretty well knocked down now at this stage, that that meeting ever took place” (see March 29, 2006).

Entity Tags: Ansar al-Islam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, Mohamed Atta, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal.Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal. [Source: Defense Department / Helene C. Stikkel]The Washington Post reports in a front page story, “The clandestine US commandos whose job is to capture or kill Osama bin Laden have not received a credible lead in more than two years. Nothing from the vast US intelligence world—no tips from informants, no snippets from electronic intercepts, no points on any satellite image—has led them anywhere near the al-Qaeda leader, according to US and Pakistani officials.” It is widely believed by US intelligence that bin Laden is hiding in tribal areas of Pakistan near the Afghanistan border. Since May 2005, al-Qaeda has killed at least 23 tribal leaders in the region who are opposed to them, making intelligence collection increasingly difficult. There is no single person in charge of the US search for bin Laden with authority to direct covert operations. One counterterrorism official complains, “There’s nobody in the United States government whose job it is to find Osama bin Laden! Nobody!” However, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has become the de facto leader of the search. In recent months, President Bush has requested that the CIA “flood the zone” to gain better intelligence and efforts have stepped up. But at the same time, “Pakistan has grown increasingly reluctant to help the US search.… Pakistani and US counterterrorism and military officials admit that Pakistan has now all but stopped looking for bin Laden. ‘The dirty little secret is, [the US has] nothing, no operations, without the Paks,’ one former counterterrorism officer said.” [Washington Post, 9/10/2006]

Entity Tags: Pakistan, Stanley A. McChrystal, George W. Bush, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI, Afghanistan, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

9/11 victims’ family members Michelle Little, Christina Kminek, and Donna Marsh O’Connor.9/11 victims’ family members Michelle Little, Christina Kminek, and Donna Marsh O’Connor. [Source: Life]9/11 victims’ family members Donna Marsh O’Connor, Christina Kminek, and Michelle Little hold a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, to call for a new investigation into the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, they want to promote an independently-produced documentary that questions gaps in the official investigations of 9/11. The documentary is 9/11: Press For Truth, which focuses on the families that fought for the creation of the 9/11 Commission. “We are not crazy. We have questions,” says O’Connor. Asked: “Why had the US military defenses failed to stop any of the four hijacked planes [on 9/11]?” former Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton, who helped lead the 9/11 Commission, says the Commission looked into the issue and got conflicting answers. He says: “Were we lied to? I don’t know that answer. We certainly were given bad information.” [WTHR, 9/11/2006]

Entity Tags: 9/11: Press For Truth, Christina Kminek, Donna Marsh O’Connor, Lee Hamilton, Michelle Little

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, US Government and 9/11 Criticism

A video lasting one hour and 16 minutes is released by a man thought to be al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri to mark the fifth anniversary of 9/11. He calls on Muslims to resist the US, threatens “new events,” and says, “Your leaders are hiding from you the true extent of the disaster.” He also calls for the release of the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, and says attacks on Westeners and Jews are considered fair, as “the reality of international politics is the humiliation and repression of the Muslim at the hands of the idol-kings who dominate this world.” In addition, he comments that the war in Afghanistan “is very good” for the Taliban, and that allied troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are “doomed.” The video, which was made available by being posted on the Internet, references recent events such as a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to CNN, the video is “more technically sophisticated” than previous al-Qaeda videos, as it has subtitles, a highlights section at the beginning, and an interviewer who asks the man thought to be al-Zawahiri questions. [CNN, 9/11/2006]

Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri

Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

President Bush tells a journalist that getting Osama bin Laden is a low priority compared to getting intelligence to stop new attacks. Fred Barnes, executive director of the Weekly Standard, and some other journalists met with Bush on September 12, 2006. Asked the next day on Fox News if Bush thinks catching bin Laden is “priority number one,” Barnes replies, “Well, he said, look, you can send 100,000 special forces, that’s the figure he used, to the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan and hunt him down, but he just said that’s not a top priority use of American resources. His vision of a war on terror is one that involves intelligence to find out from people, to get tips, to follow them up and break up plots to kill Americans before they occur. That’s what happened recently in that case of the planes that were to be blown up by terrorists, we think coming from England, and that’s the top priority. He says, you know, getting Osama bin Laden is a low priority compared to that.” [Fox News, 9/13/2006]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Fred Barnes

Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Pakistani journalist Amir Mir tells CNN: “Pakistan is essentially for the Taliban. Almost their entire leadership of Taliban is hiding in Quetta.” Quetta is a Pakistani town close to the Afghan border. CNN further reports that “American intelligence officials say, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar is also living in Quetta.” Senior British government officials say they are angry Pakistan has not rounded up the Taliban leadership “who they say are planning and plotting and getting stronger from the safety of Pakistan.” [CNN, 9/12/2006] The Christian Science Monitor came to a similar conclusion in May 2006 (see May 2, 2006). Several months later, a captured Taliban spokesman will say that Omar is living in Quetta under the protection of the Pakistani ISI (see January 17, 2007).

Entity Tags: Mullah Omar, Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan

It is reported that the US has not conducted a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) about al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups since 9/11. An NIE is a formal, top-secret analysis about a particular threat combining intelligence from all relevant government agencies. Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, says, “When I left the CIA in November 2004, they had not done an NIE on al-Qaeda. In fact, there has never been an NIE on the subject since the 1990s.” The last NIE on the subject in fact was released in 1997 (see 1997 and Late 2000-September 10, 2001). Rolling Stone magazine concludes, “Today, the [NIE] process remains bogged down in interagency disputes—largely because of resistance by the Pentagon to any conclusions that would weaken its primary role in counterterrorism. As a result, the Bush administration remains uncertain about the true nature of the terrorist foes that America faces—and unable to devise an effective strategy to combat those foes.” [Rolling Stone, 9/12/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Al-Qaeda, Michael Scheuer

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez suggests that the World Trade Center could have been brought down on 9/11 with explosives. “The hypothesis is not absurd… that those towers could have been dynamited. A building never collapses like that, unless it’s with an implosion. The hypothesis that is gaining strength… is that it was the same US imperial power that planned and carried out this terrible terrorist attack or act against its own people and against citizens of all over the world. Why? To justify the aggressions that immediately were unleashed on Afghanistan, on Iraq. A plane supposedly crashed into the Pentagon, but no one ever found a single remnant of that plane.” Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro raises the same theories in a speech and calls for an independent investigation. He says: “It’s really worrisome to think that all of that could have been a great conspiracy against humanity. An independent international investigation must be carried out one day to discover the truth about the events of Sept. 11.” [Associated Press, 9/12/2006]

Entity Tags: Hugo Chavez Frias, Nicolas Maduro

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism

Security camera footage of the Pentagon attack, from the nearby Doubletree Hotel.Security camera footage of the Pentagon attack, from the nearby Doubletree Hotel. [Source: Public domain]In mid-September 2006, the FBI releases never-before-seen footage from security cameras at a Citgo gas station near the Pentagon, recorded on the morning of 9/11. Agents seized the video just minutes after the attack on the Pentagon (see (After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FBI releases it in response to a Freedom of Information Act request and related lawsuit by the public interest group Judicial Watch. Many people believed the footage would show the strike on the Pentagon. However, the video, depicting views from the gas station’s six security cameras, shows that these cameras apparently did not capture it. The footage has been partially obscured by the FBI, though, to protect the privacy of individuals who were in the Citgo convenience store at the time it was recorded. [Citgo, 9/11/2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/13/2006 pdf file; CNS News, 9/15/2006; Judicial Watch, 9/15/2006] Early in December, the FBI releases more security camera footage from the morning of 9/11, taken from atop the Doubletree Hotel in Arlington, Virginia, which it also seized after the attacks. This is also in response to the Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch and others. The grainy video does not show American Airlines 77 in flight, but does show the explosion after the Pentagon was hit. According to Judicial Watch, this “seemingly contradicts a sworn FBI affidavit in a related case claiming that the Doubletree security recordings ‘did not show the impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.’” [Doubletree Hotel, 9/11/2001; CNN, 12/2/2006; KWTX, 12/4/2006; Judicial Watch, 12/7/2006] In the weeks after 9/11, it was reported that FBI investigators confiscated footage of the impact on the Pentagon from a hotel nearby (see September 21, 2001). Whether the hotel referred to was the Doubletree is unknown. Judicial Watch is trying to obtain 9/11 footage from cameras at the Sheraton National Hotel, which is also near the Pentagon. [Leader-Telegram, 9/12/2001; Judicial Watch, 5/16/2006; CNN, 5/17/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Judicial Watch

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) holds a press briefing offering its analysis of the 9/11 attacks. Speaking at the event are former UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, AEI fellow David Wurmser, AEI fellow Michael Ledeen, and one-time Harvard assistant professor Laurie Mylroie. Speaking first is Mylroie, who argues that al-Qaeda could not have pulled the attacks off without the help of Saddam Hussein. “There has been no clear demonstration that Osama bin Laden was involved in Tuesday’s assault on the United States, but there’s been a lot of speculation to that effect, and it may turn out that he is. So assume that he is because I think the key question will be, how likely is it that Osama bin Laden’s group or any other group carried out these attacks alone, unassisted by a state? I’d like to suggest that it is extremely unlikely—in fact, next to impossible.” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 67]

Entity Tags: Michael Ledeen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Newt Gingrich, Laurie Mylroie, David Wurmser, American Enterprise Institute

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links

Two simultaneous suicide attacks on oil and gas installations in Yemen fail. The Safer refinery in Marib and the al-Dhabba terminal in Hadramout are attacked by four suicide bombers with car bombs, but Yemeni security forces blow the cars up just before they reach their targets. The four suicide bombers and one security guard are killed. The attacks come just a few days after al-Qaeda number two leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called for attacks on oil facilities in the Persian Gulf region. A Yemeni court later sentences 32 men to between two and 15 years in jail for their roles in the attacks. Three of them are alleged al-Qaeda operatives tried in absentia who escaped from prison earlier in 2006 (see February 3, 2006). [BBC, 11/7/2007] Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam for several of the 9/11 hijackers while they lived in the US, was arrested in Yemen earlier in the month (see Early September 2006-December 2007). He allegedly also has a role preparing for the foiled attacks. [Australian, 11/3/2006; Australian, 11/4/2006] The attempted attacks also come just days before Yemen’s presidential elections. Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh, in power since 1978, quickly uses the attacks to criticize his opponent, because one of the opponents’ guards was accused of being involved. The guard is later acquitted. Saleh wins reelection. [New York Times, 3/1/2008] In 2008, one anonymous senior Yemeni official will tell the Washington Post that some important al-Qaeda members have had a long relationship with Yemen’s intelligence agencies and have targeted political opponents in the past. [Washington Post, 5/4/2008]

Entity Tags: Anwar al-Awlaki, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda, Ali Abdallah Saleh

Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks

Category Tags: Yemeni Militant Collusion, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks, Anwar Al-Awlaki

At a press conference, President Bush discusses information gained from the interrogation of 9/11 mastermind reveals Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). In an apparent reference to the 9/11 attacks, Bush says that KSM “described the design of plane attacks on buildings inside the US and how operatives were directed to carry them out.… He told us the operatives had been instructed to ensure that the explosives went off at a point that was high enough to prevent people trapped above from escaping.” [New York Times, 9/15/2006] It is not clear if Bush really meant to say explosives or if this was a verbal slip-up.

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, WTC Investigation

Sir Richard Dannatt.Sir Richard Dannatt. [Source: Associated Press]The London Times later reports that British forces in Afghanistan have cut a secret truce with the Taliban around this time, ceding authority in a portion of the Helmand province of southern Afghanistan to Taliban forces and agreeing to withdraw entirely from the region. The region centers around the town of Musa Qala, where British forces have sustained heavy losses attempting to defend a government outpost. Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the British Army, has recently warned that British troops in Afghanistan were stretched to their capacity and can only “just” cope with the demands placed on them. According to the truce, both Taliban and British forces will withdraw from the region, but few believe the Taliban will adhere to the agreement. A British officer concedes, “There is always a risk. But if it works, it will provide a good template for the rest of Helmand. The people of Sangin are already saying they want a similar deal.” One British officer sent a recent e-mail, published days earlier, saying in frustration, “We are not having an effect on the average Afghan. At the moment we are no better than the Taliban in their eyes, as all they can see is us moving into an area, blowing things up and leaving, which is very sad.” [London Times, 10/1/2006]

Entity Tags: Taliban, British Army, Richard Dannatt

Category Tags: Afghanistan

The Defense Department’s office of the inspector general issues a report saying allegations made by members of the Able Danger program are unfounded. According to the inspector general, Able Danger did not identify any of the 9/11 hijackers before the attacks, the program’s members were not prevented from sharing this information with the FBI, and there was no retaliation against one person involved in the program, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Schaffer, after he highlighted the issue in the media. The basis for the main claim that the hijackers were not identified before 9/11 is that the recollections of the people who claim lead hijacker Mohamed Atta was identified “varied significantly.” In addition, the names of Atta and the other 9/11 hijackers said to have been identified by the program were not present in any surviving documentation, although the vast majority of the data gathered by the Able Danger program was destroyed several years ago (see May-June 2000). Concerning the blocking of passage of information to the FBI, the inspector general identified only one occasion when this may have happened, but found that such blocking “would not have been inappropriate under the circumstances.” [Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, 9/18/2006 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (DoD), US Department of Defense

Category Tags: Able Danger

Omar Khyam somewhere in the mountains of Pakistan, date unknown.Omar Khyam somewhere in the mountains of Pakistan, date unknown. [Source: Public domain]A man on trial in Britain for participation in a fertilizer bomb plot halts his testimony, claiming that Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency has threatened his family in Pakistan if he continues to talk. Omar Khyam, a Pakistani-Briton, is accused of leading an al-Qaeda linked plot to blow up an unknown target in Britain (see Early 2003-April 6, 2004). Six others are on trial. In testimony on previous days, Khyam confessed to attending a militant training camp in 2000 in the mountains above Rawalpindi, Pakistan. He says that the camp was run by the ISI, and he trained with AK-47 rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. But on the third day of testimony, when asked if he had bought the fertilizer to make a bomb in Britain, he responds: “Before we go on to that topic, I just want to say the ISI in Pakistan has had words with my family relating to what I have been saying about them. I think they are worried I might reveal more about them, so right now, as much as I want to clarify matters, the priority for me has to be the safety of my family so I am going to stop.” He adds, “I am not going to discuss anything related to the ISI any more or my evidence.” [Guardian, 9/19/2006; BBC, 4/30/2007] The ISI has a reputation of arresting family members and threatening them to accomplish their goals. For instance, when Saeed Sheikh was wanted for the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl, the ISI reportedly rounded up 10 members of his family and threatened to harm them, forcing him to turn himself in to the ISI. He later refused to discuss his connection to the ISI, only saying: “I will not discuss this subject. I do not want my family to be killed” (see February 5, 2002). [Vanity Fair, 8/2002] Khyam will be found guilty and sentenced to life in prison (see Early 2003-April 6, 2004).

Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, Omar Khyam, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, NATO supreme commander General James L. Jones testifies that the Taliban headquarters is in Quetta, Pakistan. The Taliban presence there has been widely known in intelligence circles since at least 2003 (see April 22, 2003), but this marks the first time a major US figure publicly acknowledges the fact. However, the US still is not pressuring Pakistan very much over the issue. For instance, President Bush did not even bring up the issue when he hosted a dinner recently for Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. [International Herald Tribune, 10/12/2006]

Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, George W. Bush, Taliban, James L. Jones, Pervez Musharraf

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan

NATO Commander Gen. James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, says that the Taliban and al-Qaeda continue to profit from the sale of opium in Afghanistan. He says: “We’re losing ground. It affects the insurgency because there’s increasing evidence that a lot of funding goes from the narcotics traffickers to the criminal elements, to what’s left of al-Qaeda, to the Taliban and anyone else that wants to create mischief.” [ABC News, 9/21/2006]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, James L. Jones

Category Tags: Drugs, Afghanistan

Osama bin Laden is again rumored to be dead. The rumor is first sparked by the French newspaper L’Est Republicain, which publishes what it describes as a confidential document from the French intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure saying that bin Laden died of typhoid on August 23. The report is apparently based on information from Saudi Arabian intelligence. The issue becomes, as Time magazine puts it, “the question of the day,” but the accuracy of the report is questioned by French President Jacques Chirac, Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Turki al-Faisal, CIA Director Michael Hayden, and others, who all tell the media they think bin Laden may still be alive. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, remarks that leaks can be used for manipulation, saying, “When there are leaks… one can say that [they] were done especially.” [Time, 9/23/2006; MSNBC, 9/24/2006] Another video of bin Laden footage will be released a week later (see September 30, 2006), apparently by the US. A rumor of bin Laden’s death also preceded an audiotape released earlier in the year (see January 16, 2006, January 19, 2006, and January 19, 2006).

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Osama bin Laden, Jacques Chirac, Michael Hayden, Al-Qaeda, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, Turki al-Faisal

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

The 9/11 Commission interviewed presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in 2004 (see April 29, 2004) but the details of what was revealed in these interviews were not included in the commission’s final report (with one exception, see August 6, 2001). On this day, former 9/11 Commission Richard Ben-Veniste says, “I had hoped that we had—we would have made both the Clinton interview and the Bush interview a part of our report, but that was not to be. I was outvoted on that question.… I didn’t have the votes.… I think the question was that there was a degree of confidentiality associated with that and that we would take from that the output that is reflected in the report, but go no further. And that until some five years’ time after our work, we would keep that confidential. I thought we would be better to make all of the information that we had available to the public and make our report as transparent as possible so that the American public could have that.” [CNN, 9/25/2006]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Richard Ben-Veniste, 9/11 Commission, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

Omar al-Faruq in an al-Qaeda propaganda video filmed not long before his death.Omar al-Faruq in an al-Qaeda propaganda video filmed not long before his death. [Source: Public domain]An al-Qaeda leader who escaped from a US prison the year before is killed in Iraq. Omar al-Faruq is killed in a pre-dawn raid by British soldiers in the city of Basra. About 250 soldiers wearing night vision goggles attempted to take al-Faruq alive, but he is killed in a shoot-out. Al-Faruq was born to Iraqi parents and grew up in neighboring Kuwait. Counterterrorism expert Rita Katz comments: “It’s surprising for someone like him to be able to make it to Iraq, where everyone knows how he looks. The guy has long al-Qaeda records.” Experts are especially surprised to find he was in Basra, a heavily Shiite area not friendly to Sunni militants like al-Faruq. A neighbor says that al-Faruq arrived about a month earlier and had relatives in a nearby Sunni enclave. Al-Faruq escaped from the US-run Bagram prison in Afghanistan in July 2005 (see July 11, 2005). [New York Times, 9/26/2006]

Entity Tags: Rita Katz, Omar al-Faruq

Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

President Musharraf appeared on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart to promote his new book.President Musharraf appeared on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart to promote his new book. [Source: Adam Rountree / AP]President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan publishes his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, generating a number of controversies:
bullet He speculates that Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl (see January 23, 2002) and is said to have wired money to the 9/11 hijackers (see Early August 2001), may have been recruited by MI6 in the 1990s (see Before April 1993). The Independent will also comment, “he does not mention that British-born Omar Saeed Sheikh, who planned the Pearl abduction, had surrendered a week before his arrest was announced to a general with intelligence links who was Musharraf’s friend. What happened during that week?” [Independent, 11/21/2006]
bullet Musharraf writes, “Those who habitually accuse us of not doing enough in the war on terror should simply ask the CIA how much prize money it has paid to the Government of Pakistan.” [Press Trust of India, 9/28/2006] However, US law forbids rewards being paid to a government. The US Justice Department says: “We didn’t know about this. It should not happen. These bounty payments are for private individuals who help to trace terrorists on the FBI’s most-wanted list, not foreign governments.” [London Times, 9/26/2006] Musharraf then backtracks and claims the Government of Pakistan has not received any money from the US for capturing people. [Press Trust of India, 9/28/2006]
bullet He also claims that State Department Official Richard Armitage threatened that if Pakistan did not co-operate with the “war on terror,” the US would bomb it “back into the stone age” (see September 13-15, 2001).
The book does not receive good reviews. For example, the Independent calls it “self-serving and self-indulgent” and concludes that “Readers who want to understand contemporary Pakistan deserve a more honest book.” [Independent, 11/21/2006] In a review with the sub-heading “Most of Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s new book cannot be believed,” the Wall Street Journal writes, “The book is not so much an autobiography as a highly selective auto-hagiography, by turns self-congratulatory, narcissistic, and mendacious.” [Wall Street Journal, 10/19/2006]

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Saeed Sheikh, US Department of Justice, Richard Armitage

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Mahmood Ahmed, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11

The BBC reports on a leaked report about Pakistan from a senior officer at the Defence Academy, a think tank run by the British Ministry of Defence. The author remains anonymous, but he is said to be a man with a military background linked to the MI6, Britain’s external intelligence service. The Ministry of Defence and British government in general say it does not represent their official views. The paper has the following conclusions about Pakistan and the war on terrorism:
bullet Pakistan is not stable, and in fact is on the edge of chaos.
bullet The Pakistani government, through its ISI intelligence agency, has been indirectly supporting terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and attacks overseas, such as the 7/7 London bombings.
bullet Western governments have been turning a blind eye towards Pakistan’s instability and indirect protection of al-Qaeda.
bullet The US and Britain cannot hope to win against Islamist militant group until they identify the real enemies and seek to implement a more just vision. This will require Pakistan to move away from military rule and for the ISI to be dismantled and replaced.
bullet Time is running out for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The US is likely to withdraw his funding and possibly even his protection. Without US support, he is unlikely to stay in power for long.
bullet The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not gone well. The war in Iraq in particular has been a great recruitment tool for extremists across the Muslim world.
bullet A secret deal to extricate British troops from Iraq so they could focus on Afghanistan failed when British military leaders were overruled by their civilian leaders.
bullet The enemy the West has identified—terrorism—is the wrong target. As an idea, it cannot be defeated. [BBC Newsnight, 9/28/2006; BBC, 9/28/2006]
bullet The West’s fight against extremism is going nowhere with no end in sight.
bullet Britain should use its military links with Pakistan’s army at a senior level to persuade Musharraf to step down, accept free elections, and dismantle the ISI.
The report’s author traveled to Pakistan in June 2006 as part of a delegation on a fact-finding visit. He held interviews with the Pakistani officials and academics to prepare a report about the country and the global war on terror. [London Times, 9/28/2006] Musharraf rejects the report’s conclusions. He tells the BBC, “There is perfect co-ordination going on” between Pakistan and Western countries on terrorism, and there is “intelligence and operational co-ordination at the strategic level, at the tactical level.” He rejects the idea that the ISI should be dismantled. “I totally, 200% reject it. I reject it from anybody - [Ministry of Defence] or anyone who tells me to dismantle ISI.” [BBC, 9/28/2006]

Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pervez Musharraf, Ministry of Defence, Defence Academy, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11

Air Force Colonel Morris Davis.Air Force Colonel Morris Davis. [Source: US Department of Defense]Politically motivated officials at the Pentagon push for convictions of high-profile detainees ahead of the 2008 elections, according to Air Force Colonel Morris Davis, lead prosecutor for terrorism trials at Guantanamo Bay. Davis, whose later resignation is partially caused by this pressure (see July 2007), says the strategic political value of such trials is discussed at a meeting on this day, and that officials prefer “sexy” cases, rather than those that are most solid or ready to go. Davis will later say: “There was a big concern that the election of 2008 is coming up.… People wanted to get the cases going. There was a rush to get high-interest cases into court at the expense of openness.” [Washington Post, 10/20/2007] Davis specifically alleges that Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England says to him and other lawyers, “We need to think about charging some of the high-value detainees because there could be strategic political value to charging some of these detainees before the election.” [Miami Herald, 3/28/2008]

Entity Tags: Morris Davis, Gordon England

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties, 2008 Elections

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Original cover to Woodward’s ‘State of Denial.’Original cover to Woodward’s ‘State of Denial.’ [Source: Barnes and Noble]Journalist Bob Woodward’s new book State of Denial is released. While the book focuses mainly on politics regarding the Iraq war, it also describes an urgent warning that then-CIA Director George Tenet gave to Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser at the time, and other White House officials on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). [New York Times, 9/29/2006; New York Daily News, 9/29/2006; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] This warning had been mentioned in passing in a 2002 Time magazine article, but it had escaped widespread attention until Woodward’s book. [Time, 8/4/2002] The meeting is particularly controversial because neither the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry nor the 9/11 Commission mentioned in it in their final reports. The 9/11 Commission had learned about it from Tenet in early 2004 (see January 28, 2004). Rice and a number of 9/11 Commissioners deny knowing about the July meeting for several days, until documentation surfaces in the media detailing the meeting and Tenet’s testimony to the commission (see October 1-2, 2006 and September 30-October 3, 2006). Details about the July meeting and surrounding controversies are reported on by the mainstream media for about a week, but there are no articles on it in any prominent newspaper after October 3, 2006. On October 5, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) formally asks Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for hearings about the revelations in Woodward’s book, including controversies surrounding the July meeting. Kerry says in a letter to Lugar, “It is necessary to understand the mistakes of the past in order to ensure they are not repeated, and having testimony from the parties under oath will help to sharpen recollections and clarify the exact nature of this important meeting.” However, no hearings take place. [Kerry, 10/5/2006]

Entity Tags: Bob Woodward, Condoleezza Rice, Bob Kerry, 9/11 Commission

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

Senator Patrick Leahy.Senator Patrick Leahy. [Source: AP]During an interview with Amy Goodman on the radio program Democracy Now!, long-time Democratic senator Patrick Leahy says Congress is not asking two essential questions about the Bush administration’s failure to heed pre-9/11 warnings and to get Osama bin Laden after the attacks: “And, of course, the two questions that the Congress would not ask, because the Republicans won’t allow it, is, why did 9/11 happen on George Bush’s watch when he had clear warnings that it was going to happen? Why did they allow it to happen? And secondly, when they had Osama bin Laden cornered, why didn’t they get him? Had there been an independent Congress, one that could ask questions, these questions would have been asked years ago. We’d be much better off. We would have had the answers to that.” [Democracy Now!, 9/29/2006]

Entity Tags: Patrick J. Leahy

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, Escape From Afghanistan

The above still is from the bin Laden speech footage released in late 2006, and the below still is from the film <i>The Road to Guantanamo</i> released in early 2006. The date stamps are 1/8/2000 and 8/1/2000. In the film it is speculated the speech could have been from January or August 2000.The above still is from the bin Laden speech footage released in late 2006, and the below still is from the film The Road to Guantanamo released in early 2006. The date stamps are 1/8/2000 and 8/1/2000. In the film it is speculated the speech could have been from January or August 2000. [Source: London Times / Sony Pictures]A new videotape showing bin Laden, Mohamed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah in Afghanistan before 9/11 is leaked to the media. NBC reports that the US military obtained the tape at an al-Qaeda compound in Afghanistan in late 2001. NBC filed a freedom of information act request for the video earlier in 2006, but still had not gotten copies when the London Times somehow got a copy and released it. [MSNBC, 9/30/2006] The Times will only say the video was passed to them “through a previously tested channel. On condition of anonymity, sources from both al-Qaeda and the United States have confirmed its authenticity.” There is no sound, and the Times claims that “lip-readers have failed to decipher it, according to a US source.” One part of the tape shows bin Laden addressing a crowd of about 100 followers on January 8, 2000. Another part of the tape shows Atta and Jarrah together at an Afghanistan training camp on January 18, 2000, apparently while they read their wills. [London Times, 10/1/2006] Ben Venzke, head of a group monitoring terrorism communications called the IntelCentre, says, “It is highly unlikely that al-Qaeda wanted the material to be released in this manner and it is not consistent with any previous release.” He notes that bin Laden previously said he was saving Atta’s last will for a special occasion. This release could have spoiled those plans. Dia Rashwan, an Egyptian expert on militant groups, finds it strange the cameraman focuses on bin Laden’s audience instead of on bin Laden, clearly identifying many of the people in the crowd. “Was this a video by al-Qaeda or by a security agency? I have never seen such a video.” [Associated Press, 10/3/2006] Further, it is noted on the Internet that footage of bin Laden’s speech is remarkably similar to footage of a bin Laden speech in The Road to Guantanamo, a docu-drama released in March 2006. While the film is mostly made up of reenactments, it is based on the real cases of several Guantanamo prisoners and shows one of them being asked to identify himself in the speech footage in 2003.

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Dia Rashwan, Ben Venzke, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Video footage of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, apparently at a night campsite.Video footage of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, apparently at a night campsite. [Source: IntelCenter]In autumn 2006, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, said to be an adviser to Osama bin Laden, is captured and then detained in a secret CIA prison (see Autumn 2006). President Bush announced on September 6, 2006 that the secret CIA prisons were emptied, at least temporarily (see September 2-3, 2006 and September 6, 2006), and it is not known if al-Hadi is transferred to CIA custody before or after this announcement. The CIA keeps al-Hadi’s detention secret from not only the public but also from the Red Cross until late April 2007, when it is publicly announced that al-Hadi has been transferred to the US military prison at Guantanamo. Only then is the Red Cross allowed to examine him. President Bush’s September 2006 announcement was in response to a US Supreme Court decision that rules that all detainees, including those like al-Hadi held in secret CIA prisons, are protected by some provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Then in October 2006 Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, which forbids abuse of all detainees in US custody, including those in CIA custody. The CIA claims that it has no legal responsibility to alert the Red Cross about detainees such as al-Hadi, but without notifying watchdog organizations such as the Red Cross, there is no way to really know if detainees being held by the CIA are being illegally abused or not. Mary Ellen O’Connell, a professor of international law at Notre Dame Law School, says al-Hadi’s case raises the possibility that President Bush has secretly given the CIA a new mandate to operate outside the constraints of the Military Commissions Act: “This suggests that the president has signed some sort of additional authority for the CIA.” [Salon, 5/22/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Committee of the Red Cross, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

In late September 2006, a new book by Bob Woodward reveals that CIA Director Tenet and CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave National Security Adviser Rice their most urgent warning about a likely upcoming al-Qaeda attack (see July 10, 2001 and September 29, 2006). Tenet detailed this meeting to the 9/11 Commission in early 2004 (see January 28, 2004), but it was not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission’s final report later that year. According to the Washington Post, “Though the investigators had access to all the paperwork on the meeting, Black felt there were things the commissions wanted to know about and things they didn’t want to know about.” [Washington Post, 10/1/2006] The 9/11 Commissioners initially vigorously deny that they were not told about the meeting. For instance, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick says she checked with commission staff who told her they were never told about a meeting on that date. She says, “We didn’t know about the meeting itself. I can assure you it would have been in our report if we had known to ask about it.” [Washington Post, 9/30/2006] Commissioner Tim Roemer says, “None of this was shared with us in hours of private interviews, including interviews under oath, nor do we have any paper on this. I’m deeply disturbed by this. I’m furious.” Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste says the meeting “was never mentioned to us.” Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, says the commissioners and their staff had heard nothing in their private interviews with Tenet and Black to suggest that they made such a dire presentation to Rice. “If we had heard something that drew our attention to this meeting, it would have been a huge thing.” [New York Times, 10/2/2006] However, on October 3, 2006, a transcript of Tenet’s private testimony to the 9/11 Commission is leaked to reporters and clearly shows that Tenet did warn Rice of an imminent al-Qaeda threat on July 10, 2001. Ben-Veniste, who attended the meeting along with Zelikow and other staff members, now confirms the meeting did take place and claims to recall details of it, even though he, Zelikow, and other 9/11 Commissioners had denied the existence of the meeting as recently as the day before. In the transcript, Tenet says “the system was blinking red” at the time. This statement becomes a chapter title in the 9/11 Commission’s final report but the report, which normally has detailed footnotes, does not make it clear when Tenet said it. [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] Zelikow had close ties to Rice before joining the 9/11 Commission, having co-written a book with her (see March 21, 2004), and became one of her key aides after the commission disbanded (see February 28, 2005). Zelikow does not respond to requests for comments after Tenet’s transcript surfaces. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006; Washington Post, 10/3/2006]

Entity Tags: Richard Ben-Veniste, Tim Roemer, Jamie Gorelick, George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, Cofer Black

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Investigations

Mohammed Haydar Zammar, an alleged member of al-Qaeda’s Hamburg, Germany, cell with a few of the 9/11 hijackers, is discovered in Syrian custody. It had been known that Zammar was arrested in late 2001 in Morocco and renditioned to Syria for likely torture and interrogation (see October 27-November 2001 and December 2001). However, his imprisonment had never been officially admitted by the Syrian government and his exact location was unknown. But this month, a European Union official monitoring trials in Damascus, Syria, sees Zammar in a state security court and notifies the German Embassy. According to Guel Pinar, Zammar’s lawyer in Germany, if it had not been for the chance encounter, Zammar might have remained out of sight forever. “No one in the world would have known,” she will say. [Washington Post, 2/5/2007] Zammar has been secretly held without trial or charge for five years, but shortly after the sighting, he will be tried and sentenced (see February 11, 2007).

Entity Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Guel Pinar

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar, 9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings, Al-Qaeda in Germany

Secretary of State Rice says that she does not recall the meeting on July 10, 2001, when CIA Director Tenet and other officials briefed her about the al-Qaeda threat (see July 10, 2001). “What I am quite certain of is that I would remember if I was told, as this account apparently says, that there was about to be an attack in the United States, and the idea that I would somehow have ignored that I find incomprehensible.” [Associated Press, 10/2/2006] Rice says she has no recollection of what she variously calls “the supposed meeting” and “the emergency so-called meeting.” [Editor & Publisher, 10/1/2006; McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] The Washington Post comments that “Rice added to the confusion… by strongly suggesting that the meeting may never have occurred at all—even though administration officials had conceded for several days that it had.” Hours after Rice’s latest denial, the State Department confirms that documents show Rice did attend such a meeting on that date. However, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack then says, “The briefing was a summary of the threat reporting from the previous weeks. There was nothing new.” The Washington Post notes that when it was pointed out to McCormack that Rice asked for the briefing to be shown to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft (see July 11-17, 2001), “McCormack was unable to explain why Rice felt the briefing should be repeated if it did not include new material.” [Washington Post, 10/3/2006]

Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Sean McCormack, Condoleezza Rice, US Department of State, Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Denials, Other 9/11 Investigations, Warning Signs, 9/11 Investigations

Lieutenant General David Richards, the British general commanding NATO troops in Afghanistan, meets with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf on October 9, 2006, in an effort to persuade him to stop the Pakistani ISI from training Taliban fighters to attack US and British soldiers in Afghanistan. The day before, he tells the Sunday Times there is “a Taliban problem on the Pakistan side of the border.… Undoubtedly something has got to happen.” Richards has evidence compiled by NATO, US, and Afghan intelligence of satellite pictures and videos showing training camps for Taliban soldiers and suicide bombers inside Pakistan. The evidence includes the exact address of where top Taliban leader Mullah Omar lives in Pakistan. Richards wants Pakistan to arrest Omar and other Taliban leaders. One senior US commander tells the Times: “We just can’t ignore it any more. Musharraf’s got to prove which side he is on.” [Sunday Times (London), 10/8/2006] What happens between Richards and Musharraf is unknown, but there are no subsequent signs of the ISI reducing its support for the Taliban or of Pakistan arresting Taliban leaders.

Entity Tags: Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, David Richards, Pervez Musharraf, Mullah Omar

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan

Vice President Cheney linked the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program to the case of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi.Vice President Cheney linked the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program to the case of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. [Source: White House]Vice President Dick Cheney justifies an NSA program for warrantless surveillance of conversations between the US and other countries by referring to communications between 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi in the US and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). The calls were intercepted by the NSA, but this did not help the US roll up the plot. Echoing remarks previously made by President Bush (see December 17, 2005), Cheney says: “If you’ll recall, the 9/11 Commission focused criticism on the nation’s inability to uncover links between terrorists at home and terrorists overseas [note: the 9/11 Commission’s final report does not actually say this (see December 17, 2005)]. The term that was used is ‘connecting the dots’—and the fact is that one small piece of data might very well make it possible to save thousands of lives. If this program had been in place before 9/11, we might have been able to prevent it because we had two terrorists living in San Diego, contacting terrorist-related numbers overseas.” [Office of the Vice President, 8/25/2006] Before 9/11, the NSA was entitled to pass on information about the calls to the FBI, but did not do so, even though the FBI had specifically asked for information about calls between the communications hub in Yemen and the US (see Late 1998 and (Spring 2000)). Various explanations for this failure are offered after 9/11 (see Summer 2002-Summer 2004 and March 15, 2004 and After).

Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub

Several days before US midterm elections, President Bush is asked at a press conference if the US is winning the war on terror. He replies: “Absolutely, we’re winning. Al-Qaeda is on the run.” He adds: “We’re winning, and we will win, unless we leave before the job is done. And the crucial battle right now is Iraq.” [White House, 10/25/2006]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Majid Khan.Majid Khan. [Source: Public domain via Washington Post]The Bush administration submits documents to US District Judge Reggie B. Walton arguing that Majid Khan, a Guatanamo detainee who was held in the secret CIA prison system for three years, cannot be allowed access to lawyers because he may reveal what interrogation techniques were used on him. CIA Information Review Officer Marilyn A. Dorn says in an affidavit that since “detained by CIA in this program, he may have come into possession of information, including locations of detention, conditions of detention, and alternative interrogation techniques that is classified at the TOP SECRET//SCI [sensitive compartmented information] level.” [Washington Post, 11/4/2006]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Reggie B. Walton, Majid Khan

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Mohammad-Hadi Homayoun.Mohammad-Hadi Homayoun. [Source: Cultural Heritage News (Tehran)]Mohammad-Hadi Homayoun, Iran’s deputy minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, declares during a conference in Moscow that the 9/11 attacks were a hoax orchestrated by the US government. “What we watched on the TVs regarding the slamming of two planes into the New York Twin Towers, was in fact a make-believe scene. The sky-scrapers were destroyed through bomb explosions and afterwards the massive US media propaganda and the crusade issue began.” [Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 10/27/2006; Cultural Heritage News Agency (Tehran), 3/5/2007]

Entity Tags: Mohammad-Hadi Homayoun

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism

The Chenagai madrassa after the Predator strike.The Chenagai madrassa after the Predator strike. [Source: BBC]The US launches a Predator drone missile strike on a madrassa (religious school) in the Bajour district of Pakistan’s tribal region, then Pakistan sends in helicopters to attack the survivors. The aim is to kill al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, but he is not there. Pakistani officials initially claim that a number of al-Qaeda operatives are killed, including Abu Ubaida al-Masri, an operational leader. But the next day they only say that some Taliban members are killed. [ABC News, 10/30/2006; ABC News, 10/31/2006] The attack is said to have killed 82, many of them students at the madrassa located in Chenagai, a hamlet of Damadola village, which had been hit by a Predator strike earlier in the year (see January 13, 2006). [London Times, 11/26/2006]

Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Ubaida al-Masri, Taliban

Category Tags: Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan, Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Mounir El Motassadeq, a former associate of three of the 9/11 hijackers, is convicted of assisting the 9/11 attacks. The conviction is handed down by a federal appeals court in Germany, where El Motassadeq had known the hijackers. El Motassadeq had previously been convicted of being a member of a terrorist organization (see August 19, 2005), but was acquitted on similar charges of assisting the 9/11 attacks (see March 3, 2004). However, the appeals court decides this decision was wrong and that El Motassadeq should be convicted for being an accessory to the murders of the 246 people killed on the airliners on 9/11, although sentence should be imposed by a lower court. El Motassadeq admits having trained in Afghanistan and having known three of the hijackers—Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—but says he knew nothing of their plans. However, the court finds he did know they intended to crash airliners and assisted the hijackers by transferring money to them and making it seem like they were still attending university in Germany. As El Motassadeq did not know the planned targets, he cannot be convicted of assisting the murders of the thousands of people who died in the World Trade Center and Pentagon. [New York Times, 1/9/2007; Associated Press, 1/9/2007] El Motassadeq will later be sentenced to 15 years in jail for the offense (see January 8, 2007).

Entity Tags: Mounir El Motassadeq

Category Tags: 9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings, Al-Qaeda in Germany

On September 5, 2006, the government of Pakistan signs an agreement known as the Waziristan Accord with Taliban-linked militants in the tribal area of Pakistan near the border of Afghanistan known as North Waziristan (see September 5, 2006), and President Bush quickly gave his public approval to the deal (see September 7, 2006). By November 2006, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, head of US forces in Afghanistan, says that the number of Taliban attacks out of North Waziristan has tripled since the deal was signed. On December 26, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher says, “The Taliban have been able to use [the tribal regions] for sanctuary, and for command and control, and for regrouping and supply.” The State Department decides that the deal has been a failure for US policy, just as two previous deals with militants in the border region had been. But the Pakistani government continues to stick to the terms of the deal well into 2007. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 277]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Karl Eikenberry, Richard A. Boucher

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

After learning that a new book published by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (see September 25, 2006) says that alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) either killed American reporter Daniel Pearl or played a leading role in the murder (see January 31, 2002), the lawyer for Saeed Sheikh, one of the kidnappers, says he plans to use the book in an appeal. Sheikh was found guilty of the kidnapping (see April 5, 2002), but the lawyer, Rai Bashir, says, “I’m going to submit an application that [Musharraf’s] book be used as a piece of evidence. The head of state has exonerated [Sheikh and his accomplices].” [Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/2006] Bashir will also make similar comments after KSM says that he carried out the murder in early 2007 (see March 10, 2007): “In the next court hearing, I am going to submit the recent statement by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in which he said he himself beheaded the US journalist… From day one, my contention was that the evidence presented in court was not strong enough to lead to the conviction of my client.” [Guardian, 3/19/2007] Sheikh was convicted in July 2002 (see July 15, 2002). As of late July 2005, the appeal proceedings had been adjourned thirty-two times. [International Herald Tribune, 7/29/2005] As of 2007, his appeal process is still in limbo.

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Rai Bashir, Saeed Sheikh

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh

Rumsfeld leaving the Defense Department.Rumsfeld leaving the Defense Department. [Source: Boston Globe]Donald Rumsfeld resigns as US defense secretary. On November 6, he writes a letter telling President Bush of his resignation. Bush reads the letter the next day, which is also the date for midterm elections in the US, in which the Democratic Party wins majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives. Bush publicly announces the resignation the next day. No explanation is given for the delay in making the announcement. [Reuters, 8/15/2007]
Replaced by Gates - Rumsfeld is formally replaced by Robert Gates on December 18, 2006. According to a retired general who worked closely with the first Bush administration, the Gates nomination means that George H.W. Bush, his close political advisers—Brent Scowcroft, James Baker—and the current President Bush are saying that “winning the 2008 election is more important than any individual. The issue for them is how to preserve the Republican agenda. The Old Guard wants to isolate Cheney and give their girl, Condoleezza Rice, a chance to perform.” It takes Scowcroft, Baker, and the elder Bush working together to oppose Cheney, the general says. “One guy can’t do it.” Other sources close to the Bush family say that the choice of Gates to replace Rumsfeld is more complex than the general describes, and any “victory” by the “Old Guard” may be illusory. A former senior intelligence official asks rhetorically: “A week before the election, the Republicans were saying that a Democratic victory was the seed of American retreat, and now Bush and Cheney are going to change their national security policies? Cheney knew this was coming. Dropping Rummy after the election looked like a conciliatory move—‘You’re right, Democrats. We got a new guy and we’re looking at all the options. Nothing is ruled out.’” In reality, the former official says, Gates is being brought in to give the White House the credibility it needs in continuing its policies towards Iran and Iraq.
New Approach towards Iran? - Gates also has more credibility with Congress than Rumsfeld, a valuable asset if Gates needs to tell Congress that Iran’s nuclear program poses an imminent threat. “He’s not the guy who told us there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and he’ll be taken seriously by Congress.” Joseph Cirincione, a national security director for the Center for American Progress, warns: “Gates will be in favor of talking to Iran and listening to the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the neoconservatives are still there [in the White House] and still believe that chaos would be a small price for getting rid of the threat. The danger is that Gates could be the new Colin Powell—the one who opposes the policy but ends up briefing the Congress and publicly supporting it.” [New Yorker, 11/27/2006]

Entity Tags: Robert M. Gates, Joseph Cirincione, Brent Scowcroft, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, James A. Baker, George Herbert Walker Bush, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, US Military, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation, Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Speaking publicly before a Congressional committee, CIA Director Michael Hayden says that “the lessons learned in Iraq are being applied to Afghanistan” by al-Qaeda. For instance, the number of suicide bombings in Afghanistan is greatly increasing (see 2004-2007). [Rashid, 2008, pp. 282, 442] The Taliban also greatly increase the use of IEDs (improvised explosive devices), the roadside bombs which have proven highly effective in Iraq. The use of IED bombings rises from 530 times in 2005 to 1,297 in 2006. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 367]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Michael Hayden, Taliban

Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Afghanistan

A British high court approves the extradition of Haroon Rashid Aswat to the US. Many media accounts have described Aswat as the mastermind of the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005 and Late June-July 7, 2005). However, British authorities appear to be ignoring his possible connection to the 7/7 bombings and are allowing him to be extradited to the US on unrelated charges of helping to create a militant training camp in Oregon (see November 1999-Early 2000). The US has promised that he will not be sent to the prison in Guantanamo or turned over to a third country. [Guardian, 11/30/2006] As of mid-2008, Aswat has yet to be extradited.

Entity Tags: Haroon Rashid Aswat

Category Tags: Haroon Rashid Aswat, 2005 7/7 London Bombings, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

The US State Department’s Rewards for Justice program launches an advertising campaign in dozens of airports in the US. The program distributes hundreds of wanted posters featuring al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden. But strangely, the campaign is limited to the US and includes such airports as Londonderry, New Hampshire, and Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, which are not locations frequented by al-Qaeda leaders. Walter Deering, head of the Rewards for Justice program until 2003, will later point out that advertising in the wrong places can bog down investigators with false leads. “We’d get a lot of tips that were totally off the wall.” [Washington Post, 5/17/2008] Most al-Qaeda leaders are believed to be hiding in the tribal region of Pakistan near the Afghanistan border. But since at least the start of 2004, the Rewards for Justice program has been conducting little to no advertising in Pakistan (see January 2004).

Entity Tags: Walter Deering, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the US, Prince Turki al-Faisal, abruptly resigns and flies back to Saudi Arabia. His staff is reportedly shocked by his sudden departure. The explanation provided to the public is that he wants to spend more time with his family. [Washington Post, 12/10/2006] But insiders say Turki left because he was angry about dealings taking place behind his back between the previous Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar, and top White House officials (see Late November 2006 and Late 2006). [Daily Telegraph, 1/10/2007; New Yorker, 3/5/2007]

Entity Tags: Turki al-Faisal

Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

Rashid Rauf in Pakistani custody.Rashid Rauf in Pakistani custody. [Source: Farooq Naeem / Agence France-Presse]Terrorism charges are dropped in Pakistan against British-Pakistani militant Rashid Rauf, but he remains imprisoned there. Held since early August, Rauf was part of a British-based plot to blow up transatlantic airliners (see August 10, 2006). British officials have been seeking his extradition for five months, and the decision not to prosecute him in Pakistan on the charges apparently clears the way for him to be returned to Britain; although there is no extradition treaty between Pakistan and Britain, Pakistani officials indicate they are ready to send Rauf home. However, Rauf, who has denied any links with terrorism, still has to face trial next week on charges of carrying fake identity documents. His lawyer Hashmat Habib says the court’s decision to drop the terror charges clears Rauf of involvement in any bomb plots, and characterises the fake ID charges as “minor.” On the contrary, Rawalpindi police chief Saud Aziz says he will contest the court’s decision and insists Rauf had been involved in planning terrorist activities. “We did recover hydrogen peroxide from his possession and concentrated hydrogen peroxide mixed with gas can cause explosions,” he says. [Times (London), 4/12/2009] Rauf will escape prison in late 2007 in mysterious circumstances (see December 14, 2007).

Entity Tags: Rashid Rauf, Hashmat Habib, Saud Aziz

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism

Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani.Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani. [Source: Reuters]Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, a high ranking Taliban leader, is reportedly killed in Afghanistan by a US air strike. Osmani is easily the highest-ranking Taliban leader to have killed or captured since 9/11. He was in charge of Taliban operations in six provinces in Afghanistan. A Taliban official confirms his death a few days later. According to news reports, British and US forces tracked him by his satellite phone signal and bombed his vehicle once he was in an unpopulated area. [London Times, 12/24/2006; CBC News, 12/27/2006] Osmani was captured in 2002 but then apparently accidentally released a short time later (see Late July 2002).

Entity Tags: Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani

Category Tags: Afghanistan, Key Captures and Deaths

President Bush signs the Postal Reform bill and includes a signing statement asserting that the federal government has a right to search the mail of any US citizen “for foreign intelligence collection.” While White House spokesman Tony Snow insists that Bush is just clarifying current law, the New York Daily News reports that experts say Bush’s signing statement “is contrary to existing law and contradicted the bill he had just signed.” Nor do the lawmakers who drafted the law agree with Bush’s interpretation. “Despite the president’s statement that he may be able to circumvent a basic privacy protection, the new postal law continues to prohibit the government from snooping into people’s mail without a warrant,” says Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), who co-sponsored the bill. Under current law, federal agents must have a search warrant to open first-class mail. Commenting on Bush’s signing statement, Ann Beeson, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, remarks, “The signing statement raises serious questions whether he is authorizing opening of mail contrary to the Constitution and to laws enacted by Congress. What is the purpose of the signing statement if it isn’t that?” [New York Daily News, 1/4/2007; MSNBC, 1/5/2007]

Entity Tags: Ann Beeson, Henry A. Waxman, George W. Bush, Tony Snow

The Electronic Frontier Foundation files a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security in an effort to obtain more information about a secret program called the Automated Targeting System (ATS) (see 2002 and After). This program allows the government to assign terror risk numbers to American citizens who enter or leave the US. The suit demands an expedited response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request it filed earlier in the month. Frontier Foundation Senior Counsel David Sobel says, “DHS needs to provide answers, and provide them quickly, to the millions of law-abiding citizens who are worried about this ‘risk assessment’ score that will follow them throughout their lives.” [Electronic Frontier Foundation, 12/19/2006]

Entity Tags: Electronic Frontier Foundation, US Department of Homeland Security

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Internal US Security After 9/11

On December 24, 2006, Ethiopia invades Somalia with US encouragement, attacking the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist militant group that rules much of the country. The invasion is triggered because the ICU had encircled the Somali town of Baidoa, the last hold out of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the internationally recognized government of Somalia that actually controls very little of the country. Within days, the Ethiopians conquer the capital of Mogadishu and replace the ICU with the TFG. But Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia, occupying much of the country, and the ICU and other Islamist militant groups are not completely defeated. On January 5, 2007, al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri issues a message urging Somalis to “consume” the “crusader” Ethiopians “as the lions eat their prey.” [Time, 11/29/2007] The US had been quietly improving ties with Ethiopia, and had been secretly training Ethiopian forces in counterterrorism techniques for years. The US covertly assists Ethiopia’s invasion with spy satellite data and other intelligence. A secret US special forces unit, Task Force 88, launches operations into Somalia from Kenya and Ethiopia. On January 6, two US Air Force AC-130 gunships secretly arrive at a small airport in eastern Ethiopia. The next day, they carry out a strike near a small village close to the Kenyan border, attempting to kill al-Qaeda-linked militants fleeing the country. Eight people are killed, but apparently no important al-Qaeda leaders. [New York Times, 2/23/2007] A second AC-130 strike on January 23 also misses its target. It is unknown how many are killed, but the wreckage of six large trucks is later seen at the spot of the attack. But while the US strikes are unsuccessful, al-Qaeda leader Abu Talha al-Sudani is apparently killed at some point during the fighting between Ethiopian forces and Somali militants. The US will not officially say he is dead, but US officials will unofficially say he is to Time magazine later in the year. Al-Sudani is said to have been living in Somalia since 1993 and involved in al-Qaeda attacks in Kenya in 1998 and 2002. [Washington Post, 1/8/2007; Time, 11/29/2007] By summer 2007, US and Ethiopian officials will claim that the war in Somalia is over. However, the fighting, the occasional US strikes, and the Ethiopian occupation, continue. [Time, 11/29/2007]

Entity Tags: Abu Talha al-Sudani, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Transitional Federal Government (Somalia), US Military, Islamic Courts Union

Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone resigns. His resignation closely follows that of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (see November 6-December 18, 2006). Cambone, who had held his position since early 2003, was widely considered Rumsfeld’s closest aide and his “hatchet man” (see March 7, 2003). [US Department of Defense, 12/1/2006] He was in charge of many of the military’s most covert and controversial programs. Less than a year later, Cambone will be hired by QinetiQ North America (QNA), a British-owned military and intelligence contractor based in Virginia. Shortly after Cambone is hired, QNA wins a $30 million contract to provide unspecified “security services” to the US military’s Counter-Intelligence Field Activity office (CIFA). Cambone helped create and run CIFA. In 2003, CIFA launched an electronic database called Talon to collect domestic intelligence. The database later faced scrutiny when it was reported to be collecting data on anti-military protesters and peaceful demonstrators. [CorpWatch, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: QinetiQ North America, Donald Rumsfeld, Stephen A. Cambone, Counter-Intelligence Field Activity

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

CIA officer Arthur Keller allegedly hears rumors in 2007 that Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, a Pakistani militant group, is assisting Osama bin Laden with logistics in helping him hide somewhere inside Pakistan. Harkat will later be linked to the courier who lives with bin Laden in his Abbottabad, Pakistan, hideout until the US raid that kills bin Laden in 2011 (see May 2, 2011). The group also has long-standing ties to the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency. Keller had worked for the CIA in Pakistan in 2006. By 2011, he will have retired from the CIA and will tell his account about these rumors to the New York Times. Another US intelligence official will note that members of Harkat may have helped bin Laden without being aware who exactly they were helping or where he was hiding. It is unclear if the CIA investigates possible links between Harkat and bin Laden at this time, or later. [New York Times, 6/23/2011]

Entity Tags: Arthur Keller, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

In 2007, when General Nadeem Taj becomes head of the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, he allows “a number of radical ideologues associated with jihadist groups to use Abbottabad as a transit hub.” One such person is Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, head of Lashkar-e-Toiba, a Pakistani militant group sometimes linked to both the ISI and al-Qaeda. This is according to a London Times article published shortly after bin Laden is killed in Abbottabad in 2011 (see May 2, 2011). [London Times, 5/8/2011] Prior to heading the ISI, Taj was the commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, which is only 800 yards from the Abbottabad compound Osama bin Laden hid in starting around late 2005 (see Late 2005-Early 2006). Taj started that job in April 2006. [News (Islamabad), 4/24/2006] On September 29, 2008, it will be reported that the US is intensely pressuring Taj and two of his assistants to resign from the ISI because of alleged “double-dealing” with militants. [Australian, 9/29/2008] Taj will be replaced by Ahmed Shuja Pasha one day later (see September 30, 2008). [Daily Times (Lahore), 9/30/2008] Some will later say that the ISI had to have known that bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad (see May 2, 2011 and After).

Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Nadeem Taj, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

Some time this year, Said Bahaji, a member of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany along with a few of the 9/11 hijackers, speaks to his mother on the telephone, the New York Times will report in 2009. Anneliese Bahaji, Bahaji’s mother living in Germany, will tell the Times that in 2007, Bahaji “said he just wanted to call and say he’s still alive.” She will mention that he does not say where he is, and she does not hear from him afterwards. In October 2009, there will be renewed interest in Bahaji after his German passport is found in the tribal region of Pakistan (see Late October 2009). Bahaji’s mother will also mention that Said has a Moroccan passport, and he may travel using that. [New York Times, 10/30/2009] Bahaji is wanted in Spain and Germany on terrorism charges (see September 21, 2001). However, the US has never put a bounty on him, or even put him on their most wanted lists, despite reports that he had a key role in supporting the 9/11 attacks. [CNN, 10/30/2009]

Entity Tags: Anneliese Bahaji, Said Bahaji

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

The Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence.The Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence. [Source: Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence]An analysis by Swiss researchers casts doubt on the authenticity of over a dozen of the more recent communications allegedly made by Osama bin Laden. According to a 2009 article in the American Spectator (see March 2009), the Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence in Manno, Switzerland, which does computer voice recognition for bank security, compares the voices on 15 undisputedly authentic earlier recordings of bin Laden with the voices on 15 more recent recordings that have been attributed to the al-Qaeda leader. The researchers find that all of the more recent, alleged bin Laden recordings clearly differ from each other and from the genuine earlier recordings. This would therefore indicate that these more recent recordings have been faked. In contrast to the Dalle Molle Institute, the CIA found all of the recordings to be authentic. Angelo Codevilla, a professor of international relations at Boston University, will comment, “It is hard to imagine what methodology might support [the CIA’s] conclusion.” [American Spectator, 3/2009] The American Spectator will be the only publication to report this analysis. An analysis by the Dalle Molle Institute for Perceptual Artificial Intelligence in November 2002, of an audio recording allegedly made by bin Laden around that time, concluded that the recording was likely a fake (see November 29, 2002). [Guardian, 11/30/2002]

Entity Tags: Dalle Molle Institute, Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

US intelligence learns al-Qaeda courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti’s real full name. According to later media reports, his real name is Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed. In late 2005, intelligence analysts concluded Ahmed was very likely working for Osama bin Laden or some other high ranking al-Qaeda leader (see Late 2005). [MSNBC, 5/4/2011; Associated Press, 6/1/2011] An unnamed US official will cryptically say that the crucial intelligence on his real name comes not from Pakistan, but “from a different part of the world.” [CNN, 5/2/2011]
Intel from Ahmed's Family? - Apparently, around 2006, US intelligence somehow learned his real last name (see (2006)). But since “Ahmed” is a common name in many countries, more work was needed to learn the rest of his name. It appears that intelligence comes from learning about his family. The New York Times will later report that after his last name was discovered, analysts “turned to one of their greatest investigative tools—the National Security Agency (NSA) began intercepting telephone calls and e-mail messages between the man’s family and anyone inside Pakistan. From there they got [Ahmed’s] full name.” [New York Times, 5/2/2011]
How Did US Intelligence Know about His Family? - The exact sequence of events of how analysts learn who his family is will not be revealed. But the “al-Kuwaiti” in Ahmed’s “Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” alias obviously refers to Kuwait, and US intelligence learn at some point from other prisoners that Ahmed’s parents had moved to Kuwait (even though he originally was from Pakistan). [Associated Press, 6/1/2011]
Could Ahmed's Father Be Important Al-Qaeda Figure? - It will later be reported that Ahmed’s father was close to bin Laden. This still unnamed father, who lived and worked in Kuwait, allegedly had a trusting relationship with bin Laden going back 30 to 40 years. [Dawn (Karachi), 5/7/2011] Perhaps this is not relevant, but if US intelligence already had some intelligence on Ahmed’s father, this could have narrowed down the search of Pakistani-linked families living in Kuwait.
Real Name Will Lead to Location - It is unclear when, but the NSA eventually starts tracking the phone calls of Ahmed’s relatives in the Persian Gulf to anyone they call in Pakistan. Later, the NSA will be able to figure out Ahmed’s location in Pakistan from one such phone call (see Summer 2009). [Associated Press, 6/1/2011]

Entity Tags: US intelligence, National Security Agency, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Osama Bin Laden, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

Afghan intelligence allegedly suggests that Osama bin Laden is hiding in a town very close to Abbottabad, Pakistan, but the Pakistani government will not listen. Shortly after bin Laden’s death in Abbottabad in 2011 (see May 2, 2011), Amrullah Saleh, who from 2004 to 2010 was head of the NDS (National Directorate of Security), Afghanistan’s intelligence agency, will claim that in 2007, the NDS identified two al-Qaeda safe houses in the town of Manshera. Manshera is only about 13 miles from Abbottabad. Saleh brought this information up in a meeting with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, also in 2007. But Saleh says that Musharraf was outraged at the suggestion that bin Laden would be able to hide so far inside Pakistan. Musharraf allegedly smashed his fist on a table. “He said, ‘Am I the president of the Republic of Banana?’ Then he turned to President Karzai and said, ‘Why have you have brought this Panjshiri guy to teach me intelligence?’” Saleh says Karzai had to physically intervene after Musharraf started to physically threaten Saleh. [Guardian, 5/5/2011] In March 2011, a US strike force will assault a compound in Abbottabad and kill bin Laden (see May 2, 2011).

Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, Amrullah Saleh, Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf, National Directorate of Security (Afghanistan)

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

Ahmed Shayea.Ahmed Shayea. [Source: BBC]In an attempt to persuade Islamist militants to abandon violence, the Saudi government opens an unusual prison for militants designed to rehabilitate them. The small compound near Riyadh is called a “care center” and its inmates “beneficiaries.” It is run by the Interior Ministry’s newly-created Ideological Security Unit (ISU). The compound offers recreational facilities, including swimming pools, video games, and table tennis, even art therapy classes. Inmates are required to follow religious classes designed to modify their views. Since its opening, the center has processed former militants from Iraq as well as former Guantanamo prisoners. In a July 2008 report, the BBC interviews one of the inmates, Ahmed Shayea, who drove a truck bomb into the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in August 2003, killing nine. He says he was tricked by Iraqi recruiters and the authorities have chosen to believe him. “I am now an enemy of al-Qaeda,” declares the former militant. According to the BBC, some former inmates have also received financial support after their release. [Terrorism Monitor, 8/15/2007; Christian Science Monitor, 10/9/2007; Strategic Comments, 5/2008; Sunday Times (London), 7/6/2008; BBC, 7/9/2008] Juma al-Dosari, who recruited people to join al-Qaeda in the US, is a beneficiary of this program after being mysteriously released from the Guantanamo prison in 2007 (see July 16, 2007).

Entity Tags: Juma al-Dosari, Ahmed Shayea, Ideological Security Unit

Category Tags: Saudi Arabia

A 2008 Justice Department report reveals that in January 2007, the CIA prevents Justice Department investigators from questioning al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida, who is being held at the Guantanamo prison. The Justice Department will say the CIA’s obstruction was “unwarranted” and “hampered” an investigation by the department’s Office of Inspector General into the FBI’s knowledge of abuse by CIA and Defense Department interrogators. The CIA’s acting general counsel John Rizzo refused to grant access to Zubaida, claiming that he “could make false allegations against CIA employees.” By contrast, Defense Department officials grant the same investigators access to other Guantanamo detainees also allegedly subjected to torture. After Zubaida was captured in early 2002, the CIA subjected him to harsh torture techniques, including waterboarding (see Mid-May 2002 and After). [Newsweek, 5/20/2008]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees

CIA officer Richard Blee, who headed Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see August 22-September 10, 2001), is considered for the position of chief of station in Baghdad, one of the CIA’s largest stations. [Harper's, 1/28/2007] However, he does not get the position. [Harper's, 2/9/2007] The reasons for him not getting the job are apparently that he is seen as a “bad fit,” and is closely associated with detainee abuse and renditions, in particular that of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (see Shortly After December 19, 2001). In addition, he is said to have a poor relationship with the military, in particular the Special Operations community. An unnamed former official calls Blee a “smart guy,” but says, “He’s the last guy you want running a tense place like the station in Baghdad, because he creates a lot of tension himself.” [Harper's, 1/28/2007] Shortly before mid-May 2003, Blee had been loaned to the FBI, where he had a senior position, but his career history after that is unknown. [New York Times, 5/15/2003]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Richard Blee

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri releases a new audio message, entitled “Set Out and Support Your Brothers in Somalia.” The audio comes with a video still of al-Zawahiri from one of his previous videos, lasts for five and a half minutes, and was produced by al-Qaeda’s media arm As-Sahab. “You have to use ambushes and mines, and raids and suicidal attacks until you rend and eat your prey as the lion does with his prey,” says al-Zawahiri, who calls on Muslims everywhere—but specifically those in Yemen, the Arab Peninsula, Egypt, North Africa, and Sudan—to participate in a holy war against secular government and Ethiopian forces in Somalia. According to al-Zawahiri, Somalia needs men, experience, money, and advice to defeat the Ethiopian forces, which he calls the “slaves of America.” Addressing Somali Muslims directly, al-Zawahiri reminds them of US intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994, saying that America has been defeated before (see October 3-4, 1993), and due to terrorist strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American Army is relatively weaker. Al-Zawahiri also directly calls upon the youth of the radical Egyptian Islamic group Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya to participate in the jihad. He states that these members joined the group to obey Allah, and if they are prevented from that duty, “they must crush the sarcophagus where they were embalmed alive.” [Fox News, 1/5/2007]

Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, As-Sahab, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

In a review of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s autobiography In the Line of Fire, Fouad Ajami, director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, writes in the New York Times, “It is essential for Musharraf that Pakistan be a ‘dangerous place’: he and his country… feed off the menace.” Pakistani journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid agrees. He will later write: “As long as Pakistan remained the center for Talibanization, terrorism, or nuclear proliferation, the world could not ignore the military regime or dispense with Musharraf.… The West continued to view Musharraf as the only person capable of holding Pakistan together, even though some diplomats acknowledged that ‘Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head.’” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 291, 444]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Rashid, Pervez Musharraf, Fouad Ajami

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

A graphic showing the similarities between the super-dollars and real dollars.A graphic showing the similarities between the super-dollars and real dollars. [Source: Lee Hulteng and Judy Treible / McClatchy Newspapers]The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), a German daily newspaper, accuses the CIA of being the source of sophisticated, almost perfect, counterfeit US bills called “super-notes” or “super-dollars.” FAZ claims that the CIA prints the bills in a secret facility close to Washington, DC. The US government has long accused North Korea of being the source of the “super-notes,” but this claim remains unproven and disputed by some. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), 1/7/2007] In early 2008, McClatchy Newspapers will publish a similar article. It will note that the Secret Service has presented no actual evidence that the North Koreans are behind the notes, and witnesses making that claim have been discredited. The State Department has stopped accusing North Korea of making the notes. In May 2007, the Swiss federal police conclude an investigation and decide it is unlikely the North Koreans are behind the notes, though they do not know just who is. Remarkably, the super-notes have gone through at least 19 different versions, each corresponding to a tiny change in US engraving plates. Thomas Ferguson, former director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, says the super-notes appear to have been made by someone with access to some government’s printing equipment. Klaus Bender, the author of a book on the subject, “claims that the super-notes are of such high quality and are updated so frequently that they could be produced only by a US government agency such as the CIA.” The article will note that the CIA counterfeited the Soviet Union’s currency during the Cold War, and “Making limited quantities of sophisticated counterfeit notes also could help intelligence and law enforcement agencies follow payments or illicit activities or track the movement of funds among unsavory regimes, terrorist groups, and others.” [McClatchy Newspapers, 1/10/2008]

Entity Tags: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events

Mounir El Motassadeq, a former associate of three of the 9/11 hijackers, is sentenced to 15 years in prison in Germany. El Motassadeq was convicted of assisting the 9/11 attacks in November (see November 2006) and is currently serving a seven-year sentence for being a member of a terrorist organization (see August 19, 2005). The 15-year sentence is the maximum possible, as the conviction was only as an accessory to the deaths of the 246 people who died on the airliners. As El Motassadeq has already served three years, this period will be deducted from the sentence. Defense lawyers say they will appeal the conviction, and that the case may go all the way to the European Court of Justice. [New York Times, 1/9/2007; Associated Press, 1/9/2007]

Entity Tags: Mounir El Motassadeq

Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte says that al-Qaeda’s central leadership is based in Pakistan and is regrouping there. Speaking before a Senate committee, he says that al-Qaeda operatives “are cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hide-out in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.” This is the first time a high-ranking US official has described Pakistan as a “secure hide-out” for al-Qaeda or used similar language. He adds, “Pakistan is our partner in the war on terror and has captured several al-Qaeda leaders. However, it is also a major source of Islamic extremism. Eliminating the safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistan’s tribal areas is not sufficient to end the insurgency in Afghanistan but it is necessary.” [Reuters, 1/12/2007]

Entity Tags: John Negroponte, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Muhammad Hanif confessing on video.Muhammad Hanif confessing on video. [Source: BBC]A captured Taliban spokesman claims that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is living in Pakistan under the protection of the ISI. Muhammad Hanif, a.k.a. Abdul Haq Haji Gulroz, one of two Taliban spokesmen, was recently captured by the Afghan government. He is seen on video saying to his captors, “[Omar] lives in Quetta [a Pakistan border town]. He is protected by the ISI.” He further claims that the ISI funds and equips Taliban suicide bombings and former ISI Director Hamid Gul supports and funds the insurgency. The Pakistani government denies the allegations and claims Omar has not been seen in Pakistan. [BBC, 1/17/2007; Daily Telegraph, 1/19/2007]

Entity Tags: Muhammad Hanif, Hamid Gul, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mullah Omar

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Afghanistan

A man thought to be al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri releases a new video, which is mostly focused on the situation in Iraq. In the 14-minute video the man said to be al-Zawahiri predicts a fate “worse than anything you have ever seen” for the US and wonders why only 20,000 additional troops are being sent to Iraq. “Why not send 50,000 or 100,000?” he asks. The man also says that the US “must honestly try to reach a mutual understanding with the Muslims,” adding: “If we are secure, you might be secure, and if we are safe, you might be safe. And if we are struck and killed, you will definitely—with Allah’s permission—be struck and killed.” [CNN, 1/23/2007]

Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri

Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Youssef Nada in 2007.Youssef Nada in 2007. [Source: PBS]Egypt freezes the assets of dozens of top Muslim Brotherhood figures and then announces that 40 of them will stand trial in Egypt’s military court. The Associated Press notes this court is “known for its swift trials and no right of appeal.” Figures targeted include most of the top leaders of the Al Taqwa Bank in Switzerland, the Muslim Brotherhood bank banned by the US for its alleged ties to al-Qaeda. About five of those to be tried in absentia are tied to the bank, including bank directors Youssef Nada and Ghaleb Himmat. [Agence France-Presse, 1/24/2007; Associated Press, 2/6/2007; Ikhwanweb, 2/8/2007] The Muslim Brotherhood has been officially banned in Egypt for decades but it has generally been tolerated by the government. Muslim Brotherhood members became the largest opposition bloc in the Egyptian parliament after winning 88 of the 454 seats in the 2005 legislative elections by running as independents. [Associated Press, 2/6/2007]

Entity Tags: Ghaleb Himmat, Egypt, Al Taqwa Bank, Muslim Brotherhood, Youssef Nada

Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Al Taqwa Bank

Italian authorities investigating the kidnapping of radical imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar) seize half of a villa belonging to Robert Seldon Lady, a CIA substation chief involved in the abduction (see Noon February 17, 2003 and February 22-March 15, 2003). The half of the villa that belongs to Lady (the other half belongs to his wife) is to be held until the end of Lady’s trial for the kidnapping (see February 16, 2007). If Lady is convicted, it will be sold to pay for court costs and possibly damages. [Associated Press, 1/26/2007]

Entity Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, Robert Seldon Lady

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Al-Qaeda in Italy

Interpol’s bureau in Washington, DC, sends a bulletin about bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa to the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Homeland Security, concerning an unnamed “project initiated to proactively target terrorism from captured terrorists.” The bulletin will later be released in heavily redacted form by the Intelwire.com website, and what else it says is unclear. Just four days later, Khalifa will be murdered in Madagascar in mysterious circumstances (see January 30, 2007). It is his first trip outside of Saudi Arabia since the 9/11 attacks. [Guardian, 3/2/2007]

Entity Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Interpol

Category Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Journalist Ken Silverstein writes a piece about a CIA officer who is being considered for the position of station chief in Baghdad (see January-February 2007). According to Silverstein, who uses the pseudonym “James,” the officer is “the son of a well-known and controversial figure who served at the agency during its early years.” Silverstein also mentions the officer’s time managing Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, problems with his management style (see June 1999), his closeness to former CIA Counterterrorist Center chief Cofer Black (see 1998 and After), his work as station chief in Kabul after 9/11 (see December 9, 2001), and his involvement in the rendition of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (see Shortly After December 19, 2001). [Harper's, 1/28/2007] The officer, Richard Blee, will finally “out” himself in a joint statement issued with former CIA Director George Tenet and Black in August 2011 (see August 3, 2011).

Entity Tags: Richard Blee, Ken Silverstein

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, brother-in-law and former best friend of Osama bin Laden, is killed in Madagascar. Khalifa’s family claims that a large group of armed men broke into his house and killed him as he slept. His computer and laptop is stolen. Khalifa was living in Saudi Arabia but traded precious stones and was staying at a mine that he owns. His family says they do not believe he had been killed by locals. There is considerable evidence Khalifa was involved in funding al-Qaeda-connected plots in the Philippines and Yemen in the 1990s (see December 16, 1994-February 1995, December 16, 1994-May 1995, and 1996-1997 and After). Since that time, Khalifa has steadfastly denied any involvement in terrorism and has criticized bin Laden. CNN reporter Nic Robertson asks, “Was he killed by bin Laden’s associates for speaking out against the al-Qaeda leader or, equally feasibly, by an international intelligence agency settling an old score?” Just one week earlier, a Philippine newspaper published a posthumous 2006 interview with Khaddafy Janjalani, former leader of Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim militant group in the southern Philippines. In the interview, Janjalani claimed Abu Sayyaf received $122,000 from Khalifa and bomber Ramzi Yousef in the mid-1990s (see Early 1991). [CNN, 1/31/2007; Reuters, 2/1/2007] And four days before his murder, Interpol put out a bulletin about him, notifying a number of US intelligence agencies (see January 26, 2007). [Guardian, 3/2/2007] His murderers have not been found or charged.

Entity Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Abu Sayyaf, Osama bin Laden, Khaddafy Janjalani

Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing, Philippine Militant Collusion, Bin Laden Family, Key Captures and Deaths, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

In his new book America at Night, author and former CIA agent Larry Kolb writes: “[O]ur government has spent trillions turning Iraq into the world’s largest terrorist training camp, while pursuing policies guaranteed to keep at least a billion people around the workd intensely pissed at us. Our military forces are so overstretched that, if any real threat emerges, we will risk being seen as a paper tiger. And in spite of all the blue ribbon panels and commissions, and the new layer of bureaucracy called the Department of Homeland Security, the hundreds of billions of dollars spent to make us safe at home, America is less safe now from terrorism and cataclysm than it ever was.” [Kolb, 2007, pp. 225-226]

Entity Tags: Larry Kolb, US Department of Homeland Security

Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events

The Bush administration is opposed to a bill in Congress that would link military aid for Pakistan to tackling the Taliban. The bill, which has passed the House of Representatives, calls for an end to military assistance to Pakistan unless it stops the Taliban from operating out of Pakistan. Administration officials say the bill would undermine the fostering of a closer relationship with Pakistan. [Reuters, 2/1/2007]

Entity Tags: Pakistan, Bush administration (43)

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar) is released in Egypt. He was kidnapped by the CIA in Milan, Italy, in 2003 and taken to Egypt, where he was imprisoned. This sparked a confrontation between the CIA and Italian anti-terrorist authorities, who had been investigating him before he was kidnapped (see Noon February 17, 2003). Nasr, who filed an action for unlawful detention against Egypt’s Interior Ministry, is released in Alexandria after a State Security Court declares his detention “unfounded.” Nasr will apparently remain in Egypt and not return to Italy, where a warrant for his arrest was issued on terrorism counts (see April 2005). [Associated Press, 2/12/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Mohammed Haydar Zammar in 2001.Mohammed Haydar Zammar in 2001. [Source: Knut Muller / Der Spiegel]Mohammed Haydar Zammar, an alleged member of al-Qaeda’s Hamburg, Germany, cell with a few of the 9/11 hijackers, is given a 12-year prison sentence in Syria. It had been known that Zammar was arrested in late 2001 in Morocco and renditioned to Syria for likely torture and interrogation (see October 27-November 2001 and December 2001), but his exact location was not confirmed until a European Union official spotted him in Syrian custody in October 2006 (see October 2006). It has been reported that Zammar had extensive al-Qaeda connections and a probable role in the 9/11 plot, but he was not charged for any of that, and instead was accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. This group is banned in Syria, and membership in it is a crime that is punishable by death. The court initially sentences Zammar to life imprisonment but commutes his sentence to 12 years. Der Spiegel comments, “Zammar’s German citizenship and the fact that German diplomats were closely monitoring the trial may have gone some way toward saving him from the gallows.” [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 2/12/2007]

Entity Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, 9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings

Page 66 of 71 (7084 events)
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Ordering 

Time period


Categories

Key Events

Key Day of 9/11 Events (101)Key Hijacker Events (145)Key Warnings (95)

Day of 9/11

All Day of 9/11 Events (1250)Dick Cheney (53)Donald Rumsfeld (33)Flight AA 11 (145)Flight AA 77 (145)Flight UA 175 (87)Flight UA 93 (241)George Bush (121)Passenger Phone Calls (67)Pentagon (117)Richard Clarke (31)Shanksville, Pennsylvania (23)Training Exercises (56)World Trade Center (87)

The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers

Alhazmi and Almihdhar (343)Marwan Alshehhi (134)Mohamed Atta (205)Hani Hanjour (72)Ziad Jarrah (74)Other 9/11 Hijackers (172)Possible Hijacker Associates in US (79)Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training (73)Hijacker Contact w Government in US (33)Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding (42)Hijacker Visas and Immigration (135)

Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases

Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection (51)CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar (120)Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US (39)

Projects and Programs

Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit (172)Able Danger (60)Sibel Edmonds (61)Phoenix Memo (27)Randy Glass/ Diamondback (8)Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal (67)Remote Surveillance (241)Yemen Hub (75)

Before 9/11

Soviet-Afghan War (105)Warning Signs (432)Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge (53)US Air Security (71)Military Exercises (67)Pipeline Politics (67)Other Pre-9/11 Events (55)

Counterterrorism before 9/11

Hunt for Bin Laden (158)Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11 (223)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (249)

Warning Signs: Specific Cases

Foreign Intelligence Warnings (35)Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB (39)Presidential Level Warnings (31)

The Post-9/11 World

9/11 Investigations (651)9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings (22)9/11 Denials (29)US Government and 9/11 Criticism (67)9/11 Related Lawsuits (24)Media (47)Other Post-9/11 Events (76)

Investigations: Specific Cases

9/11 Commission (257)Role of Philip Zelikow (87)9/11 Congressional Inquiry (41)CIA OIG 9/11 Report (16)FBI 9/11 Investigation (144)WTC Investigation (112)Other 9/11 Investigations (128)

Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked Moles or Informants

Abu Hamza Al-Masri (102)Abu Qatada (36)Ali Mohamed (78)Haroon Rashid Aswat (17)Khalil Deek (20)Luai Sakra (12)Mamoun Darkazanli (36)Nabil Al-Marabh (41)Omar Bakri & Al-Muhajiroun (25)Reda Hassaine (23)Other Possible Moles or Informants (169)

Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures

Abu Zubaida (99)Anwar Al-Awlaki (17)Ayman Al-Zawahiri (81)Hambali (39)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (139)Mohammed Haydar Zammar (44)Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (47)Osama Bin Laden (228)Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh (105)Ramzi Yousef (67)Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (57)Victor Bout (23)Wadih El-Hage (45)Zacarias Moussaoui (159)

Al-Qaeda by Region

"Lackawanna Six" (13)Al-Qaeda in Balkans (168)Al-Qaeda in Germany (189)Al-Qaeda in Italy (55)Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia (149)Al-Qaeda in Spain (121)Islamist Militancy in Chechnya (50)

Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks or Plots

1993 WTC Bombing (73)1993 Somalia Fighting (13)1995 Bojinka Plot (78)1998 US Embassy Bombings (121)Millennium Bomb Plots (43)2000 USS Cole Bombing (114)2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing (23)2002 Bali Bombings (36)2004 Madrid Train Bombings (82)2005 7/7 London Bombings (87)

Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda Issues

Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks (89)Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements (102)Key Captures and Deaths (124)

Geopolitics and Islamic Militancy

US Dominance (112)Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links (255)Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism (83)Israel (61)Pakistan and the ISI (470)Saudi Arabia (249)Terrorism Financing (312)Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism (322)US Intel Links to Islamic Militancy (69)Algerian Militant Collusion (41)Indonesian Militant Collusion (20)Philippine Militant Collusion (74)Yemeni Militant Collusion (47)Other Government-Militant Collusion (23)

Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases

Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy (37)Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11 (73)Saeed Sheikh (59)Mahmood Ahmed (30)Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region (179)2008 Kabul Indian Embassy Bombing (10)Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan (154)

Terrorism Financing: Specific Cases

Al Taqwa Bank (29)Al-Kifah/MAK (54)BCCI (37)BIF (28)BMI and Ptech (21)Bin Laden Family (62)Drugs (71)

'War on Terrorism' Outside Iraq

Afghanistan (299)Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan (49)Destruction of CIA Tapes (92)Escape From Afghanistan (61)High Value Detainees (179)Terror Alerts (50)Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 (352)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (432)Internal US Security After 9/11 (125)
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