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Complete 911 Timeline

Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by matt, Paul, KJF, mtuck, paxvector

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Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan.Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan. [Source: Agence France-Presse / Getty Images]Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, an al-Qaeda computer expert, is released in Pakistan. He had been arrested in July 2004 (see July 13, 2004) and was quickly turned, sending out e-mails to help out dozens of al-Qaeda operatives around the world before his name was leaked to the press (see July 24-25, 2004 and August 2, 2004). He was held for three years by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. He was never charged with any crime and apparently there are no plans to charge him in the future. He is said to be living with his parents in Karachi, Pakistan. He is being closely monitored and the media is not allowed to speak with him. US and British officials and analysts express dismay at Noor Khan’s quick release. Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation says, “I find it strange and baffling.… He presents a major threat to the West.” [Guardian, 8/23/2007] Former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says, “Khan may have bargained for an early release because he cooperated.” [ABC News, 8/21/2007] But his release also comes at a time when Pakistan’s judiciary is releasing dozens of suspected Islamic militants and government critics who have been held without trial. This is seen as a sign of President Pervez Musharraf’s eroding influence after public protests forced him to reinstate Pakistan’s chief justice. [London Times, 8/23/2007] One former intelligence official says that Khan’s case is a “murky tale” in which there are “no clear answers.” [Guardian, 8/23/2007]

Entity Tags: Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, Seth Jones, Richard A. Clarke

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Pakistan and the ISI

Juma al-Dosari in Saudi Arabia after his release.Juma al-Dosari in Saudi Arabia after his release. [Source: Nancy Durham / CBC]The Defense Department releases 16 Saudis being held in Guantanamo prison and returns them to Saudi Arabia. One of them is Juma al-Dosari, a dual Bahraini/Saudi citizen, and apparently a long-time al-Qaeda operative. [Gulf Daily News, 7/17/2007]
Extensive Al-Qaeda Links - Al-Dosari was known as “the closer” for recruiting new al-Qaeda operatives, and he recruited the “Lackawanna Six” in New York State while he lived in the US from 1999 to 2001. According to his 2006 Guantanamo Administrative Review Board evidence review, there is a long list of evidence tying him to al-Qaeda since he was 16-years old in 1989, just one year after al-Qaeda was founded. He fought with militants in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Tajikistan. He was arrested in Kuwait and then again in Saudi Arabia for suspected involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings (see June 25, 1996), but released without charge both times. An unnamed source claims he was involved in the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). He was arrested during the battle of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in late 2001, and then sent to Guantanamo. US intelligence intercepted communications between him and Osama bin Laden’s son Saad bin Laden, and also him and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see November 2001-May 2002). [PBS Frontline, 10/16/2003; PBS Frontline, 10/16/2003; US Department of Defense, 9/13/2006 pdf file]
Release Unnoticed, Unexplained - Al-Dosari’s 2007 release goes almost entirely unnoticed by the US media, despite previous articles and books discussing his recruitment of the “Lackawanna Six.” In June 2008, retired FBI agent Peter Ahearn will comment to the Buffalo News that he is baffled that the US government never criminally prosecuted al-Dosari, and then released him. “We felt strongly that we could try him in Buffalo on criminal charges, but the Justice Department declined.” Ahearn is upset that al-Dosari “is walking around as a free man in Saudi Arabia.” [Buffalo News, 6/22/2008]
"Rehabilitated" in Saudi Arabia - Upon arriving in Saudi Arabia, al-Dosari is admitted into a “soft approach” government rehabilitation program designed to prevent militants from relapsing back into violent extremism (see 2007 and After). He is given a car, psychological therapy, a monthly allowance, help to find a job, and help to get married. He had attempted to commit suicide over a dozen times while in Guantanamo. In 2008, it will be reported that he is doing well in Saudi Arabia, with a new wife and a new job. He now says Osama bin Laden “used my religion and destroyed its reputation.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2007; Gulf News, 2/22/2008]

Entity Tags: Peter Ahearn, Juma al-Dosari

Category Tags: "Lackawanna Six", Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

A 2007 map showing Pakistan’s tribal areas. Regions dominated by Islamist militants are highlighted in pink.A 2007 map showing Pakistan’s tribal areas. Regions dominated by Islamist militants are highlighted in pink. [Source: New York Times]A summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland” is declassified. The NIE, a unified assessment from all 16 US intelligence agencies, says that al-Qaeda has, in the words of the Post, “reestablished its central organization, training infrastructure, and lines of global communication over the past two years, putting the United States in a ‘heightened threat environment‘…” The last NIE on terrorism worldwide was completed in April 2006 and indicated that al-Qaeda’s fortunes were declining (see April 2006). The main reason the new NIE gives for al-Qaeda’s resurgence is the establishment of a safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal region near the Afghanistan border. Its link with the affiliate group Al-Qaeda in Iraq has also helped “energize” militants and aided recruitment and funding. The NIE’s release comes just days after a similar report by the National Counterterrorism Center entitled “Al-Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West” (see July 11, 2007), and also just days after the Pakistani government broke peace deals with Islamist militants in the tribal region (see July 11-Late July, 2007). Edward Gistaro, national intelligence officer for transnational threats and the primary author of the NIE, says in a press briefing, “Over the past 18 to 24 months, safe haven in Pakistan has become more secure.” He says it has allowed al-Qaeda to develop of a new tier of leadership in the form of “lieutenants… coming off the bench,” to replace the leaders who have been captured or killed. On the same day the NIE is released, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell says of al-Qaeda, “They’re working as hard as they can in positioning trained operatives here in the United States.… They have recruitment programs to bring recruits into… Pakistan, particularly those that speak the right language, that have the right skills, that have the right base that they could come to the United States, fit into the population… and carry out acts.” [Washington Post, 7/18/2007]

Entity Tags: Mike McConnell, US intelligence, Al-Qaeda, Edward Gistaro

Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

In the wake of the Pakistani government’s attack on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in early July 2007 (see July 3-11, 2007), peace deals between the government and militant groups in Pakistan completely break down (see July 11-Late July, 2007). Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf fires Ali Jan Orakzai, a regional military commander sympathetic to the Taliban who had been promoted to governor of the North-West Frontier Province. Then, on July 19, 2007, the Pakistani army formally launches an offensive in Pakistan’s tribal region. The Taliban and al-Qaeda are believed to have their central leaderships there. There is no quick resolution, and fighting rages for months. Militants divert the army’s attention by launching suicide bombings and other attacks in other parts of the country. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 385]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Ali Jan Orakzai, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani Army

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) issues a national security bulletin based on four recent incidents in San Diego, Milwaukee, Houston, and Baltimore. The bulletin creates the impression of imminent terrorist plots targeting the aviation sector. The TSA warns that terrorists are testing the possibility of smuggling bomb components on to an airplane. TSA spokeswoman Ellen Howe says the agency has noticed an increase in unusual items in checked and carry-on luggage, including “wires, switches, cell phone components, and dense clay-like substances” - including a block of cheese. [International Herald Tribune, 7/25/2007] The incidents all turn out to have innocent explanations. On July 27, Brian Todd of CNN reports “That bulletin for law enforcement eyes only told of suspicious items recently found in passenger’s bags at airport checkpoints, warned that they may signify dry runs for terrorist attacks… it turns out none of that is true.” One such case was that of Sara Weiss, who was detained in San Diego after two ice packs covered in tape and containing clay were allegedly found in her baggage. Weiss, who works for a faith-based organization, was also carrying a survey about Muslim Americans. Weiss says she was held for three hours and questioned by San Diego Harbor Police and two other men who did not identify themselves. She says she was asked if she knew Osama bin Laden, which she described as “a ridiculous question.” Todd reports “The FBI now says there were valid explanations for all four incidents in that bulletin, and a US government official says no charges will be brought in any of these cases.” The FBI maintains “they were right” in putting the bogus reports on the TSA bulletin, which is distributed to law enforcement agencies nationwide. The TSA says that security officers must be trained in identifying suspicious packages, even when those packages turn out to be innocuous. [CNN, 7/27/2007] Defense for the TSA bulletin comes from a number of sources. “This is what TSA should be doing whether it turns out to be a whole bunch of harmless coincidences or part of a plot,” says James Carafano, a security expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation who in the past called for TSA’s abolition. House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Rep. Bennie Thompson, also a critic of the TSA, agrees the agency is handling this appropriately: “To stay ahead of potential threats to our aviation system it must use all of the intelligence available as part of its daily operations.” However, the bulletin is questioned by San Diego Harbor Police Chief Kirk Sanfilippo who says officers found two ice packs wrapped in clear tape, not duct tape, and there was no clay inside. “It was not a threat. It was not a test run,” Sanfilippo says. “The whole thing was very explainable and understandable.” [International Herald Tribune, 7/25/2007] He characterizes the bulletin as “a little bit off.” Local TSA Security Director and chief of the airport police Michael J. Aguilar says it was quickly determined the ice packs contained the usual blue gel. Aguilar says he doesn’t know why the TSA memo, issued in Washington, reported the substance as clay. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 7/25/2007]

Entity Tags: Heritage Foundation, CNN, Brian Todd, Bennie Thompson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transportation Security Agency, Sara Weiss, James Carafano, House Homeland Security Committee, Kirk Sanfilippo, Ellen Howe, Michael J. Aguilar, San Diego Harbor Police

Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11

After alleged al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani is captured in Lahore, Pakistan, by local forces in July 2007 (see July 2007), he is soon transferred to a secret CIA prison. He is held in the CIA’s secret prison system until March 14, 2008, when he is transferred to the US-run prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. [Los Angeles Times, 3/15/2008] It is not known when he is captured or handed to the CIA exactly, but a newspaper report on August 2, 2007, indicates he is already in US custody. [Asian News International, 8/2/2007]
Secret CIA Prison System Still Operational - It is also not known where he is held exactly. In September 2006, President Bush announced that the CIA’s secret prisons had been emptied, at least temporarily, and the remaining prisoners had been transferred to Guantanamo (see September 6, 2006 and September 2-3, 2006). Since then, there has only been one instance of anyone held in secret CIA custody, and that was Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, held by the CIA from autumn 2006 until April 2007 (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). Rahim’s custody indicates that the CIA prison system is still being used, although Rahim may be the only prisoner held in it at this time. [Los Angeles Times, 3/15/2008]
Is Rahim Interrogated Using Legally Questionable Methods? - In August and November 2007, an unnamed prisoner in a secret CIA prison is forced to stay awake for up to six days straight. This is almost certainly Rahim. The US State Department considers this treatment torture when other countries do it (see August and November 2007).

Entity Tags: Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, High Value Detainees

The CIA captures al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Rahim in the summer of 2007. Rahim, an Afghan, is little known to the public, but he is said to have helped Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora in late 2001. He is also known as a translator for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. CIA Director Michael Hayden calls Rahim “a tough, seasoned jihadist.” But Rahim is not on any US most wanted list and there are no known pictures of him. Only one Pakistani newspaper mentions his arrest around the time it happens, and reports that he is captured near Lahore, Pakistan, in late July 2007. He is kept in a secret CIA prison and is presumably interrogated. On March 14, 2008 the US finally announces his arrest and says he has recently been transferred to the Guantanamo prison. Only after that will he be treated in accordance with US and international law. He is the first person transferred from a secret CIA prison for over a year (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). [Associated Press, 3/14/2008; New York Times, 3/15/2008]

Entity Tags: Muhammad Rahim, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Former 9/11 Commission staffer Barbara Grewe is hired by the MITRE Corporation. Grewe was a key investigator on the Commission and on the Justice Department inspector general’s investigation of 9/11, where she had focused on FBI and CIA failures (see Between December 2002 and May 2003 and Late 2003). [Bellvue University, 8/9/2007; Center for American Progress Action Fund, 4/16/2008] The MITRE Corporation is closely linked to the CIA and other government agencies. For example, in December 2000 CIA Director George Tenet awarded the Intelligence Community Seal Medallion to Allan McClure of the MITRE Corporation for his help developing software and hardware to facilitate the exchange of information. [MITRE, 12/6/2000] After leaving the Commission, Grewe had worked as an associate general counsel at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). [Florida Atlantic University, 1/2005; National Security Law Report, 8/2005 pdf file; Center for American Progress Action Fund, 4/16/2008] There she supervised the GAO’s work related to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. [University of Michigan Law School, 3/7/2005; University Record Online, 3/14/2005] It is unclear exactly when she moves from the GAO to MITRE, but it must happen some time before August 2007. [Bellvue University, 8/9/2007] At MITRE, Grewe is a senior policy administrator and advises on information sharing issues regarding the intelligence community, the federal government, and local partners. [Bellvue University, 8/9/2007; Center for American Progress Action Fund, 4/16/2008] According to a MITRE press release, she also works as a “principal multi-discipline systems engineer.” [MITRE, 4/2008]

Entity Tags: Barbara Grewe, MITRE Corporation

Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

In October 2007, Fox News military commentator Col. David Hunt claims that in August 2007, the US military had a chance to kill Osama bin Laden, but did not. “We know, with a 70 percent level of certainty—which is huge in the world of intelligence” that bin Laden was in a convoy heading south from Tora Bora. He claims that bin Laden was seen on satellite imagery and heard through communications intercepts. “We had the world’s best hunters/killers—SEAL Team 6—nearby. We had the world class Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) coordinating with the CIA and other agencies. We had unmanned drones overhead with missiles on their wings; we had the best Air Force on the planet, begging to drop one on the terrorist.” But, “[u]nbelievably, and in my opinion, criminally, we did not kill Osama bin Laden.” He blames risk-aversion and incompetence for the failure to act. His account has not been corroborated by other sources. [Fox News, 10/23/2007]

Entity Tags: Joint Special Operations Command, US Military, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden, US Naval Special Warfare Development Group, David Hunt

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), while running for US president, says in a speech, “There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again… If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and [Pakistani] President [Pervez] Musharraf won’t act, we will.” This is in response to a recent comment made by his main opponent for the Democratic presidential nomination, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY). She said, “If we had actionable intelligence that Osama bin Laden or other high-value targets were in Pakistan, I would ensure that they were targeted and killed or captured.” The difference between the comments is Obama’s willingness to attack inside Pakistan without approval from the Pakistani government. [Reuters, 7/1/2007; ABC News, 6/9/2011]

Entity Tags: Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan, 2008 Elections

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama says he would send US troops into Pakistan to hunt down terrorists, even without permission from that country’s government. He says: “There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again.… If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.” A spokeswoman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry responds: “These are serious matters and should not be used for point-scoring. Political candidates and commentators should show responsibility.” [London Times, 8/2/2007]

Entity Tags: Barack Obama

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Video still of Ayman al-Zawahiri (top) and analysis by Krawetz (bottom).Video still of Ayman al-Zawahiri (top) and analysis by Krawetz (bottom). [Source: As-Sahab/Neal Krawetz]Researcher and computer security consultant Neal Krawetz first claims that the logos of As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm, and the US-based IntelCenter organization, which monitors terrorist activity, were added to a video released by al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri at the same time, then retracts the claim when IntelCenter protests. Krawetz initially makes the claim during a presentation at a security conference about how analysis shows al-Qaeda videos are manipulated and backgrounds are added later. Krawetz says that the As-Sahab and IntelCenter logos have the same error level, so they must have been added at the same time. However, IntelCenter says that it did not add the As-Sahab logo and that just because two items in an image have the same error level, that does not mean they were added at the same time. Krawetz then tells a journalist that he retracts his initial claim and says that the IntelCenter logo has a different error level and was added later. The journalist comments: “However, in a taped interview I conducted with him after his presentation, he said the logos were the same error levels and that this indicated they were added at the same time. Additionally, after I’d written the first blog entry about his presentation, I asked him to read it to make sure everything was correct. He did so while sitting next to me and said it was all correct. He apologizes now for the error and the confusion it caused.” [Wired News, 8/2/2007] Krawetz’s method of analysis will attract some criticism. For example, Cambridge University expert Marcus Kuhn will say that Krawetz’s tools were designed for still images, not video, and could lead a user to believe that a video had been manipulated when in fact it had not. [Times, 8/6/2007]

Entity Tags: Neal Krawetz, Marcus Kuhn, Ayman al-Zawahiri, As-Sahab, InterCenter

Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

John Brennan.John Brennan. [Source: PBS]An article in the New Yorker magazine reveals that the CIA interrogations of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) were not as reliable as they are typically made out to be. Mohammed was interrogated with methods such as waterboarding that are regarded as torture by many. CIA official John Brennan, former chief of staff for CIA Director George Tenet, acknowledges, “All these methods produced useful information, but there was also a lot that was bogus.” One former top CIA official estimates that “ninety per cent of the information was unreliable.” Cables of Mohammed’s interrogation transcripts sent to higher-ups reportedly were prefaced with the warning that “the detainee has been known to withhold information or deliberately mislead.” [New Yorker, 8/6/2007] For instance, one CIA report of his interrogations was called, “Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies” (see June 16, 2004). [Los Angeles Times, 6/23/2004] Former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel asks, “What are you going to do with KSM in the long run? It’s a very good question. I don’t think anyone has an answer. If you took him to any real American court, I think any judge would say there is no admissible evidence. It would be thrown out.” Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) says, “A guy as dangerous as KSM is, and half the world wonders if they can believe him—is that what we want? Statements that can’t be believed, because people think they rely on torture?” [New Yorker, 8/6/2007] Journalist James Risen wrote in a 2006 book, “According to a well-placed CIA source, [Mohammed] has now recanted some of what he previously told the CIA during his interrogations. That is an enormous setback for the CIA, since [his debriefings] had been considered among the agency’s most important sources of intelligence on al-Qaeda. It is unclear precisely which of his earlier statements [he] has now disavowed, but any recantation by the most important prisoner in the global war on terror must call into question much of what the United States has obtained from other prisoners around the world…” [Risen, 2006, pp. 33] In a 2008 Vanity Fair interview, a former senior CIA official familiar with the interrogation reports on Mohammed will say, “90 percent of it was total f_cking bullsh_t.” A former Pentagon analyst will add: “KSM produced no actionable intelligence. He was trying to tell us how stupid we were.” [Vanity Fair, 12/16/2008]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Carl Levin, John O. Brennan, Bruce Riedel, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Congressional legislation forces the CIA to declassify and release the executive summary of its inspector general’s report into some of its pre-9/11 failings. The legislation follows a long campaign by senators (see Spring-Summer 2007) and victims’ relatives (see June 18, 2007), and orders the CIA to release the summary within 30 days, together with a classified annex for Congress explaining the report’s redactions. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was then not released (see October 10, 2005). Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) says, “All I can say is that it’s an extraordinarily important, independent assessment, written with a specific purpose to learn how we can improve our security.” Senator Kit Bond (R-MI) points out that “this should have been declassified a long time ago.” [The Hill, 8/8/2007] The report is released two weeks later (see August 21, 2007).

Entity Tags: Ron Wyden, Christopher (“Kit”) Bond, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: CIA OIG 9/11 Report, 9/11 Investigations

Conservative columnist Stu Bykofsky writes an editorial in the Philadelphia Daily News entitled, “To Save America, We Need Another 9/11.” In it, he writes: “One month from the [next 9/11] anniversary, I’m thinking another 9/11 would help America. What kind of a sick bastard would write such a thing? A bastard so sick of how splintered we are politically—thanks mainly to our ineptitude in Iraq—that we have forgotten who the enemy is.” He identifies the enemy as “global terrorists who use Islam to justify their hideous sins.” He laments how impatient and fickle many Americans are, and longs for the “community of outrage and national resolve” in the US shortly after 9/11. “America’s fabric is pulling apart like a cheap sweater. What would sew us back together? Another 9/11 attack.… Is there any doubt they are planning to hit us again? If it is to be, then let it be. It will take another attack on the homeland to quell the chattering of chipmunks and to restore America’s righteous rage and singular purpose to prevail.” [Philadelphia Daily News, 8/9/2007] Bykofsky appears on Fox News the next day to discuss his editorial. Host John Gibson is not outraged and in fact agrees with Bykofsky’s central idea. Gibson says, “I think it’s going to take a lot of dead people to wake America up.” [Fox News, 8/10/2007]

Entity Tags: John Gibson, Stu Bykofsky, Fox News

Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events

Hambali, circa 2008.Hambali, circa 2008. [Source: US Defense Department]Fourteen “high value” detainees held by the US in Guantanamo Bay (see March 9-April 28, 2007) are ruled to be “enemy combatants.” The detainees include 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 9/11 coordinator Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali, and al-Qaeda leaders Khallad bin Attash and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. However, a judge had previously ruled that designating a detainee an “enemy combatant” was meaningless and that a person designated an enemy combatant could not be tried under the Military Commissions Act (see June 4, 2007). The Washington Post comments, “It is unclear if these men can be tried at military commissions without a change in the law or a newly designed review.” [Washington Post, 8/10/2007]

Entity Tags: Mohamad Farik Amin, Khallad bin Attash, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Military Commissions Act, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Majid Khan, Abu Zubaida, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Hambali, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Gouled Hassan Dourad

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: 1998 US Embassy Bombings, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Al-Qaeda in Germany, Hambali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

CIA Director Michael Hayden releases a statement attacking the publication of the executive summary of a report by the CIA’s inspector general about some aspects of the agency’s performance before 9/11 (see August 21, 2007). Hayden lambasts the decision to publish it, saying it will “distract officers serving their country on the frontlines of a global conflict,” “consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed,” and have a “chilling effect” on officers. Hayden also says that the officers criticized in the report and others “took strong exception to its focus, methodology, and conclusions,” and that neither he nor his predecessor Porter Goss implemented the report’s main finding (see October 10, 2005)—accountability boards to assess the performance of the officers who performed poorly before 9/11. Instead, Hayden praises these officers, saying they “worked flat out” and that their “skill, wisdom, energy, and leadership” made “powerful contributions to our national security.” Despite refusing to convene the accountability boards or even name most of the employees who performed poorly, Hayden remarks, “This is not about avoiding responsibility,” arguing that the CIA has already discussed failings in some of its programs before 9/11. [Central Intelligence Agency, 8/21/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: CIA OIG 9/11 Report, 9/11 Investigations

The media’s reaction to the release of a redacted summary of a report by the CIA’s inspector general about some aspects of the agency’s performance before 9/11 is mixed. Different outlets highlight different aspects of the story, for example:
bullet Newsweek calls it “withering” and says that it shows that “the CIA under [Director George] Tenet’s leadership repeatedly blew opportunities to disrupt the al-Qaeda network—and possibly even penetrate the 9/11 plot itself—because of ‘mismanagement,’ a lack of strategic direction and a ‘systemic breakdown’ within the agency’s Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC).” Newsweek also points out the report is bad for current CIA Director Michael Hayden, also a former NSA director, as the NSA did not work well with the CIA before 9/11, and former president Bill Clinton, whose instruction to assassinate bin Laden was allegedly unclear. [Newsweek, 8/21/2007]
bullet The New York Times’ story starts with problems understanding intelligence about alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see 1997 or After), followed by the revelation that dozens of CIA officers read cables about travel by two of the hijackers to the US in 2000 (see Mid-January-March 2000), and the proposal that accountability boards be convened to review the performance of some employees, including Tenet. [New York Times, 8/22/2007]
bullet ABC focuses on the report’s criticism of Tenet, saying that he “‘bears ultimate responsibility’ for failing to create a strategic plan to stop al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.” [ABC News, 8/21/2007]
bullet The Guardian leads with the story about the cables reporting the hijackers’ travel being read by dozens of officers. [Guardian, 8/22/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: CIA OIG 9/11 Report, 9/11 Investigations

Former CIA Director George Tenet attacks a report by the CIA’s inspector general into the agency’s failings related to al-Qaeda prior to 9/11, a classified summary of which has just been released (see August 21, 2007). Tenet, who was both praised and criticized in the report, compares it unfavorably to a previous inspector general’s report on the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, and says the inspector general’s statement that he did not have a strategic plan to fight terrorism and did not use resources correctly is “flat wrong.” Tenet also says that an effort by one of his subordinates to collect information about Osama bin Laden that was praised by the inspector general was done at his request. In addition, Tenet says he worked hard to obtain money for counterterrorism at the CIA—although the inspector general found that not all the money obtained was actually spent on counterterrorism (see 1997-2001)—and that the report “vastly under appreciates the challenges faced and heroic performance of the hard working men and women of the CIA in general and CTC in specific.” [George J. Tenet, 8/21/2007]

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: CIA OIG 9/11 Report, 9/11 Investigations

A redacted summary of a report by the CIA’s inspector general into some aspects of the agency’s pre-9/11 performance is released. The report’s main points are:
bullet No CIA employees violated the law or were guilty of misconduct in the run-up to 9/11;
bullet However, some officials did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner. The report recommended accountability boards be convened to review their performance, but former CIA Director Porter Goss decided against this recommendation in 2005 (see October 10, 2005);
bullet There was no “silver bullet” that could have prevented 9/11, but if officers had performed satisfactorily, they would have had a better chance of stopping the attacks;
bullet The CIA had no comprehensive strategy to combat al-Qaeda before 9/11 (see After December 4, 1998 and Between Mid-December 2002 and June 2004);
bullet Management of counterterrorism funds was poor (see 1997-2001);
bullet Arguments between the CIA and NSA negatively impacted counterterrorism efforts (see December 1996, Late August 1998, and 2000);
bullet Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was well-known to the CIA before 9/11, but his case was badly handled (see 1997 or After);
bullet There were numerous failures related to the CIA’s monitoring of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see Mid-January-March 2000, 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, Mid-July 2004, (After January 6, 2000), and March 5, 2000);
bullet The CIA also missed “several additional opportunities” to watchlist Pentagon hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 8, 2000 and August 23, 2001). Such watchlisting could have led to them being denied entry, or being placed under surveillance in the US;
bullet The CIA was confused about whether it was authorized to assassinate Osama bin Laden or not (see Mid-August 1998, December 24, 1998, December 26, 1998 and After, February 1999, February 1999, and December 1999);
bullet There were various problems with assets and operations linked to foreign services. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005 pdf file]
The media picks various angles in commenting on the report (see August 21, 2007), which is criticized by current CIA Director Michael Hayden (see August 21, 2007) and former Director George Tenet (see August 21, 2007).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, CIA OIG 9/11 Report

Lynn Margulis.Lynn Margulis. [Source: Javier Pedreira]Lynn Margulis, a distinguished professor in the department of geosciences at the University of Massachusetts, describes the US government’s account of 9/11 as a “fraud,” and calls for a new investigation of the attacks. In a statement published on the website PatriotsQuestion911.com, she writes, “Certainly, 19 young Arab men and a man in a cave 7,000 miles away, no matter the level of their anger, could not have masterminded and carried out 9/11: the most effective television commercial in the history of Western civilization.” She calls 9/11 a “false-flag operation” that has been used to justify the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with “unprecedented assaults on research, education and civil liberties.” She compares it to the sinking of the USS Maine in 1898—which led to the Spanish American War—and the German Reichstag fire of 1933, which facilitated the rise of the Nazi party. Some have alleged that these earlier events were orchestrated by governmental powers. Margulis has previously written extensively on a wide range of scientific topics, making original contributions to cell biology and microbial evolution, and is best known for her theory of symbiogenesis. In 1999, she received the National Medal of Science, which is America’s highest honor for scientific achievement. Margulis says she came to her conclusions about 9/11 based on her own research and from reading two books about the attacks by retired theology professor David Ray Griffin (see March 1, 2004). She concludes her statement, “I suggest that those of us aware and concerned demand that the glaringly erroneous official account of 9/11 be dismissed as a fraud and a new, thorough, and impartial investigation be undertaken.” [University of Massachusetts, 11/4/2003; Daily Hampshire Gazette, 9/11/2007; Smith College Sophian, 9/20/2007]

Entity Tags: Lynn Margulis

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism

Baitullah Mahsud.Baitullah Mahsud. [Source: Associated Press]On August 30, 2007, Pakistani militants led by Baitullah Mahsud surround a convoy of more than 270 soldiers belonging to Pakistan’s Frontier Corps. The militants are vastly outnumbered, but get the soldiers to surrender without firing a shot. In the following days, dozens more soldiers surrender or even desert to Mahsud. This is a humiliating debacle for the Pakistani army and a reflection of low morale. The Washington Post comments: “The troops’ surrender has called into question the army’s commitment to fighting an unpopular war that requires Pakistanis to kill their countrymen. It has also exposed the army to ridicule.” [Washington Post, 10/3/2007] Mahsud demands the release of 30 jailed militants and the end of Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan, the tribal region where Mahsud is the de facto ruler. After weeks of slow negotiations, he orders the beheading of three of his hostages. On November 3, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf declares a state of emergency throughout Pakistan (see November 3-December 15, 2007). Musharraf claims that his emergency powers will give him a stronger hand to fight militants like Mahsud, but the next day he releases 28 jailed militants in return for the release of the nearly 300 soldiers still held. Eight of the released militants are would-be suicide bombers. For instance, one of them had just been sentenced to 24 years in prison after being caught carrying two suicide belts. The incident propels Mahsud into becoming the figurehead of Pakistan’s militant movement, and from this time on many violent incidents are blamed on him, although his forces are probably not linked to them all. Mahsud had strong ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He fought with the Taliban in the 1990s and helped al-Qaeda leaders escape the battle of Tora Bora in late 2001. [Washington Post, 10/3/2007; Rashid, 2008, pp. 385-388; Newsweek, 1/7/2008]

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Taliban, Baitullah Mahsud, Pakistani Army, Frontier Corps, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Randy Papadopoulos, Nancy Berlage, and Diane Putney, three of the authors of <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>.Randy Papadopoulos, Nancy Berlage, and Diane Putney, three of the authors of Pentagon 9/11. [Source: Samantha L. Quigley / US Department of Defense]Defense Department historians release a book chronicling the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. The 250-page book includes the accounts of survivors, rescuers, and emergency responders, and includes previously unpublished photos of the wreckage, aircraft parts, and rescue efforts. [Fayetteville Observer, 9/13/2007; Washington Post, 9/27/2007] Titled Pentagon 9/11, it is published by the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Naval Historical Center, and with the assistance of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps historical offices. [US Department of Defense, 9/10/2007] More than 1,300 interviews were collected for it (see October 2001-September 11, 2002), of which the authors used more than 300 in putting together their account. [Washington Post, 9/27/2007] Randy Papadopoulos, a historian with the Naval Historical Center who co-authored Pentagon 9/11, calls it “the first scholarly study of what happened at the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.” [American Forces Press Service, 9/7/2007] Reportedly, one reason for writing the book was to counter skepticism and alternative theories that suggest the US government was behind the attack, and a missile rather than a hijacked aircraft hit the Pentagon (see Early March 2002). [Washington Post, 9/27/2007] Diane Putney, one of the book’s authors says, “I have no doubt it was American Airlines Flight 77 [that hit the building].” Her conclusion is reportedly based on a piece of the plane that was discovered, which bore the American Airlines logo. [American Forces Press Service, 9/7/2007]

Entity Tags: Military History Detachment, Pentagon, Randy Papadopoulos, US Department of Defense, Diane Putney

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

A secret US government document from this month called the “Joint Task Force Guantanamo Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants” calls the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, a terrorist organization. The ISI is listed with al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah as threats. The document is meant for interrogators at the Guantanamo prison who are trying to determine which detainees to release. It suggests that any link to any of these groups is an indication of terrorist activity, and evidence the detainee poses a future threat. The US has never officially declared the ISI a terrorist group, suggesting its public posture differs from its private one for political reasons. After this and other Guantanamo documents are leaked to The Guardian in 2011, The Guardian will report: “The revelation that the ISI is considered as much of a threat as al-Qaeda and the Taliban will cause fury in Pakistan. It will further damage the already poor relationship between US intelligence services and their Pakistani counterparts, supposedly key allies in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants in south Asia.” The newspaper will further note that although the document is from 2007, it is unlikely the ISI’s status at Guantanamo has changed by 2011. Other Guantanamo documents leaked to The Guardian describe instances where the ISI helped US efforts, but also instances where the ISI was seen helping Islamist militants. [Guardian, 4/25/2011]

Entity Tags: Hamas, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, US intelligence, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Hezbollah

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

A frame from Osama bin Laden’s 2007 video.A frame from Osama bin Laden’s 2007 video. [Source: Intelcenter]US analysts obtain two new videos of a man thought to be Osama bin Laden (see September 7, 2007 and September 11, 2007) before al-Qaeda makes them available on the internet. A video released on September 7 is obtained by the US-based SITE Institute, which provides it “to government agencies and news organizations at a time when many well-known jihadist Web sites had been shut down in a powerful cyberattack by unknown hackers.” The next tape is obtained by a web designer known as “Laura Mansfield,” who manages “to scoop al-Qaeda by publicly unveiling its new video, a feat she has accomplished numerous times since 2002.” Although SITE’s founder Rita Katz declines to comment on how it obtained the video, the Washington Post says that SITE, Mansfield, and others like them obtained the videos, whose release was publicly announced in advance, “using a combination of computer tricks, personal connections and ingenuity to find and download password-protected content.” [Washington Post, 9/12/2007] The fact that the SITE Institute obtained the tape in advance was apparently leaked to the press by the White House, and SITE will complain about this, as it damages an intelligence operation aimed at al-Qaeda (see September 7, 2007).

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Rita Katz, Laura Mansfield, SITE Institute

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

The US administration leaks the news that it has obtained an advance copy of a new video from a man thought to be Osama bin Laden, damaging an intelligence operation by the SITE Institute. SITE, a private organization involved in the fight against international terrorism, obtains an advance copy of the video through an intelligence operation that had been ongoing for years (see September 7 and 11, 2007) and provides the copy to the White House. SITE founder Rita Katz sends White House representatives Fred Fielding and Joel Bagnal an e-mail saying that there is a need for secrecy and the video should not be distributed, but within twenty minutes of this government defense and intelligence agencies begin downloading the video from SITE. The video leaks from the administration to the news media within a few hours, tipping al-Qaeda off to the security breach. SITE’s activities are described as “tremendously helpful” by some intelligence officials, but Katz says that due to the leak, “Techniques that took years to develop are now ineffective and worthless.” However, officials say that US agencies do not rely solely on outside contractors for such information, and Ross Feinstein, spokesman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, comments, “We have individuals in the right places dealing with all these issues, across all 16 intelligence agencies.” [Washington Post, 10/9/2007] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence announces an inquiry into the leak, but Feinstein says, “we don’t think there was a leak from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center,” which also received a copy of the video from SITE. [Washington Post, 10/10/2007]

Entity Tags: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Joel Bagnal, White House, Ross Feinstein, Fred F. Fielding, SITE Institute, Osama bin Laden, Rita Katz

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

Bin Laden video in 2004, left, and bin Laden video in 2007, right.Bin Laden video in 2004, left, and bin Laden video in 2007, right. [Source: Al Jazeera (left) and Intelcenter (right)]A man thought to be Osama bin Laden releases a new video message, his first for three years (see October 29, 2004). In the message, which is addressed to the US, the speaker says that actions by radical Islamists have influenced US policy and that American prestige in the world has fallen, even though the interests of radical Islamists “overlap with the interests of the major corporations and also with those of the neoconservatives.” He also criticizes the US media and, due to its treatment of Sunni Muslims, the Iraqi government. The speaker says, “The holocaust of the Jews was carried out by your brethren in the middle of Europe, but had it been closer to our countries, most of the Jews would have been saved by taking refugee with us,” and also references common discrimination against Jews and Muslims in Medieval Spain, pointing out that Jews in Morocco “are alive with us and we have not incinerated them.” In addition, he criticizes the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, saying that the Democratic party was elected to stop the war, but continues “to agree to the spending of tens of billions to continue the killing and war there,” because “the democratic system permits major corporations to back candidates,” who are then, it is implied, controlled by these corporations. The voice mentions the assassination of former US President John Kennedy and says that “the major corporations who were benefiting” from the Vietnam War “were the primary beneficiary from his killing.” He also references left-leaning writer Noam Chomsky, former CIA bin Laden unit chief Michael Scheuer, global warming, and the Kyoto accord, saying that the democratic system has caused a “massive failure to protect humans and their interests from the greed and avarice of the major corporations and their representatives,” and is “harsher and fiercer than your systems in the Middle Ages.” Finally, the speaker compares US President Bush to former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who failed to acknowledge the Soviet Union was losing the Afghan War, and calls on the US to get out of Iraq and embrace Islam, which recognizes Mary and Jesus, a “prophet of Allah,” but does not recognize taxation. [MSNBC, 9/7/2007 pdf file; Osama bin Laden, 9/7/2007; Osama bin Laden, 9/7/2007; Osama bin Laden, 9/7/2007] Bin Laden’s beard is different to his beard in previous videos and this leads to some discussion. According to the Washington Post, “The tape’s most striking feature [is] bin Laden’s physical appearance: The straggly, gray-streaked whiskers of his previous images [have] been replaced with a neatly trimmed beard of black or dark brown. While some analysts speculated that the beard [is] fake, others said it [is] likely that bin Laden had dyed his beard, as is customary for older men in some Muslim cultures.” [Washington Post, 9/8/2007] There are some problems with the video; for example, the picture is frozen for most of the time and the video is spliced (see September 12, 2007).

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

The Washington Post reports, “Today, al-Qaeda operates much the way it did before 2001. The network is governed by a shura, or leadership council, that meets regularly and reports to bin Laden, who continues to approve some major decisions, according to a senior US intelligence official. About 200 people belong to the core group and many receive regular salaries, another senior US intelligence official said.” This second official adds, “They do appear to meet with a frequency that enables them to act as an organization and not just as a loose bunch of guys.” Most of this core group is believed to be in the Pakistani tribal region near the Afghanistan border. [Washington Post, 9/9/2007] It has been estimated that there were roughly 1,000 al-Qaeda operatives around 9/11, but only a core of about 200 had pledged loyalty to bin Laden (see Just Before September 11, 2001).

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US intelligence, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempts to return to Pakistan, but his return is thwarted by the Pakistani authorities and he is deported to Saudi Arabia. Sharif, ousted by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 (see October 12, 1999), had been in exile for seven years due to corruption charges. After landing in Pakistan, Sharif, the leader of the political party Pakistan Muslim League-N, is briefly taken into custody and then put on a flight to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The deportation is a major political event in Pakistan and is marked by clashes between police and Sharif’s supporters. [CNN, 9/10/2007] However, Pakistan’s ISI agency will later broker a deal with Saudi authorities regarding Sharif (see November 20-23, 2007), enabling him to return (see November 25, 2007).

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan Muslim League-N, Nawaz Sharif

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

Waleed Alshehri in his video will.Waleed Alshehri in his video will. [Source: As Sahab]A new video is released featuring an audio statement by a man thought to be Osama bin Laden and a video will by one of the 9/11 hijackers, Waleed Alshehri. The man thought to be bin Laden urges sympathizers to join the “caravan of martyrs” and praises Alshehri, saying, “It is true that this young man was little in years, but the faith in his heart was big.” The audio message is accompanied by a still image of the man thought to be bin Laden, apparently taken from a video released a few days earlier (see September 7, 2007). It is unclear whether the audio message is new or was taped some time before release, although the speaker mentions the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 (see June 8, 2006). In the will, Alshehri warns the US, “We shall come at you from your front and back, your right and left.” He also criticizes the state of the Islamic world, “The condition of Islam at the present time makes one cry… in view of the weakness, humiliation, scorn and enslavement it is suffering because it neglected the obligations of Allah and His orders, and permitted His forbidden things and abandoned jihad in Allah’s path.” Homeland security adviser Frances Townsend says that the video is not important and that bin Laden is “virtually impotent.” However, MSNBC will comment, “Bin Laden’s new appearances underline the failure to find the terror leader that President Bush vowed in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks to take ‘dead or alive.’” [MSNBC, 9/11/2007]

Entity Tags: Frances Townsend, Osama bin Laden, Waleed Alshehri

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Zweites Deutsches Ferhnsehn (ZDF), Germany’s public television station, broadcasts an investigation into alternative accounts of 9/11 called “Mythos und Warheit: Der 11. September 2001.” The documentary concludes there was no government conspiracy behind the attacks but describes what producer Michael Renz calls a “wall of silence” when he approached officials for information. “When officials are asked about 9/11 conspiracy theories they react by barricading themselves. For example: one of the greatest mysteries about the attacks on America is the apparently empty crater in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Where is the wreckage of Flight United 93? After asking United Airlines, we are told that the insurance company has the wreckage. But the responsible manager at that company is first in a meeting, then on a three-day business trip, which then becomes a several weeks-long intercontinental trip. During this time he cannot be reached by email or cell-phone—or so we are told by the secretary of one of the largest airline-insurance companies in the United States. After weeks and countless phone calls finally a brief answer: we do not have the wreckage. The FBI in Washington is in charge. The FBI press officer is surprisingly open and cooperative. There will be no interview about 9/11 but he will certainly give permission to film the wreckage. After all, the investigations have ended and there is no reason to exclude the public. Alas! The FBI no longer has the wreckage. It has been returned to United Airlines. Back to square one! Yes, we have the wreckage, says the airline after a new inquiry. But no permission to film. No reason given. All inquiries to government officials, and most to private companies, end this way. Apparently no one wants to have anything to do with 9/11.” The producer describes similar difficulties when he tried to obtain permission to film inside a Boeing flight simulator or when he approached New York officials to ask them about the fireproofing in the WTC. “But when we talk with officials off-the-record, many say a gag-order has been handed from the top. There is widespread fear of getting into trouble by talking.” [Hamburger Abendblatt, 9/11/2007; Renz, 9/11/2007]

Entity Tags: FBI Headquarters, United Airlines

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations

Osama bin Laden in 2004 (left) and 2007 (right).Osama bin Laden in 2004 (left) and 2007 (right). [Source: As-Sahab]Problems with a recently released video featuring a man thought to be Osama bin Laden surface. In particular, the 26-minute recording only contains two short sections where the man said to be bin Laden is seen talking. The first covers the initial two minutes of the tape, the second begins after around twelve and a half minutes and lasts for about 90 seconds. The remaining 23 minutes of the tape show only a still image of the speaker. There are also many audio and video splices in the tape and the two live sections appear to be from different recordings, as the desk in front of bin Laden is closer to the camera in the second section. Analyst Neal Krawetz says, “the new audio has no accompanying ‘live’ video and consists of multiple audio recordings… And there are so many splices that I cannot help but wonder if someone spliced words and phrases together. I also cannot rule out a vocal imitator during the frozen-frame audio. The only way to prove that the audio is really bin Laden is to see him talking in the video.” Krawetz will also note the similarities with bin Laden’s previous video, released just before the 2004 US presidential election (see October 29, 2004): “[T]his is the same clothing [a white hat, white shirt and yellow sweater] he wore in the 2004-10-29 video. In 2004 he had it unzipped, but in 2007 he zipped up the bottom half. Besides the clothing, it appears to be the same background, same lighting, and same desk. Even the camera angle is almost identical.” Krawetz also comments, “if you overlay the 2007 video with the 2004 video, his face has not changed in three years—only his beard is darker and the contrast on the picture has been adjusted.” [News(.com), 9/12/2007] However, most of the Western news coverage about the video fails to point out that most of the video is a still image. [CNN, 8/8/2007; National Public Radio, 9/7/2007; BBC, 9/8/2007]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Neal Krawetz

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell admits, “9/11 should have and could have been prevented; it was an issue of connecting information that was available.” [ABC News, 9/18/2007] The reason he gives for this is: “There was a terrorist. He was a foreigner. He was in the United States [note: presumably he is referring to Khalid Almihdhar]. He was planning to carry out the 9/11 attacks. What the 9/11 Commission and the Joint Inquiry found is that person communicated back to al-Qaeda overseas and we failed to detect it.” [US Congress, 9/18/2007] However, it is unclear which portions of the 9/11 Commission and Congressional Inquiry reports he thinks he is referring to. The 9/11 Commission report contains two brief mentions of these calls to and from the US, but does not say whether they were detected or not, although it does say that other calls made outside the US by the 9/11 hijackers were detected. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 87-8, 181, 222] The Congressional Inquiry report says that the calls between Almihdhar in the US and the al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen were intercepted and analyzed by the NSA, which distributed reports to other intelligence agencies about some of them. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 pdf file] The FBI had requested the NSA inform it of calls between the number Almihdhar talked to, an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen, and the US (see Late 1998), but the NSA did not do so (see (Spring 2000)). A variety of explanations are offered for this after 9/11 (see Summer 2002-Summer 2004 and March 15, 2004 and After).

Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Mike McConnell, 9/11 Commission, National Security Agency

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, Key Hijacker Events

In mid-September 2007, the CIA informs the prosecution team from the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial that it has one video recordings of a high-ranking detainee interrogation. The CIA had previously claimed it had no video recordings of any interrogations when in fact it did (see May 7-9, 2003 and November 3-14, 2005). The CIA then initiates a review and unearths another video and an audio recording several days later. The prosecutors will subsequently inform the judge, but say that the error did not influence the outcome of the trial, as Moussaoui pleaded guilty, but the death penalty was not imposed. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 10/25/2007 pdf file; Reuters, 11/13/2007] Lawyers who prosecuted Zacarias Moussaoui view these two videotapes and listen to the one audiotape. The names of the one to three detainees who were recorded are not known. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 10/25/2007 pdf file] However, they were enemy combatants that could not testify at the trial, and substitutions for testimony were submitted in the trial on behalf of five enemy combatants: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Khallad bin Attash, Hambali, and Mohamed al-Khatani. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 10/25/2007 pdf file; Reuters, 11/13/2007] Shortly after this, the CIA discloses that it had destroyed some similar videotapes in 2005 (see November 2005 and December 6, 2007). Apparently this indicates some videotapes have survived the destruction.

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Zacarias Moussaoui

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Following the release of a new video and a new audio message from a man thought to be Osama bin Laden (see September 7, 2007 and September 11, 2007), terrorism analyst Peter Bergen says it may be a good idea to allow As-Sahab, a clandestine institute that makes videos for al-Qaeda, to continue to operate. Bergen says it would be difficult to shut the operation down, “You’d have to capture or kill everyone involved, and if you knew who they were, you might want to follow them instead,” says Bergen, adding, “Understanding the inner workings of As-Sahab is probably as good a way as any I can think of to get close to bin Laden and [al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-]Zawahiri.” However, former director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center John Brennan says of a possible attempt at penetrating As-Sahab, “Don’t presume that’s not happening.” CIA Director General Michael Hayden says of As-Sahab’s ability to continue putting out videos, “It might be disappointing, but it shouldn’t be surprising.” [United Press International, 9/19/2007]

Entity Tags: As-Sahab, John O. Brennan, Michael Hayden, Peter Bergen

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

A man thought to be Osama bin Laden releases a new audio tape calling on the people of Pakistan to overthrow President Pervez Musharraf. The immediate reason is a Pakistani government attack on a mosque, which is compared to the destruction of a mosque in India by Hindu nationalists, “Pervez’s invasion of Lal Masjid [the Red Mosque] in the City of Islam, Islamabad (see July 3-11, 2007), is a sad event, like the crime of the Hindus in their invasion and destruction of the Babari Masjid.” The voice on the tape accuses Musharraf of providing “loyalty, submissiveness and aid to America,” and says, “armed rebellion against him and removing him [are] obligatory.” Musharraf is also criticized for showing images of a cleric attempting to escape the mosque in women’s clothing, for Pakistani military intelligence allegedly pressurizing clerics to issue fatwas favorable to the government, for his inaction over Kashmir, and for using the Pakistani army in tribal areas. [Counterterrorismblog(.org), 9/2007; BBC, 9/20/2007] Al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri also apparently released an audio tape condemning the Red Mosque raid, but his tape took only days to appear (see July 11, 2007).

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

A New York Post graphic illustrates the numbers of Americans that believe in several possible high-level conspiracies.A New York Post graphic illustrates the numbers of Americans that believe in several possible high-level conspiracies. [Source: New York Post]According to a poll by Scripps Howard News Service and Ohio University, 62 percent of Americans believe it is possible that some people in the US government had specific advance warnings of the 9/11 attacks, but chose to ignore them. Thirty-two percent of respondents think this is “very likely,” and only 30 percent say it is unlikely. The national survey of 811 adults also inquires about respondents’ opinions on other alleged high-level conspiracies. It finds 42 percent think it likely that some people in the government knew in advance about the plot to assassinate President John F. Kennedy in 1963, 37 percent think it possible that the government is hiding the truth about UFOs, and 81 percent think that oil companies conspire to keep the price of gasoline high. [Scripps Howard News Service, 11/23/2007; Scripps Howard News Service, 11/23/2007; WorldNetDaily, 11/24/2007] The New York Post reports the survey in a story titled, “‘Blame US for 9/11’ Idiots in Majority,” which refers to “the popularity of crackpot conspiracy theories.” [New York Post, 11/24/2007] Ironically, in May 2002 the same newspaper had a prominent front-page story titled, “Bush Knew: Prez Was Warned of Possible Hijackings before Terror Attacks” (see May 15, 2002). [MSNBC, 11/26/2007] A previous Scripps Howard/Ohio University survey in July 2006 found that 36 percent of Americans thought US government officials assisted in the 9/11 attacks or deliberately took no action to stop them (see July 6-24, 2006). [Scripps Howard News Service, 8/3/2006]

Entity Tags: Ohio University, New York Post, Scripps Howard News Service

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, Media

In a reply to criticisms of its World Trade Center investigation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) admits that it is unable to fully explain the total collapse of the Twin Towers on 9/11. NIST’s letter is a response to a “request for correction” letter sent to it five months earlier by Bob McIlvaine and Bill Doyle, who both lost family members on 9/11, along with scientists Kevin Ryan and Steven E. Jones, architect Richard Gage, and the group Scholars for 9/11 Truth and Justice. This letter made several assertions about NIST’s final reports of its WTC investigation, and suggested they had violated the Data Quality Act and NIST’s information quality standards. NIST’s reply denies the requests for corrections. However, it also mentions, “[W]e are unable to provide a full explanation of the total collapse” of the World Trade Center. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/27/2007 pdf file] In its final report on the Twin Towers collapses, released in October 2005, NIST admitted that its investigation did “not actually include the structural behavior of the tower after the conditions for collapse initiation were reached and collapse became inevitable” (see October 26, 2005). [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 82]

Entity Tags: National Institute of Standards and Technology, World Trade Center

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

According to Time magazine, the CIA produces a report saying that Osama bin Laden has long-term kidney disease and may only have months to live. Time cites as its source “two US officials familiar with the report.” Allegedly, the CIA managed to get the names of some of the medications bin Laden is taking. How this was done is unclear. One of the sources says the report concluded, “Based on his current pharmaceutical intake, [we] would expect that he has no more than six to 18 months to live and impending kidney failure.” However, some observers will dispute the alleged report’s apparent claims. Paul Pillar, a former deputy director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, will say, “It’s trying to make a diagnosis from thousands of miles away with only fragments of the medical chart.” Former Bush administration official Frances Fragos Townsend will add: “I’ve read all the same conflicting reports [on bin Laden’s health] that people have talked to you about. I never found one set of reporting more persuasive than another.” When Time breaks the story the next year, the CIA will even disavow the claims attributed to the report. “I have found no one here familiar with this alleged report or the analytic line it supposedly conveys,” says CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano. “The fact that anonymous sources attribute views to the CIA is not, by itself, reason to believe the agency actually holds those views.” [Time, 6/30/2009]

Entity Tags: Frances Townsend, Central Intelligence Agency, Paul Gimigliano, Paul R. Pillar, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

The Washington Post reports, “Pakistan’s government is losing its war against emboldened insurgent forces, giving al-Qaeda and the Taliban more territory in which to operate and allowing the groups to plot increasingly ambitious attacks, according to Pakistani and Western security officials.” Since the government’s raid on the Red Mosque in July 2007 (see July 3-11, 2007 and July 11-Late July, 2007), militants have gone all out in trying to overthrow the government, but Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has been consumed by a struggle to stay in power (see October 6, 2007 and November 3-December 15, 2007) and has done little in return to fight them. Brig. Gen. Mehmood Shah, a top security official in the tribal regions until he retirement in 2005, says: “The federal government is busy with its problem of legitimacy. Getting Musharraf elected for another five years—that is keeping everything on hold.” Militants not only control much of the country’s mountainous tribal regions, but they are increasingly moving down the hills to threaten larger towns and cities. A Western military official based in Pakistan says the militants have “had a chance to regroup and reorganize. They’re well equipped. They’re clearly getting training from somewhere. And they’re using more and more advanced tactics.” But this official says that Pakistan’s military are “not trained for a counterinsurgency. It’s not their number one priority. It’s not even their number two priority.” This person adds, “The sad thing about it is that a lot of these militants are better off than the Frontier Corps,” referring to the Pakistani paramilitary force guarding the tribal region. The militants “have rockets. They have advanced weapons. And the Frontier Corps has sandals and a bolt-action rifle.” The Post notes that although the US has given about $10 billion to Pakistan since 9/11, “the aid does not seem to have won the United States many friends here. Nor has it successfully prepared the Pakistani army to battle insurgents.” [Washington Post, 10/3/2007]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Frontier Corps, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani Army

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Defense Department General Counsel William J. Haynes assumes command of the military prosecutions at Guantanamo, a decision that infuriates lead prosecutor Colonel Morris Davis. Haynes is promoted by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England; Haynes, a civilian lawyer, was blocked in his bid for a seat on an appellate court because of his connection to the now-infamous torture memos (see November 27, 2002). Davis, who opposes the use of such techniques as waterboarding and other “extreme interrogation techniques,” resigns within hours of Haynes’s promotion. Davis will later say that Haynes’ expanded powers were a key reason for his decision (see October 4, 2007). “[T]he decision to give him command over the chief prosecutor’s office, in my view, cast a shadow over the integrity of military commissions,” he will write in a December 2007 op-ed explaining his decision (see December 10, 2007). Davis will also write that he has no confidence that military commissions can be used for fair trials if “political appointees like Haynes and [convening authority Susan] Crawford” are in charge: “The president first authorized military commissions in November 2001, more than six years ago, and the lack of progress is obvious. Only one war-crime case has been completed. It is time for the political appointees who created this quagmire to let go. Sen[ators] John McCain and Lindsey Graham have said that how we treat the enemy says more about us than it does about him. If we want these military commissions to say anything good about us, it’s time to take the politics out of military commissions, give the military control over the process and make the proceedings open and transparent.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/10/2007] In 2009, one of Davis’s subordinates, prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel Darrel Vandeveld, will confirm Davis’s story (see January 18, 2009). He will recall Davis complaining of “being bullied by political appointees in the Bush administration.” Vandeveld will write that Davis resigned rather than bring prosecutions before they were ready to proceed, especially since, as Davis believed, the prosecutions were for political purposes. [Washington Post, 1/18/2009]

Entity Tags: William J. Haynes, Gordon England, Morris Davis, Darrel Vandeveld, John McCain, US Department of Defense, Lindsey Graham

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

On October 4, 2007, after secret talks with former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in London and Dubai, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf issues an amnesty from prosecution for Bhutto and other exiled politicians. Bhutto and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif have been living in exile as both had been facing corruption charges in Pakistan. Both are now free to return. As part of a deal, Bhutto agreed that the members of the main opposition political party she leads, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) will abstain from voting when Musharraf runs for a second term as president two days later (in Pakistan, the president is chosen in a parliamentary vote). This ensures Musharraf’s victory (see October 6, 2007). Bhutto will return to Pakistan on October 18. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 386-387]

Entity Tags: Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan People’s Party, Pervez Musharraf

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf wins reelection to a second five-year term as president. In Pakistan, the president is selected by a simple majority from the parliament. Musharraf made a deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto two days earlier in which her party abstains from the vote and in return she is granted amnesty and is allowed to return to Pakistan (see October 4, 2007). Other parties also abstain, and as a result Musharraf wins almost unopposed, with 57 percent of total number of MPs voting for him. However, Pakistan’s Supreme Court rules that the official results can only be declared after it rules if Musharraf is eligible to win. Musharraf is both president and head of the military, and Pakistani law prohibits an active military official from being president. However, analysts doubt the court will overturn the result. [Associated Press, 10/7/2007]

Entity Tags: Benazir Bhutto, Pervez Musharraf

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

Jamal al-Badawi in a Yemeni prison in 2005.Jamal al-Badawi in a Yemeni prison in 2005. [Source: Associated Press / Muhammed Al Qadhi]Al-Qaeda operative Jamal al-Badawi, considered one of the main planners of the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), turns himself in to Yemeni authorities on October 17, 2007. He had escaped a Yemeni prison the year before and had been sentenced to death in Yemen for his role in the bombing (see February 3, 2006). But on October 26, Yemeni authorities release him again in return for a pledge not to engage in any violent or al-Qaeda-related activity. Yemen often lets militants go free if they pledge not to attack within Yemen (see 2002 and After). The US has issued a $5 million reward for al-Badawi’s capture, but the Yemeni government refuses to extradite him. US officials are furious about the release, which is particularly galling because it comes just two days after President Bush’s top counterterrorism adviser Frances Townsend visits Yemen and praises the Yemeni government for their cooperation in fighting terrorism. The US had also just announced $20 million in new aid for Yemen, but threatens to cancel the aid due to al-Badawi’s release. Al-Badawi is put back in prison on October 29 and the aid program goes forward. However, US officials are dubious about al-Badawis’ real status. One official who visits him in prison gets the impression he was put in a prison cell just in time for the visit. [Newsweek, 10/27/2007; Newsweek, 10/31/2007; New York Times, 1/28/2008] In December 2007, a Yemeni newspaper reports that al-Badawi has again been seen roaming free in public. One source close to the Cole investigation will tell the Washington Post in 2008 that there is evidence that al-Badawi is still allowed to come and go from his prison cell. US officials have demanded to be able to conduct random inspections to make sure he stays in his cell, but apparently the Yemeni government has refused the demand. [Washington Post, 5/4/2008]

Entity Tags: Jamal al-Badawi, Frances Townsend

Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Yemeni Militant Collusion, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Attorney general nominee Michael Mukasey uses an anecdote about a cell phone battery to argue that the current legal system is poorly equipped to fight Islamic terrorism. The anecdote is told during his confirmation hearings, but he previously used it in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal in August. Mukasey says that during Ramzi Yousef’s trial for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing: “[S]omebody testified to somebody having delivered a cell phone battery to someone else. That piece of testimony disclosed to al-Qaeda that a line of communication of theirs had been compromised and, in fact, was one of communication that our government was monitoring and from which it had gotten enormously valuable intelligence. That line of communication shut down within days of that testimony and I don’t know what we lost. Nobody knows what we lost. But we probably lost something enormously valuable.” Mukasey does not say which of Yousef’s two trials the testimony was at. [Wall Street Journal, 8/22/2007; CQ Transcripts Wire, 10/18/2007] This incident is not known and is not confirmed by other sources. It is unclear who the two militants were, and why the militant who received the cell phone battery would be unable to purchase it himself. Osama bin Laden is said to have received a doctored battery for his satellite (not cell) phone in Afghanistan, and this is said to have helped the US track him (see May 28, 1998). However, this apparently happened after Yousef was sentenced in the last of the two cases to come to trial, so it is unclear how this could have been mentioned at the trial (see January 8, 1998). A rumor later circulated that bin Laden had stopped using the satellite phone with the allegedly doctored battery based on a leak of intelligence to the press, but that appears to be an urban myth (see Late August 1998).

Entity Tags: Michael Mukasey

Category Tags: Remote Surveillance

Abdallah Higazy, an Egyptian national who falsely confessed to owning a suspicious airline transceiver after the 9/11 attacks because the FBI threatened to have his family tortured (see December 17, 2001), December 27, 2001, and January 11-16, 2002), has his lawsuit against the FBI reinstated by a US appeals court. The majority opinion finds, “An officer in [FBI agent Michael] Templeton’s shoes would have understood that the confession he allegedly coerced from Higazy would have been used in a criminal case against Higazy and that his actions therefore violated Higazy’s Constitutional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.” [New York Sun, 10/18/2007]
Decision Issued and Withdrawn - Interestingly, the appeals court posts its full opinion on the case, then within minutes withdraws that opinion and issues another one, with an identical conclusion but with much of the details of Higazy’s allegations redacted. The new ruling reads: “This opinion has been redacted because portions of the record are under seal. For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, Templeton did not contest that Higazy’s statements were coerced.” But the initial opinion has already been downloaded by dozens of legal observers and bloggers, and the evidence redacted by the court is in the public view.
"People Don't Do that Voluntarily" - Washington Post reporter Dan Eggen writes, “The fresh details about his interrogation in December 2001 illustrate how an innocent man can be persuaded to confess to a crime that he did not commit, and the lengths to which the FBI was willing to go in its terrorism-related investigations after the Sept. 11 attacks.” A Justice Department spokesman says that although it does not concede that Higazy’s allegations are true, it has agreed to proceed under the assumption that they are true in order to argue the case. The appellate court does not rule on the veracity of Higazy’s story, but instead concludes that Templeton lacks the “qualified immunity” that would shield him from a civil suit.
Redacted Information - Appellate court clerk Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe says that the original Higazy ruling contained information that should have been sealed from the outset. The decision to seal the information was the court’s, she says, and not the Justice Department’s or the FBI. She says that the decision to seal the information about Templeton’s coercion, and Higazy’s fears of the Egyptian intelligence service, was made out of concern for the safety of Higazy and his family. “Prior to the world of the Internet, a decision would be issued and then withdrawn without any consequences of any moment,” Wolfe says. “Now if that happens it raises the specter of interference or some nefarious intent at work, which is not the case.” Appellate lawyer Stephen Bergstein says that the redacted information “was more embarrassing than worthy of secrecy.” He continues: “Had they left it in, a lot of people probably wouldn’t have noticed. With the Internet, nothing ever goes away.” [Howard Bashman, 10/18/2007; New York Times, 10/20/2007; Washington Post, 10/25/2007]

Entity Tags: Michael Templeton, Dan Eggen, Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Stephen Bergstein, Abdallah Higazy, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: 9/11 Related Lawsuits

In a setback for the Justice Department, a mistrial is declared in the government’s attempted prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (see 1989), a now-defunct Muslim charity that the government accused of sponsoring terrorism back in 2001. The mistrial was not the first verdict sent down; the judge originally announced a near-complete acquittal of Holy Land’s top officials on terrorist financing charges. However, three jurors stated in court that the verdict was incorrect, the judge sent the jury back into chambers for further deliberations. A mistrial of four Holy Land officials is declared after the jury declares itself locked, and a fifth official is declared innocent of all but one charge, where the jury again finds itself unable to render a verdict. The mistrials and acquittals are a blow to the Justice Department and the White House, both of which have billed the prosecution of Holy Land as the best efforts in years to secure a clear victory against terrorism. “It’s a major loss for the government,” says law professor Jonathan Turley, who has himself represented alleged terrorist financiers against the Justice Department. The case was never as solid as it was presented by government officials. In 2001, after Holy Land was declared a terrorist sponsor by the Bush administration and its funds were frozen (see February 19, 2000 and December 4, 2001), civil libertarians called the government’s definition of sponsorship of terrorism overly broad, and Holy Land fought back in court. In 2004, the government indicted Holy Land and its top leaders, leveling accusations that the charity and its officials had funnelled $12 million to the terrorist group Hamas through secondary charities (see October 1994-2001, May 12, 2000-December 9, 2004 and December 18, 2002-April 2005). A summary of wiretapped conversations between charity officials contained inflammatory anti-Semitic statements, which bolstered the government’s case in the public eye, but when the actual transcripts were examined, no such anti-Semitic statements could be found. And the government’s strategy of adding a long list of “unindicted co-conspirators” to its allegations against Holy Land, a list which includes many prominent Muslim organizations still legally operating inside the US, has caused many to accuse the government of conducting a smear campaign (see December 3-14, 2001 and August 21, 2004). While the Justice Department may well retry the case, the verdict, which seems to favor the defendants, “doesn’t bode well for the government’s prosecution” of this and other similar cases, says export controls lawyer Judith Lee. [US News and World Report, 10/22/2007]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Jonathan Turley, Hamas, Judith Lee, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, Bush administration (43)

Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Benazir Bhutto’s motorcade bombed in Karachi.Benazir Bhutto’s motorcade bombed in Karachi. [Source: BBC]Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returns to Pakistan after eight years in exile. Earlier in the month she had made a deal with President Pervez Musharraf that gave her amnesty in return for not opposing Musharraf’s reelection vote (see October 4, 2007). Bhutto, Pakistan’s most popular opposition politician, is greeted by large, enthusiastic crowds as she arrives in the city of Karachi. But as her motorcade is moving through the crowd at night, a suicide bomber approaches on foot and throws a grenade to attract attention. Then the bomber sets off a larger blast that kills at least 139 and injures around 400. Bhutto is not hurt, as she had just moved inside her vehicle from the roof moments before. CNN reporter Dan Rivers, filming the motorcade just before the attack, later comments on the lack of security. He says it was possible to walk right up to the side of her vehicle without being stopped. [CNN, 10/19/2007]
Bhutto Assigns Blame - The next day, Bhutto says, “I am not accusing the government [as a whole], but I am accusing certain individuals who abuse their positions, who abuse their powers.… I know exactly who wants to kill me. It is dignitaries of the former regime of General [Muhammad Zia ul-Haq] who are today behind the extremism and the fanaticism.” She has long accused the ISI of opposing her. Aides close to her say that she specifically names Ijaz Shah, a former ISI official linked to Saeed Sheikh (see February 5, 2002) and the director general of the Intelligence Bureau, another Pakistani intelligence agency. She also says that an unnamed “brotherly country” had warned her that several suicide squads were plotting attacks against her, including squads from the Taliban and al-Qaeda. She says this government gave the Pakistani government the phone numbers the plotters were using, but implies investigators did not take advantage of the lead. She further says the street lamps had been turned off along the motorcade route, making it difficult for her security detail to scan the crowd for possible bombers, and demands an investigation into this. [New York Times, 10/20/2007]
Others Assign Blame - Her husband Asif Ali Zardari is more direct, saying, “I blame the government for these blasts. It is the work of the intelligence agencies.” The government by contrast complains that the security situation was extremely difficult. She was taking a big risk, moving though crowds of hundreds of thousands in a notoriously violent city of 16 million people. [Australian, 10/20/2007] The US by contrast, quickly blames al-Qaeda. Only one day after the bombing, US State Department officials say they believe there is a “strong al-Qaeda connection” and that it “bears the hallmarks” of an al-Qaeda attack. [CNN, 10/20/2007]

Entity Tags: Ijaz Shah, Al-Qaeda, Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, US Department of State

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks

A new audio tape is released by a man thought to be Osama bin Laden. The voice on the tape tells the various groups in Iraq fighting the US to unify, but contains no dated references, so it is unclear when it was made. The voice says, “Beware of your enemies, especially those who infiltrate your ranks,” and, “You have done well to perform your duty, but some of you have been late to another duty, which is to unify your ranks and make them into one line.” [CNN, 10/22/2007]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

On the eve of a visit to London, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia says that his intelligence service warned Britain of an impending plot before the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005), but that British authorities failed to act on the warning. King Abdullah says, “We sent information to [Britain] before the terrorist attacks in Britain but unfortunately no action was taken. And it may have been able to maybe avert the tragedy.” He also says that Britain did not take terrorism seriously for a while. However, British authorities deny all this. [BBC, 10/29/2007] Details of the warning are not specified. However, this may be a reference to one or two discussions between Saudi Arabia and Britain in early 2005 about information indicating there was to be an attack in London (see December 14, 2004-February 2005 and April 2005 or Shortly Before).

Entity Tags: Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud

Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism, Saudi Arabia, 2005 7/7 London Bombings

Through investgative blogger Brad Friedman, former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds makes an open offer to all broadcast TV networks to give any one of them an exclusive “tell all” interview in exchange for unedited air time. Edmonds says, “[h]ere’s my promise to the American Public: If anyone of the major networks—ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, MSNBC, Fox—promise to air the entire segment, without editing, I promise to tell them everything that I know.” She further explains, “I can tell the American public exactly what it is, and what it is that they are covering up,” adding, “I’m not compromising ongoing investigations,” as “they’ve all been shut down since.” Edmonds has already gone to Congress, the Justice Department inspector general, and the 9/11 Commission, and on two separate occasions had been gagged under the State Secrets Act to prevent her testimony in court. Regarding what she has to talk about, Friedman summarizes it as: “Everything she hasn’t been allowed to tell since 2002, about the criminal penetration of the FBI where she worked, and at the Departments of State and Defense; everything she heard concerning the corruption and illegal activities of several well-known members of Congress; everything she’s aware of concerning information omitted and/or covered up in relation to 9/11. All of the information gleaned from her time listening to and translating wire-taps made prior to 9/11 at the FBI.” [Bradblog.com, 10/29/2007]

Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Brad Friedman

Category Tags: Key Warnings, Sibel Edmonds

Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed.Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed. [Source: Associated Press]The trial of 28 people accused of a role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings comes to an end, and 21 are found guilty. However, only three are convicted of murder and are given life sentences: Jamal Zougam, Othman El Gnaoui, and Emilio Suarez Trashorras. Seven of the principal bombers blew themselves up one month after the bombings (see 9:05 p.m., April 3, 2004). None of the accused confessed, making convictions difficult. Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed was accused of being the bombing mastermind. While living it Italy, he reportedly bragged, “I was the leader of Madrid,” and “the Madrid bombings were my project, and those who died as martyrs there were my beloved friends.” But his defense attorneys argued successfully that the tapes were mistranslated and so they were thrown out as evidence. A counterterrorism expert says the court appeared to have a very strict standard of admissible evidence. However, Ahmed is serving a ten-year prison sentence in Italy based on unrelated charges. [Washington Post, 11/14/2004; MSNBC, 10/31/2007; New York Times, 11/1/2007] Many victims’ relatives complain that the sentences are too lenient. And a spokesperson for Spain’s main opposition party comments, “We still don’t know who gave the order, we still don’t know who built those bombs, and we still don’t know who was the coordinator of these cells that carried out these attacks.” [BBC, 11/1/2007] Some of the other verdicts:
bullet Hamid Ahmidan - 23 years.
bullet Rachid Aglif - 18 years.
bullet Abdelmajid Bouchar - 18 years.
bullet Basel Ghalyoun - 12 years.
bullet Mohammed Larbi ben Sellam - 12 years.
bullet Fouad el Morabit - 12 years.
bullet Mouhannad Almallah - 12 years.
bullet Rafa Zouhier - 10 years.
bullet Youssef Belhadj - 12 years.
bullet Antonio Toro - Acquitted.
bullet Carmen Toro - Acquitted. [El Mundo (Madrid), 11/1/2007]

Entity Tags: Rachid Aglif, Mouhannad Almallah, Othman El Gnaoui, Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, Rafa Zouhier, Mohammed Larbi ben Sellam, Emilio Suarez Trashorras, Hamid Ahmidan, Abdelmajid Bouchar, Antonio Toro, Basel Ghalyoun, Carmen Toro, Fouad el Morabit, Jamal Zougam, Youssef Belhadj

Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

Richard Convertino.Richard Convertino. [Source: Associated Press]Richard Convertino is acquitted by a Detroit federal court jury of subverting justice in a 2003 trial (see June 2003-August 2004). Convertino had been accused of withholding photographs from defense attorneys that might have undermined their 2003 prosecution and convictions of four alleged al-Qaeda-linked terrorists in Detroit. In 2003, defense attorneys wanted photos of a Jordanian hospital, hoping the photos would not match a crude drawing Convertino argued was a terrorist planning sketch. Convertino said there were none, and claims he never saw them, but photos of the hospital were later found. [Detroit Free Press, 11/1/2007] However, a later FBI analysis determined the sketch did closely match the photos after all, so the photos would have actually strengthened Convertino’s case, not weakened it. The guilty verdicts against three of the four men - Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi, Karim Koubriti, and Ahmed Hannan - were later overturned, in large part due to the dispute over the photos (see June 2003-August 2004). The Associated Press will later comment that evidence that the sketch and photos did match “renews questions about whether the government correctly arrested the four men as a terrorist cell…” [Associated Press, 4/21/2006] Convertino alleges the charges against him were politically motivated to punish him for complaining before Congress about a lack of resources in the trial. He has filed a whistleblower lawsuit against the Justice Department. [Detroit Free Press, 11/1/2007] A judge dismisses one remaining charge against Convertino a month later. [Associated Press, 12/12/2007] It appears the Justice Department also battled with Convertino and his prosecution team and prevented him from using evidence that could have strengthened his case (see Early 2003).

Entity Tags: Karim Koubriti, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Farouk Ali-Haimoud, Ahmed Hannan, Abel-Ilah Elmardoudi, US Department of Justice, Richard Convertino

Category Tags: Nabil Al-Marabh, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Internal US Security After 9/11

Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan says that before 9/11 the Saudi government was “actively following” most of the 19 hijackers “with precision.” Prince Bandar, formerly Saudi ambassador to the US, also says that the information Saudi Arabia had may have been sufficient to prevent 9/11: “If US security authorities had engaged their Saudi counterparts in a serious and credible manner, in my opinion, we would have avoided what happened.” A US official says that the statement made by Prince Bandar should be taken with a grain of salt. [CNN, 11/2/2007] Saudi officials had previously said that they watchlisted two of the Saudi hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, in the late 1990s (see 1997 and Late 1999) and their interest in Nawaf Alhazmi may have led them to his brother, Salem. All three of these hijackers were also tracked by the US before 9/11 (see Early 1999, January 5-8, 2000, Early 2000-Summer 2001 and 9:53 p.m. September 11, 2001).
Saudi Tracking - Almost a year after Prince Bandar makes this claim, author James Bamford will offer information corroborating it. Bamford will write that Saudi officials placed an indicator in some of the hijackers’ passports and then used the indicator to track them. The Saudis did this because they thought the hijackers were Islamist radicals and wanted to keep an eye on their movements. [Bamford, 2008, pp. 58-59] Details of the tracking by the Saudis are sketchy and there is no full list of the hijackers tracked in this manner. According to the 9/11 Commission, Almihdhar and the Alhazmi brothers had indicators of Islamist extremism in their passports. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 33 pdf file] Two other hijackers may also have had the same indicator. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 564]
The three who had the indicator are: -
bullet Nawaf Alhazmi, who obtained a passport containing an indicator in the spring of 1999 (see March 21, 1999), and then left Saudi Arabia (see After Early April 1999).
bullet Khalid Almihdhar, who obtained passports containing an indicator in the spring of 1999 and June 2001 (see April 6, 1999 and June 1, 2001), and then repeatedly entered and left Saudi Arabia (see After Early April 1999, Late 2000-February 2001, May 26, 2001, and July 4, 2001).
bullet Salem Alhazmi, who obtained passports containing an indicator in the spring of 1999 and June 2001 (see April 4, 1999 and June 16, 2001), and then repeatedly entered and left Saudi Arabia (see After Early April 1999, November 2000, June 13, 2001, and (Between June 20 and June 29, 2001)).
The two who may also have had the indicator are: -
bullet Ahmed Alhaznawi, who obtained a passport possibly containing an indicator before mid-November 2000 (see Before November 12, 2000) and then repeatedly entered and left Saudi Arabia (see After November 12, 2000, (Between May 7 and June 1, 2001), and June 1, 2001).
bullet Ahmed Alnami, who obtained passports possibly containing an indicator in late 2000 and spring 2001 (see November 6, 1999 and April 21, 2001) and then repeatedly entered and left Saudi Arabia (see Mid-November, 2000 and May 13, 2001).
What the indicator actually looks like in the passports is not known.

Entity Tags: Bandar bin Sultan

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Saudi Arabia, Key Hijacker Events, Hijacker Visas and Immigration

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto gives an interview to David Frost of Al Jazeera in which she makes a number of noteworthy statements:
bullet She says that Saeed Sheikh is “the man who murdered Osama bin Laden.” Saeed helped kidnap Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, who was later murdered (see January 23, 2002), is said to have provided money for the 9/11 hijackings (see Early August 2001), and is thought to have been in prison in Pakistan since 2002 (see February 12, 2002). Although bin Laden is thought to be alive at this time (see October 22, 2007), Frost does not ask a follow-up question about bin Laden’s alleged demise. [Al Jazeera, 11/2/2007] When a video of the interview is posted at the BBC’s website, this section is initially edited out, as the editor thinks Bhutto must simply have misspoken. However, the BBC accepts this was an error and later posts a full version of the interview. [BBC, 4/1/2008] This is the only known occasion that Bhutto makes this claim.
bullet Based on information from a “friendly country,” she names four people and/or organizations that might attack her: al-Qaeda linked warlord Baitullah Mahsud; Hamza bin Laden, son of Osama; the “Pakistan Taliban in Islamabad”; and an unnamed group in Karachi.
bullet While she thinks that such groups may be used for an attack on her, they are not pulling the strings, she says. She suggests three people may be behind an attack by one of the groups. The reason these three are said to want her dead is because she could stop the rise of terrorism in Pakistan. One of the three is former ISI officer Ijaz Shah, a “very key figure in security,” who she thinks has turned a blind eye or even colluded with militants, and who is an associate of Saeed Sheikh (see February 5, 2002). [Al Jazeera, 11/2/2007] Shah, a government official, will actually be in charge of protecting Bhutto from assassination when she is assassinated. The names of the other two said to be “pulling the strings” are not certain, but they are a prominent Pakistani figure, one of whose family members was allegedly murdered by a militant group run by Bhutto’s brother, and a well-known chief minister in Pakistan who is a longstanding opponent of Bhutto. [Daily Mail, 12/30/2007]

Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, David Frost, Benazir Bhutto, Baitullah Mahsud, Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh

Marc Falkoff.Marc Falkoff. [Source: Northern Illinois University]Law professor Marc Falkoff, who represents some of the Guantanamo terror suspects, says that the resignation of Colonel Morris Davis as the lead prosecutor in the Guantanamo military commissions trials (see October 4, 2007) is important not just because only 80 of the 350 detainees are slated to be tried, leaving the other 270 in what Falkoff calls a “legal limbo, subject to indefinite detention without charge or trial or any court oversight for the duration of the war on terror,” but because of Davis’s revelations that the commissions have been tainted by political considerations. Davis’s resignation “may finally signal to the American public that politics rather than principle reigns at Guantanamo, and that decisions about the administration of justice at the camp are being made—largely outside of public view and without accountability—by political actors for nakedly political reasons.” As an example, Falkoff notes that every European in custody has been returned to their home countries, but 90% of the Yemenis in detention remain in custody even though many have been cleared for release by the US military. Falkoff says that he and his colleagues have for over three years visited their clients in Guantanamo to bring them what he calls “good news” about the court victories they have won. Falkoff writes, “To a man, upon hearing our news, our clients have smiled politely and shrugged, pointing out to us that they still have not had their day in court and that they still are not treated in accord with the Geneva Conventions. ‘You have to understand,’ they tell us, ‘this is all a big game.’ More and more, I am starting to think they are right.” [Jurist, 11/2/2007]

Entity Tags: Marc Falkoff, US Department of Defense, Morris Davis

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. [Source: Anjum Naveed Associated Press]On October 6, 2007, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf won a parliamentary vote that gave him a second term as president (see October 6, 2007). However, Pakistani law prohibits an active military officer from running as president, and Musharraf is both president and the head of the military. Pakistan’s Supreme Court is to decide soon if Musharraf’s reelection vote is valid. The outcome is uncertain, especially since the Supreme Court is headed by Iftikhar Chaudhry, who was fired by Musharraf earlier in the year and then reinstated against Musharraf’s will (see March 9, 2007). But on November 3, before the court renders a verdict, Musharraf declares a state of emergency. He suspends the constitution and basic rights. He fires Chaudhry and all the other Supreme Court judges, and places them under house arrest. He also forces all other high court judges to sign a loyalty oath validating his actions. A majority refuse to sign and are placed under house arrest as well. All private television stations are taken off the air, leaving only one state-controlled network to give the news. Up to ten thousand activists and politicians are arrested. The main opposition politician, Benazir Bhutto, is placed under house arrest for several days. Musharraf then passes six constitutional amendments legalizing his rule. In a further effort to legitimize his rule, he also resigns from the army on November 28 and gives command of the army to Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a former ISI director. But still facing widespread condemnation at home and abroad, he lifts the state of emergency on December 15, rescinds the draconian measures he imposed, and releases the thousands who have been arrested (however, Chaudhry and the other fired judges remain under house arrest). He announces that elections to pick a new prime minister will be held in January 2008. Pakistani journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid will later comment, “The forty-two-day-long emergency had blighted Pakistan, undermined its economy, destroyed what little trust the political parties and public had in Musharraf, and turned the increasingly influential middle-class and civil society against both the army and the president.” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 387-388]

Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Iftikhar Chaudhry, Benazir Bhutto

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

Michael Mukasey.Michael Mukasey. [Source: US Department of Justice]After two months of controversy, and a round of sporadically contentious Senate confirmation hearings, former judge Michael Mukasey narrowly wins the Senate’s approval to become the next attorney general, by an almost-party line 53-40 vote. Musakey replaces Alberto Gonzales, who resigned under fire in September 2007. Many Democrats vote against Mukasey because of his refusal to categorize the interrogation technique of waterboarding as torture, and his refusal to say that he would oppose President Bush’s insistence on eavesdropping on US citizens. Some Democrats took comfort in Mukasey’s characterization of waterboarding as “repugnant,” but others were not pleased by his refusal to say that the practice constitutes torture. Two key Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) refused to block Mukasey from going to the Senate for a confirmation vote. Both indicated that they reluctantly supported Mukasey’s nomination because the Justice Department needs an immediate infusion of leadership—Schumer called the department “adrift and rudderless” and in need of “a strong and independent leader”—and they feared if Mukasey was not confirmed, President Bush would put someone worse in the position as an interim appointment. [CNN, 11/8/2007] Schumer says he eventually decided to vote for Mukasey after the judge said “if Congress passed further legislation in this area, the president would have no legal authority to ignore it and Judge Mukasey would enforce it.” But Schumer’s colleague, Ted Kennedy (D-MA), is unimpressed. “Enforcing the law is the job of the attorney general,” Kennedy says. “It’s a prerequisite—not a virtue that enhances a nominee’s qualifications.” Ben Cardin (D-MD) wonders just how far, and how specifically, Congress will have to go to outlaw torture. He asks, “Are we going to have to outlaw the rack because there’s a question whether the rack is torture in this country?” [National Public Radio, 11/7/2007] Arlen Specter (R-PA), the committee’s ranking Republican, calls Mukasey “ethical, honest [and] not an intimate of the president.” [CNN, 11/8/2007] Mukasey is quietly sworn in only hours after winning the Senate vote. [National Public Radio, 11/9/2007] All four Democratic senators running for president—Hillary Clinton (D-NY), Barack Obama (D-IL), Joseph Biden (D-DE), and Christopher Dodd (D-CT)—have said they oppose Mukasey’s nomination. Obama calls Mukasey’s refusal to label waterboarding as torture “appalling,” and notes that Mukasey’s belief that the president “enjoys an unwritten right to secretly ignore any law or abridge our constitutional freedoms simply by invoking national security” disqualify him for the position. The other candidates make similar statements. [Fox News, 10/30/2007] However, none of them actually show up to cast their vote for or against Mukasey. John McCain (R-AZ), another senator running for president, also does not vote. [Associated Press, 11/8/2007] Three days after Mukasey’s confirmation, the New York Times writes a blistering editorial excoriating both the Bush administration and the compliant Senate Democrats for allowing Mukasey to become attorney general (see November 11, 2007).

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Senate Judiciary Committee, Michael Mukasey, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, Dianne Feinstein, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Alberto R. Gonzales, Geneva Conventions, Arlen Specter, Charles Schumer, Ben Cardin, New York Times

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The FBI warns that al-Qaeda operatives are planning several holiday attacks on US shopping malls in Los Angeles and Chicago over the holiday period. [ABC News, 11/8/2007] In an intelligence report distributed to law enforcement authorities, the FBI says that the attacks have been planned for two years with the goal of disrupting the US economy. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 11/7/2007 pdf file] The FBI received the information in late September and declassified it for the intelligence information reports. These reports routinely contain raw, unvetted or uncorroborated chatter about possible threats. It is estimated that the FBI released 8,000 such reports over the last year. The FBI and Department of Homeland Security Department have released about 200 threat bulletins possible plot trends that are based on actual events worldwide. [SF Gate, 11/8/2007] Questions are immediately raised about the alert. [ABC News, 11/8/2007] As with previous threats, some in the media question the timing and necessity of such a warning. The FBI anticipates this and clarifies its intentions in releasing the memo. The report states that “this information was obtained through a lengthy chain of acquisition, and was provided to the source by a sub-source who spoke in confidence. The veracity of the information is uncertain but the threat is being reported due to the nature of the information.” [ABC News, 11/8/2007] Other intelligence officers raise the possibility that it could be “disinformation.” It is believed that the source only has “indirect access” to al-Qaeda. It is common for jihadist web sites and chat rooms to have comments discussing attacks on “soft targets,” such as shopping malls. Special Agent Richard Kolko says “out of abundance of caution, and for any number of other reasons, raw intelligence is regularly shared within the intelligence and law enforcement communities - even when the value of the information is unknown… Al-Qaeda messaging has clearly stated they intend to attack the US or its interests; however, there is no information to state this is a credible threat. As always, we remind people to remain vigilant and report suspicious activity to authorities.” A Homeland Security official says “we have no credible, specific information suggesting an imminent attack.” [ABC News, 11/8/2007] LA mayor Antonio Villaraigosa urges residents to go about their daily routines, but says that they should be “mindful of anything out of the ordinary.” [SF Gate, 11/8/2007]

Entity Tags: Antonio Villaraigosa, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, US Department of Homeland Security, Joe Gandelman, Richard Kolko

Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11

“Suitcase nukes”—nuclear weapons that can fit inside a suitcase or duffel bag and be planted in buildings or football stadiums with relative ease—may be a staple of Hollywood movies, television shows such as Fox’s 24, and thriller novels, but in reality do not exist, says Vahid Majidi, the assistant director of the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. Nevertheless, the idea is so prevalent in the American conscious that the Federal Emergency Management Agency has issued warnings about “threats” from such devices, warnings repeated on the White House’s Web site (see May 2006). Officials such as Majidi say that any such device would be highly complex to produce, require significant upkeep and cost a small fortune. Majidi and other counterproliferation officials do not believe such a threat remains today. “The suitcase nuke is an exciting topic that really lends itself to movies,” Majidi says, but “No one has been able to truly identify the existence of these devices.” The real threat, say Majidi and other officials, is from less deadly and sophisticated devices assembled from stolen or black-market nuclear material. But governmental sources have played up the threat. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) once said in a hearing, “Perhaps the most likely threat is from a suitcase nuclear weapon in a rusty car on a dock in New York City.” And former representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) was known for carrying around a mock-up of a suitcase nuke made out of a briefcase, foil, and a pipe.
Origin of story - The story took hold in the public mind in the 1960s, based on information from Soviet defectors. The information leaked to the media, but no US officials ever actually saw such a Soviet-made suitcase device. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US constructed a “backpack nuke,” called a Special Atomic Demolition Munition, to be used by two-man teams to destroy dams, tunnels, or bridges. These devices now only exist in museums. In 1997, retired general Alexander Lebed, the former national security chief of Russia, told reporters that Chechen rebels had portable nuclear devices. However, his story changed radically over time and Russian government officials said it was inaccurate, and he may have been misled by training mock-ups. Russian defector and former intelligence officer Stanislav Lunev wrote in 1998 that Russian agents had suitcase nukes inside the US in preparation for some future conflict. He testified before Congress, but never gave any specific information about such devices.
Technical problems - Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, former head of the Russian strategic rocket troops, said in 2004 that such suitcase nukes would be too expensive for most countries to produce and would not last more than several months because the nuclear core would decompose quickly. Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative says the biggest threat is from a terrorist cell that uses stolen nuclear material to improvise a device. Such a device would be, at its smallest, “[l]ike SUV-sized. Way bigger than a suitcase.” [Associated Press, 11/10/2007]

Entity Tags: Curt Weldon, Byron L. Dorgan, Alexander Lebed, Viktor Yesin, Vahid Majidi, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Bush administration (43), Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Stanislav Lunev, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Laura Holgate

Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The CIA “erroneously” misled the court and the lawyers involved in the ongoing prosecution of 9/11 suspect Zacarias Moussaoui (see April 22, 2005), it admits in a letter released today. In court declarations on May 9, 2003 and on November 14, 2005, the CIA stated it had no recordings of interrogations of “enemy combatants.” Now it admits it had two video tapes and one audio tape. Moussaoui’s lawyers want the tapes as part of his defense. The federal prosecutors say they just recently learned of the tapes, but they have been assured by the CIA that the tapes have no bearing on Moussaoui’s case, and no one on the tapes mentions either Moussaoui or the 9/11 plot. The prosecutors assert that, while the CIA errors are “unfortunate,” no harm was done to Moussaoui, who pled guilty and is serving a life sentence for his complicity in the attacks (see May 3, 2006). The letter, which has been heavily censored for public consumption, reads in part, “We bring the errors to the court’s attention… as part of our obligation of candor to the court.… The government will promptly apprise the court of any further developments.” [Reuters, 11/13/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Zacarias Moussaoui

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

A poll conducted by the Sigma Dos polling company for Madrid’s El Mundo newspaper shows that 73% of Spaniards want to see a continued investigation into the Madrid train bombings. This result comes two weeks after verdicts in the trial of most of the accused bombers (see October 31, 2007). The poll results are partly split by party loyalty. 90% of those that voted for the conservative Popular Party or its allies want to see a continued investigation while about 62% of those who voted for the ruling liberal Socialist party or its allies want to see a continued investigation. Only 40% of all those polled are satisfied with the court verdict. [El Mundo (Madrid), 11/13/2007]

Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

Ahmed Idris Nasreddin is quietly removed from the US and UN terrorist financier lists. Neither the US nor the UN publicly announces the decision or explains why his name is no longer on an updated list of financiers. Nasreddin, a 78-year old businessman based in Italy and Switzerland, was formally listed in 2002 due to his ties with the banned Al Taqwa Bank (see November 7, 2001). That bank was considered one of the top funders for al-Qaeda and other militant groups until it was banned in late 2001. When asked by the Los Angeles Times about the delisting, the Treasury Department says the original listing was appropriate but Nasreddin was delisted because he submitted signed statements certifying he had terminated all business relationships with Al Taqwa and related entities and individuals. Former State Department official Victor Comras complains: “They seem to be saying that he was a bad guy but that he has renounced being a bad guy. If that’s the criteria, wow, a lot of people will try to get off the list. All they have to do is say, We’re not doing it anymore.” [Los Angeles Times, 11/28/2007]

Entity Tags: Al Taqwa Bank, Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, Victor Comras, US Department of the Treasury, United Nations

Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Al Taqwa Bank, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Following the failed return of former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Pakistan (see September 10, 2007), officials from Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency meet secretly with Saudi representatives in Riyadh to plan another attempt at bringing him back to the country ahead of forthcoming elections. (It is possible that ISI Director General Nadeem Taj and retired brigadier Niaz Ahmed also meet Sharif in Jeddah). The effort is apparently successful, as Sharif re-enters Pakistan a short time later (see November 25, 2007). Washington Post commentator Bob Novak will say these meetings indicate that if the turmoil in Pakistan causes current President Pervez Musharraf to lose his position, Sharif is “the ISI’s chosen successor.” [Daily Times (Lahore), 11/25/2007; Washington Post, 12/3/2007]

Entity Tags: Niaz Ahmed, Nawaz Sharif, Pervez Musharraf, Nadeem Taj, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Saudi Arabia

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

The bus that had been carrying ISI officials to work.The bus that had been carrying ISI officials to work. [Source: Daily Times]Pakistani militants attack the ISI intelligence agency and army in two simultaneous suicide bombings in the city of Rawalpindi, Pakistan. A suicide bomber crashes a car into a bus carrying ISI officials to work, killing 28 ISI officials, plus a bystander and the bomber. Ten minutes later, a second suicide bomber blows up while attempting to enter the army’s General Headquarters, killing one security official and bystander, as well as the bomber. [Daily Times (Lahore), 11/25/2007] Prior to the government’s raid on the Red Mosque earlier in the year (see July 11-Late July, 2007 and July 3-11, 2007), the ISI had been working closely with militant groups (see July 9, 2006).

Entity Tags: Pakistani Army, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks

On November 25, 2007, the London Times publishes an article about Luai Sakra, an al-Qaeda leader imprisoned in Turkey who allegedly was also a CIA informant before 9/11 (see September 10, 2001). The Times reports, “According to Sakra, [9/11 hijacker] Nawaf Alhazmi was a veteran operative who went on to pilot the plane that hit the Pentagon [Flight 77]. Although this is at odds with the official account, which says the plane was flown by another hijacker, it is plausible and might answer one of the mysteries of 9/11,” namely, why the FBI claims Hani Hanjour was the pilot of that plane, when many reports suggest Hanjour was a bad pilot. [London Times, 11/25/2007] Although none of the official accounts such as the 9/11 Commission report claim that Alhazmi was a pilot, there is considerable evidence to suggest that he was:
bullet In December 1999, Alhazmi was taught how to use a computer flight simulator program while in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (see Early December 1999).
bullet On April 4, 2000, Alhazmi took one day’s worth of flying lessons, and his instructor later claims he did quite well and was already almost capable of taking off and landing on his own (see April 4, 2000).
bullet One month later, he took a second one day flying lesson, however his instructor will later call him “dumb” and unskilled (see May 5 and 10, 2000).
bullet Near the end of 2000, he told two unconnected associates that he was in Arizona and learning to fly with Hanjour (see (December 2000-January 2001)).
bullet On March 19, 2001, he bought flight deck videos for Boeing 747s and a Boeing 777 (see November 5, 2000-June 20, 2001).
bullet On March 23, 2001, he bought an aeronautical chart covering the northeastern US (see March 23, 2001).
bullet In July 2001, he and Hanjour appear to have rented an aircraft together in New Jersey. Alhazmi’s credit card was used to pay for the aircraft rental, as well as fuel in Maryland (a072001haninawafflight).
bullet Neighbors will later claim that just days before the 9/11 attacks, Alhazmi was practicing flying on a computer flight simulator program. [KGTV 10 (San Diego), 9/14/2001]
bullet In 2002, al-Qaeda associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh will claim in an interview several months before his arrest that Alhazmi was one of the 9/11 pilots.

Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Luai Sakra, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hani Hanjour

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Luai Sakra, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training

Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-N political party and a former prime minister who had spent seven years abroad due to corruption charges, returns to Pakistan and is welcomed by supporters ahead of planned elections. He had made a failed attempt to return two months earlier (see September 10, 2007), but subsequently obtained the support of Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency, smoothing his path (see November 20-23, 2007). [International Herald Tribune, 11/25/2007] He returns in the middle of a state of emergency declared by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (see November 3-December 15, 2007).

Entity Tags: Pakistan Muslim League-N, Nawaz Sharif

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

A man thought to be Osama bin Laden releases a new audio message aimed at European listeners. [Reuters, 11/29/2007] As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm, gave advance notice of the tape’s release on the Internet. [Associated Press, 11/26/2007] The voice on the tape urges Europeans to end troop commitments to Afghanistan, as American power is on the wane, “With the grace of God… the American tide is receding and they would eventually return to their home across the Atlantic… It is in your interest to force the hand of your politicians [away from] the White House.” The man also says that the Taliban had no knowledge of 9/11: “I am the one responsible… The Afghan people and government knew nothing whatsoever about these events.” In saying this, he claims that the US-led invasion of Afghanistan was wrong. Bin Laden names Nicolas Sazkozy and Gordon Brown as leaders of France and Britain, indicating that the tape was made at some time after June 2007. [Reuters, 11/29/2007]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, As-Sahab

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Francesco Cossiga, former president of Italy, says in an interview, “All of the democratic circles of America and of Europe […] now know well that the disastrous [9/11] attack was planned and realized by the American CIA and Mossad with the help of the Zionist world to put under accusation the Arabic Countries and to persuade the Western powers to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan.” [Corriere della Sera (Milan), 11/30/2007] Cossiga was president of Italy in the early 1990s, when the NATO-led Gladio “stay behind” network was exposed. Gladio was a decades-long secret right wing effort to prevent left wing forces from taking power in Europe, and the network sometimes staged false-flag bombings and assassinations blamed on left-wing groups to discredit them. Cossiga admitted his long involvement in the network in 1990, adding, “I am proud of the fact that we have kept the secret [of Gladio] for 45 years.” [Guardian, 3/26/2001; Ganser, 2005, pp. 14]

Entity Tags: Francesco Cossiga

Category Tags: Israel, US Government and 9/11 Criticism

In late 2007, top Bush administration officials draft a secret plan making it easier for US special forces to conduct missions to capture or kill al-Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan’s mountainous tribal region. A highly classified Defense Department order outlines the plan, which is designed to eliminate the sharp policy disagreements and turf battles that have bogged down US policy regarding al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan. But in late June 2008, the New York Times will report that “more than six months later, the Special Operations forces are still waiting for the green light. The plan has been held up in Washington by the very disagreements it was meant to eliminate. A senior Defense Department official said there was ‘mounting frustration’ in the Pentagon at the continued delay.” [New York Times, 6/30/2008]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US Special Forces, US Department of Defense, Bush administration (43)

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

In a statement released by CIA Director Michael Hayden, the CIA admits that it has destroyed videotapes of interrogations of two detainees, Abu Zubaida and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see Spring-Late 2002 and November 2005). [Central Intelligence Agency, 12/6/2007] The statement is apparently released to preempt a New York Times article on the verge of publication that would have revealed the destruction. [Washington Post, 12/7/2007] The fact that the CIA had videoed detainee interrogations was made public a few weeks previously (see November 13, 2007). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 10/25/2007 pdf file] According to several former intelligence officials, there is concern that the tapes could have set off controversies about the legality of the interrogations and generated a backlash in the Middle East. [New York Times, 12/8/2007] Numerous political figures condemn the destruction in strong terms. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) says, “We haven’t seen anything like this since the 18½-minute gap in the tapes of President Richard Nixon,” and, “What would cause the CIA to take this action? The answer is obvious—coverup.” Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) says, “What is at stake here goes to the heart of the rule of law and justice in America.” Human rights activists are also angry, and an Amnesty International spokesman says, “It falls into a pattern of measures that have been taken that obstruct accountability for human rights violations.” [CBS News, 12/7/2007; ABC News, 12/7/2007] Both the Justice Department and the CIA’s Inspector General initiate preliminary inquiries. The House and Senate intelligence committees also start investigations. [Los Angeles Times, 12/9/2007]

Entity Tags: Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Richard (“Dick”) Durbin, Senate Intelligence Committee, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden, Amnesty International

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Following the revelation that the CIA has destroyed videotapes of detainee interrogations (see November 2005 and December 6, 2007), most of the media assume that the reason for the destruction is that the tapes must show CIA officers torturing detainees and “the CIA did not want the tapes seen in public because they are too graphic and could lead to indictments.” However, author and former CIA officer Robert Baer will suggest there may be other reasons: “I would find it very difficult to believe the CIA would deliberately destroy evidence material to the 9/11 investigation, evidence that would cover up a core truth, such as who really was behind 9/11. On the other hand I have to wonder what space-time continuum the CIA exists in, if they weren’t able to grasp what a field day the 9/11 conspiracy theorists are going to have with this… Still, the people who think 9/11 was an inside job might easily be able to believe that Abu Zubaida [one of the detainees who was videotaped] named his American accomplices in the tape that has now been destroyed by the CIA. It isn’t going to help that the Abu Zubaida investigation has a lot of problems even without destroyed evidence. When Abu Zubaida was arrested in Pakistan in 2002, two ATM cards were found on him. One was issued by a bank in Saudi Arabia (a bank close to the Saudi royal family) and the other to a bank in Kuwait. As I understand it, neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia has been able to tell us who fed the accounts (see Shortly After March 28, 2002). Also, apparently, when Abu Zubaida was captured, telephone records, including calls to the United States, were found in the house he was living in. The calls stopped on September 10, and resumed on September 16 (see Early September 2001 and September 16, 2001 and After). There’s nothing in the 9/11 Commission report about any of this, and I have no idea whether the leads were run down, the evidence lost or destroyed.” [Time, 12/7/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Baer, Abu Zubaida

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Although it is reported that the head of the CIA’s clandestine service, Jose Rodriguez, is the man most responsible for the destruction of videotapes showing detainee interrogations (see November 2005 and December 6, 2007), some commentators are skeptical of this. A former intelligence official says, “This looks like he was tossed under a giant bus… How likely is it that he took this decision on his own, especially when he’s not in the videotapes and wouldn’t be affected directly? Not very likely.” [Harpers, 12/8/2007] A former intelligence official says he is concerned Rodriguez is being unfairly singled out for blame over the matter. [New York Times, 12/11/2007] According to attorney Scott Horton, by midday on December 7, shortly after news breaks that the CIA destroyed videotapes of detainee interrogations, “White House off-the-record explainers were extremely busy pointing fingers at one man, the designated scapegoat… So the sacrificial beast now has a name: it is Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations.” Horton also sees a shift between the line initially taken by officials, and a later alteration: “Yesterday we are told, in highly implausible statements coming from General Hayden, that the CIA had acted completely appropriately… The issue had been considered, reviewed and cleared. Twenty-four hours later, there is a radical shift of course. Now we learn that the White House didn’t know about the decision and certainly wouldn’t have approved it.” Horton ascribes the shift to worries about the legality of destroying the tapes, especially as they may have been requested by a judge in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial (see May 7-9, 2003 and November 3-14, 2005), problems in prosecutions where evidence has been destroyed, and a general lack of plausibility. Former CIA officer Larry Johnson will also be skeptical: “Jose Rodriguez will not be the only one walking the public plank on this issue. In fact, he did not undertake this mission without the permission or direction from higher ups. And when you are the Deputy Director of Operations, there are not a lot of people above you.” [Harpers, 12/8/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Jose Rodriguez, Jr., Scott Horton

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) says that he did not know about the destruction of CIA videos of detainee interrogations (see November 2005 and December 6, 2007). [US Congress, 12/7/2007] This contradicts a statement by CIA Director Michael Hayden saying that, “Our oversight committees also have been told that the videos were, in fact, destroyed.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 12/6/2007] The CIA says that the committee was informed of the destruction in November 2006, but, “A review of the November 2006 hearing transcript finds no mention of tapes being destroyed.” [US Congress, 12/7/2007] The House Intelligence Committee was apparently informed in March 2007. [CBS News, 12/7/2007] However, the committee will say to Hayden that, “The notification came in the form of an offhand comment you made in response to a question,” and, “We do not consider this to be sufficient notification.” [US Congress, 12/7/2007] There is also a dispute over what happened when the committees were first informed of the videos’ existence. Hayden says, “The leaders of our oversight committees in Congress were informed of the videos years ago and of the Agency’s intention to dispose of the material.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 12/6/2007] Some political leaders were informed of the tapes in 2003, but urged that they not be destroyed (see November 2005).

Entity Tags: Senate Intelligence Committee, Michael Hayden, House Intelligence Committee, John D. Rockefeller, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Several inquiries are launched into the destruction by the CIA of videotapes showing detainee interrogations.
bullet The Justice Department begins a preliminary inquiry. It writes to the CIA’s top lawyer, John Rizzo, noting he has undertaken to ensure all currently existing records are preserved. [Associated Press, 12/8/2007]
bullet The CIA’s Inspector General begins an inquiry. One of the questions it will address is whether the destruction was obstruction of justice. [Associated Press, 12/11/2007] However, some Democratic lawmakers raise questions about the propriety of inquiries run by the Justice Department, as its lawyers offered advice about the tapes, and the CIA Inspector General, who reviewed the tapes before they were destroyed. [Washington Post, 12/15/2007]
bullet The House Intelligence Committee starts an inquiry. Committee chairman Silvestre Reyes says it is planning a “broad review” of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, but adds, “I’m not looking for scapegoats.” [International Herald Tribune, 12/8/2007] The committee requests all cables, memos and e-mails related to the videotapes, as well as legal advice given to CIA officials before the tapes were destroyed. [New York Times, 12/15/2007]
bullet The Senate Intelligence Committee also begins an inquiry. [FindLaw, 12/14/2007]
bullet The House Judiciary Committee sends letters to CIA Director Michael Hayden and Attorney General Michael Mukasey asking whether the Justice Department provided the CIA with legal advice. [Associated Press, 12/7/2007]
bullet The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform investigates whether the Federal Records Act has been violated. [FindLaw, 12/14/2007]
bullet There is a debate in a court case involving 11 Guantanamo detainees about whether the tapes were subject to a preservation order issued by the judge in that case (see December 14, 2007).

Entity Tags: House Intelligence Committee, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Senate Intelligence Committee, House Judiciary Committee, Silvestre Reyes, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

John Kiriakou.John Kiriakou. [Source: ABC News]Former CIA officer John Kiriakou gives the first of several media interviews around this time about the agency’s use of waterboarding and torture, to ABC. In this interview and others Kiriakou, who led the team that captured militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002), makes several points:
bullet Zubaida was waterboarded. This is the first official on-the-record acknowledgment by any CIA official that the controversial technique that simulates drowning was used.
bullet Zubaida was only waterboarded once, for about 30 to 35 seconds. (This is untrue. Zubaida was actually waterboarded at least 83 times—see April 18, 2009.)
bullet After the waterboarding, Zubaida became co-operative; he had previously been uncooperative. (This is also allegedly untrue—see June 2002.) Kiriakou says, “The threat information that he provided disrupted a number of attacks, maybe dozens of attacks.” Kiriakou thinks the attacks were not to be on US soil, but overseas, although he is not sure. Waterboarding and the other techniques were used because of a sense of urgency. “Those tricks of the trade require a great deal of time—much of the time—and we didn’t have that luxury. We were afraid that there was another major attack coming.”
bullet Use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques is tightly controlled in the agency. Each application of a technique had to be specifically approved by the deputy director for operations.
bullet Kiriakou implies that waterboarding is torture and should remain banned now, but the circumstances of the time warranted its use. He believes that waterboarding both compromised American principles and saved lives. “Like a lot of Americans, I’m involved in this internal, intellectual battle with myself weighing the idea that waterboarding may be torture versus the quality of information that we often get after using the waterboarding technique,” he says. “And I struggle with it.”
Although he was personally involved in Zubaida’s capture, Kiriakou was not present at the interrogations and only learned about them at CIA headquarters. [ABC News, 12/10/2007; ABC News, 12/10/2007 pdf file; ABC News, 12/10/2009 pdf file] Over the next few days, Kiriakou gives a number interviews to other media outlets with basically the same information. The New York Times will call the series of interviews a “media blitz.” [New York Times, 12/11/2007; New York Times, 4/28/2009] The media he speaks to include the Washington Post, the New York Times, National Public Radio, CBS, CNN, and MSNBC (see December 11, 2007). A CNN anchor even calls him “the man of the hour.” [New York Times, 4/28/2009] Kiriakou garners praise for his poise in front of the camera. For example, Harper’s journalist Scott Horton will call him “telegenic,” whereas Foreign Policy magazine commentator Annie Lowery will opt for “telegenic and well spoken.” [Harpers, 12/21/2007; Foreign Policy, 4/28/2009]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Scott Horton, Abu Zubaida, John Kiriakou, Annie Lowery

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Colonel Morris Davis, the former head of the Office of Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, writes in an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times that he resigned (see October 4, 2007) because he “concluded that full, fair and open trials were not possible under the current system.” He adds that, “I felt that the system had become deeply politicized and that I could no longer do my job effectively or responsibly.” Davis writes that while the legitimacy of the military commissions rests on the belief that they are being conducted fairly and honestly, the political appointee who is now the “convening authority,” Susan Crawford, is “not living up to that obligation.” The convening authority has “no counterpart in civilian courts,” Davis explains, and has great powers over certain aspects of prosecutions, such as which charges go to trial, which are dismissed, who serves on the jury, and whether to approve requests for experts, and reassesses findings of guilt and sentences. The position is mandated by law to be absolutely impartial, favoring neither prosecutions or defendants. While Crawford’s predecessor conducted himself with the required impartiality: “Crawford, on the other hand, had her staff assessing evidence before the filing of charges, directing the prosecution’s pretrial preparation of cases… drafting charges against those who were accused and assigning prosecutors to cases, among other things. How can you direct someone to do something—use specific evidence to bring specific charges against a specific person at a specific time, for instance—and later make an impartial assessment of whether they behaved properly? Intermingling convening authority and prosecutor roles perpetuates the perception of a rigged process stacked against the accused.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/10/2007]

Entity Tags: Morris Davis, John D. Altenburg Jr., Susan Crawford, Office of Military Commissions, US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who has recently admitted that the agency waterboarded militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida (see December 10, 2007), gives another interview about the issue, this time to MSNBC “Today Show” host Matt Lauer. Kiriakou again repeats his talking points: the CIA waterboarded Abu Zubaida, the use of this and other enhanced techniques was controlled by bureaucratic procedure, it led to intelligence, but it is torture. However, when Lauer asks whether the White House was involved in the decision, Kiriakou answers: “Absolutely.… This was a policy decision that was made at the White House with concurrence from the National Security Council and Justice Department.” Lauer plays a clip of an interview he did with President Bush over a year ago in which Bush said, “I told our people get information without torture and was assured by our Justice Department that we were not torturing.” Kiriakou responds to it, saying: “I disagree. I know that there was a high level policy debate on whether or not this was torture and that the Department of Justice and the White House counsel and the National Security Council decided that it was not, at the time.” [MSNBC, 12/11/2007] The CIA decides not to refer Kiriakou to the Justice Department for a leak investigation over his original interview at this time (see December 11, 2007). However, according to Harper’s magazine columnist Scott Horton, officials at the Justice Department and the National Security Council are “furious” that Kiriakou has mentioned their role in the waterboarding, and insist that he be investigated (see December 20, 2007). [Harpers, 12/21/2007]

Entity Tags: John Kiriakou, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, High Value Detainees

President George Bush says he was unaware that the CIA had videotaped detainee interrogations. The CIA had videotaped some interrogations in 2002 (see Spring-Late 2002), but the tapes were destroyed in late 2005 (see November 2005), and this was disclosed five days previously (see December 6, 2007). Bush says, “My first recollection of whether the tapes existed or whether they were destroyed was when [CIA Director] Michael Hayden briefed me.” [ABC News, 12/11/2007] Bush took an interest in information coming from one of the detainees who was videotaped, Abu Zubaida (see Late March 2002), and normally a president would be informed about activities like the detainee interrogations. However, there appears to have been a long-standing deliberate policy of keeping Bush out of the loop regarding aggressive interrogation methods to protect him from any adverse consequences that might arise (see April 2002 and After).

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Michael Hayden

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The CIA decides it will not prosecute former officer John Kiriakou, who recently admitted that the agency had waterboarded militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida (see December 10, 2007). [ABC News, 12/11/2007] One report, in the New York Times, suggests that “Kiriakou sought and received approval from the CIA” for the interviews. [New York Times, 12/11/2007] However, Kiriakou denies this and it appears not to be the case. [ABC News, 12/11/2007] Some accounts say a section of CIA officials are furious at him over the interviews. [ABC News, 12/11/2007; Harpers, 12/21/2007] However, according to Harper’s journalist Scott Horton, “Many high-level figures were elated to see the telegenic Kiriakou vigorously defend the agency on a subject on which it is already taking a lot of flak.” This is because efforts by CIA Director Michael Hayden and Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to fend off criticism from Congress and the public have “fallen flat.” One source will tell Horton: “Falling flat is putting it pretty generously. The public seems to have decided that they don’t really believe Hayden or McConnell on this issue. That’s bad news for us.” Horton adds: “Since the leaders of the intelligence community are under constant attack these days both from Democrats and Republicans, this can’t really be surprising. Kiriakou was, simply put, far more credible and appealing as a media figure.” [Harpers, 12/21/2007] Whatever the case, the CIA decides not to ask the Justice Department to investigate Kiriakou to determine whether he leaked classified information. Instead, CIA Director Michael Hayden issues a memo warning all employees “of the importance of protecting classified information,” although the memo does not mention Kiriakou by name. A spokesman adds, “Disclosing classified information is a violation of the law,” and “intelligence officers have a lifelong, moral and legal responsibility to safeguard classified information. This continues even after someone leaves the agency.” [ABC News, 12/11/2007] However, on this day Kiriakou reveals that the White House and Justice Department were involved in the waterboarding (see December 11, 2007), causing the CIA to change its mind and initiate an investigation of him (see December 20, 2007).

Entity Tags: Scott Horton, Central Intelligence Agency, John Kiriakou

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

Some US lawmakers indicate they may support the appointment of a special counsel to look into the CIA’s destruction of videotapes (see December 6, 2007), in addition to various other inquiries that are launched at this time (see December 7, 2007 and Shortly After).
bullet Initially, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) indicates he will support a special counsel if the Bush administration impedes a congressional probe and an investigation initiated by the Justice Department: “The CIA, the Justice Department, the Bush White House and every American should know that if these investigations encounter resistance or are unable to find the truth, I will not hesitate to add my voice to those calling for a special counsel.” [The Hill, 12/11/2007]
bullet Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), who is running for the Democratic presidential nomination, backs the call. [The Hill, 12/11/2007]
bullet After some lawmakers begin to question whether the Justice Department will properly investigate the scandal (see December 14, 2007), Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) expresses some support for a special counsel: “I am concerned whether we are going to get to the real facts… [Because the inquiry is] being very closely held, the question is whether the American people will have a sense that this investigation is on the level. Unless you bring the FBI in, and unless you bring in the possibility of a special prosecutor as they had in Watergate, I am not sure we’ll get to that point.” [Bloomberg, 12/14/2007]
However, a special prosecutor is opposed by some, such as Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV). [The Hill, 12/11/2007] Attorney General Michael Mukasey calls such appointment “the most hypothetical of hypotheticals.” [Associated Press, 12/11/2007]

Entity Tags: John D. Rockefeller, Harry Reid, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Michael Mukasey, Joseph Biden

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Following appearances before the Senate and then House Intelligence Committees, CIA Director Michael Hayden takes a different line than the previous week over the CIA’s destruction of videotapes showing detainee interrogations. When the scandal first broke, he had said: “The leaders of our oversight committees in Congress were informed of the videos years ago and of the Agency’s intention to dispose of the material. Our oversight committees also have been told that the videos were, in fact, destroyed.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 12/6/2007] However, the committees protested (see December 7, 2007) and, after his closed-door meeting with the House committee on December 12, he says, “particularly at the time of the destruction we could have done an awful lot better at keeping the committee alerted and informed.” [Fox News, 12/13/2007] His private explanation to the Senate committee leaves many questions unanswered, but chairman Jay Rockefeller calls it “a useful and not yet complete hearing.” [Associated Press, 12/11/2007] House committee chairman Silvestre Reyes, who expresses the committee’s “frustration” at not being kept informed about the tapes, calls the meeting “the first step in what we feel is going to be a long-term investigation,” and says some parts of Hayden’s briefing are “stunning.” [Fox News, 12/13/2007] Hayden points out to both committees that he arrived at the CIA after the tapes had been destroyed, so “Other people in the agency know about this far better than I.” [Associated Press, 12/11/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden, House Intelligence Committee, Jay Rockefeller, Senate Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The trial of the “Miami Seven” results in a deadlocked federal jury after nine days of deliberations, with one man, Lyglenson Lemorin, acquitted and a mistrial declared for the other six. The men each faced four terrorism-related conspiracy charges that carry a combined maximum of 70 years in prison. The charges relate to an alleged terrorist cell formed by the men, who hoped to forge an alliance with al-Qaeda to carry out bombings against the Sears Tower in Chicago, the FBI’s Miami office and other federal buildings (see June 23, 2006). The group operated out of a warehouse in the Liberty City section of Miami. [Guardian, 12/13/2007] The arrests of the men in 2006 were heralded as a major victory for the Bush administration’s “War on Terror.” Then-US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales warned that, if “left unchecked, these homegrown terrorists may prove to be as dangerous as groups like al-Qaeda.” The alleged plot was used as an example of the government’s post-9/11 improvements to counter-terrorism methods. The men were members of the Moorish Science Temple, a sect that blends Islam, Christianity and Judaism and does not recognize the legitimacy of the US government. The majority of the evidence in the case came from an FBI Middle Eastern informant, Elie Assad, posing as an al-Qaeda operative named “Brother Mohammad.” He had worked for the FBI for years before he approached Narseal Batiste, the alleged ringleader. Among the evidence he obtained was a recording from March 16, 2006 in which the men vowed to act as “Islamic soldiers” for al-Qaeda. Other evidence included a further 12,000 recorded conversations, including one in which Batiste spoke of waging a “ground war.” The prosecution also presented surveillance photos some defendants took of federal buildings in Miami, wish lists of weapons, and a request for $50,000 made to the informant. Batiste claimed during the trial that he was conning the informant, just as the informant was conning him. He says he was desperate for money to aid his failing construction business, so he went along with the informant in hopes of tricking him into giving him $50,000. [Time, 12/13/2007] The mistrial and acquittal is considered a major loss for the government and its strategy of pre-emptive prosecution of suspected terrorists. The jury of six men and six women twice sent notes to the presiding judge indicating they could not reach verdicts but were told to keep trying. The mistrial came after their third vote. [Guardian, 12/13/2007] The jury foreman, Jeffrey Agron, says, “It was a very difficult case with a lot of evidence… people see evidence in different ways. There were different takes that people had.” A large part of the defense was based on the extensive FBI involvement in the plot: the warehouse was paid for by the FBI and the defendants moved their operations there at the suggestion of the FBI informant. The vows to al-Qaeda were instigated by the informant, who even suggested the bombing of the Miami FBI office. Defense attorney Albert Levin says, “The case was written, produced and directed by the FBI.” Attorney Joshua Dratel, who has defended several suspects in terrorism cases, says: “[A]re we interested in finding terrorists or creating them? Even in cases where people are found guilty, I’m not sure that [this strategy] is necessarily finding people who are a genuine danger. What it’s really doing is finding people who—with enough inducement and encouragement—may do something. But whether they would ever do anything on their own, we’ll never know.” A new trial is scheduled for next year. [Time, 12/13/2007]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Jeffrey Agron, Alberto R. Gonzales, Joshua Dratel, Albert Levin, Moorish Science Temple, Lyglenson Lemorin, Narseal Batiste, Elie Assad

Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Kenneth Wainstein.Kenneth Wainstein. [Source: White House]The Justice Department attempts to delay probes by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees into the destruction of CIA tapes showing detainee interrogations, saying the administration cannot provide the witnesses or documents the committees want, as this may jeopardize its own investigations. Kenneth Wainstein, assistant attorney general for national security, and CIA Inspector General John Helgerson write to congressional intelligence committee leaders saying, “We fully appreciate the committee’s oversight interest in this matter, but want to advise you of concerns that actions responsive to your request would represent significant risk to our preliminary inquiry.” However, Wainstein and Helgerson are unable to say when they will have results. Attorney General Michael Mukasey also rejects a request for details about the Justice Department-CIA inquiry (see December 14, 2007). [Washington Post, 12/15/2007; New York Times, 12/15/2007] House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) and Vice Chairman Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) threaten to issue subpoenas and respond in a joint statement: “We are stunned that the Justice Department would move to block our investigation… Parallel investigations occur all of the time, and there is no basis upon which the Attorney General can stand in the way of our work.” [Washington Post, 12/15/2007] They add: “It’s clear that there’s more to this story than we have been told, and it is unfortunate that we are being prevented from learning the facts. The executive branch can’t be trusted to oversee itself.” [Associated Press, 12/15/2007] The New York Times comments, “The inquiry by the House committee had been shaping up as the most aggressive investigation into the destruction of the tapes.” The intelligence committee inquiries are similar to those of the Justice Department and CIA Inspector General, but also aim to determine whether anyone in the executive branch had sought to have the tapes destroyed to eliminate possible evidence that CIA officers had used banned interrogation techniques. [New York Times, 12/15/2007] A CIA spokesman says, “Director Hayden has said the Agency will cooperate fully with both the preliminary inquiry conducted by [Justice Department] and CIA’s Office of Inspector General, and with the Congress. That has been, and certainly still is, the case.” [Washington Post, 12/15/2007] However, the CIA fails to provide documents the House committee has requested. [New York Times, 12/15/2007] Commentator Scott Horton will call this “a conscious decision to shield criminal conduct from exposure before the watchdog appointed by the Constitution: Congress.” [Harpers, 12/15/2007]

Entity Tags: Silvestre Reyes, US Department of Justice, Senate Intelligence Committee, Kenneth Wainstein, Peter Hoekstra, Scott Horton, House Intelligence Committee, John Helgerson

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The Justice Department urges a federal judge not to begin an inquiry into the destruction of CIA videotapes in a case involving 11 Guantanamo Bay detainees. The judge in the case, Henry Kennedy, had previously issued a ruling that evidence related to the detainees should be preserved (see June-July 2005). After attorneys for the detainees file a motion saying the CIA’s destruction of the tapes “raises grave concerns about the government’s compliance with the preservation order entered by this court,” the administration argues it was not under an obligation to preserve the videotapes and tells US District Judge Kennedy that asking for information about the tapes’ destruction could “potentially complicate” a Justice Department inquiry into it. The Justice Department also says the judge lacks jurisdiction and is worried he will compel CIA officers to testify. In addition, the destroyed tapes were made outside Guantanamo, whereas the order previously issued by the judge only directly affected material in Guantanamo. However, evidence from “a senior al-Qaeda lieutenant” is being used against one of the detainees, and this lieutenant may have been shown on the destroyed tapes, making them relevant to the case. The Associated Press calls the Justice Department’s request “unusual,” and law professor Douglas Kmiec comments, “It’s hard to know on the surface whether this is obstruction or an advancement of a legitimate inquiry.” [New York Times, 12/11/2007; Associated Press, 12/15/2007] Another law professor, Jonathon Turley, comments: “The Justice Department insists it will essentially investigate itself and then tells the court that because it is investigating itself it won’t turn over evidence of its possible criminal misconduct. It’s so circular, it’s maddening.” [ABC News, 12/15/2007] In early January 2008, Kennedy will decline to hold a hearing into the destruction, saying that the destroyed tapes were not directly related to this case, as they were not made in Guantanamo. He is also “influenced by the assurances of the Department of Justice” that its criminal investigation will cover the issue of whether the tapes’ destruction “was inconsistent with or violated any legal obligations.” [New York Times, 1/10/2008]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Jonathan Turley, Henry H. Kennedy Jr., Douglas Kmiec

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes a fact sheet responding to 14 “frequently asked questions” about its investigation into the collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11. Some of the key questions and answers are as follows:
bullet Regarding the question, “Why was the collapse of WTC 1 and 2 not arrested by the intact structure below the floors where columns first began to buckle?” NIST replies, “The vertical capacity of the connections supporting an intact floor below the level of collapse was adequate to carry the load of 11 additional floors if the load was applied gradually and 6 additional floors if the load was applied suddenly (as was the case).” As the number of floors above the points where the collapses initiated exceeded six (12 in the case of the North Tower, 29 for the South), NIST says, “[T]he floors below the level of collapse initiation were unable to resist the suddenly applied gravitational load from the upper floors of the buildings.”
bullet In answer to the question of “Why was physical evidence not collected immediately following the collapse of the WTC towers,” NIST says, “In the initial days and weeks following the WTC disaster, the emphasis was on rescue and later on recovery, necessitating the removal of steel and disturbing the collapse site.” It adds, “NIST did not receive the legal authority to collect and preserve physical evidence from a disaster/failure site until the National Construction Safety Team Act became law in October 2002.” The decision to rapidly scrap the remaining steel from the WTC was made shortly after 9/11 (see Shortly After September 11, 2001), but the destruction of this steel was strongly protested by some within the engineering and firefighting communities (see December 25, 2001 and January 4, 2002).
bullet In response to a question about why it did not use its subpoena authority during its investigation, NIST states that its “experience during the investigation was that it was able to obtain all essential documentary and visual evidence without the need to invoke subpoena authority.”
bullet In answer to the question, “Why didn’t NIST fully model the collapse initiation and propagation of WTC towers?” NIST says, “Once the collapse had begun, the propagation of the collapse was readily explained without the same complexity of modeling” as was used to determine the sequence of events leading up to the collapse initiation.
bullet During its investigation, NIST had selected several variables for its computer simulations, and then experimented with different possible values (see (October 2002-October 2005)). But it has been asked: “Why didn’t NIST consider the ‘base’ and ‘less severe’ cases throughout its analysis of the WTC towers? What was the technical basis for selecting only the ‘more severe’ case for its analyses?” Its answer is that, “Of the three [possible values], the more severe case resulted in the closest agreement with the visual and physical evidence.” [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 12/14/2007]
NIST published its final report on the Twin Towers collapse in October 2005 (see October 26, 2005). It released an earlier fact sheet answering previous “frequently asked questions” in August 2006 (see August 30, 2006). [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 8/30/2006]

Entity Tags: National Institute of Standards and Technology

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations

Rashid Rauf.Rashid Rauf. [Source: Associated Press]Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf mysteriously escapes from a prison in Pakistan. Authorities will say he escapes after freeing himself from handcuffs while being transported from one prison to another. The two policemen escorting him allowed him to stop and pray at a mosque. According to The Guardian, “The officers claimed that when Rauf walked into the mosque they waited outside in their car, never considering for a moment that he could simply walk out of the back door.” Furthermore, they do not report the escape for several hours. The two policemen on the duty are arrested, but it is unclear what happens to them. The Pakistani government will say they must have been bribed to allow Rauf to escape.
Linked to Pakistani Militant Group - Rauf, a dual Pakistani and British citizen, was implicated as a leader of a 2006 plot to blow up airplanes in Britain using liquid explosives (see August 10, 2006). He was arrested in Pakistan. His wife is closely related to Maulana Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistani militant group that has a history of links to the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency.
Was He Allowed to Escape to Avoid Extradition? - Rauf’s lawyer will claim that it is not a case of simple bribery. “You could call it a ‘mysterious disappearance’ if you like, but not an escape,” he will say. “The Pakistanis are simply not interested in handing him over to the British. They never have been, although it is not clear why not.” In December 2006, terrorism charges against Rauf were dropped, but he remained in Pakistani custody on charges of carrying explosives and forged identity papers (see December 13, 2006). In November 2007, those charges were dropped and a judge ordered his immediate release. But less than an hour later, the Pakistani government announced that he would be extradited to Britain to be charged in the airplane plot, and he would remain in custody until that happened. His escape took place as he was getting close to being extradited. People at the mosque where he is supposed to have escaped will say that they never saw him or any policemen on this day, and the police never came looking for him later. [Guardian, 1/28/2008] In November 2008, it will be reported that Rauf was killed in a US drone strike, but his family will insist he remains alive (see November 22, 2008).

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Maulana Masood Azhar, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Rashid Rauf

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI

After it is revealed that the CIA has destroyed tapes showing detainee interrogations (see November 2005), congressional leaders Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Arlen Specter (R-PA) ask Attorney General Michael Mukasey for “a complete account of the Justice Department’s own knowledge of and involvement with” the tape destruction. News reports indicate the Justice Department did advise the CIA not to destroy the tapes as far back as 2003 (see 2003). The Justice Department is also asked whether it offered legal advice to the CIA or communicated with the White House about the issue. However, Mukasey refuses to answer any of the questions, replying that the Justice Department “has a long-standing policy of declining to provide non-public information about pending matters. This policy is based in part on our interest in avoiding any perception that our law enforcement decisions are subject to political influence.” [Washington Post, 12/15/2007] According to the New York Times, Justice Department officials describe this and another rebuff to congress (see December 14, 2007) as “an effort to caution Congress against meddling in the tapes case and other politically explosive criminal cases.” [New York Times, 12/15/2007]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Michael Mukasey, Patrick J. Leahy, Arlen Specter

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Maulana Fazlullah.Maulana Fazlullah. [Source: NBC News]In mid-December 2007, 40 militant commanders in Pakistan’s tribal region and the North-West Frontier Province hold a secret meeting and unify their forces. They create a new umbrella organization called Tehrik-i-Taliban, meaning Movement of the Taliban. They are also known as the Pakistani Taliban. They appoint Baitullah Mahsud, head of militant forces in South Waziristan, as their overall leader. Mahsud became a key figure after his forces successfully kidnapped almost 300 Pakistani soldiers and then traded them for about 30 imprisoned militants (see August 30-November 4, 2007). Other key leaders attending the meeting are: Maulana Fazlullah, militant leader in the Swat Valley, Faqir Mohammed, leader in the tribal region of Bajour, and Sadiq Noor, leader in North Waziristan. Together, these commanders at the meeting are estimated to lead about forty thousand armed followers. The leaders are closely tied to the Taliban, as the name of the new organization indicates, and many are also linked to al-Qaeda. Mahsud in particular is believed to be in regular contact with al-Qaeda leaders, and looking to them for strategic direction. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 386]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, Sadiq Noor, Faqir Mohammed, Maulana Fazlullah, Baitullah Mahsud, Al-Qaeda

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region

Speaking about the CIA videotapes scandal, Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA) says in a Fox News interview, “We have a system of checks and balances and it’s broken. We’re in Constitutional crisis because of the arrogant view of some in this administration that they can decide what the policy is, write the legal opinions to justify that policy and be accountable to no one.” And when asked about the Justice Department’s refusal to cooperate with any Congressional investigations into the scandal (see December 14, 2007), she says, “It smells like the cover-up of the cover-up.” Peter Hoekstra (R-MI), the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, is interviewed with Harman and is extremely critical of the leaders of the US intelligence community, calling them political, arrogant, and incompetent. “They’ve clearly demonstrated through the tapes case that they don’t believe that they are accountable to Congress.” [Raw Story, 12/16/2007]

Entity Tags: Peter Hoekstra, Jane Harman

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The CIA videotapes destruction scandal reopens a debate about the usefulness of torturing al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida. The FBI briefly used rapport-building techniques on Zubaida before the CIA took over and tortured him. On December 10, 2007, several days after the public disclosure that the videotapes of the CIA’s interrogation of Zubaida were destroyed, former CIA officer John Kiriakou admitted that Zubaida was tortured by the use of waterboarding (see December 10, 2007). Kiriakou claimed that waterboarding was so effective that Zubaida completely broke after just one session of waterboarding lasting 35 seconds. [ABC News, 12/10/2007] This claim became a frequently used media talking point. However, on December 18, the Washington Post presents a contrary account, stating, “There is little dispute, according to officials from both agencies, that Abu Zubaida provided some valuable intelligence before CIA interrogators began to rough him up, including information that helped identify Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, and al-Qaeda operative Jose Padilla” (see Late March through Early June, 2002). The Post notes that Kiriakou helped capture Zubaida but was not present at any of his interrogations. Furthermore, “other former and current officials” disagree with Kiriakou’s claim “that Abu Zubaida’s cooperation came quickly under harsh interrogation or that it was the result of a single waterboarding session. Instead, these officials said, harsh tactics used on him at a secret detention facility in Thailand went on for weeks or, depending on the account, even months.” [Washington Post, 12/18/2007] The most in-depth previous media accounts suggesed that the FBI interrogation of Zubaida was getting good intelligence while the CIA torture of him resulted in very dubious intelligence (see Mid-April-May 2002 and June 2002).

Entity Tags: John Kiriakou, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Speaking on CNN, George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley outlines the criminal offenses that may have been committed in the scandal surrounding the destruction of CIA videotapes showing detainee interrogations: “There are at least six identifiable crimes from obstruction of justice to obstruction of congress, perjury, conspiracy and false statements. What is often forgotten, the crime of torturing suspects. Now, if that crime was committed, it was a crime that would conceivably be ordered by the president himself, only the president can order those types of special treatments or interrogation techniques.” [CNN, 12/19/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Jonathan Turley

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

Al-Qaeda’s media arm As-Sahab asks for questions from “individuals, agencies, and all media” to be put to al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The request is issued in the form of an advertisement posted on militant websites used by As-Sahab. The questions are to be submitted in writing by sending them to the Internet forums where As-Sahab traditionally posts its messages, no later than January 16, 2008. The forums should then forward the questions “with no changes or substitutions, no matter whether they agree or disagree [with the question].” According to the Associated Press (AP), this is the first such offer by al-Qaeda’s main leadership since 9/11, although an arm of the organization in Saudi Arabia did something similar a few years ago. AP calls al-Qaeda “increasingly media-savvy,” and reports the request as “a new twist in al-Qaeda’s campaign to reach a broader audience.” [Associated Press, 12/20/2007] Al-Zawahiri will answer the questions in two installments in April (see April 2, 2008 and April 17, 2008).

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, As-Sahab

Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

The White House protests about a sub-heading in a New York Times story on the destruction of CIA videotapes showing detainee interrogations, and the New York Times admits the subheading was misleading and prints a correction. The subheading is “White House role was wider than it said” (in discussions about what to do with the tapes), but White House spokesperson Dana Perino complains. She issues a statement saying that the subheading is “pernicious and troubling,” as it indicates a conscious effort to mislead by the White House, which has not actually yet officially described its role in the tapes’ destruction except to say that President Bush thinks he was not informed. Even though it corrects the subheading, the paper notes that the White House “had not challenged the content of our story.” [New York Times, 12/19/2007; New York Times, 12/20/2007; Washington Post, 12/20/2007]

Entity Tags: Dana Perino, New York Times, White House

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

The CIA refers the case of John Kiriakou, a former officer who has recently admitted the agency waterboarded militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida (see December 10, 2007), to the Justice Department for investigation. The department is to investigate whether Kiriakou committed a criminal offence by illegally disclosing classified information in the interviews he gave about Zubaida’s treatment. [McClatchy, 12/20/2007] The CIA originally decided not to refer the case (see December 11, 2007), but pressure was applied by the Justice Department and National Security Council after Kiriakou revealed its involvement in a later interview (see December 11, 2007).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, John Kiriakou, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11

IntelCenter, a US-based organization that conducts research into terrorism, finds that al-Qaeda has released more than 90 videos in 2007. This is more than al-Qaeda released in the previous three years put together. The videos were released through the organization’s media arm, As-Sahab. Al-Qaeda’s most prominent spokesman is its second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has issued at least 16 messages this year (see January 5, 2007, January 23, 2007, and July 11, 2007), whereas al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is only credited with issuing five (see September 7, 2007, September 11, 2007, September 20, 2007, October 22, 2007, and November 29, 2007). The Associated Press will comment: “The videos have grown more sophisticated in targeting their international audience. Videos are always subtitled in English, and messages this year from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri focusing on Pakistan and Afghanistan have been dubbed in the local languages, Urdu and Pashtu. Videos and audiotapes have also had a faster turnaround, referring sometimes to events that occurred only days earlier. The al-Qaeda leaders’ messages are often interwoven with footage of past attacks, militants training, and TV news clips of world events and leaders including President Bush—evidence that their producers have easy access to media.” [Associated Press, 12/20/2007]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, IntelCenter, As-Sahab

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Al-Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid allegedly claims responsibility for the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto earlier in the day. Syed Saleem Shahzad, a journalist for both the Adnkronos International (AKI) news service and the Asia Times, claims to have gotten a call from al-Yazid. Speaking in faltering English, al-Yazid reportedly says, “We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujaheddin.” It is further alleged that the assassination was planned by al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. US officials say they cannot confirm the claim. [AKI, 12/27/2007; ABC News, 12/27/2007]

Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Benazir Bhutto, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks

A man thought to be Osama bin Laden releases a new 56-minute audio tape over the Internet. He warns Sunni Arabs aligned with the US in Iraq and also indicates he wishes to attack Israel. The voice on the tape says that the US-aligned Iraqis “have betrayed the nation and brought disgrace and shame to their people. They will suffer in life and in the afterlife.” He recommends the Islamic State in Iraq (which will later be commonly referred to as ISIS), an umbrella organization of which al-Qaeda’s Iraqi franchise is a part. Regarding Israel, he says, “We intend to liberate Palestine, the whole of Palestine from the [Jordan] river to the sea,” and threatens “blood for blood, destruction for destruction.” The tape does not mention the assassination of Benazir Bhutto two days previously, so was presumably recorded before that. [Associated Press, 12/29/2007]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Islamic State of Iraq

Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000), receives a posting at the State Department in Washington. She takes up the position of a desk officer at the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’s Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs, where she is responsible for the West Bank and Gaza. [AFSA News, 1/2008 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Shayna Steinger, US Department of State, Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs

Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Misc Entries

Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events, Hijacker Visas and Immigration

Indian intelligence allegedly warns US intelligence that Osama bin Laden is likely living in one of Pakistan’s military garrison areas, probably in northwest Pakistan. This is according to an article published in the Times of India shortly after bin Laden’s death in May 2011 (see May 2, 2011). Reportedly, Indian intelligence warned the US in mid-2007 that bin Laden could be living in northwest Pakistan, after getting some information about the movements of al-Qaeda number two leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Mid-2007). Over the next six months or so, Indian intelligence learned more about the movement of al-Qaeda leaders in northwest Pakistan. Then, in early 2008, India sends the US more intelligence. An unnamed top Indian official will later say: “This time, we specifically mentioned about his presence in a cantonment area. It was because we had definite information that his movement was restricted owing to his illness and that it would have been impossible for him to go to an ordinary hospital. We told the Americans that only in a cantonment area could he be looked after by his ISI or other Pakistani benefactors.” Cantonments are permanent military garrison areas administered by the military. Abbottabad, where bin Laden will be killed in 2011, is one of the cantonments in northwest Pakistan. Indian officials do not get the impression that US officials are particularly interested in their lead. [Times of India, 5/4/2011]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, US intelligence, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Research and Analysis Wing (Indian external intelligence agency)

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan

Page 68 of 72 (7121 events)
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Time period


Key Events

Key Day of 9/11 Events (101)Key Hijacker Events (145)Key Warnings (95)

Day of 9/11

All Day of 9/11 Events (1267)Dick Cheney (55)Donald Rumsfeld (33)Flight AA 11 (145)Flight AA 77 (145)Flight UA 175 (87)Flight UA 93 (241)George Bush (120)Passenger Phone Calls (67)Pentagon (127)Richard Clarke (31)Shanksville, Pennsylvania (23)Training Exercises (57)World Trade Center (87)

The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers

Alhazmi and Almihdhar (343)Marwan Alshehhi (134)Mohamed Atta (206)Hani Hanjour (72)Ziad Jarrah (74)Other 9/11 Hijackers (172)Possible Hijacker Associates in US (79)Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training (73)Hijacker Contact w Government in US (33)Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding (42)Hijacker Visas and Immigration (135)

Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases

Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection (51)CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar (120)Search for Alhazmi/ Almihdhar in US (39)

Projects and Programs

Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit (172)Able Danger (60)Sibel Edmonds (61)Phoenix Memo (27)Randy Glass/ Diamondback (8)Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal (67)Remote Surveillance (241)Yemen Hub (75)

Before 9/11

Soviet-Afghan War (105)Warning Signs (444)Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge (53)US Air Security (72)Military Exercises (70)Pipeline Politics (67)Other Pre-9/11 Events (55)

Counterterrorism before 9/11

Hunt for Bin Laden (158)Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11 (223)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (251)

Warning Signs: Specific Cases

Foreign Intelligence Warnings (35)Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB (39)Presidential Level Warnings (31)

The Post-9/11 World

9/11 Investigations (656)9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings (22)9/11 Denials (29)US Government and 9/11 Criticism (67)9/11 Related Lawsuits (24)Media (47)Other Post-9/11 Events (76)

Investigations: Specific Cases

9/11 Commission (257)Role of Philip Zelikow (87)9/11 Congressional Inquiry (41)CIA OIG 9/11 Report (16)FBI 9/11 Investigation (145)WTC Investigation (112)Other 9/11 Investigations (133)

Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked Moles or Informants

Abu Hamza Al-Masri (102)Abu Qatada (36)Ali Mohamed (78)Haroon Rashid Aswat (17)Khalil Deek (20)Luai Sakra (12)Mamoun Darkazanli (36)Nabil Al-Marabh (41)Omar Bakri & Al-Muhajiroun (25)Reda Hassaine (23)Other Possible Moles or Informants (169)

Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures

Abu Zubaida (99)Anwar Al-Awlaki (17)Ayman Al-Zawahiri (81)Hambali (39)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (139)Mohammed Haydar Zammar (44)Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (47)Osama Bin Laden (228)Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh (105)Ramzi Yousef (67)Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (57)Victor Bout (23)Wadih El-Hage (45)Zacarias Moussaoui (159)

Al-Qaeda by Region

"Lackawanna Six" (13)Al-Qaeda in Balkans (168)Al-Qaeda in Germany (189)Al-Qaeda in Italy (55)Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia (149)Al-Qaeda in Spain (121)Islamist Militancy in Chechnya (50)

Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks or Plots

1993 WTC Bombing (73)1993 Somalia Fighting (13)1995 Bojinka Plot (78)1998 US Embassy Bombings (121)Millennium Bomb Plots (43)2000 USS Cole Bombing (114)2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing (23)2002 Bali Bombings (36)2004 Madrid Train Bombings (82)2005 7/7 London Bombings (87)

Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda Issues

Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks (89)Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements (102)Key Captures and Deaths (124)

Geopolitics and Islamic Militancy

US Dominance (112)Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links (255)Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism (83)Israel (61)Pakistan and the ISI (470)Saudi Arabia (249)Terrorism Financing (312)Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism (322)US Intel Links to Islamic Militancy (69)Algerian Militant Collusion (41)Indonesian Militant Collusion (20)Philippine Militant Collusion (74)Yemeni Militant Collusion (47)Other Government-Militant Collusion (23)

Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases

Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy (37)Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11 (73)Saeed Sheikh (59)Mahmood Ahmed (30)Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region (179)2008 Kabul Indian Embassy Bombing (10)Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan (154)

Terrorism Financing: Specific Cases

Al Taqwa Bank (29)Al-Kifah/MAK (54)BCCI (37)BIF (28)BMI and Ptech (21)Bin Laden Family (62)Drugs (71)

'War on Terrorism' Outside Iraq

Afghanistan (299)Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan (49)Destruction of CIA Tapes (92)Escape From Afghanistan (61)High Value Detainees (179)Terror Alerts (50)Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 (352)Counterterrorism Policy/Politics (432)Internal US Security After 9/11 (125)
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