Events Leading Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Vice President Cheney, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, and dozens of senior White House officials receive a highly classified intelligence assessment, a Senior Executive Memorandum titled “Questions on Why Iraq Is Procuring Aluminum Tubes and What the IAEA Has Found to Date,” on the issue of the disputed use of the Iraqi aluminum tubes. The report concludes that the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency all believe that the aluminum tubes were most likely intended for centrifuges. The memo says that only the intelligence units at the Departments of Energy and State, along with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), disagree with that assessment and believe the tubes were purchased to be used in Iraq’s conventional rocket program, and includes discussion of the dissenting opinions. [The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka 'Robb-Silberman Commission'), 3/31/2005; National Journal, 3/2/2006]

Entity Tags: National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Energy, Condoleezza Rice, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, International Atomic Energy Agency, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Defense Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation

On January 9, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publishes preliminary results of the UN’s renewed weapons inspections in Iraq, and finds no evidence at all that Iraq has resumed its nuclear weapons program. It also finds no evidence that Iraq has used aluminum tubes to generate nuclear material (see January 9, 2003). In 2004, the New York Review of Books will comment: “Given the importance the [Bush] administration had attached to this matter, this would have seemed news of the utmost significance. Yet it was largely ignored. The [New York] Times, which had so prominently displayed its initial story about the aluminum tubes, buried its main article about [it] on page A10.” At the time, the Bush administration is arguing that the UN inspections are meaningless (see January 9, 2003). IAEA spokesperson Mark Gwozdecky will later say: “Nobody wanted to challenge the president. Nobody wanted to believe inspections had anything of value to bring to the table. The press bought into that.” [New York Review of Books, 2/26/2004]

Entity Tags: International Atomic Energy Agency

Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Media Coverage, Weapons Inspections

CIA manager Jami Miscik. [Source: Black Collegian]Jami Miscik, head of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, storms into CIA Director George Tenet’s office, complaining about having to attend more meetings with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley to rebut the Iraq-al-Qaeda connection yet again. She tells Tenet, “I’m not going back there again, George. If I have to go back to hear their crap and rewrite this g_ddamn report… I’m resigning, right now.” Tenet calls Hadley and shouts into the phone, “She is not coming over. We are not rewriting this f_cking report one more time. It’s f_cking over. Do you hear me! And don’t you ever f_cking treat my people this way again. Ever!” This is according to Ron Suskind in his book, The One Percent Doctrine. Suskind will conclude, “And that’s why, three weeks later, in making the case for war in his State of the Union address, George W. Bush was not able to say what he’d long hoped to say at such a moment: that there was a pre-9/11 connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam.” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 190-191]

Entity Tags: Jami Miscik, Stephen J. Hadley, George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Politicization of Intelligence

Vice President Cheney says: “[C]onfronting the threat posed by Iraq is not a distraction from the war on terror; it is absolutely crucial to winning the war on terror. As the president has said, Iraq could decide on any given day to provide biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group or individual terrorist, which is why the war on terror will not be won until Iraq is completely and verifiably deprived of weapons of mass destruction.” [American Forces Press Service, 1/10/2003]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Motives

Following press reports that the Bush administration has begun supplying inspectors with intelligence, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei tells reporters that the inspection teams need “more actionable information” and that the US is still refusing to provide “specific intelligence about where to go and where to inspect.” He adds that “the inspections process will intensify to allow the inspections to speedup” if the Bush administration cooperates with inspectors. He also suggests that he does not think Iraq has a nuclear weapons program. He says: “I think it’s difficult for Iraq to hide a complete nuclear-weapons program. They might be hiding some computer studies or R. and D. on one single centrifuge. These are not enough to make weapons.” [Montreal Gazette, 1/11/2003; Washington Post, 1/11/2003; Time, 1/12/2003; Sun-Herald (Sydney), 1/12/2003] Richard A. Boucher, a spokesperson for the State Department, contests ElBaradei’s contention that inspectors have been given little to go on, saying, “I can certainly say that they’re getting the best we’ve got, and that we are sharing information with the inspectors that they can use, and based on their ability to use it.” [Washington Post, 1/11/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration, Mohamed ElBaradei, Richard A. Boucher

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Weapons Inspections

Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), tells reporters during a press conference: “I think it’s difficult for Iraq to hide a complete nuclear-weapons program. They might be hiding some computer studies or R. and D. on one single centrifuge. These are not enough to make weapons. There were reports from different member states that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes for enrichment, that they were importing uranium from Africa. Our provisional conclusion is that these tubes were for rockets and not for centrifuges. They deny they have imported any uranium since 1991.” [Time, 1/12/2003]

Entity Tags: Mohamed ElBaradei

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Aluminum Tubes Allegation

Simon Dodge, an Iraq nuclear analyst from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), writes in an email to other intelligence community analysts that the “uranium purchase agreement probably is a hoax.” He adds that the document (see October 15, 2002) suggesting that Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Pakistan had met to discuss forming an anti-West coalition was “clearly a forgery.” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 164]

Entity Tags: Simon Dodge

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation

US President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell meet alone in the Oval Office for twelve minutes. According to Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, Bush says, “The inspections are not getting us there…. I really think I’m going to have to do this,” meaning go to war with Iraq. He adds that he is firm in his decision. Powell responds, “You’re sure?… You understand the consequences…. You know that you’re going to be owning this place?” Bush indicates that he understands the implications and asks, “Are you with me on this?… I think I have to do this. I want you with me.” Powell responds: “I’ll do the best I can.… Yes, sir, I will support you. I’m with you, Mr. President.” Woodward will also say in his book that Bush had never—ever—asked his Secretary of State for his advice on the matter of Iraq. “In all the discussions, meetings, chats and back-and-forth, in Powell’s grueling duels with Rumsfeld and Defense, the president had never once asked Powell, Would you do this? What’s your overall advice? The bottom line?” Woodward will write. [New York Times, 4/17/2004; Washington Post, 4/18/2004 Sources: Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, George W. Bush

Category Tags: The Decision to Invade, Decision to Invade Quotes

Both Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei say they need several more months before they can determine whether or not Saddam Hussein still has an illegal weapons program. ElBaradei says the inspectors “still need a few months to achieve our mission,” but adds that Baghdad must supply more documents to verify its claim that Iraq no longer is developing weapons of mass destruction. ElBaradei also hints at his concern that the US might end the inspections by invading the country. He says, “It could be that one day they will say, ‘Move aside boys, we are coming in.’” [New York Times, 11/13/2003]

Entity Tags: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, Hans Blix

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Before his meeting with Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, Bush tells reporters that he does not support an extension for the inspections. “I am sick and tired of games and deception, and that is my view on timetables,” he says. “The United Nations has spoken with one voice. He’s been given 11 years to disarm, and we have given him one last chance.” [New York Times, 1/15/2003; Washington Post, 1/15/2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 1/16/2003]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Category Tags: The Decision to Invade, Weapons Inspections

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expresses optimism that the Iraq conflict could be resolved peacefully. In contrast to Bush’s statements (see January 14, 2003), Annan says that Saddam’s level of cooperation has improved since the UNSCOM inspections of the late nineties and therefore there is reason to hope that war can be avoided. He also states very clearly that it is premature to discuss whether or not the use of military force will be needed. “I am both optimistic and hopeful that if we handle the situation right, and the pressure on the Iraqi leadership is maintained and the inspectors continue to work as aggressively as they are doing, we may be able to disarm Iraq peacefully,” he says. [New York Times, 1/15/2003; Washington Post, 1/15/2003]

Entity Tags: International Atomic Energy Agency, Kofi Annan, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

British Foreign Minister Jack Straw tells the BBC that prior to using force against Iraq, there should be a second Security Council resolution. He also says that there should be “a substantive vote in the House of Commons before action takes place.” [New York Times, 1/15/2003]

Entity Tags: Jack Straw

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

A disagreement arises among UN Security Council members over the weapons inspections schedule. UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002) specifies that after 60 days, the inspectors must report to the Council on the progress of inspections. But the resolution provides no instructions for how the inspections are to proceed after this date. The resolution also fails to explain what is to happen if no weapons of mass destruction are found. Hans Blix believes that after the 60 day report—due January 27—his team should revert to the terms contained within 1999 UN Resolution 1284. According to the provisions of this agreement, an additional report would be due in late March, which would contain a list of disarmament requirements that Iraq would have to satisfy prior to the lifting of sanctions. [United Nations, 12/17/1999; Sydney Morning Herald, 1/16/2003; Reuters, 1/16/2003; Washington Post, 1/16/2003; New York Times, 1/16/2003] “The 1999 resolution spells out steps, which, in theory, could lead to a suspension of sanctions as early as July,” reports Reuters. [Reuters, 1/16/2003] Bush administration officials strongly disagree with Hans Blix’s approach, fearing that it would subvert US plans to provoke a military confrontation with Iraq. The Washington Post reports, “[Blix’s] plan risks undermining the administration’s strategy to ratchet up the pressure for a decision on whether to go to war later this month and it raises the prospect that Security Council members, including some US allies, would use it as an excuse to put off a decision until March, at the earliest.” Other countries—including France, Britain, Russia, France, China and Syria—see no problem with the timetable being advocated by Hans Blix. “The Council’s resolutions shouldn’t be flouted, they should be respected,” says Fayssal Mekdad, Syria’s deputy UN ambassador. [Washington Post, 1/16/2003]

Entity Tags: United Nations Security Council, Hans Blix, Fayssal Mekdad

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Weapons Inspections

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice flies to New York City to meet with Hans Blix. She attempts to discourage him from his plans to revert to the provisions of UN Resolution 1284 after his January 27 report to the UN Security Council—the last update required by UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002). She also attempts to persuade him to press ahead with plans to aggressively interview Iraqi scientists. [Sydney Morning Herald, 1/16/2003; New York Times, 1/16/2003] At a Council luncheon, US ambassador to the UN John Negroponte attempts to convince delegates of the other member states that the inspections timetable should not be based on the 1999 resolution. But they disagree, seeing no reason to ignore the process outlined in Resolution 1284. [Reuters, 1/16/2003; Reuters, 1/16/2003; New York Times, 1/17/2003] A few days later, the London Observer reports, “US officials have made it clear that they will try to foil further reports and say that an accumulation of evidence of military activity in Iraq will be enough for Saddam to be in material breach of the orders to Saddam to disarm.” [Observer, 1/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix, John Negroponte, Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Weapons Inspections

White House speechwriters Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John Gibson decide to include an allegation about the purported Iraq-Niger uranium deal in President Bush’s upcoming state of the union address. They remember that the allegation had been pulled from at least two previous speeches (see September 11, 2002, October 5, 2002, October 6, 2002, and Late September 2002), but figure that if the CIA has a problem with it, the agency will ask them to remove it. They want to include it in the speech to increase the persuasiveness of Bush’s argument. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 169] Gibson later recalls that his assumption at this time is, “Maybe we had gotten better information on it.” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 171]

Entity Tags: Matthew Scully, Michael Gerson, John Gibson

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Africa-Uranium Allegation

The British Defense Intelligence Staff Agency (DIS) completes a classified study which concludes that Saddam Hussein and Bin Laden’s earlier attempts to collaborate had “foundered” due to ideological differences. The report says: “While there have been contacts between al-Qaeda and the regime in the past, it is assessed that any fledgling relationship foundered due to mistrust and incompatible ideology.” Osama bin Laden’s objectives, notes the report, are “in ideological conflict with present day Iraq.” The top secret report is sent to Prime Minister Tony Blair and other senior members of his government. [United Kingdom, n.d.; BBC, 2/5/2003; Independent, 2/6/2003]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Defense Intelligence Staff Agency, Osama bin Laden, Tony Blair

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties

Two Pentagon offices—the Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Office and the Office of Special Plans—prepare a white paper and slide presentation recommending the creation of a “Rapid Reaction Media Team” (RRMT) that would maintain control over major Iraqi media organizations while still projecting an Iraqi “face.” The first phase of the one-to-two-year “strategic information campaign” would last six months and cost $51 million. The paper states that the “RRMT concept focuses on USG-UK [“USG” stands for US government] pre-and post hostilities efforts to develop programming, train talent, and rapidly deploy a team of US/UK media experts with a team of ‘hand selected’ Iraqi media experts to communicate immediately with the Iraqi public opinion upon liberation of Iraq.” The “hand-picked” Iraqi experts would help “select and train the Iraqi broadcasters and publishers (‘the face’) for the USG/coalition sponsored information effort,” the paper explains. Media stories produced by this campaign would be based on US-approved information and would focus on topics like “the De-Baathification program”; “recent history telling (e.g., ‘Uncle Saddam,’ History Channel’s ‘Saddam’s Bomb-Maker,’ ‘Killing Fields,’ etc.)”; US government-approved “Democracy Series”; “Environmental (Marshlands re-hydration)”; “Mine Awareness”; “Re-starting the Oil”; “Justice and rule of law topics”; “War Criminals/Truth Commission”; “prisoners and atrocity interviews”; “Saddam’s palaces and opulence,” and “WMD (weapons of mass destruction) disarmament.” For its “Entertainment and News Magazine programming,” the plan says the media should do stories on “Hollywood,” “Arab country donations,” and “Sports.” According to the paper, “having professional US-trained Iraqi media teams immediately in place to portray a new Iraq (by Iraqis for Iraqis) with hopes for a prosperous, democratic future, will have a profound psychological and political impact on the Iraqi people.” It is not clear whether or not this particular plan is implemented. However, after the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon will contract a firm called the Lincoln Group to plant stories in the Iraqi media (see September 2004-September 2006) and will purchase an Iraqi newspaper and take control of an Iraqi radio station, using them to disseminate pro-American messages to the Iraqi public. [US Department of Defense, 1/2003 ; Inter Press Service, 5/9/2007]

Entity Tags: Office of Special Plans, Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

Timeline Tags: US Military, Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Propaganda, Office of Special Plans

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher warns that Washington will not wait for the inspections to end before taking military action. Boucher states, “There’s no point in continuing forever, going on, if Iraq is not cooperating.” [Associated Press, 1/16/2003; Daily Telegraph, 1/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Richard A. Boucher

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

UN weapons inspectors discover a cache of 12 warheads designed to carry chemical warfare agents in the Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area located about 80 miles [120km] south of Baghdad. News of the discovery is announced immediately. According to officials, the warheads were not included in Iraq’s December 7 declaration to the UN (see December 7, 2002). [Washington Post, 1/16/2003; Reuters, 1/17/2003; New York Times, 1/17/2003; New York Times, 1/18/2003] The warheads—meant for 122 mm rockets with a range of 11-22 miles—are in perfect condition. Though they seem to be configured for Sarin gas, they are empty and have no trace of chemical weapons. [Washington Post, 1/16/2003; Reuters, 1/17/2003; Reuters, 1/17/2003; Newsday, 1/18/2003; New York Times, 1/31/2003] Iraqi officials call their failure to include information about this cache in Iraq’s December 7 declaration an oversight and promise to check if they have any other old warheads in storage. General Hussam Mohammed Amin, head of Iraq’s weapons-monitoring directorate and the chief liaison to UN inspectors, says the warheads were imported in 1986 and therefore are too old to be of any use. “These are 122 mm rockets with an empty warhead. There are no chemical or biological agents or weapons of mass destruction,” he explains. “These rockets are expired… they were in closed wooden boxes… that we had forgotten about,” he adds. [Reuters, 1/17/2003; Reuters, 1/17/2003] “It doesn’t represent anything. It’s not dangerous.” [Washington Post, 1/16/2003] He refers to the discovery as a mere “storm in a teacup.” [Reuters, 1/17/2003; Reuters, 1/17/2003] The Bush administration considers the discovery significant. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says: “The president views this as troubling and serious…. What the world wants to know is if Saddam Hussein has disarmed. Possession of chemical warheads is not a good indication that the man has disarmed.” Fleischer disputes the notion that empty warheads do not represent a threat. “Putting chemical weapons into a chemical warhead is done at the last minute,” he notes. However officials from other countries seem to disagree. A French diplomat tells reporters, “I have only one thing to say—empty.” [New York Times, 1/18/2003] The inspectors feel that the discovery is “evidence that their search was beginning to yield results and should be given more time to work,” reports the New York Times. [New York Times, 1/18/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration, Hussam Mohammad Amin, Ari Fleischer, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Conducting its first raid of a private home, that of Faleh Hassan, a specialist in laser equipment who was once associated with Iraq’s nuclear program, UN inspectors discover 3,000 documents containing information that some initial reports say is related to Iraq’s former nuclear weapons program. [Daily Telegraph, 1/18/2003; Associated Press, 1/18/2003; BBC, 1/19/2003; Observer, 1/20/2003; International Atomic Energy Agency, 1/27/2003; New York Times, 1/28/2003] Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is bothered by the discovery, saying, “We haven’t received these original documents before and that’s precisely the point we have been emphasizing, Iraq should be pro-active. We shouldn’t have to find these on our own. Why should these documents be in a private home? Why are they not giving them to us?” [New York Times, 1/20/2003; Agence France-Presse, 1/20/2003] But Hassan denies that the documents are related to Iraq’s former nuclear weapons program. He later explains to reporters: “The inspectors put their hands on personal documents which have nothing to do with the former [nuclear] program. We did research on laser isotopic separation, and in 1988 we reached the conclusion that this technology was very difficult given our infrastructure, so the decision was taken to abandon that approach.” He adds that he is ready to go through the documents with ElBaradei, “page by page, line by line and even word by word to prove that everything they found is in alignment with what we declared in 1991.” [Associated Press, 1/18/2003; BBC, 1/19/2003] After the discovery of the documents, Hassan accompanies inspectors to a field where they inspect what appears to be a man-made mound. The field is part of a farm Hassan sold in 1996. While at the farm, a female American inspector offers to arrange a trip outside of Iraq for him and his wife, so his wife can undergo treatment for kidney stones, diabetes and high blood pressure. The Iraqi scientist is angered by the offer and later refers to the woman’s tactics as “mafia-like behavior.” Recalling the incident he will also tell reporters, “We would rather live as beggars in our country than live as kings abroad,” also saying, “Never, never will I leave my country.” [Associated Press, 1/18/2003; BBC, 1/18/2003; Observer, 1/20/2003] Hassan then goes with inspectors to a hotel in Baghdad where he spends most of the night arguing over whether he will be permitted to keep copies of the documents. [Observer, 1/20/2003] Three weeks later in the inspectors’ February 14 update to the UN Security Council (see February 14, 2003), ElBaradei will say: “While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq’s laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq’s laser enrichment program.” [Guardian, 2/15/2003; BBC, 2/17/2003]

Entity Tags: Faleh Hassan, Mohamed ElBaradei, International Atomic Energy Agency

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior member of Hamas, warns, “If Iraq is attacked… all American targets will be open targets for every Muslim, Arab or Palestinian. Any attack against Iraq will be answered by resistance everywhere and American interests everywhere will be targeted. We say that all American targets will be open targets to every Muslim, Arab, or Palestinian.” [Ha'aretz, 1/17/2003]

Entity Tags: Hamas, Mahmoud al-Zahar

Category Tags: Predictions

The CIA provides Centcom with intelligence for the purpose of planning targets in Iraq. But Centcom sources later tell Newsweek the intelligence was extremely poor. It “was crap,” a Centcom planner later tells Newsweek. Another source tells the magazine that the sites the agency suggests for targeting are for the most part the same ones that were bombed during the First Gulf War. While the CIA has satellite photos of the buildings to be targeted, it turns out they know little about them. “What was inside the structures was another matter,” says the source. “We asked, ‘Well, what agents are in these buildings? Because we need to know.’ And the answer was, ‘We don’t know.’” [Newsweek, 6/9/2003 Sources: Unnamed Centcom planner]

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence

Citing inspectors’ discovery of 12 empty “warheads” (see January 16, 2003) and documents related to a failed nuclear program’s attempt at laser enrichment of uranium (see Afternoon October 7, 2002), critics of the Bush administration’s planned invasion argue that the inspections are working and that they should continue under the terms of 1999 UN Resolution 1284. They contend that if Iraq still possesses illegal weapons that it can be peacefully and effectively disarmed by the inspections process, thus making the argument for war moot. But the Bush administration argues instead that the inspection process has demonstrated that Saddam Hussein is not willing to disarm. This debate occurs as weapons inspectors are preparing their January 27 (see January 27, 2003) update on inspections, as required by UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002). Washington is hoping that the report will demonstrate that Iraq is not cooperating, so that they can use it to justify using military force against Iraq. [Associated Press, 1/15/2003; New York Times, 1/17/2003; New York Times, 1/19/2003; International Herald Tribune, 1/20/2003] The New York Times reports that according to unnamed US officials, “[I]n spite of the wish by Mr. Blix and Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the chief inspector for nuclear weapons and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to continue the inspections process, the United States would move quickly to force an early conclusion by the Security Council.” [New York Times, 1/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Mohamed ElBaradei, Hans Blix

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Weapons Inspections

Iraq reports to Hans Blix that they have discovered four additional empty 122 mm warheads of the same type previously discovered by inspectors (see January 16, 2003). [Washington Post, 1/20/2003]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Top Bush administration officials appear to suggest that war can be avoided if Saddam Hussein steps down. Donald Rumsfeld, speaking on ABC’s This Week says, “I… personally would recommend that some provision be made so that the senior leadership in that country and their families could be provided haven in some other country, and I think that that would be a fair trade to avoid a war.” He also says that if Saddam goes into exile he might be granted immunity from prosecution for war crimes. [This Week with George Stephanopoulos, 1/19/2003] Similarly, Colin Powell says on CNN, “I think the Iraqi people would be a lot better off, and this whole situation would be resolved, if Saddam Hussein… his sons and the top leadership of the regime would leave.” [Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, 1/19/2003] It is not clear, however, if Rumsfeld and Powell’s comments are sincere, or if they are just trying to appear as though they are providing Saddam Hussein with an alternative to military confrontation. Their comments are seemingly contradicted by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice who says on NBC’s Meet the Press, “I… think that it is unlikely that this man is going to come down in any other way than to be forced.” [Washington Post, 1/20/2003; New York Times, 1/20/2003]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: Legal Justification

During a meeting with foreign ministers from 13 of the 15 Security Council member states, US Secretary of State Colin Powell encounters strong resistance to the Bush administration’s view that the inspections are not working and that Iraq is not cooperating. Russia, China, France and Germany all express their satisfaction with how the inspections are proceeding and say that their preference is that the inspectors be permitted to continue their work. Only Britain appears willing to provide support for Washington’s position, reiterating the American stance that Saddam is running out of time. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin is the most vocal in his opposition to the Bush administration’s attempt to rationalize the need for war. In an interview, he says the UN should remain “on the path of cooperation” and that France will never “associate [itself] with military intervention… not supported by the international community.” He adds,“We think that military intervention would be the worst possible solution.” Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov also disagrees with the Bush administration’s insistence that military force will be needed, explaining: “Terrorism is far from being crushed. We must be careful not to take unilateral steps that might threaten the unity of the entire [anti-]terrorism coalition. In this context we are strictly in favor of a political settlement of the situation revolving around Iraq.” [Washington Post, 1/20/2003] Germany’s Joschka Fischer similarly states: “Iraq has complied fully with all relevant resolutions and cooperated very closely with the UN team on the ground. We think things are moving in the right direction, based on the efforts of the inspection team, and [they] should have all the time which is needed.” [Washington Post, 1/20/2003; New York Times, 1/20/2003] The Bush administration remains unconvinced by these arguments. Powell tells reporters: “We cannot fail to take the action that may be necessary because we are afraid of what others might do. We cannot be shocked into impotence because we are afraid of the difficult choices that are ahead of us.” [Washington Post, 1/20/2003]

Entity Tags: Joschka Fischer, Dominique de Villepin, Colin Powell, Igor Ivanov

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Appearing on Fox News, Donald Rumsfeld, responding to a question, says, “… the Office of Management and Budget, has come up come up [sic] with a number that’s something under $50 billion for the cost. How much of that would be the US burden, and how much would be other countries, is an open question.” [US Department of Defense, 10/21/2002]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Predictions

Bush and his advisors respond to statements made the previous day by Russian, French, Chinese, and German ministers expressing satisfaction with the weapons inspection process (see January 19, 2003). Bush says: “He’s not disarming. As a matter of fact, it appears to be a rerun of a bad movie. He is delaying, he is deceiving, he is asking for time. He’s playing hide-and-seek with inspectors.… It’s clear to me now that he is not disarming. And, surely, our friends have learned lessons from the past. Surely we have learned how this man deceives and delays.… This business about more time—how much time do we need to see clearly that he’s not disarming? As I said, this looks like a rerun of a bad movie and I’m not interested in watching it.” [US President, 1/27/2003] US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage also disputes the notion that Saddam is cooperating with inspectors. “Our other options are just about exhausted at this point,” he asserts “This regime has very little time left to undo the legacy of 12 years. There is no sign, there is not one sign that the regime has any intent to comply fully.” [Washington Post, 1/22/2003]

Entity Tags: International Atomic Energy Agency, George W. Bush, Richard Armitage, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Joost Hiltermann. [Source: Representational Pictures]Reporter Russell Mokhiber attempts to pin down White House press secretary Ari Fleischer on the Bush administration’s condemnations of Iraq over its gassing of Iraqi Kurds in Halabja, when the US at the time tried to protect Iraq from international criticism (see January 17, 2003). Mokhiber says, “You and the president have repeatedly said that Saddam Hussein gassed his own people. The biggest such attack was in Halabja in March 1988, where some 6,800 Kurds were killed. Last week, in an article in the International Herald Tribune, Joost Hiltermann writes that while it was Iraq that carried out the attack, the United States at the time, fully aware that it was Iraq, accused Iran. This was apparently part of the US tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The tilt included billions of dollars in loan guarantees. Sensing he had carte blanche, Saddam escalated his resort to gas warfare—graduating to ever more lethal agents. So, you and the president have said that Saddam has repeatedly gassed his own people. Why do you leave out the part that the United States in effect gave Saddam the green light?” Fleischer responds that Mokhiber needs to ask someone “other than the White House,” and claims he has no idea whether those charges are accurate. Mokhiber presses forward, saying that recent media reports show “a number of major American corporations—including Hewlett-Packard and Bechtel—helped Saddam Hussein beef up its military in the 1980s [and] supplied Iraq with cluster bombs, intelligence and chemical and biological agents.” Mokhiber notes that the same articles report the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “went to Baghdad in December 1983 and met with Saddam Hussein, and this was at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons almost on a daily basis in defiance of international conventions. So there are some specifics, and the question is—if Iraq is part of the axis of evil, why aren’t the United States and these American corporations part of the axis of evil for helping him out during his time of need?” Fleischer again refuses to answer directly, saying, “I think that you have to make a distinction between chemical and biological. And, clearly, in a previous era, following the fall of the Shah of Iran, when there was a focus on the risks that were underway in the region as a result of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, different administrations, beginning with President Carter, reached different conclusions about the level of military cooperation vis-a-vis Iraq. Obviously, Saddam Hussein since that time has used whatever material he had for the purpose therefore of attacking Kuwait, attacking Saudi Arabia, attacking Israel. And, obviously, as circumstances warrant, we have an approach that requires now the world to focus on the threat that Saddam Hussein presents and that he presents this threat because of his desire to continue to acquire weapons and his willingness to use those weapons against others.” Fleischer attempts to brush off any follow-up, refusing to admit that the US had any part in Hussein’s acquisition or use of chemical weapons, and saying, “I think that he gassed his own people as a result of his decisions to use his weapons to gas his own people.” When Mokhiber presses the point, Fleischer retorts, “… I think the suggestion that you blame America for Iraq’s actions is way beyond the pale.” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration, Ari Fleischer, Russell Mokhiber

Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s

Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction

President George Bush signs an executive order formally creating the Office of Global Communications (see July 30, 2002) to coordinate efforts among various federal agencies to “disseminate truthful, accurate, and effective messages about the American people and their government” to audiences around the world. [White House, 1/21/2003; New York Times, 1/22/2003] The office has actually been in existence since before July 2002 (see July 30, 2002). Its first publication is also released on this day. Titled, “Apparatus of Lies,” the 32-page white paper argues that Iraq is using a carefully calibrated system of propaganda and disinformation to gain international support for the regime and to hide development of its weapons of mass destruction programs. In its executive summary, it states that Iraq’s foreign relations consist primarily of “a highly developed, well disciplined, and expertly organized program designed to win support for the Iraqi regime through outright deceit.” It goes on to say that the “elaborate program is one of the regime’s most potent weapons for advancing its political, military, and diplomatic objectives. In their disinformation and propaganda campaigns, the Iraqis use elaborate ruses and obvious falsehoods, covert actions and false on-the-record statements, and sophisticated preparation and spontaneous exploitation of opportunities. Many of the techniques are not new, but this regime exploits them more aggressively and effectively—and to more harmful effect—than any other regime in power today.” [Office of Global Communications, 1/21/2003 ]

Entity Tags: Office of Global Communications, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: US Military, Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Propaganda

The United Nations panel in charge of monitoring sanctions against the al-Qaeda network says it has found no evidence of collaboration between al-Qaeda and Iraq. The panel’s chairman, Michael Chandler, tells the Agence France Presse (AFP) in an interview, “We don’t have anything yet, and no one has been able to produce anything.” [Agence France-Presse, 1/22/2003] Six months later, Chandler will reaffirm this, telling the Associated Press, “Nothing has come to our notice that would indicate links between Iraq and al-Qaeda.” Abaza Hassan, a committee investigator who will also be interviewed by the news agency, will say, “It had never come to our knowledge before Powell’s speech and we never received any information from the United States for us to even follow up on.” [Associated Press, 6/27/2003]

Entity Tags: Michael Chandler, Abaza Hassanr

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties

CIA agent Joe T. travels to Vienna, Austria, where he attempts to convince IAEA nuclear scientists they were wrong to conclude that the aluminum tubes imported by Iraq, but intercepted in Jordan, were not meant to be used as rotors in a centrifuge program. The thrust of his argument is that the tubes’ dimensions are overly precise and that they are made of a special aluminum alloy that is “excessively strong.” [Washington Post, 8/10/2003 Sources: Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors] But the presentation is not convincing. “Everybody was embarrassed when he came and made this presentation, embarrassed and disgusted,” one participant later recalls to the New York Times. “We were going insane, thinking, ‘Where is he coming from?’” [New York Times, 10/3/2004] A Department of Energy expert who later reviews Joe’s briefing says it was intellectually dishonest. He says that the DOE had provided corrections to Joe’s presentations before he went to Vienna and that Joe ignored all of them. In his presentation, Joe referred to a table comparing the characteristics of the aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq to the tubes that would be needed for Beams and older Zippe centrifuges. However he did not compare the tubes to those used for rocket casings. Such a comparison would have revealed a perfect match. The length, wall thickness, inner and out diameters, as well as the type of aluminum of the tubes imported by Iraq were exactly the same as the tubes Iraq purchased in the 1980s to construct rockets. However, there was not a single match among these characteristics between the tubes purchased by Iraq and the centrifuge tubes. Joe was reportedly aware of the values for the rocket, yet purposely omitted them from his table. [Albright, 12/5/2003 ]

Entity Tags: US Department of Energy, International Atomic Energy Agency, Joe Turner

Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation

During a joint press conference, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announce that they intend to work together to oppose the Bush administration’s plan to invade Iraq. Schroeder says to a crowd of hundreds of French and German students in Berlin, “We are both of the opinion… that one can never accept it when it is said that war is unavoidable.” [BBC, 1/22/2003; BBC, 1/23/2003] Back in Washington, a reporter asks Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld if he thinks the actions of France and Germany would leave the United States without European support. To this Rumsfeld, responds: “Now, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east…. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem…. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They’re not with France and Germany on this, they’re with the United States.” [US Department of Defense, 1/22/2003; BBC, 1/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schroeder, Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

NATO denies a request from the Bush administration for military aid because many countries feel that neither the weapons inspections nor other means of diplomacy have yet been given an adequate test. The Bush administration wants permission to use NATO AWACS radar planes and Patriot air-defense batteries to protect Turkey, NATO ships in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as NATO personnel for protecting American bases in Europe and possibly the Gulf. [International Herald Tribune, 1/23/2003]

Entity Tags: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Sometime after Joe Turner’s presentation to IAEA scientists, US analysts collect and photograph tubes in Iraq that are “virtually identical” to the Medusa tubes made in Italy. The tubes even have a stamped logo of the rocket’s Italian manufacturer and the words, “81mm rocket.” This is reported by the Washington Post on January 24: “The quantity and specifications of the tubes—narrow, silver cylinders measuring 81 millimeters in diameter and about a meter in length—made them ill-suited to enrich uranium without extensive modification, the experts said. But they are a perfect fit for a well-documented 81mm conventional rocket program in place for two decades. Iraq imported the same aluminum tubes for rockets in the 1980s. The new tubes it tried to purchase actually bear an inscription that includes the word ‘rocket,’ according to one official who examined them.” [Washington Post, 1/24/2003; Washington Post, 8/10/2003 Sources: Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors]

Entity Tags: Joe Turner

Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation

Unilateralist comments from the Bush administration, especially Rumsfeld’s reference to France and Germany as “old Europe,” (see January 22, 2003) further antagonize the already tense relationship between the two continents. Following these comments, France, Germany, Russia, and China reaffirm their opposition to the Bush administration’s policy toward Iraq. Washington, in turn, responds with veiled threats that countries opposing the war will have little influence in the post-Saddam Iraq. [Reuters, 1/23/2003; BBC, 1/23/2003; Irish Examiner, 1/23/2003; London Times, 1/24/2003; Washington Post, 1/24/2003; USA Today, 12/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration

Category Tags: Propaganda, Weapons Inspections

In a report titled “What Does Disarmament Look Like?” the White House says that Iraq failed to explain its “efforts to procure uranium from abroad for its nuclear weapons program” in its December 2002 declaration (see December 7, 2002) to the UN. [White House, 1/2003 ; Washington Post, 8/8/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Africa-Uranium Allegation, Nuclear Weapons Allegations

Criticizing Iraq’s December 2002 declaration (see December 7, 2002) to the UN, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz says in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations: “There is no mention of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from abroad.” [Washington Post, 8/8/2003]

Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Africa-Uranium Allegation

The New York Times publishes an op-ed piece written by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, titled, “Why We Know Iraq is Lying,” in which she writes that “Iraq has filed a false declaration to the United Nations that amounts to a 12,200-page lie,” citing among other things its failure “to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get uranium from abroad.” She says that Iraq has reneged on its commitment to disarm itself of its alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Instead of full cooperation and transparency, Iraq has “a high-level political commitment to maintain and conceal its weapons,” she claims. Iraq is maintaining “institutions whose sole purpose is to thwart the work of the inspectors,” she adds, asserting that the country is not allowing inspectors “immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted access” to the “facilities and people” involved in its alleged weapons program. [New York Times, 1/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice

Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections, Africa-Uranium Allegation, Nuclear Weapons Allegations, WMD Allegations

The National Security Council (NSC) staff, concerned about the validity of the Bush administration’s allegations concerning Iraq, requests new intelligence to support allegations that Saddam Hussein possesses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or programs. Robert Walpole, the national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs, receives the request. He will later explain to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the NSC was concerned the “the nuclear case was weak.” [Washington Post, 5/21/2005]

Entity Tags: Robert Walpole

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Powell's Speech to UN

Robert Walpole, the national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs, sends Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley and other White House officials a memo saying Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Africa. The memo, intended to help Colin Powell prepare for his presentation before the UN Security Council, provides no new evidence to support the allegation. Rather it cites the National Intelligence Estimate written last September (see October 1, 2002), even though the Africa-uranium allegation was personally disavowed by CIA Director George Tenet on October 6 (see October 6, 2002). [New York Times, 7/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Robert Walpole

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Africa-Uranium Allegation, Powell's Speech to UN

Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, presents the latest draft of a paper that is meant to serve as a rebuttal to Iraq’s December 7 declaration (see February 5, 2003) to Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, Paul Wolfowitz, Karl Rove, Richard Armitage, Michael Gerson, and Karen Hughes. The paper, written with the help of John Hannah, is supposed to serve as the basis for the speech Secretary of State Colin Powell will deliver to the UN Security Council on February 5 (see February 5, 2003). In his presentation, Libby says that intercepts and human intelligence reports indicate that Saddam Hussein has been attempting to conceal items. He doesn’t know what items are being hidden by the Iraqis, but he says it must be weapons of mass destruction. He also claims that Iraq has extensive ties to al-Qaeda, and cites the alleged meeting between Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi Intelligence agent (see April 8, 2001) as one example. While Armitage is disappointed with Libby’s presentation, Wolfowitz and Rove seem impressed. Karen Hughes warns Libby not to stretch the facts. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 368; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 175]

Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, Michael Gerson, Condoleezza Rice, Karen Hughes, Karl Rove, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Powell's Speech to UN, Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Atta in Prague Connection, Alleged WMDs

Al-Zarqawi’s injury report after his death in 2006. He has both legs but there is a recent fracture in one leg. [Source: Ali Haider / EPA / Corbis]On January 26, 2003, Newsweek reports that in 2002, Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi “supposedly went to Baghdad, where doctors amputated his leg (injured in Afghan fighting) and replaced it with a prosthesis.” Newsweek also claims that al-Zarqawi “is supposed to be one of al-Qaeda’s top experts on chemical and biological weapons” and that he also met with “Hezbollah militants” and “Iranian secret agents.” This new account builds on previous reports claiming that al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad for some unspecified medical treatment (see October 2, 2002). The article does note, “Not surprisingly, reports putting al-Zarqawi in Iraq piqued the interest of Pentagon hard-liners eager to find evidence to support their suspicion that Saddam [Hussein] and bin Laden are allied and may have plotted 9/11 together. But neither the CIA nor Britain’s legendary MI6 put much stock in al-Zarqawi’s alleged Iraqi visits, stressing such reports are ‘unconfirmed.’” [Newsweek, 1/26/2003] Despite these caveats, it soon will be widely reported that al-Zarqawi had a leg amputated in Baghdad, with at least the tacit knowledge of the Iraqi government. For instance, several days later, USA Today reports, “To those who operate with and against the shadowy al-Zarqawi, including the Kurds of northern Iraq, he is called ‘the man with the limp.’ That is a reference to a poorly fitting artificial limb that replaced a leg amputated in Baghdad last August.” [USA Today, 2/5/2003] And Secretary of State Colin Powell will claim in his February 5, 2003 presentation to the United Nations that al-Zarqawi went to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment and stayed two months (see February 5, 2003). But in October 2004, Knight Ridder will report, based on a new CIA report (see October 4, 2004), “Al-Zarqawi originally was reported to have had a leg amputated, a claim that officials now acknowledge was incorrect.” [Knight Ridder, 10/4/2004] In early 2006, al-Zarqawi will be seen walking in a videotape, clearly in possession of both his legs. And when he is killed later that year, x-rays of his dead body will show a fracture of his right lower leg, but apparently that was caused by the blast that killed him. [Atlantic Monthly, 6/8/2006; Associated Press, 6/13/2006]

Entity Tags: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Colin Powell

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Al Zarqawi Allegation

Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, asks: “Why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the special equipment needed to transform it into material for nuclear weapons?” [Washington Post, 8/8/2003]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell

Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation, Africa-Uranium Allegation, Nuclear Weapons Allegations

Robert G. Joseph, director for nonproliferation at the National Security Council. [Source: CBC]Robert G. Joseph, director for nonproliferation at the National Security Council (NSC), telephones Alan Foley, director of the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC), and mentions plans to include the Africa-uranium claim in Bush’s upcoming State of the Union address. When Foley warns that the allegation has little evidence to support it, Joseph instead suggests including a statement about the British learning that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa, leaving out the bit about Niger and the exact quantity of uranium that was allegedly sought. [Washington Post, 7/17/2003; New York Times, 7/17/2003; Time, 7/21/2003; Washington Post, 7/27/2003] Joseph will claim he does not recall the discussion, and White House communications director Dan Bartlett calls Foley’s version of events a “conspiracy theory.” [Washington Post, 7/27/2003]

Entity Tags: Dan Bartlett, Robert G. Joseph, Alan Foley

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation

When asked by Fox News commentator Tony Snow, “If Saddam is toppled from power, do you expect to see celebrations in the streets?” White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card replies: “I think the Iraqi people are crying out for liberation and freedom. And they’ve been denied it. They’ve been living in fear for a very long time. They’re a very industrious people, and they have an awful lot to contribute to their own society as well as to the world, and they’ve been denied that chance to do so.” Snow then asks, “So you’re not worried about after shocks in Iraq?” Card answers, “I think the Iraqi people would welcome freedom with jubilation.” [Fox News Sunday, 1/26/2003]

Entity Tags: Andrew Card, Tony Snow

Category Tags: Predictions

The CIA reports that a foreign government service has determined that the uranium being stored at a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin is destined for France, not Iraq, as was alleged in a recent report (see November 25, 2002) by the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service. [US Congress, 7/7/2004, pp. 64]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation

UNMOVIC Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix and IAEA Chief Weapons Inspector Mohamed ElBaradei present their long anticipated reports on the progress of weapons inspections to the UN Security Council. Blix’s assessment is notably more critical than the IAEA report by Mohamed ElBaradei. Blix tells the UN Security Council that while the Iraqi government has passively cooperated with the weapons inspectors, it could do more. “Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.” Additionally, Blix reports that it is still too early to determine whether or not Iraq has or is developing weapons of mass destruction, noting that Iraq has still not answered several questions concerning unaccounted for weapons. [United Nations, 1/27/2003; New York Times, 1/27/2003; Washington Post, 1/28/2003; London Times, 1/28/2003; New York Times, 1/28/2003]
Hans Blix's report -
Iraq has refused to permit overflights by American U2 surveillance planes. Iraq said that it would allow the overflights only if the UN promised to demand an end to the almost daily bombings by US and British war planes in the so-called “no-fly” zones. Iraq worries that if fighter jets and U2 planes are flying over Iraq at the same time, Iraq might inadvertently shoot at the surveillance planes, thinking they are fighter jets. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
Iraq has not provided an adequate declaration of its prior production of nerve agent VX. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
Inspectors have found a “laboratory quantity” of thiodiglycol, a precursor of mustard gas. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
1,000 tons of chemical agents from the Iraq-Iran War remain unaccounted for. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
6,500 missing chemical rockets remain unaccounted for. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
Iraq has not provided evidence to substantiate its claim that it destroyed 8,500 liters of anthrax [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
650kg of bacterial growth media remain unaccounted for. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
Iraq has been developing Al Samoud 2 and Al Fatah missiles with a range beyond the 150km limit. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
380 rocket engines were smuggled into Iraq the previous month with chemicals used for missile propellants and control systems. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
Iraq had provided the names of only 400 of the estimated 3,500 Iraqi scientists. [United Nations, 1/27/2003] Iraqi scientists are refusing private interviews with UN inspectors. [United Nations, 1/27/2003]
ElBaradei's report to the UN -
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection team has failed to uncover any evidence implicating Saddam’s regime in the development of nuclear weapons. He tells the Council: “We have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapon program since the elimination of the program in the 1990’s.… No prohibited nuclear activities have been identified during these inspections.” [United Nations, 1/27/2003 ]
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection team is close to completing weapons inspections in Iraq. He says: “We should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons program. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid war.” He adds: “[T]he presence of international inspectors in Iraq today continues to serve as an effective deterrent to and insurance against the resumption” of secret weapons programs. [United Nations, 1/27/2003 ]
The aluminum tubes that Iraq attempted to import were not related to uranium enrichment. ElBaradei states: “IAEA inspectors have inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts and related documents. From our analysis to date it appears that the aluminum tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges….” [United Nations, 1/27/2003 ]
The IAEA is investigating concerns that Iraq has attempted to obtain magnets that could be used in a gas centrifuge program. “Iraq presented detailed information on a project to construct a facility to produce magnets for the Iraqi missile program, as well as for industrial applications, and that Iraq had prepared a solicitation of offers, but that the project had been delayed due to ‘financial credit arrangements’ . Preliminary investigations indicate that the specifications contained in the offer solicitation are consistent with those required for the declared intended uses. However, the IAEA will continue to investigate the matter….” [United Nations, 1/27/2003 ]
Response - Responses to the two presentations are predictable. The US and Britain see no hope for Iraqi cooperation and peaceful disarmament, whereas other nations feel Blix and ElBaradei’s reports demonstrate that the inspections are working and that the use of military force is not necessary. [New York Times, 1/27/2003; Reuters, 1/27/2003; London Times, 1/28/2003]

Entity Tags: Mohamed ElBaradei, Hans Blix

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Weapons Inspections

President Bush receives a letter signed by more than 120 members of the House of Representatives urging him “to use the opportunity provided in the upcoming State of the Union Address to offer assurances both to the American people and the international community that the United States remains committed to the diplomatic approach and comprehensive inspections process agreed to in the UN Security Council.” The letter is written by Representatives Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Ron Kind (D-WI). In it they argue that Bush should “sufficiently weigh future decisions regarding Iraq on the assessment given by UNMOVIC/IAEA, including additional inspection time and resources as appropriate.” The letter emphasizes: “Your commitment to working through the UN Security Council and your vocal support for Resolution 1441 are critical to UNMOVIC/IAEA’s eventual success.” The anti-war organization, Moveon.org, playss a large role in influencing the representatives’ decision to sign the letter. The group had helped coordinate hundreds of visits by concerned citizens to the offices of their congresspersons demanding that they sign the letter. [Brown et al., 1/24/2003]

Entity Tags: Sherrod Brown, Move-On [.org], Ron Kind, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Weapons Inspections

The CIA’s Berlin station chief warns CIA headquarters that information on the alleged mobile biological units supplied by Iraqi defector “Curveball” should be used with extreme caution. The station chief explains that the German intelligence service does not consider Curveball a reliable source and that it has been unable to confirm the defector’s statements. “[T]o use information from another liaison service’s source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration,” the station chief writes. [The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka 'Robb-Silberman Commission'), 3/31/2005; Washington Post, 5/21/2005] This information is forwarded by Tyler Drumheller to CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin. But WINPAC analysts assure McLaughlin that the reporting is solid enough to be in Powell’s upcoming speech to the UN. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 182-183; Washington Post, 6/25/2006; Unger, 2007, pp. 268-269]

Entity Tags: Tyler Drumheller, Central Intelligence Agency, ’Curveball’, Bundesnachrichtendienst, John E. McLaughlin

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Politicization of Intelligence, Biological Weapons Trailers, Curveball Fabrications, Powell's Speech to UN

US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters after the UN inspectors’ January 27 interim report: “The inspectors have also told us that they have evidence that Iraq has moved or hidden items at sites just prior to inspection visits. That’s what the inspectors say, not what Americans say, not what American intelligence says; but we certainly corroborate all of that. But this is information from the inspectors.” [Associated Press, 1/27/2003] But Hans Blix, the chief UNMOVIC weapons inspector, tells the New York Times a few days later that UN weapons inspectors had experienced no such incidents. [New York Times, 1/31/2003]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell

Category Tags: Weapons Inspections

Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of US forces during the 1991 Gulf War (see January 16, 1991 and After), says he is worried about the “cockiness” of the US war plans for Iraq. Schwarzkopf has already warned that the US must forge broader multinational alliances if it plans to invade and occupy Iraq with any reasonable expectation of success (see August 18, 2002). He adds that his active-duty friends are preoccupied by “the Rumsfeld thing,” the perception that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has little regard for their judgment. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 141]

Entity Tags: Norman Schwarzkopf, Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Internal Opposition, Pre-war Planning, Predictions

A White House report to Congress titled “A report on matters relevant to the authorization for use of military force against Iraq,” complains that Iraq did not report in its December 2002 declaration (see December 7, 2002) to the UN that it had attempted “to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it.” [US President, 1/28/2003 ; Washington Post, 8/8/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration, US Congress

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation, Nuclear Weapons Allegations

Knight Ridder Newspapers reports: “US officials and private analysts said Bush’s suggestion that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein might give such weapons to terrorists—and the implication that the risk of American retaliation can no longer deter him—stretches the analysis of US intelligence agencies to, and perhaps beyond, the limit.” The newspaper’s sources also say that “there was no evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda had cooperated on terrorist operations and no evidence of any Iraqi role in the Sept. 11 attacks.” [Knight Ridder, 1/28/2003 Sources: Unnamed US official]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties

A secret CIA report on possible links between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government is finished and sent to top US officials. The report, entitled “Iraqi Support of Terrorism,” was substantially finished by December 2002, but was delayed while other US officials put pressure on the CIA to withdraw or revise the report, because it did not find as much evidence of a Hussein-al-Qaeda link as they would have liked. In a 2007 book, former CIA Director George Tenet will describe in detail what was in the report. “Our analysts believed that there was a solid basis for identifying three areas of concern with regard to Iraq and al-Qaeda: safe haven, contacts, and training. But they could not translate this data into a relationship where these two entities had ever moved beyond seeking ways to take advantage of each other.… Ansar al-Islam, a radical Kurdish Islamic group [based in northern Iraq areas out of Iraqi government control], was closely allied to al-Qaeda.… We believed that up to two hundred al-Qaeda fighters began to relocate [to Ansar al-Islam] camps after the Afghan campaign began in the fall of 2001.” He says that one of their camps near the town of Khurmal linked to militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi “engaged in production and training in the use of low-level poisons such as cyanide.” He says that nearly 100 operatives in Western Europe connected to this camp were arrested, but, “What was even more worrisome was that by the spring and summer of 2002, more than a dozen al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad, with apparently no harassment on the part of the Iraqi government. They had found a comfortable and secure environment in which they moved people and supplies to support al-Zarqawi’s operations in northeastern Iraq.” He mentions Thirwat Salah Shehata and Yussef Dardiri, considered to be among Islamic Jihad’s best operational planners, as those in Baghdad at the time, and that “Credible information told us that Shehata was willing to strike US, Israeli, and Egyptian targets sometime in the future.” He concludes, “Do we know just how aware Iraqi authorities were of these terrorists’ presence either in Baghdad or northeastern Iraq? No, but from an intelligence point of view it would have been difficult to conclude that the Iraqi intelligence service was not aware of their activities. Certainly, we believe that at least one senior [Ansar al-Islam] operative maintained some sort of liaison relationship with the Iraqis. But operational direction and control? No.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 349-351] It is not clear from Tenet’s book just how much of the above description is of what the CIA believed at the time and how much is what Tenet still believed to be true in 2007. Some of Tenet’s claims from his book appear overblown, such as the danger of poison production in the Khurmal camp (see March 31, 2003). A new CIA report in 2005 (ignored in Tenet’s book) will conclude that Hussein’s government “did not have a relationship, harbor, or even turn a blind eye toward al-Zarqawi and his associates” (see October 2005). [New York Times, 9/8/2006] In 2006, a bipartisan US Senate report on “Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq” will note that “detainees that originally reported on [links between Ansar al-Islam and Iraqi intelligence] have recanted, and another detainee, in September 2003, was deemed to have insufficient access and level of detail to substantiate his claims.” The report will conclude, “Postwar information reveals that Baghdad viewed Ansar al-Islam as a threat to the regime and that [Iraqi intelligence] attempted to collect intelligence on the group.” [US Senate and Intelligence Committee, 9/8/2006 ]

Entity Tags: Thirwat Salah Shehata, Yussef Dardiri, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Islamic Jihad, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ansar al-Islam, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Al Zarqawi Allegation

Former ambassador Joseph Wilson and his wife, CIA case officer and WMD specialist Valerie Plame Wilson, both watch President Bush’s State of the Union address (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). According to Plame Wilson’s 2007 book Fair Game, Wilson watches from a Canadian television studio, brought there to comment on the address immediately afterwards. His wife watches from their Washington, DC home. Plame Wilson will recall being dumbstruck at Bush’s “sixteen words” claim that British intelligence had found a clandestine attempt by Iraq to purchase uranium from an African nation. She will write: “What? Had I heard him correctly? Hadn’t Joe’s report on his trip to Niger nearly a year ago (see March 4-5, 2002 and March 5, 2002), distributed throughout the intelligence community, including presumably the vice president’s office, proved the emptiness of these charges?” When Wilson returns home, he and his wife, according to Plame Wilson’s recollection, “briefly discussed what we thought the president’s claim could have meant. It seemed so odd.” The next day, Wilson calls a former colleague at the State Department who tells him that Bush must have meant a country besides Niger. Wilson finds that argument plausible: several other African countries besides Niger produce uranium. As a side note, Plame Wilson will add at this point in her book, “Several years later, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs told Joe, ‘You don’t think that if we had seen the State of the Union address before it was delivered, that we would have allowed that phrase to remain in it, do you?’” [Wilson, 2007, pp. 125-126]

Entity Tags: Valerie Plame Wilson, George W. Bush, US Department of State, Joseph C. Wilson

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Africa-Uranium Allegation, Curveball Fabrications

Iraqi bomb allegedly containing botulism toxin. [Source: CIA]President Bush gives his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress, making several false allegations about Iraq. [US President, 2/3/2003] An empty seat is left open to symbolize the lives lost during the 9/11 attacks. Author Craig Unger will later characterize Bush’s delivery as somber and effective. He will be interrupted some 70 times by thunderous applause from the assembled lawmakers in the House chambers. One of his biggest applause lines is his statement about the US’s war on “international terrorism:” “The war goes on, and we are winning.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 269-270]
African Uranium - He says: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities.… He clearly has much to hide.” [US President, 2/3/2003; White House, 4/18/2003; Independent, 6/5/2003] The British allegation cited by Bush concerns a SISMI (Italy’s military intelligence) report (see Mid-October 2001) based on a set of forged documents. Months after the speech, with evidence mounting that the statement was completely false, the administration will retract this claim (see July 11, 2003).
Aluminum Tubes - Bush alleges that a shipment of aluminum tubes imported by Iraq was intended to be used in the country’s alleged nuclear weapons program. “Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.” [US President, 2/3/2003]
Biological Agents - Bush lists a parade of agents: “anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague,” many of which Iraq has never been accused of possessing, and warns against “outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and builogical weapons… blackmail, terror, and mass murder.” He then moves from the general to the specific, accusing Iraq of having enough material “to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax—enough doses to kill several million people… more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin—enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure… as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.” [US President, 2/3/2003; Unger, 2007, pp. 270-271]
False Testimony from Iraqi Scientists - Bush alleges: “Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists inspectors are supposed to interview. Real scientists have been coached by Iraqi officials on what to say.” [US President, 2/3/2003] But Hans Blix, the chief UNMOVIC weapons inspector, tells the New York Times in an interview that he knows of no evidence supporting this claim. [New York Times, 1/31/2003]
Defector Allegations - Bush, citing intelligence provided by “three Iraqi defectors,” says, “We know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile weapons labs… designed to produce germ warfare agents and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors.” One of the defectors referred to by Bush is ‘Curveball,’ whom the CIA station chief in Germany warned was not reliable the day before (see January 27, 2003). German intelligence officials watching Bush’s speech are “shocked.” One official later recalls: “Mein Gott! We had always told them it was not proven.… It was not hard intelligence.” [Los Angeles Times, 11/20/2005] Another source for the claim was Mohammad Harith, whom the Defense Intelligence Agency had labeled a “fabricator” the previous May (see May 2002).
Torture, Murder, and 9/11 - Bush accuses Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein of routinely torturing his own people, using such techniques as “electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape.” He then connects Hussein, the torturer, murderer, and terrorist supporter, to the 9/11 attacks, saying: “[I]magine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans—this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.” He invites “all free nations” to join him in ensuring no such attack ever happens, but notes that “the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.” After another long burst of applause, Bush continues, “Whatever action is required, whatever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 270-271]
'Direct Personal Threat' - Bush states what former ambassador Joseph Wilson later writes can only be interpreted by Hussein “as a direct personal threat,” saying: “Tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country, your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation.” Wilson will later write: “Not simply promising the disarmament of Iraq as he had in his recent speeches, the president now stated outright his intention to rout Saddam from power, and to kill or capture him. It was an unwise thing to say. It made whatever strategy we adopted for Iraq that much more dangerous because it so blatantly telegraphed our next move and our ultimate goal.” [US President, 2/3/2003; Wilson, 2004, pp. 315]
Defending America - To America’s soldiers, he says: “Many of you are assembling in or near the Middle East, and some crucial hours lay ahead. In these hours, the success of our cause will depend on you. Your training has prepared you. Your honor will guide you. You believe in America, and America believes in you.” In 2007, Unger will write: “A few years earlier, Bush had confided that he thought to be a great president meant being a great commander in chief. Now George W. Bush was leading his nation into war.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 270-271]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix, George W. Bush, Joseph C. Wilson, ’Curveball’, Saddam Hussein, Craig Unger, Mohammad Harith

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Africa-Uranium Allegation, Aluminum Tubes Allegation, Biological Weapons Trailers, Curveball Fabrications

French officials are shocked by the claims Bush made in his state of the union speech (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003) concerning Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium from Africa. One government official will later recall in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that French experts considered Bush’s claim, which he attributed to the British, as “totally crazy because, in our view, there was no backup for this.” Notwithstanding, the French launch another investigation (The French sent a team to Niger to investigate its uranium several months earlier (see Late April or Early May 2002-June 2002)) and again, find no evidence supporting the US and British claim. [Los Angeles Times, 12/11/2005]

Entity Tags: Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation

Former Ambassador Joseph Wilson attempts to contact the White House through his contacts in the State Department and Senate with the message that it needs to correct the record on Iraq, specifically the allegation Bush recently made that Iraq sought uranium from Africa (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). Wilson had been sent to Niger nearly a year before by the CIA to investigate these claims (see February 21, 2002-March 4, 2002). Both he and the current US ambassador in Niger confirmed that the country’s uranium supplies were under the complete control of a French consortium and that it would have been impossible for Niger to divert uranium to Iraq. Wilson also tells his contacts about General Carlton W. Fulford Jr’s trip (see February 24, 2002) to Niger. On that trip the four-star Marine Corps general had similarly reported to Washington that the purported uranium deal was probably not true. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 174] The White House refuses to communicate with Wilson. The only message he receives is one from National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice saying that he can state his case in writing in a public forum. [Truthout (.org), 1/23/2007]

Entity Tags: Joseph C. Wilson, Condoleezza Rice

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation

US Secretary of State Colin Powell reluctantly accepts the task of making the administration’s case for war to the United Nations Security Council. He assigns his close friend and chief of staff Larry Wilkerson to go to the CIA and put together a team to craft a presentation. Though Powell has long harbored deep misgivings about the war, in public he has consistently and staunchly promoted the war, even when it came to repeating claims he knew to be false (see January 23, 2008). Powell also gives Wilkerson a 48-page report from the White House on Iraq’s alleged arsenal of banned weapons. The report is meant to serve as the basis for Powell’s upcoming speech to the UN (see February 5, 2003). Powell, skeptical of the report’s data, instructs Wilkerson to have it looked over by the CIA. The dossier was written primarily by two senior aides to Vice President Cheney, John Hannah and I. Lewis Libby (see January 25, 2003). [Bamford, 2004, pp. 368; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 281; Unger, 2007, pp. 275] The analysts at CIA will quickly determine that the documents are based on unreliable sources (see January 30-February 4, 2003). Speculation is already rampant throughout the State Department and among well-informed observers as to why Powell became such a reliable spokesman for the administration’s war plans. A State Department official will echo the opinion of others in saying that Powell is “completely aware of the machinations going on,” but wants to avoid any sort of public dispute among top White House officials—and Powell wants to keep relations with Vice President Dick Cheney on an even keel. Author Craig Unger will later note, “Regardless of what he really believed, Powell ultimately accommodated the White House to such an extent that he became the most articulate spokesman for the war effort” (see January 26, 2003). [Unger, 2007, pp. 275]

Entity Tags: Lawrence Wilkerson, US Department of State, Colin Powell, Craig Unger, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Powell's Speech to UN

Tyler Drumheller, head of CIA spying in Europe, reviews a classified draft of the speech Secretary of State Colin Powell will be delivering to the UN Security Council on February 5. He is surprised to see the allegation that according to an unnamed “chemical engineer,” Iraq has mobile biological weapons factories. Drumheller recognizes the description of the source as that of Curveball, an Iraqi defector living in Germany who is suspected of being a fabricator. Only a few days before, CIA’s Berlin station chief warned CIA headquarters that Curveball’s statements could not be verified (see January 27, 2003). Drumheller takes his pen and crosses out the entire paragraph referring to Curveball, and then calls CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin who meets with him immediately. McLaughlin, concerned, admits that Curveball is the CIA’s “only tangible source” for the story. “This is the heart of the case,” he says to the surprise of Drumheller. [Risen, 2006; Washington Post, 6/25/2006] Drumheller recalls, “And John said, ‘Oh my, I hope not. You know this is all we have,’ and I said, ‘This can’t be all we have.’ I said, ‘There must be another, there must be something else.’ And he said, ‘No, this is really the only tangible thing we have.’” [ABC News, 3/13/2007] According to Drumheller, McLaughlin says he will take care of the issue. McLaughlin later says he does not recall the meeting, but the final report of the Silberman-Robb commission cites e-mails and interviews with other CIA officials who back Drumheller’s account. [Risen, 2006; Washington Post, 6/25/2006] Despite the warning, the claim remains in Powell’s speech (see February 5, 2003).

Entity Tags: Tyler Drumheller, John E. McLaughlin

Category Tags: Biological Weapons Trailers, Curveball Fabrications, Powell's Speech to UN

Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, says that neither his country nor any other has evidence of ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda. “So far, neither Russia nor any other country has information about Iraq’s ties with al-Qaeda.” he says. “Nobody has provided us with such information…. If we receive such information we will analyze it. Statements made so far are not backed by concrete documents and concrete facts.” [Reuters, 1/30/2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 2/1/2003]

Entity Tags: Igor Ivanov

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says at a press conference that Saddam Hussein’s “regime has the design for a nuclear weapon; it was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” [Washington Post, 8/8/2003]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Africa-Uranium Allegation, Nuclear Weapons Allegations

When a reporter asks US Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte if the Bush administration is still confident that the aluminum tubes imported by Iraq were intended for the country’s alleged nuclear weapons program in light of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s judgment that they were not (see January 11, 2003), Negroponte responds: “Are we convinced that those tubes were designed and were intended for enrichment of uranium? The answer is definitely, yes.” [CNN, 1/29/2003]

Entity Tags: John Negroponte

Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation, Nuclear Weapons Allegations

Colin Powell’s chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, tasked with the duty of preparing Powell’s upcoming UN presentation (see January 29, 2003), meets with his hastily assembled team: Lynne Davidson, Powell’s chief speechwriter; Carl Ford, the head of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and Barry Lowenkron, principal deputy director of policy planning at State. They also consult with a UN staffer on the logistics of making such a presentation to the Security Council. Later that day, Wilkerson drives to the CIA building in Langley, where he meets with CIA Director George Tenet and Tenet’s deputy, John McLaughlin. Wilkerson examines information provided for Powell’s speech by the White House, and quickly determines that it is unreliable to the point of uselessness (see January 30-February 4, 2003). He decides that his team will assemble its own information. [Unger, 2007, pp. 276]
INR Analysts Not Invited to Presentation Planning Sessions - Over the next few days, Wilkerson and his team works almost around the clock putting together Powell’s upcoming presentation. In addition to Wilkerson’s staff, McLaughlin and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are frequent participants. Others who take part include Rice’s deputy, Stephen Hadley; National Security Council officer Robert Joseph, who had ensured mention of the Iraq-Niger claim in President Bush’s recent State of the Union address (see January 26 or 27, 2003); another NSC official, Will Tobey; two of Vice President Cheney’s senior aides, John Hannah and Lewis “Scooter” Libby; and Lawrence Gershwin, one of the CIA’s top advisers on technical intelligence. Aside from Ford, there are no representatives from the State Department’s own intelligence analysts of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). They had refused to give in to White House pressure to “cook” the intelligence on Iraq (see November 14, 2001, January 31, 2002, March 1, 2002, and December 23, 2002). Their absence, author Craig Unger will later write, is “another striking indication that Powell had capitulated and was trying to avoid a showdown with the White House.… [T]he hard-nosed analysts at INR, who had not bowed to White House pressure, would be a political liability for Powell.” [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003; Bamford, 2004, pp. 370-1; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Unger, 2007, pp. 276-278]
Inspirational Film - Early in the process, Wilkerson and his colleagues watch an archived film of then-UN ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s historic 1962 speech before the UN Security Council. Stevenson’s ringing denunciation of the Soviet Union, and his dramatic use of irrefutable evidence that showed Soviet missiles in Cuba, inspires the team to seek what Wilkerson calls “a similar confluence of evidence and rhetoric.” They want Powell to have his own “Stevenson moment” before the UN. [Unger, 2007, pp. 276-278]
Roadblocks - Throughout the process, Wilkerson’s team is deviled by the insistence of White House representatives, most notably those from Cheney’s office, on the insertion of information and claims that Wilkerson and his team know are unreliable (see January 30-February 4, 2003). [Unger, 2007, pp. 275]

Entity Tags: John E. McLaughlin, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Central Intelligence Agency, Carl W. Ford, Jr., Bush administration, George J. Tenet, Barry Lowenkron, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, William H. Tobey, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, US Department of State, Lynne Davidson, United Nations, Robert G. Joseph, Craig Unger, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, National Security Council, Stephen J. Hadley, Lawrence Wilkerson, John Hannah, Lawrence Gershwin

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Alleged WMDs, Legal Justification, Politicization of Intelligence, Propaganda, The Decision to Invade, Powell's Speech to UN

Colin Powell’s chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, meets with other administration officials and aides at the CIA’s Langley headquarters in a conference room down the hall from George Tenet’s office to review two White House reports on Iraq’s alleged illegal activities. The team includes George Tenet, John McLaughlin, William Tobey and Robert Joseph from the National Security Council, and John Hannah from Vice President Cheney’s office. (Tenet had intended to leave for a Middle East junket, but Powell stopped him from going, insisting on his input and participation.) The two dossiers are meant to serve as the basis for Powell’s upcoming speech at the UN (see February 5, 2003). One of the reports—a 48-page dossier that had been provided to Powell’s office a few days earlier (see January 29, 2003)—deals with Iraq’s supposed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction while the other, a slightly more recent report totaling some 45 pages, addresses the issue of Iraq’s history of human rights violations and its alleged ties to Islamic militant groups. Shortly after Wilkerson begins reviewing the 48-page report on Iraq’s alleged WMD, it becomes apparent that the material is not well sourced. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 177; Unger, 2007, pp. 276]
Dossiers Contain Large Amounts of White House Misinformation - Wilkerson has been given three dossiers: about 90 pages of material on Iraq’s WMD, on its sponsorship of terrorism, and on its violation of human rights. Wilkerson is not well informed about the variety of machinations surrounding the WMD issue, but it doesn’t take him long to realize there is a problem. The CIA has an array of analysts with decades of experience studying Iraq’s weapons programs, rigorous peer review procedures to prevent unreliable intelligence from making it into the final assessments, and a large budget devoted to Middle East intelligence. But the CIA had not produced Wilkerson’s dossiers. They had been prepared by Libby, Cheney’s chief of staff. Wilkerson is taken aback by such a breach of procedure, especially on such a critically important matter of state. Former NSC counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke later says, “It’s very strange for the Vice President’s senior adviser to be… saying to the Secretary of State, ‘This is what you should be saying.’” As Wilkerson goes through the material, he realizes, in Unger’s words, “just how aggressively Cheney and his men have stacked the deck.” Wilkerson first reads the 48-page WMD dossier, and is not impressed. “It was anything but an intelligence document,” he later says. “It was, as some people characterized it later, sort of a Chinese menu from which you could pick and choose.”
Cherry-Picked Intel - Wilkerson will continue, “When we had a question, which was virtually every line, John Hannah from the vice president’s office would consult a huge clipboard he had.” Hannah, a former official of the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy, had coauthored the dossier with Libby. He had also worked closely with Libby in the White House Iraq Group (see August 2002). Hannah cites the source of each questionable datum Wilkerson asks about, and Wilkerson and his team set about tracking down the original sources of each item. They spend hours poring over satellite photos, intercepts of Iraqi military communications, and various foreign intelligence reports. Wilkerson and his team find that in almost every instance, the original sources do not support the conclusions drawn in the dossier. “Once we read the entirety of those documents,” he will recall, “we’d find that the context was not quite what the cherry-picked item imparted.” Wilkerson believes that much of the dossier’s intelligence comes from Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (see 1992-1996), a belief given credence by the fact that Hannah had served as the chief liaison between the INC and Cheney’s office. As Wilkerson will later recall, “It was clear the thing was put together by cherry-picking everything from the New York Times to the DIA.” Reporters Michael Isikoff and David Corn will later write that “a Defense Intelligence Agency report was not being used properly, a CIA report was not being cited in a fair way, a referenced New York Times article was quoting a DIA report out of context,” and will confirm that much of the material had come from the Iraqi National Congress. [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 177; Unger, 2007, pp. 276-278]
Incomprehensible 'Genealogy' - According to Wilkerson, Feith’s office had strung together an incomprehensible “genealogy.” “It was like the Bible,” Wilkerson later recalls. “It was the Old Testament. It was ‘Joe met Bob met Frank met Bill met Ted met Jane in Khartoum and therefore we assume that Bob knew Ralph.’ It was incredible.” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 180-181]
Link to Office of Special Plans? - Powell’s staff is also “convinced that much of it had been funneled directly to Cheney by a tiny separate intelligence unit set up by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld” (see Summer 2002 and September 2002), Vanity Fair magazine later reports. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230]
Cheney's Aides Attempt to Reinsert Deleted Material - Soon Wilkerson’s team faces the same difficulties with the dossier on Iraq’s connections to Islamist terrorism that it faced with the White House-prepared dossier on Iraq’s WMD (see January 30-February 4, 2003). Tenet has tried manfully to give the administration what it so desperately wants—proof of Iraq’s connections to the 9/11 attacks. The CIA’s unit on Osama bin Laden had gone through 75,000 pages of documents and found no evidence of any such connections. Vice President Cheney and his staffers have always insisted that such a connection does indeed exist. Their strongest claim to that effect is the supposed meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence agent in April 2000 (see September 14, 2001). This claim has long been discredited (see September 18, 2001), but Cheney’s people keep attempting to bring it back into play (see February 1, 2003-February 4, 2003). [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003; Bamford, 2004, pp. 370-1; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Unger, 2007, pp. 276-278]
Information about Australian Software Erroneous - One item in the White House’s original draft alleged that Iraq had obtained software from an Australian company that would provide Iraqis with sensitive information about US topography. The argument was that Iraqis, using that knowledge, could one day attack the US with biological or chemical weapons deployed from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). But when Powell’s intelligence team investigated the issue, it became “clear that the information was not ironclad” (see October 1, 2002). [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003]
'Idiocy' - “We were so appalled at what had arrived from the White House,” one official later says. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230] As another senior official (likely Wilkerson) will later recall, “We went through that for about six hours—item by item, page by page and about halfway through the day I realized this is idiocy, we cannot possibly do this, because it was all bullsh_t—it was unsourced, a lot of it was just out of the newspapers, it was—and I look back in retrospect—it was a [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas] Feith product, it was a Scooter Libby product, it was a Vice President’s office product. It was a product of collusion between that group. And it had no way of standing up, anywhere, I mean it was nuts.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 368-9]
Starting from Scratch - After several hours, Wilkerson and Tenet are both so fed up that they decide to scrap the WMD dossier entirely. “Let’s go back to the NIE,” Tenet suggests, referring to the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see October 1, 2002). Wilkerson is not aware of how badly the NIE had been, in author Craig Unger’s words, “tampered with,” but Powell should have known, as his own intelligence bureau in the State Department had disputed key elements of the NIE. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 368-9; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 177-178; Unger, 2007, pp. 276-278]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Office of the Vice President, National Security Council, Richard A. Clarke, White House Iraq Group, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Robert G. Joseph, William H. Tobey, Lawrence Wilkerson, John Hannah, Michael Isikoff, Iraqi National Congress, Colin Powell, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Chalabi, Craig Unger, David Corn, Donald Rumsfeld, John E. McLaughlin, George J. Tenet, Douglas Feith

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Drones, Chalabi and the INC, Powell's Speech to UN

Britain’s GCHQ. [Source: BBC]British officials order translators and analysts working at the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to cooperate with a US surveillance operation (see January 31, 2003) that is targeting diplomats from the “swing nations” on the Security Council—Chile, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Angola, Guinea, and Pakistan. China, too, is likely a target of the mission. The espionage campaign is “designed to help smooth the way for a second UN resolution authorizing war in Iraq.” [Observer, 2/8/2004 Sources: Unnamed sources close to the intelligence services] The operation is likely known to the director-general of GCHQ, David Pepper, and Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, “who has overall responsibility for GCHQ.” [Observer, 2/8/2004] The operation reportedly causes “significant disquiet in the intelligence community on both sides of the Atlantic.” [Observer, 2/8/2004]

Entity Tags: Jack Straw, David Pepper

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Spying on the UN

The US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute produces a report assessing the challenges the US will probably face in post-Hussein Iraq. According to the report:
“Ethnic, tribal, and religious schisms could produce civil war or fracture the state after Saddam is deposed.”
Iraq reconstruction will require “a considerable commitment of American resources.”
The “longer US presence is maintained, the more likely violent resistance will develop.”
Political parties will likely form along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines. Free elections among these parties may actually “increase divisions rather than mitigate them.”
Armed militias may emerge.
Islamic radicals could move in and conduct suicide bombings in an effort to turn Iraqis against the US occupation
Revenue from oil production will be insufficient to fund reconstruction.
The occupation force will find it “exceptionally challenging” to provide Iraqis with electricity, water, food, and security.
The paper lists 135 postinvasion tasks that the US would need to perform, including securing the borders, establishing local governments, protecting religious, historical, and cultural sites, establishing police systems, restoring and maintaining power systems, operating hospitals, reorganizing Iraq’s military and security forces, and disarming militia groups.
The reports says the US should not abolish the Iraqi army.
About a thousand copies of the report are distributed to various government officials and offices, including to members of Congress. While Central Command reportedly appreciates the report, there is no feedback from the Pentagon’s civilian leadership. [Strategic Studies Institute, 2/2003 ; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 197-198; Salon, 6/8/2006]

Entity Tags: US Central Command, US Congress, US Department of Defense, Strategic Studies Institute

Category Tags: Predictions

Larry Wilkerson. [Source: CBS News]Secretary of State Colin Powell, preparing for his critically important presentation to the United Nations that will assert the reality of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (see February 5, 2003), sends his chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, to the CIA to prepare for the presentation. CIA Director George Tenet and his experts regale Wilkerson with the information about mobile bioweapons labs provided by the Iraqi defector Curveball (see November 1999). In 2007, Wilkerson will recall, “They presented it in a very dynamic, dramatic, ‘we know this is accurate,’ way.” Curveball’s assertion that he is a firsthand witness is very important, Wilkerson will say. “This was a man who had actually been in the belly of the beast. He had been in the lab. He had been there when an accident occurred. He’d seen people killed. And the implication was, strong implication, that they weren’t killed because of the accident in the explosion, they were killed because they were contaminated. Yes, the source was very credible. As it was presented by the CIA.” Wilkerson later says that both he and Powell accept the claims because they depend on the intelligence community for good information: “And you depend on the director of central intelligence to assimilate all the intelligence community’s input and give it to you.” Wilkerson feels the section on mobile bioweapons is the strongest part of the presentation, as does Powell. Others at the CIA are not so convinced of Curveball’s truthfulness (see September 2002, January 27, 2003, and December 2002). [CBS News, 11/4/2007]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Central Intelligence Agency, Colin Powell, ’Curveball’, United Nations, George J. Tenet, Lawrence Wilkerson

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Biological Weapons Trailers, Curveball Fabrications

President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair meet at the White House to discuss Iraq. Also present at the meeting are Blair’s foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning; his aid Matthew Rycoft; his chief of staff, Jonathan Powell; US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Dan Fried; and Bush’s chief of staff, Andrew Card. [Sands, 2005; Independent, 2/2/2006; Channel 4 News (London), 2/2/2006; New York Times, 3/27/2006]
Bush Says US Going to War with or without UN Resolution - Blair presses Bush to seek a second UN resolution that would provide specific legal backing for the use of force against Iraq. According to the minutes of the meeting, Bush says that “the diplomatic strategy [has] to be arranged around the military planning” and that the “US would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would ‘twist arms’ and ‘even threaten.’” But if such efforts fail, Bush is recorded saying, “military action would follow anyway.” Bush also tells Blair that he hopes to commence military action on March 10. Blair does not demur and offers Britain’s total support for the war, saying that he is “solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam.” Notwithstanding, he insists that “a second Security Council resolution would provide an insurance policy against the unexpected, and international cover, including with the Arabs.” According to Bush, the question that needs to be addressed is what should they cite as evidence that Iraq is in breach of its obligations under UN Resolution 1441 (see November 8, 2002). The minutes of the meeting will indicate that there is concern that inspections have failed to provide sufficient evidence of a material breach.
Suggested Provocation of Iraq - “The US was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colors,” the minutes report. “If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach.” [Sands, 2005; Channel 4 News (London), 2/2/2006; MSNBC, 2/2/2006; Guardian, 2/3/2006; New York Times, 3/27/2006] The Times of London later notes that this proposal “would have made sense only if the spy plane was ordered to fly at an altitude within range of Iraqi missiles.” In this case, the plane would be far below the 90,000 foot altitude it is capable of operating at. [London Times, 2/2/2006; Channel 4 News (London), 2/2/2006]
Bush Suggests Use of Defector - In addition to the U2 idea, Bush says it is “possible that a defector could be brought out who would give a public presentation about Saddam’s WMD, and there was also a small possibility that Saddam would be assassinated.” At one point during the two-hour meeting, Bush says he thinks “it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups.” [Sands, 2005; New York Times, 3/27/2006] Author Phillippe Sands will later ask, “Why would the US president and the British prime minister spend any time concocting ways of proposing a material breach if they knew they could prove Saddam had weapons of mass destruction?” [Rich, 2006, pp. 190]

Entity Tags: David Manning, George W. Bush, Jonathan Powell, Daniel Fried, Tony Blair, Andrew Card, Condoleezza Rice, Phillippe Sands, Matthew Rycroft

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: The Decision to Invade, Politicization of Intelligence, Predictions, Weapons Inspections

Frank Koza, chief of staff in the “Regional Targets” section of the National Security Agency, issues a secret memo to senior NSA officials that orders staff to conduct aggressive, covert surveillance against several United Nations Security Council members. This surveillance, which has the potential to wreak havoc on US relations with its fellow nations, is reportedly ordered by George W. Bush and his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Koza, whose section spies on countries considered strategically important to US interests, is trying to compile information on certain Security Council members in order to help the United States to win an upcoming UN resolution vote on whether to support military action against Iraq (see February 24, 2003.
Targeted Nations Include 'Middle Six' - The targeted members are the delegations from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea, and Pakistan, who together make up the so-called “Middle Six.” These six nations are officially “on the fence,” and their votes are being aggressively courted by both the pro-war faction, led by the US and Britain, and the anti-war faction, led by France, Russia and China (see Mid-February 2003-March 2003. [Observer, 3/2/2003] Bulgaria is another nation targeted, and that operation will apparently be successful, because within days Bulgaria joined the US in supporting the Iraq war resolution. Mexico, another fence-straddler, is not targeted, but that may be because, in journalist Martin Bright’s words, “the Americans had other means of twisting the arms of the Mexicans.” (Bright is one of the authors of the original news report.) The surveillance program will backfire with at least one country, Chile, who has its own history of being victimized by US “dirty tricks” and CIA-led coups. Chile is almost certain to oppose the US resolution. [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/6/2003] It is also likely, some experts believe, that China is an ultimate target of the spy operation, since the junior translater who will leak the Koza memo in February, Katharine Gun, is fluent in Mandarin Chinese and is unlikely to have seen the memo unless she would have been involved in translating it into that language. [AlterNet, 2/18/2004]
Operation Ruined US Chances of Winning Vote - Later assessment shows that many experts believe the spying operation scuttled any chance the US had of winning the UN vote, as well as the last-ditch attempt by the UN to find a compromise that would avert a US-British invasion of Iraq. [Observer, 2/15/2004]
Chile 'Surprised' to be Targeted - Chile’s ambassador to Britain, Mariano Fernandez, will say after learning of the NSA surveillance, “We cannot understand why the United States was spying on Chile. We were very surprised. Relations have been good with America since the time of George Bush, Sr.” [Observer, 3/9/2003]
Mexico Suspected Spying - Mexico’s UN representative, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, will tell the Observer a year later that he and other UN delegates believed at the time that they were being spied upon by the US during their meetings. “The surprising thing was the very rapid flow of information to the US quarters,” he will recall. “It was very obvious to the countries involved in the discussion on Iraq that we were being observed and that our communications were probably being tapped. The information was being gathered to benefit the United States.” [Observer, 2/15/2004]
Memo Comes Before Powell's UN Presentation - The memo comes just five days before Colin Powell’s extraordinary presentation to the UN to build a case for war against Iraq (see [complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_442]]), and is evidence of the US’s plans to do everything possible to influence the UN to vote to authorize war with that nation. The memo says the eavesdropping push “will probably peak” after Powell’s speech. [Baltimore Sun, 3/4/2003]
NSA Wants Details of Voting Plans, More - The NSA wants information about how these countries’ delegations “will vote on any second resolution on Iraq, but also ‘policies’, ‘negotiating positions’, ‘alliances’ and ‘dependencies’—the whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to US goals or to head off surprises.” [Observer, 3/2/2003] Bright will tell other reporters on March 9, “It’s quite clear what they were going for was not only the voting patterns and the voting plans and the negotiations with other interested parties such as the French or the Chinese, it wasn’t just the bare bones, it was also the office telephone communications and email communications and also what are described as ‘domestic coms’, which is the home telephones of people working within the UN. This can only mean that they were looking for personal information. That is, information which could be used against those delagates. It’s even clear from the memo that this was an aggressive operation. It wasn’t simply a neutral surveillance operation.” According to Bright’s sources, the orders for the program came “from a level at least as high as Condoleezza Rice, who is the President’s National Security Adviser.” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/6/2003]
'Surge' of Covert Intelligence Gathering - Koza advises his fellow NSA officials that the agency is “mounting a surge” aimed at gaining covert information that will help the US in its negotiations. This information will be used for the US’s so-called Quick Response Capability (QRC), “against” the six delegations. In the memo, Koza writes that the staff should also monitor “existing non-UN Security Council Member UN-related and domestic comms [office and home telephones] for anything useful related to Security Council deliberations,” suggesting that not only are the delegates to be monitored in their UN offices, but at their homes as well. Koza’s memo is copied to senior officials at an unnamed foreign intelligence agency (later revealed to be Britain). Koza addresses those officials: “We’d appreciate your support in getting the word to your analysts who might have similar more indirect access to valuable information from accesses in your product lines [intelligence sources].…I suspect that you’ll be hearing more along these lines in formal channels.” The surveillance is part of a comprehensive attempt by the US to influence other nations to vote to authorize a war against Iraq; these US attempts include proffers of economic and military aid, and threats that existing aid packages will be withdrawn. A European intelligence source says, The Americans are being very purposeful about this.” [National Security Agency, 1/31/2003; Observer, 3/2/2003; Observer, 2/8/2004]
US Media Ignores Operation - While the European and other regional media have produced intensive coverage of the news of the NSA’s wiretapping of the UN, the American media virtually ignores the story until 2004, when Gun’s court case is scheduled to commence (see February 26, 2004). Bright, in an interview with an Australian news outlet, says on March 6 that “[i]t’s as well not to get too paranoid about these things and too conspiratorial,” he was scheduled for interviews by three major US television news outlets, NBC, Fox News, and CNN, who all “appeared very excited about the story to the extent of sending cars to my house to get me into the studio, and at the last minute, were told by their American desks to drop the story. I think they’ve got some questions to answer too.” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/6/2003] Most US print media outlets fail to cover the story, either. The New York Times, the self-described newspaper of record for the US, do not cover the story whatsoever. The Times’s deputy foreign editor, Alison Smale, says on March 5, “Well, it’s not that we haven’t been interested, [but] we could get no confirmation or comment” on the memo from US officials. “We would normally expect to do our own intelligence reporting.” The Washington Post publishes a single story about the operation, focusing on the idea that surveillance at the UN is business as usual. The Los Angeles Times fixes on claims by unnamed “former top intelligence officials” believe Koza’s memo is a forgery. (When the memo is proven to be authentic, both the Post and the Los Angeles Times refuse to print anything further on the story.) Author Norman Solomon writes, “In contrast to the courage of the lone woman who leaked the NSA memo—and in contrast to the journalistic vigor of the Observer team that exposed it—the most powerful US news outlets gave the revelation the media equivalent of a yawn. Top officials of the Bush administration, no doubt relieved at the lack of US media concern about the NSA’s illicit spying, must have been very encouraged.” [ZNet, 12/28/2005]
UN to Launch Inquiry - The United Nations will launch its own inquiry into the NSA surveillance operation (see March 9, 2003).

Entity Tags: United Nations Security Council, Washington Post, NBC, New York Times, Martin Bright, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Alison Smale, Britain Mariano Fernández, Los Angeles Times, CNN, Fox News, Colin Powell, National Security Agency, Frank Koza

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Media Coverage, Spying on the UN

During a joint press conference with President George Bush and British Prime Minister Blair at the White House, the two leaders are asked by a reporter, “One question for you both. Do you believe that there is a link between Saddam Hussein, a direct link, and the men who attacked on September the 11th?” Bush answers succinctly, “I can’t make that claim.” [US President, 2/3/2003]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Tony Blair

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, The Decision to Invade, Decision to Invade Quotes

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), reduced to fact-checking the drafts of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s upcoming UN speech (see January 30-February 4, 2003 and February 5, 2003), flags 38 of the charges in the draft as “unsubstantiated” or “weak.” Twenty-eight of them are removed from the draft. [Unger, 2007, pp. 278]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Colin Powell

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, The Decision to Invade, Powell's Speech to UN

War Over Iraq book cover. [Source: Public domain]Prominent neoconservatives William Kristol and Lawrence F. Kaplan publish the book The War Over Iraq advocating a US invasion of that country. In the book’s introduction, they assert: “We stand at the cusp of a new historical era.… This is a decisive moment.… The decision about what course to take in dealing with Iraq is particularly significant because it is so clearly about more than Iraq. It is about more even than the future of the Middle East and the war on terror. It is about what sort of role the United States intends to play in the world in the twenty-first century.” [Kristol and Kaplan, 2003, pp. vii-viii]

Entity Tags: William Kristol, Lawrence F. Kaplan

Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Motives

Fadhil Chalabi, a former Iraqi oil minister and a second cousin of Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi, tells the Financial Times that within five years of Saddam Hussein’s removal, Iraq could rival Saudi Arabia in oil production. “The first phase, which would probably last one to two years, would see Halliburton, Schlumberger, and other service companies helping Iraq restore its production from the current 2.5m b/d average to 3.5m b/d, a volume it last saw in July 1990, just before it invaded Kuwait. The second, the development phase, would include the world’s biggest oil companies, among them BP, Total, ChevronTexaco, Exxon/Mobil, Shell, Lukoil, and Eni, vying for lucrative production sharing contracts with the new government.” By 2008, Chalabi suggests, Iraq could be producing 10 million barrels/day. [Financial Times, 2/21/2003]

Entity Tags: Fadhil J. Chalabi

Category Tags: Motives

A CNN/Time poll discovers that 76 percent of Americans believe Saddam Hussein provides assistance to al-Qaeda. [CNN, 3/11/2003]

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Public Opinion on Iraqi Threat

Authors Laurie Mylroie and Peter Bergen appear on a Canadian news broadcast to discuss the impending war with Iraq, and Iraq’s supposed connections to 9/11. Mylroie has long argued that Saddam Hussein was behind every terrorist attack on the US (see 1990) from the 1993 World Trade Center bombings (see October 2000) to 9/11 (see September 12, 2001); Bergen, like many in the journalistic and intelligence communities, believes Mylroie is a “crackpot” (see December 2003). According to Bergen, Mylroie opens the interview by “lecturing in a hectoring tone: ‘Listen, we’re going to war because President Bush believes Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11. Al-Qaeda is a front for Iraqi intelligence… [the US] bureaucracy made a tremendous blunder that refused to acknowledge these links… the people responsible for gathering this information, say in the CIA, are also the same people who contributed to the blunder on 9/11 and the deaths of 3,000 Americans, and so whenever this information emerges they move to discredit it.’” Bergen counters by noting that her theories defy all intelligence and “common sense, as they [imply] a conspiracy by literally thousands of American officials to suppress the truth of the links between Iraq and 9/11.” Mylroie does not like this. Bergen will later write that by “the end of the interview, Mylroie, who exudes a slightly frazzled, batty air, started getting visibly agitated, her finger jabbing at the camera and her voice rising to a yell as she outlined the following apocalyptic scenario: ‘Now I’m going to tell you something, OK, and I want all Canada to understand, I want you to understand the consequences of the cynicism of people like Peter. There is a very acute chance as we go to war that Saddam will use biological agents as revenge against Americans, that there will be anthrax in the United States and there will be smallpox in the United States. Are you in Canada prepared for Americans who have smallpox and do not know it crossing the border and bringing that into Canada?’” Bergen calls Mylroie’s outburst typical of her “hysterical hyperbole” and “emblematic of Mylroie’s method, which is to never let the facts get in the way of her monomaniacal certainties.” [Washington Monthly, 12/2003]

Entity Tags: Laurie Mylroie, Peter Bergen

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Neoconservative Influence, Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Media Coverage, Politicization of Intelligence

Katharine Gun. [Source: BBC]Katharine Gun, a 29-year old translator for British intelligence’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), leaks the National Security Agency memo documenting the NSA’s electronic and physical surveillance of numerous UN delegates to the Security Council (see January 31, 2003). Gun will be arrested on March 8 and charged with violating the Official Secrets Act (see March 9, 2003). Gun leaks the memo, [BBC, 9/15/2004] written by the NSA’s Frank Koza and sent to several US allies via its ECHELON global surveillance system, to Britain’s Observer, which spends weeks verifying the document’s veracity before running the story on March 2. Former NSA intelligence officer Wayne Madsen, now of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, says the leak illustrates the deep unhappiness among several US allies’ intelligence agencies over US and British attempts to allege ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda. “My feeling is that this was an authorized leak,” Madsen says. “I’ve been hearing for months of people in the US and British intelligence community who are deeply concerned about their governments ‘cooking’ intelligence to link Iraq to al-Qaeda.’ While surveillance of delegates and other officials at the UN is a violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, [Observer, 3/9/2003] intelligence experts acknowledge that the US and other nations routinely conduct at least some sort of surveillance on UN members. “One would have to have the innocence of an unborn child to believe that espionage doesn’t go on every day at the United Nations,” says one such expert, Loch Johnson. “From a purist point of view, it’s unfortunate in a way, because after all, we’re the host nation for the United Nations. But the reality is, Europeans and everyone else engages in espionage in New York City, much of it focused on the United Nations.” Experts say what is unprecedented is the leak itself, especially in its timeliness and detail. [Baltimore Sun, 3/4/2003]
Vietnam-era whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the so-called “Pentagon Papers” to the New York Times, writes in January 2004, “I can only admire the more timely, courageous action of Katherine Gun…who risked her career and freedom to expose an illegal plan to win official and public support for an illegal war, before that war had started. Her revelation of a classified document urging British intelligence to help the US bug the phones of all the members of the UN security council to manipulate their votes on the war may have been critical in denying the invasion a false cloak of legitimacy.…She did what she could, in time for it to make a difference, as indeed others should have done, and still can. I have no doubt that there are thousands of pages of documents in safes in London and Washington right now—the Pentagon Papers of Iraq—whose unauthorized revelation would drastically alter the public discourse on whether we should continue sending our children to die in Iraq.…Exposing governmental lies carries a heavy personal risk, even in our democracies. But that risk can be worthwhile when a war’s-worth of lives is at stake.” [Guardian, 1/27/2004]

Entity Tags: United Nations, Observer, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Wayne Madsen, Loch Johnson, United Nations Security Council, Government Communications Headquarters, Daniel Ellsberg, Katherine Gun, Al-Qaeda, Echelon, National Security Agency, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Frank Koza

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Spying on the UN

The Bush administration completes a 100-page blueprint for post-Saddam Iraq. The document replaces the State Department- and Big Oil- sanctioned plan (see February 2001 and After) with one favored by neoconservatives calling for the privatization of Iraq’s oil reserves and supporting industries as a means to undermine the OPEC cartel and destabilize Saudi Arabia (see Early 2005). It new plan bears strong resemblance to the recommendations that were put forth in a September 2002 Heritage Foundation paper by Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O’Driscoll (see September 25, 2002). It is also heavily influenced by corporate lobbyists, including Grover Norquist, the outspoken advocate for a flat-tax system. The plan advocates changing Iraq’s tax and copyright law, as well as implementing a variety of other neoliberal reforms. [Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003; BBC Newsnight, 3/17/2005; Democracy Now!, 3/21/2005; Harper's, 4/2005, pp. 74-76]

Entity Tags: Bush administration, Gerald P. O’Driscoll

Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

Rand Beers. [Source: MSNBC]The Bush Administration declares that the US military is moving to “stability operations” in Afghanistan, a euphemism for military deescalation. Rand Beers, a counterterrorism expert on the National Security Council at the time, will say in July 2003, “They wanted to make it sound as if there were just a few more stitches needed in the quilt.” He will add: “They didn’t want to call attention to the fact that Osama [bin Laden] was still at large and living along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, because they wanted it to look like the only front was Iraq. Otherwise, the question becomes: If Afghanistan is that bad, why start another war?” He will also say, “I have worried for some time that it became politically inconvenient” for the Bush administration to “complete operations sufficiently in Afghanistan.” Beers is so upset that he quits a month later, right as the Iraq war begins. [New Yorker, 7/28/2003]

Entity Tags: National Security Council, Bush administration, Rand Beers

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Diversion of Resources to Iraq

The US and British conduct a spy operation targeting UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and other top UN officials. But news of this will not surface until February 2004. “[T]he UK… was… spying on Kofi Annan’s office and getting reports from him about what was going on,” former British cabinet member Claire Short will tell BBC Radio 4’s Today. When asked to elaborate, she says, “Well I know—I’ve seen transcripts of Kofi Annan’s conversations.” [BBC, 2/26/2004; Independent, 2/26/2004; New York Times, 2/27/2004; Guardian, 2/28/2004 Sources: Claire Short] And in an interview with The Guardian one day later, Hans Blix will say that he believes he too was bugged. [Guardian, 2/28/2004 Sources: Hans Blix] Under international treaties, it is illegal for member states to spy on UN offices. [New York Times, 2/27/2004; Sydney Morning Herald, 2/28/2004]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix, Kofi Annan, Claire Short

Category Tags: Spying on the UN

The British join the US (see Mid-February 2003-March 2003) in a campaign to pressure UN Security Council members to commit to voting in favor of a second UN resolution. “[E]normous pressure was brought to bear,” British cabinet member Claire Short will later tell the BBC, who cites as an example the efforts of Valerie Amos. According to Short, Amos “went round Africa with people from our intelligence services trying to press them” to support a second resolution. “I had to make sure that we didn’t promise a misuse of aid in a way that would be illegal,” she added. [BBC, 2/26/2004 Sources: Claire Short, Valerie Anne Amos]

Entity Tags: Valerie Anne Amos, Claire Short

Category Tags: Legal Justification

Michael Maloof. [Source: PBS]In February, Hassan al-Obeidi, chief of foreign operations of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, pays a visit to Imad Hage, a Lebanese-American businessman living in Beruit who has contacts in the Pentagon. Obeidi requests his help in relaying a backchannel offer to Washington in an attempt to avert war. Hage later tells the New York Times that Obeidi told him: “If this is about oil, we will talk about US oil concessions. If it is about the peace process, then we can talk. If this is about weapons of mass destruction, let the Americans send over their people. There are no weapons of mass destruction. Americans could send 2,000 FBI agents to look wherever they wanted,” At one point, Obeidi says that Iraq would even agree to hold elections within the next two years. Hage relays everything to Pentagon staffer Michael Maloof in Washington. [New York Times, 11/6/2003] Hage then travels to Baghdad and meets with Iraq’s chief of intelligence Tahir Jalil Habbush Al-Tikriti. Hage later recalls: “[The Iraqis] would be willing to allow between 1,000 to 2,000 US agents, FBI and/or scientists, into Iraq to verify, according to them, the absence of weapons of mass destruction or that they no longer had weapons of mass destruction. The second point, they offered to turn over Abdul Rahman Yasin, [under indictment in] the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. And on the third issue, they offered to hold free and fair elections in Iraq within a year or two. They kept on asking why they were targeted or they would be targeted, that they didn’t wish confrontation with the United States. If it was about oil, they’d be willing to make concessions on oil.” [New York Times, 11/6/2003; CNN, 11/7/2003] On February 19, Hage faxes a three-page report to Maloof listing five concessions the Iraqis were willing to make: cooperation in the war on terrorism, “full support for any US plan” in the Arab-Israeli peace process, giving “the US… first priority as it relates to Iraq oil, mining rights,” support for United States strategic interests in the region, and “direct US involvement on the ground in disarming Iraq.” Details of the Iraqi offer are sent to several top Pentagon officials. [New York Times, 11/6/2003] In early March, Hage and Richard Perle meet in London. Hage informs him that the Iraqis would like to arrange a secret meeting with him to discuss their offer. According to Perle, he then contacts the CIA seeking permission to meet with the Iraqis. But according to Perle, the CIA isn’t interested. “The message was, ‘Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad.’” The agency also tells Perle that they had already pursued other backchannel leads with the Iraqi regime. According to one senior US intelligence official, the other leads “came via a broad range of foreign intelligence services, other governments, third parties, charlatans, and independent actors. Every lead that was at all plausible, and some that weren’t, were followed up.” [New York Times, 11/6/2003; Risen, 2006, pp. 183-184] In spite of the CIA’s refusal to engage in talks with the Iraqis, Hage continues to forward offers by the Iraqis to Maloof. The US ignores them. [New York Times, 11/6/2003]

Entity Tags: Richard Perle, F. Michael Maloof, Central Intelligence Agency, Imad Hage

Category Tags: The Decision to Invade, Weapons Inspections

As the date for the UN presentation by Secretary of State Colin Powell approaches (see February 5, 2003), Vice President Dick Cheney gives Powell one reason why Powell is the choice to make the presentation: “Your poll numbers are in the seventies. You can afford to lose a few points.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 280]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Colin Powell

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, The Decision to Invade, Powell's Speech to UN

An unnamed Justice Department official tells the New York Times that the FBI has been baffled by the administration’s claims of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. “We’ve been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don’t think it’s there,” the official says. [New York Times, 2/3/2003 Sources: Unnamed government official]

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties

On February 1, Secretary of State Colin Powell begins rehearsing for his February 5 presentation to the UN Security Council (see February 5, 2003). Powell is assisted by members of his staff, including his chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (see January 30-February 4, 2003). [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003; Bamford, 2004, pp. 368-9; Gentlemen's Quarterly, 4/29/2004]
Discredited Items Keep Reappearing - One item that keeps reoccurring is the discredited claim that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta met with Iraqi officials in Prague (see September 14, 2001 and September 18, 2001). Cheney’s people keep attempting to insert it into the presentation. It takes Powell’s personal intervention to have the claim removed from the presentation. “He was trying to get rid of everything that didn’t have a credible intelligence community-based source,” Wilkerson will later recall. But even after Powell’s decision, Cheney loyalist Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, tries to have it reinserted. “They were just relentless,” Wilkerson will recall. “You would take it out and they would stick it back in. That was their favorite bureaucratic technique—ruthless relentlessness.” An official (probably Wilkerson) later adds: “We cut it and somehow it got back in. And the secretary said, ‘I thought I cut this?’ And Steve Hadley looked around and said, ‘My fault, Mr. Secretary, I put it back in.’ ‘Well, cut it, permanently!’ yelled Powell. It was all cartoon. The specious connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, much of which I subsequently found came probably from the INC and from their sources, defectors and so forth, [regarding the] training in Iraq for terrorists.… No question in my mind that some of the sources that we were using were probably Israeli intelligence. That was one thing that was rarely revealed to us—if it was a foreign source.” Powell becomes so angry at the machinations that he throws the dossier into the air and snaps: “This is bullsh_t. I’m not doing this.” But he continues working on the presentation. [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003; Bamford, 2004, pp. 370-1; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Unger, 2007, pp. 278-279] The same official will add that every time Powell balks at using a particular item, he is “fought by the vice president’s office in the person of Scooter Libby, by the National Security Adviser [Condoleezza Rice] herself, by her deputy [Stephen Hadley], and sometimes by the intelligence people—George [Tenet] and [Deputy CIA Director] John [McLaughlin].” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 370]
Mobile Bioweapons Claim Survives Editing Process - One of the allegations Powell rehearses is the claim that Iraq has developed mobile biological weapons laboratories, a claim based on sources that US intelligence knows are of questionable reliability (see Late January, 2003 and February 4, 2003). Referring to one of the sources, an Iraqi major, Powell later tells the Los Angeles Times, “What really made me not pleased was they had put out a burn [fabricator] notice on this guy, and people who were even present at my briefings knew it.” Nor does anyone inform Powell that another source, an Iraqi defector known as Curveball, is also a suspected fabricator (see January 27, 2003). [Los Angeles Times, 11/20/2005] In fact, the CIA issued an official “burn notice” formally retracting more than 100 intelligence reports based on Curveball’s information. [ABC News, 3/13/2007]
Powell 'Angry, Disappointed' in Poor Sourcing of Claim - In March 2007, Powell will claim he is “angry and disappointed” that he was never told the CIA had doubts about the reliability of the source. “I spent four days at CIA headquarters, and they told me they had this nailed.” But former CIA chief of European operations Tyler Drumheller will later claim in a book that he tried and failed to keep the Curveball information out of the Powell speech (see February 4-5, 2003). “People died because of this,” he will say. “All off this one little guy who all he wanted to do was stay in Germany.” Drumheller will say he personally redacted all references to Curveball material in an advance draft of the Powell speech. “We said, ‘This is from Curveball. Don’t use this.’” But Powell later says neither he nor his chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, were ever told of any doubts about Curveball. “In fact, it was the exact opposite,” Wilkerson will assert. “Never from anyone did we even hear the word ‘Curveball,’ let alone any expression of doubt in what Secretary Powell was presenting with regard to the biological labs.” [ABC News, 3/13/2007]

Entity Tags: White House Iraq Group, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Lawrence Wilkerson, John E. McLaughlin, George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Armitage, Colin Powell, Stephen J. Hadley

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Atta in Prague Connection, Powell's Speech to UN

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) finds seven more items (see January 31, 2003) in the latest draft of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s upcoming presentation to the UN Security Council (see February 5, 2003) that it terms as unreliable or unverifiable. Three are removed, four stay. [Unger, 2007, pp. 281]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Colin Powell

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, The Decision to Invade, Powell's Speech to UN

In a memo to Secretary of State Colin Powell, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) warns him against making certain claims in his presentation to the UN Security Council about the aluminum tubes Iraq attempted to import in July 2001 (see July 2001). The CIA had been arguing that the tubes were made to meet specifications that far exceeded that for comparable rockets used by the US. But INR’s memo explains that the claim is untrue. “In fact, the most comparable US system is a tactical rocket—the US Mark 66 air-launched 70-millimeter rocket—that uses the same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has specifications with similar tolerances.” Powell will nonetheless include the tubes allegation in his speech to the UN (see February 5, 2003). [Financial Times, 7/29/2003; New York Times, 10/3/2004]

Entity Tags: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Colin Powell

Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation, Powell's Speech to UN

Secretary of State Colin Powell says that his upcoming presentation to the UN will include “no smoking gun.” Rather it will be “a straightforward and compelling demonstration that Saddam is concealing evidence of weapons of mass destruction, while preserving the weapons,” he says. [Daily Telegraph, 2/4/2003]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Legal Justification, Powell's Speech to UN

The British government releases a dossier titled “Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception, and Intimidation.” The government says the dossier is based on high-level intelligence and diplomatic sources and was produced with the approval of Prime Minister Tony Blair; it also wins praise from US Secretary of State Colin Powell (see February 7, 2003). Unfortunately, the dossier is almost wholly plagiarized from a September 2002 article by university student Ibrahim al-Marashi. [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2/23/2003] Al-Marashi was doing postgraduate work at Oxford University when he wrote it. [International Policy Fellowships, 10/1/2006] The article is entitled “Iraq’s Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis,” and was published in the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal (MERIA). [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2/23/2003] The British dossier plagiarizes two other articles as well, both from Jane’s Intelligence Review (see February 8, 2003), some of which were published as far back as 1997. MERIA is based in Israel, which even moderate Arabs say makes it a suspect source, and all the more reason why the origin of the information should have been cited. [Guardian, 2/7/2003] MERIA, an Internet-based magazine with about 10,000 subscribers, is edited by Jerusalem Post columnist Barry Rubin. [Jerusalem Post, 2/8/2003] Rubin will responds dryly: “We are pleased that the high quality of MERIA Journal’s articles has made them so valuable to our readers.… As noted on the masthead of each issue and all our publications, however, we do appreciate being given credit.” [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2/23/2003] Al-Marashi, currently working at California’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, describes himself as an opponent of Saddam Hussein’s regime: “As an Iraqi, I support regime change in Iraq,” he says. [Reuters, 2/8/2003; Associated Press, 2/7/2007]
Article Used Information from 1991 - He examined Iraq’s secret police and other, similar forces in detail, using captured Iraqi documents from the 1991 Gulf War and updating that information to be more timely. [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9/2002] The dossier contains entire sections from al-Marashi’s article quoted almost verbatim, including typographical errors contained in the original. When asked about the plagiarism, al-Marashi says he was not approached by the British government for permission to use his work. “It was a shock to me,” he says. Chris Aaron, editor of Jane’s Intelligence Review, says he had not been asked for permission to use material from his article in the dossier. The dossier uses the three articles to detail methods used by the Iraqi government to block and misdirect UN weapons inspectors’ attempts to locate weapons stockpiles in Iraq. The dossier claims that while the UN only has 108 weapons inspectors inside Iraq, the Iraqi government has 20,000 intelligence officers “engaged in disrupting their inspections and concealing weapons of mass destruction.” The dossier claims that every hotel room and telephone used by the weapons inspectors is bugged, and that WMD-related documents are being concealed in Iraqi hospitals, mosques, and homes. Powell will cite the dossier as part of his presentation to the UN detailing evidence of Iraqi weapons programs (see February 5, 2003). [Associated Press, 2/6/2003; BBC, 2/7/2003] When the media exposes the origins of the dossier, Blair officials will concede that they should have been more honest about the source material (see February 6, 2003).
British 'Inflated' Some Numbers, Used More Extreme Language - Al-Marashi, who learns of the plagiarism from a colleague, Glen Rangwala (see February 5, 2003), says the dossier is accurate despite “a few minor cosmetic changes.” He adds: “The only inaccuracies in the [British] document were that they maybe inflated some of the numbers of these intelligence agencies. The primary documents I used for this article are a collection of two sets of documents, one taken from Kurdish rebels in the north of Iraq—around four million documents—as well as 300,000 documents left by Iraqi security services in Kuwait.” [BBC, 2/7/2003] Al-Marashi and Rangwala both note that the dossier uses more extreme language. “Being an academic paper, I tried to soften the language” al-Marashi says. “For example, in one of my documents, I said that [the Iraqi intelligence agency known as the Mukhabarat] support[s] organizations in what Iraq considers hostile regimes, whereas the [British] document refers to it as ‘supporting terrorist organizations in hostile regimes.’” [Guardian, 2/7/2003; New York Times, 2/8/2003]
Third Attempt to Pass Off Old Information as New Evidence - This is the third time in recent months that Downing Street has tried to pass off old, suspect information as damning evidence against Iraq. In September, it released a 50-page dossier, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,” that used years-old information from the Foreign Office and British intelligence to make its case (see September 24, 2002); UN inspectors and British journalists visited some of the “facilities of concern” and found nothing (see September 24, 2002). In December, Downing Street released a 23-page report, “Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses,” that was heavily criticized by human rights groups, members of Parliament, and others for reusing old information. When that dossier was released, the Foreign Office put forward an Iraqi exile who had been jailed by Hussein for 11 years. The exile displayed handcuffs he said had been placed on him while in captivity. Afterwards, the exile admitted that the handcuffs were actually British in origin. [Guardian, 2/7/2003]
Dossier Product of Heated Debate - The Observer writes of the current “dodgy dossier” that discussions between Blair’s head of strategic communications, Alastair Campbell, foreign policy adviser David Manning, senior intelligence officials, and the new head of British homeland security, David Omand, resulted in a decision to “repeat a wheeze from last autumn: publishing a dossier of ‘intelligence-based evidence,’” this time focusing on Iraq’s history of deceiving weapons inspectors. The dossier had to be released before chief UN inspector Hans Blix could make his scheduled report in mid-February. The previous dossier, about Iraq’s dismal human rights record, had led to what The Observer calls “several stand-up rows between Omand and Campbell, with the former accusing the latter of sprinkling too much ‘magic dust’ over the facts to spice it up for public consumption.” That dossier left “the more sensationalist elements” in the forward, but for this dossier, “there was no time for such niceties. Led by Campbell, a team from the Coalition Information Center—the group set up by Campbell and his American counterpart during the war on the Taliban—began collecting published information that touched on useful themes.” Al-Marashi’s work became the central piece for the cut-and-pasted dossier, which The Observer says was compiled so sloppily that, in using the al-Marashi report and one of the Jane’s articles, two different organizations were confused with one another. [Observer, 2/9/2003]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix, UK Security Service (MI5), David Omand, Glen Rangwala, Ibrahim al-Marashi, Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, Jerusalem Post, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Mukhabarat, David Manning, Colin Powell, Blair administration, Christopher Aaron, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Coalition Information Center, Alastair Campbell, Saddam Hussein, Barry Rubin, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, British Foreign Office, Tony Blair

Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Politicization of Intelligence, Propaganda

CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin’s executive assistant sends a memo to Tyler Drumheller requesting that he look into the whereabouts of Curveball. McLaughlin wants to be certain that Curveball won’t pop up after Colin Powell’s UN speech (see February 5, 2003) and say something to the press that would contradict the information presented by Powell. “[W]e want to take every precaution against unwelcome surprises that might emerge concerning the intel case; clearly, public statements by this emigre, press accounts of his reporting or credibility, or even direct press access to him would cause a number of potential concerns,” the memo states. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 183] Drumheller is astonished to learn that Powell’s presentation will include a claim that Iraq’s mobile bioweapons labs can create enough toxins “in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people.” Drumheller recognizes the claim as originating with the Iraqi defector Curveball (see November 1999). Drumheller meets with McLaughlin, who promises an immediate investigation. What McLaughlin does or does not do is unclear, but Powell never hears about Drumheller’s objections. UN weapons inspector David Kay will later note, “[A]ll the fine-grained stuff that might have caused [Powell] not to use it, he wasn’t given an opportunity to hear firsthand.” (McLaughlin will later deny that Drumheller ever warned him about the Curveball intelligence: “If someone had made these doubts clear to me, I would not have permitted the reporting to be used in Secretary Powell’s speech.”) [Unger, 2007, pp. 281, 283]

Entity Tags: Tyler Drumheller, John E. McLaughlin, David Kay

Category Tags: Curveball Fabrications

The Independent reports on February 3 that according to security sources in London, Colin Powell will attempt to link Iraq to al-Qaeda in his February 5 presentation to the UN. But the sources say that intelligence analysts in both Washington and London do not believe such links exist. [Independent, 2/3/2003 Sources: Unnamed British intelligence sources] This is followed by a report the next day in the London Telegraph, reporting that the Bush administration’s insistence of a link between al-Zarqawi, Ansar al-Islam, and Saddam Hussein “has infuriated many within the United States intelligence community.” The report cites one unnamed US intelligence source who says, “The intelligence is practically non-existent,” and explains that the claim is largely based on information provided by Kurdish groups, which are enemies of Ansar al-Islam. “It is impossible to support the bald conclusions being made by the White House and the Pentagon given the poor quantity and quality of the intelligence available. There is uproar within the intelligence community on all of these points, but the Bush White House has quashed dissent.” [Daily Telegraph, 2/4/2003 Sources: Unnamed US and British intelligence sources] The Telegraph predicts that “if Mr. Powell tries to prove the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, the whole thing could fall apart,” explaining that the veto-wielding Security Council members, “France, Russia, and China… all have powerful intelligence services and their own material on al-Qaeda and they will know better than to accept the flimsy evidence of a spurious link with Baghdad.” [Daily Telegraph, 2/4/2003]

Entity Tags: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Colin Powell, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Legal Justification, Al Zarqawi Allegation, Powell's Speech to UN

The Australian reports, “The US is understood to estimate the prospect of terrorism will rise by about 75 percent if it launches military action against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.” [Australian, 2/4/2003 Sources: Unnamed US officials]

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Predictions

Les, the CIA doctor who met Curveball (see May 2000), warns the deputy chief of the CIA’s Joint Task Force in an email that one of the allegations Powell is planning to make in his February 5 presentation to the UN is based on intelligence from a single informant of dubious reliability. The doctor—who is the only member of US intelligence to have met the source—says it isn’t even certain if the informant, known as “Curveball,” is “who he said he was.” He adds, “These issues, in my opinion, warrant further inquiry before we use the information as the backbone of one of four major findings of the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW program!” The CIA official quickly responds: “Let’s keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what Curveball said or didn’t say,” he wrote. “The Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether Curveball knows what he’s talking about.” [US Congress, 7/7/2004, pp. 58; Newsweek, 7/19/2004; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 183]

Entity Tags: Les

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, The Decision to Invade, Powell's Speech to UN, Curveball Fabrications

Saddam Hussein gives a rare interview, with former Labour MP Tony Benn for Channel 4 News and flatly denies supporting al-Qaeda. He says, “If we had a relationship with al-Qaeda and we believed in that relationship, we wouldn’t be ashamed to admit it.” [BBC, 2/4/2003]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties

CIA Director George Tenet and Deputy Director John McLaughlin assure Colin Powell that the statements he will be making in his February 5 speech (see February 5, 2003) to the UN are backed by solid intelligence. Powell is apparently concerned that the allegations about mobile biological weapons laboratories have little evidence behind them. “Powell and I were both suspicious because there were no pictures of the mobile labs,” Powell’s deputy, Larry Wilkerson, will later recall in an interview with the Washington Post. But the two CIA officials claim that evidence for the mobile units is based on multiple sources whose accounts have been independently corroborated. “This is it, Mr. Secretary. You can’t doubt this one,” Wilkerson remembers them saying. [Washington Post, 6/25/2006]

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell, John E. McLaughlin

Category Tags: Biological Weapons Trailers

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) calls Colin Powell and tells him he is hopeful that his upcoming presentation to the UN Security Council will improve the prospect of getting a second UN resolution. Another resolution might force Saddam to capitulate, Biden suggests, or at the very least give an invasion legitimacy. Biden also advises Powell, “Don’t speak to anything you don’t know about.” Powell responds, “Someday when we’re both out of office, we’ll have a cup of coffee and I’ll tell you why.” Biden later says he believe Powell’s comment meant that he wasn’t confident in the information he was going to present. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 185]

Entity Tags: United Nations Security Council, Colin Powell, Joseph Biden

Category Tags: Powell's Speech to UN

On the evening of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council (see February 5, 2003), Powell’s chief of staff Larry Wilkerson (see January 30-February 4, 2003) conducts a dress rehearsal on the top floor of the US Mission to the United Nations. He rearranges the furniture to look like the seating arrangements in the UN Security Council. This is Wilkerson’s last change to get the presentation right and weed out everything that cannot be verified. One item that worries him is an intercept of a conversation between two members of Iraq’s elite Republican Guards. Wilkerson will later say, “They were very classy, rat-tat-tat-tat, hitting you fast, like all the TV crap Americans are used to these says, nine-second sound bites.” But Wilkerson is not sure they say what the CIA and the White House claim they say. “You have this guy at a chemical factory saying, ‘Get rid of it.’ Suppose he’s actually trying to get rid of [the WMD]… [But] all the intercepts could have been interpreted two or three or even more ways. Believe me, I looked at it fifty times.” Wilkerson is doubly worried about the claims that Iraq has mobile bioweapons labs (see February 3, 2003). In a dramatic sequence, Powell will present sketches of the mobile labs based on descriptions from an undisclosed source. Wilkerson is not sold: “Powell and I were both suspicious because these weren’t pictures of the mobile labs,” he will later recall. Wilkerson asks CIA Director George Tenet and Tenet’s deputy John McLaughlin about the sourcing, and both officials agree that the sourcing is “exceptionally strong” (see February 4, 2003). McLaughlin fails to tell Wilkerson about CIA official Tyler Drumheller’s concerns (see Late January, 2003). Wilkerson will recall, “I sat in the room, looking into George Tenet’s eyes, as did the secretary of state, and heard with all the firmness only George could give… I mean eyeball-to-eyeball contact between two of the most powerful men in the administration, Colin Powell and George Tenet, and George Tenet assuring Colin Powell that the information he was presenting to the UN was ironclad.” At the end of the rehearsal, Powell asks Tenet, “Do you stand by this?” “Absolutely, Mr. Secretary,” Tenet replies. “Good,” says Powell, “because you are going to be in camera beside me at the UN Security Council tomorrow.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 282-283]

Entity Tags: United Nations Security Council, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Colin Powell, George J. Tenet, John E. McLaughlin, United Nations, Tyler Drumheller, Lawrence Wilkerson

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, The Decision to Invade, Biological Weapons Trailers, Powell's Speech to UN

Around midnight, CIA Director George Tenet calls CIA official Tyler Drumheller at home and asks for the phone number of Richard Dearlove, the British intelligence chief. Tenet wants to get Dearlove’s approval to use British intelligence in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the UN (see February 5, 2003). Drumheller takes the opportunity to remind Tenet that the source for the alleged mobile labs, Curveball, is not reliable. “Hey, boss, you’re not going to use that stuff in the speech… ? There are real problems with that,” Drumheller asks. Tenet, distracted and tired, tells him not to worry. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 184; Washington Post, 6/25/2006] Tenet will later deny having such a conversation with Drumheller, writing: “I remember no such midnight call or warning.… Drumheller had dozens of opportunities before and after the Powell speech to raise the alarm with me [about Curveball], yet he failed to do so.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 283]

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Richard Dearlove, Tyler Drumheller

Category Tags: Biological Weapons Trailers, Curveball Fabrications, Powell's Speech to UN

CIA terrorism specialist Phil Mudd visits Colin Powell’s hotel suite at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City to review the terrorism section of the speech Powell will make to the UN the next morning. Mudd looks over the changes, including a deleted section on connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda. After Mudd reads the section, he says, “Looks fine.” After leaving the hotel, he will inform CIA Director George Tenet that Powell’s team had trimmed the section on Iraq’s alleged ties to militant Islamic groups. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Unger, 2007, pp. 283-284]

Entity Tags: Phil Mudd, George J. Tenet

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Powell's Speech to UN