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Torture, Rendition, and other Abuses against Captives in US Custody

Project: Prisoner Abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and Elsewhere
Open-Content project managed by Derek, KJF, mtuck

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Alberto Mora, the Navy’s general counsel, invites Justice Department lawyer John Yoo to his office to discuss Yoo’s recent memo defending the legality of extreme interrogation techniques used against terror suspects (see January 9, 2002). Mora has been working to put an end to such tactics at the Pentagon, but was horrified when his supervisor, Pentagon general counsel William Haynes, outflanked him with the Yoo memo (see January 23-Late January, 2003). Mora wants to know if Yoo believes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can be allowed at Guantanamo, and if that the president’s authority to order torture is virtually unlimited. During the meeting with Yoo, Mora asks him, “Are you saying the President has the authority to order torture?” Yoo replies, “Yes.” “I don’t think so,” Mora retorts. “I’m not talking policy,” Yoo replies, “I’m just talking about the law.” Mora responds, “Well, where are we going to have the policy discussion, then?” Yoo has no idea. Perhaps it will take place within the Pentagon, where the defense-policy experts are. Mora knows that no such discussion will ever take place; the Bush administration will use Yoo’s memo to justify its support of torture. [New Yorker, 2/27/2006; Washington Post, 4/2/2008]

Entity Tags: William J. Haynes, John C. Yoo, Alberto Mora, Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

After a year of detention at Bagram, which appears to be unusually long, Moazzam Begg is transferred to Guantanamo. [Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed, 7/26/2004 pdf file; BBC, 10/1/2004]

Entity Tags: Moazzam Begg

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Bagram (Afghanistan), Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Moazzam Begg

Major Jack Rives, a top Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer in the US Air Force, writes a memo challenging the legal opinion issued by Justice Department lawyer John Yoo justifying “harsh interrogation methods” (see January 9, 2002). Rives is representative of a large number of JAG officers who have sent fiercely worded memos calling torture and “harsh interrogation methods” illegal, regardless of what Yoo may have written. Rives writes, “[S]everal of the exceptional techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic criminal law,” and notes that US interrogators who use such techniques risk prosecution. And, telling soldiers it is permissable to brutalize prisoners could lead to a general breakdown in discipline and morale, Rives adds, “We need to consider the overall impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as giving official approval and legal sanctions to the application of interrogation techniques that US forces have consistently trained [as being] unlawful.” [Savage, 2007, pp. 180]

Entity Tags: Jack Rives, John C. Yoo, US Department of the Air Force, Judge Advocate General Corps

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, Legal Proceedings

Newsday reports that Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, told reporters, “Better intelligence has come from a senior al-Qaeda detainee who had been held in the US base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and was ‘rendered’ to Egypt after refusing to cooperate. ‘They promptly tore his fingernails out and he started to tell things.’” [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Vincent Cannistraro

Category Tags: Rendition after 9/11, Other Detainees

CIA Director George Tenet briefs National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice on the forthcoming rendition of al-Qaeda figure Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr from Italy to Egypt (see Noon February 17, 2003). According to a senior CIA officer who GQ magazine will say is “directly involved,” Rice approves the mission, but worries how she will tell President Bush. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

In Munich, in reference to the imminent war on Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is asked whether the US is bound by any international system, legal framework, or code of conduct. Avoiding a direct answer, Rumsfeld replies: “I honestly believe that every country ought to do what it wants to do… It either is proud of itself afterwards, or it is less proud of itself.” [Guardian, 2/11/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Public Statements

Moazzam Begg is put in solitary confinement at Guantanamo and remains there until at least September 2004, which is a period of almost 600 days. [Guardian, 10/1/2004] The same day, he signs a statement stating that he is a member of al-Qaeda, which he later claims he made “under threats of long term imprisonment, summary trials, and execution.” [BBC, 10/1/2004; Independent, 1/30/2005] His confession is made to the same US interrogators who questioned him at the US prison in Bagram, Afghanistan. “They reiterated the previous threats,” Begg alleges, “of summary trials, life imprisonment and execution.” [Independent, 1/30/2005]

Entity Tags: Moazzam Begg

Category Tags: Forced Confessions, Isolation, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Moazzam Begg

A dispute breaks out at the CIA after a proposal is made to render an Islamist extremist named Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr from Italy to Egypt. Nasr had previously informed for the CIA (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After), but had been close to a senior al-Qaeda figure (see Summer 2000). Robert Seldon Lady, the CIA’s senior official in Milan, disagrees with the plan. The CIA and local Italian authorities are co-operating on surveillance of Nasr, and in a few months Lady thinks they will have enough evidence to arrest and convict him. In addition, kidnapping a man in Italy could endanger US-Italian relations. However, the rendition is supported by Jeff Castelli, the chief of the CIA station in Rome. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file] Reporter Jeff Stein will even say that the rendition is Castelli’s “brainchild.” [Congressional Quarterly, 4/19/2008] Opinion appears to be divided at CIA headquarters. According to one account, the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center is against the idea, but the plan is ultimately approved by unspecified CIA managers. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file] According to another account, it is the Counterterrorist Center that approves the rendition. [Congressional Quarterly, 4/19/2008] One of the CIA officials involved in the rendition is Stephen Kappes, assistant director of the Directorate of Operations. However, details of his opinions on it are unknown. [New York Times, 11/4/2009] CIA Director George Tenet also agrees to the rendition. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Robert Seldon Lady, Stephen Kappes, Counterterrorist Center, Jeff Castelli, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

The Italian military intelligence agency SISMI is briefed by the CIA on a plan to kidnap radical imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar) in Milan (see Noon February 17, 2003). SISMI agrees to the plan, but it appears other Italian agencies are not informed of it. The CIA will later claim the plan is even approved by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, although documentation to support this will not be produced. When Italian anti-terrorist authorities, who are monitoring Nasr and planning to arrest him, find he has been kidnapped, they will charge several CIA officers with breaking Italian law (see June 23, 2005 and After). [Washington Post, 12/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, SISMI, Central Intelligence Agency, Silvio Berlusconi

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

A surveillance photograph of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr.A surveillance photograph of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency]The CIA kidnaps an Islamic extremist who previously informed for it in Milan, Italy. The man, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar), who was a member of the Egyptian terror group Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and was close to al-Qaeda, provided information to the CIA in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After) and operated in Italy (see Summer 2000). [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005] While the kidnap is happening, one of the CIA officers involved in the operation, Robert Seldon Lady, is having a meeting on the other side of Milan with Bruno Megale, head of Milan’s antiterrorism police service, DIGOS. The meeting’s purpose is to allow Lady to keep an eye on Megale in case something goes wrong. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file] The US will say that Nasr is a dangerous terrorist and that he once plotted to assassinate the Egyptian foreign minister. However, Italian officials, who were monitoring him, will deny this and say his abduction damages an intelligence operation against al-Qaeda. A senior prosecutor will say, “When Nasr disappeared in February [2003], our investigation came to a standstill.” Italian authorities are mystified by the kidnap, as they are sharing the results of their surveillance with the CIA. Nor can they understand why Egypt wants Nasr back. When Nasr reaches Cairo, he is taken to the Egyptian interior minister and told that if he agrees to inform again, he will be set free. However, he refuses and spends most of the next 14 months in prison, facing “terrible tortures.” The Chicago Tribune will ask, “Why would the US government go to elaborate lengths to seize a 39-year-old Egyptian who, according to former Albanian intelligence officials, was once the CIA’s most productive source of information within the tightly knit group of Islamic fundamentalists living in exile in Albania?” One possible answer is that he is kidnapped in an attempt to turn him back into the informer he once was. The kidnapping generates a substantial amount of publicity, leading to an investigation of the CIA’s practice of extraordinary rendition, and an Italian official will comment, “Instead of having an investigation against terrorists, we are investigating this CIA kidnapping.” [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005] Arrest warrants will later be issued for some US intelligence officers involved in the kidnapping (see June 23, 2005 and After).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Seldon Lady, Bruno Megale, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Extraordinary Rendition, Rendition after 9/11, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

A group of CIA officers arrives at Aviano Air Force Base, north of Venice, Italy, with Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar), an Islamist extremist they kidnapped in Milan five hours previously (see Noon February 17, 2003). Some English-speaking interrogators strip Omar’s clothes, putting him in blue overalls, and photograph him. They ask him some questions about his connections to al-Qaeda, his sending of recruits to fight in Iraq, and his relationship with Islamist radicals in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After). However, Nasr says nothing. The interrogators punch him in the stomach and slap him across the face. Then they wrap his head in a sticky bandage, cut some breathing holes into it, and put him on a plane that arrives in Cairo seven hours later. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file] Twenty-six US officials will later be charged in Italy with the kidnap. One of them is Joseph Romano, a US Air Force officer whose role is to help the kidnappers at the air base in Aviano. [Congressional Quarterly, 9/23/2009]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Joseph L. Romano III, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Category Tags: Extraordinary Rendition, Rendition after 9/11, Physical Assault, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Jeff Castelli, the CIA station chief whose idea it was to render Islamist extremist Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr from Italy to Egypt (see Before February 17, 2003 and Noon February 17, 2003), is promoted twice following the operation. According to journalist Matthew Cole, this places Castelli “deep in senior management” at the agency. [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Jeff Castelli

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Robert Seldon Lady, chief of the CIA’s substation in Milan, Italy, travels to Egypt for three weeks. A radical imam named Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar) was kidnapped by the CIA in Milan five days before and taken to Egypt, and Lady will later be accused of being a party to the abduction (see Noon February 17, 2003 and June 23, 2005 and After). According to the Washington Post, “many counterterrorism analysts take [Lady’s trip to Egypt] to mean he took part in the initial interrogation.” A search of Lady’s villa will later turn up computer disks showing a flight reservation from Zurich to Cairo and cell phone records will show that a phone associated with Lady was used to place calls from Cairo during the period Lady is thought to be there. Nasr will later say he is tortured when in Egypt (see April-May 2004). [Washington Post, 12/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Seldon Lady, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

The CIA assists with the interrogation in Egypt of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, an Islamist extremist the agency recently rendered from Italy (see Noon February 17, 2003). Nasr is questioned at a Cairo prison by three agents of the Egyptian Mukhabarat, who repeatedly ask him about his recruiting network and which members of the Islamist organization Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya are working with him. Several CIA officers, presumably including Robert Seldon Lady (see February 22-March 15, 2003), watch Nasr stonewall the questions on a video monitor in a nearby room. The officers, who know intimate family details about Nasr’s life due to a bug in his house, give the Egyptians a fabricated message that Nasr is to be told is from his son. Upon hearing the message, Nasr breaks down and cries. He then tells his interrogators everything he knows, including who is involved in his recruiting efforts in Milan and which Egyptians have helped hide his money transfers. Having gotten the information they wanted, the CIA agents leave and the Egyptians begin torturing Nasr (see Late February 2003 or Shortly After). [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, an Islamist extremist recently rendered from Italy to Egypt by the CIA (see Noon February 17, 2003), is tortured there. Nasr was interrogated for information by the local authorities with the agency’s help shortly after his arrival in Egypt and gave up what information he had (see (Late February 2003)). The torture techniques include:
bullet Beating;
bullet Being hung upside down;
bullet Exposure to extreme heat and cold;
bullet Sleep deprivation;
bullet Extremely loud music played for hours;
bullet Denial of bathing; and
bullet A device called the mattress, where the victim is tied to a wet mattress, his shoulders are pinned to it by one of the torturers, and electricity is fired through the mattress coils.
A former CIA official will comment on the rationale behind the Egyptians torturing someone who has already provided information: “They’re a good intel service. They use sedatives and psychological manipulation to get someone to talk. If they’re mad or you’re of no use—that’s when they get mean.” [GQ, 3/2007 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

CIA general counsel Scott Muller writes to Jane Harman (D-CA), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, but fails to respond fully to questions about the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques. [Central Intelligence Agency, 2/28/2003 pdf file] Following a briefing earlier in the month about the legality of the techniques (see February 2003), Harman had written to Muller and CIA Director George Tenet asking whether using the techniques was good policy for the US: “I would like to know whether the most senior levels of the White House have determined that these practices are consistent with the principles and policies of the United States. Have the enhanced techniques been authorized and approved by the President?” She also urges the CIA not to destroy videotapes of detainee interrogations because they are “the best proof that the written record is accurate,” and their destruction “would reflect badly on the Agency.” [US Congress, 2/10/2003 pdf file] In his reply, Muller completely fails to mention the tapes or say whether Bush has been consulted. He also says it would be inappropriate for him to comment on policy issues, merely that “it would be fair to assume that policy as well as legal matters have been addressed within the Executive Branch.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 2/28/2003 pdf file]

Entity Tags: House Intelligence Committee, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Scott Muller, Jane Harman, George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes

Abdurahman Khadr.Abdurahman Khadr. [Source: Cageprisoners]Prisoner Abdurahman Khadr says he is forced at a US prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, to lie on a cold concrete block for two days in the spring of 2003. He also experiences US soldiers stepping on his shackles, which cut through his skin “to the bone.” A female guard drags him up a flight of stairs, he recalls, after smiling at her. He is then flown to the US prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. He says the flight was a “whole torture on its own,” because, “There were people screaming around me and there was people begging for water and nobody was getting anything.” At Guantanamo, he is placed in an isolation block for 30 days, in a dark cell with just a hole for food. He is only allowed out for 15 minutes every three days. He claims, “They use this room to torture us.… They put the heat up or they put it too low so we are freezing or we are suffering because there is no air. They put the music on so you can’t sleep. They throw rocks at the block so you can’t sleep.” Ironically, Khadr is serving as a CIA informant at the time (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003). When he asks his CIA handlers why he has to suffer so much, he is told it is to make the prisoners think he is one of them. [Toronto Star, 8/19/2004] He complains and in the early summer of 2003 he is transferred to better quarters and secretly allowed better treatment. Sometimes he is even allowed to secretly leave the prison. In September 2003, he will leave Guantanamo as the CIA gives him another assignment (see September-November 2003). [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2004]

Entity Tags: Abdurahman Khadr, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Extreme Temperatures, Isolation, Physical Assault, Poor Conditions, Sleep Deprivation, Bagram (Afghanistan), Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

Iraqi prisoner Hemdan El Gashame is shot to death in US custody while being held in Nasiriyah. Gashame’s death will be investigated by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS—see May 14, 2008). [American Civil Liberties Union, 5/14/2008]

Entity Tags: Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Hemdan El Gashame

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Other US Bases and Centers

Lt. Gen. Daniel McNeill, US troop commander in Afghanistan, tells the New York Times that prisoners are forced to stand for long periods at the US prison in Bagram, but denies that they have been chained to the ceilings. “Our interrogation techniques are adapted,” he says. “They are in accordance with what is generally accepted as interrogation techniques, and if incidental to the due course of this investigation [of Dilawar’s death (see December 10, 2002)], we find things that need to be changed, we will certainly change them.” [New York Times, 3/4/2003]

Entity Tags: Dilawar, Daniel K. McNeill

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Public Statements, Stress Positions, Bagram (Afghanistan), Other Detainees

The CIA tells anti-terrorist authorities in Italy that it has reliable information that Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar), a radical Islamist cleric who was under joint Italian-CIA surveillance in Milan until recently, is in Bosnia. This is a deliberate lie; the CIA knows Nasr is in Egypt, as it recently kidnapped him and took him there, handing him over to Egyptian authorities (see Noon February 17, 2003). According to the Washington Post, the purpose of the lie is “to stymie efforts by the Italian anti-terrorism police to track down the cleric….” The Italians believe the CIA’s story for more than a year, but subsequently discover the CIA was involved in his kidnapping. [Washington Post, 12/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, Impunity

A photo taken during KSM’s alleged arrest in Pakistan.A photo taken during KSM’s alleged arrest in Pakistan. [Source: Associated Press]Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is reportedly arrested in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. [Associated Press, 3/1/2003] Officials claim that he is arrested in a late-night joint Pakistani and FBI raid, in which they also arrest Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, the purported main financer of the 9/11 attacks. [MSNBC, 3/3/2003] An insider informant allegedly tips off authorities to KSM’s location, and is given the $25 million reward money for his capture (see Shortly Before February 29 or March 1, 2003). However, some journalists immediately cast serious doubts about this arrest. For instance, MSNBC reports, “Some analysts questioned whether Mohammed was actually arrested Saturday, speculating that he may have been held for some time and that the news was made public when it was in the interests of the United States and Pakistan.” [MSNBC, 3/3/2003] There are numerous problems surrounding the US-alleged arrest of KSM:
bullet Witnesses say KSM is not present when the raid occurs. [Associated Press, 3/2/2003; Associated Press, 3/2/2003; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/2/2003; Guardian, 3/3/2003; New York Times, 3/3/2003]
bullet There are differing accounts about which house he is arrested in. [Associated Press, 3/1/2003; Los Angeles Times, 3/2/2003; Los Angeles Times, 3/3/2003]
bullet There are differing accounts about where he was before the arrest and how authorities found him. [Time, 3/1/2003; Washington Post, 3/2/2003; Washington Post, 3/2/2003; New York Times, 3/3/2003; New York Times, 3/4/2003]
bullet Some accounts have him sleeping when the arrest occurs and some don’t. [Los Angeles Times, 3/2/2003; Reuters, 3/2/2003; New York Times, 3/3/2003; Daily Telegraph, 3/4/2003]
bullet Accounts differ on who arrests him—Pakistanis, Americans, or both. [CNN, 3/2/2003; Los Angeles Times, 3/2/2003; New York Times, 3/2/2003; Daily Telegraph, 3/3/2003; London Times, 3/3/2003; Associated Press, 3/3/2003]
bullet There are previously published accounts that KSM may have been killed in September 2002 (see September 11, 2002).
bullet There are accounts that he was captured in June 2002 (see June 16, 2002).
These are just some of the difficulties with the arrest story. There are so many problems with it that one Guardian reporter says, “The story appears to be almost entirely fictional.” [Guardian, 3/6/2003]
Account by 9/11 Commissioners Conflicts - In addition, 9/11 Commission chairman Tom Kean and vice chairman Lee Hamilton will write in a 2006 book that the arrest is made in an apartment in Karachi and carried out by a joint CIA, FBI, and Pakistani team (see Early 2003).
Account by Musharraf Also Conflicts - Also in 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will publish a memoir in which he claims that KSM was arrested on February 29, 2003 (instead of the widely cited March 1, 2003), and held by Pakistani forces for three days, “during which time we interrogated him fully. Once we were done with him and had all the information we wanted, we handed him over to the United States government.” [Musharraf, 2006, pp. 193]

Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Lee Hamilton, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Pervez Musharraf

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Jan Mohammed re-enacts the alleged murder of his brother, Wakil.Jan Mohammed re-enacts the alleged murder of his brother, Wakil. [Source: Crimes of War Project]Wakil Mohammed, an unarmed peasant, is shot to death by a US Special Forces soldier while being questioned about his possible role in a firefight. He was protesting that he and his brother—an eyewitness to the shooting—were merely returning home from afternoon prayers and had nothing to do with the fighting. (His brother will later tell the reporters that he and several others were detained and tortured, including having their heads held underwater in a form of waterboarding, and having their toenails torn out.) Mohammed’s death is not reported at all in the initial reports of the firefight. The death is later listed by the Army as a murder, but no charges have ever been filed in relation to the shooting. The team’s battalion commander will later claim that Mohammed’s death was never reported to him. One member of the Special Forces team involved in the murder will tell the Los Angeles Times that his unit held a meeting after the teen’s death in order to coordinate their stories should an investigation arise. “Everybody on the team had knowledge of it,” says the soldier. “You just don’t talk about that stuff in the Special Forces community. What happens downrange stays downrange… Nobody wants to get anybody in trouble. Just sit back, and hope it will go away.” The Times learns that the Special Forces unit in Gardez already is under heavy scrutiny by superior officers. One officer reported that the Gardez unit was “the most troubled” field team among nearly a dozen in Afghanistan. Another senior officer wrote that the team was gaining a reputation as “a rogue unit,” and a battalion commander characterizes the unit’s performance as “a Guard unit operating unprofessionally in a combat zone.” The Times will later report, “What distinguishes these two fatalities from scores of other questionable deaths in US custody (referring to the murder of both Mohammed and another detainee, Jamal Naseer—see March 16, 2003) is that they were successfully concealed—not just from the American public but from the military’s chain of command and legal authorities.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/25/2006]

Entity Tags: US Special Forces, US Department of the Army, Wakil Mohammed

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Coverup, Prisoner Deaths, Waterboarding, Gardez (Afghanistan)

At some point after alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is captured (see February 29 or March 1, 2003), interrogators threaten to kill his children if he does not co-operate with them. An “experienced agency interrogator” will tell the CIA inspector general that “interrogators said to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that if anything else happens in the United States, ‘We’re going to kill your children.’” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 43 pdf file] Two of his children are alleged to have been captured in late 2002 (see After September 11, 2002). According to author Ron Suskind, this is after CIA headquarters authorizes the interrogators to “do whatever’s necessary” to get information. However, according to a CIA manager with knowledge of the incident, “He [KSM] basically said, so, fine, they’ll join Allah in a better place.” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 230]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Intimidation/Threats, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed shortly after arrest. (Note: this picture is from a video presentation on prisoners the Pakistani government gave to BBC filmmakers. It has been adjusted to remove some blue tinge.)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed shortly after arrest. (Note: this picture is from a video presentation on prisoners the Pakistani government gave to BBC filmmakers. It has been adjusted to remove some blue tinge.) [Source: BBC's "The New Al-Qaeda."]Following his arrest in Pakistan (see February 29 or March 1, 2003), al-Qaeda leader Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) finds himself in CIA custody. After two days of detention in Pakistan, where, he will allege, he is punched and stomped upon by a CIA agent, he is sent to Afghanistan. After being transferred to Guantanamo in 2006, he will discuss his experiences and treatment with officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC—see October 6 - December 14, 2006). Mohammed will say of his transfer: “My eyes were covered with a cloth tied around my head and with a cloth bag pulled over it. A suppository was inserted into my rectum. I was not told what the suppository was for.” [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009]
Naked - He is reportedly placed in a cell naked for several days and repeatedly questioned by females as a humiliation. He is attached to a dog leash and repeatedly yanked into the walls of his cell. He is suspended from the ceiling, chained naked in a painful crouch for long periods, doused with cold water, and kept in suffocating heat. [New Yorker, 8/6/2007; MSNBC, 9/13/2007] On arriving in Afghanistan, he is put in a small cell, where, he will recall, he is “kept in a standing position with my hands cuffed and chained to a bar above my head.” After about an hour, “I was taken to another room where I was made to stand on tiptoes for about two hours during questioning.”
Interrogators - He will add: “Approximately 13 persons were in the room. These included the head interrogator (a man) and two female interrogators, plus about 10 muscle guys wearing masks. I think they were all Americans. From time to time one of the muscle guys would punch me in the chest and stomach.” This is the usual interrogation session that Mohammed will experience over the next few weeks.
Cold Water - They are interrupted periodically by his removal to a separate room. There, he will recall, he is doused with “cold water from buckets… for about 40 minutes. Not constantly as it took time to refill the buckets. After which I would be taken back to the interrogation room.”
No Toilet Access - During one interrogation, “I was offered water to drink; when I refused I was again taken to another room where I was made to lie [on] the floor with three persons holding me down. A tube was inserted into my anus and water poured inside. Afterwards I wanted to go to the toilet as I had a feeling as if I had diarrhea. No toilet access was provided until four hours later when I was given a bucket to use.” When he is returned to his cell, as he will recall, “I was always kept in the standing position with my hands cuffed and chained to a bar above my head.” [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] However, he is resistant to these methods, so it is decided he will be transferred to a secret CIA prison in Poland (see March 7 - Mid-April, 2003), where he will be extensively waterboarded and tortured in other ways.

Entity Tags: International Committee of the Red Cross, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Extreme Temperatures, Forced Confessions, Sexual Humiliation, Stress Positions, Waterboarding, Destruction of CIA Tapes, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Al-Qaeda operative Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, under interrogation by the CIA following his capture (see February 29 or March 1, 2003), reportedly gives the agency the first information it has received about another al-Qaeda operative who was involved in the 9/11 plot. That operative’s name will be redacted in a later report by the CIA’s inspector general. Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will later provide additional information about that person. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 86 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi

Category Tags: Other High Ranking Detainees

An unnamed US law enforcement official tells the Wall Street Journal, “[B]ecause the [Convention Against Torture—see October 21, 1994] has no enforcement mechanism, as a practical matter, ‘you’re only limited by your imagination.’” A detainee “isn’t going to be near a place where he has Miranda rights or the equivalent of them,” the official says. “God only knows what they’re going to do to him. You go to some other country that’ll let us pistol whip this guy.” [Wall Street Journal, 3/4/2003; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Convention Against Torture

Category Tags: Statements/Writings about Torture, Rendition after 9/11

A working group appointed by the Defense Department’s general counsel, William J. Haynes, completes a 100-page-plus classified report justifying the use of torture on national security grounds. The group—headed by Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker and including top civilian and uniformed lawyers from each military branch—consulted representatives of the Justice Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies in drafting the report. It was prepared for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and was meant to respond to complaints from commanders working at the Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba who claimed that conventional interrogation tactics were inadequate. The conclusions in the report are similar to those of an August 1, 2002 memo (see August 1, 2002) drafted by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The OLC is said to have also contributed to this report. [US Department of Defense, 3/6/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; Los Angeles Times, 6/10/2004] The report notes that both Congress and the Justice Department will have difficulty enforcing the law if US military personnel could be shown to be acting as a result of presidential orders. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
President's Authority During War Gives Power to Order Torture, Supersede Law - One of the main conclusions of the report is that the president’s authority as commander-in-chief permits him during times of war to approve almost any physical or psychological interrogation method—including torture—irrespective of any domestic or international law. The report finds, “[I]n order to respect the President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign… [the 1994 law banning torture] must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority.” The draft report clearly states that neither Congress, the courts, nor international law has jurisdiction over the president’s actions when the country is waging war. The report asserts that “without a clear statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the president’s ultimate authority” to wage war. Furthermore, “any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the commander-in-chief authority in the president.” According to the document, the federal Torture Statute simply does not apply. “In order to respect the president’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign… (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his commander-in chief authority,” the report states (The parenthetical comment is in the original document). A career military lawyer will later tell the Wall Street Journal that many lawyers disagreed with these conclusions, but that their concerns were overridden by the political appointees heading the drafting of the report. The lawyer explains that instead, military lawyers focused their efforts on limiting the report’s list of acceptable interrogation methods. [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
Guantanamo Bay Not Covered under Torture Restrictions - The report also finds that the 1994 law barring torture “does not apply to the conduct of US personnel” at Guantanamo Bay, nor does it apply to US military interrogations that occurred outside US “maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
Legal Arguments to Defend against Torture Charges Conflict with International Statutes - The draft report lists several possible arguments that US civilian or military personnel might use to defend themselves against charges of torture or other war crimes. According to the administration’s lawyers, one argument would be that such actions were “necessary” in order to prevent an attack. However, this rationale seems to ignore very clear statements in the Convention Against Torture (see October 21, 1994) which states that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Another line of defense, the report says, would be to claim that the accused had been acting under “superior orders” and that therefore no “moral choice was in fact possible.” Likewise, the report cites a Justice Department opinion, which the draft report says “concluded that it could not bring a criminal prosecution against a defendant who had acted pursuant to an exercise of the president’s constitutional power.” This also contradicts the Convention against Torture, which states that orders from superiors “may not be invoked as a justification of torture.” The authors of the report also suggest in the draft report that accused officials could argue that they had “mistakenly relied in good faith on the advice of lawyers or experts,” adding, “Good faith may be a complete defense.” The memo also argues that the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR), to which the US is a party, “does not apply outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ), and that it does not apply to operations of the military during an international armed conflict,” as the US “has maintained consistently.” Since the “Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GTMO) is included within the definition of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the ICCPR does not apply to Guantanamo Bay. The authors are also convinced that officials would not be prosecutable under US law, concluding that “constitutional principles” precluded the possibility that officials could be punished “for aiding the president in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities” and neither Congress nor the courts had the authority to “require or implement the prosecution of such an individual.” [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]
Defining Parameters of Interrogation Methods - The document attempts to define the parameters of lawful interrogation methods in terms of the degree of pain or psychological manipulation they cause. The report states that the infliction of physical or mental suffering does not constitute torture. To violate Section 2340 A of the US Code, prohibiting physical torture, suffering must be “severe,” the lawyers advise, noting that according to a dictionary definition, this would mean that the pain “must be of such a high level of intensity that… [it] is difficult for the subject to endure.” It must also be “inflicted with specific intent,” they say, meaning that the perpetrator expressly intends to cause severe pain and suffering. But if the defendant simply used pain and suffering as a means to an end, such specific intent would not exist. Under certain circumstances, the lawyers explain, the US would be justified in resorting to illegal measures like torture or homicide. They argue that such measures should be considered “self-defense” in cases where officials “honestly believe” that such actions would prevent an imminent attack against the US. “Sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal law,” the draft document asserts. “In sum,” the panel determines, “the defense of superior orders will generally be available for US Armed Forces personnel engaged in exceptional interrogations except where the conduct goes so far as to be patently unlawful.” Civil law suits, the panel notes, by a foreign victim of torture will not apply to the US government. [US Department of Defense, 3/6/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]
Report May Not Define Practices, Pentagon Implies - A Pentagon spokesman later says the memo represents “a scholarly effort to define the perimeters of the law,” and notes: “What is legal and what is put into practice is a different story.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, US Department of Defense, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ), International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Convention Against Torture, Defense Intelligence Agency, Donald Rumsfeld, Mary L. Walker, William J. Haynes

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Internal Memos/Reports, Key Events

Communications antenna at Stare Kiejkuty, the Polish “black site” where Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was held for a time after his capture.Communications antenna at Stare Kiejkuty, the Polish “black site” where Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was held for a time after his capture. [Source: CBC]9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, after being detained and abused for three days in US custody in Afghanistan (see February 29 or March 1, 2003 and Shortly After February 29 or March 1, 2003), is transferred to another CIA-run facility in Poland. [New Yorker, 8/6/2007; New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] The facility is later identified as Stare Kiejkuty, a secret prison near the Szymany military airbase. Mohammed is flown in on a Gulfstream N379P jet known to prison officials as “the torture taxi.” The plane is probably piloted by “Jerry M,” a 56-year-old pilot for Aero Contractors, a company that transfers prisoners around the world for US intelligence agencies. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 4/27/2009] He is dressed in a tracksuit, blindfolded, hooded, has sound-blocking headphones placed over his ears, and is flown “sitting, leaning back, with my hands and ankles shackled in a high chair,” as he will later tell officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC—see October 6 - December 14, 2006). He later says he manages to sleep a few hours, for the first time in days. Upon arrival, Mohammed is stripped naked and placed in a small cell “with cameras where I was later informed by an interrogator that I was monitored 24 hours a day by a doctor, psychologist, and interrogator.” The walls are wooden and the cell measures some 10 by 13 feet. [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009; Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 4/27/2009]
'I Would Be Brought to the Verge of Death and Back Again' - As he will later recall, it was in this detention camp that “the most intense interrogation occurred, led by three experienced CIA interrogators, all over 65 years old and all strong and well trained.” The interrogators tell him that they have received the “green light from Washington” to give him “a hard time” (see Late September 2001 and September 25, 2002). As he will later recall: “They never used the word ‘torture’ and never referred to ‘physical pressure,’ only to ‘a hard time.’ I was never threatened with death, in fact I was told that they would not allow me to die, but that I would be brought to the ‘verge of death and back again.‘… I was kept for one month in the cell in a standing position with my hands cuffed and shackled above my head and my feet cuffed and shackled to a point in the floor.” When he falls asleep, “all my weight [is] applied to the handcuffs around my wrist resulting in open and bleeding wounds.” The ICRC will later confirm that Mohammed bears scars consistent with his allegations on both wrists and both ankles. “Both my feet became very swollen after one month of almost continual standing.”
Interrogations - He is interrogated in a different room, in sessions lasting anywhere from four to eight hours, and with a wide variety of participants. Sometimes women take part in the interrogations. A doctor is usually present. “If I was perceived not to be cooperating I would be put against a wall and punched and slapped in the body, head, and face. A thick flexible plastic collar would also be placed around my neck so that it could then be held at the two ends by a guard who would use it to slam me repeatedly against the wall. The beatings were combined with the use of cold water, which was poured over me using a hose-pipe. The beatings and use of cold water occurred on a daily basis during the first month.”
'Alternative Procedures' - The CIA interrogators use what they will later call “alternative procedures” on Mohammed, including waterboarding (see After March 7, 2003) and other techniques. He is sprayed with cold water from a hose-pipe in his cell and the “worst day” is when he is beaten for about half an hour by one of the interrogators. “My head was banged against the wall so hard that it started to bleed. Cold water was poured over my head. This was then repeated with other interrogators.” He is then waterboarded until a doctor intervenes. He gets an hours’s sleep and is then “put back in my cell standing with my hands shackled above my head.” He sleeps for a “few minutes” on the floor of cell after the torture sessions, but does not sleep well, “due to shackles on my ankles and wrists.” The toilet consists of a bucket in the cell, which he can use on request, but “I was not allowed to clean myself after toilet during the first month.” In the first month he is only fed on two occasions, “as a reward for perceived cooperation.” He gets Ensure [a liquid nutritional supplement] to drink every four hours. If he refuses it, “then my mouth was forced open by the guard and it was poured down my throat by force.” He loses 18 kg in the first month, after which he gets some clothes. In addition, “Artificial light was on 24 hours a day, but I never saw sunlight.” [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009]
Deliberately False Information - As he will later tell ICRC officials, he often lies to his interrogators: “During the harshest period of my interrogation, I gave a lot of false information in order to satisfy what I believed the interrogators wished to hear in order to make the ill-treatment stop.… I’m sure that the false information I was forced to invent… wasted a lot of their time and led to several false red-alerts being placed in the US.” [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] It will later be reported that up to 90 percent of Mohammed’s confessions may be unreliable. Furthermore, he will recant many of his statements (see August 6, 2007).

Entity Tags: Jack Goldsmith, “Jerry M”, Aero Contractors, International Committee of the Red Cross, David S. Addington, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Stare Kiejkuty

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Coverup, Human Rights Groups, Statements/Writings about Torture, Rendition after 9/11, Extreme Temperatures, Insufficient Food, Isolation, Physical Assault, Sleep Deprivation, Stress Positions, Waterboarding, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Stare Kiejkuty (Poland)

An ill Saud Memon shortly before his death.An ill Saud Memon shortly before his death. [Source: Daily Times]Saud Memon, a Pakistani businessman who owns the land where Wall Street Journal report Daniel Pearl is killed in late January 2002 (see January 31, 2002), apparently flees Pakistan for fear of being arrested for Pearl’s death. According to later newspaper accounts in Pakistan and India, Memon is arrested by the FBI in South Africa on March 7, 2003. He is kept at Guantanamo prison for more than two years and then handed over to Pakistani authorities. On April 28, 2007, some unknown men drop Memon in front of his house in Pakistan. He is deathly ill and unable to speak or recognize people. He dies less than one month later on May 18, 2007. Memon has been the top name on the list of Pakistan’s most wanted. In addition to having a suspected role in Pearl’s death, he helped fund the Al Rashid Trust, which has been banned for being an al-Qaeda front. While some suspect a US and/or Pakistan government role in Memon’s disappearance, it is not known for sure what happened to him for those four years. [Associated Press, 5/18/2007; Daily Times (Lahore), 5/19/2007; Indo-Asian News Service, 5/19/2007]

Entity Tags: Al Rashid Trust, Saud Memon

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Detainments, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

CIA manager Alfreda Frances Bikowsky takes an unauthorized trip to see alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) being waterboarded in Poland (see After March 7, 2003). Based on information from “two well-informed agency sources,” author Jane Mayer will write that Bikowsky is “so excited” by KSM’s capture that she flies “at government expense to the black site where Mohammed was held so that she could personally watch him being waterboarded.” However, according to Mayer, she is not an interrogator and has “no legitimate reason to be present during Mohammed’s interrogation.” A former colleague will say she went because, “She thought it would be cool to be in the room.” Her presence during KSM’s torture seems “to anger and strengthen his resolve, helping him to hold out longer against the harsh tactics used against him.” Bikowsky will later be reprimanded for this, and, in Mayer’s words, “superiors at the CIA scold […] her for treating the painful interrogation as a show.” A former colleague will say: “She got in some trouble. They told her, ‘It’s not supposed to be entertainment.’” [Mayer, 2008, pp. 273] Bikowsky may be interviewed by the CIA inspector general’s probe into torture (see July 16, 2003) and will later be considered for the position of deputy station chief in Baghdad (see (March 23, 2007)).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Alfreda Frances Bikowsky, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Alec Station

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Waterboarding, Stare Kiejkuty (Poland), Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

After being transferred from Afghanistan to Poland (see March 7 - Mid-April, 2003), alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is repeatedly waterboarded by the CIA, a technique simulating drowning that international law classifies as torture. He is only one of about four high-ranking detainees waterboarded, according to media reports (see May 2002-2003). [New Yorker, 8/6/2007; MSNBC, 9/13/2007; New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] He will recall: “I would be strapped to a special bed, which could be rotated into a vertical position. A cloth would be placed over my face. Cold water from a bottle that had been kept in a fridge was then poured onto the cloth by one of the guards so that I could not breathe.… The cloth was then removed and the bed was put into a vertical position. The whole process was then repeated during about one hour. Injuries to my ankles and wrists also occurred during the waterboarding as I struggled in the panic of not being able to breathe. Female interrogators were also present… and a doctor was always present, standing out of sight behind the head of [the] bed, but I saw him when he came to fix a clip to my finger which was connected to a machine. I think it was to measure my pulse and oxygen content in my blood. So they could take me to [the] breaking point.” [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] Accounts about the use of waterboarding on KSM differ. He says he is waterboarded five times. [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009] However, contradictory reports will later appear:
bullet NBC News will claim that, according to multiple unnamed officials, KSM underwent at least two sessions of waterboarding and other extreme measures before talking. One former senior intelligence official will say, “KSM required, shall we say, re-dipping.” [MSNBC, 9/13/2007]
bullet In 2005, former and current intelligence officers and supervisors will tell ABC News that KSM “won the admiration of interrogators when he was able to last between two and two-and-a-half minutes before begging to confess.” [ABC News, 11/18/2005] In 2007, a former CIA official familiar with KSM’s case will tell ABC News a sligntly different version of events: “KSM lasted the longest under waterboarding, about a minute and a half, but once he broke, it never had to be used again.” A senior CIA official will claim that KSM later admitted he only confessed because of the waterboarding. [ABC News, 9/14/2007] In November 2005, John Sifton of Human Rights Watch will say of waterboarding, “The person believes they are being killed, and as such, it really amounts to a mock execution, which is illegal under international law.” [ABC News, 11/18/2005]
bullet The New York Times will claim that “KSM was subjected to intense and repeated torture techniques that, at the time, were specifically designated as illegal under US law.” Some claim that KSM gives useful information. “However, many of the officials interviewed say KSM provided a raft of false and exaggerated statements that did not bear close scrutiny—the usual result, experts say, of torture.” CIA officials stopped the “extreme interrogation” sessions after about two weeks, worrying that they might have exceeded their legal bounds. Apparently pressure to stop comes from Jack Goldsmith, head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, who is troubled about updates from KSM’s interrogations and raises legal questions. He is angrily opposed by the White House, particularly David Addington, a top aide to Vice President Dick Cheney. [New York Times, 10/4/2007]
bullet The New Yorker will report that officials who have seen a classified Red Cross report say that KSM claims he was waterboarded five times. Further, he says he was waterboarded even after he started cooperating. But two former CIA officers will insist that he was waterboarded only once. One of them says that KSM “didn’t resist. He sang right away. He cracked real quick. A lot of them want to talk. Their egos are unimaginable. KSM was just a little doughboy.” [New Yorker, 8/6/2007]
bullet A different ABC News account will claim that KSM was al-Qaeda’s toughest prisoner. CIA officers who subject themselves to waterboarding last only about 14 seconds, but KSM was able to last over two minutes. [ABC News, 11/18/2005]
bullet In 2009, evidence will surface that indicates KSM was waterboarded up to 183 times (see April 16, 2009 and April 18, 2009).

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Central Intelligence Agency, John Sifton

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Detainments, Waterboarding, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Stare Kiejkuty (Poland)

A New York Times article reports that the US government is rendering suspects abroad (see 1993) and that “stress and duress” techniques are being used at the secret CIA interrogation center located in a hangar at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan (see October 2001). “Intelligence officials… acknowledged that some suspects had been turned over to security services in countries known to employ torture. There have been isolated, if persistent, reports of beatings in some American-operated centers,” the article claims. [New York Times, 3/9/2003; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

Category Tags: Indications of Abuse, Media, Rendition after 9/11, Bagram (Afghanistan)

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirms the government’s position that the jurisdiction of federal courts does not extend to Guantanamo Bay, and thus, that the Guantanamo detainees have no legal redress in federal courts. Guantanamo is in sovereign Cuban territory, the court argues, and therefore the 1950 Eisentrager case applies, according to which US courts have no jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus for aliens held by the US military outside US sovereign territory. [Khaled A. F. Al Odah, et al. v. United States of America, et al., 3/11/2003 pdf file]

Category Tags: Legal Proceedings, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Key Events

Wanted poster for John Doe #2, left, and Jose Padilla, right.
Wanted poster for John Doe #2, left, and Jose Padilla, right. [Source: Public domain, via Village Voice]A judge reaffirms the right of Jose Padilla, a US citizen being held as an “enemy combatant,” to meet with a lawyer (see June 10, 2002; December 4, 2002). The same judge ruled that he could meet with a lawyer in December 2002, but the government continues to challenge the ruling and continues to block his access to a lawyer. [Associated Press, 3/11/2003] Later in the month, the government tells the judge it is planning to ignore his order and will appeal the case. [Associated Press, 3/26/2003] While it may be completely coincidental, the Village Voice has noticed that Padilla is a “dead ringer” for the never found “John Doe #2” of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and other evidence could tie him to it. [Village Voice, 3/27/2002; Village Voice, 6/13/2002]

Entity Tags: Jose Padilla

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Jose Padilla

When an Associated Press reporter asks the US military to comment on the accounts of two former Afghan detainees (see December 10, 2002) (see November 30-December 3, 2002), spokesman Roger King claims their accounts are mostly untrue. “Some of the stuff they are saying sounds like partial truths, some of it’s completely bogus,” he says. “They were stripped naked probably to prevent them from sneaking weapons into the facility. That’s why someone may be stripped…. We do force people to stand for an extended period of time…. Disruption of sleep has been reported as an effective way of reducing people’s inhibition about talking or their resistance to questioning….They are not allowed to speak to one another. If they do, they can plan together or rely on the comfort of one another. If they’re caught speaking out of turn, they can be forced to do things—like stand for a period of time—as payment for speaking out.” [Associated Press, 3/14/2003; Amnesty International, 8/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Roger King

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Coverup, Public Statements

The Justice Department sends a legal memorandum to the Pentagon that claims federal laws prohibiting torture, assault, maiming, and other crimes do not apply to military interrogators questioning al-Qaeda captives because the president’s authority as commander in chief overrides the law. The 81-page memo, written by the Office of Legal Counsel’s John Yoo, is not publicly revealed for over five years (see April 1, 2008).
President Can Order Maiming, Disfigurement of Prisoners - Yoo writes that infractions such as slapping, shoving, and poking detainees do not warrant criminal liability. Yoo goes even farther, saying that the use of mind-altering drugs can be used on detainees as long as they do not produce “an extreme effect” calculated to “cause a profound disruption of the senses or personality.” [John C. Yoo, 3/14/2003 pdf file; Washington Post, 4/2/2008] Yoo asks if the president can order a prisoner’s eyes poked out, or if the president could order “scalding water, corrosive acid or caustic substance” thrown on a prisoner. Can the president have a prisoner disfigured by slitting an ear or nose? Can the president order a prisoner’s tongue torn out or a limb permanently disabled? All of these assaults are noted in a US law prohibiting maiming. Yoo decides that no such restrictions exist for the president in a time of war; that law does not apply if the president deems it inapplicable. The memo contains numerous other discussions of various harsh and tortuous techniques, all parsed in dry legal terms. Those tactics are all permissible, Yoo writes, unless they result in “death, organ failure, or serious impairment of bodily functions.” Some of the techniques are proscribed by the Geneva Conventions, but Yoo writes that Geneva does not apply to detainees captured and accused of terrorism. [Washington Post, 4/6/2008]
'National Self-Defense' - Yoo asserts that the president’s powers as commander in chief supersede almost all other laws, even Constitutional provisions. “If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al-Qaeda terrorist network,” Yoo writes. “In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions.… Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate a criminal statute, the Justice Department could not bring a prosecution because the statute would be unconstitutional as applied in this context.” Interrogators who harmed a prisoner are protected by a “national and international version of the right to self-defense.” He notes that for conduct during interrogations to be illegal, that conduct must “shock the conscience,” an ill-defined rationale that will be used by Bush officials for years to justify the use of waterboarding and other extreme interrogation methods. Yoo writes, “Whether conduct is conscience-shocking turns in part on whether it is without any justification,” explaining that that it would have to be inspired by malice or sadism before it could be prosecuted.
Memo Buttresses Administration's Justifications of Torture - The Justice Department will tell the Defense Department not to use the memo nine months later (see December 2003-June 2004), but Yoo’s reasoning will be used to provide a legal foundation for the Defense Department’s use of aggressive and potentially illegal interrogation tactics. The Yoo memo is a follow-up and expansion to a similar, though more narrow, August 2002 memo also written by Yoo (see August 1, 2002). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will suspend a list of aggressive interrogation techniques he had approved, in part because of Yoo’s memo, after an internal revolt by Justice Department and military lawyers (see February 6, 2003, Late 2003-2005 and December 2003-June 2004). However, in April 2003, a Pentagon working group will use Yoo’s memo to endorse the continued use of extreme tactics. [John C. Yoo, 3/14/2003 pdf file; Washington Post, 4/2/2008; New York Times, 4/2/2008]
Justice Department Claims Attorney General Knows Nothing of Memo - Yoo sends the memo to the Pentagon without the knowledge of Attorney General John Ashcroft or Ashcroft’s deputy, Larry Thompson, senior department officials will say in 2008. [Washington Post, 4/4/2008]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, John C. Yoo, Larry D. Thompson, Al-Qaeda, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ), Donald Rumsfeld, John Ashcroft, Geneva Conventions, US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Legal Proceedings, Internal Memos/Reports, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

The platoon of 15 interrogators led by Capt. Carolyn A. Wood is sent to Iraq together with another 15 fellow soldiers from Company A of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion. [Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004] Wood had been involved in detainee abuses in Afghanistan (see November 30-December 3, 2002) and will be involved in the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse scandal in Iraq (see (Early August 2003)).

Entity Tags: Carolyn A. Wood

Category Tags: Other Events

Jamal Naseer, an 18-year old newly recruited Afghan soldier, dies in US custody, apparently as a result of beating and torture. Naseer dies after several days in detention at a US Special Forces “firebase,” a small, outlying military base set up to support advancing troops, at Gardez, Afghanistan. [CBS News, 9/21/2004] Naseer and seven other detainees were taken into custody about a week before by Special Forces troops attempting to secure the area from the depredations of a local warlord, Pacha (or Bacha) Khan. Naseer’s brother Ahmad insists that he, his brother, and the other detainees are allies of the Americans, and never participated in Taliban- or al-Qaeda-led attacks against American forces. [Los Angeles Times, 9/25/2006] It is unclear why the men were detained in the first place, but Los Angeles Times reporters Craig Pyes and Mark Mazzetti report that according to an Afghan intelligence report. “the action was requested by a provincial governor feuding with local military commanders.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/2004] Naseer’s death will be officially recorded as resulting from “natural causes,” but fellow detainees will say that Naseer’s death was caused by abuse suffered at the hands of US Army Special Forces soldiers near Gardez. Ahmad Naseer will later describe how he and his brother were beaten and abused while in custody, subjected to electric shocks, immersed in cold water, forced to assume stress positions, thrashed with cables, suffered the forcible tearing off of their toenails, and made to lie for hours in the snow. The last time he spoke with his brother, he says Jamal was “moaning about the pain in his kidneys and back” from being repeatedly beaten. [Los Angeles Times, 9/25/2006] Jamal died shortly thereafter while being helped outside to relieve himself by two Afghan kitchen workers. [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/2004] After Naseer’s death, the unit holds a meeting to discuss the incident. The team is told that Naseer died of a sex-related infection that shut down his kidneys. According to one soldier in the meeting, the point of discussion is “to make sure everybody’s on the same sheet of paper—this is what happened to the man”—in case there’s ever an investigation. Captain Craig Mallak, medical examiner for the US armed forces, says that Naseer’s death is never reported to his office (any death of a detainee is required to be reported unless the detainee is determined to have died of natural causes). Naseer’s body is transferred to a civilian hospital where no autopsy is performed. One hospital worker who prepares the body for burial will later tell the Times that Naseer’s body was “completely black” from bruising and injuries, and was “completely swollen, as were his palms, and the soles of his feet were swollen double in size.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/25/2006] Asked about such injuries, Dr. Michael Baden, a prominent forensic pathologist who works for the New York State Police, says the descriptions are inconsistent with death by organ failure. “You can’t confuse those. It sounds very much like blunt trauma.” A local physician who examined the survivors later confirmed that all of the men were suffering from similar trauma, with extensive bruising and seeping, and unbandaged wounds. [Los Angeles Times, 9/25/2006] Eventually, Ahmad Naseer and his comrades are secretly transferred to a civilian prison in Kabul, still without any formal charges. Afghan military prosecutors immediately launch an investigation into their unexplained detention. That inquiry eventually produces a 117-page report asserting that the detainees had been tortured and that there is a “strong probability” that one of the men had been “murdered.” The report speculates that the prolonged imprisonment was intended to give the detainees’ wounds time to heal. Fifty-eight days later, all of the prisoners are released; no charges are ever filed. [Los Angeles Times, 9/25/2006]

Entity Tags: Taliban, US Special Forces, Michael Baden, Pacha Khan, Al-Qaeda, Jamal Naseer, Ahmad Naseer, Craig Mallak

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Coverup, Prisoner Deaths, Physical Assault, Stress Positions, Electrodes, Sleep Deprivation, Extreme Temperatures, Gardez (Afghanistan)

Bisher al-Rawi.Bisher al-Rawi. [Source: Craig Hibbert]In February 2003, British residents Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil al-Banna are transferred from Bagram in Afghanistan to the Guantanamo prison. They spend their first month in isolation. Al-Rawi’s head and beard are shaved off as has allegedly already happened to al-Banna during his detention at Bagram. Al-Banna is put in a cell next to detainee Asif Iqbal. “[S]oon after,” Iqbal will later recall, al-Banna “began to deteriorate.” At Guantanamo, according to Iqbal, “al-Banna was in constant pain from his joints because he suffered from rheumatism and he was diabetic.” [Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed, 7/26/2004 pdf file] Al-Rawi and al-Banna had served as informants for the British intelligence agency MI5, helping MI5 communicate with radical imam Abu Qatada, who also was an MI5 informant (see Late September 2001-Summer 2002 and Summer-Early November 2002). First in Gambia and then in Bagram, they were pressured to resume being informants, but they refused (see November 8, 2002-December 7, 2002 and December 8, 2002-March 2003). After about six months in Guantanamo, an MI5 officer visits al-Rawi and again asks him if he wants to resume being an informer. Later, one of his previous MI5 handlers comes to visit him. He will recall: “I suppose he was nice enough. He asked if I wanted anything. I asked for a book on base jumping. He never came back, and I never got the book.” Eventually, two other previous handlers visit him and try to recruit him yet again. “They said, “You know, Bisher, if you agree to work for us when you get back to Britain, we’ll get you out.” They promised to return, but never did.” When al-Rawi faces a tribunal in September 2004 to determine if his detention is justified, he asks for his previous MI5 handlers to corroborate that he had been an informant. The British government refuses to help in any way, and the tribunal decides that he should continue to be imprisoned. The two of them grow increasingly bored and depressed, and face harsh conditions. For instance, after three detainees commit suicide in June 2006, the jailers retaliate by keeping the air conditioning turned to maximum for months. “We were freezing the whole time. Other times they made it scorching hot,” al-Rawi says. Al-Banna is not even allowed to phone his sick mother just before she dies. [Washington Post, 4/2/2006; Observer, 7/29/2007] Al-Rawi will finally be freed and flown back to Britain on April 3, 2007. Al-Banna will be freed and returned to Britain on November 18, 2007.

Entity Tags: Bisher al-Rawi, Asif Iqbal, Jamil al-Banna, UK Security Service (MI5)

Category Tags: Extreme Temperatures, Intimidation/Threats, Isolation, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil al-Banna

Saudi detainee Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi is transferred from Bagram, Afghanistan (see August 2002), to Guantanamo. According to a statement he will later make (see July 1, 2009), he is abused at Guantanamo. The abuse includes:
bullet Solitary confinement;
bullet Loud music;
bullet Cold temperatures;
bullet Bright lights;
bullet US personnel disrespecting the Koran by throwing it to the ground; and
bullet Not being allowed to go to the bathroom during interrogations.
Al-Darbi is mostly questioned by the FBI, including an agent he knows as “Tom” and who questioned him at Bagram. Tom allegedly tells al-Darbi that “if I did not stick with my Bagram confessions, I would not ‘escape Bagram.’” If he does not cooperate he is allegedly to be sentenced to death and executed, or tortured, raped, and sexually abused at Guantanamo, or sent back to Bagram or to other countries. Al-Darbi will later claim, “The interrogators at Bagram and Guantanamo fed me particular details in my statements and forced me to identify individuals based on photographs or to ascribe to those individuals certain conduct.” However, he apparently never signs a written statement and will say that he makes “numerous false statements” under questioning. [al-Darbi, 7/1/2009]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi

Category Tags: Extreme Temperatures, Forced Confessions, Intimidation/Threats, Isolation, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

Briton Martin Mubanga, a Guantanamo detainee since April 20, 2002 (see Spring 2002), writes coded letters from his cell to his relatives. He says US guards at the base have threatened him with sexual assault and physical violence. He also reports that US soldiers attempt to “shame” Muslim prisoners by offering them prostitutes. [Independent, 8/8/2004]

Entity Tags: Martin Mubanga

Category Tags: Intimidation/Threats, Sexual Temptation, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

Stephen Cambone, the new Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, acquires control of all of the Pentagon’s special access programs (SAPs) related to the war on terrorism. SAPs, also known as “black” programs, are so secret that “some special access programs are never fully briefed to Congress.” SAPs were previously monitored by Kenneth deGraffenreid, who unlike Cambone (see February 4, 2003), had experience in counter-intelligence programs. DeGraffenreid quits a short time later. Cambone is considered very close to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. [New Yorker, 5/24/2004]

Entity Tags: US Congress, Kenneth deGraffenreid, Stephen A. Cambone

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Operation Copper Green

An Iraqi prisoner of war is beaten while being interrogated by members of the Naval Special Warfare Team at the LSA Diamondback facility in Mosul, Iraq. He is later found dead in his sleep. The death report will conclude that the man died from “blunt-force trauma to the torso and positional asphyxia.” [Denver Post, 5/18/2004]

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Physical Assault, Other US Bases and Centers

An unnamed intelligence source tells reporter Thomas Ricks of the Washington Post, Defense Secretary Donald “Rumsfeld is in a death fight with [CIA Director George Tenet] to get control” of intelligence programs. Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone has reportedly created a single office overseeing the organization, planning, and execution of military intelligence missions. Cambone also oversees assets, including one program called “Gray Fox.” This is said to be a secret intelligence organization that specializes in large-scale “deep penetration” missions overseas. It is said to specialize in tapping communications and laying the groundwork for overt military operations. The Post reports that Rumsfeld appears to be winning the turf battle. [Washington Post, 4/20/2003, pp. A01]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen A. Cambone, George J. Tenet

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions

The Justice Department advises in a set of legal memorandums that if “government officials… are contemplating procedures that may put them in violation of American statutes that prohibit torture, degrading treatment or the Geneva Conventions, they will not be responsible if it can be argued that the detainees are formally in the custody of another country.” That is because, according to one official, “It would be the responsibility of the other country.” The memos seem to suggest that top government officials may be concerned that they are in violation of international laws. One administration figure involved in discussions about the memos tells the New York Times in May 2004: “The criminal statutes only apply to American officials. The question is how involved are the American officials.” [New York Times, 5/13/2004]

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Rendition after 9/11, Internal Memos/Reports

Greg Ford.Greg Ford. [Source: Salon]At an Iraqi police station in Samarra, a town north of Baghdad, Sgt. Greg Ford witnesses soldiers repeatedly abuse detainees during interrogations. Ford, a soldier from the California National Guard, is part of a four-member team of the 223rd Military Intelligence Battalion. He sees his three fellow team members threaten prisoners with guns, stick lit cigarettes in their ears, and strangle them until they collapse. At one point he witnesses his team leader point a pistol at a detainee’s head. On another occasion, he sees one of the soldiers stand on the back of the neck of a handcuffed detainee and pull his arms until they pop out of their sockets. Sgt. Ford later recalls trying to prevent the abuse. “I had to intervene because they couldn’t keep their hands off of them. You weren’t supposed to stand on their neck or put lit cigarettes in their ears. Twice I had to pull burning cigarettes out of detainees’ ears.” In June, according to Ford, he reports the incidents to his commanding officers, but they dismiss his complaints. “Immediately, within the same conversation, the command said, ‘Nope, you’re delusional, you’re crazy, it never happened.’ They gave me 30 seconds to withdraw my request for an investigation.” But, he adds, “I stood my ground.” He is then ordered to see combat stress counselors, who send him out of Iraq. The Commander of the 223rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Lt. Col. Drew Ryan, later says, “All the allegations were found to be untrue, totally unfounded and in a number of cases completely fabricated.” [Associated Press, 6/9/2004] However, a report obtained by the New York Times details allegations of prisoner abuse in Samarra in the spring of 2003 that resemble the account by Sgt. Ford. The report says military personnel “forced into asphyxiations numerous detainees in an attempt to obtain information” over a period of 10 weeks. It concerned an official US army overview of the deaths and alleged abuse of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan. [Guardian, 5/26/2004]

Entity Tags: Greg Ford, Drew Ryan

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Internal Memos/Reports, Key Events, Other Detainees

The US establishes a loose network of prisons and detention centers in Iraq where Iraqi prisoners of war are held and interrogated. Iraqis detained by Coalition Forces are usually first brought to facilities at US military compounds where they are subjected to initial and secondary interrogations, ranging from a period of one week for initial interrogations up to one month for secondary interrogations. During this period, the detainees are not permitted to contact relatives or seek legal counsel. The prisoners are then sent to one of ten major Coalition prison facilities, at which point their names and information are supposed to be entered into the Coalition’s central database. The major facilities include:
bullet Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Correctional Facility or BCCF), the largest.
bullet Camp Bucca, in Umm Qasr.
bullet Talil Air force Base (Whitford Camp), located south of Baghdad.
bullet Al-Rusafa (formerly the Deportations’ Prison or Tasfirat), in Baghdad.
bullet Al-Kadhimiyya, in Baghdad, for women only.
bullet Al-Karkh, in Baghdad, for juveniles only.
bullet Al-Diwaniyya Security Detainee Holding Area.
bullet the Tikrit detention facility.
bullet the Mosul detention facility.
bullet and MEK (Ashraf Camp), near al-Ramadi. [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: US Military

Category Tags: Detainments, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Camp Bucca (Iraq)

Captured suspected “insurgents” and other militants are brought to the ultra-secret Battlefield Interrogation Facilities (BIF) in Baghdad run by Delta Force. NBC will report that “it is the scene of the most egregious violations of the Geneva Conventions in all of Iraq’s prisons.” BIF is described as a “place where the normal rules of interrogation don’t apply.” Prisoners “are kept in tiny dark cells. And in the BIF’s six interrogation rooms, Delta Force soldiers routinely drug prisoners, hold a prisoner under water until he thinks he’s drowning, or smother them almost to suffocation.” Pentagon officials will deny that prisoners held at the facility are subjected to illegal interrogation tactics. [MSNBC, 5/20/2004; CNN, 5/21/2004 Sources: Two unnamed top US government sources]

Category Tags: Detainments, Impunity, Involuntary Drugs, Waterboarding, Key Events, Other US Bases and Centers

Abdallah Khudhran al-Shamran, a Saudi Arabian national, is arrested and detained with six others of different nationalities in al-Rutba by US and allied Iraqi forces as he is traveling from Syria to Baghdad. The captives are relieved of their possessions and blindfolded. Their hands are bound behind their backs and they are forced to walk for three hours to an unknown location. Shamran is accused of being a terrorist and subjected to various means of torture, including beatings, electric shocks, “being suspended from his legs and having his penis tied,” and “sleep deprivation through constant loud music.” Four days after arriving at this site, he is again blindfolded and then moved to a camp hospital in Um Qasr for three days, where he is treated, interrogated, and released. But without his passport and money, he is forced to sleep on the streets until he finally decides to seek help from a British soldier eight days later. He is then detained a second time, taken to a military field hospital with two other detainees, and again interrogated and tortured. He later explains to two Amnesty International investigators: “He stuck the pen he was holding into my right shoulder. The scar is still fresh and visible…. They tied my hands behind my back and put me exposed in the sun from noon to early evening. Then they transferred me to a container and locked me in. The next morning they put me in the sun until about 10 a.m.” He is subsequently sent to a hospital where he receives treatment and is finally permitted to speak with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to help him recover his passport. He is then interrogated by a British officer who accuses him of being a member of Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen and threatens to execute him. [BBC, 3/16/2003; Associated Press, 3/16/2003; Observer, 3/17/2003; Inter Press Service, 5/16/2003; Amnesty International, 7/23/2003] This incident is described in a memorandum to the Coalition Provisional Authority on July 23 (see July 23, 2003).

Entity Tags: Abdallah Khudhran al-Shamran

Category Tags: Electrodes, Physical Assault, Sleep Deprivation, Other Detainees

The most cooperative detainees at Guantanamo are moved to Camp 4, a “medium-security” facility, where they are allowed to wear white uniforms, instead of the standard prison orange and enjoy more benefits. Cells in Camp 4 contain 10 prisoners each and the total camp has a capacity of about 160. [New York Times, 6/21/2004] Up to nine hours a day, according to military officials, detainees can spend outside their cells, playing soccer and watching “family oriented” films in their own language. In mid-June, according to these officers, half a dozen Camp 4 detainees are allowed to go to the beach. “Camp 4 is the place they aspire to get to,” Col. Nelson J. Cannon says. [Neil A. Lewis, 11/30/2004]

Entity Tags: Nelson J. Cannon

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Pentagon legal counsel William J. Haynes writes that “if the war on terrorists of global reach requires transfers of detained enemy combatants to other countries for continued detention on our behalf, US government instructions are to seek and obtain appropriate assurances that such enemy combatants are not tortured.” [Amnesty International, 8/19/2003] However, in December 2002, referring to objections raised about the use of unlawful interrogation methods by Egypt, one Bush government official was quoted in the Washington Post saying, “You can be sure that we are not spending a lot of time on that now.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002]

Entity Tags: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Human Rights Groups

In a report, the Pentagon working group (see January 15, 2003) recommends the adoption of 35 interrogation techniques. Twenty-six of them are recommended for use in interrogations of all unlawful combatants held outside the US. The remaining nine are considered “exceptional” and recommended for use only on unlawful combatants suspected of holding “critical intelligence.” The advice is clearly not for the public eye. “Should information regarding the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques than have been used traditionally by US forces become public,” the panel warns in its report, “it is likely to be exaggerated or distorted in the US and international media accounts, and may produce an adverse effect on support for the war on terrorism.” [MSNBC, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Key Events

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signs a memo on interrogation methods approving 24 of the 35 techniques recommended by the Pentagon working group (see April 4, 2003) earlier in the month. The new set of guidelines, to be applied to prisoners at Guantanamo and Afghanistan, is a somewhat softer version of the initial interrogation policy that Rumsfeld approved in December 2002 (see December 2, 2002). [Roth and Malinowski, 5/3/2004; Washington Post, 5/11/2004; Age (Melbourne), 5/13/2004; Washington Post, 5/13/2004; Los Angeles Times, 5/22/2004; Newsweek, 5/24/2004; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; MSNBC, 6/23/2004; Truthout (.org), 6/28/2004] Several of the techniques listed are ones that the US military trains Special Forces to prepare for in the event that they are captured by enemy forces (see December 2001 and July 2002). [New York Times, 5/13/2004]
Two Classes of Methods - The list is divided into two classes: tactics that are authorized for use on all prisoners and special “enhanced measures” that require the approval of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. The latter category of methods includes tactics that “could cause temporary physical or mental pain,” like “sensory deprivation,” “stress positions,” “dietary manipulation,” forced changes in sleep patterns, and isolated confinement. [Washington Post, 5/11/2004; Washington Post, 5/13/2004] Other techniques include “change of scenery down,” “dietary manipulation,” “environmental manipulation,” and “false flag.” The first 18 tactics listed all appear in the 1992 US Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52, with the exception of the so-called “Mutt-and-Jeff” approach, which is taken from an obsolete 1987 military field manual (1987 FM 34-52). [USA Today, 6/22/2004] The approved tactics can be used in conjunction with one another, essentially allowing interrogators to “pile on” one harsh technique after another. Categories such as “Fear Up Harsh” and “Pride and Ego Down” remain undefined, allowing interrogators to interpret them as they see fit. And Rumsfeld writes that any other tactic not already approved can be used if he gives permission. Author and reporter Charlie Savage will later write, “In other words, there were no binding laws and treaties anymore—the only limit was the judgment and goodwill of executive branch officials. ” [Savage, 2007, pp. 181] The use of forced nudity as a tactic is not included in the list. The working group rejected it because its members felt it might be considered inhumane treatment under international law. [Associated Press, 6/23/2004]
Result of Discussions among Pentagon Officials - The memo, marked for declassification in 2013 [Truthout (.org), 6/28/2004] , is the outcome, according to Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell’Orto, of discussions between Rumsfeld, William J. Haynes, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, and General Richard Myers. [Washington File, 6/23/2004] One US official explains: “There are very specific guidelines that are thoroughly vetted. Everyone is on board. It’s legal.” However in May 2004, it will be learned that there was in fact opposition to the new guidelines. Pentagon lawyers from the Army Judge Advocate General’s office had objected (see May 2003 and October 2003) and many officials quietly expressed concerns that they might have to answer for the policy at a later date (see (April 2003)). [Washington Post, 5/11/2004; Washington Post, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard B. Myers, William J. Haynes, Ricardo S. Sanchez, Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Charlie Savage

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Key Events

At Camp Bucca, a large detention camp at Umm Qasr near the Kuwaiti border (officially called the Bucca Theater Internment Facility), representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) witness a shooting incident resulting in the death of one prisoner and the wounding of another. [International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/2004]

Entity Tags: International Committee of the Red Cross

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Physical Assault, Camp Bucca (Iraq), Other Detainees

The Pentagon rejects Amnesty International’s request to visit the US military base at Bagram, Afghanistan. The Defense Department declares that “access to detainees is provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and on a case-by-case basis to selected government officials.” In a letter, Marshall Billingslea, principal deputy to the assistant secretary of defense, writes that “in this war, as in every war, captured enemy combatants have no right to counsel or access to courts for the purpose of challenging their detention.” [Amnesty International, 8/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Amnesty International

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Coverup, Human Rights Groups, Bagram (Afghanistan)

An overhead view of Abu Ghraib prison.An overhead view of Abu Ghraib prison. [Source: Google Earth]The US Army seizes the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, which is notorious for having been the scene of torture under Saddam Hussein. BBC reporter Martin Asser describes the event: “It had been only lightly looted, vandalism mainly, and the MPs—reservists led by a colonel from Florida—were there to secure the location ‘as a possible center for operations’.” [BBC, 8/4/2004]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

A medical report by US doctors at Guantanamo Bay details an attempt by a detainee to commit suicide. The detainee, who cannot be identified from publicly released records, attempted to hang himself with a towel. He fell into what doctors call a “vegetative state” due to brain injuries suffered during the hanging. Guantanamo doctors “most strongly advocate” for the detainee’s “earliest return to his home country,” noting that the detainee has a “history of depression” and “his rehabilitation will be long.” Available records will not show whether Guantanamo officials follow the recommendations of the medical staff. [American Civil Liberties Union, 6/19/2006]

Category Tags: Internal Memos/Reports, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

One of a group of 25 al-Qaeda members captured in Pakistan, Tawfiq bin Attash (see April 29, 2003), is taken into US custody and sent to a CIA-run detention facility in Afghanistan. Years later, after being transferred to Guantanamo, he will discuss his experiences and treatment with officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC—see October 6 - December 14, 2006), who will identify him as “Walid bin Attash” in their documents.
'Forced Standing' - Bin Attash will recall his introduction to detention in Afghanistan as follows: “On arrival at the place of detention in Afghanistan I was stripped naked. I remained naked for the next two weeks. I was put in a cell measuring approximately [3 1/2 by 6 1/2 feet]. I was kept in a standing position, feet flat on the floor, but with my arms above my head and fixed with handcuffs and a chain to a metal bar running across the width of the cell. The cell was dark with no light, artificial or natural. During the first two weeks I did not receive any food. I was only given Ensure [a liquid nutritional supplement] and water to drink. A guard would come and hold the bottle for me while I drank.… The toilet consisted of a bucket in the cell.… I was not allowed to clean myself after using the bucket. Loud music was playing 24 hours each day throughout the three weeks I was there.” Author Mark Danner, writing of the ICRC report in 2009 (see March 15, 2009), will note that the “forced standing” technique. with arms shackled above the head, was a favorite technique of the Soviets, who called it “stoika.” Bin Attash, who had lost a leg fighting in Afghanistan, found the technique particularly painful: “After some time being held in this position my stump began to hurt so I removed my artificial leg to relieve the pain. Of course my good leg then began to ache and soon started to give way so that I was left hanging with all my weight on my wrists. I shouted for help but at first nobody came. Finally, after about one hour a guard came and my artificial leg was given back to me and I was again placed in the standing position with my hands above my head. After that the interrogators sometimes deliberately removed my artificial leg in order to add extra stress to the position.” He is checked periodically by a doctor. The doctor does not object to the ‘forced standing,’ even though the treatment causes intense pain in bin Attash’s leg; neither does the doctor object to the suspension from shackles, even though the shackles cut and abrade his wrists.
Cold Water, Physical Beatings - Bin Attash will tell ICRC officials that he is “washed down with cold water every day.” Every day he is also subjected to beatings: “Every day for the first two weeks I was subjected to slaps to my face and punches to my body during interrogation. This was done by one interrogator wearing gloves.… Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks a collar was looped around my neck and then used to slam me against the walls of the interrogation room. It was also placed around my neck when being taken out of my cell for interrogation and was used to lead me along the corridor. It was also used to slam me against the walls of the corridor during such movements. Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks I was made to lie on a plastic sheet placed on the floor which would then be lifted at the edges. Cold water was then poured onto my body with buckets.… I would be kept wrapped inside the sheet with the cold water for several minutes. I would then be taken for interrogation.”
Moved to Second Facility - It remains unclear where bin Attash is moved to after his initial detention in Afghanistan, but he will tell ICRC officials that his captors there—also Americans—“were rather more sophisticated than in Afghanistan because they had a hose-pipe with which to pour the water over me.” Danner will later note that the methods used to interrogate and torture bin Attash are somewhat more refined than those used on an experimental basis with another al-Qaeda suspect, Abu Zubaida (see April - June 2002). For example, a towel was wrapped around Zubaida’s neck and used to slam him into walls, while bin Attash was given a plastic collar. [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009]

Entity Tags: International Committee of the Red Cross, Khallad bin Attash, Al-Qaeda, Abu Zubaida, Mark Danner, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Coverup, Criticisms of US, Independent Investigations, Extreme Temperatures, Insufficient Food, Isolation, Physical Assault, Sleep Deprivation, Stress Positions, Waterboarding, Other High Ranking Detainees

The one-time CIA Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Cofer Black, says that “a large number of terrorist suspects were not able to launch an attack last year because they are in prison.” He claims that “more than 3,000” detainees in US custody are al-Qaeda terrorists who were arrested in over 100 countries. [First, 6/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Cofer Black

Category Tags: Public Statements

Khreisan Khalis Aballey, a 39-year-old Iraqi man, is arrested at his home with his 80-year-old father by US soldiers who are looking for ‘Izzat al-Duri, a senior member of the Ba’ath Party. His brother is shot during the operation and never seen again. On July 23 (see July 23, 2003), Amnesty International will include an account of his detention in a memo to the Coalition Provisional Authority, which reads: “During his interrogation, he was made to stand or kneel facing a wall for seven-and-a-half days, hooded, and handcuffed tightly with plastic strips. At the same time a bright light was placed next to his hood and distorted music was playing the whole time. During all this period he was deprived of sleep (though he may have been unconscious for some periods). He reported that at one time a US soldier stamped on his foot and as a result one of his toenails was torn off. The prolonged kneeling made his knees bloody, so he mostly stood; when, after seven-and-a-half days he was told he was to be released and told he could sit, he said that his leg was the size of a football. He continued to be held for two more days, apparently to allow his health to improve, and was released on 9 May. His father, who was released at the same time, was held in the cell beside his son, where he could hear his son’s voice and his screams.” [Amnesty International, 7/23/2003]

Entity Tags: Khreisan Khalis Aballey

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Sleep Deprivation, Stress Positions, Other Detainees

Eight high-ranking military lawyers from the Army Judge Advocate General’s office—which historically has ensured that interrogators do not violate prisoners’ rights—visit Scott Horton, head of the New York State Bar Association’s committee on international law, and ask him to persuade the Pentagon to reverse its policy on using “stress and duress” interrogation techniques (see Late 2002-April 2003) (see April 16, 2003). “They were quite blunt,” Horton will recall. “They were extremely concerned about how the political appointees were dealing with interrogation issues. They said this was a disaster waiting to happen and that they felt shut out” from the rules-drafting process. [Washington Post, 5/13/2004; Newsday, 5/15/2004; New Yorker, 5/24/2004] The lawyers describe the new interrogation rules as “frightening,” with the potential to “reverse 50 years of a proud tradition of compliance with the Geneva Conventions.” [USA Today, 5/13/2004] The military lawyers will make another visit to Horton’s office in October (see May 2003).

Entity Tags: Scott Horton

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, High-level Decisions and Actions, Key Events

The CIA’s Office of the Inspector General reviews videotapes of the interrogation and custody of militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida. The tapes, made in 2002 (see Spring-Late 2002), show 83 applications of the waterboarding technique, most of which last for less than 10 seconds. However, 11 of the interrogation videos turn out to be blank, two others are blank except for one or two minutes, and two more are broken and cannot be reviewed. The Inspector General then compares the tapes to logs and cables about the interrogations and identifies a 21-hour period, including two waterboarding sessions, that is not captured on the tapes. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 36-37 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Waterboarding, Destruction of CIA Tapes, Abu Zubaida

The International Committee of the Red Cross sends a memorandum to Coalition Forces reporting that it has recorded roughly 200 allegations of mistreatment and abuse from prisoners of war being held at various detention facilities in Iraq. The report notes that the allegations are supported by medical examinations of the prisoners. [Amnesty International, 7/23/2003; New York Times, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: International Committee of the Red Cross

Category Tags: Human Rights Groups, Indications of Abuse

Infantry units from the Florida National Guard arrive at the Assad airbase located northwest of Baghdad. They are assigned the task of overseeing a detention center that has been set up in an aircraft hangar. The cells of this makeshift prison are separated with concertina wire. The US soldiers are “instructed to use sleep deprivation on prisoners, and taught to perform mock executions.” The interrogators are “not in regular army uniform, and the soldiers never [learn] their real names.” Camilo Mejia, a member of the Florida National Guard, will later tell The Guardian: “We had a sledgehammer that we would bang against the wall, and that would create an echo that sounds like an explosion that scared the hell out of them. If that didn’t work we would load a 9mm pistol, and pretend to be charging it near their head, and make them think we were going to shoot them. Once you did that, they did whatever you wanted them to do basically.” Mejia, the son of a famous Nicaraguan political songwriter and folksinger and who later applies for status as a conscientious objector, will say that many soldiers were uncomfortable with these tactics. “The way we treated these men was hard even for the soldiers, especially after realizing that many of these ‘combatants’ were no more than shepherds.” Mejia will also say that when his platoon leader objected to using these techniques, he was told that his refusal to do so could end his military career. [Mail & Guardian, 5/14/2004]

Category Tags: Intimidation/Threats, Sleep Deprivation, Other Detainees

The CIA notifies the Italian military intelligence agency SISMI that Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, an Islamist radical the agencies kidnapped from Milan in February (see Noon February 17, 2003), is being interrogated in Cairo, Egypt. After Italian prosecutors begin investigating the kidnap, they will raid a SISMI safehouse in Rome, finding a document that confirms the notification. [Reuters, 11/4/2009] Nasr is actually tortured in Egypt (see Late February 2003 or Shortly After).

Entity Tags: SISMI, Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr

In a homemade video journal, an unidentified female US soldier at Camp Bucca prison in Iraq candidly speaks of how she and her colleagues have shot and killed prisoners. “If we shoot any more of the Iraqis, or attack any of them, they’re gonna supposedly come in and attack the camp…. But we’ll believe that when it actually happens, because we’ve already killed another Iraqi just last night when I was working. So I don’t know what’s going on…” She does not describe under what circumstances the shootings had taken place. In another part of the video she admits to antagonizing the captives. “I actually got in trouble the other day because I was throwing rocks at them.” [CBS News, 3/12/2004]

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Camp Bucca (Iraq), Other Detainees

Soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company arrive in Iraq and are assigned to routine traffic and police duties. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004]

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

According to a unnamed aide to Secretary of State Colin Powell, at “various times throughout this period,” Powell, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld relay the Red Cross’ concerns about the Coalition’s treatment of prisoners directly to President Bush. [Baltimore Sun, 5/12/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Indications of Abuse

An unnamed Iraqi is taken into custody by Coalition Forces and then subjected to severe abuse in the military intelligence section of Camp Cropper. The International Committee of the Red Cross will later interview the person and report the prisoner’s allegations to Coalition Forces once in early July and then again in February 2004 (see February 24, 2004). The latter report will explain: “In one illustrative case, a person deprived of his liberty arrested at home by the CF [Coalition Forces] on suspicion of involvement in an attack against the CF, was allegedly beaten during interrogation in a location in the vicinity of Camp Cropper. He alleged that he had been hooded and cuffed with flexi-cuffs, threatened to be tortured and killed, urinated on, kicked in the head, lower back and groin, force-fed a baseball which was tied into the mouth using a scarf, and deprived of sleep for four consecutive days. Interrogators would allegedly take turns ill-treating him. When he said he would complain to the IRC he was allegedly beaten more. An ICRC medical examination revealed haematoma in the lower back, blood in the urine, sensory loss in the right hand due to tight handcuffing with flexi-cuffs, and a broken rib.” [International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 5/11/2004]

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Sleep Deprivation, Camp Cropper (Iraq), Other Detainees

On May 7, 2003, Leonie Brinkema, the judge in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial, asks the CIA if it has recordings of interrogations of detainees related to Moussaoui’s case. Two days later, the CIA replies that it does not, although it is actually in possession of some recordings. In 2002, the CIA secretly videotaped interrogations of high-ranking detainees Abu Zubaida and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see Spring-Late 2002) but it does not reveal this to anyone involved in the Moussaoui trial. In 2005, some of these videotapes will be destroyed (see November 2005), around the time the Brinkema makes a repeat request for the tapes (see November 3-14, 2005). However, other recordings—two videotapes and one audio tape—will survive and will finally be viewed by Moussaoui’s prosecutors in 2007, long after Moussaoui has been convicted (see September 19 and October 18, 2007). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 10/25/2007 pdf file; Reuters, 11/13/2007] Although the identity of the detainees in the recordings requested is not known, one of the prosecutors will later say, “Obviously the important witnesses included [Abu] Zubaidah, [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh, and KSM [Khalid Shaikh Mohammed]… those are the guys at the head of the witness list.” However, he will not specifically recall which tapes are requested. [Associated Press, 12/7/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Leonie Brinkema, Zacarias Moussaoui

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Coverup, Destruction of CIA Tapes

Four soldiers from the 320th Military Police Battalion severely beat prisoners after transporting them to Camp Bucca in southern Iraq. Soldiers spread the legs of some prisoners while others kick them in the groin. One prisoner allegedly has “his face smashed in.” The incident is reported by the MPs of another unit. After the soldiers are charged, one of the soldiers being investigated writes to his relatives to explain the charges: “A few of my MPs were assaulted by the enemy prisoners, and we had to use force to regain control, all justifiable.” [Associated Press, 7/27/2003; Washington Post, 5/9/2004] The four MPs of Lt. Col. Jerry L. Phillabaum’s 320th Military Police Battalion will be given less than honorable discharges, but not prosecuted. [US News and World Report, 7/9/2004]

Entity Tags: Jerry L. Phillabaum

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Camp Bucca (Iraq), Other Detainees

One Guantanamo detainee is released and four Saudi detainees are transferred “for continued detention by the government of Saudi Arabia.” The Defense Department releases no further details. [US Department of Defense, 5/16/2003]

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

Charged with supporting al-Qaeda in September 2002, all of the “Lackawanna Six” originally pled not guilty (see September 13, 2002). But by May 19, 2003, all of them change their minds and plead guilty. They accept prison terms of 6 and a half to 9 years. The Washington Post reports that the fear of being declared “enemy combatants” led “the Lackawanna Six” to engage in plea bargain talks. The six men all plead guilty of providing support to a terrorist organization and received prison sentences of six-and-a-half to nine years. “We had to worry about the defendants being whisked out of the courtroom and declared enemy combatants if the case started going well for us,” says Patrick J. Brown, attorney for one of the six. “So we just ran up the white flag and folded.” [Washington Post, 7/29/2003] “Basically, what was related to us,” says James Harrington, attorney for another, “was that if the case was not resolved by a plea, the government was going to consider any options that it had. They didn’t say they were going to do it [declare them ‘enemy combatants’], they just were going to consider it.” [Guardian, 12/3/2003] This is corroborated by the US federal attorney responsible for the prosecution of the six, Michael Battle. He says his office never explicitly threatened invoking the enemy combatant status, because he did not have to. Everybody knew this threat was in the air. “I don’t mean to sound cavalier,” he says, “but the war on terror has tilted the whole [legal] landscape. We are trying to use the full arsenal of our powers. I’m not saying the ends justify the means,” he adds. “But you have to remember that we’re protecting the rights of those who are being targeted by terror as well as the rights of the accused.” [Washington Post, 7/29/2003] Neal R. Sonnett, speaking as the chairman of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, says: “The defendants believed that if they didn’t plead guilty, they’d end up in a black hole forever. There’s little difference between beating someone over the head and making a threat like that.” [Washington Post, 7/29/2003] “Nothing illustrates the US government’s new power over suspects… better than the case of the Lackawanna Six,” Guardian journalist James Meek observes. [Guardian, 12/3/2003]

Entity Tags: Yaseinn Taher, Yahya Goba, Faysal Galab, Sahim Alwan, Neal R. Sonnett, Shafel Mosed, Michael A. Battle, Mukhtar al-Bakri, Patrick J. Brown

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Other Detainees

May 24, 2003: Detainee at Camp Cropper Shot

In relation to a hunger strike, there is unrest at Camp Cropper. One prisoner suffers a gunshot wound. [International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 pdf file]

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Camp Cropper (Iraq), Other Detainees

The Mail on Sunday reports that according to Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the US is considering plans to build an execution chamber at Camp Delta in Guantanamo Bay where suspected terrorists, convicted by a secret military tribunal for capital crimes, would be put to death. “Prisoners would be tried, convicted, and executed without leaving its boundaries, without a jury, and without right of appeal.” [Courier Mail, 5/26/2003] Britain says that it is unaware of the US plans. [Courier Mail, 5/26/2003]

Entity Tags: Geoffrey D. Miller

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Prisoner Deaths

Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and former US college student charged with bank fraud and alleged to be an al-Qaeda sleeper agent (see December 12, 2001), pleads innocent in an Illinois federal court. His court date is set for July 21, but before that can happen, President Bush will designate al-Marri an “enemy combatant” and send him into military custody, where he will be denied access to the US court system (see June 23, 2003). Al-Marri has been in detention in New York City while federal investigators probe his alleged connections to 9/11 hijackers. Al-Marri is charged with credit card fraud (see February 8, 2002) based on his alleged possession of at least 15 unauthorized and counterfeit credit cards; he is alleged to have been part of the al-Qaeda finance network. He is also charged with lying to FBI agents over alleged overseas phone calls to a number associated with an al-Qaeda figure in the United Arab Emirates, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, a known al-Qaeda facilitator linked to the 9/11 attacks (see Early-Late June, 2001). Al-Marri is not charged with being personally linked to the attacks. US Attorney Jan Paul Miller says al-Marri has not been charged with a terrorist crime. [Associated Press, 5/29/2003]

Entity Tags: Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Al-Qaeda, Jan Paul Miller, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, George W. Bush, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Category Tags: Detainments, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri

An FBI memo released to the American Civil Liberties Union in 2006 (ACLU—see February 23, 2006) documents escalating tensions between FBI and Defense Department personnel stationed at Guantanamo. According to the memo, beginning in late 2002, Defense Department interrogators received encouragement from their superiors to “use aggressive interrogation tactics” that FBI agents believed were “of questionable effectiveness and subject to uncertain interpretation based on law and regulation.” The memo names Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, as supporting interrogation methods FBI agents believe “could easily result in the elicitation of unreliable and legally inadmissible information.” FBI personnel took their concerns to senior Pentagon officials, but were ignored. [American Civil Liberties Union, 2/23/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Geoffrey D. Miller

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Internal Memos/Reports, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

Top: Wolfowitz (center). Karpinski stands to the left side. Bottom: Wolfowitz is partly behind Lane McCotter, who has a camera around his neck. Karpinski is behind them both.Top: Wolfowitz (center). Karpinski stands to the left side. Bottom: Wolfowitz is partly behind Lane McCotter, who has a camera around his neck. Karpinski is behind them both. [Source: Associated Press (top) and Utah Sheriff (bottom)]Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz visits the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The exact time of the visit is unknown, but Wolfowitz is pictured with Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski who begins working at Abu Ghraib in June 2003, and prison administrator Lane McCotter, who stops working at Abu Ghraib in early October. Other details of his visit there are unknown. [Tom Paine (.com), 5/27/2004]

Entity Tags: Janis L. Karpinski, Lane McCotter, Paul Wolfowitz

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

CIA officials ask for reauthorization of the controversial harsh interrogation methods (see April 2002 and After and August 1, 2002) that had been withdrawn (see December 2003-June 2004) after the revelation of abuse and torture at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison (see November 5, 2003). The CIA has captured a new al-Qaeda suspect in Asia, and top agency officials ask the National Security Council Principals Committee—Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft—for permission to use extreme methods of interrogation against the new detainee. Rice, who chairs the Principals Committee, says: “This is your baby. Go do it.” [ABC News, 4/9/2008] The name of the new suspect captured in Asia is not mentioned, but Hambali is captured in Thailand in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003), and he is the only prominent al-Qaeda figure arrested that summer. He is considered one of al-Qaeda’s most important leaders. There are some reports that he is one of only about four prisoners directly waterboarded by the US (see Shortly After August 12, 2003).

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, George J. Tenet, John Ashcroft, Hambali, National Security Council, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Impunity, Indications of Abuse, Statements/Writings about Torture, Sleep Deprivation, Stress Positions, Waterboarding, Internal Memos/Reports, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Hambali

According to journalist Seymour Hersh, by the summer of 2003, US-led forces have conquered Iraq but it becomes increasingly obvious that there is a growing insurgency movement. However, the US knows very little about the insurgency. A secret military report from the time states, “Human intelligence is poor or lacking… due to the dearth of competence and expertise.” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his close assistant Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steven Cambone try to solve this problem by authorizing increasingly aggressive interrogation of detainees in Iraq prisons. Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, commander of the Guantanamo (or “Gitmo”) prison in Cuba, comes to Iraq with a plan to “Gitmoize” the prisons in Iraq to make them more geared towards interrogation (see August 31, 2003-September 9, 2003). A former intelligence official will later tell Hersh, “They weren’t getting anything substantive from the detainees in Iraq. No names. Nothing that they could hang their hat on. Cambone says, I’ve got to crack this thing and I’m tired of working through the normal chain of command. I’ve got this apparatus set up—the black special-access program—and I’m going in hot.” The program mentioned is Operation Copper Green, which allows secret task forces to capture and interrogate wanted figures with very little oversight, and which is expanded to Iraq around this time. This official continues, “And it’s working. We’re getting a picture of the insurgency in Iraq and the intelligence is flowing into the white world. We’re getting good stuff. But we’ve got more targets” - meaning Iraqi detainees -“than people who can handle them.” As a result, Cambone decides to include some of the military intelligence officers working in the Iraqi prisons in the special access programs that are a part of Operation Copper Green. “So here are fundamentally good soldiers—military-intelligence guys—being told that no rules apply. And, as far as they’re concerned, this is a covert operation, and its’ to be kept within Defense Department channels.” As a result, more and more people, including the MPs (military police) pictured in the later Abu Ghraib abuse photographs, get involved in these covert programs that have almost no accountability and the stage is set for abuses to occur. The official says, “as soon as you enlarge the secret program beyond the oversight capability of experienced people, you lose control.” By the end of 2003, this official claims that senior CIA officials were complaining. “They said, ‘No way. We signed up for the core program in Afghanistan—pre-approved for operations against high-value terrorist targets—and now you want to use it for cabdrivers, brothers-in-law, and people pulled off the streets.’” The CIA supposedly ends its involvement with the covert programs in Iraqi prisons, although exactly when this happens is not clear. [New Yorker, 5/24/2004]

Entity Tags: Geoffrey D. Miller, Donald Rumsfeld, Seymour Hersh, Operation Copper Green, Stephen A. Cambone

Category Tags: Impunity, High-level Decisions and Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Operation Copper Green

Kean (left) and Hamilton (right) of the 9/11 Commission.Kean (left) and Hamilton (right) of the 9/11 Commission. [Source: Doug Mills / New York Times]The 9/11 Commission does not receive video or audio recordings of interrogations of detainees thought to know something about the 9/11 plot (see Spring-Late 2002), even though it is unhappy with the amount and quality of information it is getting from detainees (see Summer 2003) and has a series of meetings with CIA officials to improve access (see November 5, 2003-January 2004). The CIA will indicate that the Commission never asks for the tapes, saying it “went to great lengths to meet the requests of the 9/11 Commission,” and that one of the reasons that the tapes are not destroyed until after the Commission releases its final report in 2004 is so that it could have the tapes, if it so desires. [New York Times, 12/8/2007] However, when the tapes’ destruction is revealed in late 2007 (see November 2005 and December 6, 2007), former 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton will dispute this, saying that in hours of negotiations and discussions with the CIA and written requests they make it clear they want all material connected to the interrogations of the relevant detainees. [International Herald Tribune, 12/8/2007] Kean will say, “They knew what they had and they didn’t give it to us.” [ABC News, 12/7/2007] Hamilton will say, “The CIA certainly knew of our interest in getting all the information we could on the detainees, and they never indicated to us there were any videotapes… Did they obstruct our inquiry? The answer is clearly yes. Whether that amounts to a crime, others will have to judge.” [International Herald Tribune, 12/8/2007]

Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Central Intelligence Agency, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Coverup, Destruction of CIA Tapes

Iraqi national Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul, later to be nicknamed “Triple-X,” is captured by Kurdish soldiers on suspicion that he is a member of Al-Ansar al-Islam, a militant group operating in northern Iraq. [Washington Post, 10/24/2004] He is then handed over to the CIA, which takes him outside of Iraq to a secret facility in Afghanistan. [New York Times, 9/10/2004]

Entity Tags: Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Detainments, Other Detainees

Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from Vermont, sends letters to the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon with complaints about the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan and “other locations outside the United States.” He writes that according to unnamed officials, the prisoners are being subjected to beatings, lengthy sleep- and food-deprivation, and other “stress and duress” techniques (see April 16, 2003). He asks if these techniques are indeed being employed and urges the administration to issue a clear statement that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees will not be tolerated. The Pentagon and CIA respond with denials that the United States is torturing its prisoners. [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004; USA Today, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Patrick J. Leahy

Category Tags: Coverup, Indications of Abuse

The CIA starts a course for officers it calls “debriefers,” who are to participate in detainee interrogations. (In the CIA’s terminology of this time, an “interrogator” is someone who applies the agency’s “enhanced interrogation techniques,” whereas a debriefer does not apply the techniques, but merely asks a detainee questions after an interrogator has designated a detainee as “compliant.”) The purpose of the course is to train the debriefers to collect actionable intelligence from high-value detainees in CIA custody. It is intended to familiarize them with key aspects of the CIA’s interrogation program, including its goals and legal authorities, the interrogation guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of all who interact with high value detainees. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 38 pdf file] The agency began a course for interrogators the previous year (see November 2002).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Other Events

A 53-year-old Iraqi man, Naem Sadoon Hatab, is strangled to death while in US custody at the Whitehorse detainment camp in Nasiriyah. Hatab’s death will be investigated by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS—see May 14, 2008). [American Civil Liberties Union, 5/14/2008]

Entity Tags: Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Naem Sadoon Hatab

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Other US Bases and Centers

FBI officials report that a member of the military personnel has impersonated an FBI agent. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1/20/2004 pdf file] One FBI supervising special agent writes, “There were… accusations made by different investigators that military interrogators would present themselves as FBI agents to detainees and harass them… .” [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 7/13/2004 pdf file] A similar claim will be made by Rhuhel Ahmed. At one time, Ahmed complains to an FBI investigator that one of his female colleagues kept him in Camp Delta’s interrogation room for 18 hours. The investigator tells Ahmed he knows the woman, but that she is not from the FBI but from military intelligence. [Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed, 7/26/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Rhuhel Ahmed

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Rhuhel Ahmed

An Iraqi prisoner is bound to a chair and interrogated by soldiers at a “classified interrogation facility” in Baghdad. He later dies. The autopsy will report that the man was “subjected to both physical and psychological stress” and died from a “hard, fast blow” to the head. [Denver Post, 5/18/2004]

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Physical Assault, Other Detainees

A female senior official from Washington comes to Guantanamo to interrogate British national Shafiq Rasul and shows him a videotape recording of a meeting in January 2000 in Afghanistan between Osama bin Laden and Mohamed Atta, the operational leader of the 9/11 attacks. The video allegedly also shows Rasul being present. Rasul recalls saying: “Are you blind? That doesn’t look anything like me.” His questioners are adamant. “[L]oads of people had told them that this guy in a beard standing behind bin Laden was me. I told them that in 2000 I didn’t leave the country, that I was working at the Wednesbury branch of Currys, who would have my employment records. They told me I could have falsified those records—that I could have had someone working with me at Currys who could have altered the data the company held, and traveled on a false passport.” Then Rasul decides to confess. “I’d got to the point where I just couldn’t take any more. ‘Do what you have to do,’ I told them.” He recalls: “My heart is beating, beating, I’m saying it’s not me, it’s not me, but I’m thinking ‘I’m going to be screwed. I’m on an island in the middle of nowhere, there’s nothing I can do.’” [Guardian, 10/3/2004] His two friends, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, are also forced to make confessions. But the British intelligence service MI5, later demonstrates that the Tipton Three were all in Britain at that time, [Observer, 3/14/2004] and Rasul was indeed working in a Currys store in the West Midlands at the time of the alleged meeting attended by bin Laden and Mohamed Atta. [Guardian, 8/4/2004]

Entity Tags: Asif Iqbal, Rhuhel Ahmed, Mohamed Atta, Shafiq Rasul, Osama bin Laden

Category Tags: Forced Confessions, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Asif Iqbal, Rhuhel Ahmed, Shafiq Rasul

Abd al-Rahman, a minor official at the agriculture ministry in Baghdad, is taken into custody by Coalition Forces and held for three months during which time he is “beaten frequently, given shocks with an electric cattle-prod, and [has] one of his toenails prised off.” Rations are often laced with pork, which is forbidden to Muslims, and the area around his tent is infested with scorpions. [Sunday Times (London), 1/18/2004; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Abd al-Rahman

Category Tags: Dangerous Conditions, Electrodes, Physical Assault, Suppression of Religious Expression, Other Detainees

The 9/11 Commission becomes unhappy with the quality of information being provided by the CIA, FBI, and Pentagon about detainees in US custody who are being interrogated, because “the government’s investigators [are] not asking the detainees the kinds of questions [it wants] answered” - they are asking about future threats rather than the history of the 9/11 plot. The Commission is receiving detainee evidence “third-hand - passed from the detainee, to the interrogator, to the person who writes up the interrogation report, and finally to [its] staff in the form of reports, not even transcripts.” It can take up to six weeks for a report on an interrogation to be produced. Due to the absence of any interaction between Commission staff and detainees, they also have “no way of evaluating the credibility of detainee information.” [Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 119-123] In at least one case, it seem possible that the 9/11 Commission was not given all the information from CIA interrogations that it needed. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later independently view some interrogation transcripts, and from them he will claim that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) confessed to attending a pivotal al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia where the 9/11 plot was discussed (see January 5-8, 2000). The CIA was in charge of monitoring this meeting, so their failure to notice the presence of KSM, a photographed and well-known terrorist mastermind with a $2 million bounty on his head at the time, would have been nearly inexplicable (see July 9, 2003). The Commission subsequently requests direct access to the detainees, but this request is not granted (see November 5, 2003-January 2004).

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Rohan Gunaratna, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, Coverup

Michael DeLong.Michael DeLong. [Source: PBS]In a secret memo, Gen. George Casey, Jr., director of the US military’s Joint Staff, warns Gen. Michael DeLong at Central Command (Centcom) that the “CIA has advised that the techniques the military forces are using to interrogate high value detainees (HVDs)… are more aggressive than the techniques used by CIA who is [sic] interviewing the same HVDs.” DeLong replies to Casey that the techniques being used are “doctrinally appropriate techniques” in line with Army regulations and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s direction. [New Yorker, 6/17/2007] It will later come out that the CIA was using techniques on these detainees widely considered to be torture, such as waterboarding. But little is known about military treatment of these detainees or the techniques they used.

Entity Tags: George Casey, Michael DeLong, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Reports/Investigations, Waterboarding

At the Camp Whitehorse detention center near Nassiriya, Iraq, US marines beat and choke Najem Sa’doun Hattab, a former Ba’ath Party official, and then drag him by the neck to his cell. Hattab dies from his injuries. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 2/3/2004; Amnesty International, 3/18/2004] His autopsy reveals bone and rib fractures, and multiple bruises over his body. [American Civil Liberties Union, 10/24/2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Marines, Najem Sa’doun Hattab

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Physical Assault, Other Detainees, Other US Bases and Centers

Detainees at Camp Cropper in southern Iraq riot after one of the prisoners hits an MP. When things calm down, a US soldier removes his shirt and flexes his muscles in front of the prisoners, provoking another riot. After a soldier is struck in the head by a rock and another is hit by a tent pole, the MPs open fire, wounding five or six prisoners. The incident is later investigated by US authorities who conclude that the soldiers’ actions were justified. [International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 pdf file; Washington Post, 5/9/2004]

Category Tags: Physical Assault, Camp Cropper (Iraq), Other Detainees

Prisoners being held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq hold demonstrations protesting their living conditions. In response to the protests, prison authorities promise to inform each of the prisoners about the status and expected length of their detention the following day. [Amnesty International, 6/30/2003; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 pdf file] Additionally, two people attempting to escape the facility are shot. One dies of his wounds after being taken to a hospital. [International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 pdf file]

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Many detainees in Abu Ghraib are being held in poorly guarded and provisioned tents during this time.Many detainees in Abu Ghraib are being held in poorly guarded and provisioned tents during this time. [Source: HBO]Detainees being held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq hold another demonstration after prison authorities fail to follow through on a promise (see June 12, 2003) to provide the detainees with information about their status. Some of the demonstrators throw bricks and poles at the soldiers, but remain within the razor wire fence surrounding the tents and are not a threat to the soldiers. In response, the prison guards fire from three watchtowers into the detention area, killing 22-year-old Ala’ Jassem Sa’ad, who is in one of the tents. Seven others who are sharing the tent are injured. According to the prison authorities, the “shooting [is] justified as the three tower [guards] determined that the lives of the interior guards were threatened.” [Amnesty International, 6/30/2003; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/24/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Ala’ Jassem Sa’ad

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Other Detainees

On June 17, 2003, al-Qaeda suspect Adil Al-Jazeeri is arrested at a public swimming pool in Peshawar, Pakistan. He is not on any wanted list, and there is very little public information known about him, but intelligence sources call im a long-time aide to bin Laden and someone involved in training for al-Qaeda. On July 14, 2003, CBS News reports that he has been transferred over to US authorities after being subjected to “tough questioning” by Pakistani agents. US forces has then flown him “blindfolded and bound to an unknown location for interrogation in US custody.” Most likely, he is taken to the Bagram air base in Afghanistan. [Associated Press, 6/19/2003; CBS News, 7/14/2003; Amnesty International, 8/19/2003] In late 2005, Human Rights Watch will list his as a likely “ghost prisoner” probably being held by the CIA. [Human Rights Watch, 11/30/2005]

Entity Tags: Adil Al-Jazeeri

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Rendition after 9/11, Other Detainees

The CIA, the RAND Corporation, and the American Psychological Association host a two-day workshop entitled, “Science of Deception: Integration of Practice and Theory.” One session, “Law Enforcement Interrogation and Debriefing,” explores the question, “What pharmacological agents are known to affect apparent truth-telling behavior?” [American Psychological Association, 6/18/2003; Congressional Quarterly, 4/4/2008] This question becomes more relevant in light of evidence that mind-altering drugs may be used by US interrogators against terror suspects (see April 4, 2008).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, RAND Corporation, American Psychological Association

Category Tags: Independent Investigations, Statements/Writings about Torture

Abdul Wali turns himself in to a US base in Asadabad, Afghanistan [CBS News, 6/18/2004] at the request of the Afghan governor of Kunar province. Wali allegedly participated in rocket attacks against the base, which is located in northeast Afghanistan close to the border with Pakistan. During the next two days, according to an indictment, he is “brutally assault[ed]” by David A. Passaro, a private contractor, employed by the CIA, [Guardian, 6/23/2004] who uses “his hands and feet and a large flashlight.” On June 21, Wali dies in detention. The CIA refers the case to the Justice Department in November 2003. Passaro will be indicted with charges of assault in June 2004. [CBS News, 6/18/2004]

Entity Tags: David A. Passaro, Abdul Wali

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Prisoner Deaths, Private Contractors, Other Detainees, Other US Bases and Centers

In the city of Blantyre in Malawi, the local National Intelligence Bureau, together with US officials who are reportedly CIA agents, move to arrest five foreigners on suspicion of belonging to al-Qaeda. They are Ibrahim Habaci and Arif Ulusam, both Turkish; Saudi citizen Faha al Bahli; Mahmud Sardar Issa from Sudan; and Kenyan national Khalifa Abdi. They are held incommunicado in an undisclosed location somewhere in Malawi, and defense attorneys take immediate action on their behalf. That evening, the High Court of Blantyre orders that the detainees be brought before it within 48 hours. [Amnesty International, 8/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Faha al Bahli, Arif Ulusam, Ibrahim Habaci, Khalifa Abdi, Mahmud Sardar Issa

Category Tags: Detainments, Other Detainees

Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri.Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. [Source: Slate]A month before he is slated to go on trial for bank and credit card fraud charges (see February 8, 2002), the federal government drops all criminal charges against Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who has been held without legal representation, and in solitary confinement, since 2001 (see December 12, 2001). [CBS News, 6/23/2003; CBS News, 6/23/2003; CNN, 12/13/2005; Progressive, 3/2007]
'Grave Danger' - President Bush says al-Marri “represents a continuing, present, and grave danger” to the country, and the government designates al-Marri as an “enemy combatant,” alleging that he helped al-Qaeda operatives settle in the US. “Mr. Al-Marri possesses intelligence, including intelligence about personnel and activities of al-Qaeda,” Bush continues, and adds that gaining access to it “would aid US efforts to prevent attacks by al-Qaeda.” [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003; Progressive, 3/2007] The presidential order says he “engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism.” His detention is necessary, the order claims, to prevent him from participating in terrorist activities against the US. The order in effect precludes a pretrial hearing scheduled for July 2 and the start of a formal trial on July 22. [CNN, 6/24/2003]
Alleged Sleeper Agent - The government declaration for al-Marri says he worked as an “al-Qaeda sleeper agent” who was planning to “hack into the computer systems of US banks,” and possibly facilitate a follow up to the 9/11 attacks. For its part, the Defense Department says al-Marri trained at a terror camp in Afghanistan before 9/11, personally met Osama bin Laden, and volunteered for an unspecified “martyr mission.” [CNN, 12/13/2005] Attorney General John Ashcroft will later claim that al-Marri refused repeated offers to cooperate with the FBI; “consequently,” Ashcroft will write, Bush declares him an enemy combatant. Ashcroft will claim that under the laws of war, an enemy combatant can be killed out of hand. Instead, the government will hold al-Marri “without charge or trial until the end of the war.” [Slate, 11/30/2006]
Transferred to Navy Brig - Instead, the “enemy combatant” designation takes al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and legal US resident, out of the civilian criminal justice system and places him under the control of the Defense Department, which immediately transfers him into detention at a Navy brig in South Carolina. He could face a military tribunal or remain in detention indefinitely, without trial. He is only the third person to be publicly named as an enemy combatant, along with US citizens Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi.
Fingered by KSM - According to a Justice Department official, al-Marri was “positively identified” as being part of a planned second wave of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks by an “al-Qaeda detainee in a position to know.” Justice officials imply that the detainee to finger al-Marri is senior 9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [CBS News, 6/23/2003] Another suspected al-Qaeda operative, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (see Early-Late June, 2001), is also said to have mentioned him. [CNN, 12/13/2005] Alice Fisher, the deputy assistant attorney general for the Justice Department’s criminal division, says the department did not drop the criminal charges against al-Marri because the case was weak: “We are confident we would have prevailed on the criminal charges. However, setting the criminal charges aside is in the best interests of our national security.” The criminal charges—lying to banks, lying to the FBI, and credit card fraud—could have given al-Marri up to 60 years in prison and $1.75 million in fines. [CBS News, 6/23/2003]
Pleaded Not Guilty - Al-Marri’s lawyer Mark Berman says that his client pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges (see May 29, 2003), and the case was proceeding to trial. “I definitely got the sense they were reluctant to try the case in court,” Berman says. “They’d rather be in a forum where defendants aren’t represented by counsel.” Al-Marri’s wife and five children have left the US. The Saudi Arabian government granted the family passports in February, in spite of a State Department request not to issue the passports, as department officials wanted al-Marri’s wife, who is Saudi, to be available to the FBI for questioning. [Knight Ridder, 6/23/2003] Al-Marri’s lawyers say they are preparing a legal challenge to Bush’s decision. [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Osama bin Laden, US Department of Justice, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, John Ashcroft, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Mark Berman, Alice Fisher, George W. Bush, Jose Padilla, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Yaser Esam Hamdi

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Indefinite Detention, Legal Proceedings, Military Commissions / Tribunals, Abrogation of Rights, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri

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Key Events

Key Events (98)

General Topic Areas

Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath (28)Coverup (144)Criticisms of US (171)Detainee Treatment Act (15)Detainments (121)Disciplinary Actions (17)High-level Decisions and Actions (450)Human Rights Groups (81)Impunity (49)Indefinite Detention (41)Independent Investigations (27)Indications of Abuse (61)Legal Proceedings (217)Media (77)Military Commissions / Tribunals (66)Other Events (20)Prisoner Deaths (48)Private Contractors (8)Public Statements (84)Reports/Investigations (144)Statements/Writings about Torture (129)Supreme Court Decisions (5)

Renditions

Extraordinary Rendition (24)Rendition after 9/11 (75)Rendition before 9/11 (34)

Types of Abuses Performed by US

Abrogation of Rights (37)Dangerous Conditions (18)Deception (5)Electrodes (9)Exposure to Insects (4)Extreme Temperatures (48)Forced Confessions (37)Ghost Detainees (28)Insufficient Food (25)Intimidation/Threats (44)Involuntary Drugs (14)Isolation (33)Medical Services Denied (14)Mental Abuse (21)Physical Assault (140)Poor Conditions (30)SERE Techniques (30)Sexual Humiliation (57)Sexual Temptation (3)Sleep Deprivation (74)Stress Positions (65)Suppression of Religious Expression (18)Use of Dogs (20)Waterboarding (92)

Documents

Internal Memos/Reports (95)Presidential Directives (8)

Specific Events or Operations

Destruction of CIA Tapes (94)Operation Copper Green (9)Qala-i-Janghi Massacre (17)

US Bases and Interrogation Centers

Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq) (187)Al Jafr Prison (Jordan) (8)Al Qaim (Iraq) (6)Bagram (Afghanistan) (60)Camp Bucca (Iraq) (13)Camp Cropper (Iraq) (13)Diego Garcia (8)Gardez (Afghanistan) (7)Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba) (293)Kandahar (Afghanistan) (19)Salt Pit (Afghanistan) (34)Stare Kiejkuty (Poland) (21)US Base (Thailand) (15)USS Peleliu (7)Other US Bases and Centers (40)

High Ranking Detainees

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (32)Abu Zubaida (52)Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (6)Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (26)Hambali (9)Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (10)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (34)Majid Khan (7)Ramzi bin al-Shibh (13)Other High Ranking Detainees (14)

Other Detainees

Abed Hamed Mowhoush (8)Asif Iqbal (20)Binyam Mohamed (14)Bisher al-Rawi (11)Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (37)Huda al-Azzawi (10)Jamal Udeen (10)Jamil al-Banna (9)John Walker Lindh (29)Jose Padilla (31)Khalid el-Masri (17)Maher Arar (14)Moazzam Begg (8)Mohamed al-Khatani (13)Mohammed Jawad (14)Rhuhel Ahmed (22)Saddam Salah al-Rawi (8)Salim Ahmed Hamdan (12)Shafiq Rasul (20)Tarek Dergoul (11)Yaser Esam Hamdi (22)Other Detainees (167)
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