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Torture, Rendition, and other Abuses against Captives in US Custody

Project: Prisoner Abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and Elsewhere
Open-Content project managed by Derek, KJF, mtuck

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To a question regarding allegations of abuse at Guantanamo, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld answers: “That is a pattern and a practice of terrorists, to allege abuse.” When a reporter uses the word “torture” in relation to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, he responds: “I’m not a lawyer. My impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different from torture.” He adds: “I don’t know if… it is correct to say…, that torture has taken place, or that there’s been a conviction for torture. And therefore I’m not going to address the torture word.” [US Department of Defense, 5/4/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Public Statements, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller plays down the significance of his role in the Abu Ghraib abuse, saying his team recommended in September 2003 “having the guard force passively involved in the ability to interrogate rapidly and effectively.” [Washington Post, 5/9/2004]

Entity Tags: Geoffrey D. Miller

Category Tags: Public Statements, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, tells the CBS News “Early Show”: “Those soldiers were not following orders.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004]

Entity Tags: Peter Pace

Category Tags: Public Statements, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

An internal FBI e-mail shows that abusive interrogation methods at Guantanamo are endorsed by senior Defense Department (DoD) officials. The e-mail states that “hooding prisoners, threats of violence, and techniques meant to humiliate detainees” have been “approved at high levels w/in DoD.” Another FBI e-mail states that some aggressive interrogation methods considered abusive by some FBI agents were “approved by the deputy secretary of defense,” Paul Wolfowitz. [American Civil Liberties Union, 2/23/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Paul Wolfowitz

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Intimidation/Threats, Internal Memos/Reports, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

May 5, 2004: Journalists Tour Abu Ghraib

For the first time, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller leads a group of journalists around the Abu Ghraib prison. When prisoner Huda al-Azzawi sees Miller with the group of reporters, she shouts out: “We are not the killers. You are the killers. This is our country. You have invaded it.” [Guardian, 9/20/2004] Journalists notice five women screaming and waving their arms through the iron bars. One of them, possibly Al-Azzawi, shouts in Arabic: “I’ve been here five months. I don’t belong to the resistance. I have children at home.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004] The women had been instructed the day before to keep quiet (see May 4, 2004). Al-Azzawi recalls: “After that they didn’t let me out of my cell for an entire month. A US officer came to me and said: ‘Because of you we have all been punished.’” [Guardian, 9/20/2004] Elsewhere at Abu Ghraib, prisoners run out shouting as the bus with journalists drives by. A man with one leg waves his prosthetic leg in the air, shouting in Arabic: “Why? Why? Nobody has told me why I am here.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004]

Entity Tags: Huda al-Azzawi, Geoffrey D. Miller

Category Tags: Huda al-Azzawi, Coverup, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Speaking about the Abu Ghraib scandal (see April 28, 2004), President Bush promises a “full investigation.” In an interview with Al Arabiya, he says: “It’s important for people to understand that in a democracy, there will be a full investigation. In other words, we want to know the truth. In our country, when there’s an allegation of abuse… there will be a full investigation, and justice will be delivered.… It’s very important for people and your listeners to understand that in our country, when an issue is brought to our attention on this magnitude, we act. And we act in a way in which leaders are willing to discuss it with the media.… In other words, people want to know the truth. That stands in contrast to dictatorships. A dictator wouldn’t be answering questions about this. A dictator wouldn’t be saying that the system will be investigated and the world will see the results of the investigation.” [White House, 5/5/2004] In April 2009, after significant revelations of Bush torture policies have hit the press (see April 16, 2009 and April 21, 2009), Atlantic columnist Andrew Sullivan will write: “Bush personally authorized every technique revealed at Abu Ghraib. He refused to act upon the International Committee of the Red Cross’s report that found that he had personally authorized the torture of prisoners, in violation of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention on Torture and domestic law against cruel and inhuman treatment. A refusal to investigate and prosecute Red Cross allegations of torture is itself a violation of the Geneva Accords.” [Atlantic Monthly, 4/27/2009]

Entity Tags: Andrew Sullivan, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, High-level Decisions and Actions, Reports/Investigations, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

President Bush appears on two Arab television channels, the US-funded Al-Hurra network and the Al-Arabiya satellite channel. The interviews last ten minutes for each station. He says: “People in Iraq must understand that I view those practices as abhorrent.…must also understand that what took place in that prison does not represent the America that I know.” He adds: “The America that I know has sent troops to Iraq to promote freedom.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004] During the interviews, Bush is not asked to make an apology and nor does he offer one. [BBC, 5/5/2004] Later in the day, White House spokesman Scott McClellan uses the word “sorry” a half-dozen times. “The president is sorry for what occurred and the pain it has caused.” Asked why the president has not apologized himself, McClellan says: “I’m saying it now for him.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004]

Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Public Statements, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

The overseas flights of the Gulfstream V jet, apparently owned by a CIA front organization and used to transfer prisoners to countries for detention and interrogations, are stalled. [Guardian, 9/13/2004]

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Rendition after 9/11

An Army officer writes that, in light of the recently released photos from Abu Ghraib, abusive interrogation techniques such as the application of cold or ice, loud music, sleep deprivation, and confining detainees to a metal box, will “continue to cause us problems, as some interrogation techniques aren’t real defensible given the Abu Ghraib fallout.” The memorandum will be released to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 2006 (see January 12, 2006). [American Civil Liberties Union, 1/12/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, American Civil Liberties Union

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Criticisms of US, Extreme Temperatures, Physical Assault, Sleep Deprivation, Stress Positions, Internal Memos/Reports, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, author of a hard-hitting report on Abu Ghraib prison abuse, is summoned to meet Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for the first time. Rumsfeld is scheduled to testify about Abu Ghraib before Congress the next day (see May 7, 2004). Also attending the meeting is Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers, Army chief of staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant Lt. Gen. Bantz Craddock, and others. According to Taguba, when he walks in, Rumsfeld declares in a mocking voice, “Here… comes… that famous General Taguba—of the Taguba report!” Asked if there was torture at Abu Ghraib, Taguba recalls, “I described a naked detainee lying on the wet floor, handcuffed, with an interrogator shoving things up his rectum, and said, ‘That’s not abuse. That’s torture.’ There was quiet.” Rumsfeld asks who leaked Taguba’s report to the public, but Taguba says he doesn’t know. Rumsfeld then complains that he has not seen a copy of his report or the Abu Ghraib abuse photographs and yet he has to testify to Congress tomorrow. Taguba is incredulous, because he sent over a dozen copies of his report to the Pentagon and Central Command headquarters, and had just spent several weeks briefing senior military leaders about it. He also was aware that Rumsfeld, Myers, Craddock, and others were notified about the abuse and the photographs back in January, before Taguba even began his investigation (see January 15-20, 2004). Taguba will later suspect that the military leaders were trying to remain ignorant of the scandal to avoid responsibility and accountability. For instance, when Taguba urged one lieutenant general to look at the photographs, he got the reply, “[I] don’t want to get involved by looking, because what do you do with that information, once you know what they show?” Taguba will later complain of the meeting, “I thought they wanted to know. I assumed they wanted to know. I was ignorant of the setting.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Antonio M. Taguba, Bantz J. Craddock, Peter J. Schoomaker, Richard B. Myers, Stephen A. Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz

Category Tags: Coverup, High-level Decisions and Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III, the navy inspector general, visits Guantanamo Bay in order “to ensure that [Donald Rumsfeld’s] orders with respect to detainees at GTMO [Guantanamo] and Charleston were being carried out” (see May 3, 2004) He conducts over 100 interviews among Guantanamo prison staff and does 43 at random under oath testimonies. Questions asked include: “Have you seen any abuse, have you heard of any abuse, do you know anybody who has seen abuse, would you report abuse if you saw it, would you feel free to come forward if you see anything that doesn’t look right.” [US Department of Defense, 5/12/2004]

Entity Tags: Albert T. Church III, Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Reports/Investigations, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says in a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Any suggestion that there is not a full, deep awareness of what has happened [at Abu Ghraib], and the damage it has done, I think, would be a misunderstanding.” [Washington Post, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Coverup

Rumsfeld under oath, testifying about Abu Ghraib.Rumsfeld under oath, testifying about Abu Ghraib. [Source: HBO]In public testimony under oath before the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claims he had no early knowledge of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse. He says, “It breaks our hearts that in fact someone didn’t say, ‘Wait, look, this is terrible. We need to do something.’ I wish we had known more, sooner, and been able to tell you more sooner, but we didn’t.” He claims that when reports about the hard-hitting Taguba report on Abu Ghraib (see February 26, 2004) first appeared publicly just days before his testimony, “it was not yet in the Pentagon, to my knowledge.” Regarding the shocking Abu Ghraib photos, seen by millions on the television program 60 Minutes on April 28 (see April 28, 2004), Rumsfeld claims, “I say no one in the Pentagon had seen them.” He adds that “I didn’t see them until last night at 7:30.” Asked when he’d first heard of them, he replies, “There were rumors of photographs in a criminal prosecution chain back sometime after January 13th… I don’t remember precisely when, but sometime in that period of January, February, March.… The legal part of it was proceeding along fine. What wasn’t proceeding along fine is the fact that the President didn’t know, and you didn’t know, and I didn’t know. And, as a result, somebody just sent a secret report to the press, and there they are.” But General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later acknowledge in testimony that just days after the photos were given to US Army investigators on January 13, information had been given “to me and the Secretary [Rumsfeld] up through the chain of command.… And the general nature of the photos, about nudity, some mock sexual acts and other abuse, was described” (see January 15-20, 2004). Major General Antonio M. Taguba, author of the Taguba report, will later claim that he was appalled by Rumfeld’s testimony. “The photographs were available to him—if he wanted to see them.… He’s trying to acquit himself, and a lot of people are lying to protect themselves.” Congressman Kendrick Meek (D-FL) will later comment, “There was no way Rumsfeld didn’t know what was going on. He’s a guy who wants to know everything, and what he was giving us was hard to believe.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Kendrick Meek, Antonio M. Taguba, Richard B. Myers

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Public Statements, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appears before the Senate to express his dismay over the abuse. The incidents of abuse, Rumsfeld says, “sullied the reputation of our country. I was stunned. It was a body blow.” [MSNBC, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Public Statements

The CIA’s inspector general completes a lengthy, secret report on the interrogation of detainees in US custody. The report, based on over 100 interviews, a review of the CIA’s videotapes of interrogations (see November 2005), and some 38,000 pages of documents, will remain secret throughout the Bush administration and into the first year of the Obama administration. Some portions will be made public over the years. The report includes evidence that US interrogators used harsh tactics—torture—against detainees who were not withholding information. Officials familiar with the report will say that it concludes some of the techniques used violate the UN Convention against Torture (see October 21, 1994). According to a declassified summary of the report later made public, the report finds that “it is difficult to determine conclusively whether interrogations have provided information critical to interdicting specific imminent attacks.” The threat of such an imminent attack was cited by the Justice Department in its numerous authorizations of torture. The report prompts CIA general counsel John Rizzo to request new statements from the Justice Department confirming the legality of CIA interrogation methods (see May 10, 2005 and May 30, 2005). [Washington Post, 5/9/2009]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Obama administration, John Rizzo, Convention Against Torture

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Reports/Investigations

Lynndie England.Lynndie England. [Source: CBS]Pfc. Lynndie England becomes the seventh on the list of MPs charged with criminal behavior committed at Abu Ghraib. She is charged with indecent acts, assault of detainees, conspiring to “maltreat Iraqi detainees,” and committing acts “prejudicial to good order and discipline and were of nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces through her mistreatment of Iraqi detainees.” [CNN, 5/8/2004]

Entity Tags: Lynndie England

Category Tags: Disciplinary Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

The CIA’s inspector general, John Helgerson, releases a highly classified report from his office that examines allegations of torture from the time period between September 2001 (after the 9/11 attacks, when the CIA first began detaining suspected terrorists and informants) and October 2003. In the report, Helgerson warns that some aggressive interrogation techniques approved for use by the CIA since early 2002 (see Mid-March 2002) might violate some provisions of the international Convention Against Torture (see October 21, 1994). The report doubts the Bush administration position that the techniques do not violate the treaty because the interrogations take place overseas on non-US citizens. It will be released, in heavily redacted form, to the public in August 2009 (see August 24, 2009). From what becomes known of the report’s contents, the CIA engaged in a number of illegal and ethically questionable tactics on the part of its interrogators. Some of these tactics include the use of handguns, power drills, threats, smoke, and mock executions. Many of the techniques used against detainees were carried out without authorization from higher officials. The report says that the CIA’s efforts to provide “systematic, clear, and timely guidance” to interrogators were “inadequate at first” and that that failure largely coincided with the most significant incidents involving the unauthorized coercion of detainees, but as guidelines from the Justice Department accumulated over several years, oversight “improved considerably.” The report does not conclude that the techniques reviewed constitute torture, but it does find that they appear to constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under the Convention. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 11/9/2005; MSNBC, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/24/2009]
Physical Abuse - The report defines torture as an act “intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain and suffering.” It then begins detailing such acts. Incidents of physical abuse include:
bullet One incident caused the death of an Afghani detainee. According to the report: “An agency independent contractor who was a paramilitary officer is alleged to have severely beaten the detainee with a large metal flashlight and kicked him during interrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009] In a 2009 statement, Helgerson will write: “In one extreme case, improvisation took a disastrous turn when an agency contractor in rural Afghanistan—acting wholly outside the approved program and with no authorization or training—took it upon himself to interrogate a detainee. This officer beat the detainee and caused his death. Following an investigation of the incident, this contract employee was convicted of assault and is now in prison.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; Washington Post, 8/24/2009]
bullet Waterboarding was routinely used, in a manner far exceeding previously issued guidelines. Interrogators “continuously applied large volumes of water,” and later explained that they needed to make the experience “more poignant and convincing.” The CIA interrogators’ waterboarding technique was far more aggressive than anything used in military survival training such as the SERE program (see December 2001). Eventually, the agency’s Office of Medical Services criticized the waterboarding technique, saying that the “frequency and intensity” with which it was used could not be certified as “efficacious or medically safe.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/24/2009] The report refers in particular to the treatment of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), who was reportedly waterboarded more than once (see Shortly After February 29 or March 1, 2003). Waterboarding is considered torture and is illegal in the US. The report also raises concern that the use of these techniques could eventually cause legal troubles for the CIA officers who used them. [New York Times, 11/9/2005]
Helgerson will write: “We found that waterboarding had been utilized in a manner that was inconsistent with the understanding between CIA and the Department of Justice. The department had provided the agency a written legal opinion based on an agency assurance that although some techniques would be used more than once, repetition would ‘not be substantial.’ My view was that, whatever methodology was used to count applications of the waterboard, the very large number of applications to which some detainees were subjected led to the inescapable conclusion that the agency was abusing this technique.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; Washington Post, 8/24/2009]
bullet In July 2002, a CIA officer used a “pressure point” technique “with both of his hands on the detainee’s neck, the officer manipulated his finger to restrict the detainee’s carotid artery.” The carotid artery supplies the brain with oxygenated blood; such “manipulat[ion]” could lead to unconsciousness or even death. A second officer “reportedly watched his eyes to the point that the detainee would nod and start to pass out. Then the officer shook the detainee to wake him. This process was repeated for a total of three applications on the detainee.”
bullet A technique routinely used by CIA interrogators was the “hard takedown,” which involves an interrogator grabbing a detainee and slamming him to the floor before having the detainee moved to a sleep-deprivation cell. One detainee was hauled off his feet by his arms while they were bound behind his back with a belt, causing him severe pain.
bullet Another routinely used technique is “water dousing,” apparently a variant of waterboarding, in which a detainee is laid on a plastic sheet and subjected to having water sluiced over him for 10 to 15 minutes. The report says that at least one interrogator believed the technique to be useful, and sent a cable back to CIA headquarters requesting guidelines. A return cable explained that a detainee “must be placed on a towel or sheet, may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the air temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried immediately.”
- - Detainee Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, suspected of plotting the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000), was repeatedly “bathed” with hard-bristled scrub brushes in order to inflict pain. The brushes caused abrasions and bleeding. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
Helgerson will write: “Agency officers who were authorized to detain and interrogate terrorists sometimes failed in their responsibilities. In a few cases, agency officers used unauthorized, threatening interrogation techniques. The primary, common problem was that management controls and operational procedures were not in place to avoid the serious problems that arose, jeopardizing agency employees and detainees alike.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; Washington Post, 8/24/2009]
Mental Abuse - Numerous instances of mental and emotional abuse were also documented.
bullet In 2002, interrogators staged a mock execution to intimidate a detainee. CIA officers began screaming outside the room where the detainee was being interrogated. When leaving the room, he “passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee, lying motionless on the ground, and made to appear as if he had been shot to death.” The report says that after witnessing this performance, the detainee “sang like a bird.”
bullet Handguns and power drills were used to threaten detainees with severe bodily harm or death. One such instance involved al-Nashiri. An American, whose name is not released but who is identified as not being a trained interrogator and lacking authorization to use “enhanced methods,” used a gun and a power drill to frighten him. The American pointed the gun at al-Nashiri’s head and “racked” a round in the chamber. The American also held a power drill near al-Nashiri and revved it, while al-Nashiri stood naked and hooded. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
In 2009, reporter David Ignatius will say he finds the “image of a CIA interrogator standing with a power drill next to somebody he’s interrogating… particularly horrific, because that’s a technique that’s been used in torturing people in Iraq.” [PBS, 8/24/2009]
bullet A CIA interrogator told al-Nashiri that if he did not cooperate with his captors, “we could get your mother in here” and “we can bring your family in here.” The report says that the interrogator wanted al-Nashiri to infer for “psychological” reasons that his female relatives might be sexually abused. The interrogator has denied actually threatening to sexually abuse al-Nashiri’s mother or other relatives.
bullet An interrogator threatened the lives of one detainee’s children. According to the report, an “interrogator said to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that if anything else happens in the United States, quote, ‘we’re going to kill your children.’” According to the report, the debriefer was trying to exploit a belief in the Middle East that interrogation techniques included sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainees. It was during these same interrogation sessions that Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times in a single month (see April 16, 2009). [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
Fear of Recriminations - According to the report, there was concern throughout the agency over the potential legal consequences for agency officers. Officers “expressed unsolicited concern about the possibility of recrimination or legal action” and said “they feared that the agency would not stand behind them,” according to the report. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009] According to the report, CIA personnel “are concerned that public revelation” of the program will “seriously damage” personal reputations as well as “the reputation and effectiveness of the agency itself.” One officer is quoted as saying he could imagine CIA agents ending up before the World Court on war crimes charges. “Ten years from now, we’re going to be sorry we’re doing this,” another officer said. But “it has to be done.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; Washington Post, 8/24/2009] Helgerson will write: “This review of the agency’s early detention and interrogation activities was undertaken in part because of expressions of concern by agency employees that the actions in which they were involved, or of which they were aware, would be determined by judicial authorities in the US or abroad to be illegal. Many expressed to me personally their feelings that what the agency was doing was fundamentally inconsistent with long established US government policy and with American values, and was based on strained legal reasoning. We reported these concerns.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; Washington Post, 8/24/2009]
Recommendations - The report lists 10 recommendations for changes in the treatment of detainees, but it will not be reported what these are. Eight of the recommendations are apparently later adopted. Former CIA assistant general counsel John Radsan will later comment, “The ambiguity in the law must cause nightmares for intelligence officers who are engaged in aggressive interrogations of al-Qaeda suspects and other terrorism suspects.” [New York Times, 11/9/2005]
Approval, Contradictory Statements by Attorney General - The report says that Attorney General John Ashcroft approved all of these actions: “According to the CIA general counsel, the attorney general acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DOJ opinion that the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The attorney general was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a single individual.” In 2009, reporter Michael Isikoff will say that the contents of the report “conflict… with the public statements that have been made over the years by Bush administration officials and CIA directors.” In 2007, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden will tell the Council on Foreign Relations that the agency’s detention and interrogation program was “very carefully controlled and lawfully conducted—has been carefully controlled and lawfully conducted.” Isikoff will say, “It’s kind of hard to square that with… what was in the CIA inspector general report that had been presented five years ago in 2004.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
Questions of Effectiveness - The report does document that some interrogations obtained critical information to identify terrorists and stop potential plots, and finds that some imprisoned terrorists provided more information after being exposed to brutal treatment (see August 24, 2009). It finds that “there is no doubt” that the detention and interrogation program itself prevented further terrorist activity, provided information that led to the apprehension of other terrorists, warned authorities of future plots, and helped analysts complete an intelligence picture for senior policymakers and military leaders. But whether the harsh techniques were effective in this regard “is a more subjective process and not without some concern,” the report continues. It specifically addresses waterboarding as an illegal tactic that is not shown to have provided useful information. “This review identified concerns about the use of the waterboard, specifically whether the risks of its use were justified by the results, whether it has been unnecessarily used in some instances,” the report reads, and notes that in many instances, the frequency and volume of water poured over prisoners’ mouths and noses may have exceeded the Justice Department’s legal authorization. In the instance of detainee Abu Zubaida, the report finds, “It is not possible to say definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu [Zubaida]‘s increased production [of intelligence information], or if another factor, such as the length of detention, was the catalyst.” In 2009, Isikoff will note that the effectiveness of torture is not clarified by the report. “As you know, Vice President [Dick] Cheney and others who had defended this program have insisted time and again that valuable intelligence was gotten out of this program. You could read passages of this report and conclude that that is the case, that they did get—some passages say important intelligence was gotten. But then others are far more nuanced and measured, saying we don’t really know the full story, whether alternative techniques could have been used.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004 pdf file; New York Times, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
Cheney Blocked Report's Completion - Reporter Jane Mayer later learns that Cheney intervened to block Helgerson from completing his investigation. Mayer will write that as early as 2004, “the vice president’s office was fully aware that there were allegations of serious wrongdoing in the [interrogation] program.” Helgerson met repeatedly and privately with Cheney before, in Mayer’s words, the investigation was “stopped in its tracks.” She will call the meetings “highly unusual.” In October 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden will order an investigation of Helgerson’s office, alleging that Helgerson was on “a crusade against those who have participated in controversial detention programs.” [Public Record, 3/6/2009]

Entity Tags: Office of Medical Services (CIA), International Criminal Court, Jane Mayer, John Helgerson, David Ignatius, John Radsan, John Ashcroft, Convention Against Torture, Abu Zubaida, Bush administration (43), US Department of Justice, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Michael Isikoff

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Indications of Abuse, Reports/Investigations, Destruction of CIA Tapes, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

The Wall Street Journal publishes portions of the February Red Cross (ICRC) report (see February 24, 2004) on coalition prisons in Iraq. [Wall Street Journal, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: International Committee of the Red Cross

Category Tags: Media

Some time after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s testimony to Congress, where he claimed he knew virtually nothing about the Abu Ghraib incidents (see May 7, 2004), former Defense Policy Board member Kenneth Adelman confronts Rumsfeld. As Adelman will recall: “I said to Rumsfeld, ‘Well, the way you handled Abu Ghraib I thought was abysmal.’ He says, ‘What do you mean?’ I say, ‘It broke in January of—what was that, ‘04? Yeah, ‘04. And you didn’t do jack sh_t till it was revealed in the spring.’ He says, ‘That’s totally unfair. I didn’t have the information.’ I said, ‘What information did you have? You had the information that we had done these—and there were photos. You knew about the photos, didn’t you?’ He says, ‘I didn’t see the photos. I couldn’t get those photos. A lot of stuff happens around here. I don’t follow every story.’ I say, ‘Excuse me, but I thought in one of the testimonies you said you told the president about Abu Ghraib in January. And if it was big enough to tell the president, wasn’t it big enough to do something about?’ He says, ‘Well, I couldn’t get the photos.’ I say, ‘You’re secretary of defense. Somebody in the building who works for you has photos, and for five months you can’t get photos—hello?’” [Vanity Fair, 2/2009]

Entity Tags: Kenneth Adelman, Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, High-level Decisions and Actions

Thirty-two graves of British and Indian soldiers killed in World War I are desecrated or destroyed at the Commonwealth military cemetery in Palestinian Gaza City. Some graves have posters attached to headstones depicting photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib. “We will revenge” was a message printed on some of the posters. [Associated Press, 5/10/2004]

Entity Tags: India

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Islam Online stresses the viewpoint of one former Abu Ghraib prisoner, with the pseudonym of Abu Abdul Rahman, that “the afflictions of the US occupiers dwarfed the torture and oppression of the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein.” [Islam Online, 5/10/2004]

Entity Tags: Abu Abdul Rahman, Saddam Hussein

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Criticisms of US, Other Detainees

Republican Senator James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma causes considerable astonishment when he says during a Senate committee hearing that he is “more outraged by the outrage,” than by the abuse of the prisoners. He says, “I’m probably not the only one up at this table that is more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment.” He continues: “These prisoners, they’re murderers, they’re terrorists, they’re insurgents. Many of them probably have American blood on their hands. And here we’re so concerned about the treatment of those individuals.” He adds, “I am also outraged that we have so many humanitarian do-gooders right now crawling all over these prisons, looking for human rights violations while our troops, our heroes, are fighting and dying.” [New York Times, 5/11/2004] An editorial in the New York Times calls Inhofe’s comment “astounding.” [New York Times, 5/12/2004]

Entity Tags: James M. Inhofe

Category Tags: Public Statements

The Washington Post reports that according to Pentagon figures and estimates by intelligence experts, “more than 9,000 people are held by US authorities overseas… the vast majority under military control.” Najeeb Nuaimi, a former justice minister of Qatar, tells the Post: “The number of people who have been detained in the Arab world for the sake of America is much more than in Guantanamo Bay. Really, thousands.” [Washington Post, 5/11/2004] The Independent will similarly report a few days later that “almost 10,000 prisoners [are] held around the world in secretive American-run jails and interrogation centers.” [Independent, 5/15/2004]

Entity Tags: Najeeb Nuaimi, US Military

Category Tags: Detainments, Media

US Secretary of State Colin Powell says, “We kept the president informed of the concerns that were raised by the [International Committee of the Red Cross] and other international organizations as part of my regular briefings of the president, and advised him that we had to follow these issues, and when we got notes sent to us or reports sent to us… we had to respond to them, and the president certainly made it clear that that’s what he expected us to do.” (see (May 2003-May 2004)) [Baltimore Sun, 5/12/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Colin Powell

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions

A Pentagon report determines that conditions at the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Charleston, South Carolina used to house “enemy combatants” are problematic at best. The facilities house three designated enemy combatants: Jose Padilla (see May 8, 2002), Yaser Esam Hamdi (see December 2001), and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (see December 12, 2001). The report, entitled “Brief to the Secretary of Defense on Treatment of Enemy Combatants Detained at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston,” is written by the Navy’s Vice Admiral A.T. Church III and by Marine Brigadier General D.D. Thiessen. The focus of the report is to “[e]nsure Department of Defense orders concerning proper treatment of enemy combatants.” The report documents extensive problems at both locations. It cites the following as some of the problems:
bullet “One detainee has Koran removed from cell as part of JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] interrogation plan. Muslim chaplain not available.”
bullet “One detainee in Charleston has mattress removed as part of JFCOM-approved interrogation plan.”
bullet “One detainee in each location currently not authorized ICRC [Red Cross] visits due to interrogation plans in progress.”
bullet “One detainee in Charleston has Koran, mattress, and pillow removed and is fed cold MREs as part of interrogation plan.” This citation has a footnote that reads, “After completion of current interrogation,” removal of the Koran as an incentive to answer questions “will no longer be used at Charleston.”
bullet “Limited number and unique status of detainees in Charleston precludes interaction with other detainees. Argument could be made that this constitutes isolation.”
bullet At the Charleston brig, “Christian chaplain used to provide socialization, but could be perceived as forced proselytization.”
Nonetheless, the report concludes, “No evidence of noncompliance with DoD orders at either facility.” The authors assume that “treatment provided for in presidential and SECDEF orders constitutes ‘humane treatment.’” [Progressive, 3/2007] When Church presents his report to journalists (see May 12, 2004), he says he only found eight “minor infractions.”

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Jose Padilla, D.D. Thiessen, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Albert T. Church III, Yaser Esam Hamdi

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Indefinite Detention, Abrogation of Rights, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Jose Padilla, Yaser Esam Hamdi

A female prisoner in Abu Ghraib showing her breasts in a photograph taken by Cpl. Charles Graner, on October 29, 2003.A female prisoner in Abu Ghraib showing her breasts in a photograph taken by Cpl. Charles Graner, on October 29, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Senators are shown hundreds of unreleased photographs and videos showing mostly sexual abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and sex among US soldiers that appears to be consensual. The pictures show forced sodomy; Pfc. Lynndie England having sex with other US soldiers, sometimes in front of prisoners; prisoners cowering in front of attack dogs; Iraqi women being forced to expose their breasts; naked prisoners tied up together; prisoners being forced to masturbate; and a prisoner repeatedly smashing his head against a wall. Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden says afterwards: “I expected that these pictures would be very hard on the stomach lining and it was significantly worse than anything that I had anticipated.… Take the worse case and multiply it several times over.” [Breaking News (Ireland), 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Lynndie England, Ron Wyden

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Sexual Humiliation, Use of Dogs, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Referring to a photo of herself holding an Iraqi prisoner on a leash, Pfc. Lynndie England tells KCNC-TV News: “I was instructed by persons in higher rank to stand there and hold this leash and look at the camera.” The photographs were intended to coerce prisoners to talk, she said. “We think everything was justified, because we were instructed to do this and to do that.” [Breaking News (Ireland), 5/13/2004] Military intelligence officers would tell MPs, according to England: “This is working. Keep doing it. It’s getting what we need.” [Breaking News (Ireland), 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Lynndie England

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), High-level Decisions and Actions

Nouri Badranm, a recently retired interior minister of Iraq’s Governing Council, tells Reuters that US soldiers running detention camps in Baghdad concealed the conditions of the prison from Iraqi officials who came to inspect the facility. “Every time they had pressure on them and there was a visit, they arranged things in advance,” he explains. “They cleaned up the prison and fixed the situation of the prisoners. So when a council member or another official went there they saw nothing.” He also says that occupation officials were aware that abuses were going on. “The abuses have been happening for a long time and the occupation forces knew about them. We heard about them from prisoners who were released. The occupation officials said nothing when we asked them.” [Reuters, 5/12/2004; China Central Television, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Nouri Badranm

Category Tags: Coverup

Albert T. Church III.Albert T. Church III. [Source: US Navy]Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III reports to journalists the results of his review of prison operations at Guantanamo conducted the week before (see May 6-7, 2004). He finds: “There is a very, we have a very professional organization in place. With very detailed and understood roles and responsibilities. Strong leadership, strong chain of command, and a very positive command climate. The directions to the secretary of defense with respect to humane treatment of detainees and the interrogation techniques were being carried out as best we could determine.” Over a period going back to 2002, he only finds eight cases of mistreatment, which he repeatedly refers to as “minor infractions.” Four of the eight cases involved guards; three involved interrogators; and one involved a barber who gave a prisoner an “unauthorized” Mohawk-style haircut. Punishments, Church says, “ranged from admonishment to reduction in rate, and some cases maybe more.” One person, he says, was court-martialed. But, he says, “We found no evidence of current abuse….” Church says he is “very impressed” with the small amount of infractions by prison guards and interrogators, when taking into account the stressful conditions they were working under, “particularly when you look at the other side, the 14 incidents against the guards weekly.” He says he was told that each week on average prison personnel are the victim of about 14 acts of abuse by prisoners against guards: “verbal harassment, throwing of excrement, that type of thing.” [US Department of Defense, 5/12/2004] Church did not interview a single detainee during the course of his investigation. [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Albert T. Church III

Category Tags: Coverup, Reports/Investigations, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admits that interrogation techniques used by US guards and interrogators in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison violated the Geneva Conventions. Pace says he is not sure who approved those techniques. Pace, who a week before had blamed lower-ranking soldiers for carrying out the abuses (see May 5, 2004), contradicts Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who has insisted that the techniques used on prisoners at Abu Ghraib meet international standards for humane treatment. In a hearing conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Jack Reed (D-RI) asks Pace what he would think if he saw a US Marine in enemy custody, bound, naked, and forced into a painful position with a hood over his head. Would it violate the Geneva standards? Reed asks. “I would describe it as a violation, sir,” Pace replies. Reed notes that just that sort of treatment had previously been authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of US ground forces in Iraq. Pace says he knows of no military guidelines that would allow prisoners to be put in so-called “stress positions,” denied sleep, threatened with dogs, or kept in isolation for weeks on end. Committee Democrats contend with the committee chairman, John Warner (R-VA), who initially attempts to stop discussion of the Abu Ghraib torture allegations and focus only on the issue of the Bush administration’s new request for $25 million in funding for the military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Warner eventually gives way to the Democrats after Ted Kennedy (D-MA) says: “I’ve been in the Senate 42 years, and I have never been denied the opportunity to question any person that’s come before a committee, on what I wanted to ask for it. And I resent it and reject it on a matter of national importance.” The New York Times notes, “Outrage over the prison abuse has been near-universal, but in recent days Republicans have been quicker than Democrats to try to change the subject or insist on limiting release of the new prison photos.” House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) says that “[s]ome people are overreacting” to the prison photos and surrounding revelations of abuse. “The people who are against the war are using this to their political ends.” [New York Times, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: Geneva Conventions, Bush administration (43), Donald Rumsfeld, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy, Ricardo S. Sanchez, Jack Reed, Tom DeLay, Peter Pace, John W. Warner

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Criticisms of US, High-level Decisions and Actions, Statements/Writings about Torture, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

The New York Times learns that FBI Director Robert Mueller has ordered FBI interrogators to stay out of CIA-led interrogations of suspected al-Qaeda members. Mueller, and many FBI officials, believe the CIA’s interrogation tactics are too brutal and violate domestic and international laws. Mueller and other FBI officials have objected to the use of techniques such as waterboarding, as well as forced starvation, forced drugging, and beatings. FBI officials told Mueller that the techniques would be prohibited in criminal cases. Some CIA officers are worried that public outrage over the recent revelations of prisoner abuse at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison might lead to a closer examination of the agency’s treatment of al-Qaeda prisoners. “Some people involved in this have been concerned for quite a while that eventually there would be a new president, or the mood in the country would change, and they would be held accountable,” one says. “Now that’s happening faster than anybody expected.” [BBC, 5/13/2004] In 2008, a Justice Department investigation (see May 20, 2008) will reveal that sometime in mid-2002, the FBI’s then-assistant director for counterterrorism, Pasquale D’Amuro, ordered FBI agents at Guantanamo to stop participating in interrogations and leave the facility. D’Amuro brought the issue to Mueller’s attention; according to the Justice Department report, D’Amuro “stated that his exact words to Mueller were ‘we don’t do that’ and that someday the FBI would be called to testify and he wanted to be able to say that the FBI did not participate in this type of activity.” D’Amuro was concerned that the use of such aggressive interrogation techniques “failed to take into account an ‘end game.’” The report will continue: “D’Amuro stated that even a military tribunal would require some standard for admissibility of evidence. Obtaining information by way of ‘aggressive’ techniques would not only jeopardize the government’s ability to use the information against the detainees, but also might have a negative impact on the agents’ ability to testify in future proceedings.” Mueller agreed with D’Amuro and issued what became a “bright line rule” barring FBI agents from participating in CIA and military interrogations involving such methods. [Newsweek, 5/20/2008]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Robert S. Mueller III, Pasquale D’Amuro, US Department of Justice

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, High-level Decisions and Actions, Insufficient Food, Involuntary Drugs, Physical Assault, Waterboarding, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

President Bush says he has been “disgraced” by the abuse at Abu Ghraib. [New York Times, 5/13/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Category Tags: Public Statements

President Bush, referring to the Abu Ghraib scandal, alleges it is “the cruelty of a few” that “has brought discredit to their uniform and embarrassment to our country.” [US President, 5/24/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Category Tags: Public Statements, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal allege in an open letter to President Bush, that the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo resembles that of detainees at Abu Ghraib. “From the moment of our arrival at Guantanamo Bay (and indeed from long before) we were deliberately humiliated and degraded,” they write. Women would “inappropriately provoke and indeed molest them. It was completely clear to all the detainees that this was happening to particularly vulnerable prisoners, especially those who had come from the strictest of Islamic backgrounds.” [Guardian, 5/14/2004]

Entity Tags: Asif Iqbal, Shafiq Rasul, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Shafiq Rasul, Rhuhel Ahmed, Asif Iqbal, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

Amnesty International publishes a report titled, “Iraq: One year on the human rights situation remains dire,” which documents a pattern of human rights violations being committed by US forces in Iraq. “Many detainees have alleged they were tortured and ill-treated by US and UK troops during interrogation,” the report says. “Methods often reported include prolonged sleep deprivation; beatings; prolonged restraint in painful positions, sometimes combined with exposure to loud music; prolonged hooding; and exposure to bright lights. Virtually none of the allegations of torture or ill-treatment has been adequately investigated.” [Amnesty International, 3/18/2004]

Entity Tags: Amnesty International

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, Human Rights Groups

The generals who were most involved in setting interrogation policy in Iraq are invited to hearings by US Congress. Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez announces he has revoked, as of the previous day, all authorizations for coercive practices, including sensory deprivation, forcing detainees into “stress positions,” and keeping them awake. Although he still makes an exception for very rare circumstances, he says. [Observer, 5/16/2004]

Entity Tags: US Congress, Ricardo S. Sanchez

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, High-level Decisions and Actions

Lt. Gen. David Barno, commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, reports he is “in the midst of putting out some new policy guidance” and is determined to “make sure those rules are enforced across all our operations in Afghanistan,” and that his subordinates will be “treating all of… detainees with dignity and respect.” [CNN, 5/18/2004]

Entity Tags: David Barno

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath

An FBI official writes in an e-mail to agent Chris Briese, “According to a Task Force 6-26 e-mail stream I have seen, the following techniques can no longer be used absent the high-level authorization: stress positions, MWDs, sleep management, hoods, stripping (except for health inspection), and environmental manipulation (e.g., loud music).” [ [Sources: Email to FBI agent Chris Briese, 5/14/2004]

Entity Tags: Chris Briese

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, High-level Decisions and Actions

On May 14, 2004, 293 prisoners are released from Abu Ghraib prison. [CNN, 5/18/2004] Over the next weeks until mid-June, an estimated additional 1,680 prisoners are released from the prison. [US News and World Report, 6/21/2004] Prior to these mass releases, there were about 3,800 prisoners at Abu Ghraib. [CNN, 5/18/2004]

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Lt. Col. Leon Sumpter, a spokesman for the Guantanamo Joint Task Force, confirms that on every occasion that Guantanamo’s “Extreme Reaction Force” (ERF) has been called into action—often to deal with uncooperative prisoners—it has been filmed. The films are stored in an archive at Guantanamo, he says. [Observer, 5/16/2004] The films could contain evidence of prisoner abuse at the facility. For example, Tarek Dergoul, a former detainee, alleges that the ERF was called in once when he refused to submit to a body search. “They pepper-sprayed me in the face… pinned me down and attacked me, poking their fingers in my eyes, and forced my head into the toilet pan and flushed,” he tells the Observer. “They tied me up like a beast and then they were kneeling on me, kicking and punching. Finally they dragged me out of the cell in chains, into the rec yard, and shaved my beard, my hair, my eyebrows.” [Observer, 5/16/2004]

Entity Tags: Tarek Dergoul, Leon Sumpter

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Physical Assault, Tarek Dergoul

A native German speaker visits Khalid el-Masri in the US prison in Kabul but does not identify himself. “I asked him,” El-Masri recalls, “‘Are you from the German authorities?’ He says: ‘I do not want to answer that question.’ When I asked him if the German authorities knew that I was there, he answered: ‘I can’t answer this question.’” What the German is able to tell him, is that one of the obstacles to his release is that the Americans do not want to leave any evidence that el-Masri has ever been in the prison. [Guardian, 1/14/2005]

Entity Tags: Khalid el-Masri

Category Tags: Khalid el-Masri, Coverup, Salt Pit (Afghanistan)

In response to what the five Britons released from Guantanamo (see March 9, 2004) have claimed about the abuses they suffered during their stay at the US detention camp, John Sifton from Human Rights Watch says, “It is now clear that there is a systemic problem of abuse throughout the US military’s detention facilities—not merely misbehavior by a few bad apples.” [Observer, 5/16/2004]

Entity Tags: John Sifton

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Criticisms of US, Human Rights Groups

Samuel Provance.Samuel Provance. [Source: ABC News]Sgt. Samuel Provance of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion is interviewed by Maj. Gen. George Fay. But according to Provance, the general seems interested only in the part played by the military police, not the interrogators. Fay, who has been charged with determining the role of military intelligence in the abuses committed against detainees, also appears to discourage Provance from testifying, threatening to recommend administrative action against him that would bar promotions for failing to report what he knew sooner. [ABC News, 5/18/2004] Shortly after the interview, Provance receives written orders not to discuss Abu Ghraib. [Chicago Tribune, 5/20/2004] He becomes convinced that the government is engaged in a cover-up. [ABC News, 5/18/2004]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Samuel Provance

Category Tags: Coverup, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Sgt. Samuel Provance of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion tells ABC News that the US military is engaged in a cover-up of the Abu Ghraib abuses. “There’s definitely a cover-up,” he says. “People are either telling themselves or being told to be quiet.” He also says the MPs seen in the photos with naked Iraqi prisoners at the prison were acting under orders from military intelligence. “Anything [the MPs] were to do legally or otherwise, they were to take those commands from the interrogators…. One interrogator told me about how commonly the detainees were stripped naked, and in some occasions, wearing women’s underwear. If it’s your job to strip people naked, yell at them, scream at them, humiliate them, it’s not going to be too hard to move from that to another level.” [ABC News, 5/18/2004; Washington Post, 5/20/2004]

Entity Tags: Samuel Provance

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Coverup

Military Intelligence solider Sgt. Samuel Provance tells the Washington Post in a telephone interview that the highest ranking military intelligence officers at Abu Ghraib were involved in the abuses and that he believes that the Army is trying to deflect attention away from military intelligence’s role. [Washington Post, 5/20/2004]

Entity Tags: Samuel Provance

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document shows that Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the supreme commanding officer of US forces in Iraq, approved of extreme interrogation methods to be used by military interrogators against detainees. A DIA officer in charge of a team of interrogators states that there is a 35-page order spelling out the rules of engagement that interrogators are supposed to follow, and that they are encouraged to “go to the outer limits to get information from the detainees by people who wanted the information.” When asked to whom the officer is referring, the officer answers, “LTG Sanchez.” The officer states that the expectation coming from “headquarters” is to break the detainees. [American Civil Liberties Union, 5/2/2006]

Entity Tags: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Defense Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions

Lt. Col. Tucker Mansager tells reporters that the media will not be permitted access to secret detention facilities in Afghanistan, claiming that to do so would violate the prisoners’ rights under the Geneva Conventions. However in February 2002, the administration had denied “prisoner of war” status to all Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan (see February 7, 2002) on grounds they were “illegal combatants.” Since then, the US has maintained that these prisoners are not protected by the Conventions. Nonetheless, Mansager explains: “Part of… spirit [of the Geneva Conventions] is to ensure that the persons under confinement are not subject to any kind of exploitation. It is the coalition’s position that allowing media into the facilities would compromise that protection.” [Reuters, 5/19/2004]

Entity Tags: Tucker Mansager

Category Tags: Coverup, Media

The Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the FBI issues an instruction that states that if “an FBI employee knows or suspects non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee, the FBI employee must report the incident.” [ [Sources: Email to FBI agent Chris Briese, 5/14/2004]

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath

Charles Graner gets the longest Abu Ghraib-related sentence: ten years in prison.Charles Graner gets the longest Abu Ghraib-related sentence: ten years in prison. [Source: US Army]Between May 19, 2004, and March 22, 2006, a series of low ranking US soldiers are convicted in military trials for abuses of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq:
bullet Specialist Jeremy Sivits. He pleads guilty to four charges on May 19, 2004. He is demoted, discharged, and sentenced to one year in prison.
bullet Specialist Armin Cruz. He pleads guilty to two charges on September 11, 2004. He is demoted, discharged, and sentenced to eight months in prison.
bullet Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick. He pleads guilty to eight counts on October 21, 2004. He is demoted, forfeits pay, and sentenced to eight years in prison.
bullet Specialist Megan Ambuhl. She pleads guilty to one charge on October 30, 2004. She is demoted.
bullet Specialist Charles Graner. He is found guilty to a number of charges on January 15, 2005. He is demoted, dishonorably discharged, and sentenced to ten years in prison.
bullet Specialist Roman Krol. He pleads guilty to two charges on February 1, 2005. He is sentences to ten months in prison.
bullet Sergeant Javal Davis. He pleads guilty to three charges on February 4, 2005. He is demoted, discharged, and sentenced to six months in prison.
bullet Specialist Sabrina Harman. She is found guilty of three charges on May 19, 2005. She is discharged and sentenced to six months in prison.
bullet Private first class Lynndie England. She is found guilty of three charges on September 27, 2005. She is dishonorably discharged and sentenced to three years in prison.
bullet Sergeant Michael Smith. He is found guilty of five charges. His is demoted, discharged, and sentenced to three months in prison.
So far no officers have been convicted for any Abu Ghraib related abuses. [New York Times, 3/23/2006]

Entity Tags: Roman Krol, Michael J. Smith, Megan Ambuhl, Sabrina Harman, Jeremy C. Sivits, Lynndie England, Charles Graner, Ivan L. Frederick II, Javal Davis, Armin J. Cruz

Category Tags: Legal Proceedings, Disciplinary Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

FBI Director Robert Mueller appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee and is asked if the FBI is aware of prisoner abuse by the military or the CIA similar to what happened at Abu Ghraib. Mueller is said to appear “uneasy and unusually hesitant.” Sen. Dianne Feinstein says: “He gave me a kind of gobbledygook answer. At best his answer was confusing and at worst it was obfuscatory.” Mueller’s response is that FBI agents “on occasion… may disagree with the handling of a particular interview.” [Newsweek, 1/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Robert S. Mueller III, Dianne Feinstein

Category Tags: Coverup

Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez and Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller appear before a classified session of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The following day, Representative Jane Harman shoots a letter off to Miller saying there were “gaps and discrepancies” in his presentation and accuses him of selectively withholding information. She also tells him that she now questions his candor. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Geoffrey D. Miller, Jane Harman, US Congress

Category Tags: Coverup

After speaking to the media (see May 18, 2004) (see May 19, 2004), Sgt. Samuel Provance receives a disciplinary order from his battalion commander, Lt. Col. James Norwood, notifying him that he has been stripped of his security clearance, transferred to a different platoon, and made ineligible for promotions or awards. He is also informed that he may be prosecuted for speaking out because his comments were “not in the national interest.” [ABC News, 5/21/2004] Norwood says: “There is reason for me to believe that you may have been aware of the improper treatment of the detainees at Abu Ghraib before they were reported by other soldiers.” The conclusions of Maj. Gen. George Fay’s investigation (see August 25, 2004), Norwood warns, “may reveal that you should face adverse action for your failure to report.” [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] Indeed, the Fay report will conclude that Provance “[f]ailed to report detainee abuse” and “[f]ailed to obey a direct order.” Maj. Gen. Fay will also write, “He interfered with this investigation by talking about the investigation, giving interviews to the media, and passing the questions being asked by investigators to others via a website.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Provance’s attorney, Scott Horton, believes the military is intimidating soldiers in an effort to prevent them from speaking out about what they know. “I see it as an effort to intimidate Sgt. Provance and any other soldier whose conscience is bothering him, and who wants to come forward and tell what really happened at Abu Ghraib,” he says. [ABC News, 5/21/2004]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Scott Horton, James Norwood, Samuel Provance

Category Tags: Coverup, Disciplinary Actions, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales stresses in an interview that President Bush had urged interrogation and detention policy to be legally sound. Gonzales says, “Anytime a discussion came up about interrogations with the president,… the directive was, ‘Make sure it is lawful. Make sure it meets all of our obligations under the Constitution, US federal statutes and applicable treaties.’” [Washington Post, 6/9/2004]

Entity Tags: Alberto R. Gonzales

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Coverup

Newsweek reveals the existence of the January 9, 2002 draft memo written by Justice Department lawyers John Yoo and Robert Delahunty (see January 9, 2002). [Newsweek, 5/21/2004]

Entity Tags: Robert J. Delahunty, John C. Yoo

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Media

The Pentagon orders Army Brig. Gen. Charles H. Jacoby Jr. to conduct an investigation of detention operations in Afghanistan. [Associated Press, 5/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Charles H. Jacoby Jr.

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Reports/Investigations

In an e-mail, an “On Scene Commander” of the FBI in Baghdad refers to an executive order by President Bush allowing aggressive interrogation techniques to be used at any rate in Iraq by Task Force 6-26, which is the new name for JTF-121. These techniques include sleep deprivation, stress positions, loud music, yelling, stripping, dogs, and hooding. The executive order is still in use even though the use of hooding, stress positions, dogs, and stripping at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan were prohibited on January 15, 2003 (see January 15, 2003). Since the FBI agent has been ordered to report instances of abuse (see May 19, 2004), he notes a dilemma: would the techniques authorized by the executive order constitute abuse or not? He writes: “This instruction begs the question of what constitutes ‘abuse.’ We assume this does not include lawful interrogation techniques authorized by executive order.” A week before, apparently as a result of the unfolding of the Abu Ghraib scandal, some techniques described in the executive order could only be used with special approval from top levels in the hierarchy. Thus, the FBI agent says in his e-mail: “[W]e will still not report the use of these techniques as ‘abuse’ since we will not be in a position to know whether, or not, the authorization for these tactics was received from the aforementioned high-level officials. We will consider as abuse any physical beatings, sexual humiliation or touching, and other conduct clearly constituting abuse. Yet, there may be a problem if OGC [FBI Office of General Counsel] does not clearly define ‘abuse’ and if OGC does not draw a clear line between conduct that is clearly abusive and conduct that, while seemingly harsh, is permissible under applicable Executive Orders and other laws. In other words, we know what’s permissible for FBI agents but are less sure what is permissible for military interrogators.” [FBI, 5/14/2004]

Entity Tags: Chris Briese, George W. Bush

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Presidential Directives, Key Events

The US Ambassador to Germany Daniel Coats tells German Interior Minister Otto Schily that the CIA has been holding an innocent German citizen named Khalid el-Masri at a black site for several months (see January 23 - March 2004) and shortly plans to release him (see May 29, 2004). The CIA had intended to keep this information from the German authorities (see (May 2004)), but the Germans are told at the suggestion of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (see (May 2004)). According to author Jane Mayer, Schily is “extremely unhappy” at hearing the news and makes it clear that he would have preferred not to have known. “Why are you telling me this?” he asks. “My secretary is here—taking notes! Now there’s a record! It will get out—it will become a German political issue. I’ll have to face investigations—I’ll have to testify in front of the Bundestag! Why didn’t you just let him go, give him some money, and keep it quiet?” [Mayer, 2008, pp. 286]

Entity Tags: Otto Schily, Daniel Coats

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Khalid el-Masri, Salt Pit (Afghanistan)

When the Taguba report (see March 9, 2004), which together with all its 106 annexes includes 6,000 pages, is delivered by the Pentagon to the Senate Armed Services Committee, some 2,000 pages are missing, withheld by the Defense Department. Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita calls this an “oversight.” [Associated Press, 5/24/2004] Nevertheless, the missing pages contain key documents, internal Army memos and e-mails, sworn statements by soldiers, officers, contractors, and prisoners. It also includes the final section of Taguba’s interview with Col. Thomas M. Pappas. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] The missing annexes of the Taguba report hold evidence that the abuse was not conducted solely by a few MPs acting on their own, but instead at the instigation and with the involvement of military intelligence personnel.

Entity Tags: US Congress, Larry DiRita, Thomas M. Pappas

Category Tags: Coverup, Reports/Investigations, Key Events

A heavily redacted e-mail shows that either a military officer or government official is told that three reports of detainee abuse from Iraq are “probably true/valid.” One detainee was “in such poor physical shape from obvious beatings that [name redacted] asked the MPs to note his condition before he proceeded with interrogation.” Another detainee was “in such bad shape… that he was laying down in his own feces.” These cases seem to have occurred in Abu Ghraib and Camp Cropper. The e-mail will be released in 2006 (see May 2, 2006). [American Civil Liberties Union, 5/2/2006]

Category Tags: Reports/Investigations, Statements/Writings about Torture, Physical Assault, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq), Camp Cropper (Iraq)

The American Civil Liberties Union and other civil rights organizations submit a second Freedom of Information Act request to the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Homeland Security, and the CIA. [Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief. ACLU, et al. v. Department of Defense, et al., 7/6/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: American Civil Liberties Union

Category Tags: Human Rights Groups

In its annual report, titled “Why human rights matter,” Amnesty International says that America’s war on terrorism has “made the world a more dangerous place.” This is the consequence of “the US seeking to put itself outside the ambit of judicial scrutiny,” the organization says. Furthermore, “[s]acrificing human rights in the name of security at home, turning a blind eye to abuses abroad, and using pre-emptive military force where and when it chooses, have neither increased security nor ensured liberty,” the report adds. Practicing and apparently condoning torture, according to Amnesty International’s Secretary General Irene Khan, has resulted in the US having “lost its high moral ground and its ability to lead on peace and elsewhere.” The practice of violating human rights and the war in Iraq is believed to have a broader influence than on the immediate victims. “The war in Iraq,” the report says, “has diverted global attention from other human rights abuses around the world.” [BBC, 5/26/2004; Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief. ACLU, et al. v. Department of Defense, et al., 7/6/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Amnesty International, Irene Khan

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, Human Rights Groups

At the end of May, more than a week after the German’s visit (see Mid-May 2004), [Guardian, 1/14/2005] Khalid el-Masri is cuffed, blindfolded, and put on a small jet. After a bus ride of six or seven hours, he is left on the side of the road. He follows the instruction of a man who tells him to walk in a certain direction and arrives at a border crossing, which he discovers is in northern Albania close to the Macedonian border. Three Albanian border officers await him. When El-Masri tells them of his five months in captivity, one of them starts to laugh. He says, according to El-Masri, “Don’t tell that story to anyone because no one will believe it. Everyone will laugh.” El-Masri is then handed back the belongings that were taken from him on the first day of his captivity in Macedonia (see December 31, 2003-January 23, 2004), including his passport and money. His passport is then stamped with the date of May 29, 2004. He returns to Germany on June 3. [New York Times, 1/9/2005]

Entity Tags: Khalid el-Masri

Category Tags: Khalid el-Masri, Salt Pit (Afghanistan)

Alfred Frances Bikowsky (see September 21, 2011), the CIA officer responsible for the wrongful rendition and torture of the innocent German Khalid el-Masri (see Before January 23, 2004 and January 23 - March 2004), is promoted at some point after el-Masri is released from prison (see May 29, 2004). Writing in 2008, author Jane Mayer will say Bikowsky is appointed to “a top post handling sensitive matters in the Middle East.” [New York Review of Books, 8/14/2008] A February 2011 Associated Press article will state that at that time Bikowsky is head of the agency’s Global Jihad Unit, so presumably the promotion is to the position of head of this unit. [Associated Press, 2/9/2011]

Entity Tags: Global Jihad Unit, Central Intelligence Agency, Alfreda Frances Bikowsky

Category Tags: Khalid el-Masri

The legal office of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo issues a warning to military and civilian personnel at Guantanamo, titled Interaction with Defense Counsel, informing them that they are not required to provide the attorneys of detainees statements on the “personal treatment of detainees” or any “failure to report actions of others.” Refusing to cooperate with the attorneys, the document states, “will not impact your career.” [USA Today, 6/12/2004]

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Coverup, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey Jr. releases a newly declassified Pentagon report that states that al-Qaeda “master planner” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was “very skeptical” about Jose Padilla’s dirty bomb plan when they met in Pakistan in March 2002, and suggested instead that Padilla bomb apartment buildings through conventional means. Padilla tells US interrogators later that he “proposed the dirty-bomb plot only as a way to get out of Pakistan and avoid combat in Afghanistan, yet save face with Abu Zubaida” (see May 8, 2002). He says he also had “no intention of carrying out the apartment-building operation.” Nevertheless, the release of the Pentagon report is apparently intended to draw attention to Padilla’s high-level al-Qaeda connection in an attempt to influence deliberations by the Supreme Court on the Padilla case. [Newsweek, 6/9/2004] Comey and other government officials admit that Padilla’s alleged confession can never be used as evidence in court, because Padilla made the statements without ever being informed of his legal rights. The government had consistently refused to discuss how Padilla was interrogated, claiming that to make that knowledge public would assist al-Qaeda in preparing countermeasures for other operatives who might be captured in the future. Defense lawyers and civil rights experts believe that the government may have used illegal methods in interrogating Padilla. The criminal charges eventually filed against Padilla will make no mention of the allegations of planning to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb” or of any plans to blow up apartment buildings. [Newsweek, 2/28/2007] The release of the Pentagon report by the Justice Department is heavily criticized at the time as being an inappropriate interference of the executive with the judiciary branch. [New York Review of Books, 7/15/2004]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, James B. Comey Jr., Abu Zubaida, Jose Padilla, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Category Tags: Detainments, High-level Decisions and Actions, Indefinite Detention, Abrogation of Rights, Internal Memos/Reports, Jose Padilla

In a confidential June 2004 report, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) alleges that the techniques used at Guantanamo are “tantamount to torture.” According to the report, the system in place at Guantanamo is designed to break the will of detainees by making them totally dependent on their interrogators through “humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, use of forced positions.” In addition, the organization writes, detainees are subjected to “some beatings.” These methods, according to the ICRC, are increasingly “more refined and repressive” in comparison to what is observed during earlier missions. The report concludes: “The construction of such a system, whose stated purpose is the production of intelligence, cannot be considered other than an intentional system of cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and a form of torture.” [Neil A. Lewis, 11/30/2004]

Entity Tags: International Committee of the Red Cross

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Criticisms of US, Human Rights Groups

June 2004: 400 Detainees at Bagram

Lt. Gen. David Barno, head of US forces in Afghanistan, tells the Guardian newspaper of London that there are currently 400 detainees at the Bagram base in Afghanistan, none of whom have been charged. More than 2,000 people have been detained there since the war, he also says. [Guardian, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: David Barno

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Detainments, Bagram (Afghanistan)

After many SERE techniques have been authorized for use in interrogations (see December 2001, January 2002 and After, and July 2002), and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency considers sending SERE trainers to interrogation facilities in Afghanistan, a SERE psychologist warns: “[W]e need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at SERE school (done to INCREASE RESISTANCE capability in students) versus what is taught at interrogator school (done to gather information). What is done by SERE instructors is by definition ineffective interrogator conduct.… Simply stated, SERE school does not train you on how to interrogate, and things you ‘learn’ there by osmosis about interrogation are probably wrong if copied by interrogators.” [Huffington Post, 4/21/2009]

Entity Tags: Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

Category Tags: SERE Techniques

Critics in the Senate argue that the Bush administration created an atmosphere of legal permissiveness that led to the abusive treatment of detainees. Senator Edward Kennedy says he believes that the April 2003 Pentagon memo laid the foundations for abuse. “We know when we have these kinds of orders what happens,” he says, “we get the stress test, we get the use of dogs, we get the forced nakedness that we’ve all seen and we get the hooding.” [Guardian, 6/9/2004] Senator Patrick Leahy, the Democrat member of the Senate subcommittee on foreign operations, says, the “cruel and degrading treatment” in Afghanistan “were part of a wider pattern stemming from a White House attitude that ‘anything goes’ in the war against terrorism, even if it crosses the line of illegality.” [Guardian, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Patrick J. Leahy, Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy

Category Tags: Criticisms of US

Russia releases all former Russian Guantanamo detainees from prison without trial after four months in jail. [BBC, 10/4/2004]

Entity Tags: Russia

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba is a young officer rising through the ranks of the US Army with unusual speed. But after his hard-hitting report on the Abu Ghraib abuses (see February 26, 2004), he claims that Gen. John Abizaid, head of US Central Command, threatens to have him investigated (see May 2004). Taguba had been scheduled to rotate to the Third Army’s headquarters in Georgia in June of 2004, but instead he is ordered to work at the Pentagon. A retired four-star Army general later tells Taguba that he had been sent to the job in the Pentagon so that he could “be watched.” Taguba later claims that in January of 2006, General Richard Cody, the Army’s Vice-Chief of Staff. calls him and bluntly tells him without any explanation, “I need you to retire by January of 2007.” Taguba does retire in January 2007, after thirty-four years of active service.. He will later complain, “They always shoot the messenger. To be accused of being overzealous and disloyal—that cuts deep into me. I was being ostracized for doing what I was asked to do.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Antonio M. Taguba, Richard Cody

Category Tags: Coverup, Other Events, Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Gen. James T. Hill says Guantanamo is “a professional, humane detention and interrogation operation… bounded by law and guided by the American spirit.” [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]

Entity Tags: James T. Hill

Category Tags: Public Statements, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

An Iraqi detainee in US custody in Tikrit charges that he has been beaten and shocked with a taser. A US military medic examines the prisoner and finds evidence confirming his allegations. The medic states, “Everything he described he had on his body.” Yet the medic gives the detainee Tylenol and clears him for further interrogations. There are no indications that the medic ever reports the abuse. [American Civil Liberties Union, 5/2/2006]

Category Tags: Coverup, Electrodes, Physical Assault, Other US Bases and Centers, Other Detainees

The CIA closes a prison known as the Salt Pit near Kabul, Afghanistan. According to the Washington Post, the reason for the closure is that the road leading to the prison is unsafe. The facility is relocated to Bagram Air Base. The date of closure is uncertain, although a detainee was still being held there in late May 2004 (see May 29, 2004) and the prison’s closure is reported in November 2005. [Washington Post, 11/2/2005]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Salt Pit (Afghanistan)

The American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and four other independent organizations file a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act demanding the release of information about detainees held by the United States at military bases and other detention facilities overseas. “The government’s ongoing refusal to release these records is absolutely unacceptable, particularly in light of the severity of the abuses we know to have occurred,” says Jameel Jaffer, an ACLU staff lawyer. More than seven months have passed since the initial request (see October 7, 2003) was made to the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security and Justice, and the CIA for these documents. [American Civil Liberties Union, 6/2/2004]

Entity Tags: American Civil Liberties Union

Category Tags: Coverup, Human Rights Groups

Bertrand Ramcharan, the acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, says the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners could constitute a war crime. He says, “Willful killing, torture, and inhuman treatment” represent a grave breach of international law and “might be designated as war crimes by a competent tribunal.” He also calls for the immediate appointment of “an international ombudsman or commissioner” to oversee the monitoring of human rights in Iraq and to regularly report on compliance with “international norms of human rights and humanitarian law.” [New York Times, 6/5/2004]

Entity Tags: Bertrand Ramcharan

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Human Rights Groups

Cpt. Bruce Frame, a US Army spokesman for CENTCOM, tells Human Rights First that there “may or may not” be detention centers in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan. [First, 6/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Human Rights First, Bruce Frame

Category Tags: Coverup

The Wall Street Journal reports that according to an unnamed military official, “Methods now used at Guantanamo include limiting prisoners’ food, denying them clothing, subjecting them to body-cavity searches, depriving them of sleep for as much as 96 hours and shackling them in so-called stress positions.” [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]

Category Tags: Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Media, Insufficient Food, Stress Positions, Sexual Humiliation, Sleep Deprivation

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell learn of the two-year-old Justice Department torture memo (see August 1, 2002) from the Washington Post article revealing its existence (see June 8, 2004). Both confront White House counsel Alberto Gonzales. According to a senior White House official, Rice “very angrily said there would be no more secret opinions on international and national security law,” and threatens to go to President Bush if Gonzales keeps them out of the loop on anything else. Powell admiringly comments, as they are leaving Gonzales’s office, that Rice was “in full Nurse Ratched mode,” a reference to the head nurse of the mental hospital in the 1975 film One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Neither of them take their objections to Vice President Cheney, says the official: that would be a much more dangerous course. [Washington Post, 6/25/2007]

Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Alberto R. Gonzales, Colin Powell

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Legal Proceedings, Reports/Investigations

The Washington Post reveals the existence of a secret August 2002 memo from the Justice Department. This memo advised the White House that torturing al-Qaeda terrorists in captivity “may be justified,” and that international laws against torture “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted in the US war on terrorism (see August 1, 2002). The legal reasoning was later used in a March 2003 report by Pentagon lawyers assessing interrogation rules governing the military detention center at Guantanamo Bay (see March 6, 2003). Bush officials say that despite the memo, it has abided by the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties proscribing torture (see February 7, 2002). The incidents at Abu Ghraib, where numerous Iraqi prisoners were tortured, maimed, and sometimes murdered, were not policy, officials say. Human rights organizations and civil libertarians are appalled at the memo. “It is by leaps and bounds the worst thing I’ve seen since this whole Abu Ghraib scandal broke,” says Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch. “It appears that what they were contemplating was the commission of war crimes and looking for ways to avoid legal accountability. The effect is to throw out years of military doctrine and standards on interrogations.” A senior Pentagon official says that the Judge Advocate Generals (JAGs) were quick to challenge the Justice Department opinion when it was promoted by the Pentagon. “Every flag JAG lodged complaints,” the official says. A senior military attorney says of the memo: “It’s really unprecedented. For almost 30 years we’ve taught the Geneva Convention one way. Once you start telling people it’s okay to break the law, there’s no telling where they might stop.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2004] Attorney General John Ashcroft tells the Senate Judiciary Committee that he will not discuss the contents of the August 2002 memo, nor turn it over to the committee. “I believe it is essential to the operation of the executive branch that the president has the opportunity to get information from the attorney general that is confidential,” he says. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]

Entity Tags: Senate Judiciary Committee, Bush administration (43), Geneva Conventions, John Ashcroft, Tom Malinowski, US Department of Justice, Judge Advocate General Corps, US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Coverup

Attorney General John Ashcroft tells a Senate committee, “This administration rejects torture.” [Guardian, 6/9/2004] When asked whether torture might be justified in certain situations, Ashcroft responds, “I condemn torture. I don’t think it’s productive, let alone justified.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2004] With regard to President Bush’s involvement, he says: “Let me completely reject the notion that anything that this president has done or the Justice Department has done has directly resulted in the kind of atrocity which were cited. That is false.” [Guardian, 6/9/2004] Ashcroft adds, “There is no presidential order immunizing torture.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, John Ashcroft

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Public Statements

The memos written by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the Pentagon Working Group cause a flow of criticism when they are revealed in May and June 2004. The Washington Post fumes that the news of the “torture memos” “brings shame on American democracy.” [Washington Post, 6/9/2004]

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, Media

A former senior government official says President Bush “felt very keenly that his primary responsibility was to do everything within his power to keep the country safe, and he was not concerned with appearances or politics or hiding behind lower-level officials. That is not to say he was ready to authorize stuff that would be contrary to law. The whole reason for having the careful legal reviews that went on was to ensure he was not doing that.” [Washington Post, 6/9/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions

A Washington Post editorial argues that “the administration’s reasoning will provide a ready excuse for dictators, especially those allied with the Bush administration, to go on torturing and killing detainees.” [Washington Post, 6/9/2004]

Entity Tags: Washington Post

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, Media

During the annual G-8 economic summit, held in Sea Island, Georgia [2004 G8 Summit, 2004] , President Bush rejects the notion that he approved the use of torture. “The authorization I gave,” the president says, “was that all we did should be in accordance with American law and consistent with our international treaty obligations. That’s the message I gave our people.” He adds, “What I authorized was that we stay within the framework of American law.” And to emphasize his point, he says: “Listen, I’ll say it one more time.… The instructions that were given were to comply with the law. That should reassure you. We are a nation of laws. We follow the law. We have laws on our books. You could go look at those laws and that should reassure you.” [US President, 6/21/2004] During the summit, the foreign ministers of the participating countries are suddenly called to Washington to meet with Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell. As Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham will later recall: “Colin suddenly phoned us all up and said, ‘We’re going to the White House this morning.’ Now, this is curious, because normally the heads of government don’t give a damn about foreign ministers. We all popped in a bus and went over and were cordially received by Colin and President Bush. The president sat down to explain that, you know, this terrible news had come out about Abu Ghraib and how disgusting it was. The thrust of his presentation was that this was a terrible aberration; it was un-American conduct. This was not American. [German Foreign Minister] Joschka Fischer was one of the people that said, ‘Mr. President, if the atmosphere at the top is such that it encourages or allows people to believe that they can behave this way, this is going to be a consequence.’ The president’s reaction was: ‘This is un-American. Americans don’t do this. People will realize Americans don’t do this.’ The problem for the United States, and indeed for the free world, is that because of this—Guantanamo, and the ‘torture memos’ from the White House (see November 6-10, 2001 and August 1, 2002), which we were unaware of at that time—people around the world don’t believe that anymore. They say, ‘No, Americans are capable of doing such things and have done them, all the while hypocritically criticizing the human-rights records of others.’” [Vanity Fair, 2/2009]

Entity Tags: Bill Graham, George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Joschka Fischer

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Public Statements

A Pentagon official agrees to speak with Human Rights First about Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, but tells the organization that “as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on other facilities.” [First, 6/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Human Rights First

Category Tags: Detainments, Human Rights Groups

Al Jafr prison.Al Jafr prison. [Source: Yola Monakhov / Panos Pictures]US News and World Report reports that according to unnamed US and Jordanian intelligence sources, Al Jafr prison, in the southern desert of Jordan, is used as a CIA interrogation center. About 100 detainees have allegedly been processed there, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. “Most stay just a few days before being shipped out to longer-term facilities,” the magazine reports. [US News and World Report, 6/2/2003] The CIA and the Defense Department refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any detention facilities in Jordan controlled by the US. [First, 6/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

Category Tags: Detainments, Media, Al Jafr Prison (Jordan), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

In Guantanamo, British/Zambian detainee Martin Mubanga is taken from his cell for interrogation. After several hours of questioning, he asks his interrogator to let him use the lavatory. But according to Mubanga, the official says: “You’ll go when I say so.” When the interrogator leaves the room, Mubanga feels forced to urinate on the floor. The interrogator returns with a mop, dips it in the puddle and begins to cover Mubanga with his own urine, “like he’s using a big paintbrush.” “All the while,” Mubanga relates, “he’s racially abusing me, cussing me: ‘Oh, the poor little negro, the poor little nigger.’” [Observer, 2/6/2005]

Entity Tags: Martin Mubanga

Category Tags: Poor Conditions, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba), Other Detainees

The 9/11 Commission releases a new report on how the 9/11 plot developed. Most of their information appears to come from interrogations of prisoners Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), the 9/11 mastermind, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a key member of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell. In this account, the idea for the attacks appears to have originated with KSM. In mid-1996, he met bin Laden and al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef in Afghanistan. He presented several ideas for attacking the US, including a version of the 9/11 plot using ten planes (presumably an update of Operation Bojinka’s second phase plot (see February-Early May 1995)). Bin Laden does not commit himself. In 1999, bin Laden approves a scaled-back version of the idea, and provides four operatives to carry it out: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khallad bin Attash, and Abu Bara al Taizi. Attash and al Taizi drop out when they fail to get US visas. Alhazmi and Almihdhar prove to be incompetent pilots, but the recruitment of Mohamed Atta and the others in the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell solves that problem. Bin Laden wants the attacks to take place between May and July 2001, but the attacks are ultimately delayed until September. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004] However, information such as these accounts resulting from prisoner interrogations is seriously doubted by some experts, because it appears they only began cooperating after being coerced or tortured. For instance, it is said that KSM was “waterboarded,” a technique in which his head is pushed under water until he nearly drowns. Information gained under such duress often is unreliable. Additionally, there is a serious risk that the prisoners might try to intentionally deceive. [New York Times, 6/17/2004] For instance, one CIA report of his interrogations is called, “Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies.” [Los Angeles Times, 6/23/2004] The Commission itself expresses worry that KSM could be trying to exaggerate the role of bin Laden in the plot to boost bin Laden’s reputation in the Muslim world. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004] Most of what these prisoners have said is uncorroborated from other sources. [New York Times, 6/17/2004] In 2007, it will be alleged that as much as 90 percent of KSM’s interrogation could be inaccurate, and that he has recanted some of his confessions (see August 6, 2007).

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, 9/11 Commission, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Category Tags: Independent Investigations, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh

Calls for the demolition of the Abu Ghraib prison are quelled when a military judge, Col. James L. Pohl, declares the prison a crime scene and rules that it cannot be destroyed prior to a verdict. [Associated Press, 6/21/2004]

Entity Tags: James L. Pohl

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq)

Reacting to one of the “torture memos,” Republican representative Frank Wolf of Virginia writes in a letter to the Justice Department: “I am deeply concerned that this memorandum provides legal justification for the US government to commit cruel, inhumane, and degrading acts, including torture, on prisoners in US custody.” [MSNBC, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Frank Wolf

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Criticisms of US

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urges the Security Council to vote against a resolution that would exempt US soldiers serving in UN approved operations from prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Talking to journalists, he says, “For the past two years, I have spoken quite strongly against the exemption, and I think it would be unfortunate for one to press for such an exemption, given the prisoner abuse in Iraq.” [Inter Press Service, 6/21/2004] He adds, “It would discredit the Council and the United Nations that stands for the rule of law and the primacy of the rule of law.” [Truthout (.org), 6/28/2004] Since President Bush has taken office, the US, by threatening to withdraw funding for UN peacekeeping missions (see July 12, 2002), has made the Security Council adopt a resolution each year prohibiting the ICC from investigating or prosecuting officials from states that have not ratified the Rome Statute, like the US, for acts committed during participation in a UN-authorized mission. “Given the recent revelations from Abu Ghraib prison,” said Richard Dicker from Human Rights Watch, “the US government has picked a hell of a moment to ask for special treatment on war crimes.” [Inter Press Service, 6/21/2004] The US will eventually withdraw the resolution knowing China will use its veto power. China’s ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, later explains that his country did not want to support a resolution that could grant impunity to people committing abuses like the ones that happened at Abu Ghraib. [New York Times, 6/5/2004] The “major diplomatic defeat,” as the Financial Times calls it, “also marked,” according to the Washington Post, “the most concrete evidence of a diplomatic backlash against the scandal over abuses of US detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq.” [Truthout (.org), 6/28/2004] However, even with the defeat at the Security Council there is little chance that the US will be brought before the court for any future alleged war crimes because of bilateral immunity agreements that are still in force between the US and several countries (see August 2002-July 1, 2003). [Inter Press Service, 6/21/2004]

Entity Tags: Kofi Annan, Wang Guangya, Richard Dicker, United Nations, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: US International Relations

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath

Vice President Cheney has called the prisoners being held by the US at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, “the worst of a very bad lot” (see January 27, 2002) and other US officials have suggested that information from them has exposed terrorist cells and foiled attacks. But a lengthy New York Times investigation finds that US “government and military officials have repeatedly exaggerated both the danger the detainees posed and the intelligence they have provided.… In interviews, dozens of high-level military, intelligence and law-enforcement officials in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East said that contrary to the repeated assertions of senior administration officials, none of the detainees at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay ranked as leaders or senior operatives of al-Qaeda. They said only a relative handful—some put the number at about a dozen, others more than two dozen—were sworn al-Qaeda members or other militants able to elucidate the organization’s inner workings.” While some information from the prisoners has been useful to investigators, none of it has stopped any imminent attacks. Information from Guantanamo is considered “only a trickle” compared to what is being learned from prisoners held by the CIA in secret prisons elsewhere. Brig. Gen. Jay W. Hood, in charge of the task force running the prison, says, “The expectations, I think, may have been too high at the outset. There are those who expected a flow of intelligence that would help us break the most sophisticated terror organization in a matter of months. But that hasn’t happened.” Ironically, although few prisoners have been released, it appears about five have rejoined the Taliban and resumed attacks against US forces. Abdullah Laghmani, the chief of the National Security Directorate in Kandahar, Afghanistan, says, “There are lots of people who were innocent, and they are capturing them, just on anyone’s information. And then they are releasing guilty people.” [New York Times, 6/21/2004] Abdurahman Khadr, a CIA informant posing as a Guantanamo inmate for much of 2003 (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003 and Spring 2003), will later say about the prison: “There’s only, like, a 10 percent of the people that are really dangerous, that should be there. And the rest are people that, you know, don’t have anything to do with it, don’t even- you know, don’t even understand what they’re doing here.” [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2004] The Los Angeles Times reported back in August 2002 that no al-Qaeda leaders are being held at Guantanamo (see August 18, 2002). Some al-Qaeda leaders will be transferred into the prison from secret CIA prisons in September 2006 (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: Abdurahman Khadr, Abdullah Laghmani, Jay W. Hood

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Media, Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba)

Attempting to stem the flow of bad publicity and world-wide criticism surrounding the revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad and similar reports from Guantanamo Bay, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Pentagon general counsel William J. Haynes, accompanied by Pentagon lawyer Daniel Dell’Orto, give a lengthy press conference to discuss the US’s position on interrogation and torture. Gonzales and Haynes provide reporters with a thick folder of documents, being made public for the first time. Those documents include the so-called “Haynes Memo” (see November 27, 2002), and the list of 18 interrogation techniques approved for use against detainees (see December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003). Gonzales and Haynes make carefully prepared points: the war against terrorism, and al-Qaeda in particular, is a different kind of war, they say. Terrorism targets civilians and is not limited to battlefield engagements, nor do terrorists observe the restrictions of the Geneva Conventions or any other international rules. The administration has always acted judiciously in its attempt to counter terrorism, even as it moved from a strictly law-enforcement paradigm to one that marshaled “all elements of national power.” Their arguments are as follows:
Always Within the Law - First, the Bush administration has always acted within reason, care, and deliberation, and has always followed the law. In February 2002, President Bush had determined that none of the detainees at Guantanamo should be covered under the Geneva Conventions (see February 7, 2002). That presidential order is included in the document packet. According to Gonzales and Haynes, that order merely reflected a clear-eyed reading of the actual provision of the conventions, and does not circumvent the law. Another document is the so-called “torture memo” written by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (see August 1, 2002). Although such legal opinions carry great weight, and though the administration used the “torture memo” for months to guide actions by military and CIA interrogators, Gonzales says that the memo has nothing to do with the actions at Guantanamo. The memo was intended to do little more than explore “the limits of the legal landscape.” Gonzales says that the memo included “irrelevant and unnecessary” material, and was never given to Bush or distributed to soldiers in the field. The memo did not, Gonzales asserts, “reflect the policies that the administration ultimately adopted.” Unfortunately for their story, the facts are quite different. According to several people involved in the Geneva decision, it was never about following the letter of the law, but was designed to give legal cover to a prior decision to use harsh, coercive interrogation. Author and law professor Phillippe Sands will write, “it deliberately created a legal black hole into which the detainees were meant to fall.” Sands interviewed former Defense Department official Douglas Feith about the Geneva issue, and Feith proudly acknowledged that the entire point of the legal machinations was to strip away detainees’ rights under Geneva (see Early 2006).
Harsh Techniques Suggested from Below - Gonzales and Haynes move to the question of where, exactly, the new interrogation techniques came from. Their answer: the former military commander at Guantanamo, Michael E. Dunlavey. Haynes later describes Dunlavey to the Senate Judiciary Committee as “an aggressive major general.” None of the ideas originated in Washington, and anything signed off or approved by White House or Pentagon officials were merely responses to requests from the field. Those requests were prompted by a recalcitrant detainee at Guantanamo, Mohamed al-Khatani (see August 8, 2002-January 15, 2003), who had proven resistant to normal interrogation techniques. As the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approached, and fears of a second attack mounted, Dell’Orto says that Guantanamo field commanders decided “that it may be time to inquire as to whether there may be more flexibility in the type of techniques we use on him.” Thusly, a request was processed from Guantanamo through military channels, through Haynes, and ultimately to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who approved 15 of the 18 requested techniques to be used against al-Khatani and, later, against other terror suspects (see September 25, 2002 and December 2, 2002). According to Gonzales, Haynes, and Dell’Orto, Haynes and Rumsfeld were just processing a request from military officers. Again, the evidence contradicts their story. The torture memo came as a result of intense pressure from the offices of Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney. It was never some theoretical document or some exercise in hypothesizing, but, Sands will write, “played a crucial role in giving those at the top the confidence to put pressure on those at the bottom. And the practices employed at Guantanamo led to abuses at Abu Ghraib.” Gonzales and Haynes were, with Cheney chief of staff David Addington and Justice Department lawyers John Yoo and Jay Bybee (the authors of the torture memo), “a torture team of lawyers, freeing the administration from the constraints of all international rules prohibiting abuse,” in Sands’s words. Dunlavey was Rumsfeld’s personal choice to head the interrogations at Guantanamo; he liked the fact that Dunlavey was a “tyrant,” in the words of a former Judge Advocate General official, and had no problem with the decision to ignore the Geneva Conventions. Rumsfeld had Dunlavey ignore the chain of command and report directly to him, though Dunlavey reported most often to Feith. Additionally, the Yoo/Bybee torture memo was in response to the CIA’s desire to aggressively interrogate another terror suspect not held at Guantanamo, Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). Sands will write, “Gonzales would later contend that this policy memo did ‘not reflect the policies the administration ultimately adopted,’ but in fact it gave carte blanche to all the interrogation techniques later recommended by Haynes and approved by Rumsfeld.” He also cites another Justice Department memo, requested by the CIA and never made public, that spells out the specific techniques in detail. No one at Guantanamo ever saw either of the memos. Sands concludes, “The lawyers in Washington were playing a double game. They wanted maximum pressure applied during interrogations, but didn’t want to be seen as the ones applying it—they wanted distance and deniability. They also wanted legal cover for themselves. A key question is whether Haynes and Rumsfeld had knowledge of the content of these memos before they approved the new interrogation techniques for al-Khatani. If they did, then the administration’s official narrative—that the pressure for new techniques, and the legal support for them, originated on the ground at Guantanamo, from the ‘aggressive major general’ and his staff lawyer—becomes difficult to sustain. More crucially, that knowledge is a link in the causal chain that connects the keyboards of Feith and Yoo to the interrogations of Guantanamo.”
Legal Justifications Also From Below - The legal justification for the new interrogation techniques also originated at Guantanamo, the three assert, and not by anyone in the White House and certainly not by anyone in the Justice Department. The document stack includes a legal analysis by the staff judge advocate at Guantanamo, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver (see October 11, 2002), which gives legal justifications for all the interrogation techniques. The responsibility lies ultimately with Beaver, the three imply, and not with anyone higher up the chain. Again, the story is severely flawed. Beaver will give extensive interviews to Sands, and paint a very different picture (see Fall 2006). One Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) psychologist, Mike Gelles (see December 17-18, 2002), will dispute Gonzales’s contention that the techniques trickled up the chain from lower-level officials at Guantanamo such as Beaver. “That’s not accurate,” he will say. “This was not done by a bunch of people down in Gitmo—no way.” That view is supported by a visit to Guantanamo by several top-ranking administration lawyers, in which Guantanamo personnel are given the “green light” to conduct harsh interrogations of detainees (see September 25, 2002).
No Connection between Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib - Finally, the decisions regarding interrogations at Guantanamo have never had any impact on the interrogations at Abu Ghraib. Gonzales wants to “set the record straight” on that question. The administration has never authorized nor countenanced torture of any kind. The abuses at Abu Ghraib were unauthorized and had nothing to do with administration policies. Much evidence exists to counter this assertion (see December 17-18, 2002). In August 2003, the head of the Guantanamo facility, Major General Geoffrey Miller, visited Abu Ghraib in Baghdad, accompanied by, among others, Diane Beaver (see August 31, 2003-September 9, 2003). They were shocked at the near-lawlessness of the facility, and Miller recommended to Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the supreme US commander in Iraq, that many of the same techniques used at Guantanamo be used in Abu Ghraib. Sanchez soon authorized the use of those techniques (see September 14-17, 2003). The serious abuses reported at Abu Ghraib began a month later. Gelles worried, with justification, that the techniques approved for use against al-Khatani would spread to other US detention facilities. Gelles’s “migration theory” was controversial and dangerous, because if found to be accurate, it would tend to implicate those who authorized the Guantanamo interrogation techniques in the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. “Torture memo” author John Yoo called the theory “an exercise in hyperbole and partisan smear.” But Gelles’s theory is supported, not only by the Abu Ghraib abuses, but by an August 2006 Pentagon report that will find that techniques from Guantanamo did indeed migrate into Abu Ghraib, and a report from an investigation by former defense secretary James Schlesinger (see August 24, 2004) that will find “augmented techniques for Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were neither limited nor safeguarded.” [White House, 7/22/2004; Vanity Fair, 5/2008]

Aides to President Bush, including Alberto Gonzales, publicly renounce the internal memo of August 1, 2002 (see August 1, 2002) that outlined a legal opinion by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). They say it created the false impression that the US government was claiming the right to authorize interrogation techniques in violation of international law. Gonzales agrees that some of its conclusions were “controversial” and “subject to misinterpretation.” [Washington Post, 6/23/2004] The White House announces that all legal advice rendered by the OLC on interrogations will be reviewed and that sections of the August memo will be rewritten. Gonzales says the section in the memo arguing that the president, as Commander-in-Chief, is not bound by anti-torture laws is “unnecessary.” Justice Department officials also say the section will be scrapped. [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] In his introductory statement, however, Gonzales describes the circumstances under which the memo had come about: “We face an enemy that lies in the shadows, an enemy that doesn’t sign treaties, they don’t wear uniforms, an enemy that owes no allegiance to any country, they do not cherish life. An enemy that doesn’t fight, attack, or plan according to accepted laws of war, in particular Geneva Conventions.” [Washington File, 6/23/2004] Gonzales claims that giving these people a protected status under the Geneva Conventions would be tantamount to rewarding the terrorists’ lawlessness. “[T]o protect terrorists when they ignore the law is to give incentive to continued ignoring that law,” he says. [Washington File, 6/23/2004] Gonzales says he thinks that Bush never actually saw the August 2002 memo: “I don’t believe the president had access to any legal opinions from the Department of Justice.” [New York Times, 6/24/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Alberto R. Gonzales

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath, Public Statements

President Bush, responding to questions regarding reports that prisoners have been tortured in Iraq, says: “Let me make very clear the position of my government and our country: We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being.” [Washington Post, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

Category Tags: Public Statements

To demonstrate that President Bush has never authorized torture against prisoners, the White House declassifies and releases a large number of internal documents, including the February 7, 2002 memo (see February 7, 2002) signed by Bush, and documents, inter alia from Gen. James T. Hill, showing that the US military interrogators were seeking more aggressive interrogation techniques. The disclosures are made, according to Alberto R. Gonzales, because the government “felt that it was harmful to this country, in terms of the notion that perhaps we may be engaging in torture.” [Washington Post, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bush administration (43), Alberto R. Gonzales, James T. Hill

Category Tags: Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath

The head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Jack Goldsmith (see June 17, 2004), Deputy Attorney General Jack Comey, and Justice Department lawyer Patrick Philbin brief reporters on the OLC’s decision to withdraw the department’s memos authorizing torture (see June 22, 2004). Comey explains that the statements about potential defenses against war crimes charges, and the commander in chief’s power to ignore anti-torture laws and treaties, are nothing more than “broad academic theories” that had never actually been relied upon to formulate policy. The “golden shield” memo (see August 1, 2002) is “under review and will be replaced with analysis limited to the legality of actual al-Qaeda interrogation practices and the torture statutes and other applicable laws.” Goldsmith’s decision to withdraw the memos causes what author and reporter Charlie Savage will later term “a final burst of apoplexy among the hard-liners on the Bush-Cheney legal team.” OLC lawyer John Yoo, who authored many of the withdrawn memos, will later write that Goldsmith’s decision set “a terrible precedent” and rendered “Justice Department judgments on the law… just one more political target open to political attack and political negotiations.” Yoo will accuse Goldsmith and Comey of being “too worried about public perceptions” of the department’s work. [Savage, 2007, pp. 190-191]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Charlie Savage, Jack Goldsmith, James B. Comey Jr., John C. Yoo, Patrick F. Philbin, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ)

Category Tags: High-level Decisions and Actions, Legal Proceedings

Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC) writes: “Heretofore, the world looked to the United States to do the right thing. No more. The United States has lost its moral authority.” [Truthout (.org), 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Ernest F. Hollings

Category Tags: Criticisms of US, Public Statements

The Guardian, during the course of an in-depth investigation of the Bagram air base in Afghanistan, learns that while some of the base’s prisoners are being transferred to Guantanamo, others are being purposely kept off the books, a practice that a human rights organization has coined, “RPing,” or “Rumsfeld Processing.” These prisoners are sometimes called ghost prisoners. These detainees are sometimes rendered to the intelligence services of Egypt or other foreign governments for interrogation. [Guardian, 6/23/2004]

Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Coverup, Independent Investigations, Rendition after 9/11, Ghost Detainees, Bagram (Afghanistan)

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Key Events

Key Events (98)

General Topic Areas

Abu Ghraib Scandal Aftermath (28)Coverup (144)Criticisms of US (171)Detainee Treatment Act (15)Detainments (121)Disciplinary Actions (17)High-level Decisions and Actions (450)Human Rights Groups (81)Impunity (49)Indefinite Detention (41)Independent Investigations (27)Indications of Abuse (61)Legal Proceedings (217)Media (77)Military Commissions / Tribunals (66)Other Events (20)Prisoner Deaths (48)Private Contractors (8)Public Statements (84)Reports/Investigations (144)Statements/Writings about Torture (129)Supreme Court Decisions (5)

Renditions

Extraordinary Rendition (24)Rendition after 9/11 (75)Rendition before 9/11 (34)

Types of Abuses Performed by US

Abrogation of Rights (37)Dangerous Conditions (18)Deception (5)Electrodes (9)Exposure to Insects (4)Extreme Temperatures (48)Forced Confessions (37)Ghost Detainees (28)Insufficient Food (25)Intimidation/Threats (44)Involuntary Drugs (14)Isolation (33)Medical Services Denied (14)Mental Abuse (21)Physical Assault (140)Poor Conditions (30)SERE Techniques (30)Sexual Humiliation (57)Sexual Temptation (3)Sleep Deprivation (74)Stress Positions (65)Suppression of Religious Expression (18)Use of Dogs (20)Waterboarding (92)

Documents

Internal Memos/Reports (95)Presidential Directives (8)

Specific Events or Operations

Destruction of CIA Tapes (94)Operation Copper Green (9)Qala-i-Janghi Massacre (17)

US Bases and Interrogation Centers

Abu Ghraib Prison (Iraq) (187)Al Jafr Prison (Jordan) (8)Al Qaim (Iraq) (6)Bagram (Afghanistan) (60)Camp Bucca (Iraq) (13)Camp Cropper (Iraq) (13)Diego Garcia (8)Gardez (Afghanistan) (7)Guantanamo (US Base in Cuba) (293)Kandahar (Afghanistan) (19)Salt Pit (Afghanistan) (34)Stare Kiejkuty (Poland) (21)US Base (Thailand) (15)USS Peleliu (7)Other US Bases and Centers (40)

High Ranking Detainees

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (32)Abu Zubaida (52)Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (6)Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (26)Hambali (9)Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (10)Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (34)Majid Khan (7)Ramzi bin al-Shibh (13)Other High Ranking Detainees (14)

Other Detainees

Abed Hamed Mowhoush (8)Asif Iqbal (20)Binyam Mohamed (14)Bisher al-Rawi (11)Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (37)Huda al-Azzawi (10)Jamal Udeen (10)Jamil al-Banna (9)John Walker Lindh (29)Jose Padilla (31)Khalid el-Masri (17)Maher Arar (14)Moazzam Begg (8)Mohamed al-Khatani (13)Mohammed Jawad (14)Rhuhel Ahmed (22)Saddam Salah al-Rawi (8)Salim Ahmed Hamdan (12)Shafiq Rasul (20)Tarek Dergoul (11)Yaser Esam Hamdi (22)Other Detainees (167)
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