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US Health Care System

Marketing

Project: US Health Care System
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Warner-Lambert launches a new campaign to aggressively promote its epilepsy drug Neurontin. To boost the drug’s sales, the company begins marketing the drug for uses that have not been approved by the FDA. (While it is legal for doctors to write prescriptions for “off-label” uses, drug companies are prohibited from promoting such uses.) The company’s discreet campaign claims the drug can be used to treat pain, headaches, Lou Gehrig’s disease, attention deficit disorder, restless leg syndrome, drug and alcohol withdrawal seizures, bi-polar disorder, and other psychiatric illnesses. [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Associated Press, 8/8/2003] One marketing executive is recorded on tape telling a sales representative, “If we are going to market Neurontin effectively, we have to do it for monotherapy, for epilepsy, also for pain and bipolar and other psychiatric uses.” (Neurontin is only approved for use in conjunction with other drugs—it is not supposed to be used monotherapeutically.) Independent studies later suggest that the drug is not an effective treatment for some of those unapproved uses, and in some cases, Neurontin may even make a patient’s condition worse. Furthermore, patients may suffer if a doctor takes them off an effective medication so they can take Neurontin instead. [New York Times, 5/15/2002] The company’s marketing campaign is so effective that by 2003, 90 percent of the drug’s $2.7 billion in sales is for uses not approved by the FDA. [New York Times, 5/14/2004] In addition to the promotion of off-label use, the Warner-Lambert sale representatives are instructed to press doctors to prescribe the drug at levels higher than the FDA-approved dosage. [New York Times, 5/15/2002]
Marketing tactics -
bullet Paying doctors to write favorably about the drug. In one case the company reportedly pays $303,764 to publish a textbook on epilepsy written by Ilo Leppik, a professor at the University of Minnesota. Leppik later denies that the book was a marketing tool and says the book discussed other drugs beside Neurontin. [New York Times, 3/30/2003; Associated Press, 8/8/2003]
bullet Hiring marketing firms to help write articles favorable of Neurontin. Doctors are paid to claim authorship for the articles, which are vetted by Warner-Lambert before being submitted to a journal for publication. In one case, Warner-Lambert agrees to pay a company $12,000 per article and $1,000 to any doctor agreeing to accept authorship. [New York Times, 5/15/2002]
bullet Rewarding dozens of doctors who write a high-volume of Neurontin prescriptions with consulting or speaking contracts worth tens of thousands of dollars. By 1997, Dr. B. J. Wilder, a former professor of neurology at the University of Florida, receives almost $308,000 for speeches he gives. Six other doctors get paid more than $100,000 each. And Dr. Steven C. Schachter, a neurologist at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, earns $71,477 for speaking on the drug’s off-label uses. [New York Times, 3/30/2003]
bullet Paying doctors $350 a day or more to admit sales representatives into examining rooms to meet with patients, review their medical charts, and recommend treatment. This tactic, known as “shadowing,” involves approximately 75 to 100 doctors in several Northeast states. [New York Times, 5/15/2002]
bullet Instructing sales representatives to pressure doctors to write Neurontin prescriptions for unapproved uses (see April 1996-July 1996).

Entity Tags: Parke-Davis

Category Tags: Marketing

David Franklin later accuses drug company Parke-Davis of instructing its sales representatives to pressure doctors to prescribe the drug Neurontin for off-label uses. This marketing tactic is part of a larger effort aimed at increasing Neurontin prescriptions for uses not approved by the FDA (see 1996-2000). “I was trained to do things and did things that were blatantly illegal,” he says. “I knew my job was to falsely gain physicians’ trust and trade on my graduate degree.… I’d tell them we had physicians across the county, some involved in clinical trials, and others who had hundreds of patients on Neurontin, all getting an extraordinary response rate. We’d make them think everyone was using it but them.… [W]e were taking people who were moderately controlled on another drug and experimenting with Neurontin. We were gambling with people’s lives.” Franklin quits after two executives pressure him to get with the program. When Franklin tells one of them that he’s leaving, the executive warns, “I can’t guarantee what is going to happen to you or your career.” [Boston Globe, 3/12/2003]

Entity Tags: Pfizer, David Franklin, Parke-Davis

Category Tags: Marketing

David Franklin, a former salesman for Warner-Lambert drug company, files a lawsuit alleging that Warner-Lambert is illegally marketing its drug Neurontin for non-approved uses (see 1996-2000 and April 1996-July 1996). Franklin also says that the company’s illegal promotion of the drug is resulting in state Medicaid programs spending millions of dollars on Neurontin for non-approved uses. [New York Times, 5/15/2002]

Entity Tags: David Franklin, Parke-Davis

Category Tags: Marketing, Medicaid

Merck sends all of its sales representatives a “Cardiovascular Card,” a tri-fold pamphlet on the safety of Vioxx, so they “are well prepared to respond to questions about the cardiovascular effects of Vioxx.” Since the announcement (see March 27, 2000) of the VIGOR study results, physicians have been asking the representatives whether Vioxx causes heart problems. The pamphlet contains a table of data appearing to indicate that patients on Vioxx are 11 times less likely to die than patients on standard anti-inflammatory drugs, and 8 times less likely to die from heart attacks and strokes. Another section displays data showing that Vioxx patients are half as likely to suffer heart attacks as patients who receive a placebo. The risk for patients on other anti-inflammatory drugs appears to be identical. [Merck, 4/28/2000 pdf file] But the pamphlet is based on the combined data of several disparate studies, conducted before the drug’s approval. None of the studies were designed to test the cardiovascular safety of the drug. An FDA medical reviewer later tells the staff of a congressional committee that the relevance of those studies to the question of Vioxx’s effects on the heart is “nonexistent.” Furthermore, the reviewer says it would be “ridiculous” and “scientifically inappropriate” to use the pamphlet as evidence of the drug’s safety. [Office of Representative Henry A. Waxman, 5/5/2005, pp. 16-19 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck, VIGOR

Category Tags: Vioxx, Marketing

Merck’s sales force develops a flash-card game called “Dodge Ball Vioxx” to help train Merck sales representatives on how to respond to certain questions and concerns that doctors might have about Vioxx. [Daily Journal Extra, 1/31/2005] The game includes a 12-page list of obstacles including some questions concerning the association between Vioxx and heart problems. One of them is, “I am concerned about the cardiovascular effects of Vioxx.” In the summer of 2005, a former Merck sales woman tells CBS 60 Minutes that when faced with that question, the company said representatives should say the drug does not cause heart problems. “We were supposed to tell the physician that Vioxx did not cause cardiovascular events; that instead, in the studies, Naproxen has aspirin-like characteristics which made Naproxen a heart-protecting type of drug where Vioxx did not have that heart-protecting side,” she said. According to the FDA, there is no evidence that Naproxen has such properties. [CBS News, 4/28/2005]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Manipulation of data, Marketing, Vioxx

Fearing increased public concern over the safety of Vioxx, Merck sends its sales representatives a bulletin instructing them in all capital letters: “Do not initiate discussions on the FDA Arthritis Advisory Committee… or the results of the… VIGOR study.” The previous day, an FDA panel (see February 8, 2001) reviewed the results of the VIGOR study and said physicians need to be informed that Vioxx appears to cause “an excess of cardiovascular events in comparison to naproxen.” The Merck bulletin provides a list of responses that its representatives are authorized to use in addressing physicians’ concerns. It emphasizes that these are the only responses they are allowed to use. If doctors ask about Vioxx’s effects on the heart, sales persons should say, “Because the study is not in the label, I cannot discuss the study with you.” However, as a report by Henry A. Waxman notes, drug company representatives are permitted by FDA regulations to discuss safety concerns even when those concerns are not on the label. The sales persons are also advised to tell physicians to submit their questions in writing to Merck’s medical services department. Merck says reps can also show the physicians the Cardiovascular Card, a pamphlet consisting of data that appears to show that Vioxx is safe (see April 28, 2000). The bulletin indicates that sales reps are not supposed to leave the pamphlet with the doctor. [Merck, 2/9/2001 pdf file; Office of Representative Henry A. Waxman, 5/5/2005, pp. 22 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Manipulation of data, Marketing, Vioxx

A new Merck training manual instructs company sales representives on how to use reprints of medical journal articles in their sales pitches to doctors. The company has divided the reprints into two categories, “approved” and “background.” The “approved” category includes articles that “provide solid evidence as to why [doctors] should prescribe Merck products for their appropriate patients.” Only these articles can be used or cited by Merck sales people. Background articles, on the other hand, cannot be used or even referenced. Doing so would be “a clear violation of Company Policy,” the document says. If a physician has any questions about studies not in the “approved” category, the sales representive should refer the individual to Merck’s medical services department. [Merck, 3/2001 pdf file; Office of Representative Henry A. Waxman, 5/5/2005, pp. 12-13 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Marketing, Vioxx

The same day the New York Times publishes an article (see May 22, 2001) raising questions about the safety of Vioxx, Merck sends a bulletin to its sales representatives instructing them in capital letters: “Do not initiate discussions on the results of the… VIGOR study, or any of the recent articles in the press on Vioxx.” The bulletin says that if physicians ask any questions about the cardiovascular safety of Vioxx, sales reps should refer to the “Cardiovascular Card” (a marketing pamphlet on the safety of Vioxx, see April 28, 2000), request that Merck’s “Medical Services” staff fax or Fedex additional information to the doctor, or respond appropriately “in accordance with the obstacle-handling guide.” [Merck, 5/22/2001 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Manipulation of data, Marketing, Vioxx

Merck issues a press release titled “Merck Confirms Favorable Cardiovascular Safety Profile of Vioxx” asserting that there is no evidence that patients taking the prescribed dosage levels of Vioxx have an increased risk of having heart problems. It says that the higher number of heart troubles experienced by patients taking Vioxx compared to naproxen during the VIGOR study (see March 2000) was likely because naproxen has similar properties to aspirin, which is known to prevent heart attacks. [Merck, 5/22/2001] The FDA later issues a warning to Merck calling this press release “simply incomprehensible, given the rate of MI and serious cardiovascular events compared to naproxen” (see September 17, 2001). [US Food and Drug Administration, 9/17/2001, pp. 1-2 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Manipulation of data, Marketing, Vioxx

The Food and Drug Administration faxes a warning letter to Raymond Gilmartin, the CEO of Merck, accusing the company of conducting a deceptive promotional campaign for its drug Vioxx. The eight-page letter, referring mostly to events that took place between June 2000 and June 2001, states: “You have engaged in a promotional campaign for Vioxx that minimizes the potentially serious cardiovascular findings that were observed in the VIOXX Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) study (see March 2000), and thus, misrepresents the safety profile for VIOXX. Specifically, your promotional campaign discounts the fact that in the VIGOR study, patients on VIOXX were observed to have a four to five fold increase in myocardial infarctions (MIs) compared to patients on the comparator non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID), Naprosyn (naproxen).… You assert that Vioxx does not increase the risk of MIs and that the VIGOR finding is consistent with naproxen’s ability to block platelet aggregation like aspirin. That is a possible explanation, but you fail to disclose that your explanation is hypothetical, has not been demonstrated by substantial evidence, and that there is another reasonable explanation, that Vioxx may have pro-thrombotic properties [i.e., cause heart attacks]. You have also engaged in promotional activities that minimize the Vioxx/Coumadin (warfarin) drug interaction, omit important risk information, make unsubstantiated superiority claims against other NSAIDS, and promote Vioxx for unapproved uses and an unapproved dosing regimen.… Your minimizing these potential risks and misrepresenting the safety profile for Vioxx raise significant public health and safety concerns.” The letter also warns the company about a May 2001 press release (see May 22, 2001), which claimed the drug has a “favorable cardiovascular safety profile.” [US Food and Drug Administration, 9/17/2001, pp. 1-2 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Raymond Gilmartin, Merck

Category Tags: Disregard for Public Safety, Manipulation of data, Marketing, Vioxx

Beginning no later than January 2002, Merck provides its sales staff with detailed information on the prescribing habits of individual doctors, or as they like to call them, “customers.” The data—purchased by Merck from an outside company—allows sales representatives to see how many prescriptions each of their customers writes for any given medication. The sales person can see which customers are prescribing large quantities of Merck drugs and which ones aren’t, indicating to the rep which customers need to be worked on the most. Furthermore, each doctor has a “Merck Potential,” which is a “dollar estimate of each prescriber’s total prescribing volume that can realistically be converted to Merck prescriptions.” Bonuses for reps are based on the overall sales and Merck market shares for their respective sales territories. So the more Merck drugs their customers prescribe, the more money they make. [Merck, 1/2002 pdf file; Office of Representative Henry A. Waxman, 5/5/2005, pp. 13-14 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Marketing, Vioxx

A training manual for Merck’s marketing force recommends that sales representatives think of people like Helen Keller, Martin Luther King, Tiger Woods, and George Washington when they are faced with a doctor who is a hard sell. “Martin Luther King could have laid low when his home was firebombed,” the manual states, suggesting that like MLK, the Vioxx sales representatives should never back down. [Merck, 1/2002 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Merck

Category Tags: Marketing, Vioxx

Pfizer pleads guilty and agrees to pay $430 million to settle criminal and civil charges that Warner-Lambert, a company it acquired in 2000, marketed its epilepsy drug, Neurontin, for non-approved uses (see 1996-2000, August 1996, and April 1996-July 1996). [New York Times, 5/14/2004]

Entity Tags: Pfizer, US Department of Justice

Category Tags: Marketing

A survey of 483 physicians by GfK Market Measures finds that one-third feel drug company sales representatives are “too aggressive or pushy.” Roughly an equal percentage says that many reps are “not knowledgeable.” One general practitioner tells GfK, “It’s silly that a highly trained sales force does not know what their product is used for and they have to ask me.” According to the survey, drug companies Pfizer and Merck are considered by doctors to have the most effective marketing teams. Abbott Laboratories’ sales force is rated as the least effective. [CNN, 9/14/2005]

Entity Tags: GfK Market Measures, Merck, Abbott Laboratories, Pfizer

Category Tags: Marketing

The New York Times publishes an article suggesting that pharmaceutical companies are using sex to sell their drugs. Physicians interviewed in the article indicate that the sexual marketing of drugs is widespread. “There’s a saying that you’ll never meet an ugly drug rep,” says Dr. Thomas Carli of the University of Michigan. T. Lynn Williamson, a cheering advisor at the University of Kentucky, tells the Times that recruiters from pharmaceutical companies routinely call him looking for prospective sales representatives. “They watch to see who’s graduating,” he explains. “They don’t ask what the major is. Exaggerated motions, exaggerated smiles, exaggerated enthusiasm—they learn those things, and they can get people to do what they want.” He says approximately two dozen cheerleaders from the university, mostly women but also some men, have gone on to work for the drug industry. The newspaper also interviews Gregory C. Webb, the owner of Spirited Sales Leaders, a company that helps former cheerleaders find work in the sales industry. “I’ve had people who are going right out, maybe they’ve been out of school for a year, and get a car and make up to $50,000, $60,000 with bonuses, if they do well,” he explains. His company’s website boasts that a “large number of former Varsity employees have secured sales positions and built successful careers in various fields, such as pharmaceutical and medical sales.” The website’s header combines a large photo of a hospital room with a photo of a cheerleader. [New York Times, 11/28/2005; Spirited Sales Leaders, 7/23/2006]

Entity Tags: T. Lynn Williamson, Gregory C. Webb, Spirited Sales, Thomas Carli

Category Tags: Marketing

Dr. Susan Molchan testifies before Congress.Dr. Susan Molchan testifies before Congress. [Source: CBS News]Dr. Susan Molchan, a former clinical researcher for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), testifies before Congress that her supervisor at NIH made a secret deal with the pharmaceutical company Pfizer that involved human tissue samples supposedly collected for the public good, but were instead used for Pfizer’s own research and garnered the company millions in profit. [CBS News, 6/14/2006] Molchan testifies before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations [The Scientist, 6/14/2006] that a collection of unused spinal fluid samples, which CBS News describes as a "a treasure trove of biological material, many painfully given up by Alzheimer’s patients" disappeared without a trace from her laboratory freezer at NIH. The samples were slated to be used for NIH studies on Alzheimer’s disease. Molchan says she was told that some of the samples were lost due to freezer malfunctions, but, "nothing solid, nothing that made sense. I never got a handle on what happened to them." [CBS News, 6/14/2006] Procuring the tissue samples alone cost the government $6.4 million, say committee staffers, who spent a year investigating the matter. "It would really be a shame if we find out that the National Institutes of Health has more control over its paper clips and trash cans than it has over its human tissue samples," says committee member Joe Barton (R-TX). [The Scientist, 6/14/2006] Molchan’s testimony, and other data gathered by Congressional investigators, prove that Molchan’s immediate supervisor, Dr. Trey Sunderland, a well-known psychiatric researcher, cut a secret deal with Pfizer at the same time Pfizer was launching and refining a new Alzheimer’s drug. "If individual scientists are making use of that tissue for their own personal gain, that’s something we need to know about it. It’s not the right thing," says House Energy subcommittee chairman Ed Whitfield (R-KY). Sunderland provided Pfizer "access" to 3,200 tubes of spinal fluid, costing the NIH and, as a result, taxpayers, an estimated $6 million. In exchange, Sunderland reportedly received $285,000 in personal compensation. Pfizer’s drug Aricept is now the top-selling drug in the world for treating Alzheimer’s, generating $1.6 billion in sales in 2004. "The more tissue samples you can collect these days and extract genetic information about risk and benefit, that’s the future of drug development around the world," says Dr. Art Caplan, a bio-ethicist at the University of Pennsylvania. The House committee finds that Pfizer itself broke no NIH rules or knew of any wrongdoing by Sunderland, who does not testify before Congress, instead invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. [CBS News, 6/14/2006] Sunderland himself received more than $600,000 in outside consulting and speaking fees from Pfizer from 1998 to 2004 without prior government disclosure or approval. A review by NIH’s Office of Management Assessment found that Sunderland "engaged in serious misconduct, in violation of HHS ethics rules and Federal law and regulation," the report stated. In December 2006, Sunderland will accept a plea bargain in regards to his accepting payments from Pfizer (see December 11, 2006). [The Scientist, 6/14/2006]

Entity Tags: Susan Molcher, Pfizer, Joe Barton, Pearson (“Trey”) Sunderland III, Art Capland, Ed Whitfield, United States National Institutes of Health

Category Tags: Fraud, Marketing, Defense of corporate interests

Dr. Pearson “Trey” Sunderland.Dr. Pearson “Trey” Sunderland. [Source: CreativityFound (.org)]Dr. Pearson “Trey” Sunderland III, a National Institute of Health (NIH) senior researcher on Alzheimer’s disease, pleads guilty to a federal charge that he committed a criminal conflict of interest. The charges stem from Sunderland’s contract with the pharmaceutical firm Pfizer as a paid consultant for work that overlapped his duties as a public servant. Sunderland is the first official in 14 years to be prosecuted for conflict of interest at NIH, an agency rocked in recent years by revelations of widespread financial ties to the drug industry. According to the original court filing, in early 1998, “Sunderland initiated negotiations with Pfizer, the pharmaceutical giant, to be paid as a consultant for his work on the same project” that he headed for NIH, a research project into Alzheimer’s disease. In June 2006, Sunderland was revealed to have engaged in a secret contract with Pfizer to supply thousands of samples of spinal fluid collected from Alzheimer’s patients at taxpayer expense and slated to be used in NIH research. Sunderland turned those samples over to Pfizer, which in turn used them to refine and market its drug Aricept, a leading prescription drug for treating the disease (see June 14, 2006). According to the original charging document filed with the court, in 1998 Sunderland approached Pfizer with a proposal that he be paid $25,000 a year for “consulting” with the firm, plus $2,500 every time he attended a one-day meeting with company representatives. Pfizer agreed. Later that same year, Sunderland set up another deal with Pfizer to be paid another $25,000 a year, according to prosecutors. The House Energy and Commerce Committee received little cooperation from NIH—Sunderland himself invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when called to testify before the committee in June 2006—but subpoeaned 21 drug manufacturers known to have paid NIH researchers. Sunderland’s history of payments from Pfizer, which he did not reveal to the NIH as required by law, were some of those discovered. After that information was revealed in 2004, NIH director Elias Zerhouni requested that the inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services investigate the matter. Government researchers found that 44 researchers, including Sunderland, had off-the-books relationships with drug and biotech companies; many of those researchers were reprimanded and/or took early retirement. At the time of Sunderland’s contracts with Pfizer, NIH restrictions against public-private collaborations were far more lax than they are today. [Associated Press, 12/4/2006; Associated Press, 12/5/2006; Los Angeles Times, 12/5/2006; Washington Post, 12/5/2006]
'Public Trust Has Been Violated' - Congressman John Dingell (D-MI) asks, “Will a criminal conviction for conflict of interest be enough to get someone fired from NIH?” Bart Stupak (D-MI) adds, “If the National Institutes of Health and Commissioned Corps fail to discipline Dr. Sunderland, even after criminal charges have been brought, we can only conclude that no one is being held accountable, the system is broken, and the public trust has been violated.” [Associated Press, 12/5/2006; Los Angeles Times, 12/5/2006] Committee member Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) says: “I found this story incredibly distressing because it is so important that people have confidence in the NIH. It is a pretty big move for people to donate human tissue to further scientific discovery. People have to have confidence that that decision… is treated with the utmost respect.” [Washington Post, 12/5/2006]
Guilty Plea Avoids Jail Time - Sunderland pleads guilty to the charge under a plea agreement in which he admits to taking some $285,000 in “unauthorized” consulting fees from Pfizer as well as $15,000 in travel expense payments between 1998 and 2003. During the same period, he provided Pfizer with spinal-tap samples collected from hundreds of patients as part of a research collaboration approved by the NIH. He agrees to pay the government $300,000, perform 400 hours of community service, and serve two years’ probation. Sunderland faced up to a year in prison and a $100,000 fine, but avoided those penalties through his plea agreement. After the hearing, US Attorney Rod Rosenstein tells reporters that Sunderland’s actions constitute a breach of the public trust. [Los Angeles Times, 12/5/2006; Washington Post, 12/5/2006] According to NIH spokesman Don Ralbovsky, Sunderland remains an employee, working as a “special assistant and senior adviser” in a division that gives out grants; Rabolvsky refuses to comment on whether Sunderland faces termination procedures. The branch of NIH that Sunderland once headed, the Geriatric Psychiatry Branch, no longer exists, according to Ralbovsky. [Washington Post, 12/5/2006] One media report says Sunderland is planning to retire. [Associated Press, 12/4/2006] Sunderland will later become a doctor and director of the Alzheimer Research Center at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York. [Lundbeck Institute, 12/11/2008]
Pfizer Denies Wrongdoing - For its part, Pfizer maintains that it broke no laws and breached no ethics, saying in a statement: “We believe our actions complied with applicable laws and ethical standards. We are not aware of any allegation that we violated any law or regulation.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/5/2006; Washington Post, 12/5/2006; Los Angeles Times, 12/11/2006]

Entity Tags: Pfizer, Pearson (“Trey”) Sunderland III, Rod Rosenstein, John Dingell, Bart Stupak, Don Ralbovsky, Elias Zerhouni, United States National Institutes of Health, Tammy Baldwin

Category Tags: Fraud, Marketing, Defense of corporate interests

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) acknowledges it has funded a series of television advertisements in support of legislation primarily written by Max Baucus (D-MT), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, to reform US health care. The television ads are part of an agreement between the Obama administration, Baucus, and PhRMA in June, where the organization agreed to various givebacks and discounts designed to reduce America’s pharmaceutical spending by $80 billion over 10 years. PhRMA then set aside $150 million for advertising to support health care legislation. More progressive House Democrats such as Henry Waxman (D-CA) are pushing for stiffer drug industry givebacks than covered in the deal. PhRMA is led by Billy Tauzin, a former Republican congressman. Until recently, the organization spent some $12 million on ads by an offshoot coalition called Americans for Stable Quality Care, and aired television ads such as “Eight Ways Reform Matters to You.” PhRMA’s new ads will specifically support the Baucus bill. Many are critical of the deal, with James Love of the progressive research group Knowledge Ecology charging, “Essentially what the US got was not $80 billion, but $150 million in Obama campaign contributions.” [New York Times, 9/12/2009] Investigative reporter Matt Taibbi agrees with Love, accusing the White House of colluding with Baucus and Tauzin’s PhRMA to orchestrate a “big bribe” in exchange for the Democrats’ dropping of drug-pricing reform in the Baucus bill. Taibbi writes that in June, White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel met with representatives from PhRMA and drug companies such as Abbott Laboratories, Merck, and Pfizer to cut their deal. Tauzer later told reporters that the White House had “blessed” a plan involving the $150 million in return for the White House’s agreement to no longer back government negotiations for bulk-rate pharmaceuticals for Medicare, and to no longer support the importation of inexpensive drugs from Canada. Taibbi writes that the White House worked with Baucus and PhRMA to undercut Waxman’s attempts to give the government the ability to negotiate lower rates for Medicare drugs. PhRMA’s ads are being aired primarily in the districts of freshmen Democrats who are expected to face tough re-election campaigns, and in the districts of conservative “Blue Dog” Democrats, who have sided with Baucus, Obama, and PhRMA to oppose the Waxman provision in favor of PhRMA’s own provision, which would ban the government from negotiating lower rates for Medicare recipients. [True/Slant, 9/14/2009]

Entity Tags: James Love, Henry A. Waxman, Americans for Stable Quality Care, Abbott Laboratories, Rahm Emanuel, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Senate Finance Committee, Obama administration, Medicare, Max Baucus, Matt Taibbi, Pfizer, Merck, W.J. (“Billy”) Tauzin

Category Tags: Marketing, Defense of corporate interests, US Health Insurers, Obama Health Care Reform, Medicare

The Public Campaign Action Fund (PCAF), a campaign finance watchdog organization, finds that insurance and health management organizations (HMOs) have spent over $700,000 a day during the first half of 2009 to defeat health care reform. It also notes that health care and insurance interests, which include organizations outside of the HMOs and insurance companies, have spent roughly $1.4 million a day during the first quarter of 2009 to defeat reform efforts. During the first six months of 2009, the companies spent $126,430,438, mostly on hired lobbyists, to oppose the health care reform legislation working its way through Congress. Since 2007, the companies have spent around $585 million to defeat health care reform. “The insurance and HMO interests are fighting health care reform with hundreds of millions of dollars,” says PCAF’s David Donnelly. “Why are so many in Congress willing to listen to an industry that is spending tens of millions every month on politics rather than on lowering their premiums or helping to address the costs of health care? They need the cash to pay for their campaigns.” The HMO and insurance companies have 1,795 lobbyists registered in Washington to represent their concerns to Congress and members of the Obama administration; the same firms hired almost 2,000 lobbyists in 2008. PCAF says it compiled its data from information provided by the Center for Responsive Politics and the Senate lobbying disclosure Web sites. [Public Campaign Action Fund, 9/15/2009]

Entity Tags: Center for Responsive Politics, Public Campaign Action Fund, David Donnelly

Category Tags: Marketing, Defense of corporate interests, Obama Health Care Reform

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