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US International Relations

Post-Soviet Relations

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President-elect Bill Clinton announces that his administration rejects the idea of a US-only space-based defense system (see March 23, 1983 and January 29, 1991) and would instead support the development of what he calls “a limited missile defense system within the strict framework” of the ABM Treaty (see May 26, 1972). He announces that his administration also supports the development and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) systems “to protect our troops from short- and medium-range missiles.” [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Strategic Defense Initiative

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

The Clinton administration rejects the Reagan/Bush “broad interpretation” of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see May 26, 1972 and October 6-11, 1985) in favor of the narrow, “traditional” interpretation. A senior government official informs Congress that “it is the position of the Clinton administration that the ‘narrow,’ or ‘traditional,’ interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the correct interpretation and, therefore, that the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to technology utilized.” [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: Clinton administration

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

Ukraine agrees to give up its nuclear weapons. It is the last of the former Soviet states to give up its nuclear arsenal, and, as the New York Times’s Bill Keller will later observe, “probably the only one with the technological wherewithal to override Moscow’s centralized control systems and become an overnight nuclear state.” The Bush and Clinton administrations used a combination of diplomatic promises and pressure to convince Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons; the US has agreed to funnel large amounts of financial aid into the country as well as entering into a military partnership with it. Keller will note that at this time: “possession of nuclear weapons [i]s still understood as a serious impediment for a country seeking admission into the Western world. If you want… to join the party, you checked your nukes at the door.” [New York Times, 5/4/2003] Ukraine will ship the last of its nuclear weapons to Russia in June 1996. [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 6/2/1996]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (41), Bill Keller, Clinton administration

Category Tags: Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, United Nations, Post-Soviet Relations

A total of 350 Republican candidates for Congress announce their support for the so-called “Contract with America,” a broad platform of hardline conservative positions which includes a call for the US deployment of both an anti-ballistic missile defense system (SDI or “Star Wars”—see March 23, 1983 and January 29, 1991) and more limited theater missile defense systems (TMD—see November 3, 1992). [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: Strategic Defense Initiative

Category Tags: Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

Yeltsin and Clinton share a laugh.Yeltsin and Clinton share a laugh. [Source: Associated Press / BBC]US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issue a joint statement that they have “agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty” (see May 26, 1972). In the statement, Clinton and Yeltsin state: “Both sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The presidents agree that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater missile defenses and early warning. This exercise would contribute to providing a basis for US and Russian forces to operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.” [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Boris Yeltsin

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

The new peace accords and arms reductions negotiations between the US and Russia (see November 3, 1992, July 13, 1993, and September 28, 1994) are severely tested when the Russian military informs President Boris Yeltsin that it has detected a missile launch bound for Russian territory—possibly a nuclear missile from a US submarine launched to destroy the Russian government in Moscow. With the missile in flight, Yeltsin convenes an emergency teleconference of his senior defense officials and discusses launching a nuclear counterstrike against the US. Two minutes before the missile is to detonate on Russian soil—and the Russians are to launch the counterstrike—the Russians realize the “missile” is actually a Norwegian scientific rocket that poses no threat to their nation. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 175]

Entity Tags: Boris Yeltsin

Category Tags: US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issue a joint statement announcing that they endorse a set of principles for negotiating the deployment of “theater missile defense” systems (TMD), designed for protection from intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and smaller “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons. TMD systems will not be designed and implemented in a manner that poses a serious threat to either side’s nuclear arsenals. They both agree that the 1972 ABM Treaty (see May 26, 1972) “does not apply to theater missile defense systems that may simply have a theoretical capability against some strategic missiles but which would not be militarily significant in the context of operational considerations.” They agree that “theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other,” and that “the scale of deployment—in number and geographic scope—of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater missile defense programs confronting that side.” The two nations will develop their respective TMD systems “on a cooperative basis.” [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Boris Yeltsin

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

The Clinton administration succeeds in getting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT—see July 1, 1968) extended indefinitely. The NPT Review and Extension Conference also calls for the successful conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (see June 28, 1996) by 1996. [Federation of American Scientists, 12/18/2007]

Entity Tags: Clinton administration

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations, Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts

The US and Russia agree on a framework for anti-ballistic (ABM) and theater missile defense (TMD) systems similar to the proposal issued by their respective leaders in May (see May 9-10, 1995). They consent to a number of restrictions on TMD capabilities and mutual verification protocols. The US declares that “with respect to those TMD systems with higher velocity interceptors, the status quo continues, which is to say that the United States will make compliance determinations based on the relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty.” [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]

Entity Tags: Clinton administration

Category Tags: Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

Bowing to intense diplomatic pressure from the Clinton administration, Belarus agrees to give up its nuclear arsenal. It is the third former Soviet state to give up its nuclear weapons after negotiations and pressure from the US, joining Kazakhstan and Ukraine. [Federation of American Scientists, 12/18/2007]

Entity Tags: Clinton administration

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, Post-Soviet Relations

President Clinton signs the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (NMDA), which states in its entirety, “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).” The NMDA mandates that the US will deploy some sort of missile defense system (see March 23, 1983 and January 29, 1991), but Clinton will refuse to order the system’s deployment in 2000, in part because it has failed its tests and in part because to deploy the system would require the US to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see May 26, 1972), a move Clinton is unwilling to make. Clinton will acknowledge that the US makes its own national security decision, but will add, “We can never afford to overlook the fact that the actions and reactions of others in this increasingly interdependent world do bear on our security.” [US Senate, 7/22/1999; White House, 7/22/1999; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 173-174]

Entity Tags: National Missile Defense Act, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton

Category Tags: Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

President Clinton considers building a radar facility as part of a proposed national missile defense system. Clinton’s legal advisers have told him that he could “interpret” the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (see May 26, 1972) to allow such a facility, even though the treaty clearly prohibits any moves towards a missile defense system. Clinton later authorizes the construction of a radar facility in Alaska, but leaves the bulk of the decision-making to the next administration. [Agence France-Presse, 6/21/2000; Savage, 2007, pp. 67] Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, will withdraw from the treaty entirely (see December 13, 2001).

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton

Category Tags: Nuclear Weapons Treaties, Post-Soviet Relations

President Bush gives a speech at the National Defense University outlining what he calls a “new strategic framework” for the nation’s strategic defense policy. “This afternoon, I want us to think back some 30 years to a far different time in a far different world,” he tells his listeners. “The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a hostile rivalry.… Our deep differences were expressed in a dangerous military confrontation that resulted in thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other on hair-trigger alert. Security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise: that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations.” Bush is referring to the concept of “mutual assured destruction,” or MAD, which has driven the policies of the US and the former Soviet Union since the 1950s. “We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty (see May 26, 1972), based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be insured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear attack,” he says.
A Different Threat - Times have now changed: “Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world.… Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union.… Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed… ballistic missile technology.… And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life.” Bush cites the example of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who, he says, could have forced a very different outcome to the 1991 Gulf War (see January 16, 1991 and After) had he “been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons.” Hussein is an exemplar of today’s hate-driven dictators, Bush asserts: “Like Saddam Hussein, some of today’s tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate our friends, they hate our values, they hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough.”
ABM Treaty Now a Hindrance to US Security - “To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us,” Bush says. “Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter proliferation and defenses.… We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.… We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.… We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.” Bush is heralding his intention of withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty (see December 13, 2001). Bush says of the treaty: “We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries. That’s why we should work together to replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.” [White House, 5/1/2001; CNN, 5/1/2001; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 171-172]
An Old Response to a New Threat - Author J. Peter Scoblic later calls Bush’s rationale “disingenuous.” He explains: “Conservatives had wanted to field missile defenses ever since the Soviet Union had developed ICBMs.… But somewhat paradoxically, following the collapse of the Soviet Union—and with it the likelihood of of a missile attack—conservative calls for missile defense increased” (see September 27, 1994). [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 171-172] Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calls Bush’s proposal “tragically mistaken.” [PBS, 5/1/2001] Senator John Kerry (D-MA), an outspoken opponent of Bush’s foreign policies, says: “This is essentially a satisfy-your-base, political announcement. It serves no other purpose.” [New York Times, 5/1/2001]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, J. Peter Scoblic, John Kerry, Saddam Hussein, Joseph Cirincione

Category Tags: Neoconservatives in Foreign Policy, Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Foreign Policy, Post-Soviet Relations

Congressional Democrats are highly critical of President Bush’s proposal to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and instead implement a “new strategic framework” for the US’s defense against nuclear weapons (see May 1, 2001). Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) says: “Many in the administration… argue that deploying an ineffective defense can still be an effective system simply because it would cause uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries. That position is based on the flawed assumption that a president would be willing to gamble our nation’s security on a bluff, and that no adversary would be willing or able to call such a bluff. Instead of increasing our security, pursuing a strategy that cannot achieve its goal could leave our nation less secure and our world less stable.” Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), an acknowledged expert on US defense capabilities, says, “To abandon the ABM with the hope to get that [missile defense] capacity somewhere down the line would damage the security interests of the United States.” Senator John Kerry (D-MA) notes: “If you can’t shoot down 100 percent of them [nuclear missiles], you haven’t gotten rid of mutually assured destruction. And if you can, you set off an arms race to develop a capacity that can’t be touched by a missile defense system.” Perhaps most disparaging is a comment by Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) who says that the new missile defense systems under consideration are “more appropriate to [film studio] Dreamworks and [film director] Steven Spielberg than to actual implementation.” [Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 5/2/2001]

Entity Tags: John Kerry, George W. Bush, Tom Daschle, Joseph Biden, Neil Abercrombie

Category Tags: Neoconservatives in Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Foreign Policy, Post-Soviet Relations

At a joint press conference in Genoa, Italy, US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin discuss the necessity of maintaining the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see May 26, 1972), a treaty from which Bush and many American conservatives wish to withdraw (see May 1, 2001 and June 2001). Putin says, “As far as the ABM Treaty and the issues of offensive arms, I’ve already said we’ve come to the conclusion that [the] two of these issues have to be discussed as a set… one and the other are very closely tied.” Bush, who agrees with his administration’s conservatives, counters that the two nations do not need such treaties because they have “a new relationship based on trust.” Putin responds: “The world is far from having international relations that are built solely on trust, unfortunately. That’s why it is so important today to rely on the existing foundation of treaties and agreements in the arms control and disarmament areas.” Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, dismisses the idea that the Russians could distrust the US as “silly.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 175]

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

Presidents Bush and Putin during the summit.Presidents Bush and Putin during the summit. [Source: BBC]The first summit meeting between US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin goes well, with the two apparently forming a warm working relationship. Both say they have found the basis for a relationship of mutual respect. Bush describes Putin as straightforward and trustworthy, and says: “I looked the man in the eye.… I was able to get a sense of his soul.” No real progress is made on the issues that divide the two nations—particularly US plans to enlarge NATO and expand its defense capabilities—but Bush says the two sides are resolved to put aside Cold War-era attitudes and differences, and to move away from the concept of “mutually assured destruction” and towards “mutually earned respect.” [BBC, 7/16/2001]

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Post-Soviet Relations

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice publicly joins the chorus of Bush administration officials demanding that the US withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see May 26, 1972, May 1, 2001 and June 2001). Rice, an expert on the former Soviet Union, describes herself as a former “high priestess of arms control” who has changed her thinking. She says there is no longer a reason to discuss respective numbers of ballistic missiles held by the US and Russia, or, as she says, no further reason to debate “how many warheads could dance on the head of an SS-18.” [Chicago Sun-Times, 7/16/2001; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 184]

Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, Post-Soviet Relations

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the Russian government realizes the US will attempt to push into the Central Asian “Stans”—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—as part of the US effort to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the region. But these countries had been part of the Soviet Union ten years before, and Russia does not want the US increasing its influence there. On September 13, 2001, Russian intelligence officials hold a meeting with Northern Alliance figures and the other governments that support the Northern Alliance—Iran, India, and Uzbekistan. They promise to increase support to the Northern Alliance in an attempt to outbid the US and keep the US military out of the region. Soon after, Tajikistan announces that it will not allow its airspace to be used by US aircraft. But Uzbekistan is the key country, since it has the most military bases inherited from the Soviet era, the largest population, and also a key strategic location. It also has been working with the CIA against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for several years (see 1998 and After). Uzbekistan indicates it is going to allow the US to base some of its military operations there. Realizing that the other countries are likely to follow Uzbekistan’s lead, Russia switches positions and attempts to make a collective offer to the US. On September 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a meeting in Moscow with the leaders from all the “Stans” in an attempt to reach a joint agreement about allowing the US to use former Soviet military bases. A formal deal is reached between the US and Russia on September 22 after Putin speaks to President Bush on the telephone.
bullet The US agrees that its bases in the region will only be temporary.
bullet Bush will stop criticizing Russia for its war in Chechnya.
bullet The US will consult with Russia before taking further steps in Central Asia.
bullet The US will help accelerate Russian integration into Western economic institutions.
bullet Russian commanders who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s give extensive briefings to US Army generals.
By this time, CIA teams are already moving into the K2 air base in southern Uzbekistan. Tajikistan also reverses course and allows the US to use bases there as well. Deals between the US, Russia, and Central Asian countries are initially kept secret from the public. But within days of the agreement between Putin and Bush, newspapers begin to report that US forces are moving into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Other countries make similar deals later (see September 22, 2001-December 2001). [Rashid, 2008, pp. 69-71]

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Russia, George W. Bush, Taliban, United States

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, US and International Terrorism, Post-Soviet Relations

Nine Republican senators, led by conservatives Jesse Helms (R-NC), Trent Lott (R-MS), and Jon Kyl (R-AZ), send a letter to President Bush urging him to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see May 26, 1972, May 1, 2001, and June 2001). They explain their position by arguing that the ABM Treaty has become “the most significant obstacle to improved relations between the United States and Russia.” This argument is a complete reversal of conservatives’ earlier positions: that arms control agreements such as the ABM Treaty did nothing to stabilize relations between the US and its nuclear-armed opponents. The argument also flies in the face of public and private statements by Russian leaders, who consider the treaty one of the key elements of stable US-Russian relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stressed the importance of the treaty in maintaining nuclear parity between the two nations (see July 2001), even as Russia seeks to reduce its nuclear arsenal from 6,000 to 1,500 deployed missiles. In 2008, author J. Peter Scoblic will speculate as to why conservatives wish to withdraw from the treaty: “For isolationists, missile defense renewed the dream of Fortress America, allowing us to retreat even further from crises abroad. For nationalists and moralists, missile defense was a shield against engagement and detente in the event that, say, North Korea was to develop a nuclear-armed ICBM (see August 31, 1998). For neoconservatives, missile defense was a necessary adjunct to their proactive vision of changing regimes and democratizing the world” (see March 12, 2001). [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 174-176]

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush, J. Peter Scoblic, Trent Lott, Jon Kyl, Jesse Helms

Category Tags: Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

John Yoo and Robert Delahunty of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) write a classified memo to John Bellinger, the senior legal counsel to the National Security Council. Yoo and Delahunty claim that President Bush has the unilateral authority to “suspend certain articles” of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and Russia (see May 26, 1972). Six months later, President Bush will withdraw the US from the treaty (see December 13, 2001). [US Department of Justice, 11/15/2001 pdf file; American Civil Liberties Union [PDF], 1/28/2009 pdf file] The memo will not be released until two months after the Bush administration leaves the White House (see March 2, 2009).

Entity Tags: National Security Council, John Bellinger, John C. Yoo, US Department of Justice, Robert J. Delahunty, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ)

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Neoconservatives in Foreign Policy, Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, Post-Soviet Relations

The Bush administration, prodded by State Department official John Bolton, refuses to certify that Russia is in compliance with international accords banning chemical and biological weapons. As a result, Russia is no longer eligible for State Department and Defense Department funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs (see January 10, 2001 and After). The Clinton administration harbored similar concerns, but believed that helping Russia secure its loose nuclear weapons and technology was more important than holding Russia in noncompliance in the CBW accords. In related negotiations, Bolton successfully impedes progress in negotiations in a liability agreement with the US over the securing of “loose nukes”; Bolton insists on absolving US government officials, as well as private firms and personnel, of any liability for accidents or even sabotage encountered as part of the nonproliferation programs. The dispute will not be resolved until September 2006. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 209]

Entity Tags: Clinton administration, Bush administration (43), US Department of State, John R. Bolton, US Department of Defense

Category Tags: Biological Weapons Programs, Chemical Weapons Programs, Neoconservatives in Foreign Policy, Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

Bush and Putin at a Kremlin news conference announcing the SORT signing.Bush and Putin at a Kremlin news conference announcing the SORT signing. [Source: September 11 News (.com)]Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin sign a joint US-Russian treaty, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), agreeing to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals from some 6,000 warheads, respectively, to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads apiece. Bush allies hail the agreement as evidence of Bush’s willingness to negotiate with other nations and his desire to reduce and perhaps end the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation. However, the treaty is very similar in content to an informal agreement between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in 1997. And SORT has far more flexibility built into its framework than either Clinton or Yeltsin had discussed: it does not call for the destruction of delivery vehicles, as the START I and II agreements had (see May 1982 and After), nor does it call for the destruction of warheads themselves, as START III had. In reality, either side can merely remove weapons from missiles and bombers, store them, and redeploy them in the future. Secretary of State Colin Powell will reassure conservative senators in June that “the treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want.” Arms reduction opponent John Bolton (see June 2001) approves the treaty, later noting that it “provided ‘exit ramps’ to allow for rapid change.” The treaty—only 500 words long—provides for no verification protocols whatsoever. And, as author J. Peter Scoblic will later write, “in a bit of diplomatic quantum mechanics, the treaty’s warhead limit was slated to take effect on the very day that it expired—December 31, 2012—meaning it would be valid for no more than twenty-four hours.” Scoblic will conclude that the treaty, in line with Bush’s “new strategic framework” (see May 1, 2001), is “still designed to fight nothing less than an all-out nuclear war with Russia.” [Federation of American Scientists, 5/24/2002; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 177-178] Bush sees little need for the treaty, or any treaty, saying that “mutual trust” between the US and Russia should suffice (see July 2001). He agrees to this treaty in what Scoblic later calls a “condescending” manner, saying, “If we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I’ll do that.” Bolton will later call the treaty “the end of arms control.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 184]

Entity Tags: J. Peter Scoblic, George W. Bush, John R. Bolton, Vladimir Putin, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Colin Powell, Boris Yeltsin

Category Tags: Nuclear Weapons Treaties, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports on an array of problems with the military’s missile defense system (see March 23, 1983 and January 29, 1991). Its report includes an unclassified list of 50 recommendations for improving the system that originated in a public report produced by the Pentagon in 2000. Instead of acting on the recommendations, the Pentagon declares the list of recommendations “retroactively classified,” thereby forbidding Congressional members from discussing the recommendations in public. House members Henry Waxman (D-CA) and John Tierney (D-MA), who requested the GAO report, send an angry letter to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld calling the decision to classify the recommendations “highly dubious” and “an attempt to stymie public debate through the use of the classification system.” Rumsfeld ignores the protest. [Savage, 2007, pp. 103-104]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Henry A. Waxman, John Tierney, Donald Rumsfeld, General Accounting Office

Timeline Tags: US Military, Civil Liberties

Category Tags: US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

John Bolton, a neoconservative and the Bush administration’s chief official in charge of arms reduction, says he does not believe that the unsecured nuclear weapons and items of nuclear technology belonging to the former Soviet Union pose any threat to US security. Three years earlier, a commission reported that Russian and other Eastern European “loose nukes” posed the single greatest danger to the US. “I don’t believe that at this point, or for some number of years, there’s been a significant risk of a Russian nuclear weapon getting into terrorist hands,” Bolton says. “I say that in part because of all the money we’ve spent… but also because the Russians themselves are completely aware that the most likely consequence of losing control of one of their own nuclear weapons is that it will be used in Russia.” [Washington Post, 10/26/2004] In 2008, author J. Peter Scoblic will write, “This assessment flew in the face of all available evidence regarding what had and had not been accomplished in Russia.” Only 54 percent of former Soviet facilities containing nuclear materials are under satisfactory security measures. The US has no idea how many Russian tactical nuclear weapons exist, where they are stored, or how well they are guarded, if they are guarded at all. Scoblic will write, “These are the weapons that nuclear experts calculate terrorists would most likely steal because their smaller size makes them easier to transport and conceal.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 209]

Entity Tags: J. Peter Scoblic, John R. Bolton, Bush administration (43)

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Neoconservatives in Foreign Policy, Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, US and International Terrorism, Post-Soviet Relations

Former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), one of the nation’s most respected defense experts, is critical of the Bush administration’s wholesale failure to work to help Russia secure its “loose nukes” (see January 10, 2001 and After and August 2002). “In measuring the adequacy of our response to today’s nuclear threats,” he says, “on a scale of one to ten, I would give us about a three.” Nunn adds that a recent summit between Presidents Bush and Putin moves the US “closer to a four.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 210]

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Bush administration (43), Sam Nunn, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, Post-Soviet Relations

Russia strenuously objects to US plans to deploy 10 missile interceptors and an advanced radar system in Eastern Europe—in essence creating a missile defense system in several former Soviet satellite states. Russia says that those installations will be targeted by Russian nuclear weapons, and hints that it will accelerate its development of new ICBMs and new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, threatening a new, post-Cold War arms race. The US protests that the weapons systems are not intended for use against Russian targets, but the Russian government is not mollified. “In questions of military-strategic stability there are… immutable laws, actions, counteractions, defense, offensive systems,” says Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. “These laws operate regardless of how somebody would like to see this or that situation. The military has its own duty, to figure out threats and take countermeasures.” Russian President Vladimir Putin says that the US missile defense system plans are “destroying the strategic equilibrium in the world,” and adds, “In order to restore that balance without setting up a missile defense system, we will have to create a system to overcome missile defense, and that is what we are doing now.” If the US continues with its planned deployment, Russia says it will stop observing the limits on conventional arms in Europe, an agreement negotiated by George H. W. Bush, and will consider withdrawing from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (see December 7-8, 1987). [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 190-191]

Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov

Category Tags: Diplomacy and Geopolitics, US Foreign Policy, US Nuclear Weapons Programs, Post-Soviet Relations

An anonymous Kremlin official suggests that Wikileaks founder Julian Assange should receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Following US criticism of Assange after Wikileaks began to release US diplomatic cables, the official tells the state news agency RIA Novosti: “[N]on-governmental and governmental organizations should think of ways to help him. Perhaps he could be awarded a Nobel prize.” [Haaretz, 12/8/2010]

Entity Tags: Julian Assange, WikiLeaks

Timeline Tags: Misc Entries, Domestic Propaganda

Category Tags: Post-Soviet Relations

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