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The United Nations passes Resolution 678. The resolution gives Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw entirely from Kuwait (see July 25, 1990) and restore its national sovereignty. The US uses UN authority to build a “coalition” of nations to support its upcoming “Desert Storm” operation designed to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (see January 16, 1991 and After). 34 countries contribute personnel: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. West Germany and Japan do not contribute forces, but they do contribute $6.6 billion and $10 billion, respectively, to the cause. While some countries join out of a sincere belief that Iraq must not be allowed to dominate the region and control Middle Eastern oil reserves (see August 7, 1990), others are more reluctant, believing that the affair is an internal matter best resolved by other Arab countries, and some fear increased US influence in Kuwait and the region. Some of these nations are persuaded by Iraq’s belligerence towards other Arab nations as well as by US offers of economic aid and/or debt forgiveness. [NationMaster, 12/23/2007] As with all such UN resolutions, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein rejects this resolution. [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, United Nations

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) lives in Qatar during these years. He is invited there by Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Qatar’s Minister of Religious Affairs at the time. He works on a farm owned by al-Thani and lives in the open, not even bothering to use an alias. He works as a project engineer for the government. One US official will later recall that al-Thani “has this farm and he always had a lot of people around, the house was always overstaffed, a lot of unemployed Afghan Arabs…. There were always these guys hanging around and maybe a couple of Kalashnikovs [machine guns] in the corner.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] KSM continues to plot and travel extensively, including a 1995 trip to fight in Bosnia with the trip’s expenses paid for by al-Thani. Apparently the CIA becomes aware that KSM is living there in 1995 and is also already aware of his role in the 1993 WTC bombing and the Bojinka plot (see October 1995). KSM will finally have to leave his Qatar base after his presence becomes too well known in early 1996 (see January-May 1996). [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 147, 488] KSM will return to Qatar occasionally, even staying there with the knowledge of some Qatari royals for two weeks after 9/11 (see Late 2001).

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

1992-1995: KSM Fights and Fundraises in Bosnia

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) fights and fundraises in Bosnia. The 9/11 Commission will later state, “In 1992, KSM spent some time fighting alongside the mujaheddin in Bosnia and supporting that effort with financial donations.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 147] He reportedly fights with the elite El Mujahid battalion, and gains Bosnian citizenship. [Schindler, 2007, pp. 281] He also works for Egypitska Pomoc, an Egyptian aid group in Zenica, Bosnia, and in 1995 becomes one of its directors. [Playboy, 6/1/2005] KSM mostly lives in Qatar for the next three years (see 1992-1996), but in 1995 he is back fighting in Bosnia as the violence escalates that year. Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Qatar’s Minister of Religious Affairs, underwrites the costs of the trip. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 147, 488] This second trip to Bosnia means that KSM fights there at the same time as 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, though it is not known if they meet (see 1993-1999). The FBI will later suspect that KSM helped build a bomb used to blow up a police station in neighboring Croatia while KSM was in the area (see October 20, 1995).

Entity Tags: El Mujahid battalion, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Egypitska Pomoc, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Mohammmed Salameh.Mohammmed Salameh. [Source: Sygma / Corbis]An internal FBI report finds that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) played a role in the bombing of the World Trade Center. According to the report, KSM wired $660 from Qatar to a bank account of Mohammed Salameh, one of the key bombers, on November 3, 1992. This is apparently the first time KSM has come to the attention of US law enforcement. Transaction records show the money was sent from “Khaled Shaykh” in Doha, Qatar, which is where KSM is living openly and without an alias at the time (see 1992-1995). [US Congress, 7/24/2003] KSM also frequently talked to his nephew Ramzi Yousef on the phone about the bombing and sent him a passport to escape the country, but apparently these details are not discovered until much later. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 147, 488]

Entity Tags: Mohammed Salameh, Ramzi Yousef, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Ramzi Yousef attempts to bomb two US airliners over the US. On January 31, 1995, Yousef flies from Pakistan to Thailand, despite an international manhunt, and meets his associate Istaique Parker there. Yousef has Parker check two suitcases filled with bombs and put one on a Delta Airlines flight and another on a United Airlines flight. Both are timed to blow up over populated areas of the US. Parker spends much of the day at the airport, but is too scared to approach the airlines with the suitcases. Finally he returns to Yousef at a hotel and lies that the airline cargo sections were asking for passports and fingerprints so he could not go through with it. Yousef comes up with another plan. He calls a friend in Qatar who is willing to take the suitcases to London and then fly them to the US where they will explode and destroy the plane. The name of this friend has not been revealed but his father is said to be a very senior politician and leading member of the establishment in Qatar. Yousef plans to use the friend’s diplomatic immunity to make sure the suitcases are not checked. (At this time, Yousef’s uncle Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is living in Qatar as the guest of a Qatari cabinet official (see 1992-1996).) However, a problem develops and the plot cannot be carried out. On February 2, Yousef and Parker return to Pakistan. Parker turns Yousef in for reward money a few days later. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 98-100]

Entity Tags: Istaique Parker, Ramzi Yousef

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) goes to Sudan, but he is soon discovered there by the Sudanese intelligence agency. Sudan is facing increasing trouble with Western countries due to its reputation as a terrorist haven, so KSM is told to leave and given a few weeks to move on. Later in the year, Sudanese intelligence tells an FBI agent about KSM’s recent visit and also reveals that he was headed to Qatar (where he has already been based for several years 1992-1996). By October 1995, the FBI tracks KSM to a certain apartment building in Qatar, but he will escape capture (see October 1995). [Miniter, 2003, pp. 85-86]

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Sudan, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Melissa Boyle Mahle.Melissa Boyle Mahle. [Source: Publicity photo]According to a later account by CIA agent Melissa Boyle Mahle, “a tidbit received late in the year revealed the location” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) in Qatar (see 1992-1996). [Mahle, 2005, pp. 247-248] This presumably is information the FBI learned in Sudan that KSM was traveling to Qatar (see Shortly Before October 1995). However, US intelligence should also have been aware that KSM’s nephew Ramzi Yousef attempted to call him in Qatar in February 1995 while Yousef was in US custody (see After February 7, 1995-January 1996). Mahle is assigned to verify KSM’s identity. She claims that at the time the CIA is aware of KSM’s involvement in the Bojinka plot in the Philippines (see January 6, 1995) and in the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993) She is able to match his fingerprints with a set of fingerprints the CIA already has in their files. [Guardian, 3/31/2005] By October 1995, the FBI tracks KSM to a certain apartment building in Qatar. Then, using high-technology surveillance, his presence in the building is confirmed. [Miniter, 2003, pp. 85-86] Mahle argues that KSM should be rendered out of the country in secret. The US began rendering terrorist suspects in 1993 (see 1993), and a prominent Egyptian extremist is rendered by the CIA in September 1995 (see September 13, 1995). She argues her case to CIA headquarters and to the highest reaches of the NSA, but is overruled. [Guardian, 3/31/2005] Instead, the decision is made to wait until KSM can be indicted in a US court and ask Qatar to extradite him to the US. Despite the surveillance on KSM, he apparently is able to leave Qatar and travel to Brazil with bin Laden and then back to Qatar at the end of 1995 (see December 1995). KSM will be indicted in early 1996, but he will escape from Qatar a few months later (see January-May 1996).

Entity Tags: Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Melissa Boyle Mahle, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Bin Laden reportedly visits Qatar at least twice between the years of 1996 and 2000. He visits Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, the country’s religious minister who later becomes the interior minister. [New York Times, 6/8/2002; ABC News, 2/7/2003] In 1999, the New York Times reports that bin Laden visited al-Thani “in Qatar twice in the mid-1990s.” [New York Times, 7/8/1999] Presumably one of these times is in May 1996, when bin Laden stops by Qatar while moving from Sudan to Afghanistan, and is reportedly warmly greeted by officials there (see May 18, 1996). Former CIA officer Robert Baer will later claim that one meeting between bin Laden and al-Thani takes place on August 10, 1996. [Baer, 2003, pp. 195] Al-Thani is known to shelter Muslim extremists. For instance, the CIA narrowly missed catching al-Qaeda leaders Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mohammed Atef at his farm in May 1996 (see January-May 1996). Al-Thani is a member of Qatar’s royal family, but ABC News will later report, “One former CIA official who preferred to remain anonymous said the connection went beyond al-Thani and there were others in the Qatari royal family who were sympathetic and provided safe havens for al-Qaeda.” [New York Times, 6/8/2002; ABC News, 2/7/2003] Al-Thani will reportedly shelter al-Qaeda leaders like KSM even after 9/11 (see March 28, 2003), but the US has not taken any action against him, such as officially declaring him a terrorism financier.

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Robert Baer

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Early 1996: KSM Said to be Building a Bomb

In early 1996, while US officials are waiting from approval from officials in Qatar so they can arrest Khalid Shaikh Mohammmed (KSM) there, the Qatari government tells the US that it fears KSM is constructing an explosive device. They also say that he possesses more than 20 different passports. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] By this time, the US is aware of KSM’s involvement in the 1995 Bojinka plot involving explosives (see January 6, 1995) and his role in the 1993 WTC bombing (see March 20, 1993).

Entity Tags: Qatar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani.Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani. [Source: Fethi Belaid/ Agence France-Presse]Since Operation Bojinka was uncovered in the Philippines (see January 6, 1995), many of the plot’s major planners, including Ramzi Yousef, are found and arrested. One major exception is 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). He flees to Qatar in the Persian Gulf, where he has been living openly using his real name, enjoying the patronage of Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Qatar’s Interior Minister and a member of the royal family (see 1992-1996). [ABC News, 2/7/2003] He had accepted al-Thani’s invitation to live on his farm around 1992 (see 1992-1995). The CIA learned KSM was living in Qatar in 1995 after his nephew Ramzi Yousef attempted to call him there while in US custody (see After February 7, 1995-January 1996). The Sudanese government also tipped off the FBI that KSM was traveling to Qatar. Some CIA agents strongly urged action against KSM after his exact location in Qatar was determined, but no action was taken (see October 1995). In January 1996, KSM is indicted in the US for his role in the 1993 WTC bombing, and apparently this leads to an effort to apprehend him in Qatar that same month. FBI Director Louis Freeh sends a letter to the Qatari government asking for permission to send a team after him. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] One of Freeh’s diplomatic notes states that KSM was involved in a conspiracy to “bomb US airliners” and is believed to be “in the process of manufacturing an explosive device.” [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] Qatar confirms that KSM is there and is making explosives, but they delay handing him over. After waiting several months, a high-level meeting takes place in Washington to consider a commando raid to seize him. However, the raid is deemed too risky, and another letter is sent to the Qatari government instead. One person at the meeting later states, “If we had gone in and nabbed this guy, or just cut his head off, the Qatari government would not have complained a bit. Everyone around the table for their own reasons refused to go after someone who fundamentally threatened American interests….” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] Around May 1996, Mohammed’s patron al-Thani makes sure that Mohammed and four others are given blank passports and a chance to escape. A former Qatari police chief later says the other men include Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda’s number two and number three leaders, respectively (see Early 1998). [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; ABC News, 2/7/2003] In 1999, the New York Times will report that “Although American officials said they had no conclusive proof, current and former officials said they believed that the Foreign Minister [Sheik Hamed bin Jasim al-Thani] was involved, directly or indirectly” in tipping off KSM. [New York Times, 7/8/1999] KSM will continue to occasionally use Qatar as a safe haven, even staying there for two weeks after 9/11 (see Late 2001).

Entity Tags: Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed Atef, Hamed bin Jasim al-Thani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Louis J. Freeh, Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The CIA apparently ignores a warning from a recently retired CIA agent that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is heading al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations. Robert Baer left the CIA in late 1997 and began private consulting in the Middle East. Baer soon meets Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad al Thani, who was Qatar’s minister of the economy and chief of police until he was deposed and exiled the year before. Al Thani tells Baer that KSM is now bin Laden’s chief of terrorist operations, and gives Baer other details about KSM, including how some Qatari royals helped KSM escape Qatar the year before after the CIA tracked him there (see January-May 1996 and Early 1998). In early 1998, Baer passes all this information on to a friend still in the CIA, who then passes it on to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. But the friend writes back a week later, saying the CIA showed no interest. [Baer, 2003, pp. 190-198] The 9/11 Commission, by contrast, will later claim that, in 1997 and 1998, KSM has some links with al-Qaeda, but mostly helps them collect newspaper articles and update computer equipment. Supposedly, not until after the August 1998 embassy bombings does he begin working directly with al-Qaeda on plotting attacks. This account appears entirely based on KSM’s testimony taken while in US custody. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 149-150] It will later be reported that up to 90 percent of KSM’s testimony could be inaccurate, mostly due to the use of torture (see Late August 1998). Further, the CIA gained evidence shortly after the embassy bombings that KSM was one of the masterminds of those bombings, which would strongly support Baer’s information over the 9/11 Commission version (see August 6, 2007).

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Robert Baer, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad al Thani

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

In 2008, the website Intelwire.com will obtain a declassified FBI document from this date. The content is heavily redacted, including the title, but the full title appears to be, “Summary of information obtained from the United Arab Emirates with regard to Manila Air fugitive Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.” The document appears to detail a briefing by United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials from the General Department of State Security to FBI officials visiting the UAE. It mentions that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) “who was reported to be in _____ during mid-1998, is still currently living in Sharjah, UAE, with his family.” The report also mentions that “in July 1998, authorities from ______ based on information probably obtained from Qatar, located KSM living and working in ____. After questioning him about his activities with the [Muslim Brotherhood], he was deported to Bahrain.” [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 7/8/1999 pdf file] The 9/11 Commission will later mention this document a single time, and reveal that one of the redacted sections discusses KSM’s links to the Abu Sayyaf militant group in the Philippines. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 488] Sharjah is a major hub of al-Qaeda activity at this time (see Mid-1996-October 2001), and one of the 9/11 hijackers, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, is from the emirate of Sharjah (see 1980s and 1990s). 9/11 plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi will be based in Sharjah in the months before the 9/11 attacks, and some of the 9/11 hijackers will pass through there and visit him (see Early-Late June, 2001). It is not known what action US intelligence takes in response to this briefing.

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Muslim Brotherhood, General Department of State Security

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Hamza Alghamdi.Hamza Alghamdi. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division]Future 9/11 hijacker Hamza Alghamdi flies from Iran to Kuwait on October 8, travels to Qatar the next day, and enters Saudi Arabia on October 13. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 32-33 pdf file] According to the 9/11 Commission, he is accompanied on the flight from Iran to Kuwait by fellow hijacker Mohand Alshehri. The 9/11 Commission will mention this flight in a section of its final report suggesting co-operation on travel between Iran, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda—Iran may have helped al-Qaeda by allowing operatives to transit Iran on their way to and from Afghanistan without stamping their passports (see After October 12, 2000). According to a detainee who may have been tortured, Alghamdi was in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000 (see Summer 2000); according to militant leader Luai Sakra, he was in Turkey at around this time (see Late 1999-2000), so it is unclear where Alghamdi and Alshehri are coming from. In any case, there are no direct links between this flight and actions by Iranian operatives, although the commission will note in this context that a senior Hezbollah operative visited Saudi Arabia around this time, and planned to help people in Saudi Arabia travel to Iran. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 240] The 9/11 Commission’s statement that the hijackers took this flight will be based on intelligence reports from the NSA, mostly drafted shortly after 9/11. Another source for the paragraph that mentions this flight will be “operative’s claimed identification of photos of two Sept. 11 hijackers,” dated August 2002, although it will not be clear if this applies to this trip by Alghamdi and Alshehri. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 529; Shenon, 2008, pp. 370-3]

Entity Tags: Hamza Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

US Central Command raises the force protection condition level for US forces based in the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In six countries the force protection level is raised to Delta, the highest level possible. The US orders all its naval ships docked in those countries out to sea, and the US Fifth Fleet moves out of port in Bahrain. Regional military exercises are canceled and US embassies are temporarily closed. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 256-257, 534] This is partly in response to an al-Qaeda video which surfaced the previous week containing the message, “It’s time to penetrate America and Israel and hit them where it hurts most” (see June 19, 2001). [Bamford, 2004, pp. 241; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 256, 534] Additionally, Newsweek reports at the time that this alert comes after “Western intelligence agencies picked up ‘quite reliable’ signs of increased activity among Islamic extremists with Afghanistan ties. These indications are said to have included information picked up through electronic monitoring of suspected militants, who US experts say have acquired fairly sophisticated communications and computer equipment.” [Newsweek, 7/22/2001] However, as author James Bamford later notes, “No precautions were ever taken within the United States, only overseas.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 241]

Entity Tags: US Fifth Fleet, US Central Command

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, from Qatar but a legal US resident, arrives in the US with his wife and five children, reportedly to pursue a master’s degree in computer science at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois. [Peoria Journal Star, 12/19/2001; New York Times, 6/21/2004] Al-Marri appears to have been sent to the US by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). During his interrogation, KSM will identify al-Marri as “the point of contact for al-Qaeda operatives arriving in the US for September 11 follow-on operations.” He will describe al-Marri as “the perfect sleeper agent because he has studied in the United States, had no criminal record, and had a family with whom he could travel.” [Newsweek, 6/15/2003] However, there are doubts about the reliability of KSM’s interrogation, which is believed that have been obtained through the use of torture (see June 16, 2004). Al-Marri also lived in Illinois for part of 2000 under a different name. [New York Daily News, 1/11/2003] He is apparently related to Mohamed al-Khatani, who attempted to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see July 2002). [New York Times, 6/21/2004] In December 2001, al-Marri will be detained as a material witness to the 9/11 attacks (see December 12, 2001).

Entity Tags: Mohamed al-Khatani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

The New York Times will later report that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) hides in Qatar for two weeks with the support of some members of the Qatari royal family. KSM stays there “with the help of prominent patrons” after fleeing from Kuwait. One of the Qatari royals sheltering KSM is possibly Abdul Karim al-Thani, who has repeatedly sheltered Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and given passports and more than $1 million to al-Qaeda. It is also possible that KSM may have received help from Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, who is Qatar’s Interior Minister by this time and who allowed KSM live on his farm for several years until 1996 (see January-May 1996). CIA Director George Tenet is reportedly infuriated, but no action is taken. In fact, the US military will base its headquarters for the Iraq war in Qatar (see March 28, 2003). [New York Times, 2/6/2003]

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abdul Karim al-Thani, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Qatari citizen Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a computer science graduate student at Illinois’s Bradley University, is arrested as a material witness to the 9/11 attacks. [Peoria Journal Star, 12/19/2001; CNN, 12/13/2005] Al-Marri was interviewed twice by the FBI, once on October 2 and again on December 11. Both times, according to the FBI, he lied in response to their questions. Al-Marri claimed to have entered the US on September 10, 2001, his first visit to the country since 1991, when he earned his undergraduate degree at Bradley. [CBS News, 6/23/2003; CNN, 12/13/2005]
Connections to 9/11 Terrorists Alleged - The FBI says al-Marri has been in the US since 2000. Al-Marri denied calling the United Arab Emirates phone number of Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial of suspected “20th hijacker” Zacarias Moussaoui. Prosecutors say al-Hawsawi provided financial backing to Moussaoui and the 9/11 hijackers, and allegedly helped some of the hijackers travel from Pakistan to the United Arab Emirates and then to the US in preparation for the attacks. [CBS News, 6/23/2003; Progressive, 3/2007] (Al-Hawsawi will be captured in Pakistan in March 2003, and detained in an undisclosed location somewhere outside the US. See Early-Late June, 2001) [CNN, 12/13/2005] The government also alleges that the phone number was a contact number for Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, another unindicted co-conspirator in the Moussaoui indictment. The government says that two calling cards were used to call the number, which was also listed as a contact number on a package it believes was sent by 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta to the UAE on September 8, 2001. The cards were allegedly used to place phone calls from al-Marri’s residence, from his cellphone, and from the Marriott hotel room he was staying in on September 11. However, none of the three calls to the UAE number were made from phones registered to Al-Marri, though, nor is there proof he placed them. Some of the calls made from the card to the UAE were placed to relatives of al-Marri. [Bradley Scout, 3/29/2002] In March 2002, Justice Department official Alice Fisher will say that an unnamed al-Qaeda detainee “in a position to know… positively identified al-Marri as an al-Qaeda sleeper operative who was tasked to help new al-Qaeda operatives get settled in the United States for follow-on attacks after 9/11.” That unidentified tipster brought al-Marri to the attention of federal law enforcement shortly after the attacks. FBI officials have said that al-Marri is not considered to have played any part in the attacks, but is still considered a danger to the US. [Knight Ridder, 6/23/2003] In 2003, the FBI adds that it found “an almanac with bookmarks in pages that provided information about major US dams, reservoirs, waterways and railroads.” [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003] He is believed to be a relative of Saudi national and future Guantanamo detainee Mohamed al-Khatani, who is said to be an intended 9/11 hijacker (see July 2002). [New York Times, 6/21/2004]
Bank and Credit Card Fraud - According to the FBI, al-Marri obtained a bank account under a false name, rented a motel room under a false name to create a mailing address, and formed a fake company, AAA Carpet, using the motel’s address. The FBI also says al-Marri used a fake Social Security number to open three other bank accounts. Al-Marri was carrying well over 15 fake credit card numbers on him when he was interviewed yesterday, says the US Attorney’s office in Illinois. [CBS News, 6/23/2003; Progressive, 3/2007] There are also allegedly over 1,000 more in his personal computer files. He has missed so many classes, the FBI says, that he is on the verge of flunking out. The FBI says al-Marri’s computer also contains Arabic lectures by Osama bin Laden, photographs of the 9/11 attacks, and a cartoon of planes crashing into the World Trade Center. The computer has a folder labeled “jihad arena,” and another labeled “chem,” which, government officials say, contains industrial chemical distributor websites used by al-Marri to obtain information about hydrogen cyanide, a poisonous gas used in chemical weapons. [CNN, 12/13/2005] Al-Marri consents to the search and the seizure of his computer and other possessions. [Bradley Scout, 3/29/2002] Al-Marri will be charged with financial crimes in 2002 (see February 8, 2002), charges that later will be dropped (see June 23, 2003). [CBS News, 6/23/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Zacarias Moussaoui, Mohamed al-Khatani, Alice Fisher, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda, Bradley University, Osama bin Laden, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Accused al-Qaeda sleeper agent Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (see December 12, 2001) is charged with one count of credit card fraud. He has already been arrested on a material witness warrant pertaining to the investigation of the 9/11 attacks; since January, he has been in detention in New York City, where most of the investigations are centered. [Bradley Scout, 3/29/2002] According to the FBI, phone records link al-Marri with a phone number in the United Arab Emirates that was used by 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and one of his associates, Ramzi bin Al-Shibh. Al-Marri’s lawyer, Richard Jasper, says there is no evidence linking al-Marri to the phone calls by Atta and bin al-Shibh, al-Marri merely attempted three phone calls to the same number. “Attempted—I don’t know what that means, do you?” Jasper says. “It’s the thinnest of inferences, actually. If you read the affidavit carefully there’s no direct or indirect evidence he made the calls. How do we know there wasn’t some kind of mistaken call or some flaw in recovering the numbers?” Al-Marri has family members in the UAE. [Chicago Sun-Times, 3/21/2002]

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Richard Jasper, Mohamed Atta

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. [Source: Qatar embassy]Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda recently interviewed 9/11 figures Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), though there are conflicting accounts about whether the interview took place before or after KSM was publicly identified as the 9/11 mastermind (see April, June, or August 2002). Author Ron Suskind will later claim in the book The One Percent Doctrine that on June 14, 2002, Fouda went to his superiors at Al Jazeera’s headquarters in Qatar and told them about the interview. He speaks to Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani, the chairman of Al Jazeera and the cousin of the emir of Qatar, and a few others. At this time, the US is intensely pressuring the Qatari government to get Al Jazeera to tone down what the US perceives as anti-American news coverage. In fact, it is widely believed in Qatar that the US deliberately bombed the Al Jazeera office in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November 2001 to send a message. Perhaps as a result of this pressure, a few days after Fouda reveals his interview, the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, tells the CIA all about it. Fouda described some of al-Qaeda’s operational plans and even had a good idea where the apartment was in Karachi, Pakistan, where the interview took place, and what floor he had been on. Suskind claims that “No one, not even Al Jazeera management, knew the emir was making the call” to the CIA. US intelligence begins an intense surveillance of Karachi in an attempt to find KSM and bin al-Shibh (see Before September 11, 2002). Mostly because of this lead, bin al-Shibh will be arrested in Karachi in September 2002, around the time when Fouda’s interview is finally aired in public (see September 11, 2002). [Suskind, 2006, pp. 134-140] Interestingly, in early September 2002, it will be reported that KSM was arrested in an apartment in Karachi on June 16, 2002, which would be right about when the CIA was given this information (see June 16, 2002).

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Yosri Fouda, Al Jazeera, Central Intelligence Agency, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani, Ramzi bin al-Shibh

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Abdulaziz Alomari filmed speaking in Afghanistan in early 2001. He stands in front of a large map of the world.Abdulaziz Alomari filmed speaking in Afghanistan in early 2001. He stands in front of a large map of the world. [Source: Spiegel TV]Details of an Al Jazeera interview with al-Qaeda leaders Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see April, June, or August 2002) are widely publicized starting on September 8, 2002. [London Times, 9/8/2002; Australian, 9/9/2002; Guardian, 9/9/2002] But there are numerous doubts about this interview, since there is no video footage and only audio footage from bin al-Shibh. It has further been suggested that the broadcast of bin al-Shibh’s voice in the interview helps in his arrest (see September 11, 2002). [Observer, 9/15/2002; CBS News, 10/9/2002] Bin al-Shibh’s voice is first broadcast on September 9, 2002, as part of uncredited narration on another documentary released that day (see September 9, 2002). His voice is only publicly identified as his on the morning of September 11, 2002, just hours before bin al-Shibh is said to be arrested. [Fouda and Fielding, 2003, pp. 159] Al Jazeera also broadcasts footage of hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari speaking against the US filmed in Afghanistan in early 2001 (see September 9, 2002) and other footage of some other hijackers (see September 9, 2002). [Financial Times, 9/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Abdulaziz Alomari, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al Jazeera, Ramzi bin al-Shibh

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

The Los Angeles Times reports that, ironically, the man in charge of security for the nation where the US bases its headquarters for the Iraq war is a supporter of al-Qaeda. Sheik Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani is the Interior Minister of Qatar. US Central Command and thousands of US troops are stationed in that country. In 1996, al-Thani was Religious Minister and he apparently let 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) live on his farm (see January-May 1996). Mohammed was tipped off that the US was after him. Some US officials believe al-Thani was the one who helped KSM escape, just as he had assisted other al-Qaeda leaders on other occasions. [Los Angeles Times, 3/28/2003] Another royal family member has sheltered al-Qaeda leaders and given over $1 million to al-Qaeda. KSM was even sheltered by Qatari royalty for two weeks after 9/11 (see Late 2001). [New York Times, 2/6/2003] Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, who has ties to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993), the Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995), and also attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), was sheltered by al-Thani’s religious ministry in 2000. [Newsweek, 9/30/2002] Former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says al-Thani “had great sympathy for Osama bin Laden, great sympathy for terrorist groups, was using his personal money and ministry money to transfer to al-Qaeda front groups that were allegedly charities.” However, the US has not attempted to apprehend al-Thani or take any other action against him. [Los Angeles Times, 3/28/2003]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Richard A. Clarke, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Osama bin Laden, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, United States, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

US troops in Saudi Arabia at some point before 9/11.US troops in Saudi Arabia at some point before 9/11. [Source: PBS]On April 30, 2003, the US announces that it is withdrawing most of its troops from Saudi Arabia. About 10,000 US soldiers have been stationed there since the first Gulf War (see August 5, 1990 and After and March 1991). The withdrawal is completed by the end of August 2003. About several hundred US military personnel remain in the country to train Saudi forces and tend to military sales. The US moves the rest of its troops to new bases in Qatar and other Persian Gulf countries, as well as building new bases in Iraq, conquered just a month before the announcement. [Agence France-Presse, 8/26/2003] The withdrawal of US troops from Saudi Arabia has been bin Laden’s most persistent demand since the troops entered the country in 1990. For instance, in his 1996 fatwa (see August 1996), he said, “The latest and greatest of these aggressions incurred by Muslims since the death of the Prophet… is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places… by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies.” [Daily Telegraph, 4/30/2003] One senior US military official says the decision to leave was made partly to help relieve internal political pressure on the royal family: “The Saudis will be happy when we leave. But they’re concerned that it not look as if it’s precipitous, because it will look like bin Laden won.” [Washington Post, 4/30/2003] One unnamed senior Saudi prince who participated in high-level debates about the withdrawal says, “We are fighting for our lives, and we are going to do what is necessary to save our behinds.” [New York Times, 4/30/2003]

Entity Tags: United States, Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and former US college student charged with bank fraud and alleged to be an al-Qaeda sleeper agent (see December 12, 2001), pleads innocent in an Illinois federal court. His court date is set for July 21, but before that can happen, President Bush will designate al-Marri an “enemy combatant” and send him into military custody, where he will be denied access to the US court system (see June 23, 2003). Al-Marri has been in detention in New York City while federal investigators probe his alleged connections to 9/11 hijackers. Al-Marri is charged with credit card fraud (see February 8, 2002) based on his alleged possession of at least 15 unauthorized and counterfeit credit cards; he is alleged to have been part of the al-Qaeda finance network. He is also charged with lying to FBI agents over alleged overseas phone calls to a number associated with an al-Qaeda figure in the United Arab Emirates, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, a known al-Qaeda facilitator linked to the 9/11 attacks (see Early-Late June, 2001). Al-Marri is not charged with being personally linked to the attacks. US Attorney Jan Paul Miller says al-Marri has not been charged with a terrorist crime. [Associated Press, 5/29/2003]

Entity Tags: Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Al-Qaeda, Jan Paul Miller, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, George W. Bush, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri.Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. [Source: Slate]A month before he is slated to go on trial for bank and credit card fraud charges (see February 8, 2002), the federal government drops all criminal charges against Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who has been held without legal representation, and in solitary confinement, since 2001 (see December 12, 2001). [CBS News, 6/23/2003; CBS News, 6/23/2003; CNN, 12/13/2005; Progressive, 3/2007]
'Grave Danger' - President Bush says al-Marri “represents a continuing, present, and grave danger” to the country, and the government designates al-Marri as an “enemy combatant,” alleging that he helped al-Qaeda operatives settle in the US. “Mr. Al-Marri possesses intelligence, including intelligence about personnel and activities of al-Qaeda,” Bush continues, and adds that gaining access to it “would aid US efforts to prevent attacks by al-Qaeda.” [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003; Progressive, 3/2007] The presidential order says he “engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism.” His detention is necessary, the order claims, to prevent him from participating in terrorist activities against the US. The order in effect precludes a pretrial hearing scheduled for July 2 and the start of a formal trial on July 22. [CNN, 6/24/2003]
Alleged Sleeper Agent - The government declaration for al-Marri says he worked as an “al-Qaeda sleeper agent” who was planning to “hack into the computer systems of US banks,” and possibly facilitate a follow up to the 9/11 attacks. For its part, the Defense Department says al-Marri trained at a terror camp in Afghanistan before 9/11, personally met Osama bin Laden, and volunteered for an unspecified “martyr mission.” [CNN, 12/13/2005] Attorney General John Ashcroft will later claim that al-Marri refused repeated offers to cooperate with the FBI; “consequently,” Ashcroft will write, Bush declares him an enemy combatant. Ashcroft will claim that under the laws of war, an enemy combatant can be killed out of hand. Instead, the government will hold al-Marri “without charge or trial until the end of the war.” [Slate, 11/30/2006]
Transferred to Navy Brig - Instead, the “enemy combatant” designation takes al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and legal US resident, out of the civilian criminal justice system and places him under the control of the Defense Department, which immediately transfers him into detention at a Navy brig in South Carolina. He could face a military tribunal or remain in detention indefinitely, without trial. He is only the third person to be publicly named as an enemy combatant, along with US citizens Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi.
Fingered by KSM - According to a Justice Department official, al-Marri was “positively identified” as being part of a planned second wave of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks by an “al-Qaeda detainee in a position to know.” Justice officials imply that the detainee to finger al-Marri is senior 9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [CBS News, 6/23/2003] Another suspected al-Qaeda operative, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (see Early-Late June, 2001), is also said to have mentioned him. [CNN, 12/13/2005] Alice Fisher, the deputy assistant attorney general for the Justice Department’s criminal division, says the department did not drop the criminal charges against al-Marri because the case was weak: “We are confident we would have prevailed on the criminal charges. However, setting the criminal charges aside is in the best interests of our national security.” The criminal charges—lying to banks, lying to the FBI, and credit card fraud—could have given al-Marri up to 60 years in prison and $1.75 million in fines. [CBS News, 6/23/2003]
Pleaded Not Guilty - Al-Marri’s lawyer Mark Berman says that his client pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges (see May 29, 2003), and the case was proceeding to trial. “I definitely got the sense they were reluctant to try the case in court,” Berman says. “They’d rather be in a forum where defendants aren’t represented by counsel.” Al-Marri’s wife and five children have left the US. The Saudi Arabian government granted the family passports in February, in spite of a State Department request not to issue the passports, as department officials wanted al-Marri’s wife, who is Saudi, to be available to the FBI for questioning. [Knight Ridder, 6/23/2003] Al-Marri’s lawyers say they are preparing a legal challenge to Bush’s decision. [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Osama bin Laden, US Department of Justice, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, John Ashcroft, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Mark Berman, Alice Fisher, George W. Bush, Jose Padilla, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Yaser Esam Hamdi

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

March 8, 2004: Court Denies Al-Marri Appeal

A federal court denies the appeal of suspected al-Qaeda operative Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri , who is challenging his classification as an enemy combatant (see June 23, 2003) and wants his case heard in Illinois, where he attended college. The court rules that al-Marri’s case belongs in South Carolina, where he is being held in strict isolation in the Charleston naval brig. Mark Berman, an attorney for al-Marri, says the ruling will be appealed to the Supreme Court. (The Court will decline to review the decision (see October 4, 2004).) Al-Marri’s lawyers say that wherever the case is heard, they will seek a writ of habeas corpus to require the government to justify its detention of their client. Government lawyers say they have evidence that al-Marri was in the US helping al-Qaeda plan terrorist attacks, but have refused to provide that evidence. [Associated Press, 3/10/2004]

Entity Tags: US Supreme Court, Alice Fisher, Al-Qaeda, Mark Berman, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The leading British bank Barclays announces that it will issue new shares worth £4.5bn (about $9bn) to bolster its finances, which have been hit by losses on US mortgage-backed securities. Much of the new money will come from Asian investors, led by the state-run Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). The Qataris will invest £1.7bn (about $3.4bn), taking a 7.7 percent stake. [BBC, 6/25/2008] The QIA’s holding company is chaired by Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Qatar’s prime minister, who is to invest another £533m (about $1bn) privately through a company named Challenger. [Daily Telegraph, 6/27/2008] The Japanese bank Sumitomo Mitsui will invest £500m (about $1bn) and existing shareholders are also to buy more shares. The China Development Bank will buy another £136m (about $270m) of shares, and the Singaporean investment fund Temasek will buy another £200m (about $390m) of them. [BBC, 6/25/2008]

Entity Tags: Barclays Bank, Qatar Investment Authority, China Development Bank, Temasek Holdings, Sumitomo Mitsui, Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Challenger

Timeline Tags: Global Economic Crises

President Obama and Hisham Melhem, during the interview.President Obama and Hisham Melhem, during the interview. [Source: Al Arabiya / Time]President Obama gives his first interview after assuming the presidency to the Dubai-based satellite broadcaster Al Arabiya. He tells interviewer Hisham Melhem that Americans are not the enemy of the Muslim world, and wants Israel and the Palestinians to resume peace negotiations. [Al Arabiya, 1/27/2009] Melhem, Al Arabiya’s Washington bureau chief, originally believes he was slated to interview the newly named US envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell (see January 22, 2009). Melhem believed there was some discussion among White House officials on whether it was the right time for Obama to grant an interview to the Arab media. The selection of Al Arabiya is deliberate, as that channel is considered more moderate and Western-friendly than, for example, Al Jazeera. [Time, 1/28/2009]
Intent to Reopen Talks between Israel, Palestinians - Obama intends to resume negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and says the US will open up new talks by listening to the two sides instead of immediately issuing demands. “[W]hat I told Mitchell] is start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating—in the past on some of these issues—and we don’t always know all the factors that are involved. So let’s listen. He’s going to be speaking to all the major parties involved. And he will then report back to me. From there we will formulate a specific response. Ultimately, we cannot tell either the Israelis or the Palestinians what’s best for them. They’re going to have to make some decisions. But I do believe that the moment is ripe for both sides to realize that the path that they are on is one that is not going to result in prosperity and security for their people. And that instead, it’s time to return to the negotiating table.” The larger peace plan for the Middle East recently proposed by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah will play an important role in the negotiations, Obama says.
'A Language of Respect' - Language matters, Obama notes. “[M]y job is to communicate the fact that the United States has a stake in the well-being of the Muslim world that the language we use has to be a language of respect,” he says. “[T]he language we use matters. We cannot paint with a broad brush a faith as a consequence of the violence that is done in that faith’s name.”
Restoring Relations with the Muslim World - Melhem asks Obama about tensions between the US and the Islamic world, inflamed by demagogues and extremists on both sides. Obama says: “Well, I think that when you look at the rhetoric that they [extremists]‘ve been using against me before I even took office… what that tells me is that their ideas are bankrupt. There’s no actions that they’ve taken that say a child in the Muslim world is getting a better education because of them, or has better health care because of them.” Obama reminds Melhem, and the viewers, that he lived for a time in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, during his childhood. He learned through his experiences in Indonesia and other Muslim countries that everyone, regardless of differences in culture or faith, has similar hopes and aspirations. “My job to the Muslim world is to communicate that the Americans are not your enemy,” he says. “We sometimes make mistakes. We have not been perfect. But if you look at the track record, as you say, America was not born as a colonial power, and that the same respect and partnership that America had with the Muslim world as recently as 20 or 30 years ago, there’s no reason why we can’t restore that.”
Dealing with Iran - Wrapping up the interview, Melhem asks if the US is prepared to “live with a nuclear Iran.” Obama responds: “I said during the campaign that it is very important for us to make sure that we are using all the tools of US power, including diplomacy, in our relationship with Iran.… Iran has acted in ways that’s not conducive to peace and prosperity in the region: their threats against Israel; their pursuit of a nuclear weapon which could potentially set off an arms race in the region that would make everybody less safe; their support of terrorist organizations in the past—none of these things have been helpful. But I do think that it is important for us to be willing to talk to Iran, to express very clearly where our differences are, but where there are potential avenues for progress.” [Al Arabiya, 1/27/2009]
Responses - In Pakistan, Obama’s interview is widely viewed, and receives what CNN calls “a generally positive response from analysts there.” Islamabad author and journalist Imtiaz Gul says, “It’s a good sign of an attempt to reconcile with the Muslim world, to say America wants to reach out to them and not to consider them as an enemy.” [CNN, 1/27/2009] Egyptian student Omar Youssef, who has joined in protests against the Israeli war in Gaza, says of Obama: “He’s a man of diplomacy and speaks well. Bush, Arab people hate him. But the world needs a man like Obama.” Another student, Ahmed Mahmoud, adds, “Maybe if he can solve the problem between white and black people in America, he can also solve the problem between Arab and Jewish people here.” [Time, 1/28/2009] Melhem, who has long criticized US policies towards the Middle East, later says he was touched by Obama’s conciliatory tone and references to his Muslim roots. “You can feel the authenticity about him,” he says. “The interview was his way of saying, ‘There is a new wind coming from Washington.’ Barack Obama definitely sees the world differently from a man named George W. Bush.” [Time, 1/29/2009] Al Arabiya General Manager Abdul Rahman al-Rashed says: “What he did campaigning in the US he is trying to do in the Middle East, convincing people that he is on their side. He is telling Muslims that he is proud of his Muslim roots. This is being received positively.” And Jordanian news columnist Jamil Nimri writes, “The language of force, conceit, and threat has totally disappeared.” [Time, 1/28/2009] Neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer disputes Obama’s implication that the Bush administration treated Islam with any disrespect, saying: “[S]omehow he is implying that somehow the Obama era is a break with the American past. Somehow it is undoing a disrespect of Islam that had somehow occurred under the previous administration.… We have no need to apologize. Extend a hand, yes, but to imply that there was a disrespect of Islam in the last administration, I think is unfair and fictional.” [Fox News, 1/28/2009]

Entity Tags: Al Arabiya, Barack Obama, Ahmed Mahmoud, Charles Krauthammer, Jamil Nimri, Omar Youssef, Imtiaz Gul, Hisham Melhem, Abdul Rahman al-Rashed

Timeline Tags: US International Relations

NWFP Minister Bashir Bilour with Swat Treaty Hasham Ahmed.NWFP Minister Bashir Bilour with Swat Treaty Hasham Ahmed. [Source: Agence France Presse - Getty Images]Pakistan agrees to a truce with Taliban fighters that would impose strict Islamic religious law—sharia—on the Swat Valley in northwest Pakistan, a setback for the Obama administration’s hopes to mount a united front against Islamist militants there and in Afghanistan. The agreement gives the Taliban religious and social control of the Swat region, considered of critical strategic importance in battling insurgents in the wild border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. James Dobbins, a former Bush administration envoy to Afghanistan, says: “It is definitely a step backwards. The Pakistanis have to take a stronger line with extremists in the region.” Obama administration envoy Richard Holbrooke says, “We are very concerned about Pakistan and stability.” A Pentagon official calls it a “negative development,” but other officials are more circumspect. “What is, of course, important is that we are all working together to fight terrorism and particularly to fight the cross-border activities that some Taliban engage in,” says Pentagon spokesman Gordon Duguid. NATO officials take a tougher stance, with NATO spokesman James Appathurai calling the truce a “reason for concern.” He adds, “Without doubting the good faith of the Pakistani government, it is clear that the region is suffering very badly from extremists and we would not want it to get worse.” Amnesty International official Sam Zarifi says, “The government is reneging on its duty to protect the human rights of people from Swat Valley by handing them over to Taliban insurgents.” [Associated Press, 2/18/2009]

Entity Tags: Richard Holbrooke, Taliban, Gordon Duguid, James Appathurai, James Dobbins, Sam Zarifi, Obama administration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad orders that his country’s foreign exchange reserves be moved from the dollar to the euro, setting the stage for the Iranian Central Bank to cut its foreign currency reserve interests rates from 12 percent to 5 percent. The estimated rate cut makes it cheaper for the bank to acquire foreign currency. “They have been talking about switching their foreign currency reserve from the dollar to the euro for a while now, but it makes them more dependent on the euro and the European Union,” says Dr. Ali Ansari, director of Scotland’s St. Andrews University Iranian Studies Centre.
Followed Call Addressed to OPEC - Ahmadinejad’s decision comes shortly after he called for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to discard the dollar as the currency standard for oil-related deals. Despite recent declines in dollar value and the fact that most major oil producing countries are outside the US, the dollar remains the prevailing currency for pricing a barrel of oil. The dollar also remains the most frequently used international trade currency.
Possible Motivation - Some analysts believe that exchanging the dollar for the euro may be Iran’s attempt to lessen the effects of US economic sanctions in force since the 1979 Islamic revolution when the US backed the overthrown Shah of Iran, who was replaced by an Islamic republic. US sanctions include prohibiting US involvement with Iran’s petroleum development, as well as prohibiting all trade and investment activities by US citizens around the globe. Sanctions were softened somewhat in 2000, when the US Treasury amended its prohibition edict by allowing US citizens to buy and import carpets and food products like dried fruits, nuts, and caviar produced in Iran. Recent media reports suggest, however, that President Obama is considering an increase in sanctions if Iran persists in its alleged development of nuclear weapons. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for power production. [Media Line, 9/22/2009]

Entity Tags: Iran, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ali Ansari

Timeline Tags: Global Economic Crises

A State Department official sends a secret cable from the US Embassy in Doha, Qatar, to the FBI, CIA, and Department for Homeland Security in Washington, DC. The contents of the cable will be made public by the Daily Telegraph and WikiLeaks in early 2011. The cable recommends that a United Arab Emirates man named Mohamed al Mansoori be watchlisted because he is “currently under investigation by the FBI for his possible involvement in the [9/11 attacks]. He is suspected of aiding people who entered the US before the attacks to conduct surveillance of possible targets and providing other support to the hijackers.” The cable mentions that Mansoori’s US visa had been revoked at some earlier point. Mansoori spent about a week with three Qatari men—Meshal Al Hajri, Fhad Abdulla, and Ali Al Fehaid—several weeks before 9/11. The three men traveled in the US for several weeks and left the day before 9/11. Their behavior raised suspicions amongst the staff at one Los Angeles hotel, and their trip was funded by Al Hajri’s brother, who was living in Virginia but later would be suspected as a terrorist and deported (see August 15-September 10, 2001). [Daily Telegraph, 2/1/2011] In 2011, law enforcement officials will tell NBC News that the cable was prompted because the three Qataris were planning to return to the US. The Qataris ended up not coming to the US, but Mansoori presumably was added to the watchlist. These officials will also claim that there is no active investigation of Mansoori or the Qataris. No hard evidence has linked any of them to the 9/11 plot. However, an official claims that Mansoori was deported from the US several years after 9/11, and the FBI apparently continued to have suspicions about him. [MSNBC, 2/2/2011]

Entity Tags: Meshal Al Hajri, Ali Al Fehaid, Central Intelligence Agency, Fhad Abdulla, US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of State, Mohamed al Mansoori

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Mohamed bin Hammam, president of the Asian Football Confederation and a senior member of FIFA’s executive committee that is soon to vote on the allocation of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, criticizes a Sunday Times investigation which recently revealed two of his fellow committee members were corrupt. The investigation led to the suspension of the two men, Nigeria’s Amos Adamu and Tahiti’s Reynald Temarii, from the committee, after they agreed to accept money from Sunday Times reporters posing as lobbyists to vote a certain way. “Forging identity, fabricating evidence, and setting traps are unethical behaviours in my point of view,” says bin Hammam. “One thing about Middle East media, these are rare happenings there. Is it ethical to use unethical measures to protect the ethic? How can we serve justice and look for fairness by not acting justly and fairly? How will we clean dirty laundry by using dirty water?” [Daily Mail, 11/2/2010]

Entity Tags: Asian Football Confederation, Mohamed bin Hammam, International Federation of Association Football

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

Mohamed bin Hammam, a Qatari, senior FIFA executive committee member, and president of the Asian Football Confederation, denies that he has agreed to back the Spain/Portugal bid for the 2018 World Cup in return for Spain backing the Qatari bid. The claim was recently reported in the Spanish daily Marca, which purported to carry an interview with him expressing his support for Spain/Portugal. “A Spanish newspaper, called Marca, which I have never heard of, completely fabricated an interview with me, pretending that Asia and I will support Spain’s bid,” says bin Hammam. “The Asian executive committee had taken a decision to support Europe in 2018. However, no decision was taken to back any one country. We agreed to give the four Asian members the freedom to select the country that they deem appropriate.” [Daily Mail, 11/28/2010] It will later be reported that bin Hammam did indeed vote for Spain/Portugal (see May 1, 2011).

Entity Tags: International Federation of Association Football, Mohamed bin Hammam, Asian Football Confederation

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

Australia is eliminated in the first round of voting for the 2022 World Cup hosts, after receiving only one vote. The full results of the first round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
bullet Australia: one vote. Franz Beckenbauer (see October 26, 2010).
bullet Japan: two votes. Junji Ogura (Japan).
bullet United States: three votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
bullet South Korea: four votes. Mong Joon Chung (South Korea) and Geoff Thompson (England, see Before December 1, 2010).
bullet Qatar: 11 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Geoff Thompson (England), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010] As there is no absolute majority in the first round, the vote will go to a second round. [BBC, 12/2/2010]

Entity Tags: Issa Hayatou, Vitaly Mutko, Senes Erzik, Worawi Makudi, International Federation of Association Football, Geoff Thompson, Franz Beckenbauer, Hany Abo Rida, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Chuck Blazer, Rafael Salguero, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Mong Joon Chung, Joseph S. Blatter, Julio Grondona, Junji Ogura, Nicolas Leoz, Jacques Anouma, Marios Lefkaritis, Jack Warner, Mohamed bin Hammam, Michel D’Hooghe, Michel Platini

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

Japan is eliminated in the second round of voting for the 2022 World Cup hosts, after receiving only two votes. Australia was previously eliminated in the first round (see Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010). The full results of the second round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
bullet Japan: two votes. Junji Ogura (Japan).
bullet United States: five votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
bullet South Korea: five votes. Mong Joon Chung (South Korea) and Geoff Thompson (England, see Before December 1, 2010).
bullet Qatar: 10 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Franz Beckenbauer (Germany), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010] As there is no absolute majority in the second round, the vote will go to a third round. [BBC, 12/2/2010]

Entity Tags: International Federation of Association Football, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Senes Erzik, Vitaly Mutko, Hany Abo Rida, Franz Beckenbauer, Geoff Thompson, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Chuck Blazer, Nicolas Leoz, Worawi Makudi, Mohamed bin Hammam, Jacques Anouma, Jack Warner, Issa Hayatou, Joseph S. Blatter, Mong Joon Chung, Rafael Salguero, Marios Lefkaritis, Junji Ogura, Michel D’Hooghe, Michel Platini, Julio Grondona

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

South Korea is eliminated in the third round of voting for the 2022 World Cup hosts, after receiving only five votes. Australia and Japan have already been eliminated in previous rounds (see Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010 and Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010). The full results of the third round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
bullet South Korea: five votes. Mong Joon Chung (South Korea) and Geoff Thompson (England, see Before December 1, 2010).
bullet United States: six votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
bullet Qatar: 11 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Franz Beckenbauer (Germany), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), Junji Ogura (Japan), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010] As there is no absolute majority in the third round, the vote will go to a fourth round. [BBC, 12/2/2010]

Entity Tags: Hany Abo Rida, Rafael Salguero, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Geoff Thompson, Vitaly Mutko, Worawi Makudi, Franz Beckenbauer, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Chuck Blazer, Mong Joon Chung, Senes Erzik, Michel Platini, Jack Warner, Issa Hayatou, International Federation of Association Football, Mohamed bin Hammam, Jacques Anouma, Nicolas Leoz, Julio Grondona, Junji Ogura, Joseph S. Blatter, Michel D’Hooghe, Marios Lefkaritis

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

FIFA’s executive committee votes to award the 2022 World Cup finals to Qatar, which receives an absolute majority in the fourth round of the ballot. Australia, Japan, and South Korea have already been eliminated in previous rounds (see Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010, Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010, and Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010). The full results of the fourth round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
bullet United States: eight votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
bullet Qatar: 14 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Franz Beckenbauer (Germany), Mong Joon Chung (South Korea), Geoff Thompson (England), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), Junji Ogura (Japan), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010]

Entity Tags: Geoff Thompson, Nicolas Leoz, Franz Beckenbauer, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Senes Erzik, Vitaly Mutko, Mong Joon Chung, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Worawi Makudi, Chuck Blazer, Rafael Salguero, Michel D’Hooghe, Michel Platini, International Federation of Association Football, Hany Abo Rida, Issa Hayatou, Jack Warner, Mohamed bin Hammam, Joseph S. Blatter, Junji Ogura, Julio Grondona, Marios Lefkaritis, Jacques Anouma

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

Franz Beckenbauer, a member of FIFA’s executive committee that recently awarded the 2022 football World Cup to Qatar, says that the tournament should be played in winter, rather than in its traditional summer slot. Beckenbauer, who won the World Cup as a player and coach with West Germany, says this move would avoid the problem of summer temperatures of around 50 degrees Celsius in the emirate, although in its bid Qatar said that it would use climate control to keep the temperature on the pitch to 27 degrees. “One should think about a different solution,” Beckenbauer tells the Bild newspaper. “In January or February you have a comfortable 25 degrees there. Plans for the biggest leagues would have to change for 2022 but that would not be a major undertaking.… It would be an alternative to using climate control at great expense for stadiums and fanzones.” Beckenbauer also criticizes FIFA’s decision to award the 2018 and 2022 World Cups on the same day. “I would be happy to leave the 2022 decision to the next generation,” he says. [Reuters, 3/3/2010]

Entity Tags: Franz Beckenbauer

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

FIFA president Sepp Blatter says that homosexual fans attending the 2022 World Cup, planned for Qatar, should “refrain from sexual activity.” The comment is made in response to a question about whether he sees any cultural problems with holding the World Cup in Qatar, where homosexual activity is illegal. According to the BBC, Blatter’s comments are apparently a joke and he then adds seriously that he is sure there will be no problems for homosexuals who decide to attend. Despite this, his comments will be condemned by numerous figures involved in campaigning for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights. [BBC, 12/14/2010]

Entity Tags: International Federation of Association Football, Joseph S. Blatter

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

Mohamed bin Hammam, the Qatari president of the Asian Football Confederation, tells a press conference that the 2022 World Cup will be held only in Qatar and will not be shared with other neighbouring countries. In addition, it will be held in summer, as originally planned. The comments come in response to suggestions from FIFA president Sepp Blatter and vice president Michel Platini that the tournament should be shared with other Gulf nations. Although bin Hammam does not directly comment on the chances of him standing against Blatter for the position of FIFA president in June, he does mention two of the issues involved; he alludes to both Blatter’s advanced age and the need for FIFA to introduce term limits for the presidency. Bin Hammam implies that FIFA presidents should serve no more than two four-year terms. Blatter’s third term is coming to an end. [Associated Press, 1/29/2011]

Entity Tags: Asian Football Confederation, Joseph S. Blatter, Michel Platini, Mohamed bin Hammam

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

An artist’s rendition of Qatar’s proposed ‘artificial cloud’ system.An artist’s rendition of Qatar’s proposed ‘artificial cloud’ system. [Source: TechFever (.net)]Scientists at Qatar University say they have developed artificial clouds, costing $500,000 each, to provide shade for stadia and training grounds at the 2022 World Cup. The work was done due to concerns over the fierce summer heat in the Gulf, which can reach up to 50 degrees in June and July. Saud Abdul Ghani, head of the mechanical and industrial engineering department at the university, says the clouds are made from a lightweight carbon structure and carry a giant envelope of material containing helium gas. Four solar-powered engines move the structure via remote control. [BBC, 3/24/2011]

Entity Tags: Qatar University, Saud Abdul Ghani

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

FIFA secretary general Jerome Valcke says that Qatar “bought” the right to hold the 2022 World Cup in a private e-mail to FIFA vice president Jack Warner. “For MBH [Mohamed bin Hammam, the leading Qatari football official who is now running for president of FIFA], I never understood why he was running. If really he thought he had a chance or just being an extreme way to express much he does not like anymore JSB [Sepp Blatter, bin Hammam’s opponent in the race]. Or he thought you can buy FIFA as they bought the WC [World Cup].” The e-mail’s date is unknown, but presumably it is written in the early spring of 2011. After the e-mail is made public in a wave of mud-slinging during the presidential election, Valcke will say that he did not mean that Qatar officials actually bribed voters: “I’d like to clarify that I may use in an email—a ‘lighter’ way of expression by nature.… What I wanted to say is that the winning bid used their financial strength to lobby for support.” [Sky News, 5/30/2016]

Entity Tags: International Federation of Association Football, Jack Warner, Jerome Valcke, Mohamed bin Hammam

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

British newspaper The Observer states that Mohamed bin Hammam, a Qatari, president of the Asian Football Confederation, and a senior member of FIFA’s executive committee, voted for the Spain/Portugal bid for the 2018 World Cup in December 2010. Shortly before the vote, bin Hammam denied he had a deal with Spain/Portugal to vote for their bid for 2018 in return for them voting for Qatar in 2022 (see November 28, 2010). [Observer, 5/1/2011] It is unclear how The Observer knows this, as information about who voted for which bid is secret. [BBC, 12/2/2010]

Entity Tags: Mohamed bin Hammam, Asian Football Confederation

Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics

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