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The US, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and 58 other countries sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT’s preamble refers explicitly to the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and to the “determination expressed by the parties [to the treaty] to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.” The NPT will become effective on March 5, 1970. [Federation of American Scientists, 12/18/2007] In 2008, author J. Peter Scoblic will write that the NPT “relied heavily on appeals to national interest.” Scoblic will continue: “Given that the treaty allows five states to legally possess nuclear weapons while prohibiting the other 183 from ever developing them, why did dozens of states agree to the top-tiered, discriminatory system—a system of nuclear apartheid, as India put it (see June 20, 1996)? Because it made sense for them to do so.” The NPT gives nations a chance to opt out of nuclear arms races with their neighbors, and gives them the opportunity to share in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Over the years, far more nations will, under the NPT, give up their nascent nuclear programs—Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, others—than start them in defiance of the treaty. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 274-276]
The South Korean government informs the State Department that it received a request from Iraq to militarize some helicopters. [Battle, 2/25/2003]
Korean Airlines Flight 007 before takeoff. [Source: Check-Six (.org)]A Soviet Su-15 fighter plane fires two missiles into a Korean Airlines 747 passenger plane, KAL 007. The plane, en route from Alaska to Seoul, South Korea, had strayed into Soviet air space, had not responded to radio communications, and had either ignored or not seen warning shots fired at it. The 747 crashes into the Sea of Japan, killing all 269 passengers, including conservative House Representative Larry McDonald (D-GA) and 62 other Americans. The Soviets insist that the passenger plane was deliberately sent into their airspace to test their military readiness; later investigation shows that a US spy plane had just left the area, agitating Soviet radar units, and, according to their own radio transmissions, the Soviets had honestly believed the 747 was another spy plane, most likely an American RC-135. Though it has definitely strayed into Soviet airspace at least twice, and flown over a sensitive Soviet airbase on the Kamchatka Peninsula, it is most likely shot down in international airspace. [Fischer, 3/19/2007; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 131]
Angry White House Officials Respond - Reagan administration officials are furious. Secretary of State George Shultz, dubbed “The Sphinx” by journalists for his remote demeanor, rails at the Soviets in a press conference called just four hours after the White House learns of the incident. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 131] Four days later, Reagan will denounce the Soviets in a primetime televised speech (see September 5, 1983).
Massive PR Campaign against USSR - The US will use the shootdown to mount a tremendous public relations campaign against the Soviets, focusing on the Soviet civilian leadership as well as Soviet international business interests; for example, the US will demand a global boycott of the Soviet airline Aeroflot. According to a memo issued to the Politburo by the Defense Ministry and the KGB, the Soviets well understood the political ramifications of the shootdown: “We are dealing with a major, dual-purpose political provocation carefully organized by the US special services. The first purpose was to use the incursion of the intruder aircraft into Soviet airspace to create a favorable situation for the gathering of defense data on our air defense system in the Far East, involving the most diverse systems including the Ferret satellite. Second, they envisaged, if this flight were terminated by us, [the US would use] that fact to mount a global anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union.” In its own counter-propaganda efforts, Soviet leader Yuri Andropov will say that an “outrageous military psychosis” has taken over US foreign policy. He adds, “[T]he Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the point at which any sober-minded person must stop.” [Fischer, 3/19/2007]
Exacerbating Tensions - After the shootdown and its aftermath, according to the Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, both sides go “a little crazy.” The shootdown gives the US hard evidence of its worst-case assumptions about the Soviets. For the Soviets, the US reaction gives them hard evidence of their own assumptions about the US’s attempts to provoke the USSR into some sort of confrontation (see 1981-1983) and to embarrass the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world. Reagan’s use of the KAL 007 incident to ask Congress for more defense funding is, in the Soviets’ eyes, proof that the entire incident was engineered by the Americans for just such an outcome. [Fischer, 3/19/2007]
Alternative Accounts - A number of alternative accounts about the incident spring up, in particular concerning McDonald. [Insight, 4/16/2001]
Four days after the Soviet shootdown of a Korean Airlines passenger jet (see September 1, 1983), President Reagan delivers a televised speech from the Oval Office calling the incident a “massacre,” a “crime against humanity,” and “an atrocity.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 131] The shootdown is, Reagan says, “an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations.” [Fischer, 3/19/2007]
A week after President Reagan publicly denounced the Soviet Union for shooting down a Korean Airlines passenger jet (see September 1, 1983 and September 5, 1983), Secretary of State George Shultz meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko later recalls the conversation as “the sharpest exchange I ever had with an American secretary of state, and I have had talks with 14 of them.” The Reagan administration will deny Gromyko permission to fly into New York City, where he is scheduled to attend the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 131]
Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov gives a press conference regarding the KAL 007 shootdown. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency]The Soviet Union, flustered and angry at the harsh denunciations heaped on it by the US after their shootdown of a Korean Airlines passenger jet (see September 1, 1983, September 5, 1983, and Mid-September, 1983), reacts badly to the US’s response. Between the KAL incident and other episodes—President Reagan’s terming the USSR an “evil empire” (see March 8, 1983), the refusal of the US to negotiate on arms reduction (see April 1983-December 1983), and the US’s launch of the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense program (see April 1983-December 1983), the Soviets are not prepared to accept the US’s position on the shootdown, nor are they prepared to accept responsibility for shooting down a passenger plane full of civilians. Instead, the KAL incident provides what Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the US, will later call “a catalyst for the angry trends that were already inherent in relations during the Reagan presidency.” Newly installed Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov issues a statement saying that US-Soviet relations cannot improve so long as Reagan is president: “If anybody ever had any illusions about the possibility of an evolution to the better in the policy of the present American administration, these illusions are completely dispelled now.” Soviet statements begin referring to the danger of war and US nuclear first strikes. The Soviet press calls Reagan a “madman” and compares him to Adolf Hitler. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko worries that “the world situation is now slipping towards a very dangerous precipice.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 132]
President George H. W. Bush nominates his former foreign policy adviser, Donald Gregg, to become the US Ambassador to South Korea. Gregg is one of the architects of the Contra funding and supply program (see March 17, 1983). Gregg faces some difficulty in his Senate confirmation hearings stemming from his linchpin role in Iran-Contra, with Senator Alan Cranston (R-WY) telling him: “You told the Iran-Contra committee that you and Bush never discussed the Contras, had no expertise on the issue, no responsibility for it, and the details of Watergate-sized scandal involving NSC staff and the Edwin Wilson gang [a group of ‘rogue’ CIA agents operating in apparent conjunction with Bush] was not vice presidential. Your testimony on that point is demonstrably false. There are at least six memos from Don Gregg to George Bush regarding detailed Contra issues.” But Cranston is the only member of the committee to vote against Gregg’s confirmation. [Spartacus Schoolnet, 12/28/2007]
The United Nations passes Resolution 678. The resolution gives Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw entirely from Kuwait (see July 25, 1990) and restore its national sovereignty. The US uses UN authority to build a “coalition” of nations to support its upcoming “Desert Storm” operation designed to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (see January 16, 1991 and After). 34 countries contribute personnel: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. West Germany and Japan do not contribute forces, but they do contribute $6.6 billion and $10 billion, respectively, to the cause. While some countries join out of a sincere belief that Iraq must not be allowed to dominate the region and control Middle Eastern oil reserves (see August 7, 1990), others are more reluctant, believing that the affair is an internal matter best resolved by other Arab countries, and some fear increased US influence in Kuwait and the region. Some of these nations are persuaded by Iraq’s belligerence towards other Arab nations as well as by US offers of economic aid and/or debt forgiveness. [NationMaster, 12/23/2007] As with all such UN resolutions, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein rejects this resolution. [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996]
Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung. [Source: Encyclopedia Brittanica]President Bush meets with South Korean president Kim Dae Jung (known in the administration as KDJ), and pointedly snubs Kim in an official press conference, announcing that he has no intention of following the Clinton policy of engaging North Korea in any sort of dialogue regarding North Korea’s nuclear buildup. Kim has attempted to implement a “sunshine” policy of open negotiations with the North, including economic trade and nuclear talks, but his efforts are predicated on US support. Secretary of State Colin Powell advocates working with Kim to further implement negotiations with North Korea, but loses out (see March 7, 2001) to pressure from Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who believe Clinton had been doing little more than appeasing a tyrant in negotiating with North Korea’s Kim Jong Il. Bush misstates the facts in the conference, saying that “we’re not certain as to whether or not they’re keeping all terms of all agreements,” when there has only been a single agreement between the US and North Korea, the 1994 agreement to freeze North Korea’s plutonium processing (see October 21, 1994). Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill believes that the gaffe is due to Bush’s lack of understanding of the complex situation between the US, North Korea, and the US’s allies in Southeast Asia, and Bush’s failure to “do his homework” before Kim’s arrival in Washington. O’Neill attempts to salvage the situation by lauding South Korea’s superb literacy rate among its citizens, earning a look of surprise from Bush. O’Neill privately mulls over the decision-making process in the White House, with Bush damaging ten years of “delicately stitched US policy towards North Korea” in just a few minutes. [Suskind, 2004, pp. 114-115] In 2004, foreign affairs reporter Fred Kaplan will offer an explanation of Bush’s behavior. To negotiate with an “evil regime” such as North Korea’s is, in Bush’s view, “to recognize that regime, legitimize it, and—if the negotiations led to a treaty or a trade—prolong it.” Bush has already told one reporter that he “loathed” Kim Jong Il. He distrusts anyone such as KDJ who has any intention of accomodating or even negotiating with such a regime. Additionally, Bush views the South Korean leader—a democratic activist who had spent years in prison for his beliefs—with what Kaplan calls “startling contempt.” Charles “Jack” Pritchard, who had been director of the National Security Council’s Asia desk under Clinton and is now the State Department’s special North Korean envoy under Bush, will later recall, “Bush’s attitude toward KDJ was, ‘Who is this naive, old guy?’” Bush and his advisers, particularly Rumsfeld and Cheney, hope not only to isolate North Korea, but to undermine Kim Dae Jung’s regime in hopes to shake his administration and drive South Koreans to elect a conservative in the next elections. [Washington Monthly, 5/2004]
Jim Kelly. [Source: ViewImages.com]Undersecretary of State Jim Kelly, slated to try to revive the US’s attempts to negotiate with North Korea over that nation’s nuclear weapons program, goes to South Korea in preparation for President Bush to visit Seoul. Kelly is fully aware that the Bush administration has gone out of its way to undermine and disrupt the Clinton-era negotiations with North Korea, and a year before had insulted then-President Kim Dae Jung over the issue (see March 7, 2001). Now South Korea has a new president, Roh Moo Hyun, a populist with the same intentions of reopening a dialogue with North Korea as his predecessor. Charles Pritchard, the Bush administration’s special North Korean envoy, accompanies Kelly on the visit, and later recalls: “The conversation in the streets of Seoul was, ‘Is there going to be a war? What will these crazy Americans do?’” When Kelly and Pritchard meet with Roh, the president tells them, “I wake up in a sweat every morning, wondering if Bush has done something unilaterally to affect the [Korean] peninsula.” Bush’s visit to South Korea does little to ease tensions or convince North Korea to consider abandoning its uranium enrichment program (see October 4, 2002). [Washington Monthly, 5/2004]
The Bush administration opens brief, futile negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program (see October 4, 2002 and January 10, 2003 and After). Chief negotiator Jim Kelly goes to Beijing to prepare for multilateral talks with North Korea, Japan, China, and South Korea. However, Kelly is crippled by specific instructions on how to deal with the North Koreans. He is not even allowed to speak with the North Korean delegates unless the other countries’ delegates are also present. During the negotiations, North Korea’s deputy foreign minister Li Gun, an experienced negotiator, says that his country now has nuclear weapons—calling them a “deterrent”—and says the weapons will not be given up unless the US drops its “hostile attitude” (see March 2003-May 2003) towards the regime. Stripping away the rhetoric, the North Koreans are offering to disarm if the US will sign a non-aggression pact. Kelly returns to Washington and announces a “bold, new proposal” from the North Koreans. But President Bush dismisses the proposal, expressing his feelings in his words to a reporter: “They’re back to the old blackmail game.” Foreign affairs journalist Fred Kaplan will later write, “This was the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld line: As long as the North Koreans were pursuing nuclear weapons, even to sit down with them would be ‘appeasement,’ succumbing to ‘blackmail,’ and ‘rewarding bad behavior.’” [Washington Monthly, 5/2004] Bush administration officials refuse to discuss any specifics until North Korea agrees to scrap its nuclear program. They also refuse to talk directly with the North Korean officials, instead insisting that the Chinese delegation pass along their demands. Not surprisingly, the North Koreans walk out of the meeting. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 240-241]
The US takes part in another round of multilateral negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program (see April 2003). The US has failed to destabilize the North Korean government, and the North Koreans have been unsuccessful in luring the US into bilateral talks. Instead, both sides agree to “six-way” talks that include Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea.
Heavy Restrictions on US Negotiators - US chief negotiator Jim Kelly is finally permitted to meet one-on-one with his North Korean counterpart Li Gun—for only 20 minutes, and only in the presence of the other delegates. This time, Kelly is allowed to chat briefly with Li in a corner. Kelly is also forbidden from making any offers or even suggesting the possibility of direct negotiations. Kelly’s fellow negotiator, Charles Pritchard, will later recall that Kelly was told to start the chat with Li by saying: “This is not a negotiating session. This is not an official meeting.” Foreign affairs journalist Fred Kaplan will later write: “For the previous year-and-a-half, the State Department had favored a diplomatic solution to the Korea crisis while the Pentagon and key players in the [National Security Council] opposed it. The August meeting in Beijing was Bush’s idea of a compromise—a middle path that constituted no path at all. He let Kelly talk, but didn’t let him say anything meaningful; he went to the table but put nothing on it.” But even this level of negotiation is too much for some administration hawks. During the meetings in Beijing, Undersecretary of State John Bolton gives a speech in Washington where he calls North Korea “a hellish nightmare” and Kim Jong Il “a tyrannical dictator.” Kaplan will observe, “True enough, but not the sort of invective that senior officials generally issue on the eve of a diplomatic session.” An exasperated Pritchard resigns in protest from the administration. He will later say: “My position was the State Department’s envoy for North Korean negotiations, yet we were prohibited from having negotiations. I asked myself, ‘What am I doing in government?’” Pritchard had also learned that White House and Pentagon officials did not want him involved in the talks, dismissing him as “the Clinton guy.” (Pritchard had helped successfully negotiate earlier agreements with the North Koreans during the Clinton administration.) [Washington Monthly, 5/2004] A Chinese diplomat says, “The American policy towards DRPK [North Korea]—this is the main problem we are facing.” [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 241]
Cheney Source of Restrictions - According to Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, the restrictions on Kelly come directly from Vice President Cheney. “A script would be drafted for Jim, what he could say and what he could not say, with points elucidated in the margins,” Wilkerson will later explain. The process involves President Bush, Cheney, Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers. On at least two occasions, Cheney rewrites the script for Kelly without consulting with the other principals, even Bush. According to Wilkerson, Cheney “put handcuffs on our negotiator, so he could say little more than ‘welcome and good-bye.’” In the words of authors Lou Dubose and Jake Bernstein, Cheney’s “negotiating position was that there would be no negotiations.” [Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 185-186]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard B. Myers, Lou Dubose, Fred Kaplan, George W. Bush, Jake Bernstein, Jim Kelly, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Charles Pritchard, Clinton administration, National Security Council, John R. Bolton, Li Gun, Lawrence Wilkerson, Kim Jong Il
Timeline Tags: US International Relations
Vice President Dick Cheney travels to Asia to talk with US allies about dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program. Cheney reiterates the same position the US has had for years: the allies must join together in isolating North Korea and force “regime change” in that nation. The allies Cheney visits—South Korea, Japan, and China—have no interest in such a policy. They fear the possible consequences, be they a sudden onslaught of refugees, a power vacuum, or retaliatory strikes by Kim Jong Il in his last chaotic days in control of North Korea. Instead, China has opened up its own negotiations with North Korea, trying on its own to defuse the issue and calm Kim down. Meanwhile, North Korea says it has successfully solved all of the technical problems standing in the way of it producing nuclear weapons. No one knows precisely what, if any, nuclear weapons North Korea has, or what it is capable of producing (see January 10-22, 2004). [Washington Monthly, 5/2004]
The tasks before the forthcoming Group of 20 (G-20) summit to be hosted by President Barack Obama in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, are rolled out in the media. The number one agenda item for global leaders will be restraining financial institutions’ compensation and forcing them to clean their balance sheets to avert a duplicate of the near-meltdown of global financial systems. They will also attempt to find new methods for controlling over-the-counter derivatives markets, which are said to have augmented the global crash. The leaders are also scheduled to “increase oversight of hedge funds, credit rating agencies, and debt securitization.” Most leaders agree that it is essential to find a resolution for the huge financial imbalances in trade, savings, and consumption, all of which played a role in the global financial crisis, and ultimately may leave global economies vulnerable to future financial shocks. Christine Lagarde, the French Finance Minister, says that signs of economic recovery should not act as an excuse to avoid economic reforms. Officials of France and Germany are recommending stringent financial sector regulations, which incorporate limits on executive pay. The mandate of the G-20 is to “promote open and constructive discussion between industrial and emerging-market countries on key issues related to global economic stability.” The G-20 is comprised of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union, which is represented by the rotating council presidency and the European Central Bank. [Reuters, 9/22/2009; New York Times, 9/22/2009; Voice of America, 9/22/2009; G-20.org, 9/22/2009]
In his first speech to the General Assembly at United Nations headquarters, President Obama says all nations bear responsibility for addressing the global problems of nuclear proliferation, war, climate change, and economic crises. “We must build new coalitions that bridge old divides,” Obama says. “All nations have rights and responsibilities—that’s the bargain that makes [the UN] work.” Obama acknowledges that high expectations accompanying his presidency are “not about me,” adding that when he took office at the beginning of the year: “Many around the world had come to view America with skepticism and mistrust. No world order which elevates one nation above others can succeed in tackling the world’s problems. Those who used to chastise America for acting alone in the world cannot now stand by and wait for America to solve the world’s problems alone.” Obama devotes a considerable portion of his speech to discussing the challenges inherent in finding a peaceful solution to settlements in the Middle East. He calls for the resumption of Israel-Palestine negotiations “without preconditions,” and also uses his speech to indicate that the US has returned to the global arena as a team player.
Warm but Restrained Reception - Although warmly received, applause appears slightly restrained, perhaps an indication that expectations for the Obama presidency are becoming more realistic, given the global problems with which most nations now struggle. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon opens the 64th Session’s proceedings by saying, “Now is the time to put ‘united’ back into the United Nations.”
Followed by Libyan Leader - Libya’s President Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi follows Obama and speaks for over an hour, vehemently criticizing the UN’s power structure as uneven, archaic, and unjust. From a copy of the preamble to the UN Charter, al-Qadhafi reads: “It says nations are equal whether they are small or big—are we equal in the permanent seats? No, we are not equal. Do we have the rights of the veto? All nations should have an equal footing. For those who have a permanent seat, this is political feudalism. It shouldn’t be called the Security Council; it should be called the Terror Council.” Despite reigning in Libya for over 40 years, this is al-Qadhafi’s first UN General Assembly speech. [BBC, 9/23/2009]
England and South Korea agree to vote for each other as potential hosts of the World Cup finals in 2018 and 2022. The deal is concluded by the English and South Korean members of FIFA’s executive committee, Geoff Thompson and Mong Joon Chung, over a whisky with British Prime Minister David Cameron. Chung is to vote for England to host the finals in 2018, whereas Thompson is to vote for South Korea in 2022. Thompson will carry out his end of the bargain (see Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010), although Chung will not (see (December 1, 2010) and Around 2:00 p.m. December 2, 2010). [Guardian, 12/4/2010]
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin calls officials in the government of South Korea to get them to influence a forthcoming vote to be cast by South Korean FIFA executive committee member Mong Joon Chung. Putin wants Chung to vote for Russia’s bid to host the 2018 World Cup. The leverage Putin uses to get the officials to pressure Chung is that South Korea needs Russian support in dealings with North Korea. Chung, a hugely wealthy member of the Hyundai dynasty with close links to South Korea’s ruling party, is then asked to vote for Russia. He has a pact with England to vote for its bid (see Before December 1, 2010), but does as he is now asked and votes for Russia (see Around 2:00 p.m. December 2, 2010). [Guardian, 12/4/2010]
Australia is eliminated in the first round of voting for the 2022 World Cup hosts, after receiving only one vote. The full results of the first round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
Australia: one vote. Franz Beckenbauer (see October 26, 2010).
Japan: two votes. Junji Ogura (Japan).
United States: three votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
South Korea: four votes. Mong Joon Chung (South Korea) and Geoff Thompson (England, see Before December 1, 2010).
Qatar: 11 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Geoff Thompson (England), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010] As there is no absolute majority in the first round, the vote will go to a second round. [BBC, 12/2/2010]
Entity Tags: Issa Hayatou, Vitaly Mutko, Senes Erzik, Worawi Makudi, International Federation of Association Football, Geoff Thompson, Franz Beckenbauer, Hany Abo Rida, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Chuck Blazer, Rafael Salguero, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Mong Joon Chung, Joseph S. Blatter, Julio Grondona, Junji Ogura, Nicolas Leoz, Jacques Anouma, Marios Lefkaritis, Jack Warner, Mohamed bin Hammam, Michel D’Hooghe, Michel Platini
Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics
Japan is eliminated in the second round of voting for the 2022 World Cup hosts, after receiving only two votes. Australia was previously eliminated in the first round (see Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010). The full results of the second round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
Japan: two votes. Junji Ogura (Japan).
United States: five votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
South Korea: five votes. Mong Joon Chung (South Korea) and Geoff Thompson (England, see Before December 1, 2010).
Qatar: 10 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Franz Beckenbauer (Germany), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010] As there is no absolute majority in the second round, the vote will go to a third round. [BBC, 12/2/2010]
Entity Tags: International Federation of Association Football, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Senes Erzik, Vitaly Mutko, Hany Abo Rida, Franz Beckenbauer, Geoff Thompson, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Chuck Blazer, Nicolas Leoz, Worawi Makudi, Mohamed bin Hammam, Jacques Anouma, Jack Warner, Issa Hayatou, Joseph S. Blatter, Mong Joon Chung, Rafael Salguero, Marios Lefkaritis, Junji Ogura, Michel D’Hooghe, Michel Platini, Julio Grondona
Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics
South Korea is eliminated in the third round of voting for the 2022 World Cup hosts, after receiving only five votes. Australia and Japan have already been eliminated in previous rounds (see Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010 and Around 2:30 p.m. December 2, 2010). The full results of the third round and the FIFA executive committee members who voted for the various potential hosts are:
South Korea: five votes. Mong Joon Chung (South Korea) and Geoff Thompson (England, see Before December 1, 2010).
United States: six votes. Chuck Blazer (USA).
Qatar: 11 votes. Mohamed bin Hammam (Qatar). [BBC, 12/2/2010; BBC, 12/2/2010]
The other FIFA executive committee members who vote are Sepp Blatter (Switzerland), Jack Warner (Trinidad and Tobago), Senes Erzik (Turkey), Marios Lefkaritis (Cyprus), Jacques Anouma (Ivory Coast), Franz Beckenbauer (Germany), Rafael Salguero (Guatemala), Issa Hayatou (Cameroon), Michel D’Hooghe (Belgium), Michel Platini (France), Angel Maria Villar Llona (Spain), Julio Grondona (Argentina), Ricardo Teixeira (Brazil), Nicolas Leoz (Paraguay), Worawi Makudi (Thailand), Hany Abo Rida (Egypt), Junji Ogura (Japan), and Vitaly Mutko (Russia). [BBC, 12/2/2010] As there is no absolute majority in the third round, the vote will go to a fourth round. [BBC, 12/2/2010]
Entity Tags: Hany Abo Rida, Rafael Salguero, Ricardo Terra Teixeira, Geoff Thompson, Vitaly Mutko, Worawi Makudi, Franz Beckenbauer, Angel Maria Villar Llona, Chuck Blazer, Mong Joon Chung, Senes Erzik, Michel Platini, Jack Warner, Issa Hayatou, International Federation of Association Football, Mohamed bin Hammam, Jacques Anouma, Nicolas Leoz, Julio Grondona, Junji Ogura, Joseph S. Blatter, Michel D’Hooghe, Marios Lefkaritis
Timeline Tags: Football Business and Politics
South Korea’s Supreme Court rules that US chemical corporations Monsanto and Dow Chemical must pay 39 Korean Vietnam War veterans $415,000 in total for skin diseases they suffered when they came into contact with the defoliant Agent Orange. South Korea sent some 300,000 soldiers to fight alongside US and South Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War. The court also sends back for review a 2006 case that ordered the two firms to pay $61 million in compensation to 6,795 South Korean veterans and their families. The lawsuit filed by over 16,000 veterans in 1999 alleged that Agent Orange was responsible for skin diseases such as “chemical acne,” shown to be caused by exposure to the dioxin in Agent Orange. Veterans in South Korea estimate the number of Korean victims of Agent Orange at about 150,000. Dow says, in a statement quoted to the Yonhap news agency, that it disagrees with the ruling, and that the verdict was not backed by the available evidence. Dow cited US court rulings which had found in chemical corporations’ favor. The South Korean Supreme Court says in sending back the $61 million ruling case to a lower court, “There is no evidence their diseases were caused by their exposure to the defoliant sprayed during the Vietnam War.” Agent Orange, which contained the lethal chemical dioxin, was used heavily in Vietnam to deprive enemy forces of ground cover in rain forests, and to destroy food crops used by guerrillas and civilians. Vietnam has also asserted claims, saying that millions of its citizens have suffered and some have died due to Agent Orange exposure. The US has consistently refused to accept responsibility for the Vietnamese government’s claim, though it has agreed to be liable for the health complications in US soldiers that resulted from exposure (see 1960-1973). [Birmingham News, 7/12/2013; Agence France-Presse, 7/13/2013]
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