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After a spate of criticism of his administration’s Iraq policy from several prominent Republican former US government officials, President George Bush says from his ranch in Crawford, Texas: “I am aware that some very intelligent people are expressing their opinions about Saddam Hussein and Iraq. I listen very carefully to what they have to say. I’ll continue to consult…. I will use all the latest intelligence to make informed decisions about how best to keep the world at peace, how best to defend freedom for the long run…. Listen, it’s a healthy debate for people to express their opinion. People should be allowed to express their opinion. But America needs to know, I’ll be making up my mind based upon the latest intelligence and how best to protect our own country plus our friends and allies.” But he also adds, “There should be no doubt in anybody’s mind that this man is thumbing his nose at the world, that he has gassed his own people, that he is trouble in his neighborhood, that he desires weapons of mass destruction.” [CNN, 8/16/2002; Fox News, 8/16/2002; New York Times, 8/17/2002]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Neoconservative Richard Perle, the head of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, says that the Bush administration has expended so much time and effort in making its case for war against Iraq that it has no other choice except to invade. He says, “The failure to take on Saddam [Hussein]… would produce such a collapse of confidence in the president that it would set back the war on terrorism.” [New York Times, 8/16/2002] In 2006, author Frank Rich interprets Perle’s words, writing: “If Bush didn’t get rid of Saddam after all this saber rattling, he will look like the biggest wimp since—well, his father. If he didn’t do it soon, after all these months of swagger, he would destroy his credibility and hurt the country’s.” [Rich, 2006, pp. 62]

Entity Tags: Richard Perle, Bush administration (43), Defense Policy Board, Frank Rich, George Herbert Walker Bush, George W. Bush, US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In a Washington Post op-ed piece, Zbigniew Brzezinski reprimands the Bush administration for its reckless foreign policy, saying that “war is too serious a business and too unpredictable in its dynamic consequences—especially in a highly flammable region—to be undertaken because of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual assertions.” Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser to President Carter, adds that “[i]f it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that legitimizes US global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more responsible system of international security.” He then makes several recommendations for improving US foreign policy, including a summary of “a wrong way for America to initiate a war.” [Washington Post, 8/18/2002]

Entity Tags: Zbigniew Brzezinski

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded allied forces during the Gulf War, warns against invading Iraq without the support of allies. He explains: “In the Gulf War we had an international force and troops from many nations. We would be lacking if we went it alone at this time…. It is not going to be an easy battle but it would be much more effective if we didn’t have to do it alone.” [London Times, 8/19/2002]

Entity Tags: Norman Schwarzkopf

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The Observer’s Ed Vulliamy writes: “One year on, the United States is more isolated and more regarded as a pariah than at any time since Vietnam, possibly ever. The bookends of that year are headlines in the French newspaper Le Monde. On 12 September 2001 it declared: ‘Now We Are All Americans.’ But last month, in Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Washington Dismantles the International Architecture’; a reflection on a year of treaties broken or ignored (see March 7, 2001, March 27, 2001, July 9, 2001, July 23-25, 2001, November 19, 2001-December 7, 2001, December 13, 2001, December 31, 2001, August 28, 2002, and September 20, 2002), and a brazen assertion of the arrogance of power.” [Guardian, 8/18/2002]

Entity Tags: Ed Vulliamy, Le Monde

Timeline Tags: US International Relations

86 percent of those polled in a CNN/USA Today Gallup poll say they believe that Saddam Hussein supports groups “that have plans to attack the United States” and 53 percent think Saddam Hussein was “personally involved in the September 11 attacks.” The results are based on telephone interviews with 801 adults and the margin of error is estimated at 4 percent. [Gallup News Service, 8/23/2002]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

During an interview with Fox News, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld mocks calls from Washington, Europe and the Arab world demanding that the Bush administration show them evidence to substantiate the hawk’s claim that Saddam Hussein is a threat to the US and its allies. “Think of the prelude to World War Two,” the Defense Secretary says. “Think of all the countries that said, well, we don’t have enough evidence. I mean, Mein Kampf had been written. Hitler had indicated what he intended to do. Maybe he won’t attack us. Maybe he won’t do this or that. Well, there were millions of people dead because of the miscalculations. The people who argued for waiting for more evidence have to ask themselves how they are going to feel at that point where another event occurs.” [Daily Telegraph, 8/21/2002; Guardian, 8/22/2002; Fox News, 8/20/2003] Rumsfeld also says during a news conference that according to “intelligence reports,” Saddam’s government is “hosting, supporting or sponsoring” an al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. Responding to a question about whether he has any evidence to support the claim that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq, Rumsfeld states, “There are Al-Qaeda in a number of locations in Iraq…. The suggestion that… [Iraqi government officials] who are so attentive in denying human rights to their population aren’t aware of where these folks [al-Qaeda] are or what they’re doing is ludicrous in a vicious, repressive dictatorship…. [I]t’s very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what’s taking place in the country.” [New York Times, 8/20/2002] Shortly after Rumsfeld’s remarks, a senior US intelligence official tells The Guardian that there is no evidence to back the defense secretary’s claims. “They are not the official guests of the government,” a second official says, adding that any al-Qaeda in the region are still “on the run.” [Guardian, 8/22/2002]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Following a trip to several Middle Eastern countries, which included meetings with several diplomats and foreign dignitaries, US Representative John Larson (D-CT) warns that “the innocent slaughter of Muslims will create, in essence, what Osama bin Laden was unable to do, a united Islamic jihad against us.” [New Britain Herald, 8/22/2002]

Entity Tags: John Larson

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In a speech to the Economic Club of Florida in Tallahassee, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who recently served as the president’s special envoy to the Middle East, argues that there are more pressing issues than Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Specifically, he points to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instability in Afghanistan, the continuing existence of the al-Qaeda network, and the theocracy in Iran. He adds that the proposed war with Iraq would be expensive and would put considerable strain on the military’s resources, which already are “stretched too tight all over the world.” Furthermore, notes the general, invading Iraq would further antagonize America’s allies in the Middle East. “We need to quit making enemies that we don’t need to make enemies out of,” he says. He also notes, “It’s pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way and all the others who have never fired a shot and are hot to go to war see it another way.” [Tampa Tribune, 8/24/2002]

Entity Tags: Anthony Zinni

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The New York Times publishes an opinion article by James Baker, a former secretary of state and a close friend of the Bush family. In his piece, Baker writes that the US must raise a coalition and secure a broad base of support before attempting to remove Saddam Hussein by force. Although it may be possible to successfully invade the country and depose its regime, he argues, America’s image would suffer irreparable damage as a consequence. Therefore, according to Baker, a unilateral preemptive strike in the midst of massive opposition from US allies in Europe and the Middle East would be detrimental to American strategic interests. [New York Times, 8/25/2002]

Entity Tags: James A. Baker

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Ari Fleischer.Ari Fleischer. [Source: Washington Post]White House press secretary Ari Fleischer says that White House lawyers believe President Bush does not need the approval of Congress before launching an attack against Iraq. Fleischer goes on to say that such a consultation with Congress is important, if not constitutionally necessary, because “Congress has an important role to play.… The president knows that any decision he makes on a hypothetical congressional vote will be guided by more than one factor, more than legal factors alone.” Bush “would consider a variety of legal, policy, historical factors in making up his mind about this, if it again becomes a relevant matter. The president knows that in a democracy, it’s vital to have the support of the public if he reaches any point where he makes decisions about military action.” [CNN, 8/26/2002] Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution specifically states that Congress, not the executive branch, has the responsibility of declaring war with another nation. In modern US history, the judiciary has concurred with a number of presidents that the executive branch has limited powers to authorize military strikes, though not the power to commit US forces to a region for an extended period of time without Congressional approval. [University of Missouri-Kansas City, 8/16/2007] And the 1973 War Powers act requires the president to consult with Congress before deploying the military in “hostilities,” to notify Congress of troop commitments within 48 hours of deployment, and to end hostilities within 60 days unless Congress declares war or grants an extension to the deployment. In previous deployments since the law’s passage, presidents have often ignored the law, and Congress has usually not pressed the issue. White House lawyers say Bush has such authority based on his constitutional power to make military decisions as commander in chief, as well as under the terms of the 1991 Gulf War resolution and the September 14, 2001 Congressional resolution approving military action against terrorism. But House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) says that it is “imperative” that Congress debate and vote on any plan to attack Iraq. “This issue is much more than just a legal debate. The president will need the decisive support of the public and their elected representatives in order to initiate and sustain the effort that will be required to eliminate the threat posed by this regime.” [CNN, 8/26/2002]

Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, Richard Gephardt, George W. Bush, Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Cheney speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars.Cheney speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars. [Source: White House]In a speech to the Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vice President Dick Cheney says Saddam Hussein will “seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.” He also states unequivocally that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.… What he wants is time, and more time to husband his resources to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons program, and to gain possession of nuclear weapons.… Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined,” he says. “The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.… The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents, and they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago.” Therefore he argues, the answer is not weapons inspections. “Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of shoot and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.” He also says: “Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace.” [White House, 8/26/2002]
First White House Assertion of Iraq's Nuclear Program - Cheney’s speech marks the first major statement from the White House regarding the Bush administration’s Iraq policy following a flood of criticisms from former officials. Significantly, the speech was not cleared by the CIA or the State Department. [Newsweek, 9/9/2002] Furthermore, Cheney’s comments dismissing the need for the return of inspectors, were not cleared by President Bush, according to White House chief of staff Andrew Card. [Newsweek, 9/9/2002] The speech creates a media stir because it is the first time a senior US official has asserted Iraq has nuclear capabilities with such certainty. The CIA is astonished by the claim. CIA official Jami Miscik will later recall: “He said that Saddam was building his nuclear program. Our reaction was, ‘Where is he getting that stuff from? Does he have a source of information that we don’t know about?’” CIA analysts redouble their efforts to collect and review evidence on Iraq and nuclear weapons, but analysts know very little. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 167-169] Cheney’s assertions are contradicted by a broad base of military experts. [Dean, 2004, pp. 138]
Powell 'Blindsided' by Cheney - Three days after the speech, a State Department source tells CNN that Secretary of State Colin Powell’s view clashes with that which was presented in Cheney’s speech, explaining that the secretary of state is opposed to any military action in which the US would “go it alone… as if it doesn’t give a damn” what other nations think. The source also says that Powell and “others in the State Department were ‘blindsided’ by Cheney’s ‘time is running out’ speech… and were just as surprised as everyone else.” [CNN, 8/30/2002] Author and Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward will later describe Powell as “dumbfounded.” [Roberts, 2008, pp. 145] Cheney did, however, inform President Bush he would be speaking to the VFW. He did not provide Bush a copy of his speech. Bush merely told Cheney, “Don’t get me into trouble.” [Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 175]
'Off Script' - Current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later observe that it was always a tactic of the Iraq campaign strategy for Cheney to “lean a little more forward in his rhetoric than the president.” However, McClellan will go on to say that Cheney did not always “stay on message,” and will blame Cheney’s “deep-seated certitude, even arrogance” that sometimes operates “to the detriment of the president.” Cheney’s assertion to the VFW that it would be pointless to send UN inspectors back to Iraq is, McClellan will reflect, “off script.” Bush wants to continue to “show that he [is] exhausting all diplomatic options” before invading Iraq. [McClellan, 2008, pp. 138]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, US Department of State, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Scott McClellan, Jami Miscik, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Bob Woodward

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Speaking to US Marines of the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton in California, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says: “Leadership in the right direction finds followers and supporters…. It’s less important to have unanimity than it is making the right decision and doing the right thing, even though at the outset it may seem lonesome.” [Associated Press, 8/28/2002; CBS News, 8/28/2002; US Department of Defense, 8/27/2003]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

German authorities seize a boat in the port of Hamburg containing a shipment of rubber parts—allegedly bound for Iran—that could be used to make tracks for tanks and US-made M-113 armored personnel carriers. The seized boat, the Zim Anvers, is owned by the Zim-American Israeli Shipping Company. An Israeli company, PAD, headed by Avihai Weinstein, 34, had been issued a German export license for the shipment. The license specifies Thailand as its final destination, but according to German customs, the shipment is really destined for Iran. According to the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot, it was to be transferred in Hamburg to an Iranian cargo ship headed to the southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. Weinstein claims he had no knowledge of the shipment’s actual destination. Raphael Eitan, an adviser on terrorism for several Israeli governments between 1978 and 1985, tells public radio the next day that it would have been impossible for Weinstein “not to know what the final destination of the shipment was. In this type of affair, there is no innocent contract. He knew the shipment was headed to Iran,” he says. Tehran denies any involvement with the boat. [Agence France-Presse, 3/29/2002]

Entity Tags: Zim-American Israeli Shipping Co.

Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran

Gideon Ezra, Israel’s deputy interior minister, says, “The more aggressive the attack is, the more it will help Israel against the Palestinians. The understanding would be that what is good to do in Iraq, is also good for here.” He says that a US invasion of Iraq would “undoubtedly deal a psychological blow” to the Palestinians. [Christian Science Monitor, 8/30/2002]

Entity Tags: Gideon Ezra

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Yuval Steinitz, a Likud party member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, suggests that the imposition of a pro-American regime in Baghdad would ease Israel’s discomfort with Syria, which it views as a threat. Steinitz says, “After Iraq is taken by US troops and we see a new regime installed as in Afghanistan, and Iraqi bases become American bases, it will be very easy to pressure Syria to stop supporting terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, to allow the Lebanese army to dismantle Hezbollah, and maybe to put an end to the Syrian occupation in Lebanon. If this happens we will really see a new Middle East.” [Christian Science Monitor, 8/30/2002]

Entity Tags: Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Yuval Steinitz

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

With the US having diverted much of their best troops and equipment to Iraq, the Taliban and al-Qaeda begin regrouping inside Afghanistan. In August 2002, it is reported that former Taliban head Mullah Omar has secretly returned to Afghanistan and is living in remote hideouts near Kandahar. [Guardian, 8/30/2002] In September, US intelligence officials say “al-Qaeda operatives who found refuge in Pakistan are starting to regroup and move back into Afghanistan… The movement back into Afghanistan is still relatively small and involves al-Qaeda members traveling in small groups, the officials say.… American officials say the world’s largest concentrations of al-Qaeda operatives are now in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the recent influx into Afghanistan is creating new dangers.” [New York Times, 9/10/2002] In December, a United Nations report claims that al-Qaeda training camps have recently been reactivated in Afghanistan, and new volunteers are making their way to the camps. While the new camps are basic, they are said to be “increasing the long-term capabilities of the al-Qaeda network.” [Associated Press, 12/17/2002]

Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, United Nations, Mullah Omar

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells Fortune magazine, “If you [worry about just] the cost, the money, Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan… Iraq has oil. They have financial resources.” [Financial Times, 1/16/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In Athens, a number of Iraqi security officials get snagged in an arms bust arranged by the CIA. The CIA made it appear as though the Iraqis were buying guns for terrorists. The operation was part of an effort by the CIA’s Iraq Operations Group to exacerbate the tension between the US and Saddam Hussein in the lead-up to war with Iraq. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 161]

Entity Tags: Iraq Operations Group, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The British government is “shocked” when it learns “that in the postwar period, the Defense Department would still be running the show.” [Washington Post, 6/12/2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Dismayed at the lack of post-invasion planning in the Defense Department (see August 2002), the Joint Chiefs of Staff advance their own proposal for a military command to govern Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld insists on a split between military and civilian functions; he places Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith in charge of planning for the civilian administration. Feith, whom CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks calls “the dumbest f_cking guy on the planet,” is an academic with no experience at administration on such a level, and will be roundly excoriated for his incompetence in handling the assignment. Author and public administration professor Alasdair Roberts will later write that beyond Feith’s lack of competence is a bureaucratic failure: the Pentagon “was simply reaching beyond its abilities.” A RAND report will later find the Defense Department “lacked experience, expertise, funding authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential civilian organizations” to do the task it had set for itself. Roberts will write that the Pentagon will substitute improvisation for meticulous planning (see January 2003). [Roberts, 2008, pp. 126, 134]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Alasdair Roberts, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thomas Franks, RAND Corporation

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

As Bush administration lawyers warn that Vice President Cheney and his Pentagon allies are setting the government up for defeat in the courts with their hardline advice on interrogation techniques (see Late 2001-Early 2002, January 25, 2002, April 2002 and After, and August 1, 2002) and indefinite detentions (see After September 11, 2001 and December 2001-January 2002), one of the uneasiest of Justice Department lawyers is Solicitor General Theodore Olson. Cheney and Olson have similar views on the expansion of presidential powers, but his job in the administration is to win court cases. Olson is not sure that Cheney’s legal arguments are tenable. Olson is particularly worried about two pending cases, those of US citizens Jose Padilla (see June 10, 2002) and Yaser Esam Hamdi (see December 2001 and August 16, 2002). Both have been declared enemy combatants and denied access to lawyers. Olson warns that federal courts will not go along with that provision, but he finds himself opposed by CIA and Pentagon officials. When Olson and other lawyers propose that Padilla and Hamdi be granted lawyers, Cheney’s chief lawyer, David Addington, beats back their proposal because, says deputy White House counsel Timothy Flanigan, “that was the position of his client, the vice president.” The issue comes to a head in the West Wing office of Alberto Gonzales, the White House’s chief legal counsel. Four officials with direct knowledge of the meeting later recall the chain of events. Olson has the support of associate White House counsel Bradford Berenson, a former law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. Berenson says that Kennedy, the Court’s swing vote, will never accept absolute presidential authority to declare a US citizen an enemy and lock him away without benefit of counsel. Another former Kennedy law clerk, White House lawyer Brett Kavanaugh, had made the same argument earlier. Addington, representing Cheney in the meeting, accuses Berenson of surrendering presidential authority on what he calls a fool’s prophecy about the Court; Berenson retorts by accusing Addington of “know-nothingness.” Gonzales listens quietly as the Justice Department and his own staff line up against Addington. He finally makes a decision: in favor of Cheney and Addington. [Washington Post, 6/25/2007]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Brett Kavanaugh, Bradford Berenson, Alberto R. Gonzales, Central Intelligence Agency, Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, David S. Addington, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, US Department of Justice, Jose Padilla, Yaser Esam Hamdi, Timothy E. Flanigan

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

The Bush White House establishes a “high-level, interagency task force” charged with the task of “coordinating all Iraq war planning efforts and postwar initiatives.” The task force is headed by the Deputies Committee, which is made up of the “No. 2 officials at the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, CIA, National Security Council, and vice president’s office.” The committee’s job is to review the work of other groups who have been involved in the planning of post-war Iraq, and provide recommendations to President Bush’s top advisers. The committee draws on the work of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) (see 2002-2003 and September 2002), Elliott Abrams’s group (see November 2002-December 2002 and December 2002) and the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project (see April 2002-March 2003). Later accounts make clear that Abrams’s and the OSP’s recommendations have much more influence. The Deputies Committee usually meets in the White House situation room. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice keeps Bush updated on the progress of the task force’s work. In November, US News and World Report reports that a consensus is forming “at the highest levels of the Bush administration over how to run the country after Saddam and his regime are history.” [Financial Times, 11/4/2002; US News and World Report, 11/25/2003; Reuters, 11/25/2003]
Some Conclusions of the Deputies Committee -
No US-Created Government - The US should not create a provisional government or a government in exile. “We are not going to be in the business of choosing” who should lead Iraq, a senior official tells US News and World Report. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Lengthy Occupation - The invasion of Iraq will likely be followed by a lengthy occupation. This conclusion is passed on to Bush. “I have been with the president when he has been briefed about the need to have US forces there for an extended period of time,” a senior administration official will later tell US News and World Report. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Military Occupation Rule before Turning over Rule to Iraqis - During the first phase of the occupation, Iraq will be ruled by the military, probably a US general. The primary objective during this phase will be maintaining security and preventing the emergence of hostilities between the Shi’ites and Sunnis. Pentagon officials involved in planning this stage are reported to have reviewed the archived plans for the occupation of Germany and Japan. The second phase of the occupation will involve some sort of international civilian administration, with a diminished US military presence, and Iraqis will be given a larger role in the government. In the last phase, a constitution will be drafted, transferring power to a representative, multiethnic Iraqi government that commits to being free of weapons of mass destruction. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
War Paid for by Iraqi Oil - Revenue generated from the sale of Iraq’s oil will be used for the cost of reconstruction and for conducting humanitarian operations. Hardliners however want the funds to pay for the military costs of the invasion as well. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Dissension over Roles of Iraqi Exiles - No firm decisions are made about the what role, if any, Iraqi exiles affiliated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) will play in post-Saddam Iraq. Pentagon hardliners and some top officials in the White House favor giving them a prominent role, while the CIA and State Department adamantly oppose their inclusion, arguing that the exiles cannot be trusted. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
US Will Not Be Seen as 'Liberators' - Iraqis will not necessarily treat the invading American soldiers as “liberators.” Many Iraqis harbor a deep resentment against the US for the decades-long sanction policy. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]

Entity Tags: Office of Special Plans, National Security Council, Office of the Vice President, US Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush, Iraqi National Congress, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Chalabi, Condoleezza Rice, Elliott Abrams

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

As the administration’s push to convince Americans that the Iraq war is necessary is reaching its height, the Pentagon sends its military analysts out to the television networks and the press (see April 20, 2008 and Early 2002 and Beyond) with talking points portraying Iraq as an imminent threat. The analysts are to emphasize that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons that it can and will use, that it is developing nuclear weapons, and that it is sure to provide these weapons to al-Qaeda. A military invasion, the talking points state, is not only a necessity, but will be a relatively quick, relatively bloodless, and relatively inexpensive “war of liberation.” Pentagon public relations chief Victoria Clarke and her staff are thrilled at how well the analysts incorporate Pentagon talking points into their own presentations. Clarke’s aide Brent Krueger recalls: “You could see that they were messaging. You could see they were taking verbatim what the secretary was saying or what the technical specialists were saying. And they were saying it over and over and over.” Some days, “We were able to click on every single station and every one of our folks were up there delivering our message. You’d look at them and say, ‘This is working.’” [New York Times, 4/20/2008]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Brent T. Krueger, Al-Qaeda, US Department of Defense, Victoria (“Torie”) Clarke

Timeline Tags: US Military, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

In 2008, Scott McClellan, currently the deputy press secretary in the Bush administration, will describe the current belief in the White House that overthrowing Iraq’s Saddam Hussein will lead to the overall democratization of the Middle East. According to McClellan, once Hussein has been overthrown and democracy established, the White House believes “it would serve as an example to other freedom-seeking reformers in the Middle East.” McClellan will call this ideal a “positive domino effect” that would bring about transformative, democratic change in Iran and Afghanistan. Both Iran and Iraq, McClellan will write, have “a significant number of well-educated, forward-looking citizens,” and as for Afghanistan, that nation is “already on the verge of democracy.” An Iraqi democracy will, the argument goes, inspire the Iranian people “to rise up and change their country’s governance, and a free Iraq and Iran would remove two major threats to peace and stability in the Middle East—two parts of the ‘axis of evil’ Bush had highlighted in his January 2002 State of the Union address (see Mid-January 2003 and 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). And this, in turn, would dramatically reduce global tensions and enhance a key national security interest of the United States by ensuring the long-term stability of the massive oil reserves of the Middle East.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 129]

Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In 2008, Scott McClellan, the current White House deputy press secretary, will write of President Bush’s lowering of accepted standards to allow for a pre-emptive war. McClellan will write: “Bush was now lowering the bar for engaging in pre-emptive war, a step that might have been more widely viewed as radical had it occurred prior to 9/11. The [Bush] doctrine (see 8:30 p.m. September 11, 2001) unambiguously stated that while the United States would always proceed deliberately and carefully weigh the consequences of actions, it would not hesitate to use force if necessary to preempt not just an ‘imminent’ threat but a ‘grave and gathering’ one if need be (see September 16, 2002). It was based on the assumption that waiting for a threat to become imminent before acting would likely mean that we would respond too late. And this new principle encoded in our new national security strategy was clearly aimed in part in paving the way to removing Saddam Hussein from power by force.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 134]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), George W. Bush, Scott McClellan

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

US officials, advisers, and foreign policy experts suggest that a portion of the cost of the US military operation in Iraq, as well as the post-war reconstruction, could be funded with Iraq’s oil wealth. [White House, 2/18/2003; St. Petersburg Times, 4/2/2003; US Congress, 9/30/2003; Financial Times, 1/16/2004]

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

According to a senior intelligence official interviewed by the Associated Press in June of 2003, the CIA shares with Britain the results of Joseph Wilson’s trip to Niger (see February 21, 2002-March 4, 2002), advising British intelligence that claims that Iraq attempted to procure uranium from Niger are unsubstantiated. But another report, by the Observer the following month, contradicts this AP report. It cites a series of letters to the British Foreign Affairs Committee which show that although the US had asked Britain not to use the Africa-uranium claim, they did not provide any details about Wilson’s mission to Niger. [Associated Press, 6/12/2003; Observer, 7/13/2003; Time, 7/21/2003] In spite of this warning, Britain publishes a dossier in September which includes the claim.(see September 24, 2002)

Entity Tags: Joseph C. Wilson, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

A DIA office.A DIA office. [Source: Daily Wireless]The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issues an 80-plus-page classified report titled, “Iraq: Key Weapons Facilities—An Operational Support Study,” concluding that there is “no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons.” [US Department of Defense, 9/2002 pdf file; Bloomberg, 6/6/2003; Reuters, 6/6/2003; US News and World Report, 6/9/2003] When this is reported in the press in June 2003, Michael Anton, a spokesman with the National Security Council, immediately denies that the report suggested the administration had misrepresented intelligence. “The entire report paints a different picture than the selective quotes would lead you to believe. The entire report is consistent with [sic] the president was saying at the time,” he claims. [Fox News, 6/6/2003] But two Pentagon officials confirm to Fox News that according to the report, the Defense Intelligence Agency indeed had no hard evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons. [Fox News, 6/6/2003]

Entity Tags: Defense Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Retired General Wesley Clark writes a piece in the Washington Monthly, titled, “An Army of One: In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They’re the key to it,” in which he argues that it is a “fundamental misjudgment” to continue the war on terrorism in the absence of NATO support. He refers to NATO’s war in Kosovo repeatedly in his essay using it as an example of how he thinks a just and effective war should be fought. He also says that cooperation with its European allies is crucial if the Bush administration wants to prevent future attacks, noting that most of the planning and preparations for the 9-11 attacks took place in cells in Europe. [Washington Monthly, 9/2002]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Wesley Clark

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Former CIA director and noted neoconservative James Woolsey tells the Washington Post: “It’s pretty straightforward. France and Russia have oil companies and interests in Iraq. They should be told that if they are of assistance in moving Iraq toward decent government, we’ll do the best we can to ensure that the new government and American companies work closely with them…. If they throw in their lot with Saddam, it will be difficult to the point of impossible to persuade the new Iraqi government to work with them.” [Washington Post, 9/15/2002]

Entity Tags: James Woolsey

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

Senior intelligence officials tell the Washington Post that the CIA has yet to find solid evidence that Saddam Hussein has ties to international militant Islamic groups despite substantial efforts including analysis of surveillance photos and communications intercepts. [Washington Post, 9/10/2002; Washington Post, 9/26/2002]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The CIA’s Anabasis operatives begin training in the Nevada Desert at the Energy Department’s nuclear test site. About 80 Iraqis take part in the training. They name their squad Scorpions 77 Alpha after a special forces unit Saddam had disbanded. A second team comprised of about 15 Arab fighters, mostly Egyptians and Lebanese, also train at the site. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 153-156]

Entity Tags: Anabasis, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

A US official with inside knowledge of the interrogations of detainees at the US prison at Guantanamo tells USA Today that the administration’s recent assertions that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members are based on uncorroborated information from a single Guantanamo detainee. The source also notes that the detainees may be lying to US authorities to encourage a US invasion of Iraq in order to add support to the al-Qaeda argument “that the United States is the mortal enemy of Muslim countries.” [USA Today, 9/26/2002]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration (43), US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

After CIA Director George Tenet learns of the formation of the Office of Special Plans (OSP—see September 2002), he fails to challenge its existence and mission even though the OSP is working to actively undermine the other US intelligence agencies. In 2007, author Craig Unger will write, “The existence of the OSP effectively meant that [Vice President Dick] Cheney, [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld, and the [Bush administration] neocons had declared war on the CIA by creating a bureaucratic operation whose sole purpose was to circumvent and subvert the nation’s statutorily authorized intelligence apparatus.” Tenet, who Unger describes as “ever anxious to ingratiate himself with the White House,” does nothing to block the OSP’s inroads and depredations. According to the then-director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Greg Thielmann, “That’s totally unacceptable for a CIA director.” Unger will note that while Tenet is following his orders to “do everything in his power to make sure the CIA gets the goods on Saddam [Hussein]… in effect, by remaining silent about the OSP, Tenet was betraying his own men at the CIA—and the Agency’s mission.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 245]

Entity Tags: Office of Special Plans, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Greg Thielmann, George J. Tenet, Craig Unger

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Tyler Drumheller, CIA chief in Europe.Tyler Drumheller, CIA chief in Europe. [Source: PBS]Tyler Drumheller, the head of CIA spying in Europe, calls the German Intelligence (BND) station chief at the German embassy in Washington hoping to obtain permission to interview Curveball. Over lunch at a restaurant in Georgetown, the two discuss the case and the German officer tells Drumheller that Curveball is “crazy” [Los Angeles Times, 11/20/2005] and that the BND questions “whether Curveball [is] actually telling the truth.” [Washington Post, 5/21/2005]
Germans Confirm Curveball a Likely Fabricator - Author Craig Unger will write: “Curveball was a proprietory source of the BND, which passed its information from him to the Pentagon’s Defense HUMINT Service. In other words, even though the United States had no direct access to Curveball, [CIA Director George] Tenet was so anxious to please the White House (see September 2002) that he had given the Senate the explosive, but unsubstantiated revelation (see September 24, 2002). But now, with the crucial Senate vote over the war imminent (see October 10, 2002), Tenet had to make sure Curveball was for real. Not long after the meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee, Tenet asked [top CIA official] Tyler Drumheller to get direct access to Curveball.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 247] In 2009, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer will recall: “I was astonished that the Americans used Curveball, really astonished. This was our stuff. But they presented it not in the way we knew it. They presented it as a fact, and not as the way an intelligence assessment is—could be, but could also be a big lie. We don’t know.” [Vanity Fair, 2/2009] The Germans respond that Curveball is “probably a fabricator.” They also inform Drumheller that the BND will not give in to CIA requests to gain access to Curveball.
Violent Opposition to Characterization among CIA Officials - After the meeting, Drumheller and several aides get into bitter arguments with CIA analysts working on the Curveball case. “The fact is, there was a lot of yelling and screaming about this guy,” James Pavitt, chief of clandestine services, will later tell the Los Angeles Times. “My people were saying, ‘We think he’s a stinker.’” But CIA analysts remain supportive of Curveball’s account. In one meeting, the chief CIA analyst argues that material she found on the Internet corroborates Curveball’s account, to which the operations group chief for Germany retorts, “That’s where he got it too.” [Los Angeles Times, 11/20/2005] Drumheller will later recall his astonishment at the violence of the reaction among CIA officials. “People were cursing,” he will recall. “These guys were absolutely, violently committed to it [relying on Curveball as a primary source of intelligence].” Drumheller is unaware that a draft National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see October 1, 2002) has already been written, and that it relies heavily on Curveball’s intelligence. When Drumheller tells Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin that Curveball may be a fabricator, McLaughlin replies, “Man, I really hope not, because this is really the only substantive part of the NIE.” Drumheller now realizes what has escaped him before—Curveball is the only source the US has for its explosive claims about Iraq’s bioweapons labs, claims being used to justify a war. He tells his group chief that he had assumed the CIA had other sources to validate Curveball’s data. “No,” she says. “This is why they’re fighting so ferociously to validate this source.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 247-248]
Politicization of Intelligence - Paul Pillar, the CIA’s former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, will later tell a PBS reporter: “Politicization, real politicization, rarely [takes the form of] blatant, crude arm twisting.… It’s always more subtle.… Intelligence assessments that conform with what is known to be the policy [have] an easier time making it through.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 249]

Entity Tags: Joschka Fischer, Tyler Drumheller, George J. Tenet, James Pavitt, ’Curveball’, Bundesnachrichtendienst, Central Intelligence Agency, Paul R. Pillar

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld holds a “top secret” briefing on Iraq for selected Congressional members, including, among others, Senator John McCain (R-AZ). The briefing takes place in the most secure room in the Capitol, a small, windowless chamber that is ostentatiously swept for bugs before the briefing. At the outset, the lawmakers are sworn to deepest secrecy. But during the briefing, Rumsfeld tells the assembled members nothing they couldn’t learn by watching the nightly news. McCain abruptly leaves the meeting, and later says, “It was a joke.” Vice President Cheney has said that the administration doesn’t trust the 535 members of Congress not to leak classified information, and therefore they must make their decisions concerning war with Iraq without the benefit of complete intelligence briefings (see Before September 9, 2002 and After). McCain reflects the feelings of many members in expressing his aggravation with the administration. “It becomes almost insulting after a while,” he says. “Everyone that goes to them is frustrated.” Rather than give “pretend” briefings that convey little information, McCain says, President Bush should just suspend the briefings entirely. House member Robert Menendez (D-NJ) says many members are skipping the briefings entirely to avoid signing a secrecy pledge that restricts what they can and cannot talk about. Menendez, briefed earlier by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and CIA Director George Tenet, says, “I heard nothing that was new, compelling, or that I have not heard before.” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer says, “The White House will continue to as fully inform as possible members of Congress, while also preserving sensitive intelligence information so no inadvertent disclosure jeopardizes sources or methods or missions.” The White House has had some success with Democrats who might be resistant to its arguments for war by choosing to give more complete briefings to a few selected Democratic leaders, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO). As a result, Democratic leaders in Congress are more supportive of the push towards war than many of their rank-and-file colleagues. [Washington Post, 9/15/2002]

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Ari Fleischer, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Menendez, US Department of Defense, John McCain, George W. Bush, Richard Gephardt, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

A memo prepared for Colonel Brittain Mallow, the commander of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF), documents objections raised by Mallow to the harsh interrogation methods—torture—being used at Guantanamo Bay. Mallow’s memo cites “unacceptable methods” involving “threats,” “discomfort,” and “sensory deprivation,” and provides guidance to CITF agents on permissible interrogation methods for use on detainees. Mallow instructs his unit not to take part in “any questionable” interrogation techniques at the prison. In 2008, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) will observe, “The memo suggests that CITF expressed disapproval of abusive methods used at Guantanamo as far back as September 2002.” [American Civil Liberties Union, 5/14/2008]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, American Civil Liberties Union, Criminal Investigation Task Force, Brittain Mallow

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

William Luti.William Luti. [Source: Helene C. Stikkel / Defense Department]Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, both staunch neoconservatives, rename the Northern Gulf Affairs Office on the Pentagon’s fourth floor (in the seventh corridor of D Ring) the “Office of Special Plans” (OSP) and increase its four-person staff to sixteen. [Knight Ridder, 8/16/2002; Los Angeles Times, 11/24/2002; New Yorker, 5/12/2003; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003; Tom Paine (.com), 8/27/2003; American Conservative, 12/1/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004] William Luti, a former navy officer and ex-aide to Vice President Cheney, is put in charge of the day-to-day operations [Guardian, 7/17/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004] , apparently at the behest of Cheney. Luti was, according to former Defense Intelligence Agency official Patrick Lang, a member of Cheney’s “shadow National Security Council.” [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
Transforming NESA - Luti worked for the Near East and South Asian Affairs desk (NESA) at the Pentagon since mid-2001. Lang later describes NESA as having been “a Pentagon backwater, responsible primarily for arranging bilateral meetings with military counterparts” from various nations. Before the Afghanistan war, NESA worked closely with the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) for the Near East, South Asia, and Counterterrorism. During Luti’s first months at NESA, the DIO was Bruce Hardcastle. The Pentagon dismantled the entire DIO system, partly because of friction between Luti and Hardcastle (see Early 2002). Lang will write, “The roots of the friction between Hardcastle and Luti were straightforward: Hardcastle brought with him the combined wisdom of the professional military intelligence community. The community had serious doubts about the lethality of the threat from Saddam Hussein, the terrorism links and the status of the Iraqi WMD programs. Luti could not accept this. He knew what he wanted: to bring down Saddam Hussein. Hardcastle could not accept the very idea of allowing a desired outcome to shape the results of analysis.” Luti transforms NESA into what Lang will call “a ‘de facto’ arm of the vice president’s office,” and in the process shuts Hardcastle out of NESA (and later OSP) intelligence briefings. Luti does not report to either Feith or Donald Rumsfeld, as his chain of command delineates, but to Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby. OSP staffer Karen Kwiatkowski later recalls being “shocked” to learn that Luti reports to Libby and not to his putative Pentagon superiors. She will say, “In one of the first staff meetings that I attended there, Bill Luti said, ‘Well, did you get that thing over to Scooter? Scooter wants this, and somebody’s got to get it over to him, and get that up to him right away.’ After the meeting, I asked one of my co-workers, who’d been there longer, ‘Who is this Scooter?’ I was told, ‘That’s Scooter Libby over at the OVP (Office of the Vice President). He’s the Vice President’s chief of staff.’ Later I came to understand that Cheney had put Luti there.” Under Luti, NESA becomes a virtual adjunct to the OSP. [Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
Strong Neoconservative Influence - The Office of Special Plans is staffed with a tight group of like-minded neoconservative ideologues, who are known advocates of regime change in Iraq. Notably, the staffers have little background in intelligence or Iraqi history and culture. [Salon, 7/16/2003; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003; American Conservative, 12/1/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004] Some of the people associated with this office were earlier involved with the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, also known as the “Wurmser-Maloof” project (see Shortly After September 11, 2001). They hire “scores of temporary ‘consultants‘… including like-minded lawyers, congressional staffers, and policy wonks from the numerous right-wing think-tanks in the US capital.” Neoconservative ideologues, like Richard Perle, Michael Ledeen, and Newt Gingrich, are afforded direct input into the Office of Special Plans. [Guardian, 7/17/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Vanity Fair, 7/2006, pp. 150] Kwiatkowski later says she saw Ledeen going “in and out of there (OSP) all the time.” [Vanity Fair, 7/2006, pp. 150]
Planning for Post-Saddam Iraq - The official business of Special Plans is to help plan for post-Saddam Iraq. The office’s staff members presumably “develop defense policies aimed at building an international coalition, prepare the secretary of defense and his top deputies for interagency meetings, coordinate troop-deployment orders, craft policies for dealing with prisoners of war and illegal combatants, postwar assistance and reconstruction policy planning, postwar governance, Iraqi oil infrastructure policy, postwar Iraqi property disputes, war crimes and atrocities, war-plan review and, in their spare time, prepare congressional testimony for their principals.” [Insight, 12/2/2003]
Covert Source of 'Alternative' Intelligence - But according to numerous well-placed sources, the office becomes a source for many of the administration’s prewar allegations against Iraq. It is accused of exaggerating, politicizing, and misrepresenting intelligence, which is “stovepiped” to top administration officials who use the intelligence in their policy decisions on Iraq. [Knight Ridder, 8/16/2002; Los Angeles Times, 11/24/2002; New Yorker, 5/12/2003; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003; Tom Paine (.com), 8/27/2003; American Conservative, 12/1/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Daily Telegraph, 7/11/2004; CNN, 7/11/2004]
'Top Secret' - There are very few news reports in the American mainstream media that report on the office. In fact, the office is reportedly Top Secret. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 308] “We were instructed at a staff meeting that this office was not to be discussed or explained,” Kwiatkowski will later say, “and if people in the Joint Staff, among others, asked, we were to offer no comment.” [American Conservative, 12/1/2003]
Part of a 'Separate Government,' Powell Feels - Colin Powell is said to have felt that Cheney and the neoconservatives in this “Gestapo” office had established what was essentially a separate government. [Washington Post, 4/17/2004] Powell’s former chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, is even more blunt. “When I say ‘secret cabal,’ I mean ‘secret cabal,’ he says of the White House officials behind the OSP. He compares Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the neoconservatives to the Jacobins, the radical zealots who plunged 18th-century France into the Reign of Terror. “I see them as messianic advocates of American power from one end of the globe, much as the Jacobins in France were messianic advocates of the French Revolution. I don’t care whether utopians are Vladimir Lenin on a sealed train to Moscow or Paul Wolfowitz. You’re never going to bring utopia, and you’re going to hurt a lot of people in the process.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 299-300] Among the claims critics find most troubling about the office are:
Heavy Reliance on Intelligence from Exiles and Defectors - The office relies heavily on accounts from Iraqi exiles and defectors associated with Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC), long considered suspect by other US intelligence agencies. [New Yorker, 5/12/2003; Salon, 7/16/2003; Guardian, 7/17/2003; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003; Independent, 9/30/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004] One defector in particular, code-named “Curveball,” provides as much as 98 percent of the intelligence on Iraq’s alleged arsenal of biological weapons. [CNN, 7/11/2004] Much of the information provided by the INC’s sources consists of “misleading and often faked intelligence reports,” which often flow to Special Plans and NESA directly, “sometimes through Defense Intelligence Agency debriefings of Iraqi defectors via the Defense Human Intelligence Service and sometimes through the INC’s own US-funded Intelligence Collection Program, which was overseen by the Pentagon.” [Mother Jones, 1/2004] According to Kwiatkowski, the movement of intelligence from the INC to the Office of Special Plans is facilitated by a Colonel Bruner, a former military aide to Gingrich. [Newsweek, 12/15/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004; Salon, 3/10/2004] Bruner “was Chalabi’s handler,” Kwiatkowski will tell Mother Jones. “He would arrange meetings with Chalabi and Chalabi’s folks.” [Mother Jones, 1/2004] Kwiatkowski also finds that OSP personnel, along with DIA and CIA officials, are taking part in the debriefing of INC informants. She will recall confronting one DIA officer, John Trigilio, about the practice: “I argued with [Tregilio] after the president’s Cincinnati speech (see October 5, 2002 and October 6, 2002). I told him that the president had made a number of statements that were just not supported by the intelligence. He said that the president’s statements are supported by intelligence, and he would finally say, ‘We have sources that you don’t have.’ I took it to mean the sources that Chalabi was bringing in for debriefing… Trigilio told me he participated in a number of debriefs, conducted in hotels downtown, or wherever, of people that Chalabi brought in. These debriefs had Trigilio from OSP, but also CIA and DIA participated… If [the information] sounded good, it would go straight to the OVP or elsewhere. I don’t put it out of possibility that the information would go straight to the media because of the (media’s) close relationship with some of the neoconservatives. So this information would make it straight out into the knowledge base without waiting for intelligence [analysts] to come by with their qualifications and reservations.” [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
Cherry-Picked Intelligence - The Office of Special Plans purposefully ignores intelligence that undermines the case for war while exaggerating any leads that support it. “It wasn’t intelligence—it was propaganda,” Kwiatkowski will later explain. “They’d take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, often by juxtaposition of two pieces of information that don’t belong together.” [New York Times, 10/24/2002; New Yorker, 5/12/2003; Salon, 7/16/2003; Guardian, 7/17/2003; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003; Independent, 9/30/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004] “At the OSP, what they were doing was looking at all the intelligence they could find on WMD. That was the focal point, picking bits and pieces that were the most inflammatory, removing any context that might have been provided in the original intelligence report, that would have caused you to have some pause in believing it or reflected doubts that the intelligence community had, so if the intelligence community had doubts, those would be left out… They would take items that had occurred many years ago, and put them in the present tense, make it seem like they occurred not many years ago… But they would not talk about the dates; they would say things like, ‘He has continued since that time’ and ‘He could do it tomorrow,’ which of course, wasn’t true… The other thing they would do would be to take unrelated events that were reported in totally unrelated ways and make connections that the intelligence community had not made. This was primarily in discussing Iraq’s activities and how they might be related to al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups that might be against us, or against Israel… These kinds of links would be made. They would be made casually, and they would be made in a calculated way to form an image that is definitely not the image that anyone reading the original reports would have. The summaries that we would see from Intelligence did not match the kinds of things that OSP was putting out. So that is what I call propaganda development. It goes beyond the manipulation of intelligence to propaganda development.” [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
No Intelligence Oversight - The OSP bypasses established oversight procedures by sending its intelligence assessments directly to the White House and National Security Council without having them first vetted by a review process involving other US intelligence agencies. [New Yorker, 5/12/2003; Salon, 7/16/2003; Guardian, 7/17/2003; Mother Jones, 1/2004] The people at Special Plans are so successful at bypassing conventional procedures, in part, because their neoconservative colleagues hold key positions in several other agencies and offices. Their contacts in other agencies include: John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security; Bolton’s adviser, David Wurmser, a former research fellow on the Middle East at the American Enterprise Institute, who was just recently working in a secret Pentagon planning unit at Douglas Feith’s office (see Shortly After September 11, 2001); Elizabeth Cheney, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs; Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser; Elliott Abrams, the National Security Council’s top Middle East aide; and Richard Perle, Newt Gingrich, James Woolsey and Kenneth Adelman of the Defense Policy Board. The office provides very little information about its work to other US intelligence offices. [Salon, 7/16/2003; Guardian, 7/17/2003; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003]
'Stealth Organization' - Greg Thielmann, the former director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office at the State Department’s Intelligence Bureau, later says of the OSP: “It was a stealth organization. They didn’t play in the intelligence community proceedings that our office participated in. When the intelligence community met as a community, there was no OSP represented in these sessions. Because, if they had done that, they would have had to subject their views to peer review. Why do that when you can send stuff right in to the vice president?” [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004; Unger, 2007, pp. 299] Lang will say in January 2004 that what happened was fundamentally different from anything that had happened under previous presidents. Cheney’s staff and allies “behaved as though they had seized control of the government in a ‘silent coup,’” The result, according to Lang, is “a highly corrupted system of intelligence and policymaking, one twisted to serve specific group goals, ends, and beliefs held to the point of religious faith.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 301]
Pressuring Intelligence Analysts - Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Dale Davis, who headed the International Programs Department at the Virginia Military Institute until March 2004, and an expert on Middle East affairs, later says he believes intelligence analysts at the CIA and other agencies were pressured indirectly. Davis will say, “By creating the OSP [Office of Special Plans], Cheney was able to say, ‘Hey, look at what we’re getting out of OSP. How come you guys aren’t doing as well? What is your response to what this alternative analysis that we’re receiving from the Pentagon says?’ That’s how you do it. You pressure people indirectly.” Vincent Cannistraro, a former senior counterterrorism official with the CIA, will agree: “Over a long period of time, there was a subtle process of pressure and intimidation until people started giving them what was wanted… When the Senate Intelligence Committee interviewed, under oath, over 100 analysts, not one of them said, ‘I changed my assessment because of pressure.‘… The environment was conditioned in such a way that the analyst subtly leaned toward the conceits of the policymakers… The intelligence community was vulnerable to the aggressiveness of neoconservative policymakers, particularly at the Pentagon and at the VP’s office. As one analyst said to me, ‘You can’t fight something with nothing, and those people had something. Whether it was right or wrong, fraudulent or specious, it almost didn’t make any difference, because the policymakers believed it already, and if you didn’t have hard countervailing evidence to persuade them, then you were at a loss.’” [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
Strong Pro-Israel, Anti-Arab Biases - Lastly, the people involved in Special Plans openly exhibit strong pro-Israel and anti-Arab bias. The problem, note critics, is that the analysis of intelligence is supposed to be apolitical and untainted by ideological viewpoints. [American Conservative, 12/1/2003] According to a CIA intelligence official and four members of the Senate’s Intelligence Committee, Special Plans is the group responsible for the claim Bush will make in his 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from an African country (see 9:01 pm January 28, 2003). [Nation, 6/19/2003; Information Clearing House, 7/16/2003]
Personal Grudges against Intelligence Community - The OSP reflects the personal grudges and ill will of many in the Office of the Vice President against the intelligence community, in part because of the CIA’s refusal to give much weight to the claims of Chalabi and the INC. “This had been a fight for such a long period of time, where people were so dug in,” a friend of one of Vice President Cheney’s senior staffers will later reflect. A colleague of the senior staff later says, “They so believed that the CIA were wrong, they were like, ‘We want to show these f_ckers that they are wrong.’” [New Republic, 11/20/2003]
Propaganda - Kwiatkowski will later recall that the OSP generated a large amount of what she terms propaganda, in the form of “talking points” used in briefings and in press conferences. “With the talking points, many of the propagandistic bullets that were given to use in papers for our superiors to inform them—internal propaganda—many of those same phrases and assumptions and tones, I saw in Vice President Cheney’s speeches and the president’s speeches,” she will say. “So I got the impression that those talking points were not just for us, but were the core of an overall agenda for a disciplined product, beyond the Pentagon. Over at the vice president’s office and the [neoconservative news magazine] Weekly Standard, the media, and the neoconservative talking heads and that kind of thing, all on the same sheet of music.” Kwiatkowski identifies Abram Shulsky, a neoconservative academic and recent Pentagon hire, as the source of many of these talking points. [Middle East Policy Council, 6/2004]
Denials, Counter-Accusations after Public Learns of OSP - After the existence of the Office of Special Plans is revealed to the public, the Pentagon will deny that it served as a direct conduit to the White House for misleading intelligence, instead claiming that its activities had been limited to postwar plans for Iraq. [New Yorker, 5/12/2003] And a December 2003 opinion piece published in Insight magazine will call the allegations surrounding the Office of Special Plans the work of conspiracy theorists. [Insight, 12/2/2003]

Entity Tags: Colonel Bruner, Colin Powell, Abram Shulsky, Craig Unger, Office of the Vice President, David Wurmser, Elizabeth (“Liz”) Cheney, Dale Davis, Douglas Feith, Donald Rumsfeld, James Woolsey, John Trigilio, Office of Special Plans, Kenneth Adelman, Stephen J. Hadley, Vincent Cannistraro, Lawrence Wilkerson, Karen Kwiatkowski, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Newt Gingrich, Patrick Lang, Greg Thielmann, Elliott Abrams

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence, Domestic Propaganda

The Defense Intelligence Agency releases an intelligence assessment entitled “Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Program” that claims, “Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake” for the production of nuclear weapons. The DIA is referring to the tale of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal (see Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001, October 15, 2001, October 18, 2001, November 20, 2001, February 5, 2002, March 1, 2002, Late April or Early May 2002-June 2002, and Late June 2002), as well as purported dealings with Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The assessment says that “DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources.” [Defense Intelligence Agency, 9/2002 pdf file; Unger, 2007, pp. 259]

Entity Tags: Defense Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

In an interview with the BBC, Secretary of State Colin Powell states that he favors the return of UN inspectors as a necessary “first step” in dealing with Iraq. He says: “Iraq has been in violation of these many UN resolutions for most of the last 11 or so years. So as a first step, let’s see what the inspectors find, send them back in, why are they being kept out.” Regarding the decision of whether or not the use of military action would be required, he says: “The world has to be presented with the information, with the intelligence that is available. A debate is needed within the international community so that everybody can make a judgment about this.” [Independent, 9/2/2002] His comments directly contradict statements made by Vice President Dick Cheney in a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on August 7 (see August 7, 2002), and another speech to the Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26 (see August 26, 2002).
White House Insists No Conflict - Interestingly, it also comes one day after Scott McClellan, the White House deputy press secretary, told reporters: “The view of the administration is united and one in the same. We are singing from the same songbook.” [CNN, 8/30/2002] But commentators are concluding otherwise, which spurs another statement from Washington, this one from White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, who the next day tells reporters as they accompany him on Air Force One: “There is no difference in position between Cheney, Powell, and President Bush. It’s much ado about no difference.” [CNN, 9/3/2002]
Powell 'Shocked' at Cheney's Remarks - Privately, Powell is “shocked” by Cheney’s statements, according to his chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson. Wilkerson will later recall: “Here we were saying one thing out of one side of our mouth, and here was the vice president speaking to what you might call a semi-official military audience and he was saying the exact opposite. Undercutting every bit of diplomacy before that diplomacy actually got off the ground. And I remember Powell coming back from a principals’ meeting where he had made some remonstrance to the president about what’s going on. And the president had said something which he was wont to say about most things like this. He said, ‘Oh, that’s just Dick.’” [Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 176-177]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Ari Fleischer, Colin Powell, Lawrence Wilkerson, Scott McClellan

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Vice President Cheney and his staff have become increasingly reliant on intelligence from Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC—see Early 2003). Cheney’s senior aide John Hannah, the liaison between Cheney and the INC, has become increasingly invested in the exile group. “He relied on Ahmed Chalabi for insights and advice,” a Bush administration official will later recall. Cheney has himself become an increasingly vocal Chalabi advocate. At a meeting of President Bush’s National Security Council, the State Department and Pentagon officials argue over whether to increase funding to the INC. Cheney, a former NSC staffer will recall, “weighed in, in a really big way. He said, ‘We’re getting ready to go to war, and we’re nickel-and-diming the INC at a time when they’re providing us with unique intelligence on Iraqi WMD.’” The fact that no one else, particularly the CIA, could confirm anything the INC was providing was merely proof that the CIA was recklessly disregarding INC intelligence. The administration official will say that before long, “there was something of a willingness to give [INC- provided intelligence] greater weight” than that offered by the intelligence community. In return, Cheney’s aides tried to inject their intelligence into the CIA’s own conduits. One CIA analyst will recall that both Cheney and his chief of staff, Lewis Libby, “come out there loaded with crap from OSP [the Office of Special Plans—see September 2002], reams of information from Chalabi’s people” on both terrorism and WMD. One of the main channels into the CIA for Cheney and his staff is Alan Foley, the director of the CIA’s Nonproliferation Center. Cheney’s office inundates Foley with questions about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, particularly about Iraq’s supposed attempts to purchase uranium from Niger (see Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001, October 15, 2001, October 18, 2001, November 20, 2001, February 5, 2002, March 1, 2002, Late April or Early May 2002-June 2002, and Late June 2002). At first, Foley attempts to push back by “stressing the implausibility of it,” a colleague of Foley’s will recall. But as Cheney and his aides keep pressing, Foley begins to give in. “He was bullied and intimidated,” one of his friends will recall. The pressure on Foley and other analysts is both relentless and hostile. One retired CIA analyst close to current analysts will recall: “It was done along the lines of: ‘What’s wrong with you bunch of assh_les? You don’t know what’s going on, you’re horribly biased, you’re a bunch of pinkos.’” A current analyst later explains, “It gets to the point where you just don’t want to fight it anymore.” [New Republic, 11/20/2003]

Entity Tags: Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Alan Foley, Ahmed Chalabi, Bush administration (43), John Hannah, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Special Plans, Iraqi National Congress, National Security Council, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations

As Vice President Cheney and his staff members pressure CIA analysts for the “proper” intelligence findings (see 2002-Early 2003), intelligence analysts grow increasingly resentful towards both Cheney and his staff. In fact, they see little difference between any of them. CIA analysts in particular see them as acting in concert under Cheney’s direction (see Fall 2002 and After). One former analyst will later recall, “When I heard complaints from people, it was, ‘Man, you wouldn’t believe this sh_t that [Lewis] Libby and [Douglas] Feith and [Paul] Wolfowitz do to us.’ They were all lumped together. I would hear them say, ‘G_ddamn, that f_cking John Hannah, you wouldn’t believe.’ And the next day it would be, ‘That f_cking Bill Luti’ (see September 2002). For all these guys, they’re interchangeable.” Another former analyst will later say: “They had power. Authority. They had the vice president behind them.… What Scooter [Libby] did, Cheney made possible. Feith, Wolfowitz—Cheney made it all possible. He’s the fulcrum. He’s the one.” [New Republic, 11/20/2003]

Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz, Central Intelligence Agency, Douglas Feith, John Hannah, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, William Luti

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

President Bush invites a group of congressional leaders to have breakfast with him and Cheney in the White House’s private dining room to discuss Iraq. Present at the meeting are Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, and House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt. Bush tells the lawmakers that he needs a Congressional resolution authorizing military force against Iraq, and he needs it soon. During the meeting, Daschle suggests that it would be better to postpone the debate on such a resolution until after the November elections, so as to take politics out of the equation (see September 19, 2002). According to Daschle, Bush looks at Cheney, who replies with a “half smile.” Then Bush answers, “We just have to do it now.” [New York Times, 9/7/2002; Dean, 2004, pp. 140; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 23] After the meeting, the lawmakers pass the word that Bush implied new intelligence about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program would be forthcoming. That new information never materializes. [Dean, 2004, pp. 140] In the upcoming days, many Democrats will accuse the Bush administration of attempting to “politicize” the debate on the resolution in order to impact the upcoming midterm elections (see September 25, 2002 and September 26, 2002).

Entity Tags: Tom Daschle, Trent Lott, Dennis Hastert, George W. Bush, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard Gephardt

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

During a Defense Department news briefing on Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says: “We know that they were a lot closer than any of the experts had estimated they would be with respect to [developing] a nuclear weapon. To the extent that they have kept their nuclear scientists together and working on these efforts, one has to assume they’ve not been playing tiddlywinks.” [US Department of Defense, 9/3/2002; Associated Press, 9/3/2002; United Press International, 9/3/2002]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The Washington Post publishes an op-ed by James Webb, a former assistant secretary of defense and secretary of the Navy, warning that the neoconservatives’ plan to invade Iraq would commit the US to a long term occupation of Iraq. “The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years. Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay. This reality was the genesis of a rift that goes back to the Gulf War itself, when neoconservatives were vocal in their calls for ‘a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad.’ Their expectation is that the United States would not only change Iraq’s regime but also remain as a long term occupation force in an attempt to reconstruct Iraqi society itself.” [Washington Post, 9/4/2002]

Entity Tags: James Webb, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Neoconservative Influence

The Bush administration invites two dozen senators from both parties to the Pentagon to discuss Iraqi policy with Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and CIA Director George Tenet. [New York Times, 9/7/2002]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George J. Tenet, George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

White House officials, in interviews with the New York Times, describe the administration’s strategy to convince the public, Congress, and US allies of the need to confront Iraq. They say the centerpiece of the strategy will be Bush’s September 11 speech at Ellis Island in New York Harbor, which they have been planning since at least June. (The speech will not actually make a case for confronting Iraq. Bush will first make his case to the nation in his October 7 speech (see February 20, 2001).) Explaining why the White House did not launch this effort in August when the administration’s plans came under intense criticism from a number of different quarters, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card tells the New York Times, “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in August.” Card is the founding member of the White House Iraq Group (see August 2002 and June 9, 2008), which was formed to “educate the public” on the alleged threat from Iraq. The officials also tell the Times that one of the administration’s goals is for Congress to pass a resolution approving the use of force in Iraq within the next four to five weeks. “In the end it will be difficult for someone to vote against it,” one administration official tells the Times. [New York Times, 9/7/2002] In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will write: “The proposed hurry-up vote on the eve of the first election since 9/11 presented a win-win scenario for the White House: If Democrats voice caution or skepticism about the proposed war resolution (see October 11, 2002), then the GOP could portray them as weak on terrorism ahead of the election, and if Democrats supported the bill, then the Bush-Cheney administration would fortify its powers by eliminating even the suggestion that it might later need to ask for permission to launch any war against Iraq” (see August 2002). By mid-September, Republican Congressional candidates will make Iraq a central issue of their campaigns, proclaiming unwavering support for Bush and attacking their Democratic opponents. In New Mexico, Republican House candidate Mike Pence will say of his opponent, John Arthur Smith, who is still considering whether or not to support the invasion, “While Smith ‘reflects’ on the situation, the possibility of a mushroom cloud hovering over a US city (see September 4, 2002) remains.” In Minnesota, Republican Senate candidate Norm Coleman will attack Democratic incumbent Paul Wellstone for refusing to “stand with the president.” Similar tactics will be used in campaigns around the country. As a result, almost every Democrat facing re-election joins Republicans in supporting the war authorization. Savage will write, “Thus, even though the Founders wanted Congress to make the final decision about when the United States should go to war, lawmakers abdicated their responsibility and delegated their power to the president.” [USA Today, 10/13/2002; Savage, 2007, pp. 156-157]

Entity Tags: Norm Coleman, Mike Pence, Andrew Card, White House Iraq Group, Bush administration (43), John Arthur Smith, Charlie Savage, Paul Wellstone

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

During a joint press conference with US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the two leaders make two factually incorrect statements, which are quickly contested by experts.
bullet Tony Blair states, “We only need to look at the report from the International Atomic Agency [IAEA] this morning showing what has been going on at the former nuclear weapons sites to realize that” Saddam is a real threat. [US President, 9/16/2002] But no such report exists. [Washington Times, 9/27/2002] What Blair is actually referring to is a set of commercial satellite photographs showing signs of new construction at a site the US had bombed in 1998. [MSNBC, 9/7/2002; Guardian, 9/9/2002; Associated Press, 9/10/2002] That same day, Mark Gwozdecky, a spokesman for the UN agency, says the agency had drawn no conclusion from those photographs. [MSNBC, 9/7/2002] On September 9, the Guardian of London will report that according to “a well-placed source” the photographs do not support Blair’s statement. “You cannot draw any conclusions,” the source explains. “The satellites were only looking at the top of a roof. You cannot tell without inspectors on the ground.” [Guardian, 9/9/2002] The following day, Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, will similarly tell reporters: “… [S]atellites don’t see through roofs. So we are not drawing conclusions from them. But it would be an important element in where, maybe, we want to go to inspect and monitor.” [Associated Press, 9/10/2002; Globe and Mail, 9/11/2002]
bullet Bush asserts, “I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied—finally denied access [in 1998], a report came out of the Atomic—the IAEA that they were six months away from developing a weapon,” adding, “I don’t know what more evidence we need.” [US President, 9/16/2002; Washington Times, 9/27/2002] But Bush’s statement is quickly refuted by an MSNBC news report published later that day, which includes an excerpt from the summary of the 1998 IAEA report Bush cited. The summary reads, “[B]ased on all credible information available to date… the IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons or of Iraq having retained a physical capability for the production of weapon-useable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained such material.” [MSNBC, 9/7/2002; Dean, 2004, pp. 138] The text of the actual report, authored by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, reads: “There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.” [Washington Times, 9/27/2002] When confronted by MSNBC reporters on this point, an unnamed senior White House official states, “What happened was, we formed our own conclusions based on the report.” [MSNBC, 9/7/2002] Later, when The Washington Times presses Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan for an explanation, he says, “[Bush is] referring to 1991 there. In ‘91, there was a report saying that after the war they found out they were about six months away.” But this too is challenged by Gwozdecky, spokesman for the UN agency, who says that no such report was ever published by the IAEA in 1991. Apparently the President’s accusations are based on two news articles that were published more than a decade ago—“a July 16 [2001] story in the London Times by Michael Evans and a July 18 [2001] story in the New York Times by Paul Lewis.” But as The Washington Times notes, “Neither article cites an IAEA report on Iraq’s nuclear-weapons program or states that Saddam was only six months away from ‘developing a weapon’—as claimed by Mr. Bush.” Instead the two news articles reported that at that time, UN inspectors had concluded that Iraq was only six months away from the large-scale production of enriched uranium. But as the 1998 report shows, both 1991 news stories are outdated. [Washington Times, 9/27/2002]

Entity Tags: Tony Blair, International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, George W. Bush, Mark Gwozdecky, Scott McClellan

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Condoleezza Rice appears on CNN to discuss the alleged threat posed to the US by Saddam Hussein. She insists that Iraq is intent on developing a nuclear weapon. “We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance—into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to—high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon. And we know that when the inspectors assessed this after the Gulf War, he was far, far closer to a crude nuclear device than anybody thought, maybe six months from a crude nuclear device. The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t what the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” [CNN, 9/8/2002; CNN, 9/8/2002; New York Times, 7/20/2003; US House Committee on Government Reform, 3/16/2004] In his 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, author Ron Suskind writes, “The statement sent off shock waves. Rice was criticized for fear-mongering, for suggesting that there was evidence that Hussein might have such a weapon. Arguments about proof, though, were missing the point—Rice’s roundabout argument was that the United States should act whether or not it found a “smoking gun.” She was showing an edge of the actual US policy: the severing of fact-based analysis from forceful response; acting on any inkling was now appropriate—to be safe, to be sure, to get an opponent before he can develop capability, so others know to not even start down that path.” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 170]

Entity Tags: White House Iraq Group, Ron Suskind, Condoleezza Rice

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Aerial photo of Iraqi chemical munitions facility.Aerial photo of Iraqi chemical munitions facility. [Source: CIA]Secretary of State Colin Powell appears on “Fox News Sunday,” and asserts that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons stocks and that Saddam Hussein is intent on building a nuclear weapon. He cites a recent article in the New York Times by Judith Miller and Michael Gordon (see September 8, 2002) as evidence of Hussein’s nuclear ambitions. “There’s no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there’s no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity to produce more chemical weapons. With respect to biological weapons, we are confident that he has some stocks of those weapons, and he’s probably continuing to try to develop more. And biological weapons are very dangerous because they can be produced just about in any kind of pharmaceutical facility. With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that he continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow him to develop a nuclear weapon. Whether he could do it in one, five, six or seven, eight years is something that people can debate about, but what nobody can debate about is the fact that he still has the incentive, he still intends to develop those kinds of weapons. And as we saw in reporting just this morning, he is still trying to acquire, for example, some of the specialized aluminum tubing one needs to develop centrifuges that would give you an enrichment capability. So there’s no question that he has these weapons, but even more importantly, he is striving to do even more, to get even more.” Tony Snow, the program’s host, asks Secretary of State Colin Powell to respond to comments by former UN Chief Weapons Inspector Scott Ritter in a speech he recently made to Iraq’s parliament, in which the former weapons inspector stated: “The rhetoric of fear that is disseminated by my government and others has not to date been backed up by hard facts that substantiate any allegations that Iraq is today in possession of weapons of mass destruction or has links to terror groups responsible for attacking the United States. Void of such facts, all we have is speculation.” Powell responds: “We have facts, not speculation. Scott is certainly entitled to his opinion but I’m afraid that I would not place the security of my nation and the security of our friends in the region on that kind of an assertion by somebody who’s not in the intelligence chain any longer… If Scott is right, then why are they keeping the inspectors out? If Scott is right, why don’t they say, ‘Anytime, any place, anywhere, bring ‘em in, everybody come in—we are clean?’ The reason is they are not clean. And we have to find out what they have and what we’re going to do about it. And that’s why it’s been the policy of this government to insist that Iraq be disarmed in accordance with the terms of the relevant UN resolutions.” [Fox News, 9/8/2002; Associated Press, 9/8/2002; NewsMax, 9/8/2002]

Entity Tags: Michael Gordon, Scott Ritter, New York Times, Colin Powell, White House Iraq Group, Tony Snow, Judith Miller, Fox News

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appears on CBS’ Face the Nation and talks about Iraq. He tells host Bob Schieffer, “[President Bush] has decided to go to the Congress and to the United Nations later this week and make the case of what Iraq has done for 11 years. It has invaded its neighbors; it’s violated almost every single UN resolution that relates to Iraq. And against the agreement they had to disarm, they proceeded to develop weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear.” When asked if the government has “smoking gun” evidence that Iraq is developing nuclear weapons, Rumsfeld responds: “The smoking gun is an interesting phrase. It implies that what we’re doing here is law enforcement, that what we’re looking for is a case that we can take into a court of law and prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The problem with that is, the way one gains absolutely certainty as to whether a dictator like Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon is if he uses it, and that’s a little late. It’s not late if you’re interested in protecting rights of the defendant in a court of law, but it’s a quite different thing if one thinks about it.” Schieffer then asks whether or not the administration has information that has not yet been shared with the public. Rumsfeld says: “The problem we have, of course, is a real one. Intelligence, we spend billions of dollars gathering intelligence. And to do it, you have to have methods of doing it and sources from whom you get this information. And to the extent you take that intelligence and spread it out in the public record, what you do is you put people’s lives at risk, the sources of that information, because people can connect the dots there and say, well, who knew that, and then they go out and they stop people from helping us learn that type of information, or if it’s a source, a satellite or some other thing. To the extent that we reveal the information and show our capability, we then lose that capability because they find ways to deceive and deny us from gaining access to it. So there’s a very good reason for not taking all the information.” [CBS News, 9/8/2002]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, White House Iraq Group

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

Vice President Dick Cheney is interviewed on NBC’s Meet the Press to discuss the Bush administration’s position on Iraq and the alleged threat Iraq poses to the world. “[B]ased on intelligence that’s becoming available—some of it has been made public [referring to the recent New York Times story—see September 8, 2002 ]—… he has indeed stepped up his capacity to produce and deliver biological weapons,… he has reconstituted his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon,… there are efforts under way inside Iraq to significantly expand his capability.… [H]e now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs.… There’s a story in The New York Times this morning… [I]t’s now public that, in fact, he has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel, the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge. And the centrifuge is required to take low-grade uranium and enhance it into highly enriched uranium, which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb. This is a technology he was working on back, say, before the Gulf War. And one of the reasons it’s of concern,… is… [that] we know about a particular shipment. We’ve intercepted that. We don’t know what else—what other avenues he may be taking out there, what he may have already acquired. We do know he’s had four years without any inspections at all in Iraq to develop that capability.… [W]e do know, with absolute certainty, that he [Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment [aluminum tubes] he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.” Cheney says the US intends to work with the international community, but hints that the US is willing to confront Saddam without international support. “We are trying very hard not be unilateralist,” he says. “We are working to build support with the American people, with the Congress, as many have suggested we should. And we are also as many of us suggested we should, going to the United Nations, and the president will address this issue.… We would like to do it with the sanction of the international community. But the point in Iraq is this problem has to be dealt with one way or the other.” [Meet the Press, 9/8/2002; Washington File, 9/9/2002; Washington Post, 2/7/2003; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/27/2003; New York Times, 10/3/2004] Authors Lou Dubose and Jake Bernstein will later write of Cheney’s remarks: “Taken together [with Cheney’s recent speech to the VFW—see August 26, 2002], the vice president’s warnings made a compelling case for war. They were, however, entirely untrue. Yet they reframed the terms of the Iraq debate, leading the public to the conclusion that the question should not be ‘if’ but rather ‘when’ the nation goes to war in Iraq.” [Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 176]

Entity Tags: Jake Bernstein, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, White House Iraq Group, Lou Dubose

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda

The White House Iraq Group (WHIG—see August 2002) launches its Iraq marketing campaign with a blitz of the Sunday morning talk shows. Vice President Dick Cheney appears on NBC (see September 8, 2002 and September 8, 2002), Secretary of State Colin Powell on Fox (see September 8, 2002), Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on CBS (see September 8, 2002), and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice on CNN (see September 8, 2002). Rice is the first to use the characterization, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” (see September 4, 2002), but President Bush and his senior officials repeat the phrase over and over in the following days. Author Craig Unger will note “Cheney’s most Machiavellian flourish” in having all four officials cite “evidence” of Iraq’s nuclear program, suspicious aluminum tubes, and attribute the information to the New York Times. Cheney and the others are referring to a story by the Times’ Judith Miller and Michael Gordon (see September 8, 2002) that Iraq had tried “to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes” that American experts believe could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. The story is attributed to “unnamed administration sources;” Miller and Gordon do not inform their readers that the story comes from Cheney’s office. In essence, Cheney planted disinformation in the New York Times, then cited the Times article to prove his contention. Gordon will later insist that he and Miller had to pry that story out of the administration, but Unger will note that it is hard to equate Gordon’s contention with four of the administration’s highest officials going on television simultaneously to spread the story and cite the Times article. Furthermore, because of the scheduling practices on the four networks, it appears that the four officials’ simultaneous appearances were arranged in advance. As the Times is the flagship newspaper of the US press, over 500 other newspapers and broadcast outlets pick up on the Times story and the officials’ appearances, giving the story tremendous visibility throughout the world. [Unger, 2007, pp. 252-254]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, CNN, CBS News, Craig Unger, Judith Miller, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, NBC News, New York Times, Michael Gordon, White House Iraq Group, Fox News

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In another statement on NBC’s Meet the Press (see September 8, 2002, September 8, 2002, and September 8, 2002), Vice President Dick Cheney strongly implies that Iraq was behind the 9/11 attacks. “I’m not here today to make a specific allegation that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11,” Cheney says. “I can’t say that.” As author Frank Rich will later write, “Then he made unspecific allegations suggesting exactly that.” Cheney specifically alludes to the allegation that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta had met with Iraqi officials in Prague (see Late July 2002 and October 21, 2002). [Rich, 2006, pp. 59]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Frank Rich

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Vice President Cheney continues to argue his case for war with Iraq, this time during an appearance on PBS’s “News Hour with Jim Lehrer.” “We know based on primarily intelligence reporting [that Saddam Hussein] is continuing to expand and improve his biological weapons capability both in terms of production and delivery systems; we know he is working once again on a nuclear program.” Cheney goes on to say that Congress would have to make a decision on whether to authorize an attack on Iraq without being able to see the evidence that Cheney says exists. To brief Congress—535 lawmakers—about such “highly classified” matters would invite leaks that would potentially compromise national security. Instead, lawmakers who do not sit on the respective intelligence committees will have to make their decisions based on the limited amount of information the White House chooses to share with them. [Savage, 2007, pp. 157, 357]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Civil Liberties

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London concludes in a report that “Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons” and that “it would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to build such fissile material production facilities.” [John Chipman, 9/9/2002; BBC, 9/9/2002; Guardian, 9/10/2002; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2002; San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/2002]

Entity Tags: International Institute for Strategic Studies

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and US President George Bush meet in Detroit to discuss policy towards Iraq as well as security measures along the US-Canadian border initiated after September 11. Chretien later tells reporters that Bush said that Saddam Hussein’s alleged ties to militant Islamic groups was “not the angle they’re exploring now. The angle they’re exploring is the production of weapons of mass destruction.” [Washington Post, 9/10/2002; CNN, 9/10/2002]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, Jean Chretien

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet give a classified briefing to some members of Congress in an attempt to persuade them of the immediate need to invade Iraq (see September 19, 2002 and September 24, 2002). After the briefing, several Democrats say they are unconvinced that Saddam Hussein poses an imminent threat to the US; some intimate that the White House is trying to “politicize” the debate on the resolution in order to impact the elections. Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, says, “I know of no information that the threat is so imminent from Iraq” that Congress cannot wait until January to vote on a resolution. “I did not hear anything today that was different about [Saddam Hussein’s] capabilities,” save a few “embellishments.” She is joined by Tom Lantos (D-CA), a hawkish Democrat who supports the overthrow of the current Iraq regime, but who wants a special session of Congress after the November 5 elections to debate a war resolution. “I do not believe the decision should be made in the frenzy of an election year,” he says. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) agrees: “It would be a severe mistake for us to vote on Iraq with as little information as we have. This would be a rash and hasty decision” because the administration has provided “no groundbreaking news” on Iraq’s ability to strike the United States or other enemies with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Durbin’s fellow senator, Evan Bayh (D-IN) adds that while he agrees Iraq is a valid threat, the White House must do more to convince lawmakers and the American people of that threat before asking Congress to approve military action. “If the president wants to have a vote before the election, he needs to give the military threat, or he risks looking political. With that timing, he will run the risk of looking brazenly political,” Bayh says. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) agrees with Pelosi and Durbin, saying, “What was described as new is not new. It was not compelling enough” to justify war. “Did I see a clear and present danger to the United States? No.” Senate Majority Whip Harry Reid (D-NV) favors delaying the vote as well, but Daschle says he will likely allow the Senate to vote on the resolution if Bush meets several criteria, including obtaining more international support for a military campaign and providing senators a more detailed explanation of how the war would be conducted and how Iraq would be rebuilt. House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) is one of the very few Republicans to oppose the resolution coming up for a vote before the elections. Most Republicans agree with Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), who wants the White House to submit a specific war resolution by September 23 so it can be voted on before the October adjournment. But an unnamed House Republican leader also seems to believe the case Tenet and Rice presented is weak: he says, “Daschle will want to delay this and he can make a credible case for delay.” [Washington Post, 9/10/2002; CNN, 9/10/2002; CNN, 9/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Durbin, Tom Daschle, Trent Lott, Tom Lantos, Robert Menendez, Harry Reid, Condoleezza Rice, House Intelligence Committee, Dick Armey, Nancy Pelosi, George J. Tenet, Evan Bayh

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In an appearance on Good Morning America with Charlie Gibson, Rumsfeld dismisses the notion that the administration needs to disclose evidence about Iraq’s banned weapons to the public before going to war. Gibson asks: “One of the seminal moments of my life was when John Kennedy went on television and showed satellite photos of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil. Isn’t it going to take—and do you have that kind of direct evidence?” In response, Rumsfeld states: “You know, the idea of direct evidence is not like a court of law under Article 3 of our Constitution where your goal is to punish somebody for doing something wrong. That really isn’t the case here. This is self defense, and the United States task is to see that we don’t allow an event to happen that then one has to punish someone.” Gibson then follows with another question: “But you can’t go to war without American public support and I’m asking don’t you need that kind of direct evidence? Or do you have it, to get the American public support or to get a coalition?” Rumsfeld replies: “The evidence is certainly there. The President has to decide what precisely he believes is the best approach. And one thing he’d say is, the one course of action that’s not acceptable is doing nothing.” [Financial Times, 9/11/2002; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

An article in the Boston Globe suggests that neoconservatives in the Bush administration see war in Iraq as “merely a first step” in transforming the entire Middle East. Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, John Hannah, I. Lewis Libby, and John Bolton are said to be some of the top officials pushing this view. “Iraq, [they] argue, is just the first piece of the puzzle. After an ouster of Hussein, they say, the United States will have more leverage to act against Syria and Iran, will be in a better position to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and will be able to rely less on Saudi oil.” Vice President Dick Cheney also mentioned this motive in a speech in August, saying, “When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace” (see August 26, 2002). The article also says: “A powerful corollary of the strategy is that a pro-US Iraq would make the region safer for Israel and, indeed, its staunchest proponents are ardent supporters of the Israeli right-wing. Administration officials, meanwhile, have increasingly argued that the onset of an Iraq allied to the US would give the administration more sway in bringing about a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though Cheney and others have offered few details on precisely how.” One US official says, “Maybe we do stir the pot and see what comes up.” Former CIA analyst and Iraq expert Judith Yaphe is critical, saying: “There are some people who religiously believe that Iraq is the beginning of this great new adventure of remapping the Middle East and all these countries. I think that’s a simplistic view.” Jessica T. Mathews, president of Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, a Washington policy group, is also critical. “The argument we would be starting a democratic wave in Iraq is pure blowing smoke,” Mathews says. “You have 22 Arab governments and not one has made any progress toward democracy, not one. It’s one of the great issues before us, but the very last place you’d suspect to turn the tide is Iraq. You don’t go from an authoritarian dictatorship to a democracy overnight, not even quickly.” But one anonymous senior US official says: “There are people invested in this philosophy all throughout the administration. Some of the strongest voices are in [the State Department].” [Boston Globe, 9/10/2002]

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, John Hannah, Judith Yaphe, John R. Bolton, Douglas Feith, Jessica Tuchman Mathews

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The first draft of the British intelligence dossier entitled “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction” (see February 5, 2003) is circulated. The principal author is John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and therefore the report comes to be known as the “Scarlett dossier.” Scarlett had considerable input from intelligence officials and Downing Street officials, including communications director Alastair Campbell, who will later insist he gave nothing more than “presentational” advice and did not pressure Scarlett to “sex up” the dossier. (Campbell’s claim will be challenged when evidence is later produced that shows senior press official John Williams helped Scarlett write the dossier—see February 18, 2008.) Section 6 of the first draft states flatly that “Uranium to be used in the production of suitable fissile material has been purchased from Africa.” The context of the section makes it clear that the reference is not to uranium purchased by Iraq from Niger in 1982 and later sealed and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is clear that the reference is to the supposed uranium deal from 1999-2000. That deal was clearly never made, and allegations to the contrary were based upon fabricated documents. Fabricated evidence or not, the dossier states that not only was Iraq seeking uranium, but that uranium “has been purchased.” Eight pages later, the dossier claims that “there is compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa,” a significant language shift—from flat certainty to an assertion of “compelling evidence.” And in the executive summary, Scarlett writes that “recent intelligence… indicates” Iraq “has purchased large quantities of uranium ore, despite having no civil nuclear programme that would require it.” The document’s claims fluctuate from one section to the next. [Common Dreams (.org), 8/26/2003] The final version will be released later in the month, and include the same vagaries of language (see September 24, 2002).

Entity Tags: John Scarlett, International Atomic Energy Agency, John Williams, Joint Intelligence Committee, Alastair Campbell

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

Philip Gold.Philip Gold. [Source: New York Times]Influential conservative university professor Philip Gold, who describes himself as “a grumpy old Marine (a former intelligence officer) who has grown infuriated with and appalled by the conservative embrace of disaster,” describes neoconservatives as “a new aristocracy of aggression that combines 19th-century Prussian pigheadedness with a most un-Prussian inability to read a man or a ledger book, and a near-total lack of military—let alone combat—experience. Ask these people to show you their wounds and they’ll probably wave a Washington Post editorial at you.” [Seattle Weekly, 9/11/2002; Dean, 2006, pp. 77-78]

Entity Tags: Washington Post, Philip Gold

Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence

Peggy Noonan.Peggy Noonan. [Source: MSNBC]Peggy Noonan, the former Reagan speechwriter and a staunch loyalist of the first President Bush, implores the current President Bush to make a solid case for war with Iraq based on facts and not emotional pronouncements. “[I]f Mr. Bush is to make the case it will not be with emotional rhetoric, with singing phrases, with high oratory,” she writes. “It will not, in this coming cooler time, be made with references to evil ones. All of that was good, excellent and Bushian the past passionate year. But now Mr. Bush should think in terms of Sgt. Joe Friday. ‘Just the facts, ma’am.’ ‘Saddam is evil’ is not enough. A number of people are evil, and some are even our friends. ‘Saddam has weapons of mass destruction’ is not enough. A number of countries do. What the people need now is hard data that demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he is readying to use on the people of the US or the people of the West. If Mr. Bush has a good case, he will make it and the people will back him. If he does not, he will not convince the American people that blood and treasure must go to this endeavor.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/11/2002]

Entity Tags: Peggy Noonan, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Bush giving his speech in front of the Statue of Liberty.Bush giving his speech in front of the Statue of Liberty. [Source: September 11 News (.com)]The Bush administration’s public relations team decides to kick off its push for a war with Iraq, and its drive to the midterm elections, with President Bush’s speech commemorating the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. After much deliberation, Ellis Island in New York Harbor is chosen as the setting for Bush’s speech; the Ellis site won out over nearby Governors Island because the senior public relations officials want the Statue of Liberty as a backdrop. “We had made a decision that this would be a compelling story either place,” White House communications director Dan Bartlett will later recall. “We sent a team out to go and look and they said, ‘This is a better shot,’ and we said okay.” Leading that team is Scott Sforza, the former ABC producer who will later oversee the May 2003 “Mission Accomplished” event (see May 1, 2003 and April 30, 2008). [Rich, 2006, pp. 57-58] (Deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later write of Sforza, “Reagan’s team had perfected this art of stagecraft, and the man in charge for Bush, deputy communications director Scott Sforza, took it to new heights.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 82] Sforza is joined by former Fox News producer Gary Jenkins and former NBC cameraman Bob De Servi. They use three barges laden with stadium lights to illuminate the Statue of Liberty for the shoot. Former Reagan administration public relations chief Michael Deaver will later observe that the Bush team is far better at this kind of marketing presentation than the Reagan, Bush I, or Clinton public relations teams ever were. “[T]hey’ve taken it to an art form,” Deaver will say. The speech is designed to push Congress towards authorizing the war before the midterm elections (see January 19, 2002 and October 10, 2002), when, as author Frank Rich will later write, “the pressure on congressmen facing re-election to prove their war-waging machismo would be at its nastiest. Any weak sisters could expect a thrashing much like that Republicans inflicted on Democrats who had failed to vote for the ‘use of force’ resolution sought by the first President Bush after the Persian Gulf War in 1991” (see January 9-13, 1991). A senior administration official says, “In the end it will be difficult for someone to vote against it.” [Rich, 2006, pp. 57-58] In other preparatory moves for the speech, the government raises the National Threat Level from yellow to orange (see September 10, 2002), and announces the death or capture of some 2,700 al-Qaeda operatives since 9/11 (see September 10, 2002). The administration will also attempt to significantly revise its account of events on 9/11 itself (see September 11, 2002).

Entity Tags: Frank Rich, Dan Bartlett, Bob De Servi, Michael Deaver, Scott Sforza, Gary Jenkins, Bush administration (43), George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda, 2004 Elections

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush says: “Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.… Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” [PBS, 9/12/2002; US President, 9/16/2002; Age (Melbourne), 6/7/2003] Bush also says that the US “will work with the UN Security Council.” [US President, 9/16/2002; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 285] Deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later describe the speech somewhat differently: “The UN speech… had been an ultimatum—either the UN acts to disarm Saddam Hussein or the United States will. The zero tolerance message was a further sign of how determined the president was to topple the regime by force. Saddam was never going to come completely clean. His power was grounded in brutality and in his ability to portray the regime as stronger than it was to intimidate the populace and potential enemies like Iran. The zero tolerance policy and the new ‘last chance’ resolution gave Bush plenty of room to maneuver and plausible justifications for his policy of regime change.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 142]

Entity Tags: UN General Assembly, Scott McClellan, George W. Bush, United Nations

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

A CBS news poll concludes that 51 percent of Americans think that Saddam Hussein “was personally involved in the Sept. 11 attacks” and “70 percent believe that members of al-Qaeda are currently in Iraq.” [CBS News, 9/24/2002]

Entity Tags: CBS News, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

During a media roundtable discussion with the BBC And Voice Of America, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says: “Think of the faces in Afghanistan when the people were liberated, when they moved out in the streets and they started singing and flying kites and women went to school and people were able to function and other countries were able to start interacting with them. That’s what would happen in Iraq.” [US Department of Defense, 9/13/2002]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), an outspoken critic of the administration’s plan to invade Iraq, says: “There is no imminent threat by Iraq against the United States. Iraq does not have nuclear capabilities that anyone has been able to specifically determine, nor does it have the ability to deliver such a weapon, nor does it have the intent to do so. It could be said by Iraq that they are facing the imminent threat…. Oil is a factor. How much [of a factor] is anybody’s guess, but to discount it as a factor is, I think, to be misleading…. It’s not a conspiracy theory to bring it in because, after all, it is the second largest oil supply in the world.” [CNS News, 9/16/2002]

Entity Tags: Dennis Kucinich

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Concerning the proposed Congressional resolution to authorize force against Iraq (see September 19, 2002), President Bush is asked, “Are you concerned that Democrats in Congress don’t want a vote there until after UN action?” Bush replies, “[Are] Democrats waiting for the UN to act? I can’t imagine an elected United States—elected member of the United States Senate or House of Representatives saying, I think I’m going to wait for the United Nations to make a decision. It seems like to me that if you’re representing the United States, you ought to be making a decision on what’s best for the United States. If I were running for office, I’m not sure how I’d explain to the American people—say, vote for me, and, oh, by the way, on a matter of national security, I think I’m going to wait for somebody else to act.… My answer to the Congress is, they need to debate this issue and consult with us, and get the issue done as quickly as possible. It’s in our national interests that we do so. I don’t imagine Saddam Hussein sitting around, saying, gosh, I think I’m going to wait for some resolution. He’s a threat that we must deal with as quickly as possible.” [White House, 9/13/2002]

Entity Tags: United Nations, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In response to Tony Snow’s probing on Fox News Sunday as to whether or not President Bush was convinced there were links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is circumspect until she’s pressed. “He clearly has links to terrorism…—Links to terrorism [that] would include al-Qaeda….” [Fox News, 9/15/2002; Islam Online, 9/15/2002; CNN, 9/26/2002; US House Committee on Government Reform, 3/16/2004]

Entity Tags: Tony Snow, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Lawrence Lindsey, head of the White House’s National Economic Council, says he believes the Bush administration’s planned invasion of Iraq could cost between $100 and $200 billion. The cost, he says, will have only a modest impact on the US economy, since it will only amount to between one and two percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). “One year [of additional spending]? That’s nothing.” Mitch Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget, subsequently disputes the figure, saying it is “very, very high.” He suggests the total costs would run between $50 and $60 billion. [Wall Street Journal, 9/16/2002; Reuters, 9/18/2002; Washington Times, 5/13/2005] The White House press office also denies Lindsey’s prediction. As the current deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later recall: “Lindsey’s biggest mistake wasn’t the size of the figures he chose to cite. It was citing any figures at all. Talking about the projected cost of a potential war wasn’t part of the script, especially not when the White House was in the crucial early stages of building broad public support. In fact, none of the possible, unpleasant consequences of war—casualties, economic effects, geopolitical risks, diplomatic repercussions—were part of the message. We were in campaign mode now, just as we had been when [President] Bush traveled the country leading the effort to pass tax cuts and education reforms. This first stage was all about convincing the public that the threat was serious and needed addressing without delay. Citing or discussing potential costs, financial or human, only played into the arguments our critics and opponents of war were raising. Lindsey had violated the first rule of the disciplined, on-message Bush White House: don’t make news unless you’re authorized to do so. Lindsey’s transgression could only make the war harder to sell.” As McClellan recalls, Bush is “steamed” at Lindsey’s comments. Lindsey will resign four months later. McClellan will write: “Larry, a highly regarded economist, had violated a basic principle of the Bush White House: the president doesn’t like anyone getting out in front of him. It’s his job to make the news, not anyone else’s—unless authorized as part of the script.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 121-124]

Entity Tags: Mitch Daniels, Bush administration (43), George W. Bush, Lawrence Lindsey, Scott McClellan

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In closed sessions, administration officials are asked several times whether they have evidence of an imminent threat from Iraq against US citizens. US Representative Anna Eshoo (D-CA) later tells the San Francisco Chronicle that the officials acknowledged they had no such evidence. “They said ‘no,’” she says. “Not ‘no, but’ or ‘maybe,’ but ‘no.’ I was stunned. Not shocked. Not surprised. Stunned.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 9/20/2002 Sources: Anna Eshoo]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Anna Eshoo

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri meets with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Arab League Secretary-General Amir Moussa and gives them a letter expressing Baghdad’s willingness to readmit the UN weapons inspectors without conditions. The offer is made after Saddam Hussein convened an emergency meeting in Baghdad with his cabinet and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). [Associated Press, 9/16/2002; Associated Press, 9/16/2002; Independent, 9/17/2002; New York Times, 9/17/2002] Iraq’s letter is effectively an agreement to the December 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1284. [New York Times, 9/18/2002] Kofi Annan tells reporters after the meeting, “I can confirm to you that I have received a letter from the Iraqi authorities conveying its decision to allow the return of the inspectors without conditions to continue their work and has also agreed that they are ready to start immediate discussions on the practical arrangements for the return of the inspectors to resume their work.” Annan credits the Arab League, which he says “played a key role” in influencing Saddam Hussein’s decision to accept the inspectors, and suggests that a recent speech by Bush also played a critical part in influencing Baghdad’s decision. [UN News Center, 9/16/2002] UNMOVIC Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix also meets with Iraqi officials and it is reportedly agreed that weapons inspectors will return to Iraq on October 19. UNMOVIC spokesman Ewen Buchanan tells the BBC, “We are ready to discuss practical measures, such as helicopters, hotels, the installation of monitoring equipment and so on, which need to be put in place.” [BBC, 9/17/2002] The Bush administration immediately rejects the offer, calling it “a tactical step by Iraq in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action,” in a statement released by the deputy press secretary. [Agence France-Presse, 9/16/2002; White House, 9/16/2002] And Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, tells reporters: “We’ve made it very clear that we are not in the business of negotiating with Saddam Hussein. We are working with the UN Security Council to determine the most effective way to reach our goal.” He then claims Iraq’s offer is a tactic to give “false hope to the international community that [President Saddam] means business this time,” adding, “Unfortunately, his more than decade of experience shows you can put very little into his words or deeds.” Two days later Bush will tell reporters that Saddam’s offer is “his latest ploy, his latest attempt not to be held accountable for defying the United Nations,” adding: “He’s not going to fool anybody. We’ve seen him before…. We’ll remind the world that, by defying resolutions, he’s become more and more of a threat to world peace. [The world] must rise up and deal with this threat, and that’s what we expect the Security Council to do.” [Independent, 9/17/2002; Agence France-Presse, 9/19/2002] Later that night, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice reportedly hold a conference call with Kofi Annan and accuse him of taking matters into his own hands. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 285] Britain supports the US position and calls for a UN resolution backed with the threat of force. [BBC, 9/17/2002] Other nations react differently to the offer. For example, Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, says: “It’s important that, through our joint efforts, we have managed to put aside the threat of a war scenario around Iraq and return the process to a political channel… It is essential in the coming days to resolve the issue of the inspectors’ return. For this, no new [Security Council] resolutions are needed.” [Independent, 9/17/2002; BBC, 9/17/2002]

Entity Tags: Hans Blix, Naji Sabri Hadithi, Kofi Annan, Dan Bartlett, Condoleezza Rice, Scott McClellan, Amir Moussa, Colin Powell, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that President Bush has not decided to go to war. [White House, 9/16/2002; Associated Press, 9/16/2002]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In a speech in Davenport, Iowa, President Bush reiterates his talking points against Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s harsh treatment of his citizens, its disregard and duplicity regarding United Nations resolutions, and its support for Islamist terrorism. Together, these make Iraq into “a grave and gathering danger” that must be dealt with. Bush says: “My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose his power.” Scott McClellan, currently the deputy White House press secretary, will later write, “In a White House that prided itself on message discipline, Bush’s speech provided the new talking points for ‘educating the public about the threat’ (as we described our campaign to sell the war).” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 119-120] In the morning press gaggle, McClellan softpedals the president’s message somewhat: “The president will continue to consult with the international community and Congress as we move forward, and he will continue to talk to the American people as we move forward on any particular course of action. That is something he is doing now, and that is something he will continue to do. But what needs to happen right now is that the UN needs to act, and they need to back up their actions with enforcement. And that’s where our focus is, and we’re pleased with the emerging consensus from the international community around the president’s call for the UN to act.” [White House, 9/16/2002]

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, United Nations, Scott McClellan, United Nations Security Council

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The second draft of the “Scarlett dossier” (see September 10-11, 2002) on Iraqi WMD is circulated. As with the first draft, the language of exactly how certain British intelligence is about the Iraq-Niger uranium deal (see Before September 2002) varies from section to section. One page states flatly that “[u]ranium has been sought [by Iraq] from Africa,” but another page says there is “compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply” of uranium. Such language shifts (similar to those in the first draft) may mean little to the lay reader, but are very significant within the intelligence community. In the first draft, principal author John Scarlett’s executive summary added to the confusion by saying that “recent evidence… indicates” Iraq has tried to purchase uranium from Africa, an even less certain phrasing. But this draft’s executive summary will be redacted from public view. [Common Dreams (.org), 8/26/2003]

Entity Tags: John Scarlett

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

The White House releases a detailed timeline depicting past Iraqi attempts to obstruct United Nations efforts, including Saddam Hussein’s repeated refusals to provide inspectors access to sites they wanted to visit. [White House, 9/17/2002; New York Times, 9/18/2002]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

CIA Director George Tenet testifies before the Senate Intelligence Committee. On the subject of alleged connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda, Tenet, using a recently released CIA draft report entitled “Iraqi Support for Terrorism,” tells the panel that no evidence of any such connections exists. Iraq had no foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks or any other al-Qaeda strike, Tenet says. He testifies: “The intelligence indicates that the two sides at various points have discussed safe-haven, training, and reciprocal non-aggression. There are several reported suggestions by al-Qaeda to Iraq about joint terrorist ventures, but in no case can we establish that Iraq accepted or followed up on these suggestions.” [Center for Public Integrity, 1/23/2008]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet, Senate Intelligence Committee, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warns the House Armed Services Committee of the serious and imminent threat that Saddam Hussein poses to Western countries. He says: “No terrorist state poses a greater and more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein.” He adds: “What has not changed is Iraq’s drive to acquire those weapons of mass destruction, and the fact that every approach that the United Nations has taken to stop Iraq’s drive has failed. This is a critical moment for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test unfortunately the world’s free nations have failed before in recent history with unfortunate consequences.” [US Congress, 9/18/2002; Daily Telegraph, 9/19/2002; Agence France-Presse, 9/19/2002] Rumsfeld says of Iraq’s putative nuclear weapons program, “Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent—that Saddam [Hussein] is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain…. He has, at this moment, stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and is pursuing nuclear weapons.” [Salon, 3/6/2004] The Secretary of Defense also says that Congress must authorize the president to use military force against Iraq before the Security Council votes on the issue. “Delaying a vote in the Congress would send a message that the US may be unprepared to take a stand, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand and as we are cautioning the Iraqi regime to consider its options,” argues Rumsfeld, adding, “Our job today—the president’s, the Congress’ and the United Nations’—is to… anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happen and to make the right decision as to whether or not it’s appropriate for this country to take action…. The goal is not inspections, the goal is disarmament.” [US Congress, 9/18/2002; Associated Press, 9/19/2002] He also tries to discredit Iraq’s September 16, 2002 (see September 16, 2002), offer to admit UN inspectors without conditions. He says: “There’s no doubt in my mind but that the inspection program that currently is on the books wouldn’t work because it’s so much weaker than the earlier one. The more inspectors that are in there, the less likely something is going to happen. The longer nothing happens, the more advanced their weapons programs go along.” [US Congress, 9/18/2002] Rumsfeld is drastically revising his own stance from over a year before, when he told an interviewer on February 12, 2001, that Iraq was “probably not a nuclear threat” (see February 12, 2001).

Entity Tags: US Congress, Saddam Hussein, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The White House delivers a draft of a strongly worded resolution to Congress authorizing the president to use “all appropriate means” against Iraq. The 20-paragraph draft includes provisions that would allow Bush to ignore the UN and “use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce” the UN’s Security Council resolutions, “defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.” According to the Associated Press, “Three senior White House aides familiar with the draft said it would give Bush maximum flexibility to confront the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, including an explicit OK to use military force.” Although numerous congresspersons complain that the proposed wording of the resolution would provide Bush with a blank check to use military force anywhere in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, several senators—Democrats and Republicans alike—say that an amended version of the resolution would likely pass. [Associated Press, 9/19/2002; London Times, 9/19/2002; Independent, 9/19/2002; Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
bullet The draft lists several allegations against Iraq, depicting the country as an imminent threat against the US and its citizens. It states that Iraq continues to “possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations, thereby continuing to threaten the national security interests of the United States and international peace and security.” It also claims that Iraq “continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations,” including members of al-Qaeda. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
bullet The proposed resolution asserts that the use of military force against Iraq would constitute self-defense. It reads, “Whereas the United States has the inherent right, as acknowledged in the United Nations Charter, to use force in order to defend itself.” [Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
bullet The draft calls on Congress to authorize the president to use military force against Iraq. “The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.” [Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
bullet At a photo opportunity with Secretary of State Colin Powell the same day, Bush tells a gathering of reporters, “At the United Nations Security Council it is very important that the members understand that the credibility of the United Nations is at stake, that the Security Council must be firm in its resolve to deal with a truth threat to world peace, and that is Saddam Hussein. That the United Nations Security Council must work with the United States and Britain and other concerned parties to send a clear message that we expect Saddam to disarm. And if the United Nations Security Council won’t deal with the problem, the United States and some of our friends will.” Allies of the US that Bush expects to join in moving against Iraq “heard me loud and clear when I said, either you can be the United Nations, a capable body, a body able to keep the peace, or you can be the League of Nations.” Of the resolution, Bush says, “I am sending suggested language for a resolution. I want—I’ve asked for Congress’ support to enable the administration to keep the peace. And we look forward to a good, constructive debate in Congress.” Bush emphasizes that the resolution must pass before the upcoming November midterm elections: “I appreciate the fact that the leadership recognizes we’ve got to move before the elections” (see September 24, 2002). [White House, 9/19/2005] White House political adviser Karl Rove will later claim that the White House does not want to push the resolution through Congress before the elections in order to avoid politicizing the issue, a claim that is demonstrably untrue (see November 20, 2007).

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), US Congress, Karl C. Rove, Colin Powell

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri reads the full text of a statement by Saddam Hussein before the UN secretariat-general. The statement condemns the Bush administration’s attempts to provoke a war with Iraq and accuses the administration of working hand in hand with the hardline Zionists in the Israeli government [Arabic News, 9/21/2002] “I hereby declare before you that Iraq is totally clear of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,” the letter says. “Our country is ready to receive any scientific experts, accompanied by politicians you choose to represent any one of your countries, to tell us which places and scientific and industrial installations they would wish to see.” [New York Times, 9/20/2002] Hussein also states that in pursuing its aggressive policy towards Iraq, the US is “acting on behalf of Zionism which has been killing the heroic people of Palestine, destroying their property, murdering their children,” adding that Washington intends to “control Middle East oil.” The passage draws the applause of several UN diplomats. [Independent, 9/20/2002]

Entity Tags: United Nations, Naji Sabri Hadithi, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix tells the Security Council that he intends to position an advance weapons inspection team in Iraq by October 15. He explains: “We will select some sites that we think are interesting to go to in the early phases, so it’s not like it takes two months before we can send any guys out there in the field. It will be much earlier than that.” [BBC, 9/20/2002]

Entity Tags: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Hans Blix

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

A group of nineteen House Democrats form a coalition against war in Iraq and draft a resolution advocating multilateral diplomacy. [Washington Times, 9/20/2002] Representative Barbara Lee of California introduces a resolution advocating that “the United States… work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.” The resolution has twenty-six co-sponsors. [US Congress, 9/19/2002 pdf file] The resolution dies in the House Committee on International Relations.

Entity Tags: Barbara Lee

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Eleven days after the New York Times published a front-page article detailing Iraq’s supposed attempt to procure components for creating nuclear weapons (see August 2002 and September 8, 2002), the Washington Post’s Joby Warrick has a story published, “Evidence on Iraq Challenged; Experts Question if Tubes Were Meant for Weapons Program,” that disputes the Times’ article and questions whether the components—aluminum tubes—are indeed intended for nuclear use. Warrick cites “a report by independent experts” from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) questioning the conclusion that the tubes must be for use in constructing nuclear weapons (see September 23, 2002). The ISIS report also notes that the Bush administration is trying to rein in dissent among its own analysts about how to interpret the evidence provided by the aluminum tubes. “By themselves, these attempted procurements are not evidence that Iraq is in possession of, or close to possessing, nuclear weapons,” the report says. “They do not provide evidence that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant or when such a plant could be operational.” In recent days, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has told television viewers that the tubes “are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs” (see September 8, 2002). But Warrick’s story is buried on page 18 of the Post and widely ignored. Author Craig Unger will later write: “No one paid attention. Once the conventional wisdom had been forged, mere facts did not suffice to change things.” [Washington Post, 9/19/2002; Unger, 2007, pp. 254]

Entity Tags: Institute for Science and International Security, Condoleezza Rice, Craig Unger, New York Times, Joby Warrick, Washington Post

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The Bush administration makes it clear that it will prevent the UN inspectors from going to Iraq under the terms of the current UN resolution. Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the House International Relations Committee, “If somebody tried to move the team in now [before a UN resolution authorizing the use of force is passed], we would find ways to thwart that.” [BBC, 9/20/2002; Daily Telegraph, 9/21/2002; CNN, 9/29/2002]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

White House and Pentagon officials publicly disclose that the Department of Defense has finished a highly detailed plan for attacking Iraq that was delivered to President Bush’s desk in early September by Gen. Tommy R. Franks. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, “The president has options now, and he has not made any decisions.” The New York Times interviews senior officials who explain that the plan includes specific details, including the “number of ground troops, combat aircraft and aircraft carrier battle groups that would be needed,” and the “detailed sequencing for the use of air, land, naval and Special Operations forces to attack thousands of Iraqi targets, from air-defense sites to command-and-control headquarters to fielded forces.” Officials also tell the Times that any attack would begin “with a lengthy air campaign led by B-2 bombers armed with 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs to knock out Iraqi command and control headquarters and air defenses.” The principal goal of the air attacks, they say, “would be to sever most communications from Baghdad and isolate Saddam Hussein from his commanders in the rest of the country.” [New York Times, 9/21/2002] The disclosure of this information notably comes only a few days after Iraq has offered to unconditionally admit weapons inspectors (see September 16, 2002).

Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush, Thomas Franks

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The Bush administration submits to Congress a 31-page document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States.”
Preemptive War - The National Security Strategy (NSS) openly advocates the necessity for the US to engage in “preemptive war” against nations it believes are likely to become a threat to the US’s security. It declares: “In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle. The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” The declaration that the US will engage in preemptive war with other nations reverses decades of American military and foreign policy stances; until now, the US has held that it would only launch an attack against another nation if it had been attacked first, or if American lives were in imminent danger. President Bush had first mentioned the new policy in a speech in June 2002 (see June 1, 2002), and it echoes policies proposed by Paul Wolfowitz during the George H. W. Bush administration (see March 8, 1992). [Shenon, 2008, pp. 128]
US Must Maintain Military 'Beyond Challenge' - The National Security Strategy states that the ultimate objective of US national security policy is to “dissuade future military competition.” The US must therefore “build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” [London Times, 9/21/2002]
Ignoring the International Criminal Court - The NSS also states, “We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.” [US President, 9/2002]
Declaring War on Terrorism Itself - It states: “The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” Journalism professor Mark Danner will later comment in the New York Times: “Not Islamic terrorism or Middle Eastern terrorism or even terrorism directed against the United States: terrorism itself. ‘Declaring war on “terror,”’ as one military strategist later remarked to me, ‘is like declaring war on air power.’” [New York Times Magazine, 9/11/2005]
Fundamental Reversal of Containment, Deterrence Principles - Washington Post reporter Tim Reich later describes the NSS as “revers[ing] the fundamental principles that have guided successive presidents for more than 50 years: containment and deterrence.” Foreign policy professor Andrew Bacevich will write that the NSS is a “fusion of breathtaking utopianism [and] barely disguised machtpolitik.” Bacevich continues, “It reads as if it were the product not of sober, ostensibly conservative Republicans but of an unlikely collaboration between Woodrow Wilson and the elder Field Marshal von Moltke.” [American Conservative, 3/24/2003]
Written by Future Executive Director of 9/11 Commission - The document is released under George W. Bush’s signature, but was written by Philip D. Zelikow, formerly a member of the previous Bush administration’s National Security Council, and currently a history professor at the University of Virginia and a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Zelikow produced the document at the behest of his longtime colleague National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see June 1, 2002). His authorship of the document will not be revealed until well after he is appointed executive director of the 9/11 commission (see Mid-December 2002-March 2003). Many on the Commission will consider Zelikow’s authorship of the document a prima facie conflict of interest, and fear that Zelikow’s position on the Commission will be used to further the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive war (see March 21, 2004). [US Department of State, 8/5/2005; Shenon, 2008, pp. 128]

Entity Tags: Tim Reich, University of Virginia, National Security Council, Bush administration (43), Issuetsdeah, 9/11 Commission, Andrew Bacevich, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Philip Zelikow

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations, 9/11 Timeline

President Bush hosts a dinner meeting with a group of Republican governors at the White House. As deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later recall, because the meeting is private—no press is allowed—Bush is “conspicuously candid with his former colleagues, now trusted friends and political allies.… Bush’s forthrightness about his thinking and approach on Iraq [is] revealing.” Bush boasts of the recent capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see September 11, 2002) and says of Osama bin Laden, “[W]e don’t know where he is, but he has been diminished.” He then turns to Iraq: “It is important to know that Iraq is an extension of the war on terror,” he says. “In the international debate, we are starting to shift the burden of guilt to the guilty. The international community is risk averse. But I assure you I am going to stay plenty tough.” He repeats his belief that if the international community brings enough pressure to bear, the Iraqi people will take matters into their own hands: “I believe regime change can occur if we have strong, robust inspections. Saddam Hussein is a guy who is likely to have his head show up on a platter” if enough outside pressure is brought to bear. Of Hussein, Bush says: “He is a hateful, ugly, repugnant man who needs to go. He is also paranoid. This is a guy who killed his own security guards recently. I would like to see him gone peacefully. But if I unleash the military, I promise you it will be swift and decisive.” He then tells the governors how to handle questions from possible critics: “Don’t fall into the argument that there is no one to replace Saddam Hussein.… And our planning will make sure there is no oil disruption; we are looking at options to enhance oil flow.” To sum up, Bush says: “Military force is my last option, but it may be the only choice.… I’m gonna make a prediction. Write this down. Afghanistan and Iraq will lead that part of the world to democracy. They are going to be the catalyst to change the Middle East and the world.” In the questioning period, Bush tells the governors that while he intends to invade Iraq sooner rather than later, he is aware that the political timing of the decision is important, with the midterm elections approaching. He reiterates: “[I]f we have to go [into Iraq], we will be tough and swift and it will be violent so troops can move very quickly.… If we go, we will use the full force and the might of the US military (see February 25, 2003).… I believe in the power of freedom.” After the meeting, Governor John Rowland (R-CT), the chairman of the Republican Governors Association, calls the meeting a “heart to heart” on Iraq. But, McClellan will later reflect, “it was also a frank strategy powwow between the leader of a campaign and some important members of his team—a collection of local politicians who could play a crucial role in helping to generate popular support for the decision to invade.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 139-141]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bush administration (43), Scott McClellan, Saddam Hussein, Republican Governors Association, John Rowland

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

The New York Times publishes a highly detailed set of military options the Pentagon has recently given President Bush for attacking Iraq (see September 20, 2002). General Tommy Franks gave Bush the document just before a US speech at the UN calling for military action against Saddam Hussein. The attack would begin with a lengthy air campaign by B-2 bombers using satellite-guided bombs to knock out Iraqi command centers and air defenses, to isolate Hussein from field commanders. Ground forces would stage out of Kuwait. “The President has options now, and he has not made any decisions,” states White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. [New York Times, 9/21/2002] These plans assume that only 5,000 troops would remain in Iraq by December 2006, a date only 45 months from the proposed invasion date - D-Day. The plans discussed goals and strategies for the invasion: “POTUS/SECDEF [President of US/Secretary of Defense] directed effort; limited to a very small group… Integrate / consider all elements of national power… [State Department] will promote creation of a broad-based, credible provisional government - prior to D-day… Iraqi regime has WMD capability.” [National Security Archive, 2/14/2007] The release of the military plans causes no widespread outrage or official US investigation, suggesting the White House approved the leak.

Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush, Ari Fleischer, Thomas Franks

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Three retired four-star generals testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee and warn Congress that a unilateral strike against Iraq without UN approval might limit aid from allies, create more recruits for al-Qaeda and subvert long term US diplomatic and economic interests. A fourth general urges the committee to support the use of military force against Iraq. [New York Times, 9/24/2002]

Entity Tags: Wesley Clark, Kofi Annan, US Congress, Naji Sabri Hadithi, Amir Moussa

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

British education secretary Estelle Morris asks during a cabinet meeting what specifically has changed over the last few years—other than President George Bush’s coming to office—that makes military action against Iraq necessary. [Sunday Times (London), 10/5/2003; Guardian, 10/6/2003]

Entity Tags: Estelle Morris

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

National Public Radio (NPR) learns of the administration’s tough approach to what it calls a pattern of information leaks from Congress and government employees. The FBI is investigating a number of Congressmen who are suspected of leaking information about the administration’s Iraq policies to the press (regardless of the presumption that members of Congress have the right to reveal unclassified information as they see fit), but the administration wants more from the FBI than questioning legislators. The administration is pushing the FBI to administer lie detector tests to legislators and federal employees it suspects of talking to reporters. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wants to jail leakers who work for the government. And one of Rumsfeld’s analysts has suggested that police SWAT teams be sent to reporters’ homes to help find leakers. [Unger, 2007, pp. 256] By August 2002, the FBI also questioned nearly all senators and congresspeople making up the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry to uncover which one of them leaked information to the press (see August 2, 2002).

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Public Radio, Bush administration (43)

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In a speech to the Commonwealth Club, former Vice President Al Gore discusses his views on the struggle against terrorism and the proposed war in Iraq. He says that the major focus of the US should be the apprehension and punishment of “those who sponsored, planned and implemented the cold-blooded murder of more than 3,000 Americans.” He states his belief that the US is capable of succeeding in this task, despite the fact that it is taking much longer than anticipated. “President Bush is telling us that America’s most urgent requirement of the moment—right now—is not to redouble our efforts against al-Qaeda, not to stabilize the nation of Afghanistan after driving its host government from power, even as al-Qaeda members slip back across the border to set up in Afghanistan again; rather, he is telling us that our most urgent task right now is to shift our focus and concentrate on immediately launching a new war against Saddam Hussein. And the president is proclaiming a new, uniquely American right to preemptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat.” Gore warns that “if other nations assert that same right, then the rule of law will quickly be replaced by the reign of fear.” He states that this policy of preemptive action will damage American international alliances and inhibit the effective execution of the war on terror, which requires a multilateral approach to succeed. Gore advises Congress to fully examine the evidence prior to any commitment in Iraq and to always bear in mind what he says are the core principles of the US. He says “the administration has not said much of anything to clarify its idea of what would follow regime change or the degree of engagement that it is prepared to accept for the United States in Iraq in the months and years after a regime change has taken place.” Ominously, he warns “the resulting chaos in the aftermath of a military victory in Iraq could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam.” Gore asks, “What if in the aftermath of a war against Iraq, we face a situation like that because we washed our hands of it?…what if the al-Qaeda members infiltrated across the borders of Iraq the way they are in Afghanistan?” [Commonwealth Club.org, 9/23/2002]

Entity Tags: Albert Arnold (“Al”) Gore, Jr., George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Within “two hours and ten minutes” of the British dossier’s publication (see September 24, 2002), Iraqi government officials invite British journalists on a tour of the sites named in the document as suspected weapon sites. The journalists are permitted to choose which facilities, of those mentioned in the dossier, they want to visit.
Al-Qa'qa complex - The first site they visit is the al-Qa’qa complex, located 30 miles south of Baghdad, which according to the British government’s paper has “been repaired” and is now “operational.” “Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant,” states the dossier, which makes two claims. The first is that the substance, phosgene, is being produced at the facility and can be used “as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.” The second claim is that the facility’s phosgene production plants had been “dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt.” [United Kingdom, 9/24/2002; Independent, 9/25/2002] Both claims are disputed by the Iraqis. Director-General Sinan Rasim Said concedes that the plants produce phosgene as a byproduct of centralit, a stabilizer for gunpowder (which is not illegal), but denies that it can be used “as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent,” as alleged in the British document. He explains to reporters that phosgene can “not be extracted from the manufacturing equipment, let alone be used for making nerve agents.” To support his claims, he says that during the Gulf War, the US had never attempted to destroy the phosgene plants “because they knew we can’t make use of it.” Instead they had bombed the boiler room and the storage area, he says. Said also disputes the claim that UNSCOM had attempted to dismantle the facility’s phosgene production plants. There was no reason to, he explains, because the plant was not in violation of any laws. He tells reporters that if the British had simply requested the relevant documents from the UN they would have seen that they were wrong. [Independent, 9/25/2002] Amir al Sa’adi, a senior Iraqi weapons expert, offers his own opinion as to why the facility was referred to in the dossier. He suggests that Blair singled out the plant “because it could produce propellant powder for weapons from pistols to artillery guns for Iraqi air defenses.” [Independent, 9/25/2002] UNMOVIC weapons inspectors will visit the site in February 2003 and find nothing. [CNN, 2/3/2003; Financial Times, 2/14/2003; Guardian, 2/14/2003]
Amariyah Sera - The second site they visit is Amariyah Sera, a facility which the British say UNSCOM inspectors had concluded “was used to store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf War.” [United Kingdom, 9/24/2002; Independent, 9/25/2002] It is also claimed by Downing Street that the facility “has now expanded its storage capacity,” implying that the expansion is related to biological weapons. [United Kingdom, 9/24/2002; Independent, 9/25/2002] But the facility’s director, Karim Obeid, disputes the dossier’s claim that UNSCOM had earlier determined the plant was used for genetic research and storing biological agents. He tells the Independent of London: “They were coming here ever since the Gulf War until they left, and they have never accused us of any of those things in that time. All our work was done with their supervision.” He says the facility is being used “for testing typhoid fever.” Moreover, he adds that he is morally opposed to biological warfare “both as a scientist and a human being.” [Independent, 9/25/2002] Obeid also explains that the storage capacity of the facility has been increased, as the dossier states, but that the additional rooms are not being used in a way that violates international law. A reporter from the Independent, who visits the additional rooms, reports that one of the added areas is “a large mostly empty room” which the director says is being used “to store solutions for blood tests, imported from the Melat pharmaceutical company in France,” while a second area is “stacked with empty bottles of various brands of vaccine.” [Independent, 9/25/2002] Weapons inspectors will visit the site on December 15, 16, and 22 and find no evidence of biological weapons. [UN News Center, 12/15/2002; UN News Center, 12/16/2002; UN News Center, 12/22/2002; Financial Times, 2/14/2003; Guardian, 2/14/2003]

Entity Tags: Karim Obeid, International Atomic Energy Agency, Amir Hammudi al-Saadi, Sinan Rasim Said, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

In a press conference, President Bush urges Congress to pass its resolution authorizing military force against Iraq (see September 19, 2002) before the midterm elections. “Congress must act now to pass a resolution which will hold Saddam Hussein to account for a decade of defiance,” he says. “I’m confident a lot of Democrats here in Washington, DC, will understand that Saddam [Hussein] is a true threat to America. And I look forward to working with them to get a strong resolution passed.” [White House, 9/24/2002] White House political adviser Karl Rove will later claim that the White House did not want the resolution to go up for debate until after the elections, a claim that is demonstrably untrue (see November 20, 2007).

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Karl C. Rove, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Photo of aluminum tubes intercepted by Western intelligence.Photo of aluminum tubes intercepted by Western intelligence. [Source: CIA]The final, published report from British intelligence about Iraq’s WMD programs is released. Prepared by Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) chairman John Scarlett and known as the “Scarlett dossier,” it contains much the same vagaries of language that the previous draft versions contained (see September 10-11, 2002 and September 16, 2002).
Contradictory Claims about African Uranium - Chapter 3 tells the reader “what we know” about Iraqi WMD, including the statement that “Uranium has been sought from Africa.” Unfortunately, the first and second drafts’ language clearly indicated that British intelligence does not “know” anything about the uranium deal, but merely believes the claim to be true. Author Dennis Hans writes in 2003, “Properly interpreted, the list is evidence not of Iraq’s capabilities, actions, and intentions, but of a JIC policy of saying ‘we know’ when the JIC doesn’t know, so as to lend undeserved credibility to the claims.” The language of the final draft contradicts the claim of established fact; later in Chapter 3, the “compelling evidence” of earlier drafts has been downgraded to merely stating, “But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” And in the executive summary, Scarlett writes, “As a result of the intelligence we judge” that, among other things, Iraq has “sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it.” The language is similar to that of the first draft, but a statement saying “we judge” is not the same as a statement saying “we know.” Hans concludes, “In any event, the published dossier, carefully reviewed by the best and brightest of the British intelligence and the Blair administration’s communications staff, presents three different interpretations: a ‘judgment’ in the executive summary, a statement of fact in Chapter 3, and a vague ‘there is intelligence’ claim in Chapter 3. Take your pick.” Prime Minister Tony Blair uses the dossier to flatly assert that “we now know the following”: that Iraq indeed tried to purchase uranium from Africa, “though we do not know whether he has been successful” (see September 24, 2002). [Common Dreams (.org), 8/26/2003; Hutton Inquiry, 1/28/2004] Later reporting will reveal that the main source for the dossier’s Africa-uranium allegation was in fact an Italian intelligence report (see Mid-October 2001) that was based on the same set of forged documents that formed the basis of the US allegations. [La Repubblica (Rome), 10/24/2005; La Repubblica (Rome), 10/25/2005]
'No Definitive Intelligence' on Aluminum Tube Allegations - In the section discussing Iraq’s alleged nuclear weapons program, the dossier says there “is no definitive intelligence evidence” that the shipment of aluminum tubes intercepted by the CIA was intended for use in an Iraqi nuclear program. This assessment of the tubes contradicts the majority view at the CIA. [United Kingdom, 9/24/2002]
'Echo Chamber,' 'Disinformation Campaign' - Former CIA official Milt Bearden will later say, “When you are playing a disinformation campaign, you’re like a conductor who can single out one note in the symphony and say, ‘Let the Brits have that.’” Author Craig Unger will note that by the time the “Scarlett dossier” is released, between the various US and British claims and the array of reports in the media, it seems as if the claims of Iraq trying to buy Nigerien uranium are coming from multiple sources, “when in fact there [is] merely an echo chamger of corroboration.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 259]
Claim that Iraq Can Launch WMD within 45 Minutes - Perhaps the most infamous portion of the dossier is the claim that Iraq can launch weapons of mass destruction against chosen targets within 45 minutes of the order being given. That particular claim was not in the drafts of the dossier, and was apparently inserted by Blair administration officials seeking to bolster the case for war with Iraq. The Blair government will later deny that assertion. [Associated Press, 2/18/2008] After it is revealed early the following year that the US had relied on intelligence based on forged documents, the British will insist that they have additional evidence to support their claims (see March 7, 2003-July 7, 2003). [Sunday Times (London), 11/6/2005]

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Milt Bearden, Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett, Dennis Hans, Craig Unger, SISMI, Central Intelligence Agency, Tony Blair

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

British Prime Minister Tony Blair gives a speech to Parliament concurrent with the just-released dossier on Iraqi WMD (see September 24, 2002). Blair combines fact—such as Iraq’s lengthy defiance and deception of UN weapons inspections since the 1991 Gulf War, the possible existence of tons of chemical and biological weapons material left unaccounted for in 1998, and the attempts by Iraq to subvert the UN’s Food for Oil program—with speculation that Saddam Hussein’s “chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons program is not an historic leftover from 1998.… His WMD program is active, detailed, and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The WMD program is not shut down. It is up and running.”
Unverified Claims - Blair calls the dossier “extensive, detailed, and authoritative,” and says that according to intelligence data used to compile it: “Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.… Saddam has continued to produce them… he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shi’a population, and … he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.” Only the “45-minute” strike capability is not sourced from the dossier (see September 28, 2002). Blair makes a number of patently false allegations about Iraq’s nuclear weapons, including the disputed aluminum tubes claim (see Between April 2001 and September 2002, April 11, 2001, July 25, 2002, September 24, 2002, October 1, 2002, Between December 2002 and January 2003, January 11, 2003, and March 7, 2003) and the tale about Iraq attempting to purchase uranium from Niger (see Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001, October 15, 2001, October 18, 2001, November 20, 2001, February 5, 2002, March 1, 2002, Late April or Early May 2002-June 2002, and Late June 2002). “[W]e know Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful,” Blair says. He tells the assembled lawmakers: “There will be some who dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For some of this material there may be innocent explanations. There will be others who say, rightly, that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before he acquires a usable nuclear weapon. Though, if he were able to purchase fissile materiel illegally, it would only be a year or two. But let me put it at its simplest: on this 11-year history; with this man, Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available; with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate: would the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed; to say, despite 14 separate UN demands on this issue, all of which Saddam is in breach of, we should do nothing; to conclude that we should trust not to the good faith of the UN weapons inspectors but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime?”
Regime Change - After all of this buildup, Blair says that he is not necessarily calling for military action against Iraq, but “the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament… is overwhelming.” He then makes the case for regime change, citing the need for a new leader “who can bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not languishing as a pariah. Someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by Saddam’s personal greed. Someone who can lead a government more representative of the country as a whole, while maintaining absolutely Iraq’s territorial integrity. We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Liberated from Saddam, they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the Middle East. So the ending of regime would be the cause of regret for no one other than Saddam.” Blair says, “our purpose is disarmament,” not military action, but it is hard to conceive how the regime change he advocates could be effected without military action. [10 Downing Street, 9/24/2002] Two years later, Blair will admit that the claim is erroneous (see October 13, 2004).

Entity Tags: Tony Blair, Saddam Hussein

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

In a paper titled, “The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq,” which is a part of the study, “A Future of a Post-Saddam Iraq: A Blueprint for American Involvement,” authors Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O’Driscoll argue for the implementation of neoliberal reforms including the privatization of Iraq’s major industries. The document says that poverty in Iraq is a result of Saddam Hussein’s mismanagement, namely Saddam’s decision to nationalize certain industries; Iraq’s war with Iran; the invasion of Kuwait; and Saddam’s refusal to comply with the requirements for the suspension of UN sanctions. The paper’s proposal for jumpstarting Iraq’s economy focuses on privatization of Iraq’s industries and several other neoliberal reforms. To complement this, the authors recommend using the “media and the educational system to explain the benefits of privatization and the changes to come in order to ensure broad public support.” The costs of reconstruction, they suggest, could be paid for with funds generated from the sale of Iraq’s oil. “Iraq’s vast oil reserves are more than ample to provide the funds needed to rebuild and boost economic growth,” the report says. [Observer, 11/3/2002; Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003] But in order to generate this amount, Cohen and Driscoll write, the post-Saddam government would probably have to reconsider its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). “Following the demise of Saddam Hussein, it is unlikely that the Saudi kingdom would transfer a fraction of its production quota under the [OPEC] regime to Iraq to compensate for those lost profits and facilitate its rebuilding,” the authors note. “Iraq will need to ensure cash flow for reconstruction regardless of OPEC supply limitations. Combined with the potential privatization of the oil industry, such measures could provide incentive for Iraq to leave the OPEC cartel down the road, which would have long term, positive implications for global oil supply.… An Iraq outside of OPEC would find available from its oil trade an ample cash flow for the country’s rehabilitation.” [Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003] Cohen will later admit in an interview after the invasion of Iraq that his interest in Iraq withdrawing from OPEC was to destabilize Saudi Arabia (see Early 2005).

Entity Tags: Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Saddam Hussein, Ariel Cohen

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

A member of the National Security Council staff speaks with a CIA analyst about the allegation that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger. The CIA analyst reportedly tells the NSC staff member that the claim should be removed from an upcoming speech (It is not known which speech this concerns, though it could be Bush’s speech in Cincinnati). The CIA analyst later tells a Senate investigative committee that the NSC staff member said removing the allegation would leave the British “flapping in the wind.” [US Congress, 7/7/2004, pp. 59]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

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