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General Jean-Jacques Dessalines declares Haiti’s independence, after crushing the French army sent by Napoleon to re-enslave it following the world’s first successful slave revolt. Dessalines quickly makes himself emperor. (Rogozinski 1992; Dunkel 1994)
The young Duke of Brabant is crowned King Leopold II of Belgium. (Hochschild 1999, pp. 37-38, 40-42)
Guatemala suffers under a succession of dictators. During the period, the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which is exempt from taxes, exerts significant influence within the country. (Gleijeses 1992; Woodward 1999; Schlesinger and Kinzer 1999)
US President Woodrow Wilson sends US forces to Haiti in an attempt to prevent Germany or France from taking it over. Haiti controls the Windward Passage to the Panama Canal and is seen as strategically critical. The Haitian government is near insolvency at this time and is significantly in debt to foreign corporations. German companies control almost 80 percent of Haitian trade. US forces will occupy the country until 1934. (Rogozinski 1992, pp. 238-239) A few weeks later, the US State Department installs Senator Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave as the head of state. “When the National Assembly met, the Marines stood in the aisles with their bayonets until the man selected by the American Minister was made President,” Smedley Butler, a Marine who will administer Haiti’s local police force, later writes. (Rogozinski 1992, pp. 239; Guma 3/10/2004)
The US drafts a constitution for Haiti, which notably excludes a provision from the country’s previous constitution which had prohibited foreign ownership of land. Under the US-drafted constitution, foreign investors would be able to purchase fertile areas and establish sugar cane, cacao, banana, cotton, tobacco, and sisal plantations. But the Haitian legislature finds the US-proposed constitution unacceptable and continues working on a new document which would reverse the terms of the 1915 treaty (see November 11, 1915), giving control of Haiti back to its own government, and which would leave the previous constitution’s land restrictions intact. When a copy of the document is sent to Washington, it is quickly rejected by the US State Department which complains that it is “unfriendly” and instructs that its passage be prevented. But the Haitian lawmakers continue their work with plans to quickly ratify the new constitution and then impeach Haitian President Dartiguenave on the basis of the new document’s provisions. To prevent its passage, Dartiguenave orders US Marine Smedley Butler to dissolve the Haitian legislature, which he does as they are preparing to vote on the new constitution. Smedley claims that the measure is necessary in order “to end the spirit of anarchy which animates it [the Hatian legislature].” (Rogozinski 1992, pp. 240; Guma 3/10/2004)
The US authorities in Haiti submit the US-drafted constitution (see Early 1917) to a popular referendum, which approves it in a landslide. Less than 5 percent of Haiti’s population participate in the vote. (Rogozinski 1992, pp. 240; Guma 3/10/2004)
Haiti’s new constitution (see Early 1917) goes into effect. Sudre Dartiguenave remains president, though his position is nothing more than that of a figurehead. Real power remains with the US occupiers. (Rogozinski 1992, pp. 240; Guma 3/10/2004; Encyclopedia of World History, 6th ed. 1/2/2006)
Angered by a US-instigated law requiring forced labor (see November 11, 1915), as many as 40,000 Haitians in the north led by Charlemagne Peralte and Benoit Batraville, attack and defeat the local gendarmerie and take control over much of the northern mountainous region. US forces are called in to repress the rebellion in March of 1919. For the first time ever, airplanes are used to support soldiers. The fighting continues until November 1920. The official US record of casualties shows that thirteen US soldiers and 3,071 Haitians are killed. (LeBlanc n.d.; Rogozinski 1992, pp. 240)
For three decades, the US Marine-trained Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina rules the Dominican Republic as a brutal dictator. His regime, backed by the US during most of its reign, is responsible for many atrocities, including the assassinations and kidnappings of political adversaries. In 1937, inspired by the racist philosophies of his era, Trujillo sends troops to the Haitian border where they massacre 19,000-20,000 Haitian squatters who he believes represent a threat to the Dominican race because of their slightly darker skin. He is assassinated in 1961. (Blum 1995; BBC 12/9/2005; Encyclopedia Britannica 1/2/2006)
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs Executive Order 8248, reorganizing the Executive Office of the President. According to the order, “There shall be within the Executive Office of the President the following principal divisions, namely: (1) The White House Office, (2) the Bureau of the Budget, (3) the National Resources Planning Board, (4) the Liaison Office for Personnel Management, (5) the Office of Government Reports, and (6) in the event of a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency, such office for emergency management as the President shall determine.” The order creates the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), a civil defense unit responsible for protecting government functions in the event of a disaster. The President’s Secretary declares that in times of national emergency, “it has always been necessary to establish administrative machinery in addition to that required for normal work of the government.… Although these management facilities need be brought into action only when an emergency or serious threat of emergency exists, they must function in an integral relationship to the regular management arms of the President.” (Executive Order 8248 9/8/1939; Belair 9/10/1939; New York Times 3/28/1941; New York Times 4/20/1941)
President Harry Truman signs the National Security Act of 1947, reorganizing the military and overhauling the government’s foreign policy-making bureaucracy. The act gives birth to three major organizations: the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC). The DOD unifies the three branches of the military—the Army, Navy and Air Force—into a single department overseen by a secretary of defense. The act establishes a separate agency, the CIA, to oversee all overt and covert intelligence operations. The act forms the NSC to directly advise the President on all matters of defense and foreign policy. In addition, the act establishes the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) to advise the President “concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization” in times of war. Should the nation come under attack, the NSRB will be in charge of allocating essential resources and overseeing “the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation’s security.” (US Congress. House. Senate. 7/26/1947; Trager 11/1977)
President Harry S. Truman signs Executive Order 10186, shifting many responsibilities of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), which oversees federal emergency planning, to a new civil defense organization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). The FCDA is placed within the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), an agency established as part of the Executive Office of the President years earlier by President Franklin Roosevelt (see September 8, 1939). The purpose of the FCDA, according to President’s Truman’s order, “shall be to promote and facilitate the civil defense of the United States in cooperation with several States.” (Executive Order 10186 12/1/1950) The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 will be signed into law weeks later, establishing the FCDA as an independent agency and detailing the organization’s responsibilities (see January 12, 1951)
President Harry S. Truman signs the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), established weeks earlier within the Executive Office of the President (see December 1, 1950), is transformed into an independent agency headed by a presidential appointee. The FCDA is placed in charge of providing emergency aid and assistance to local communities affected by disasters. The act also provides special emergency powers to the FCDA and the President in the event of a national crisis. According to President Truman, the act establishes a “basic framework for preparations to minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population, and to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would create.” According to the New York Times, “The measure directs the Federal Government to provide leadership to states and communities in developing arrangements to protect civilian life and property in the country’s 150 critical target areas against possible enemy attack by atomic bombs, biological or bacteriological warfare or any other technique.” The new civil defense plans are estimated to cost $3.1 billion. The FCDA will distribute brochures and produce television and radio segments aimed at preparing the general public for a nuclear attack. The FCDA will also stage drills and exercises to test public and government readiness for such a disaster. The agency will become infamous for encouraging civilians to “duck and cover” in the event of a nuclear strike. (Statement by the President Upon Signing the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 1/12/1951; Lawrence 1/12/1951, pp. 7; Greenberg 2/20/2003; Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea 6/1/2006, pp. 10 )
President Harry S. Truman signs Executive Order 10346, ordering the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to coordinate “continuity” plans within the federal government. The plans will be designed to ensure the continuation of essential government functions in the event of a major disaster, such as a nuclear attack on Washington DC. According to the order, “each Federal department and agency shall prepare plans for maintaining the continuity of its essential functions at the seat of government and elsewhere during the existence of a civil-defense emergency.” In addition to the FCDA, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), established by the National Security of Act of 1947, (See July 26, 1947), is to play an advisory role in the emergency plans. (Executive Order 10346 4/17/1952)
The land redistribution collides with the interests of the United Fruit Company (UFCO), for whom 85 percent of the 550,000 acres they own are uncultivated. The US government demands extra compensation for the United Fruit Company over what has already been given. (Gleijeses 1992; Woodward 1999; Schlesinger and Kinzer 1999)
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 is signed into law, restructuring the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) within the Executive Office of the President. The ODM, originally created by President Harry S. Truman in December of 1950 (see December 16, 1950), will incorporate the responsibilities of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), which shares similar objectives. The purpose of the ODM is to ensure the continuation of essential government and industry functions, particularly during times of crisis. President Dwight D. Eisenhower says merging the ODM and the NSRB will “enable one Executive Office agency to exercise strong leadership in our national mobilization effort, including both current defense activities and readiness for any future national emergency.” (New York Times 4/3/1953, pp. 1; US Congress. House. Senate. 6/12/1953)
Ngo Dinh Diem returns from exile in the US to head the South Vietnamese government. The CIA office in Saigon, under the leadership of Colonel Edward Lansdale, conducts a propaganda campaign aimed at creating the perception that North Vietnam is plagued with massive civil unrest and disorder while there is stability in South Vietnam and widespread popular support for its newly installed leader. (Herring 1986, pp. 44; Pilger 1986, pp. 192) “Paramilitary groups infiltrated across the demilitarized zone on sabotage missions, attempting to destroy the government’s printing presses and pouring contaminants into the engines of buses to demobilize the transportation systems. The teams also carried ‘psywar’ operations to embarrass the Vietminh regime and encourage emigration to the South. They distributed fake leaflets announcing the harsh methods the government was prepared to take and even hired astrologers to predict hard times in the north and good times in the south.” (Herring 1986, pp. 44) “[Landale’s team] stimulated North Vietnamese Catholics and the Catholic armies deserted by the French to flee south. SMM teams promised Catholic Vietnamese assistance and new opportunities if they would emigrate. To help them make up their minds, the teams circulated leaflets falsely attributed to the Viet Minh telling what was expected of citizens under the new government. The day following distribution of the leaflets, refugee registration tripled. The teams spread horror stories of Chinese Communist regiments raping Vietnamese girls and taking reprisals against villages. This confirmed fears of Chinese occupation under the Viet Minh. The teams distributed other pamphlets showing the circumference of destruction around Hanoi and other North Vietnamese cities should the United States decide to use atomic weapons. To those it induced to flee over the 300-day period the CIA provided free transportation on its airline, Civil Air Transport, and on ships of the US Navy. Nearly a million North Vietnamese were scared and lured into moving to the South.” (Pilger 1986, pp. 192)
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 is signed into law, merging the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) into a single agency, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). The OCDM will be responsible for ensuring the continuation of essential government and industry functions in the event of a national emergency. President Dwight D. Eisenhower submitted the reorganization plan to Congress in April 1958 with the intention of establishing a “single pattern with respect to the vesting of defense mobilization and civil defense functions.” In addition to merging the civil defense agencies, the reorganization plan transfers to the president the authorities previously delegated to the FCDA and the ODM (see December 1, 1950 and December 16, 1950). (Message of the President 4/24/1958; US Congress. House. Senate. 7/1/1958)
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah makes Ghana a republic with himself as president. Under Ghana’s new constitution, the president has wide legislative and executive powers. (BBC 11/4/1997; Encyclopaedia Britannica 2004)
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President-elect John F. Kennedy meet at the White House for a final briefing before Eisenhower leaves office. Eisenhower tells Kennedy that he must assume responsibility for the overthrow of Fidel Castro and his government in Cuba, and recommends the hastening of the proposed Cuban invasion. Eisenhower says, “[W]e cannot let the present government there go on.” (Gravel 9/29/1967, pp. 635-637; National Security Archive 3/23/2001)
Brazilian President Joao Goulart holds a national plebiscite on whether Brazil should have a presidential or parliamentary government (a recent constitutional amendment required the president to share power with a council of ministers responsible to the legislature). Voters decide overwhelmingly to restore to Goulart full presidential powers under the 1946 constitution, despite the CIA spending close to $20 million in an effort to thwart his election. (Gribbin 4/1979; Keen 1992, pp. 357)
Juan Bosch takes office in the Dominican Republic. A liberal anti-communist, he attempts to implement significant economic and social reforms including land reform, nationalization of some businesses and physical infrastructure development. Though opposed to communism, he respects the right of communists to speak and assemble freely. Conservative voices in the US are not satisfied with Bosch, alleging that he is allowing “communists” to “infiltrate” into the country. One reporter for the Miami News claims “Communist penetration of the Dominican Republic is progressing with incredible speed and efficiency.” (Blum 1995)
Buddhist clerics begin immolating themselves in protest of South Vietnamese President Diem’s prosecution of Buddhists. (Herring 1986, pp. 95)
In the Dominican Republic, the government of Juan Bosch is overthrown by an archconservative faction of the military led Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin and replaced with a civilian triumvirate. The new leaders quickly abolish the constitution, declaring it “nonexistent.” The coup reportedly happens with a “wink from the US Pentagon.” (Yates 1988; Blum 1995)
John F. Kennedy, the thirty-fifth president of the United States, is assassinated during a political trip to Dallas, Texas. (Earl Warren 9/24/1964, pp. 48) Kennedy is assassinated inside a motorcade, sitting alongside his wife Jacqueline “Jackie” Kennedy, Texas Governor John Connally, his wife Nellie Connally; driving the motorcade is Secret Service agent William Greer, who is sitting next to Roy Kellerman, assistant special agent-in-charge of the Secret Service White House detail. Before the first bullet hits him, Kennedy is waving to his right at a group of people standing near a sign reading “Stemmons Freeway”. His right arm and hand are slightly over the side of the car. Approaching what is known as the “Triple Underpass”, a railroad bridge converging three streets underneath, Mrs. Connally says to the president: “Mr. President, you can’t say that Dallas doesn’t love you.” Kennedy replies, “No, you certainly can’t.” (Marrs 1/22/1993, pp. 11) According to the Warren Commission: “… as the President’s open limousine proceeded at approximately 11 miles per hour along Elm Street toward the Triple Underpass, shots fired from a rifle mortally wounded President Kennedy and seriously injured Governor Connally. One bullet passed through the President’s neck; a subsequent bullet, which was lethal, shattered the right side of his skull. Governor Connally sustained bullet wounds in his back, the right side of his chest, right wrist, and left thigh.” (Earl Warren 9/24/1964, pp. 48)
For the next 20 years, Guyana is governed by Forbes Burnham, who is later described by Kennedy’s special assistant Arthur Schlesinger in his book, A Thousand Days, as “an opportunist, racist and demagogue intent only on personal power.” He holds power through force and fraud until his death in 1985 and runs up a foreign debt totaling over $2 billion during this time—an amount representing over five times the country’s GDP. (Weiner 10/30/1994; Jagan 1999) Burnham’s two decades of rule is marked by questionable elections; suppression of human rights, civil liberties, and union activities; corruption and economic stagnation. During this time there are two major political assassinations. Jesuit priest and journalist Bernard Darke is killed in July 1979 and the distinguished historian and Working People’s Alliance (WPA) party leader Walter Rodney is murdered in June 1980. President Burnham is widely believed to have had a hand in the killings. (GlobalEdge 2005)
Brazilian President Joao Goulart nationalizes oil, expropriates unused land, and passes a law limiting the amount of profits multinationals can send out of the country. (Gribbin 4/1979; Keen 1992, pp. 358)
Elections in Guyana are held and the Progressive People’s Party (PPP) gains 46 percent of the vote, while the People’s National Congress (PNC) receives 41 percent and the conservative United Force (TUF) ends up with 12 percent. But the TUF gives its votes in the legislature to the PNC and consequently PNC candidate Forbes Burnham becomes the prime minister. (US Department of State 1/2006)
A small group of Indonesian junior military officers loyal to left-wing nationalist President Ahmed Sukarno kidnaps and kills six senior army generals and announces the creation of a revolutionary council to rule the country. The officers, led by one of Sukarno’s bodyguards, Colonel Untung, claim the killings were necessary to thwart an imminent, CIA-backed coup against the Sukarno government. This event is known as the “September 30 Affair.” (Scott 1985; Kadane 5/19/1990; Sydney Morning Herald 7/10/1999) Interestingly, Indonesian General Suharto, who will take control of Jakarta the following day (see October 1, 1965), had foreknowledge of the attacks but did nothing to stop them. (Williams 7/9/1999 Sources: Abdul Latief) Prior to this event, tension between Indonesia and the West were on the rise. Sukarno had earlier threatened to nationalize US oil assets. (Sydney Morning Herald 7/10/1999)
Indonesian General Suharto takes control of Jakarta one day after a group of junior military officers killed six senior army generals (see September 30, 1965). Suharto claims the killings were part of a Communist plan to take over Indonesia. For the next five months, he oversees the slaughter of between 500,000 and 1 million people, many of them targeted because of their affiliation with the PKI, Indonesia’s Communist party. (Scott 1985; Kadane 5/19/1990; Williams 7/9/1999; Sydney Morning Herald 7/10/1999) During this period, Suharto is backed by the US, Britain, and Australia. The US embassy in Indonesia provides the Indonesian army with a list compiled by the CIA consisting of the names of thousands of Communist Party leaders who the Indonesian military hunts down and executes. (Kadane 5/19/1990; Sydney Morning Herald 7/10/1999; US Department of State 2001 Sources: Unnamed former CIA officials and US diplomats)
The Ghanaian army stages a coup, overthrowing the pan-Africanist government of Kwame Nkrumah—who is in Burma at the start of a grand tour aimed at resolving the conflict in Vietnam. (Stockwell 1978; BBC 11/4/1997; Yergin and Stanislaw 1998) A weak economy (see 1961-Early 1966), exacerbated by the deliberate actions of Western governments to destabilize the country (see (3.00pm-3:30pm) March 11, 1965) (see March 27, 1965), had severely damaged the president’s popularity among the masses. Additionally, the military was upset with Nkrumah’s cuts to the defense budget and the declining real wage of army officers. The coup itself was supported by the CIA, which had maintained intimate contact with the plotters for at least a year (see (3.00pm-3:30pm) March 11, 1965). The CIA’s involvement in the plot was so close that it managed to recover some classified Soviet military equipment as the coup was happening. (Stockwell 1978; Hersh 1980; Lee 6/7/2002 Sources: Howard T. Banes)
Britain grants Guyana independence. (Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. 2005)
In a conversation with National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger about civilian casualties in Vietnam, US President Richard Nixon says, “I don’t give a damn. I don’t care.” (CBS News 2/28/2003)
The New York Times publishes excerpts from a secret Pentagon study leaked by Daniel Ellsberg of the RAND Corporation to journalist Neil Sheehan. Ellsberg had worked in the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The study, later known as the “Pentagon Papers,” had been commissioned by McNamara and completed in 1968. It focused on how policy and tactical decisions had been made during the war. Between 30 and 40 writers and researchers participated in the 40-volume project, producing 3,000 pages of analysis and compiling 4,000 pages of original documents. After the Times publishes its first article on the papers, the US government goes to great lengths to block additional stories. But on June 30, the US Supreme Court rules in a 6-3 decision in favor of the New York Times. (Sheehan 6/13/1971; National Security Archives 6/29/2001; Vietnam Veterans of America 4/15/2004) The June 13 Times article reports that the Pentagon Papers included the following conclusions:
“That the Truman Administration decision to give military aid to France in her colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh ‘directly involved’ the United States in Vietnam and ‘set’ the course of American policy.” (Sheehan 6/13/1971)
“That the Eisenhower Administration’s decision to rescue a fledgling South Vietnam from a Communist takeover and attempt to undermine the new Communist regime of North Vietnam gave the Administration a ‘direct role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva settlement’ for Indochina in 1954.” (Sheehan 6/13/1971)
“That the Kennedy Administration, though ultimately spared from major escalation decisions by the death of its leader, transformed a policy of ‘limited-risk gamble,’ which it inherited, into a ‘broad commitment’ that left President Johnson with a choice between more war and withdrawal.” (Sheehan 6/13/1971)
“That the Johnson Administration, though the president was reluctant and hesitant to take the final decisions, intensified the covert warfare against North Vietnam and began planning in the spring of 1964 to wage overt war, a full year before it publicly revealed the depth of its involvement and its fear of defeat.” (Sheehan 6/13/1971)
“That this campaign of growing clandestine military pressure through 1964 and the expanding program of bombing North Vietnam in 1965 were begun despite the judgment of the Government’s intelligence community that the measures would not cause Hanoi to cease its support of the Vietcong insurgency in the South, and that the bombing was deemed militarily ineffective within a few months.” (Sheehan 6/13/1971)
“That these four succeeding administrations built up the American political, military and psychological stakes in Indochina, often more deeply than they realized at the time, with large-scale military equipment to the French in 1950; with acts of sabotage and terror warfare against North Vietnam, beginning in 1954; with moves that encouraged and abetted the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diuem of South Vietnam in 1963; with plans, pledges and threats of further action that sprang to life in the Tonkin Gulf clashes in August, 1964; with the careful preparation of public opinion for the years of open warfare that were to follow; and with the calculation in 1965, as the planes and troops were openly committed to sustained combat, that neither accommodation inside South Vietnam nor early negotiations with North Vietnam would achieve the desired result.” (Sheehan 6/13/1971)
President Nixon officially announces the end of the gold standard system of monetary policy for international exchange of gold deposits in an evening address to the country. Nixon’s move to sever the link between the dollar’s value and gold reserves effectively ends the Breton Woods system of monetary exchange and changes the dollar to a “floating” currency whose value is to be determined largely by market influences. Nixon’s decision results from a run on gold exchanges and rampant speculation in gold markets in Europe, and he changes the US monetary policy after receiving advice from Treasury Secretary John Connally, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Paul A. Volcker, and others in a special working group. The dollar becomes a fiat currency, causing a brief international panic before other countries follow suit and also allow their currencies to “float.” (UPI 8/16/1971, pp. 1)
CIA covert policies (at an expense of $8 million from 1970-73) lead to a coup d’etat in which Allende is killed and Augusto Pinochet brought to power. (Kornbluh n.d.; Time 9/24/1973; US Congress 12/4/1975, pp. 148-160; BBC 11/14/2000) After Allende’s assassination, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will explain to Congress, “The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves.” (Hunt 9/1/2009, pp. 8)
The Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot evacuates the capital, sending its urban population into the countryside to work in agriculture. The regime destroys vehicles and machinery because of their Western origins and systematically kills between half a million and two million Cambodians, targeting mostly the wealthy and educated. Pol Pot also abolishes currency and the postal system. (Library of Congress 1990; Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. 2005)
British Energy Secretary Tony Benn announces an inquiry into the sale of British equipment to Pakistan for use in that country’s nuclear weapons program, and suspends such sales. The action results from a tip-off about operations run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan from a disgruntled former supplier. Ernst Piffl had supplied Khan with 20 inverters, but Khan was unhappy with the price and switched suppliers (see Before July 1978). Piffl then blew the whistle on the business, alerting Frank Allaun, an MP for the British Labour Party, that the components were for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons industry. Allaun, who is associated with the anti-nuclear movement, began to ask questions about the parts in parliament and Benn then decides to suspend sales and start an inquiry. (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 54) The inquiry will report back in the fall (see November 1979).
A group of reformist civilian and military officials in El Salvador organize a coup to overthrow the regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero. The group is made up of a mix of reformists with a genuine interest in political and economic reform and anticommunist hardliners concerned that the Romero regime was incapable of preventing a leftist uprising from taking over the country as had happened earlier in the year in Nicaragua. (Montgomery 1995, pp. 73-75) Two army colonels, Adolfo Arnoldo Majano and Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, serve as the figureheads of the new regime. They promise land reform, greater political tolerance, democratic elections, an end to corruption, and a stop to the harsh repression by security forces. (DeYoung 10/21/1979)
The British government places high-frequency inverters, equipment purchased by A. Q. Khan in Britain for his nuclear weapons work, on its export control list. This makes it practically impossible for Khan to obtain the parts in Britain. The move follows an official inquiry into the sale of British equipment to Khan (see July 1978). The inquiry found that a previous sale of inverters to Khan, arranged by British businessman Peter Griffin, was legal at that time. However, British Energy Secretary Tony Benn comments: “We acted in a way that was right and proper. But I have a sort of feeling it wasn’t effective, and that what President [actually Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto began and President [Muhammad] Zia [ul-Haq] continued is going to be, if it isn’t already, a nuclear weapon in Pakistan.” (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 55)
British tax and customs authorities focus on the dealings of Peter Griffin, a British businessman who is known to supply equipment for A. Q. Khan’s nuclear weapons work in Pakistan. Griffin will later say that he speaks to the authorities at this time and justifies what he is doing to them: “Customs started causing me endless headaches. I told the tax and customs people that I was never curious and never asked questions. I did everything within export control legislation. I was a businessman. I never sold a bullet, never sold anything that would kill anyone. When the Brits tried to appeal to my better nature and said, ‘This is nuclear stuff you’re contributing to,’ I said, ‘As far as I am concerned A. Q. Khan’s work is for peaceful purposes only and I believe that all countries have an unalienable right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. I’ll stop just as soon as you stop selling small arms, handcuffs, and torture equipment to African countries.’” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment, “From now on this would be Griffin’s justification for all the work he would do for Khan.” (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 55)
British businessman Peter Griffin is unable to obtain a license to export inverters to Pakistan, where they are wanted by his customer A. Q. Khan for nuclear weapons work. Griffin tries to obtain the inverters from Emerson Industrial Controls, which had previously supplied Khan with them through both Griffin and another intermediary (see Spring 1978). However, Griffin’s applications for an export license are refused twice. This is because the British government is now aware of the transactions and has placed inverters on its export control list (see November 1979). (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 55)
Sheikh Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad serves as Osama bin Laden’s “spiritual adviser” during the war between the Soviet Union and the US-backed mujaheddin in Afghanistan, according to a statement made by Sheikh al-Moayad at his trial in 2004-2005. (Wald and Kokenes 8/2/2005) Al-Moayad’s trial in the United States will cause resentment in Yemen because he is a highly-esteemed cleric and member of the influential Islah party. (Weissenstein 3/10/2005) Another of bin Laden’s “mentors” at this time is Abdul Mejid al-Zindani, a dynamic mujaheddin recruiter who becomes a leader of the Islah party. Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s half-brother and military commander Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar also recruits mujaheddin fighters for Bin Laden. These fighters will later establish training camps in Yemen. (Novak 5/28/2005)
President Jimmy Carter signs the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Bill into law. Carter says the bill will “help control inflation, strengthen our financial institutions and help small savers.” Among the bill’s main provisions are raising of ceilings on the interest paid to small savers and a substantial enhancement to the monetary control powers of the nation’s central bank, the Federal Reserve System. The main provisions of the law:
Permanently overrides state-imposed ceilings on mortgage rates unless states act within three years to reenact them.
Wipes out for three years interest rate limits on agricultural and business loans of more than $25,000.
Increases to 15 percent from 12 percent the maximum interest rate on credit union loans, with even higher rates possible for periods up to 18 months.
Continues use of credit union share drafts, bank’s automatic transfer accounts and remote service units.
Simplifies truth-in-lending laws.
Requires lenders to repay consumers for overcharges.
Authorizes federal savings and loan associations to expand their consumer loan and credit card operations and allows them to offer trust services.
Gives the Federal Reserve a more effective reach by establishing a universal and uniform system of banking reserves. Over an eight year period all depository institutions, including savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks, will be encouraged to post reserves with their chapter Federal Reserve banks which will be 12 percent of all transactions as opposed to the tiered structure at 16 1/4 percent, leaving those that left the Federal Reserve System prior to the enactment of this law at a competitive disadvantage until they themsleves register their funds with the Federal Reserve. (Farnsworth 4/1/1980, pp. 1)
With support from Saddam Hussein, the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), a militant Iranian opposition group, joins Iraqi troops in fighting against the Iranians (see September 1980). (US Department of State 4/30/2003; Peterson 12/31/2003)
Iran conducts a limited air strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, after being publicly exhorted to do so by Israel’s chief of Army intelligence. The Osirak reactor is at the same site as the Iraq Nuclear Research Center, in al-Tuwaitha, where Israeli intelligence believes the first Arab atomic bomb will be assembled. The strike is part of a larger strike by Iran against a conventional electric power plant near Baghdad. The strike inflicts only minor damage, and the plant is quickly repaired and brought back online. Iran will not conduct any further air strikes against Iraqi nuclear facilities throughout the entire Iran-Iraq War. In fact, it is not clear whether the Iranian strike is a pre-planned bombing raid by Iranian war planners, or an air strike by two pilots with a chance at a target of opportunity. (Waas and Unger 11/2/1992; Institute for National Strategic Studies 5/1995) In June 1981, Israel will obliterate the Osirak facility (see June 7, 1981).
The incoming Reagan administration marginalizes the State Department’s Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Its director is supposed to be the primary advisor to the president on non-proliferation issues, but, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, he is “kept out of Reagan’s way.” In addition, many staffers are fired. Richard Barlow, an intern who will go on to have a long career in intelligence, will say that the firings greatly damaged the agency’s morale, commenting, “There were grown men crying around me in the office.” One reason for this may be that ACDA had kept former President Jimmy Carter well informed of Pakistan’s attempts to build a bomb, leading to sanctions against that country. However, the Reagan administration now wants to get close to Pakistan, whose support is viewed as necessary for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 78)
Congressman Alan Cranston (D-CA) writes to Secretary of State Alexander Haig about signals that the Reagan administration is preparing to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in return for Pakistani support against the Soviet Union. Details of the deal are already being leaked, and there are rumors the aid for Pakistan will even include F-16 fighters. “I view our nation’s leadership in international nuclear non-proliferation efforts as a central component of our national security program,” Cranston writes. He adds that without much digging he has learned that “the Pakistanis—through continued purchases of sensitive hardware and dual use technology in Europe—have achieved swift progress towards making their new reprocessing plant operational and have continued development of larger reprocessing and enrichment plants.” (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 80-81)
Congressman Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) says that Pakistan’s nuclear policy represents a “clear and present danger to the US and indeed Western security interests in the Persian Gulf and South Asia.” Bingham, chairman of the House International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee, is part of a group of congressmen who oppose a plan by the Reagan administration to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in return for support against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Another of the group is former astronaut and current Senator John Glenn (D-OH). One of Glenn’s aides, Len Weiss, will later describe the feeling in Congress at this time: “Afghanistan had a huge effect on the Hill, becoming a marker of patriotism. There were only two choices. You were against the Soviets and therefore for Pakistan. Or you were against Pakistan and somehow for the Soviets. Nobody thought to tell us that we could be against Pakistan’s bomb and against the Soviets too. That required too much work for the Reagan people. They were lazy and short-sighted.” (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 80, 475)
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes 10-7 to approve a six-year waiver requested by the Reagan administration allowing it to provide aid to Pakistan. The waiver is required because foreign aid for Pakistan was cut off in 1979 in response to revelations that it had acquired unsafeguarded uranium enrichment technology. The Reagan administration wants to provide aid to Pakistan to get it to assist anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan. An increased aid package will be approved in December (see December 1981). (Armstrong and Trento 2007, pp. 118-119; Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 85)
On the order of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and after heated debate among Israeli leaders, Israeli warplanes strike the Osirak (also spelled Osiraq) Tammuz I nuclear plant at al-Tuwaitha near Baghdad, destroying it and dealing a severe setback to Iraq’s nuclear program. Israel claims it fears Iraq is building a nuclear weapon with which to strike it. Osirak is a French-made nuclear reactor, which is near completion but lacks any nuclear fuel, thereby raising no danger of any radioactive link. Ariel Sharon, concurrently Defense Minister and a proponent of the strike, later says, “This was perhaps the most difficult decision which faced any [Israeli] government during all the years of the state’s existence.” The Israeli government states after the strike, “The atomic bombs which that reactor was capable of producing, whether from enriched uranium or from plutonium, would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a mortal danger to the people of Israel progressively arose.… Under no circumstances will we allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people.” The reactor is slated to be completed by September, 1981, though it would be years before it could produce any nuclear-grade fissionable material. Iraq denies the reactor is developed to produce nuclear weapons, though the construction of the plant gives credence to claims that Iraq is more interested in building a weapon than generating electricity. (After the strike, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein says, “Any state in the world which really wants peace… should help the Arabs in one way or another to acquire atomic bombs,” giving further credence to suspicions that Hussein wanted to build a nuclear weapon.) The Israeli strike follows up a September 1980 raid on the Osirak facility by Iranian warplanes (see September 30, 1980). Publicly, Iran and Israel are dire enemies, but Israel has begun secretly selling US-made arms to Iran as a way to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq (see 1981). (BBC 7/7/1981; Waas and Unger 11/2/1992; Institute for Strategic Studies 5/1995) In 1984, Brookings Institution fellow Lucien Vandenbroucke will write, “Ironically, Israel’s raid may prove to be a brilliant tactical success achieved at the expense of the country’s long-term interests. Certainly, the attack set Iraq’s nuclear program back several years. But the strike also ushered in a de facto Israeli claim to nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, a move that in the long run generally promises to encourage the larger Arab world on the nuclear path.… In the decision-making process, Israeli fears and the propensity to rely on worst-case analyses seem to have prevailed. The advocates of the strike focused on the unreasonable, rather than the reasonable, aspects of Iraqi behavior, and thus even a limited prospect that Iraq might soon acquire a nuclear bomb became more of a risk than they were prepared to accept.” (Vandenbroucke 10/1984)
A PROMIS oversight committee is formed at the Justice Department to supervise the implementation of the PROMIS software at US attorneys’ offices. The committee’s members are initially Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Deputy Attorney General Stanley E. Morris, Director of the Executive Office for US Attorneys William P. Tyson, and the Justice management division’s Assistant Attorney General for Administration Kevin D. Rooney. The associate attorney general is the chairman of the committee. The date on which the committee is established is unclear, but it will be mentioned in a memo dated August 13, 1981, so it must be at this date at the latest. Lowell Jensen will also be significantly involved in the committee, first as the associate attorney general for the criminal division until early 1983, and then as associate attorney general, meaning he also chairs the committee. The main official who reports to the committee is PROMIS project manager C. Madison “Brick” Brewer, although he will not be hired by the department until the start of the next year (see April 1982). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
The US Senate approves an aid package for Pakistan worth $3.2 billion. This makes Pakistan the third largest recipient of US assistance after Israel and Egypt, and is in response to Pakistani support for the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. The aid is granted despite the fact that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program, as Congress is assured that the aid is conditional on Pakistan stopping this program (see September 1981). However, Pakistan does not do so and informs the Reagan administration of this (see Mid-December 1981). (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, pp. 89) Due to an amendment introduced by Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), aid for any country that detonates a nuclear device will be cut off. Author Dennis Kux will note that this makes “the ‘tacit’ understanding about Pakistan’s not testing (see April 1981)… a legal requirement for US aid.” (Armstrong and Trento 2007, pp. 118-119)
Jack Rugh of the the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Justice Department’s Executive Office of US Attorneys provides a copy of a government-owned version of PROMIS to Bob Bussey of the Colorado District Attorneys’ Council. The version is a pilot one for Prime computers and is provided at the request of the department’s PROMIS project manager, Madison “Brick” Brewer. Rugh will later discuss the availability of other government-owned versions of PROMIS with Bussey and will provide him with a version for DEC computers early next year. (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS provides versions of the software to entities outside the Justice Department (see April 22, 1983).
Jack Rugh of the the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys repeatedly tells Jean Gollatz of the Pennsylvania State Government that a pilot government-owned version of the PROMIS software for Prime computers is available for her use, if she wants it. He also provides her with a copy of a request for proposal used by his office for a computer contract at some time in early 1982, and says that his office’s enhanced Prime version should be available by mid-summer 1983. (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS discusses providing versions of the software to other entities (see April 22, 1983).
One month after the Justice Department and Inslaw sign a contract on the installation of PROMIS software (see March 1982), a departmental official raises the possibility of terminating the contract. At a meeting of the PROMIS Project Team, project manager C. Madison Brewer, the Justice Department’s contracting officer Peter Videnieks, and Jack Rugh, the acting assistant director for the Office of Management Information Systems Support, discuss terminating the contract with Inslaw for convenience of the government, according to notes taken at the meeting. “Discussed Inslaw’s ‘PROMIS II’ memo, termination for convenience discussed,” read Videnieks’ notes. When the contract becomes the subject of a series of legal actions, the three men begin to suffer from what the House Judiciary Committee will call “severe memory loss” over what happened at the meeting. In a sworn statement, Brewer will say he does not recall the details of the meeting, but if this recommendation were made, it was made “in jest.” However, he will admit to being upset with Inslaw’s handling of the contract and its demand for payment for enhancements it had made privately to the application (see April 2, 1982). Bankruptcy Court Judge George Bason will comment: “All of the [Justice Department] witnesses who attended the April 14, 1982 meeting professed a total lack of memory about it. They testified they had no recollection of any such meeting. This court disbelieves that testimony. None of them could offer any credible explanation, or indeed any explanation, of the meaning of Videnieks’ handwritten notes other than what this court finds to be their meaning.… These notes constitute a ‘smoking gun’ that clearly evidences Brewer’s intense bias against Inslaw, his single-minded intent to drive INSLAW out of business, and Rugh’s and Videnieks’ complicity.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Inslaw asks the Justice Department to appoint a manager other than C. Madison “Brick” Brewer to run the PROMIS project that Inslaw is working on for the department. Brewer had formerly worked for Inslaw, but had left under a cloud (see 1976), and later been hired by the department to supervise the contract between it and Inslaw (see April 1982). Following initial problems with Brewer (see April 14, 1982 and April 19, 1982), Inslaw asks Associate Deputy Attorney General Stanley E. Morris to replace him, as Inslaw owner William Hamilton thinks he has antagonistic feelings toward Inslaw due to their past. However, departmental officials say that Brewer’s skills and prior employment with Inslaw were important factors in his hiring by the department. Laurence McWhorter, deputy director of the Executive Office for US Attorneys, will later say that Brewer’s employment by Inslaw qualified him to “run the implementation of a case tracking system for US attorneys” and “to basically direct the implementation of a case tracking system in US attorneys offices.” The House Judiciary Committee will comment, “It is difficult to understand, however, how… McWhorter could make this statement” because Brewer himself admitted that at the time he left Inslaw, “he had very little, if any, experience in managing computer projects and government ADP [automated data processing] procurement law,” and he also “admitted to a lack of experience or detailed understanding of computers or software.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Justice Department manager C. Madison Brewer displays his hostility towards Inslaw, Inc., in a meeting to discuss the implementation of the PROMIS application. An Inslaw memorandum of the meeting says, “Brewer seized upon this issue [that Inslaw wanted to be paid for privately-financed enhancements it had made to the software] and launched into a tirade which was very emotional, unorganized, and quite illogical.” Brewer’s complaints are:
The memo claiming the payments is “typical of Inslaw and [Inslaw owner] Bill Hamilton and that it was self-serving and unnecessary.”
How did the Justice Department “know that we might say work was not finished under our government contracts and the next week copyright the work and begin selling it back to the Justice Department?”
A press release about a contract awarded to Inslaw was inaccurate because “it described West Virginia as a successful implementation when in fact, they had spent an additional 20K [$20,000] on the project and Lanier was doing all the work.”
The memo had caused “all kinds of problems in Justice and had many people upset.”
“Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Michigan Prosecuting Attorney’s Association, Andy Voight, and others,” would say that “Inslaw did not do good or successful work.”
“Hamilton started the PROMIS system as an employee of the DC, USAO [US Attorneys Office in Washington, DC]. And that all of the software was developed with Federal funds and what right did Hamilton have to try to claim ownership of the software.”
The memo adds, “All of these comments were based with an obvious dislike of Bill Hamilton and a resentment for the success of Inslaw personified in him.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
In an internal memo, Inslaw employee John Gizarelli outlines a problem concerning the PROMIS project with the Justice Department official handling the contract, C. Madison “Brick” Brewer (see April 14, 1982, April 19, 1982, and Mid-April 1982). Brewer had left Inslaw under a cloud in the mid-1970s (see 1976), but is now overseeing the PROMIS implementation project at the Justice Department. Gizarelli writes to Inslaw vice president Dean Merrill that Brewer “has made no secret of his dislike of [Inslaw president] Bill Hamilton.” He adds: “In his present job, he is in a position to demonstrate his dislike. Bill, however, has kept his distance from the project and probably will continue to do so, until and unless there are large problems which Bill—in his role as president—must deal with personally. It is entirely possible—and I believe likely—that Brick will escalate the level of controversy until he draws Bill into the project, at which time he will be able to ‘lord it over him’ and show who’s boss. I don’t think Brick will ever be at peace with his feelings about Bill and therefore, with us.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Peter Videnieks, the Justice Department’s contracting officer, writes to Inslaw to demand that it turn over all computer programs and supporting documentation relating to a contract to install PROMIS software for the department (see March 1982). In response, Inslaw says it will not do this without the department modifying the contract between them to acknowledge that it has inserted privately-funded enhancements into a public domain version developed for the department. This modification is apparently required because the department is using a time-share version of the application in advance of full installation, and Inslaw’s other timesharing customers also use a version with the enhancements. The department then says that the original contract called for software in which the government has unlimited rights, and asks Inslaw to identify the parts of the software it claims are proprietary. Inslaw offers to provide the enhanced software to the 94 attorneys’ offices covered by the contract at no extra charge, provided the department agrees to Inslaw’s rights and does not disseminate the software beyond these offices. However, Videnieks will later tell investigators for the House Judiciary Committee that the department believed that it had unlimited rights to any versions of PROMIS, and if restrictions were placed on data rights, then this would not satisfy Inslaw’s obligation under the contract. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
The Justice Department’s PROMIS project manager, C. Madison “Brick” Brewer, writes a memo about potential developments in the project. In the memo, he says he is concerned about the possibility Inslaw, the company that is implementing the PROMIS software, may go bankrupt, and that staff at the Executive Office for US Attorneys may need to take over the project. Brewer also mentions the possibility that the contract with Inslaw could be terminated by the department. Inslaw will enter bankruptcy in 1985, at least partially as a result of the department withholding payments from it (see February 1985). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
The Justice Department makes a counter-proposal in the dispute over whether Inslaw should provide an enhanced version of the PROMIS software and documentation to the department to ensure against the company’s bankruptcy (see December 6, 1982). The counter-proposal is made in a letter from Peter Videnieks, the department’s contracting officer, to Harvey Sherzer, an attorney for Inslaw. Videnieks still wants a copy of the enhanced PROMIS software, but is willing to limit the software’s dissemination to the attorneys’ offices contemplated by the original contract. However, the department does not admit that Inslaw has made privately-funded enhancements to the software, so this limitation on dissemination will only apply if Inslaw can demonstrate the privately-funded enhancements that it claims have actually been made. Nevertheless, no mechanism for producing such proof will be specified. If Inslaw can show the software contains such enhancements, the department will either tell it to remove them, or negotiate regarding inclusion of the enhancements. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Inslaw and the Justice Department conclude a modification, number 12, to a contract under which the company is to install PROMIS software for the department (March 1982). The modification appears to resolve a dispute that has arisen between the two parties (see December 6, 1982 and March 18, 1983), as the department wants Inslaw to give it a copy of the software, but Inslaw says it has made privately-funded enhancements to the code and wants the department to undertake not to disseminate the enhanced software beyond the locations specified in the original contract (the department is entitled to disseminate an earlier, public domain version of the contract any way it wants). The modification says that Inslaw will give the department a copy of the software, and the department undertakes not to disseminate it in future, provided that Inslaw can demonstrate the enhancements were actually made. As a result of the agreement, the department will continue to make advance payments to Inslaw. It is this modification that leads to a series of legal disputes that will last well into the next decade, as the parties never come to an agreement on how the enhancements are to be demonstrated and the department begins to disseminate the software unchecked. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
An official in the Massachusetts State government asks a Justice Department official about the availability of PROMIS software from sources other than Inslaw, the company that created it. This follows a demonstration of PROMIS by Inslaw at the Boston US Attorneys office to a group of people from the State of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts request is passed on to Jack Rugh of the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys. Rugh replies that some government-owned versions of the software are available, but there is currently a dispute with Inslaw over ownership of an enhanced version of the software. (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS discusses providing versions of the software to other entities (see April 22, 1983).
The Justice Department makes a version of PROMIS software owned by the government available to a contractor named Dave Hudak. The version is a pilot copy for use on Prime computers and is provided to Hudak under a contract according to which he should develop benchmarking programs for computer purchases by the department. Apparently, the version is made available by the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Executive Office for US Attorneys. No restrictions are placed on the use of this software. According to Jack Rugh of OMISS, the department may also tell the bidders a version of PROMIS which Inslaw claims it owns may be made available to them at some future date. (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS provides versions of the software to entities outside the Justice Department (see April 22, 1983).
Various versions of PROMIS software owned by the government are made available to potential bidders who may offer to supply computer equipment to the government. Apparently, the versions are made available by the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Executive Office for US Attorneys for use in benchmarking the contractors’ equipment. No restrictions are placed on the use of this software. According to Jack Rugh of OMISS, the Justice Department may also tell the bidders a version of PROMIS which Inslaw claims it owns may be made available to them at some future date. (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS provides versions of the software to entities outside the Justice Department (see April 22, 1983).
Jack Rugh of the the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Executive Office for US Attorneys holds a number of informal discussions with personnel in the Justice Department’s criminal division regarding the division’s possible use of OMISS’s enhanced version of PROMIS, as well as its use of one of OMISS’s Prime computers. In addition, the possibility of cooperating on PROMIS software maintenance and enhancements in the future is discussed. (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS discusses providing versions of the software to other entities (see April 22, 1983).
Jack Rugh of the the Office of Management Information Systems Support (OMISS) at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys discusses the availability of a government-owned pilot version of PROMIS software, as well as an enhanced version, with Don Manson of the Bureau of Justice Statistics on a number of occasions. According to a later memo drafted by Rugh, Manson is “particularly interested in providing a copy of our enhanced software to the US Virgin Islands.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) This is one of several occasions when OMISS discusses providing versions of the software to other entities (see April 22, 1983).
Jack Rugh, the acting assistant director of the Office of Management Information Systems Support at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys, drafts a memo summarizing occasions on which versions of PROMIS software have been provided to organizations other than US Attorneys’ offices by the department or such provision has been discussed. The memo is drafted in response to a request by PROMIS project manager Madison “Brick” Brewer, who asked Rugh about any discussions he may have had about such provision a week earlier. The memo lists various occasions on which versions of PROMIS were provided to entities outside the Justice Department (see Early 1982,Before April 22, 1983, and Before April 22, 1983). It also documents discussions Rugh has had about providing the software to other entities (see Early 1982, Between Early 1982 and April 22, 1983, Before April 22, 1983, and Before April 22, 1983). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
A Justice Department official writes a memo saying he will soon provide the PROMIS application to an Israeli government representative. The official is Jack Rugh, the acting assistant director of the Office of Management Information Systems Support at the Executive Office of US Attorneys. The memo states that “Reference my memorandum to file dated April 22, 1983, on the same subject. [C. Madison] Brick Brewer [PROMIS project manager at the Justice Department] recently instructed me to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS [a version wholly owned by the Justice Department] available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the government of Israel. Dr. Orr called me to discuss that request after my earlier memorandum was written. I have made a copy of the LEM DEC version of PROMIS and will provide it along with the corresponding documentation, to Dr. Orr before he leaves the United States for Israel on May 16.”
High Officials Possibly Involved - The House Judiciary Committee will comment: “Given the international dimensions to the decisions, it is difficult to accept the notion that a group of low-level Department personnel decided independently to get in touch with the government of Israel to arrange for transfer of the PROMIS software. At the very least, it is unlikely that such a transaction occurred without the approval of high-level Department officials, including those on the PROMIS Oversight Committee.”
Actual Version of PROMIS Unclear - The committee will also later speculate that a version whose ownership is under dispute was also given to the Israelis, saying: “[I]t is uncertain what version actually was transferred. Department managers believed that all versions of the Enhanced PROMIS software were the Department’s property. The lack of detailed documentation on the transfer, therefore, only creates new questions surrounding allegations that Enhanced PROMIS may have been sold or transferred to Israel and other foreign governments.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) Rugh will pass the application to Brewer for handing over to Orr six days later (see May 12, 1983).
Jack Rugh, the acting assistant director of the Office of Management Information Systems Support at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys, writes a memo turning over the PROMIS application to a colleague, C. Madison Brewer. The application is for passage to the government of Israel, a transfer already discussed by Brewer and Rugh (see May 6, 1983). Rugh writes: “Enclosed are the PROMIS materials that you asked me to produce for Dr. Ben Orr of the government of Israel. These materials consist of the LEM DEC PDP 11/70 version of PROMIS on magnetic tape along with the printed specifications for that tape, as well as two printed volumes of PROMIS documentation for the LEAA version of the system.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen and other members of the Justice Department’s PROMIS Oversight Committee approve the termination of part of a contract with Inslaw, Inc., for the installation of PROMIS software (see March 1982). The termination, pushed through despite a report that there was progress with Inslaw’s attorney on the resolution of contract problems, only concerns the part of the contract for the installation of PROMIS on word processing hardware in 74 small US attorneys’ offices. Inslaw will still be contracted to install the application in 20 other US attorneys’ offices. The termination is to be for default, as Inslaw has allegedly failed to perform this portion of the contract, although a different reason will later be given (see February 1984). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Miroslav Kalousek, who will go on to be an influential Czech politician, joins a political party for the first time. He becomes a member of the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), which at this time is a minority partner in a Communist-led National Front government of Czechoslovakia. (Novinky(.cz) 2010)
Justice Department procurement counsel William Snider issues a legal opinion stating that the department lacks legal justification to terminate part of a contract on the installation of PROMIS software for default. The department’s PROMIS Oversight Committee had decided on this course of action in December (see December 29, 1983), as it said that Inslaw, the company installing PROMIS, was not performing the contract properly. However, the committee decides to terminate the portion of the contract anyway, but for convenience—meaning Inslaw may receive some compensation—not default. PROMIS project manager C. Madison Brewer then notifies INSLAW owner William Hamilton that Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen has decided on partial termination. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Madison “Brick” Brewer, director of the the Office of Management Information Systems Support at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys, argues against accepting a proposal made by Inslaw to resolve the dispute that has arisen over rights to an enhanced version of the PROMIS application. In a memo to Kamal J. Rahal, director of the procurement and contracts staff, Justice Management Division, Brewer warns, “The proposal would substantially alter our rights in data (e.g., we would become a licensee—and thus give up the unlimited rights we currently enjoy).” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Inslaw representatives Elliot Richardson and Donald Santarelli, a former administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, meet with acting Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen to discuss a resolution of the Inslaw affair concerning the Justice Department’s alleged misappropriation of enhanced PROMIS software. Richardson and Santarelli ask for rapid talks to resolve disputes that have caused the department to withhold money from Inslaw and the company to go bankrupt, that the department consider a new proposal for work by Inslaw, and that Jensen appoint somebody to investigate Inslaw’s claims that some department officials, in particular C. Madison Brewer (see 1976 and April 1982), are biased against it. The business proposal is that Inslaw implement PROMIS in smaller US attorneys’ offices. This was originally covered by a contract between Inslaw and the department (see March 1982), but this part of the contract was terminated in 1984 (see December 29, 1983 and February 1984). (US Congress 9/10/1992) The department rejects the proposal for additional work, but it is unclear whether the allegations against Brewer and others are investigated (see After March 13, 1985).
In an analysis of an Inslaw proposal for the resolution of the PROMIS dispute, the Executive Office for US Attorneys (EOUSA), a Justice Department component, says that Inslaw has not made any proprietary enhancements to the software. “It appears [to the department] that there are no proprietary enhancements,” says the analysis sent by William P. Tyson, the EOUSA director, to Jay Stephens, the deputy associate attorney general. “All proposals received from Inslaw attempt to force the department into acknowledging Inslaw’s proprietary interest in the US attorneys’ version of PROMIS by offering a license agreement for software maintenance,” Tyson adds. According to the memo, accepting Inslaw’s proposal “would, in effect, ratify Inslaw’s claim that the software is proprietary; not only the micro-computer version which Inslaw proposes to develop, but also the Prime mini-computer version currently operational in 20 districts.” The Justice Department’s position means that it would have unlimited rights to the software. The House Judiciary Committee will later comment that the department “may have used its ‘unlimited rights’ posture as a pretextual basis for its national and international distribution of Enhanced PROMIS outside of the department.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
The Justice Department makes enhanced PROMIS software available at multiple locations, outside the framework of its contract with Inslaw on the application’s installation and over protests by the company. The software is first installed at 25 US attorneys’ offices in addition to 20 still covered by a contract between Inslaw and the department (see Between August 29, 1983 and February 18, 1985). According to Inslaw’s counsel Elliot Richardson, an enhanced version of the software is then illegally copied to support an additional two sites. Finally, 31 additional sites are brought on line via telecommunications. These additional, smaller US attorneys’ offices had initially been covered by the contract with Inslaw, but this portion of the contract was terminated in 1984 (see February 1984). Inslaw will repeatedly protest about this installation (see March 14, 1986), and a bankruptcy court will find it is in violation of the law (see September 28, 1987), although this ruling will be overturned (see May 7, 1991). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Inslaw complains about additional installations of enhanced PROMIS software by the Justice Department. Inslaw and the department had a contract for the company to install the software in 20 large US attorneys’ offices and then dozens of smaller ones (see March 1982), but the portion of the contract for the smaller offices was terminated (see February 1984), and the department is installing an enhanced version of the software Inslaw says it owns in these smaller offices (see Between June 24, 1985 and September 2, 1987). The complaint is made in a letter by Inslaw president William Hamilton to H. Lawrence Wallace, the assistant attorney general for administration. “I am extremely disturbed and disappointed to learn that the Executive Office for US Attorneys has begun to manufacture copies of the PROMIS software for customization and installation in additional US attorneys offices, specifically those in St. Louis, Missouri, and Sacramento, California,” Hamilton writes. “This action occurs at the very time that the Department of Justice and Inslaw are attempting to resolve, by negotiation, Inslaw’s claim that the US attorneys version of PROMIS contains millions of dollars of privately-financed enhancements that are proprietary products of Inslaw and for which Inslaw has, to date, received no compensation.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
The Justice Department makes a counterproposal in the dispute with Inslaw over rights to an enhanced version of the PROMIS software. The principles of the settlement, set out by the Justice Management Division’s general counsel Janice A. Sposato in a letter to Inslaw lawyer Harvey Sherzer, are:
The department will not pay Inslaw any additional money for the enhanced software obtained under a contract on implementation of PROMIS at US attorneys’ offices;
Inslaw will recognize that the US government has the right to unrestricted use of the enhanced software obtained under the contract for any federal project, including projects implemented by independent contractors;
The department will agree not to make or permit any disclosure or distribution of the software other than as described above, or as required by federal law.
Inslaw will not accept the counterproposal, and the dispute will continue. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Peter Vidieneks, the Justice Department contracting officer working on the PROMIS contract, declares that Inslaw has not made any proprietary enhancements to the software. He therefore denies Inslaw’s claim of $2.9 million for licensing fees. This means that the Justice Department thinks it owns all versions of PROMIS, whereas Inslaw says it owns one version it has improved through privately-funded enhancements. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) sends a letter to the Justice Department asking about the dispute with Inslaw over enhanced PROMIS software. The letter will spark interest by Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns in the case (see After July 9, 1986). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns is told that the Justice Department has waived its rights to enhanced PROMIS software (see August 11, 1982). Following a letter asking about the Inslaw case from Senator Charles Mathias (see July 9, 1986), Burns asks subordinates about the litigation with Inslaw and is told the company wants the department to pay royalties. Burns then suggests that the issue should be turned around and that a claim against Inslaw should be made for it to pay royalties to the government, which funded the development of the first version of PROMIS (see Mid-1970s). However, further research comes up with a result shocking to Burns, who will say in 1988, “The answer that I got, which I wasn’t terribly happy with but which I accepted, was that there had been a series of old correspondence and back and forthing [sic] and stuff, that in all of that, our lawyers were satisfied that Inslaw could sustain the claim in court, that we had waived those rights, not that I was wrong that we didn’t have them but that somebody in the Department of Justice, in a letter or letters, as I say in this back and forthing [sic], had, in effect, waived those rights.” The House Judiciary Committee will later comment, “Considering that the deputy attorney general was aware of Inslaw’s proprietary rights, the department’s pursuit of litigation can only be understood as a war of attrition between the department’s massive, tax-supported resources and Inslaw’s desperate financial condition, with shrinking (courtesy of the department) income.” The committee will add, “In light of Mr. Burns’ revelation, it is important to note that committee investigators found no surviving documentation (from that time frame) which reveal the department’s awareness of the relative legal positions of the department and Inslaw, on Inslaw’s claims to proprietary enhancements referred to by Mr. Burns.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Former Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen says that Attorney General Ed Meese was informed about the Justice Department’s dealings with Inslaw. He makes the statement in a sworn deposition to the Office of Professional Responsibility, a Justice Department unit investigating the department’s alleged theft of the enhanced PROMIS case tracking software from Inslaw. Jensen says, “I have had conversations with the attorney general [Meese] about the whole Inslaw matter, as to what had taken place in the PROMIS development and what had taken place with the contract and what decisions had been made by the department with reference to that.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) However, Meese will tell the House Judiciary Committee he has no recollection of any discussions about case tracking (see July 12, 1990).
General Prosper Avril, a former leader of Duvaliers’ Presidential Guard, seizes control of Haiti. During his rule, he suspends 27 articles of the constitution, declares a state of siege, and is responsible for numerous human rights abuses. A US District Court will later award $41 million in compensation to six Haitians who were tortured under his regime including opposition politicians, union leaders, scholars, and “even a doctor trying to practice community medicine.” The US will help Avril evade arrest in December 2003 (see December 2003). (Colon 5/31/2001; Farmer 4/15/2004)
The Berlin Wall begins to fall in East Germany, signifying the end of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Just six days later, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell will present a new strategy document to President George H. W. Bush, proposing that the US shift its strategic focus from countering Soviet attempts at world dominance to ensuring US world dominance. Bush will accept this plan in a public speech, with slight modifications, on August 2, 1990: the same day Iraq invades Kuwait. In early 1992 (see March 8, 1992), Powell, counter to his usual public dove persona, will tell members of Congress that the US requires “sufficient power” to “deter any challenger from ever dreaming of challenging us on the world stage.” He will say, “I want to be the bully on the block.” Powell’s early ideas of global hegemony will be formalized by others in a 1992 policy document and finally realized as policy when George W. Bush becomes president in 2001. (Armstrong 10/2002)
Miroslav Kalousek, who will go on to become an influential Czech politician, takes his first government job. He is hired as the head of a specialist section subordinate to Czechoslovak Deputy Prime Minister Antonin Baudys. (Novinky(.cz) 2010)
The United States executes an extraordinary rendition of Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican doctor accused of being involved in the torture and killing of a DEA official. He is captured in Mexico and taken to the US without the approval of the Mexican government. The rendition, approved by President George Bush, draws strong criticism from the Mexicans, who were not informed of Alvarez-Machain’s abduction in advance and believe the matter should have been dealt with under the extradition treaty between the two countries. (US House of Representatives 7/24/1992; Benjamin 10/21/2007) Alvarez-Machain will be tried in the US and the rendition issue will go all the way to the Supreme Court (see June 15, 1992).
Charles Hayes, a surplus computer dealer, claims he has purchased computers with PROMIS software installed on them from the US Attorneys’ Office for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Hayes, who the House Judiciary Committee will say has “alleged ties to both United States and foreign intelligence communities,” says that the Harris-Lanier word processing equipment he purchased came with 5 1/4-inch computer disks and he believes these disks contain the enhanced version of the PROMIS software. When the committee investigates, the Justice Department refuses to provide some computer equipment related to these allegations (see February 12, 1991), but the disks turn out not to contain the software (see February 13, 1991). (However, the computer equipment Hayes purchased does contain sensitive information that should not have been disclosed, including grand jury material and information regarding confidential informants.) Hayes will also make a number of other allegations about PROMIS. According to an October 1990 memo drafted by William Hamilton, owner of the company that developed PROMIS, Hayes told him he can identify 300 locations where the software has been installed illegally by the government. In addition, a businessman named Earl Brian allegedly sold the software to the CIA in 1983 for implementation on computers purchased from Floating Point Systems and what the CIA called PROMIS Datapoint. Brian has supposedly sold about $20 million of PROMIS licenses to the government. Hayes will later make the same claims in person to the committee on numerous occasions, adding that he has received information from unnamed sources within the Canadian government saying that Brian sold the PROMIS software to the Canadian government in 1987. The committee will say that he makes “numerous promises” that confirming documentation will be provided by unnamed Canadian officials. However, on August 16, 1991, Hayes will say the Canadian officials have decided not to cooperate with the committee. In its final report, the committee will call the allegations “intriguing,” but point out that Hayes “has not provided any corroborating documentation.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
The House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law holds a hearing about the failure of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to provide full access to all documents and records about the Inslaw case. At the hearing, Inslaw owner William Hamilton and its attorney Elliot Richardson air their complaints about an alleged criminal conspiracy in the Justice Department’s handling of a contract with Inslaw and its alleged theft of an enhanced version of the PROMIS application. Steven Ross, the general counsel to the clerk of the US House of Representatives, refutes the Justice Department’s rationale for withholding documents related to possible wrongdoing by its officials involved with the Inslaw contract. In addition, Government Accountability Office representatives describe deficiencies in the Justice Department’s Information Resources Management Office and its administration of data processing contracts.
Bason's Allegations - Judge George Bason, a bankruptcy judge who had found in favor of Inslaw in a dispute with the department (see September 28, 1987), testifies that he believes his failure to be reappointed as bankruptcy judge was the result of improper influence on the court selection process by the department because of his findings. Bason cites information provided to him by a reporter (see May 1988) and negative statements about him by departmental employees (see June 19, 1987 and June 1987 or Shortly After). After investigating these allegations, the committee will find: “The committee could not substantiate Judge Bason’s allegations. If the Department of Justice had influence over the process, it was subtle, to say the least.” Bason will point out that Norma Johnson, the judge who chaired the meeting at which he was not reappointed (see December 15, 1987), had previously worked with departmental official Stuart Schiffer, who was involved in the Inslaw case. However, the committee will comment that it has “no information that Judge Johnson talked to Mr. Schiffer about Inslaw, Judge Bason, or the bankruptcy judge selection process.”
Thornburgh's Reaction - Following this hearing, Thornburgh agrees to cooperate with the subcommittee, but then fails to provide it with several documents it wants. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Juval Aviv, an Israeli businessman resident in the US, makes allegations to the House Judiciary Committee about the distribution of PROMIS software. Aviv, who claims to be a former member of Mossad, says he can provide information that a businessman named Earl Brian sold the enhanced version of the PROMIS software to US government agencies outside the Justice Department, including the CIA, NSA, NASA, and the National Security Council. Aviv also claims Brian sold the software to Interpol in France, the Israeli Air Force, and the Egyptian government, the latter through the foreign military assistance program. He also says the software was converted for use by both the United States and British Navy nuclear submarine intelligence data base. Aviv says there are witnesses and documents to corroborate his allegations, but refuses to repeat these claims under oath or provide any further information. These charges will be mentioned in the committee’s final report on the Inslaw affair, but the committee will not endorse them. (US Congress 9/10/1992) Aviv previously collaborated on the book Vengeance, which purports to describe Mossad’s assassination campaign after a terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The book will later be made into a film, Munich, by Steven Spielberg. However, intelligence writers Yossi Melman and Steven Hartov will call the book a “Walter Mitty fabrication,” adding: “[O]ur investigations show that Aviv never served in Mossad, or any Israeli intelligence organisation. He had failed basic training as an Israeli Defence Force commando, and his nearest approximation to spy work was as a lowly gate guard for the airline El Al in New York in the early ‘70s.” (Melman and Hartov 1/17/2006)
Ari Ben-Menashe, a former employee of an Israeli intelligence agency, says he is willing to testify before the House Judiciary Committee in its investigation into the alleged theft of PROMIS software. In return, however, he asks the committee to arrange an extension for his US visa, which is about to expire, and to provide him with immunity from any prosecution. The immunity is to relate to information and documents he allegedly possesses regarding the illegal distribution and sale of an enhanced version of the software by businessman Earl Brian to the Israeli government. However, the committee refuses the request, and Ben-Menashe will later provide a sworn statement with no conditions (see May 29, 1991). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli intelligence employee, provides a sworn statement to the House Judiciary Committee on the PROMIS affair. He had previously said he would only tell what he knows under conditions (see February 6, 1991), but now waives this demand. Ben-Menashe says under oath that, in 1982, businessman Earl Brian and Robert McFarland, a former director of the National Security Council, provided the public domain version of PROMIS software to the Israeli government’s special intelligence operation Defense Forces. (This version was owned by the Justice Department; correspondence indicates the department provided a version of the software to Israel in 1983—see May 6, 1983 and May 12, 1983). Ben-Menashe also alleges he was present in 1987 when Brian sold an enhanced version of the software (which would have been owned by Inslaw) to the Israeli intelligence community and the Singapore armed forces and that, after these sales were completed, approximately $5.5 million was placed in a foreign bank account to which Brian had access. He also says that Brian sold the public domain version of PROMIS to military intelligence organizations in Jordan in 1983 and to the Iraqi government in 1987, a transaction brokered by a businessman named Carlos Cardoen. Ben-Menashe further claims that he has information about the sale of a public domain version of PROMIS by Israel to the Soviet Union in 1986, and the sale of the enhanced version to the Canadian government coordinated by Brian. Ben-Menashe states that various unnamed Israeli officials would corroborate his statements, but refuses to identify these officials or provide evidence to corroborate his statements unless he is called as an official witness for the committee under a grant of immunity. The committee decides not to grant immunity and will include these claims in a section of its report that merely states what witnesses told it, without endorsing their claims. (US Congress 9/10/1992) Ben-Menashe will go on to be involved in numerous major and minor international scandals, picking up a chequered reputation for honesty. (Hilsum 2/25/2002)
Daniel Casolaro, a journalist investigating the Inslaw affair and matters he believes to be related, makes several calls to Thomas Gates, an FBI agent. According to sworn testimony Gates will later provide to the House Judiciary Committee, there are several such calls over a four week period that ends when Casolaro is found dead (see August 10, 1991). Although Casolaro’s death will be ruled a suicide, Gates will say that the journalist sounds “upbeat” during the calls. The reason Casolaro contacts Gates is unclear, although Gates may have been investigating Robert Nichols, a source for Casolaro (see Before August 10, 1991). (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh informs the House Judiciary Committee that he will not attend a committee hearing the next day, despite previously saying he would. The hearing is to discuss the committee’s access to departmental documents and the Inslaw affair, in which the department had allegedly stolen an enhanced version of the PROMIS application. According to a report by the committee, Thornburgh refuses to appear because a “press release announcing the hearing had been unduly aggressive and contentious and not in keeping with the tenor of an oversight hearing.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Daniel Casolaro, a journalist investigating the Inslaw affair and matters he believes to be related, calls Richard Stavin, a former Department of Justice Organized Crime Strike Force prosecutor, to discuss his research into the matter. In a sworn statement to the House Judiciary Committee, Stavin will later say: “He spoke to me about Inslaw. He spoke to me about a group he called the Octopus. I believe he mentioned Robert Nichols [an important source for Casolaro’s research], and possibly also John Phillip Nichols, in this conversation, and was extremely interested, intrigued, and frustrated in his inability to get a grasp on what he called the Octopus. He had indicated that he had met with—again I believe it was Robert Nichols on several occasions, that Robert Nichols was extremely talkative to a point, but when Mr. Casolaro would ask specific questions, he [Nichols] would become somewhat evasive.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Daniel Casolaro, a journalist investigating the Inslaw affair and matters he believes to be related, is told to “back off” the story, according to his brother Anthony. In a statement made after Daniel is found dead (see August 10, 1991), Anthony Casolaro will say that on this date his brother tells him, “someone else told me I better back off the story.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Robert Nichols, a businessman who is of interest to the FBI, provides information to Daniel Casolaro, a journalist investigating the Inslaw affair and matters he believes to be related. There is some dispute about the significance of this information. According to Inslaw owner William Hamilton and Michael Riconosciuto, another figure who becomes involved in the Inslaw affair, Nichols is Casolaro’s primary source of information in his investigation into the alleged theft of the PROMIS software. However, in a later telephone interview with investigators for the House Judiciary Committee, Nichols will say that he was acting as a sounding board for Casolaro, and providing direction and insight for his investigation into the Inslaw affair. (US Congress 9/10/1992)
Daniel Casolaro, a journalist investigating the Inslaw affair and matters he believes to be related, reportedly tells his family and friends that, if he were to be found dead, they should not believe he committed suicide. According to the House Judiciary Committee, Casolaro tells “several people” that he is receiving death threats “because he was getting close to concluding his investigation.” (US Congress 9/10/1992)