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The militant Sunni group, Asbat al-Ansar, begins sending fighters to Iraq. The group is based in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. A deputy commander of the group later tells the New York Times, “The US is oppressing a lot of people. They are killing a lot of innocents, but one day they are getting paid back.” [New York Times, 3/16/2007] The Bush administration, which has repeatedly called Iraq the new front in the war on terrorism, will reportedly begin funneling funds through the Lebanese government to Asbat al-Ansar and other militant Sunni groups in late 2006 and early 2007 in an effort to rollback the influence of Iran and the Shiites in Iraq (see Late 2006).
On the second day of a US invasion of Iraq, the US military conducts an airstrike against the training camp in Northern Iraq controlled by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The camp is territory controlled by Kurdish rebels and it is believed that a chemical weapons lab is there. Prior to the start of the war, the US drew up three separate plans to attack the camp with air strikes, but each time the plans were rejected by the White House. [MSNBC, 3/2/2004] More than 40 cruise missiles hit the camp near the town of Khurmal, destroying what Gen. Tommy Franks calls a “massive terrorist facility.” But Saddam Hussein had been given an ultimatum before the start of the war, which meant the timing of the start of the war had been announced several days in advance. Not surprisingly, by the time the camp is hit, al-Zarqawi and many of his followers had already left it. One of al-Zarqawi’s top lieutenants, Abdul Hadi Daghlas, a.k.a. Abu Taisir, is killed. Al-Zarqawi will release an audio message several months later lamenting his death. [Wall Street Journal, 2/10/2004] Former National Security Council member Roger Cressey will later claim, “Here’s a case where they waited, they waited too long and now we’re suffering as a result inside Iraq.” [MSNBC, 3/2/2004]
The FBI issues a reward of $5 million for information on Adnan Shukrijumah, starting a world-wide manhunt that will last for years. Shukrijumah lived in the same area as most of the 9/11 hijackers and was reportedly seen with Mohamed Atta in the spring of 2001 (see May 2, 2001), when he was being investigated by the FBI over two terrorist plots (see April-May 2001 and (Spring 2001)). Information gleaned from detainees suggests that Shukrijumah is a top al-Qaeda operative who was trained in Afghanistan and is associated with 9/11 architect Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Jose Padilla (see June 10, 2002). In May 2004 Attorney General John Ashcroft will even single out Shukrijumah as the most dangerous al-Qaeda operative planning to attack the US. However, despite reported sightings in Central America, he is still on the run in 2006 and believed to be hiding in the tribal areas of Pakistan. [US News and World Report, 4/7/2003; USA Today, 6/15/2003; FrontPage Magazine, 10/27/2003; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 40-41 ; Los Angeles Times, 9/3/2006]
Flight Training - US authorities claim he is a pilot and has been receiving flight training outside the US for several years, though they do not release any evidence to substantiate this. His family insists that he is neither a qualified pilot nor an al-Qaeda operative. [USA Today, 6/15/2003; CNN, 9/5/2003] A senior Bush administration official says the government has evidence Shukrijumah had attended the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, but does not say when. Other Islamist militants, including Zacarias Moussaoui, attended that school before 9/11 (see February 23-June 2001, May 18, 1999 and May 15, 1998). The director of the school claims there is no evidence of a student with any of Shukrijumah’s publicly revealed aliases. [New York Times, 3/21/2003]
The CIA drafts a report containing statements reportedly made by alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) under interrogation at a black site. According to the report, KSM says that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar did not receive specialized training at a course for al-Qaeda operatives scheduled for inclusion in the 9/11 operation in late 1999 because he had already received the training from KSM. In later statements, KSM will deny this and say he gave Almihdhar no such training, adding that he assumed Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef had excused Almihdhar from the training (see Early December 1999). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 157, 493] The report also states that KSM says he sent Zacarias Moussaoui to Malaysia (see September-October 2000), that Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali helped Moussaoui when he was in Malaysia, and that KSM recalled Moussaoui from Malaysia when he discovered he was behaving badly there. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 490, 520] The US is already aware that Moussaoui had been to Malaysia, that Hambali and KSM were linked, and that Moussaoui behaved badly in Malaysia. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006] Details of the report will apparently be leaked to the media four days later (see March 28, 2003).
The Los Angeles Times reports that, ironically, the man in charge of security for the nation where the US bases its headquarters for the Iraq war is a supporter of al-Qaeda. Sheik Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani is the Interior Minister of Qatar. US Central Command and thousands of US troops are stationed in that country. In 1996, al-Thani was Religious Minister and he apparently let 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) live on his farm (see January-May 1996). Mohammed was tipped off that the US was after him. Some US officials believe al-Thani was the one who helped KSM escape, just as he had assisted other al-Qaeda leaders on other occasions. [Los Angeles Times, 3/28/2003] Another royal family member has sheltered al-Qaeda leaders and given over $1 million to al-Qaeda. KSM was even sheltered by Qatari royalty for two weeks after 9/11 (see Late 2001). [New York Times, 2/6/2003] Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, who has ties to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993), the Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995), and also attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), was sheltered by al-Thani’s religious ministry in 2000. [Newsweek, 9/30/2002] Former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says al-Thani “had great sympathy for Osama bin Laden, great sympathy for terrorist groups, was using his personal money and ministry money to transfer to al-Qaeda front groups that were allegedly charities.” However, the US has not attempted to apprehend al-Thani or take any other action against him. [Los Angeles Times, 3/28/2003]
Aafia Siddiqui. [Source: FBI]Alleged al-Qaeda member Aafia Siddiqui vanishes in Karachi, Pakistan, with her three children. Although she and her family are Pakistani, she had been a long-time US resident until late 2002, and had even graduated with a biology degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The day after her disappearance, local newspapers will report that an unnamed woman has been taken into custody on terrorism charges, which is unusual since nearly all terrorism suspects have been men. A Pakistan interior ministry spokesman confirms that Siddiqui is the woman who has been arrested. But several days later, both the Pakistan government and the FBI publicly deny that she is being held. Later in 2003, her mother will claim that two days after her disappearance, “a man wearing a motor-bike helmet” arrives at the Siddiqui home in Karachi, and without taking off his helmet, says that she should keep quiet if she ever wants to see her daughter and grandchildren again. Beginning with a Newsweek article in June 2003, Siddiqui and her husband will be accused of having helped al-Qaeda as possible US sleeper agents. Siddiqui’s sister will claim that in 2004 she is told by Pakistan’s interior minister that Siddiqui has been released and will return home shortly. Also in 2004, FBI Director Robert Mueller will announce at a press conference that Siddiqui is wanted for questioning. Siddiqui divorced her long-time husband in 2002. The BBC will later report that, shortly before her disappearance, she married Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, a nephew of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and alleged participant in the 9/11 plot. “Although her family denies this, the BBC has been able to confirm it from security sources and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s family.” In July 2008, she will reappear in mysterious circumstances in Afghanistan, and then be transferred to the US to stand trial for murder (see July 17, 2008). Allegations continue that she was secretly held by the US or Pakistan some or all of the five years between 2003 and 2008. Her three children will not be seen following their disappearance. [BBC, 8/6/2008]
A Kurdish soldier allied with US forces stands on the site where the Sargat training camp used to be. He holds a piece of a US cruise missile that hit the camp. [Source: Scott Peterson / Getty Images]US Special Forces working with local Kurdish forces overrun the small border region of Iraq controlled by the militant group Ansar al-Islam. This is where Secretary of State Colin Powell alleged militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had a ‘poison factory’ near the town of Khurmal where chemical weapons of mass destruction capable of killing thousands were made. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers says, “We think that’s probably where the ricin that was found in London probably came; at least the operatives and maybe some of the formulas came from this site.” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld comments, “We’re not certain what we’ll find but we should know more in the next three days - three or four days.” [New York Daily News, 3/31/2003] In a 2007 book, CIA Director George Tenet will claim, “Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, al-Zarqawi’s camp in Khurmal was bombed by the US military. We obtained reliable human intelligence reporting and forensic samples confirming that poisons and toxins had been produced at the camp.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 277-278] He will further claim that the camp “engaged in production and training in the use of low-level poisons such as cyanide. We had intelligence telling us that al-Zarqawi’s men had tested these poisons on animals and, in at least one case, on one of their own associates. They laughed about how well it worked.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 350] But Tenet’s claims seem wildly overblown compared to other subsequent news reports about what was found at the camp. In late April 2003, the Los Angeles Times will report that, “Documents obtained by the Los Angeles Times, along with interviews with US and Kurdish intelligence operatives, indicate [Ansar al-Islam] was partly funded and armed from abroad; was experimenting with chemicals, including toxic agents and a cyanide-based body lotion; and had international aspirations. But the documents, statements by imprisoned Ansar guerrillas, and visits to the group’s strongholds before and after the war produced no strong evidence of connections to Baghdad and indicated that Ansar was not a sophisticated terrorist organization. The group was a dedicated, but fledgling, al-Qaeda surrogate lacking the capability to muster a serious threat beyond its mountain borders.” A crude chemical laboratory is found in the village of Sargat, but no evidence of any sophisticated equipment is found. “Tests have revealed the presence of hydrogen cyanide and potassium cyanide, poisons normally used to kill rodents and other pests. The group, according to Kurdish officials, had been experimenting on animals with a cyanide-laced cream. Several jars of peach body lotion lay at the site beside chemicals and a few empty wooden birdcages.” While a lot of documentation is found showing intention to create chemical weapons, the actual capability appears to have been quite low. [Los Angeles Times, 4/27/2003] As the Christian Science Monitor will later conclude, the “‘poison factory’ proved primitive; nothing but substances commonly used to kill rodents were found there.” [Christian Science Monitor, 10/16/2003] Journalist Jason Burke will also later comment, “As one of the first journalists to enter the [al-Qaeda] research facilities at the Darunta camp in eastern Afghanistan in 2001, I was struck by how crude they were. The Ansar al-Islam terrorist group’s alleged chemical weapons factory in northern Iraq, which I inspected the day after its capture in 2003, was even more rudimentary.” [Foreign Policy, 5/2004]
According to multiple sources, the Defense Department’s head of intelligence, Stephen Cambone, dispatches a quasi-military team to Iraq in the weeks after the invasion. Cambone’s “off-the-books” team, consisting of four or five men, operates under the auspices of Defense Department official Douglas Feith and the Office of Special Plans (OSP—see September 2002). The team is tasked to secure the following, in order of priority: downed Navy pilot Scott Speicher, Iraq’s WMD stockpiles, and Saddam Hussein. The sources, who speak to reporter Larisa Alexandrovna in 2006 on the condition of anonymity, include three US intelligence sources and a person with close ties to the United Nations Security Council. Speicher, classified as “killed in action” (KIA) after being shot down in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, was touted by Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi (see 1992-1996, November 6-8, 2001, December 20, 2001, and February 2002) as alive and held as a prisoner of war as part of Chalabi’s push for the US invasion of Iraq. Chalabi also told Bush administration officials of enormous stockpiles of chemical and biological WMD throughout Iraq (see Summer 2002, Fall 2002, and Early 2003). Cambone’s team operates outside the auspices of other officially sanctioned groups such as Task Force 20 and other units operating in Iraq before the invasion itself, though the team may be comprised of TF20 personnel. The team is not tasked with actually finding and destroying any WMD stockpiles so much as it is ordered to find such a stockpile and thereby solve what the UN Security Council source calls the administration’s “political WMD” problem. “They come in the summer of 2003, bringing in Iraqis, interviewing them,” the UN source later says. “Then they start talking about WMD and they say to [these Iraqi intelligence officers] that ‘Our president is in trouble. He went to war saying there are WMD and there are no WMD. What can we do? Can you help us?’” [Raw Story, 1/5/2006]
Items seized in a raid on Abu Hamza’s Finsbury Park mosque in January 2003. [Source: Daily Telegraph]After learning some information about the Islamist militant connections of leading London imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, British Home Secretary David Blunkett initiates a campaign against him. Blunkett introduces legislation to have Abu Hamza stripped of his British citizenship, which he acquired unlawfully (see April 29, 1986), and then either deported or interned. However, the British intelligence service MI5 fails to provide Blunkett with all the information it has about Abu Hamza, who has been an informer for MI5 and Special Branch since 1997 (see Early 1997 and Before May 27, 2004). Even after the relevant legislation is passed in April 2003, the process is drawn out by Abu Hamza, who appeals, delays the appeal process by not filing a defense, and then argues the government should pay his legal fees. [O'Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 284-5] A hearing will be held on the case in April 2004 (see April 26, 2004).
In April 2003, Spanish police alert judge Baltasar Garzon to the existence of an Islamist militant cell in Madrid. Garzon has generally led al-Qaeda related investigations in Spain. An intelligence report to Garzon details a cell led by Mustapha Maymouni. Its assistant leaders are said to be Driss Chebli, Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, and the brothers Hassan and Mohammed Larbi ben Sellam. The cell is linked to the radical Takfir Wal Hijra movement and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG). The MICG is said to be led by Amer el-Azizi, who escaped arrest in Spain (see Shortly After November 21, 2001), and an international arrest warrant has been issued for him. The cell has links to el-Azizi as well. In fact, the wife of one of the cell members recently told the authorities that Fakhet and others are staying in contact with el-Azizi by e-mail (see January 4, 2003), a lead that apparently is not pursued. In May 2003, suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco, kill 45, and the MICG is quickly identified as the group behind the attacks. Maymouni had gone to Morocco just before the bombings and is arrested there later in May (see Late May-June 19, 2003). On June 25, 2003, Chebli is arrested in Spain for his links to the Casablanca bombings. He will later be accused of a minor role in the 9/11 plot and sentenced to six years in prison (see September 26, 2005). However, the others are not arrested at this time. The police who are monitoring Fakhet will later say they do not understand why Fakhet at least was not arrested after the Casablanca bombings due to his link to Maymouni, who is his brother-in-law. Authorities will claim he was not arrested because there was no evidence he was involved in any plot. [El Mundo (Madrid), 3/3/2007] However, this cell is being monitored by a variety of means, including the use of
an informant named Abdelkader Farssaoui, a.k.a. Cartagena (see October 2002-June 2003). Even before the Casablanca bombings, Farssaoui tells his handlers that this cell is discussing launching attacks in Morocco and Spain. [El Mundo (Madrid), 10/18/2004] Furthermore, a 2002 report said that Fakhet was preparing for “violent action” (see 2002). Farssaoui will later claim that he came across evidence that Fakhet was also an informant (see Shortly After October 2003). Fakhet will take over leadership of the group after Maymouni’s arrest and will lead most of them in carrying out the Madrid train bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004).
Activists for the animal rights organization Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC—see 1998 and 2002 and After) begin pressuring the biotechnology firm Chiron. Like other firms targeted by SHAC, Chiron does business with British research firm Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), long accused of abusing and torturing animals in its research practices. The pressure begins with SHAC activists protesting at the homes of Chiron employees. On June 11, 2003, the organization posts an anonymous message on its Web site, allegedly from a Chiron employee, telling SHAC members “how to bypass security at a Chiron office” and giving the names and Social Security numbers of Chiron staff. The message says to Chiron, “Send a fax to SHAC saying you will never use HLS again, and you can avoid paying for lawyers, security, and broken windows.” In August, activists calling themselves “Animal Liberation Brigade” and “Revolutionary Cells” claim responsibility for setting off two pipe bombs at the Chiron office in Emeryville, California. The bombs cause relatively minor damage, but a message on a SHAC Web site asks, “You might be able to protect your buildings, but can you protect the homes of every employee?” [Anti-Defamation League, 2005]
Fahad al-Quso, far left, Jamal al-Badawi, in center with black cap, and two other militants in a Yemeni prison in February 2005. [Source: Khaled Abdullah / Reuters / Corbis]Ten suspects in the USS Cole bombing escape from prison in Aden, Yemen. The suspects include al-Qaeda operatives Jamal al-Badawi and Fahad al-Quso, both thought to play important roles in the Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). [Associated Press, 4/11/2003] All ten are recaptured in Yemen in March 2004. [New York Times, 3/20/2004] After al-Badawi is recaptured, some Yemeni officials try unsuccessfully to claim a multimillion-dollar US award. Newsweek will later comment that this suggests the escape was a scam. At the time, al-Badawi apparently is friendly with Colonel Hussein al-Anzi, a top official in the Political Security Organization, Yemen’s version of the FBI. Al-Anzi will later be fired. [Newsweek, 2/13/2006] Al-Quso will later be sentenced to 10 years in prison in Yemen for his role in the Cole attack, while al-Badawi will be given the death penalty. However, al-Badawi will later escape again (see February 3, 2006), then be pardoned, and then imprisoned again (see October 17-29, 2007). Al-Quso also will be secretly freed by the Yemeni government in 2007 (see May 2007). [New York Times, 9/30/2004]
Mullah Dadullah Akhund. [Source: Associated Press]Afghan President Hamid Karzai travels to Islamabad, Pakistan, and meets with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. Karzai hands Musharraf a list of Taliban leaders living in Quetta, Pakistan, and urges Musharraf to have them arrested. The list includes the names of senior Taliban leaders Mullah Omar, Mullah Dadullah Akhund, and Mullah Akhter Mohammed Usmani. All are believed to be in Quetta. The list is leaked to the press. The Pakistani government denounces Karzai and denies any Taliban leaders are in Pakistan. The US government declines to back the list, even though the US embassy in Kabul had helped make it. Journalist Ahmed Rashid will later explain: “The Americans were already deeply involved in Iraq and wanted no distractions such as a cat fight between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The US] was unwilling to push the Pakistanis, and the Afghans were angry that the Americans had allowed Karzai’s credibility to suffer.” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 246]
Twenty-five al-Qaeda operatives are captured in Karachi, Pakistan, including two key 9/11 figures. The captured include Tawfiq bin Attash, better known by his nickname Khallad. He is considered one of the masterminds of the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000) and attended a Malaysia summit where the 9/11 plot was discussed (see January 5-8, 2000). Also captured is Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, one of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s nephews. He made travel arrangements for and wired money to many of the 9/11 hijackers. One investigator will later say, “He was turning up everywhere we looked—like a chameleon.” [New York Times, 5/1/2003; Los Angeles Times, 5/21/2006] Both Aziz Ali and bin Attash will be sent to secret CIA prisons and remain there until 2006, when they will be transfered to the Guantanamo Bay prison (see September 2-3, 2006). Bin Attash will be extensively tortured while in US custody in Afghanistan (see April 29 - Mid-May, 2003). The identities and fates of the others captured with them are unknown.
A medical report by US doctors at Guantanamo Bay details an attempt by a detainee to commit suicide. The detainee, who cannot be identified from publicly released records, attempted to hang himself with a towel. He fell into what doctors call a “vegetative state” due to brain injuries suffered during the hanging. Guantanamo doctors “most strongly advocate” for the detainee’s “earliest return to his home country,” noting that the detainee has a “history of depression” and “his rehabilitation will be long.” Available records will not show whether Guantanamo officials follow the recommendations of the medical staff. [American Civil Liberties Union, 6/19/2006]
One of a group of 25 al-Qaeda members captured in Pakistan, Tawfiq bin Attash (see April 29, 2003), is taken into US custody and sent to a CIA-run detention facility in Afghanistan. Years later, after being transferred to Guantanamo, he will discuss his experiences and treatment with officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC—see October 6 - December 14, 2006), who will identify him as “Walid bin Attash” in their documents.
'Forced Standing' - Bin Attash will recall his introduction to detention in Afghanistan as follows: “On arrival at the place of detention in Afghanistan I was stripped naked. I remained naked for the next two weeks. I was put in a cell measuring approximately [3 1/2 by 6 1/2 feet]. I was kept in a standing position, feet flat on the floor, but with my arms above my head and fixed with handcuffs and a chain to a metal bar running across the width of the cell. The cell was dark with no light, artificial or natural. During the first two weeks I did not receive any food. I was only given Ensure [a liquid nutritional supplement] and water to drink. A guard would come and hold the bottle for me while I drank.… The toilet consisted of a bucket in the cell.… I was not allowed to clean myself after using the bucket. Loud music was playing 24 hours each day throughout the three weeks I was there.” Author Mark Danner, writing of the ICRC report in 2009 (see March 15, 2009), will note that the “forced standing” technique. with arms shackled above the head, was a favorite technique of the Soviets, who called it “stoika.” Bin Attash, who had lost a leg fighting in Afghanistan, found the technique particularly painful: “After some time being held in this position my stump began to hurt so I removed my artificial leg to relieve the pain. Of course my good leg then began to ache and soon started to give way so that I was left hanging with all my weight on my wrists. I shouted for help but at first nobody came. Finally, after about one hour a guard came and my artificial leg was given back to me and I was again placed in the standing position with my hands above my head. After that the interrogators sometimes deliberately removed my artificial leg in order to add extra stress to the position.” He is checked periodically by a doctor. The doctor does not object to the ‘forced standing,’ even though the treatment causes intense pain in bin Attash’s leg; neither does the doctor object to the suspension from shackles, even though the shackles cut and abrade his wrists.
Cold Water, Physical Beatings - Bin Attash will tell ICRC officials that he is “washed down with cold water every day.” Every day he is also subjected to beatings: “Every day for the first two weeks I was subjected to slaps to my face and punches to my body during interrogation. This was done by one interrogator wearing gloves.… Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks a collar was looped around my neck and then used to slam me against the walls of the interrogation room. It was also placed around my neck when being taken out of my cell for interrogation and was used to lead me along the corridor. It was also used to slam me against the walls of the corridor during such movements. Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks I was made to lie on a plastic sheet placed on the floor which would then be lifted at the edges. Cold water was then poured onto my body with buckets.… I would be kept wrapped inside the sheet with the cold water for several minutes. I would then be taken for interrogation.”
Moved to Second Facility - It remains unclear where bin Attash is moved to after his initial detention in Afghanistan, but he will tell ICRC officials that his captors there—also Americans—“were rather more sophisticated than in Afghanistan because they had a hose-pipe with which to pour the water over me.” Danner will later note that the methods used to interrogate and torture bin Attash are somewhat more refined than those used on an experimental basis with another al-Qaeda suspect, Abu Zubaida (see April - June 2002). For example, a towel was wrapped around Zubaida’s neck and used to slam him into walls, while bin Attash was given a plastic collar. [New York Review of Books, 3/15/2009]
Bombing damage at Mike’s Place. [Source: Associated Press]On April 30, two British citizens, Asif Hanif and Omar Sharif, attempt to bomb Mike’s Place, a cafe in Tel Aviv, Israel, located very close to the US embassy.
Hanif’s bomb goes off, but a security guard prevented him from entering the cafe, so just three people are killed and 65 are injured. Only Sharif’s detonator goes off, so he flees the scene, being chased by several people. He manages to run away, but his dead body is found in the ocean nearby two weeks later. A British inquest will later suggest he drowned, although why he did remains unknown. The two men are Britain’s second known Islamist suicide bombers (see December 25, 2000). They had lived in Britain most of their lives and only arrived in Israel a couple of weeks earlier, after a short stay in Syria. Hamas takes credit for the bombing and later shows a video of their last testaments in which Hanif states: “It is an honor to kill all these people. It is an honor.” [Daily Telegraph, 9/6/2006] The two are believed to have been members of the radical British militant group Al-Muhajiroun. The group’s leader, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, says Sharif had recently attended a course at his school, studying Islamic law. A reporter claims to have interviewed Hanif by chance at Al-Muhajiroun’s London office a month before the bombing. They also attended the Finsbury Park mosque, where radical imam Abu Hamza al-Masri preaches. [Observer, 5/4/2003; ISN Security Watch, 7/21/2005; BBC, 7/9/2006] The pair apparently were featured in a recruitment video for Abu Hamza in March 2000. In 2002, a pair of activists working against Abu Hamza, Neil Doyle and Glen Jenvey, tricked Abu Hamza into sending them some recruitment videos, and one showed two masked men holding assault rifles claiming to be fighting in Bosnia. Only in 2004, after Hamas released the video of Sharif and Hanif’s last testaments, did it become clear they were the masked men in the 2000 video as well. [Sunday Mercury (Birmingham UK), 9/19/2004] Mohammad Sidique Khan, the lead suicide bomber in the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005), traveled to Israel seven weeks before the bombing, and it is suspected he assisted the bombing in some way, because he had known the two men since at least 2001 (see Summer 2001 and February 19-20, 2003).
The Associated Press reveals that 10 days before the execution of convicted Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh (see June 2, 1997, June 11-13, 1997, and 7:14 a.m. June 11, 2001), lawyers for FBI laboratory employees sent an urgent letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft, saying that a prosecution witness in the McVeigh trial, forensic expert Steven Burmeister, may have lied on the stand (see June 11, 2001). The letter was never given to McVeigh’s lawyers. McVeigh’s former lawyer Stephen Jones says, “It is truly shocking and just the latest revelation of government conduct that bankrupts the prosecution, investigation, and verdict.” Justice Department spokesperson Barbara Comstock says she does not believe the allegations, even if true, would have affected the outcome of the trial, saying, “Court after court has found that the evidence of guilt against McVeigh was overwhelming.” FBI officials call the allegations against Burmeister specious. FBI laboratory director Dwight Adams says: “It didn’t happen. Steve Burmeister is one of the FBI’s finest experts. He is meticulous and honest.” [New York Times, 5/1/2003]
The CIA notifies the Italian military intelligence agency SISMI that Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, an Islamist radical the agencies kidnapped from Milan in February (see Noon February 17, 2003), is being interrogated in Cairo, Egypt. After Italian prosecutors begin investigating the kidnap, they will raid a SISMI safehouse in Rome, finding a document that confirms the notification. [Reuters, 11/4/2009] Nasr is actually tortured in Egypt (see Late February 2003 or Shortly After).
Fahad al Thumairy, a Saudi official suspected of contacts with two 9/11 hijackers, is deported from the US. Al Thumairy had worked at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles since 1996. In March 2003, he was secretly put on a watch list due to suspected terrorist links. He then left the US to visit Saudi Arabia. When he returns on May 6, he is stopped at the Los Angeles International Airport and detained, despite having a special diplomatic visa. He is held in custody for two days and questioned for several hours, but apparently he says very little. Then he is deported to Saudi Arabia. [Los Angeles Times, 5/10/2003] Al Thumairy was in frequent contact with hijacker associate Omar al-Bayoumi (see December 1998-December 2000), and the FBI gained evidence he could have been in contact with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (see 2002), as well as al-Qaeda figure Khallad bin Attash (see June 9, 2000). Journalist Philip Shenon will later comment that al Thumairy “had a reputation as fanatically anti-American.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 53]
Reconstruction begins after the Riyadh bombings. [Source: US Rewards for Justice] (click image to enlarge)Saudi Arabia is attacked by three suicide bombings in the capital of Riyadh. At least 34 people are killed. Some evidence suggests that elements within the Saudi government were complicit with or behind the attacks (see May 12, 2003). The Saudi government had taken very little action against al-Qaeda prior to this. However, it appears to more aggressively combat al-Qaeda afterward. [Los Angeles Times, 7/16/2004] In early 2006, it will be reported that the Saudis aggressively combat al-Qaeda within Saudi Arabia, but do next to nothing to stop al-Qaeda or its financing outside of the country (see January 15, 2006).
Convicted Oklahoma City bombing conspirator Terry Nichols (see March 29, 1999) will stand trial on 160 counts of first-degree murder, Oklahoma State District Court Judge Allen McCall rules. The 160 murder counts represent the 160 citizens who died in the blast (see 8:35 a.m. - 9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995). Nichols is already serving a life term in federal prison (see June 4, 1998) for his role in the bombing as it pertained to eight federal law enforcement officials killed in the blast. Nichols faces the death penalty in the upcoming trial. The United States Supreme Court has already ruled that a state trial does not amount to double jeopardy. The preliminary hearing features the same arguments and some of the same witnesses that testified against Nichols in 1997, most prominently Michael Fortier, a friend of Nichols’s co-conspirator Timothy McVeigh who is also serving jail time for his role in the bombing conspiracy (see May 27, 1998). [New York Times, 5/14/2003]
Saif al-Adel. [Source: FBI]Around May 4, 2003, Iran attempted to start negotiations in an attempt to resolve all outstanding issues between Iran and the US. The US completely rejected the offer within days. Iran immediately comes back with a more limited proposal, offering to hand over a group of al-Qaeda leaders being held in Iran in return for the US to hand over leaders of the Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK). The US had already officially listed MEK as a terrorist group. [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] Iran is believed to be holding a number of top al-Qaeda leaders, including military commander Saif al-Adel and Osama bin Laden’s son Saad bin Laden (see Spring 2002). The US had captured about 4,000 members of MEK in Iraq the month before, in bases where they had been staging attacks against Iran. Iran pledges to grant amnesty to most of the MEK prisoners, try only 65 leaders, forgo the death penalty on them, and allow the Red Cross to supervise the transfer. [Washington Post, 7/9/2004] Iran proposes to start with an exchange of information, offering to share the list of names of al-Qaeda operatives they are detaining in return for the US to share the list of names of MEK operatives US forces has captured in Iraq. This exchange of names is discussed at a White House meeting. Hardliners in favor of regime change in Iran argue that MEK is different than al-Qaeda. President Bush is said to respond, “But we say there is no such thing as a good terrorist.” [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] And he initially seems in favor of a prisoner exchange, saying about the MEK, “Why not? They’re terrorists.” [Washington Post, 7/9/2004] But Bush does not immediately approve the exchange of names, although he does approve the disarming of MEK who have surrendered to US troops and he allows the State Department to continue secret negotiations on the issue of exchanging names and prisoners in Switzerland. But on May 12, 2003, a bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia kills a number of US citizens (see May 12, 2003). Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, and other neoconservatives argue that the bombing was planned by al-Qaeda leaders being held in Iran. [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] The Washington Post will report in 2007 that, “US intelligence officials said there are suspicions, but no proof, that one of [the al-Qaeda leaders in Iran] may have been involved from afar in planning” the Riyadh bombing. Some of Bush’s top advisers argue in favor of trading the prisoners, suggesting that directly interrogating the al-Qaeda leaders could result in important new intelligence leads. But Cheney and Rumsfeld argue that any deal would legitimize Iran’s government. Bush ultimately offers to accept information about the al-Qaeda leaders without offering anything in return. Not surprisingly, Iran refuses. [Washington Post, 2/10/2007] A planned meeting between US and Iranian officials on May 21 is canceled and negotiations come to a halt. The American Prospect will later comment, “In a masterstroke, Rumsfeld and Cheney had shut down the only diplomatic avenue available for communicating with Iran and convinced Bush that Iran was on the same side as al-Qaeda.” [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] Flynt Leverett, a State Department official dealing with Middle East policy, will later say, “Why we didn’t cut this deal is beyond me.” [Washington Post, 7/9/2004] One anonymous senior US official will later say, “One reason nothing came of it was because we knew that there were parts of the US government who didn’t want to give them the MEK because they had other plans for them… like overthrowing the Iranian government.” [MSNBC, 6/24/205]
The Casa de Spain was one of the bombed buildings in Casablanca. [Source: Associated Press]Twelve suicide bombers attack five targets in Casablanca, Morocco, including a Jewish cultural center. Forty-five people are killed, including most of the bombers. Moroccan authorities link the bombers to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG), which is allegedly linked to al-Qaeda. After the attacks, Moroccan officials sentence two surviving bombers to death and round up thousands of people suspected of having ties to terrorism. [PBS Frontline, 1/25/2005] The suspected mastermind, Saad al-Houssaini, has extensive al-Qaeda ties and lived in Afghanistan for four years before 9/11. He will be captured in 2007. [Washington Post, 7/7/2007] The leader of the MICG is said to be Amer el-Azizi, who has links to the 9/11 attacks and the 2004 Madrid train bombings (see Before July 8, 2001 and Before March 11, 2004). [New Yorker, 7/26/2004] Some of the other leaders of the bombings are also said to be linked to the 2004 Madrid bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). Also, Mohammed Fazazi, a radical imam who preached at the Hamburg mosque attended by some of the 9/11 hijackers, will be convicted for a role in the bombings (see 1993-Late 2001). [Irujo, 2005, pp. 241-242]
In a joint press conference with President Arroyo of the Philippines, President Bush says of the relationship between poverty and terrorism: “First, let me make it very clear, poor people aren’t necessarily killers. Just because you happen to be not rich doesn’t mean you’re willing to kill. And so it’s important to understand—people are susceptible to the requirement by these extremists, but I refuse to put a—put killers into a demographic category based upon income.” [White House, 5/19/2003]
US serviceman Mike Quinn is fatally shot at a traffic control point in Fallujah, Iraq, during an ambush. According to his friend, Staff Sgt. Dave Harris, he was killed because he was not wearing his body armor. He had apparently given his vest to a young soldier who had not been provided with one of his own. [European and Pacific Stars and Stripes, 8/31/2003]
An FBI memo released to the American Civil Liberties Union in 2006 (ACLU—see February 23, 2006) documents escalating tensions between FBI and Defense Department personnel stationed at Guantanamo. According to the memo, beginning in late 2002, Defense Department interrogators received encouragement from their superiors to “use aggressive interrogation tactics” that FBI agents believed were “of questionable effectiveness and subject to uncertain interpretation based on law and regulation.” The memo names Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, as supporting interrogation methods FBI agents believe “could easily result in the elicitation of unreliable and legally inadmissible information.” FBI personnel took their concerns to senior Pentagon officials, but were ignored. [American Civil Liberties Union, 2/23/2006]
On May 13, 2003, 45 people are killed in a series of suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco (see May 16, 2003). Later that month, Mustapha Maymouni is arrested in Morocco for a role in the bombings. He will be sentenced to 18 years in prison. In early June, Abdelaziz Benyaich is arrested in Cadiz, Spain for a role in the bombings. He will later be sentenced to eight years in prison in Spain, then acquitted, and has since been fighting extradition to Morocco. On June 19, Hicham Temsamani is also arrested in the Basque region of Spain for a role in the bombings. He will be extradited to Morocco in March 2004 but acquitted in 2005. [El Mundo (Madrid), 9/28/2004; Arabic News, 4/21/2005; El Mundo (Madrid), 9/18/2006] All three men had been under surveillance by Spanish police for months before the Casablanca bombings. Maymouni is the brother-in-law to Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, who will later be considered one of about three masterminds of the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Spanish police have been monitoring Fakhet’s apartment while Maymouni slept there for several months (see January 17, 2003-Late March 2004). Police have also noticed that Benyaich is part of the group of militants around Fakhet. This group has also been in contact with Temsamani, who is a former imam of a mosque in Toledo, Spain. [El Mundo (Madrid), 8/10/2005] As a result, Spanish authorities focus more attention and surveillance on Fakhet’s militant group. Court approvals for more surveillance usually make reference to links to the Casablanca bombings. For instance, in February 2004, the court order to approve more surveillance of Madrid bombers Fakhet and Jamal Zougam will say that they have been linked “with al-Qaeda operatives” who were “directly implicated in the events” in Casablanca (see February 3, 2004). [El Mundo (Madrid), 9/28/2004]
Yusef al-Ayeri, believed to be in charge of al-Qaeda operations in the Arabian peninsula, is shot and killed while attempting to flee a security checkpoint in Saudi Arabia. His body was strapped with explosives and a 6-month-old letter from Osama bin Laden was reportedly in his pocket. Al-Ayeri was publicly named earlier in the month and his photograph was distributed nationwide. [Knight Ridder, 6/4/2003] US intelligence had known of al-Ayeri by his alias “Swift Sword” for a year and had eventually learned his real name. They had told Saudi intelligence that he may be behind an aborted al-Qaeda plot to attack the US with a chemical bomb (see February-Late March 2003) and said they were highly interested in questioning him. However, not only is he killed, but the Saudis apparently never collect his personal effects, such as his cell phone, his address book, or his car registry, and never trace such clues back to any residence that can be searched. One CIA operative involved in the search to find him will later recall, “We wondered, was it an accident that they killed him, or not? The Saudis just shrugged.… The bottom line: the missing link [that could reveal who took part in the planned US attack] was dead and his personal effects, which can be pretty important, were gone. Like so much else when you’re dealing with these countries, you’re never sure—was it an issue of will or capability?” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 146, 237-239] The Internet communications run by al-Ayeri will be taken over by a previously unknown figure named Lewis Atiyallah. In 2005, it will be reported that some counterterrorism experts believe Atiyallah “is a pseudonym for Yusef al-Ayeri… Al-Ayeri was reported killed in 2003, however there are lingering doubts about whether he is in fact dead.” [AKI, 6/8/2005]
Anti-abortion activist Eric Robert Rudolph, wanted in a deadly spree of bombings that targeted abortion clinics, a gay and lesbian nightclub, and the 1996 Olympic Park in Atlanta (see October 14, 1998), is captured after five years of living as a fugitive from law enforcement attempts to find and arrest him. Rudolph is found in the mountainous Nantahala National Forest of western North Carolina, where FBI and other authorities believe he has been hiding since his 1998 bombing of an Alabama abortion clinic (see January 29, 1998). “He had been in the area the whole time,” says Cherokee County Sheriff Keith Lovin. Rudolph may face the death penalty. He was spotted by a Murphy, North Carolina, police officer, who saw him behind a local grocery store. The officer initially thought Rudolph might be a burglar. Rudolph does not resist arrest and is quickly brought into custody, where he is identified. Rudolph’s last known sighting was in July 1998. Rudolph later says that during some of his time as a fugitive, he was forced to subsist on acorns and salamanders until he began successfully stealing food from local businesses and residences.
Attorney General: Rudolph 'the Most Notorious American Fugitive' on FBI's List - Attorney General John Ashcroft calls Rudolph “the most notorious American fugitive on the FBI’s ‘Most Wanted’ list,” and adds, “This sends a clear message that we will never cease in our efforts to hunt down all terrorists, foreign or domestic, and stop them from harming the innocent.” Former nurse Emily Lyons, who was disfigured and disabled in the 1998 Alabama bombing, tells reporters that she has always believed Rudolph was alive and in hiding; she says she looks forward to confronting him in court and asking him why he bombed the clinic and other locales. “What was it that you picked that day, that place, for what purpose?” she says. “Why did you do the Olympics? Why did you do [that] to the others in Atlanta? What were you trying to tell everybody that day?… That’s the ultimate goal, to see him in court, possibly to talk to him and to see the final justice done.” Family members will tell reporters that Rudolph is against all forms of government, and holds white supremacist, anti-Semitic, and separatist views. He has been confirmed as a member of the violent anti-abortion and anti-gay organization Army of God (AOG—see 1982, August 1982, and July 1988). [CNN, 5/31/2003; CNN, 5/31/2003; CNN, 12/11/2003; Orlando Weekly, 8/24/2006]
Studied Unabomber - During his isolation in Murphy, Rudolph determined to become one of the most dangerous terrorists of all time. He focused primarily on the “lone wolf” methods employed by Ted Kaczynski, the “Unabomber” (see April 3, 1996). FBI agent Jack Killorin later says of Rudolph: “Eric was something of a student of the game. I think he learned from the Unabomber that if you go underground, the trail goes cold. If you isolate yourself, you can evade identification and capture.” [Orlando Weekly, 8/24/2006]
Praised by White Supremacist, Extremist Organizations - White supremacist and extremist anti-abortion groups praise Rudolph as a “hero” and “freedom fighter,” and call him a “martyr” for his actions. Some of the organizations call for further violence in emulation of Rudolph’s actions. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) warns that the extremist “chatter” comprises a “a dangerous mix” of twisted conspiracy theories about Jews and calls to violence. “What some hatemongers and extremists are saying is, this person is a hero whose crusade against abortion and the government is noble and praiseworthy,” says Abraham Foxman of the ADL. “What is even more troubling is that some of the chatter is calling for violence or lone-wolf acts to be carried out in Rudolph’s name. Others are using the arrest as an excuse to spread twisted conspiracy theories about Jews. As we have seen in the past, this can be a dangerous mix.” A Pennsylvania faction of the Christian Identity and neo-Nazi group Aryan Nations (see Early 1970s) posts on its Web site: “Let his enemies gloat, for their days are numbered. There will always be another to fill the shoes of a fallen hero. The enemy has not won and will NEVER win.” An Atlantic City neo-Nazi group posts a comment saying: “[A]nother good solid white warrier becomes another prisoner of war! We need more lone wolves… WAY MORE!!!” A message posted on a White Revolution message board praises Rudolph for killing “degenerate scum.” A Christian Identity (see 1960s and After) poster warns that the government will escalate attempts to “persecute” white supremacist and neo-Nazi organizations. Several white supremacist organizations such as Stormfront charge the “Jewish-controlled media” with “unfairly” targeting their organizations in the wake of the Rudolph bombings. “[T]he message is clear,” one site posts. “Shut up, or else!” A Stormfront poster writes that if there were “more Erich [sic] Rudolphs, Timothy McVeighs, Benjamin Smiths, and Buford Furrows in America, we’d have a much nicer place to live.” Smith and Furrow are two white supremacists who went on deadly shooting sprees in the Midwest and California in the summer of 1999 (see July 2-4, 1999 and August 10, 1999). The AOG Web site posts a photo of a nurse injured in the Alabama bombing with the caption, “Babykilling Abortion Nurse Emily Lyons got a taste of her own medicine.” [Anti-Defamation League, 6/3/2003]
Entity Tags: Benjamin Smith, Timothy James McVeigh, Aryan Nations, Anti-Defamation League, Abraham Foxman, Theodore J. (“Ted”) Kaczynski, Stormfront, Federal Bureau of Investigation, John Ashcroft, Keith Lovin, Eric Robert Rudolph, Buford Furrow, Emily Lyons, Jack Killorin, Army of God
Timeline Tags: US Domestic Terrorism
Destruction after the bombing of the UN building in Baghdad. [Source: US Army]In the summer of 2003, Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi moves his operations to the Sunni areas of Iraq. Soon he is linked to a number of bombings of civilians.
On August 7, his group al-Tawhid allegedly car bombs the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, killing 17 people and wounding more than 60.
On August 19, a car bomb hits United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24 people and wounding more than 100. UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello is one of those killed.
On August 29, two suicide car bombs explode outside the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, one of the most sacred shrines for Shi’ites, killing 125 people. Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim, a revered Shia cleric, is one of those killed. [MSNBC, 5/4/2005; Atlantic Monthly, 6/8/2006]
A former Jordanian intelligence official who studied al-Zarqawi for a decade will say in 2006 of this time period, “Even then—and even more so now—al-Zarqawi was not the main force in the insurgency. To establish himself, he carried out the Muhammad al-Hakim operation, and the attack against the UN. Both of them gained a lot of support for him—with the tribes, with Saddam’s army and other remnants of his regime. They made al-Zarqawi the symbol of the resistance in Iraq, but not the leader. And he never has been.” [Atlantic Monthly, 6/8/2006] Over the next several years, the US government blames nearly every major bombing of civilians in Iraq on al-Zarqawi. For instance, an MSNBC article in early 2005 lists 35 attacks attributed to him. [MSNBC, 5/4/2005] But there is rarely any evidence definitively determining who was behind any given attack, and arrests or prosecutions of the bombers or their associates are even rarer. In late 2004, a Daily Telegraph article will claim that several US military intelligence sources complain that the importance of al-Zarqawi “has been exaggerated by flawed intelligence and the Bush administration’s desire to find ‘a villain’ for the post-invasion mayhem. US military intelligence agents in Iraq have revealed a series of botched and often tawdry dealings with unreliable sources who, in the words of one source, ‘told us what we wanted to hear.… We were basically paying up to $10,000 a time to opportunists, criminals, and chancers who passed off fiction and supposition about al-Zarqawi as cast-iron fact, making him out as the linchpin of just about every attack in Iraq’” (see October 4, 2004). [Daily Telegraph, 10/4/2004] But despite this, the blaming of nearly all attacks on al-Zarqawi will continue. The Jordanian intelligence expert on al-Zarqawi will complain in 2006, “The Americans have been patently stupid in all of this. They’ve blown Zarqawi so out of proportion that, of course, his prestige has grown. And as a result, sleeper cells from all over Europe are coming to join him now.… Your government is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.” [Atlantic Monthly, 6/8/2006] In April 2006, the Washington Post will report that the US military has been deliberately exaggerating the importance of al-Zarqawi in order to link the war in Iraq to al-Qaeda for the US public, due to al-Zarqawi’s alleged al-Qaeda ties (see April 10, 2006).
Kean (left) and Hamilton (right) of the 9/11 Commission. [Source: Doug Mills / New York Times]The 9/11 Commission does not receive video or audio recordings of interrogations of detainees thought to know something about the 9/11 plot (see Spring-Late 2002), even though it is unhappy with the amount and quality of information it is getting from detainees (see Summer 2003) and has a series of meetings with CIA officials to improve access (see November 5, 2003-January 2004). The CIA will indicate that the Commission never asks for the tapes, saying it “went to great lengths to meet the requests of the 9/11 Commission,” and that one of the reasons that the tapes are not destroyed until after the Commission releases its final report in 2004 is so that it could have the tapes, if it so desires. [New York Times, 12/8/2007] However, when the tapes’ destruction is revealed in late 2007 (see November 2005 and December 6, 2007), former 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton will dispute this, saying that in hours of negotiations and discussions with the CIA and written requests they make it clear they want all material connected to the interrogations of the relevant detainees. [International Herald Tribune, 12/8/2007] Kean will say, “They knew what they had and they didn’t give it to us.” [ABC News, 12/7/2007] Hamilton will say, “The CIA certainly knew of our interest in getting all the information we could on the detainees, and they never indicated to us there were any videotapes… Did they obstruct our inquiry? The answer is clearly yes. Whether that amounts to a crime, others will have to judge.” [International Herald Tribune, 12/8/2007]
The House Appropriations subcommittee investigating the Branch Davidian tragedy in Waco (see March 1, 1993 and April 19, 1993) releases heavily edited excerpts from 911 call conversations between federal agents and Davidian members made during the February 1993 raid on the Davidian compound by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF—see 5:00 A.M. - 9:30 A.M. February 28, 1993). A Dallas FBI agent released edited portions of the tapes to a Congressional investigator, who gave the tapes to the subcommittee members. The Justice Department says the FBI agent, Oliver “Buck” Revell, erred in giving the tape; a department investigation finds Revell did not knowingly do anything wrong in releasing the tape, which is used by the FBI to train negotiators to deal with similar situations. The McLennan County, Texas, Police Department releases unedited versions of the tapes shortly after the House subcommittee makes its tapes public; federal prosecutors who intend to prosecute some of the surviving Davidians (see August 7, 1993) had intended to keep the tapes secret until the trial. Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) asks Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate the tape’s initial release, saying: “Who edited the version of the tape given to the House in the first place, and why, in that version, are conversations with David Koresh out of order? Is there a reason why the FBI, for training purposes, would leave out the threatening statements made by the Branch Davidians on the actual tape?” The House subcommittee was told that the tape was an accurate recording of the first half-hour of local police negotiations with Davidian Wayne Martin. “The release of altered tapes that are evidence before a grand jury is an assault on the department’s integrity,” DeConcini writes. “It is essential that this matter be investigated thoroughly and that the individuals responsible receive the most severe penalties available under the law.” The edited tape makes it appear that the 911 call center could not reach BATF agents for almost an hour after the 911 calls commenced. The police tapes feature two unedited hours of conversation between Martin and local law enforcement officials, and show that 911 operators made contact with BATF raid commanders within a half-hour of the first call to the hotline by Martin. The police tapes also indicate that BATF officials worked closely with the 911 call center to negotiate a cease-fire and evacuation of wounded federal agents. [Dallas Morning News, 8/7/1993]
Entity Tags: McLennan County Sheriff’s Department (Texas ), David Koresh, Branch Davidians, Dennis DeConcini, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, House Committee on Appropriations, Janet Reno, US Department of Justice, Wayne Martin, Oliver (“Buck”) Revell
Timeline Tags: 1993 Branch Davidian Crisis
The White House sends a classified memo to the CIA. The contents of the memo remain secret, but the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Washington Post will later learn that the memo approves the use of “harsh tactics” by CIA interrogators in questioning suspected terrorists. The memo was requested by CIA Director George Tenet, who asked for legal cover for the torture and harsh interrogation methods employed by CIA interrogators. A lawyer in the CIA’s general counsel office, John Radsan, later says, “The question was whether we had enough ‘top cover.’” A senior intelligence official will later add: “The CIA believed then, and now, that the program was useful and helped save lives. But in the agency’s view, it was like this: ‘We don’t want to continue unless you tell us in writing that it’s not only legal but is the policy of the administration.’” A Bush administration official will later blame the CIA for pressuring the administration to approve harsh interrogations, saying: “The CIA had the White House boxed in. They were saying, ‘It’s the only way to get the information we needed, and—by the way—we think there’s another attack coming up.’ It left the principals in an extremely difficult position and put the decision-making on a very fast track.” But a CIA official will dispute that characterization. “The suggestion that someone from CIA came in and browbeat everybody is ridiculous,” the official will state. “The CIA understood that [the interrogation program] was controversial and would be widely criticized if it became public. But given the tenor of the times and the belief that more attacks were coming, they felt they had to do what they could to stop the attack.” [Washington Post, 10/15/2008; American Civil Liberties Union [PDF], 1/28/2009 ]
A story in the New York Times about captured anti-abortion extremist Eric Rudolph (see April 14, 2005) portrays the sympathy many locals have for Rudolph, and ties Rudolph’s acts of terrorism with the Christian faith as espoused by some. Crystal Davis of Murphy, North Carolina, where Rudolph hid from authorities for five years, tells a reporter: “He’s a Christian and I’m a Christian and he dedicated his life to fighting abortion. Those are our values. And I don’t see what he did as a terrorist act.” Many Murphy residents agree with Davis’s views, and express their sympathy for Rudolph and their disdain for the federal agents who combed the area looking for him. Birdhouse builder William Hoyt says: “We thought it was kind of funny when the feds rolled in here all arrogant. They kept saying they didn’t need our help. It put a lot of people off. Nobody around here condones murder, but I think a lot of people weren’t sure which side to be on.” Some Murphy residents sport T-shirts with the slogans “Run, Rudolph, Run” and “Eric Rudolph—Hide and Seek Champion of the World.” Davis says she would have helped Rudolph had she been given the opportunity. “If he came to my door, I’d give him food,” she says. “That’s just how we are with strangers.” Assistant high school principal Bill Gaither says: “I agree with his views. But not his ways. I’m glad they finally got him.” [New York Times, 6/1/2003] Weeks later, liberal blogger David Neiwert will cite the Times article and ask if Rudolph might well be termed a “Christian terrorist.” Neiwert will write, referring to the “Christian Identity” movement of religious white supremacists and anti-Semites of which Rudolph is affiliated (see 1960s and After): “Both Mrs. Davis and the reporter’s basic question eliminated the distinction between Identity and Christianity—something that has become increasingly easy to do as Identity rhetoric attunes itself to the mainstream, and conservatism itself becomes increasingly bellicose and intolerant. These lines blurred even further as other media reports picked up the ‘Christian terrorist’ idea and played with it.” Washington Post reporter Alan Cooperman asks, “Is he a ‘Christian terrorist’?” and goes on: “The question is not just whether Rudolph is a terrorist, or whether he considers himself a Christian. It is whether he planted bombs at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, two abortion clinics, and a gay nightclub to advance a religious ideology—and how numerous, organized and violent others who share that ideology may be.” Cooperman then quotes a sociology professor from Idaho State University, James Aho, who says he is reluctant to use the term “Christian terrorist,” saying, “I would prefer to say that Rudolph is a religiously inspired terrorist, because most mainstream Christians consider Christian Identity to be a heresy.” If Christians take offense at the juxtaposition of the words “Christian” and “terrorist,” he adds, “that may give them some idea of how Muslims feel” when they constantly hear the term “Islamic terrorism.… Religiously inspired terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon, and every major world religion has people who have appropriated the label of their religion in order to legitimize their violence.… I’m inclined to believe that people who are violent in their inclinations search out a religious home that justifies their violence.” However, Syracuse University professor Michael Barkun says, “Based on what we know of Rudolph so far, and admittedly it’s fragmentary, there seems to be a fairly high likelihood that he can legitimately be called a Christian terrorist.” Barkin has been a consultant to the FBI on Christian extremist groups. [Washington Post, 6/2/2003; David Neiwert, 6/17/2003]
Abdelhaleem Ashqar. [Source: Paul J. Richards / Agence France-Presse / Getty Images]NBS News and ABC News report that Mohammad Salah is living openly in Chicago. The US government had declared Salah a “designated global terrorist,” in 1995 and his name has remained on the list ever since (see February 1995). Salah was convicted in Israel for being a member of Hamas and served five years in prison. Suspected Hamas fundraiser Jamil Sarsour is running a grocery store in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. US officials say Sarsour helped finance a string of suicide bus bombings in Israel, including one that killed two Americans. He also spent several years in an Israeli prison in the 1990s. Furthermore, suspected Hamas fundraiser Abdelhaleem Ashqar is working as a professor at Howard University in Washington. NBC additionally reports there are “about two dozen [other] alleged Hamas operatives in the United States now under investigation by the FBI.” FBI agent Robert Wright began investigating these men and others in the early 1990s. For instance, Ashqar organized a secret Hamas fundraising meeting in Philadelphia in the early 1990s that was wiretapped by the FBI (see October 1993). Wright believes Sarsour has been a pivotal figure in sending funds from the US to Hamas overseas since the early 1990s (see 1989-January 1993). Wright claims that the FBI could have moved against Hamas in the US years before 9/11. He says, “The Hamas criminal enterprise has been flourishing since then. These guys are still operating strong today because we’re doing absolutely nothing about it. The FBI has turned a blind eye to what they are doing.” Salah, who had been employed as a college professor in Chicago since February 2002, is fired from his job as a result of these stories. [MSNBC, 6/2/2003; ABC News, 6/5/2003; ABC News, 6/12/2003] But the men are not arrested in the wake of the media reports. Salah and Ashqar will finally be indicted in August 2004 (see August 20, 2004).
Yaqub Mirza. [Source: Publicity photo, via Byrd Business Review]Soliman Biheiri, the former head of BMI Inc., a New Jersey-based investment firm with ties to many suspected terrorism financiers (see 1986-October 1999), had left the US immediately after a raid of the SAAR network in March 2002 (see March 20, 2002). On this day, he returns to the US and is immediately arrested and interviewed by Customs agent David Kane. Biheiri tells Kane that he has longstanding ties to leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Muslim group banned in Egypt. Agents are able to search his laptop computer, and discover ties with Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk. He is also connected to two principals of the banned Al Taqwa Bank (see November 7, 2001), Youssef Nada and Ghaleb Himmat, when their addresses are discovered on his computer as well. Agents say there are “other indications” of connections between Al Taqwa and Biheiri’s company BMI, including financial transactions. [Forward, 10/17/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/21/2004; Associated Press, 10/12/2004] An e-mail is also discovered showing Biheiri was involved in Saudi multimillionaire Yassin al-Qadi’s financial dealings with Yaqub Mirza, the director of the raided SAAR network. The US froze al-Qadi’s assets in late 2001 (see October 12, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003] Biheiri will be convicted of immigration fraud in October 2003. He will be convicted again in 2004 for lying to Kane about his ties to Marzouk during his interview. [Wall Street Journal, 6/21/2004; Associated Press, 10/12/2004]
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. [Source: Slate]A month before he is slated to go on trial for bank and credit card fraud charges (see February 8, 2002), the federal government drops all criminal charges against Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who has been held without legal representation, and in solitary confinement, since 2001 (see December 12, 2001). [CBS News, 6/23/2003; CBS News, 6/23/2003; CNN, 12/13/2005; Progressive, 3/2007]
'Grave Danger' - President Bush says al-Marri “represents a continuing, present, and grave danger” to the country, and the government designates al-Marri as an “enemy combatant,” alleging that he helped al-Qaeda operatives settle in the US. “Mr. Al-Marri possesses intelligence, including intelligence about personnel and activities of al-Qaeda,” Bush continues, and adds that gaining access to it “would aid US efforts to prevent attacks by al-Qaeda.” [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003; Progressive, 3/2007] The presidential order says he “engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism.” His detention is necessary, the order claims, to prevent him from participating in terrorist activities against the US. The order in effect precludes a pretrial hearing scheduled for July 2 and the start of a formal trial on July 22. [CNN, 6/24/2003]
Alleged Sleeper Agent - The government declaration for al-Marri says he worked as an “al-Qaeda sleeper agent” who was planning to “hack into the computer systems of US banks,” and possibly facilitate a follow up to the 9/11 attacks. For its part, the Defense Department says al-Marri trained at a terror camp in Afghanistan before 9/11, personally met Osama bin Laden, and volunteered for an unspecified “martyr mission.” [CNN, 12/13/2005] Attorney General John Ashcroft will later claim that al-Marri refused repeated offers to cooperate with the FBI; “consequently,” Ashcroft will write, Bush declares him an enemy combatant. Ashcroft will claim that under the laws of war, an enemy combatant can be killed out of hand. Instead, the government will hold al-Marri “without charge or trial until the end of the war.” [Slate, 11/30/2006]
Transferred to Navy Brig - Instead, the “enemy combatant” designation takes al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and legal US resident, out of the civilian criminal justice system and places him under the control of the Defense Department, which immediately transfers him into detention at a Navy brig in South Carolina. He could face a military tribunal or remain in detention indefinitely, without trial. He is only the third person to be publicly named as an enemy combatant, along with US citizens Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi.
Fingered by KSM - According to a Justice Department official, al-Marri was “positively identified” as being part of a planned second wave of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks by an “al-Qaeda detainee in a position to know.” Justice officials imply that the detainee to finger al-Marri is senior 9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [CBS News, 6/23/2003] Another suspected al-Qaeda operative, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (see Early-Late June, 2001), is also said to have mentioned him. [CNN, 12/13/2005] Alice Fisher, the deputy assistant attorney general for the Justice Department’s criminal division, says the department did not drop the criminal charges against al-Marri because the case was weak: “We are confident we would have prevailed on the criminal charges. However, setting the criminal charges aside is in the best interests of our national security.” The criminal charges—lying to banks, lying to the FBI, and credit card fraud—could have given al-Marri up to 60 years in prison and $1.75 million in fines. [CBS News, 6/23/2003]
Pleaded Not Guilty - Al-Marri’s lawyer Mark Berman says that his client pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges (see May 29, 2003), and the case was proceeding to trial. “I definitely got the sense they were reluctant to try the case in court,” Berman says. “They’d rather be in a forum where defendants aren’t represented by counsel.” Al-Marri’s wife and five children have left the US. The Saudi Arabian government granted the family passports in February, in spite of a State Department request not to issue the passports, as department officials wanted al-Marri’s wife, who is Saudi, to be available to the FBI for questioning. [Knight Ridder, 6/23/2003] Al-Marri’s lawyers say they are preparing a legal challenge to Bush’s decision. [Knight Ridder, 6/24/2003]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Osama bin Laden, US Department of Justice, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, John Ashcroft, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Mark Berman, Alice Fisher, George W. Bush, Jose Padilla, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Yaser Esam Hamdi
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties
President Bush issues a proclamation to mark the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. Bush states that the US is “committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example.” He vows to prosecute torture and to prevent any “other cruel and unusual punishment.” The CIA’s chief lawyer, Scott Muller, complains to the White House that Bush’s statement could cause CIA interrogators, authorized by Bush to torture suspected al-Qaeda members (see February 7, 2002), to fear that they could be used as scapegoats by the administration. White House officials reassure Muller that despite Bush’s words, the administration still supports the CIA’s torture of prisoners. [New York Times, 5/3/2009]
US intelligence has long suspected the Al-Rajhi Bank for supporting radical militant causes. However, the US has not acted overtly against the Saudi bank because it is so large and influential, with an estimated $26 billion in assets and yearly profits of almost $2 billion in 2006. In mid-2003, a new CIA report details linkages between the bank and militants (see Before September 11, 2001), and suggests that the owners of the bank are aware of these links and have an extremist agenda (see Mid-2003). The US begins to rethink the quiet diplomacy approach. Deputies from the CIA, National Security Council, Treasury and State departments meet to discuss the problem. They debate officially listing the bank as a supporter of terrorism. They also consider the possibility of covert operations against the bank, such as interfering with the bank’s internal operations. Another possibility is working with other countries for more scrutiny and regulatory action against the bank. But ultimately, the Bush administration decides against all these options and chooses merely to continue privately exerting pressure on the Saudi government in hopes that the Saudis will do something. [Wall Street Journal, 7/26/2007] In late 2004, Homeland Security Adviser Frances Townsend will make a secret visit to Saudi Arabia to put more pressure on the government to do something about the bank. [Wall Street Journal, 10/1/2004] What the US has done regarding the bank since that time is unknown. The bank denies any ties to Islamic militancy.
Sulaiman Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi. [Source: Nadec]A CIA report strongly suggests that the Al-Rajhi Bank is being used to finance militants. The bank is one of the biggest in Saudi Arabia, with an estimated $26 billion in assets in 2006. The report states, “Islamic extremists have used Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation since at least the mid-1990s as a conduit for terrorist transactions… Senior al-Rajhi family members have long supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank. Reporting indicates that senior al-Rajhi family members control the bank’s most important decisions and that [their] principal managers answer directly to Sulaiman [Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi]. The al-Rajhis know they are under scrutiny and have moved to conceal their activities from financial regulatory authorities.” It adds that in 2002, Sulaiman ordered the bank’s board “to explore financial instruments that would allow the bank’s charitable contributions to avoid official Saudi scrutiny.” US intelligence have extensive circumstantial evidence but no direct proof that bank managers knowingly support terrorism. For instance, the report says that in December 1998, Sulaiman and his brother Salah sent $4 million to Germany and Pakistan using “a unique computer code to send funds at regular intervals to unspecified recipients, suggesting they were trying to conceal the transactions and that the money may have been intended for illegitimate ends.” Islamist operatives in many countries have used the bank, including at least some al-Qaeda leaders and 9/11 hijackers (see Before September 11, 2001). In 1997, US investigators recovered the address book of al-Qaeda financier Wadih El-Hage, and discovered Salah al-Rajhi’s phone number in it (see Shortly After August 21, 1997). Salah is Sulaiman’s brother and co-owner of the bank. In 2002, the US will raid the SAAR Network, a collection of linked financial entities in the US suspected of funding militants. SAAR stands for Sulaiman Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi, and the network was founded and funded by him (see March 20, 2002). [Wall Street Journal, 7/26/2007; Wall Street Journal, 7/26/2007] The US government will subsequently consider taking overt action against the bank, but will ultimately decide against it (see Mid-2003). The bank continues to deny any links to Islamic militancy.
Omar Khyam in Pakistan in 2003. [Source: Public domain]In early 2003, the British domestic intelligence agency MI5 begins investigating a man named Mohammed Quayyum Khan (a.k.a. “Q”), who is a taxi driver living in Luton, England. MI5 believes he is an important al-Qaeda operative. Mohammad Sidique Khan is the head suicide bomber in the 7/7 London bombings, and at some point before he goes to a training camp in Pakistan in July 2003 (see July-September 2003), MI5 traces his cell phone number from a phone call or calls between him and Quayyum. It will later be revealed in court that Quayyum arranged for Sidique Khan to attend the training camp, so it seems probable the monitored communication relates to these arrangements. MI5 discovers the prepaid phone belongs to a “Siddique Khan,” but they find no reference to him in their own records or on the Police National Computer, so they do not pursue the lead any further. In early 2004, MI5 will repeatedly monitor Khan meeting with Omar Khyam (see February 2-March 23, 2004), the head bomber in a plot to bomb a target in Britain with a large fertilizer bomb (see Early 2003-April 6, 2004). They allegedly do not know Khan’s name, but they learn in June 2004 that the car he has been driving Khyam around in is registered to the name “Siddeque Khan.” But, as the London Times will later note, “For reasons that remain unexplained, no one at MI5 made the connection to the Siddique Khan whose mobile phone number had already cropped up.” Strangely, despite his links such as this to both the fertilizer bomb plot and the 7/7 bombers, Quayyum will never be arrested or even questioned by officials, and continues to live openly in Britain (see March 2003 and After). [London Times, 5/1/2007; BBC, 5/25/2007]
Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, commander of US troops in Afghanistan at this time, will later complain that an opportunity to kill bin Laden is lost due to a lack of the right equipment. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) like the Predator are in short supply due to the war in Iraq. Vines receives intelligence that bin Laden is on the move and can take one of three routes. However, there is only one UAV to send. Vines will later recall, “A UAV was positioned on the route that was most likely, but he didn’t go that way. We believed that we were within a half-hour of possibly getting him, but nothing materialized.” [Washington Post, 9/10/2006]
Jamal Ahmidan. [Source: Spanish Interior Ministry]Jamal Ahmidan, alias “El Chino,” has a long history of drug dealing in Spain. In 2000, he returned to his home country of Morocco and was arrested on murder charges there. In July 2003, he is released and returns to Spain. He continues to deal drugs, but he allegedly became a radical Islamist while in prison as well. He soon meets Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, the leader of a group of Islamist militants in Madrid, and joins their group. But the group is being heavily monitored and soon Ahmidan is being monitored as well. For instance, Spanish police notice that Fakhet sometimes uses a car owned by Ahmidan’s relatives (see Spring 2003 and After). The wife of one of the militants also informs for the police and reports on Ahmidan (see January 4, 2003). Ahmidan will prove to be the key link between the militants and a group of drug dealers (who are mostly also government informants) that supply the explosives enabling the militants to conduct the Madrid train bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). [El Pais (Spain), 3/8/2007]
The CIA briefs Vice President Dick Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, and National Security Council legal adviser John Bellinger on the use of waterboarding and other methods. According to a 2009 Senate Intelligence Committee report, the officials “reaffirmed that the CIA program was lawful and reflected administration policy.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 4/22/2009 ; Washington Post, 4/22/2009] In 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)‘s Jameel Jaffer will say: “This was not an abstract discussion. These were very detailed and specific conversations. And it’s further evidence of the role that senior administration officials had.” [Washington Post, 4/22/2009]
Anthony Garcia (left) and Omar Khyam (right) facing the camera, in Pakistan in 2003. Both will be sentenced to life in prison for the fertilizer bomb plot. [Source: Corbis]In the summer of 2003, a group of young Pakistani-Briton men rent a room in a hostel in Lahore, Pakistan. The group is very noisy at night, talking and playing music, which draws complaints from neighbors. One neighbor will later tell the Times of London that it was obvious they were violent militants: “We knew what they were doing and we were afraid at those boys being here, but we couldn’t do anything about it.” The neighbors finally call the police after hearing a series of late night explosions coming from their room. The group tells police that a propane gas cylinder had exploded. But the police do not believe it and begin a surveillance operation.
Investigation - Investigators learn the group recently traveled to Malakand, a very mountainous region of Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan. It is known that al-Qaeda maintains training camps there. Members of the group are also seen making regular visits to an office complex in Lahore where Al-Muhajiroun and other militant groups rent space. Most of the group members are linked to Al-Muhajiroun back in Britain. One member of the group is Omar Khyam, who is a key figure in a fertilizer bomb plot in Britain that will be foiled by British intelligence in March 2004 (see Early 2003-April 6, 2004). Another member is Mohammad Sidique Khan, the head suicide bomber in the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005). Yet another member is Mohammed Junaid Babar, an al-Qaeda operative living in Britain who is important enough to attend a key al-Qaeda summit in 2004 (see March 2004).
Return Home - Khan returns to Britain in August 2003 and Khyam returns one month later (Khyam is already under surveillance in Britain). It is unknown when Babar returns exactly, but in early April 2004 he flies from Britain to the US, is arrested, and begins telling all he knows about his associates in return for a reduced sentence (see April 10, 2004). He only knows Khyam by his alias “Ausman” and Khan by his alias “Ibrahim,” and it is unknown just how much he reveals about their training together in Pakistan.
Warnings - But the Pakistani ISI will later claim that they twice gave warnings to British intelligence about the monitored group in Lahore. Apparently the ISI decided the group was not a threat in Pakistan but was planning a bombing in Britain. A high-ranking ISI official will later claim: “There is no question that 7/7 could have and should have been stopped. British agencies did not follow some of the information we gave to them.” [London Times, 5/1/2007]
Surveillance - If the ISI does not in fact warn British intelligence, then it is likely the British have at least some awareness of this group in Lahore attending training camps through another source. British intelligence has been closely monitoring Mohammed Quayyum Khan, who is believed to be a key al-Qaeda operative living in Britain and sending funds and militant recruits to Pakistan (see March 2003 and After). Quayyum remains in phone contact with Khayam in Pakistan. He also is monitored as he talks on the phone with Salahuddin Amin, a member of the fertilizer bomb plot who lives in Pakistan. [BBC, 5/25/2007]
Abu Faraj al-Libbi. [Source: FBI]In July 2003, al-Qaeda leader Abu Faraj al-Libbi allegedly receives a letter from Osama bin Laden’s “designated courier” stating that this person will be the “official messenger” between bin Laden and others in Pakistan. Around the same time, al-Libbi moves to Abbottabad, Pakistan. Al-Libbi had become al-Qaeda’s head of operations following the capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in March 2003 (see February 29 or March 1, 2003). This is according to one of al-Libbi’s Guantanamo prison files, from September 2008. In the file, the courier is named as Maulawi Abd al-Khaliq Jan. [US Department of Defense, 9/10/2008]
Al-Libbi Leads to Bin Laden's Courier - Other sources make clear that this information comes from al-Libbi’s 2005 interrogation (see Shortly After May 2, 2005). By late 2005, US intelligence analysts will decide that al-Libbi was lying, and he had made up the name of Jan to protect the real courier, whose real name will eventually be discovered to be Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed (see Late 2005). In fact, Ahmed moves to Abbottabad in 2004 (see January 22, 2004-2005) and bin Laden joins him there in late 2005 (see Late 2005-Early 2006).
Al-Libbi Moves Away - Al-Libbi moves away from Abbottabad in mid-2004. Perhaps this is in response to two Pakistani government raids that narrowly miss catching him (see April 2004 and After April 2004). [US Department of Defense, 9/10/2008]
Musharraf's 2006 Book - In a 2006 book, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will detail the two raids that narrowly miss him, and adds that al-Libbi revealed in a 2005 interrogation “that he was in contact with Osama through a courier and the last letter he had received from Osama was sometime in December 2004. We have been looking for the couriers intensely.” [Musharraf, 2006, pp. 172] Presumably, al-Libbi’s confession about living in Abbottabad and meeting the courier would help point US investigators looking for the courier to Abbottabad, and if not that, Musharraf’s 2006 book would do so. But it is unknown when US intelligence begins closely investigating al-Qaeda activity in Abbottabad.
Rohan Gunaratna. [Source: George Washington University]Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna claims to know what was discussed at the al-Qaeda summit held in Malaysia in January 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). Gunaratna has been described as an “ad hoc adviser to US intelligence officials,” and it is believed he has seen top secret transcripts of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s (KSM) recent interrogations in CIA prisons. It has not been explained how he saw such transcripts, but the CIA has not disputed the assertion that he saw them. [Bergen Record, 7/10/2003] In public testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Gunaratna says that “Khalid Shaikh Mohammed chaired that meeting [in Malaysia]. The first two hijackers to enter the United States, they were present at that meeting. So the 9/11 operation is an extension of old Plan Bojinka (see January 6, 1995). So the players of old plan Bojinka, they were not all arrested.… If you read the interrogation of [KSM], who is now in US custody, he has very clearly stated how 9/11 was planned, that it originated from [Bojinka].” However, the 9/11 Commissioners do not ask him any follow-up questions about this. [9/11 Commission, 7/9/2003 ] In the 9/11 Commission’s final report, there will be no mention of any suggestions KSM was at the Malaysia summit or any clear accounting as to who all the attendees were. Their report will also downplay any connections between the 1995 Bojinka plot and the 9/11 plot, which they will claim began in 1999. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 153-154] However, later on the same day as his testimony, Gunaratna will give more details of what he claims to have learned from KSM’s interrogations in an interview with a reporter. He says that at the summit KSM said al-Qaeda operatives would need to learn to fly commercial airliners in the US as part of a “suicide operation.” However, although KSM had already agreed on the targets with bin Laden, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not mentioned at the summit. KSM “was careful not to discuss all the specific plans at that meeting.” The reporter who interviewed Gunaratna notes that “some US intelligence officials” have “pooh-poohed the significance of the Malaysian meeting as a link to Sept. 11,” and if KSM was at the meeting, that “further underscores how the CIA missed an opportunity” to stop the 9/11 attacks. [Bergen Record, 7/10/2003] The CIA had Malaysian intelligence photograph and film the attendees of the summit as they were coming and going, but apparently there was no attempt to monitor what was said in the summit meetings (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). If Gunaratna is correct, it suggests that the CIA and 9/11 Commission may have withheld some details of KSM’s interrogations to the public that are embarrassing to US intelligence agencies. Note also that doubts have been expressed about the reliability of KSM’s testimony, which was at least partly obtained through the use of torture (see June 16, 2004).
From left to right: Omar Opik Lasal, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, and Abdulmukim Edris. [Source: All three pictures Agence France-Presse / Getty Images]Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, said to be an important operative for both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate, escapes from Camp Crame, the highest security prison in the Philippines. Two Abu Sayyaf figures, Omar Opik Lasal and Abdulmukim Edris, escape with him. There are many oddities about their escape:
The three men apparently have a spare set of keys, unlock their cell door, relock it, walk out of the jail building and through the prison gates, and then use a small guardhouse to vault over a compound wall. Additionally, the cell door was so rusted that it could simply be lifted by its hinges and moved aside. The nearest guards are either sleeping or out shopping. A prisoner left behind tries to notify the guards about the escape, but is ignored. Only when the guards are changed five hours later is the escape discovered, and many more hours pass before Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and other top leaders are notified. All four guards on duty at the time of the escape will later fail lie detectors tests. One will say they were set up by higher-ups to take the fall. [Asia Times, 7/26/2003]
The janitor in the prison at the time is Cosain Ramos (a.k.a. Abu Ali). Ramos worked with major al-Qaeda figure, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, and was part of Konsonjaya, a front company run by Hambali used to fund the 1995 Bojinka plot. He had given al-Ghozi explosives which were used in a 2000 bombing. After he was arrested in 2002, not only was he not charged, but he was made a protected witness and given the janitor job (see Shortly Before December 24, 2000). [Ressa, 2003, pp. 136; Gulf News, 6/10/2003; Australian, 7/18/2003]
Lasal will be rearrested on October 8, 2003, and will admit, “I am a government asset, a deep penetration agent.” He will say he helped the Philippine military track al-Ghozi after the escape. He says he joined Abu Sayyaf in 1992 and soon began informing on the group. He claims he has a brother and a cousin who were informants on Abu Sayyaf as well. “Wherever we went, the military knew our whereabouts, because I was giving them the information.” He is seen after his rearrest walking into Manila’s Hall of Justice without any handcuffs on and only one escort. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10/15/2003] He will be arrested in 2007 and then let go after it is reported he was confused with his cousin and in fact is in a witness protection program. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 3/20/2007]
One week after the escape, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reports that Edris, the alleged leader of the Abu Sayyaf’s explosives team, has long-time links to the Philippine military and police. A police intelligence source says that he has been a government asset since 1994. He had been arrested in November 2002 and proclaimed “the No. 1 bomber of the Abu Sayyaf” by the Philippine president. Edris was implicated by other captured Abu Sayyaf suspects as the mastermind of a series of bombings in Zamboanga City in October and November 2002 that killed over a dozen people, including a US Green Beret. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7/23/2003]
Supt. Reuben Galban, chief of the police Intelligence Group’s Foreign Intelligence Liaison Office, is fired after failing a lie detector test about the escape. He fails questions about planning the escape and getting paid for it. An intelligence source will claim that Galban and Senior Supt. Romeo Ricardo were in on the escape as handlers for Edris, one of the escapees and an alleged government informant. Ricardo does not take a lie detector test. The source claims: “Edris was deliberately delivered to Al-Ghozi for them to develop trust and confidence. It’s what we call in the intelligence community as human agents manipulation but what is so wrong in this case was the fact that they did it at the expense of the national security.” A police investigator admits that this angle is being pursued as a theory to explain the escape, but “no target would justify the humiliation brought about by this incident.” [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7/23/2003] Galban was at the prison outside of his usual hours during the escape, which took place in the middle of the night. He also had recently moved al-Ghozi from a secure floor in the prison to the least secure floor. [Asia Times, 7/26/2003]
Six officers of the Philippine National Police’s Intelligence Group are charged with graft and gross negligence in relation to the escape. Galban is one of those charged but Ricardo is not. [Manila Bulletin, 7/25/2003] However, about one month after the escape, an investigative team concludes there was no collusion between any officials and the escapees. Apparently the charges against the six officers are quietly dropped. Twenty police or intelligence officers are fired, but no higher-up officials. [Asia Times, 7/26/2003; Manila Sun Star, 8/28/2003]
Intelligence agents from the Armed Forces Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF) will later implicate police director Eduardo Matillano in the escape. Two intelligence agents will be caught monitoring Matillano’s house one week after the escape. Armed Forces chief Gen. Narciso Abaya will say of the agents, “Somebody gave them a license plate number of a car allegedly connected with the escape of al-Ghozi and they traced it to the home of Matillano.” Mantillano threatens to press charges against the ACTAF, but apparently does not do so. He also is not fired. [Asia Pulse, 7/22/2003]
Edris and al-Ghozi will be shot and killed in August and October 2003 respectively by Philippine authorities (see October 12, 2003). Supposedly they are killed while resisting being rearrested. But many, including Aquilino Pimentel, president of the Philippines Senate, will suggest they were both summarily executed after being arrested in order to silence them from potentially revealing their confederates in the escape. [Manila Bulletin, 10/18/2003]
Some elements in the Philippine military are so suspicious about the circumstances of the escape that two weeks later they stage a mutiny to protest this and other issues. They claim the Philippine government has been manipulating rebel groups and even staging or allowing terrorist bombings to manipulate the population (see July 27-28, 2003).
Entity Tags: Aquilino Pimentel, Romeo Ricardo, Cosain Ramos, Abdulmukim Edris, Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Reuben Galban, Omar Opik Lasal, Eduardo Matillano, Philippine National Police, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Narciso Abaya, Jemaah Islamiyah
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report concludes that at least six 9/11 hijackers received “substantial assistance” from associates in the US, though it’s “not known to what extent any of these contacts in the United States were aware of the plot.” These hijackers came into contact with at least 14 people who were investigated by the FBI before 9/11, and four of those investigations were active while the hijackers were present. But in June 2002, FBI Director Mueller testified: “While here, the hijackers effectively operated without suspicion, triggering nothing that would have alerted law enforcement and doing nothing that exposed them to domestic coverage. As far as we know, they contacted no known terrorist sympathizers in the United States” (see June 18, 2002). CIA Director Tenet made similar comments at the same time, and another FBI official stated, “[T]here were no contacts with anybody we were looking at inside the United States.” These comments are untrue, because one FBI document from November 2001 uncovered by the Inquiry concludes that the six lead hijackers “maintained a web of contacts both in the United States and abroad. These associates, ranging in degrees of closeness, include friends and associates from universities and flight schools, former roommates, people they knew through mosques and religious activities, and employment contacts. Other contacts provided legal, logistical, or financial assistance, facilitated US entry and flight school enrollment, or were known from [al-Qaeda]-related activities or training.” [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ] The declassified sections of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report show the hijackers have contact with:
Mamoun Darkazanli, investigated several times starting in 1993 (see 1993; Late 1998); the CIA makes repeated efforts to turn him into an informer (see December 1999).
Mohammed Haydar Zammar, investigated by Germany since at least 1997 (see 1996), the Germans periodically inform the CIA what they learn.
Osama Basnan, US intelligence is informed of his connections to Islamic militants several times in early 1990s but fails to investigate (see April 1998).
Omar al-Bayoumi, investigated in San Diego from 1998-1999 (see September 1998-July 1999).
Anwar al-Awlaki, investigated in San Diego from 1999-2000 (see June 1999-March 2000).
Osama “Sam” Mustafa, owner of a San Diego gas station, and investigated beginning in 1991 (see Autumn 2000).
Ed Salamah, manager of the same gas station, and an uncooperative witness in 2000 (see Autumn 2000).
An unnamed friend of Hani Hanjour, whom the FBI tries to investigate in 2001.
An unnamed associate of Marwan Alshehhi, investigated beginning in 1999.
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who had contact with Basnan, al-Bayoumi, al-Awlaki, Mustafa, and Salamah, “maintained a number of other contacts in the local Islamic community during their time in San Diego, some of whom were also known to the FBI through counterterrorist inquiries and investigations,” but details of these individuals and possible others are still classified. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ] None of the above people have been arrested or even publicly charged with any crime associated with terrorism, although Zammar is in prison in Syria.
Entity Tags: Robert S. Mueller III, Osama Basnan, Osama (“Sam”) Mustafa, Nawaf Alhazmi, Omar al-Bayoumi, Mamoun Darkazanli, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Ed Salamah, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Anwar al-Awlaki, George J. Tenet, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
A group of Philippine soldiers mutiny, claiming they are trying to prevent the Philippine government from staging terrorist attacks on its own people. About 300 soldiers, many of them officers, rig a large Manila shopping mall and luxury hotel with explosives, evacuate them, and then threaten to blow up the buildings unless President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and other top Philippine leaders resign. After a twenty hour siege, the soldiers surrender and no one is hurt. Their leaders are jailed for mutiny. While Arroyo remains in power, other top leaders resign, including the county’s defense minister, police chief, and military intelligence chief. [Guardian, 7/28/2003; Guardian, 8/15/2003] The mutineers had a number of grievances. They complain:
Senior military officials, in collusion with President Arroyo, are secretly behind recent bombings that have been blamed on Muslim militant groups. They specifically claim that a series of bombings in March and April 2002 in the southern city of Davao that killed 38 people were actually false flag operations. (Their allegations could be related to a May 2002 incident in which a US citizen staying in the area was injured when a bomb he was making exploded in his hotel room; see May 16, 2002. The Philippines media suggested that he was a CIA operative taking part in false flag operations.)
The government is selling weapons and ammunition to rebel groups such as Abu Sayyaf even as these groups fight the government. The Guardian will later note that local newspaper reports describe the military’s selling of weapons to rebels as ‘an open secret’ and “common knowledge.” [Guardian, 8/15/2003] Gracia Burnham, an American missionary who was kidnapped in 2001 and held hostage by Abu Sayyaf rebels for more than a year, claims that her captors told her their weapons came from the Philippine government. [Asia Times, 7/29/2003]
Islamic militants are being allowed to escape from jail. Just two weeks before the mutiny, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a bomb maker with the al-Qaeda allied Jemaah Islamiyah group, was inexplicably able to escape from a heavily guarded prison in Manila. There are many dubious circumstances surrounding his escape (see July 14, 2003).
The government is on the verge of staging a new string of bombings to justify declaring martial law so Arroyo can remain in office past the end of her term in 2004.
The Guardian will later note, “Though the soldiers’ tactics were widely condemned in the Philippines, there was widespread recognition in the press, and even inside the military, that their claims ‘were valid and legitimate’…. Days before the mutiny, a coalition of church groups, lawyers, and NGOs launched a ‘fact-finding mission’ to investigate persistent rumors that the state was involved in the Davao explosions. It is also investigating the possible involvement of US intelligence agencies.” [Guardian, 8/15/2003] CNN comments, “While the government issued a statement calling the accusation ‘a lie,’ and saying the soldiers themselves could be victims of propaganda, the soldiers’ accusation plays on the fears of many Filipinos after the infamous 21-year term of President Ferdinand Marcos, during which he did the same thing. Marcos instigated a series of bombings and civil unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s, using that as an excuse to declare martial law in 1972. It took the People Power Revolt of 1986 to end Marcos’ dictatorship.” [CNN, 7/26/2003]
John Pistole. [Source: Marshall Center]John S. Pistole, deputy assistant director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, testifies before a Congressional committee. He states the 9/11 investigation “has traced the origin of the funding of 9/11 back to financial accounts in Pakistan, where high-ranking and well-known al-Qaeda operatives played a major role in moving the money forward, eventually into the hands of the hijackers located in the US.” [US Congress, 7/31/2003] Pistole does not reveal any further details, but in India it is noted that this is consistent with previous reports that Saeed Sheikh and ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed were behind the funding of 9/11. [Times of India, 8/1/2003; Pioneer, 8/7/2003] However, the FBI will tell the 9/11 Commission that when Pistole used the word “accounts”, he did not mean actual accounts with a bank, merely that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who was based in Pakistan, handled the money. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 144 ]
Rod Coronado displays a jug of gasoline and oil that can be used as an incendiary device. [Source: Fur Commission]Environmental and animal rights activist Rod Coronado (see 1995 and March 2004), a convicted arsonist and member of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF—see 1997), gives a speech urging activists to commit arson and telling them how to build an incendiary device. Coronado’s speech comes on the heels of the firebombing of a San Diego condominium complex in which an ELF banner was left behind (see August 1, 2003). Coronado gave a similar presentation to a conference in January, where he displayed a milk jug filled with gasoline and oil, and told listeners: “Here’s a little model I’m going to show you here. I didn’t have any incense, but—this is a crude incendiary device. It is a simple plastic jug, which you fill with gasoline and oil. You put in a sponge, which is soaked also in flammable liquid.… You put the incense stick in here, light it, place it—underneath the ‘weapon of mass destruction,’ light the incense stick—sandalwood works nice—and you destroy the profits that are brought about through animal and earth abuse. That’s about two dollars.” In February 2006, Coronado will be indicted for charges stemming from the August 2003 speech. [Los Angeles Times, 2/23/2006; Fur Commission, 2010]
In the wake of the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s full report, anonymous officials leak some details from a controversial, completely censored 28-page section that focuses on possible Saudi support for 9/11. According to leaks given to the New York Times, the section says that Omar al-Bayoumi and/or Osama Basnan “had at least indirect links with two hijackers [who] were probably Saudi intelligence agents and may have reported to Saudi government officials.” It also says that Anwar al-Awlaki “was a central figure in a support network that aided the same two hijackers.” Most connections drawn in the report between the men, Saudi intelligence, and 9/11 is said to be circumstantial. [New York Times, 8/2/2003] One key section is said to read, “On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA memorandum, ‘incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists… On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.’”(see August 2, 2002) Some of the most sensitive information involves what US agencies are doing currently to investigate Saudi business figures and organizations. [Associated Press, 8/2/2003] According to the New Republic, the section outlines “connections between the hijacking plot and the very top levels of the Saudi royal family.” An anonymous official is quoted as saying, “There’s a lot more in the 28 pages than money. Everyone’s chasing the charities. They should be chasing direct links to high levels of the Saudi government. We’re not talking about rogue elements. We’re talking about a coordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multiple places in the Saudi government.… If the people in the administration trying to link Iraq to al-Qaeda had one-one-thousandth of the stuff that the 28 pages has linking a foreign government to al-Qaeda, they would have been in good shape.… If the 28 pages were to be made public, I have no question that the entire relationship with Saudi Arabia would change overnight.” [New Republic, 8/1/2003] The section also is critical that the issue of foreign government support remains unresolved. One section reads, “In their testimony, neither CIA or FBI officials were able to address definitely the extent of such support for the hijackers, globally or within the United States, or the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. This gap in intelligence community coverage is unacceptable.” [Boston Globe, 8/3/2003]
Damage to the front of the Marriott Hotel. [Source: CNN]A suicide bomber crashes into the lobby of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 16 people and wounding 150. All of those killed are Indonesian except for one Dutch man. No group takes credit for the bombing, but US and Indonesian officials quickly blame Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in Southeast Asia. The New York Times calls the Marriott “the most visibly American building in the city, [leaving] little doubt about the intentions of the terrorists.” Two weeks before, a militant captured in a raid in central Java revealed that he had recently delivered two carloads of bombmaking materials to Jakarta. Furthermore, drawings were found indicating that JI was planning an attack on one of the following targets: the Grand Hyatt, Mulia, or Marriott hotels, two Jakarta shopping malls, or some Christian sites. Police claim they went on high alert. But the Marriott says they were never given any warning, and there was no public alert of any kind. The US ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, says the US was not given any warning. Time magazine will later comment that “serious questions remain about just how much more police might have done to prevent the attack in the first place.” [New York Times, 8/7/2003; Time, 8/10/2003] One Indonesian later convicted for a role in the bombing, Mohammad Rais, will later testify in court that he had frequently met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in recent years, and the bombing was inspired by bin Laden’s talk about waging war against the US and its allies. “We saw the Marriott attack as a message from Osama bin Laden.” [Associated Press, 12/2/2004] US treasury official Stuart Levey will later claim that al-Qaeda funded the attack by having a courier bring $30,000 in cash to Indonesia. [USA Today, 6/18/2006] The funds for the bombing allegedly passed through Hambali, an al-Qaeda and JI leader arrested in Thailand several days later (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/19/2003] JI leaders Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top are said to have masterminded the bombing, together with Hambali. [New York Times, 10/7/2005]
Joe Trento. [Source: Canal+]After 9/11, an unnamed former CIA officer who worked in Saudi Arabia will tell investigative journalist Joe Trento that hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were allowed to operate in the US unchecked (see, e.g., February 4-Mid-May 2000 and Mid-May-December 2000) because they were agents of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agency. “We had been unable to penetrate al-Qaeda. The Saudis claimed that they had done it successfully. Both Alhazmi and Almihdhar were Saudi agents. We thought they had been screened. It turned out the man responsible for recruiting them had been loyal to Osama bin Laden. The truth is bin Laden himself was a Saudi agent at one time. He successfully penetrated Saudi intelligence and created his own operation inside. The CIA relied on the Saudis vetting their own agents. It was a huge mistake. The reason the FBI was not given any information about either man is because they were Saudi assets operating with CIA knowledge in the United States.” [Stories That Matter, 8/6/2003] In a 2006 book the Trentos will add: “Saudi intelligence had sent agents Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi to spy on a meeting of top associates of al-Qaeda in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, January 5-8, 2000. ‘The CIA/Saudi hope was that the Saudis would learn details of bin Laden’s future plans. Instead plans were finalized and the Saudis learned nothing,’ says a terrorism expert who asks that his identity be withheld… Under normal circumstances, the names of Almihdhar and Alhazmi should have been placed on the State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and US Customs watch lists. The two men would have been automatically denied entry into the US. Because they were perceived as working for a friendly intelligence service, however, the CIA did not pass along the names.” [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 8]
Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie). [Source: Defense Department]Hambali (a.k.a. Riduan Isamuddin) is arrested in Thailand in a joint US-Thai operation. He has been considered the operational leader of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. He was involved in the Bojinka plot in 1995, attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), and was said to be involved in the 2002 bombing of two nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia (see October 12, 2002), the 2003 bombing of a Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003), and other similar acts. He is taken into US custody and is said to quickly and fully cooperate with his captors. [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003] According to the Washington Post, at some point he will be transferred to the US naval base at the British island colony of Diego Garcia, where the CIA is believed to have a secret interrogation center. [Washington Post, 12/17/2004; Washington Post, 1/2/2005, pp. A01] Two of Hambali’s associates - Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), and Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) - are arrested with him. Both are Malaysians and are said to be al-Qaeda operatives. Supposedly they were members of a four person suicide squad working for Hambali and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to hijack an airplane (see October 2001-February 2002). [Time, 10/6/2003] The US will later classify both of them, and Hambali, as about a dozen of the top al-Qaeda operatives in US custody (see September 2-3, 2006).
The liberal news publication CounterPunch profiles the “Rumsfeld Group,” a government public relations group put together after the 9/11 attacks to manipulate the media’s reporting of the Bush administration’s war on terror (see Late May 2001). One noteworthy aspect of the profile is the success the “Rumsfeld Group” has had in working with the press to spread its message.
Benador Associates - One of the most effective “perception managers” for the Bush administration is Elena Benador, the media placement expert who runs Benador Associates. She oversees the Middle East Forum, an organization CounterPunch reporter Jeffrey St. Clair calls “a fanatically pro-Zionist paper mill,” and has close connections with some of Washington’s most influential hardliners and neoconservatives, including Michael Ledeen, Charles Krauthammer, Alexander Haig, Max Boot, Daniel Pipes, Richard Perle, and Judith Miller. Benador is given the task of getting these pro-war hawks on the air and in the press as often as possible. She does an excellent job in both getting the placements and crafting the message to ensure that they all make the same points. “There are some things, you just have to state them in a different way, in a slightly different way,” Benador explains. “If not, people get scared.”
Washington Post Particularly Compliant - Many press and television news outlets help promulgate the Pentagon’s story, but, St. Clair will note, few are as reliable or as enthusiastic as the Washington Post. He mentions the example of Private Jessica Lynch, whose story was fed for weeks by an over-the-top report from the Post that was fueled entirely by PR flacks from the Pentagon’s Combat Camera operation (see April 1, 2003 and April 3, 2003). In the months leading up to the Iraq invasion, the Post’s op-eds ran 3 to 1 in favor of attacking Iraq. St. Clair notes that in 1988, the Post shrugged off reports of Saddam Hussein gassing Iranians and his own Iraqis as “a quirk of war”; at that point, the US wanted close relations with the Hussein regime, and wanted to play down Hussein’s depredations. The Post echoed the government’s lack of interest.
Firing of Donahue - St. Clair points to MSNBC’s firing of liberal talk show host Phil Donahue on the eve of the Iraq invasion (see February 25, 2003) as another example of the Pentagon’s reach into the mainstream US media. At the behest of the Pentagon’s PR officials, MSNBC fired Donahue and replaced him with a pro-war broadcast called Countdown: Iraq. While MSNBC blamed “poor ratings” on the firing, in reality Donahue’s ratings were MSNBC’s highest. Instead, the network did not like what it called Donahue’s propensity to have “anti-war, anti-Bush” voices on his show. [CounterPunch, 8/13/2003]
Entity Tags: Michael Ledeen, Jeffrey St. Clair, Elena Benador, Daniel Pipes, CounterPunch, Charles Krauthammer, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Jessica Lynch, Max Boot, Judith Miller, Washington Post, Middle East Forum, MSNBC, Richard Perle, Phil Donahue
Timeline Tags: Domestic Propaganda
The CIA’s Baghdad station chief, Gerry Meyer (see May 18, 2006), files an Aardwolf, or time-critical situation report, about the crisis in the area in the immediate aftermath of the bombing of the UN offices in that city (see August 29, 2003). The report says that the UN bombing was part of a strategy by a new and bold insurgency to discredit and isolate the US-led coalition, and warns that insurgents and terrorists have the capability to carry out many more attacks against “soft targets.” The insurgency is increasingly dangerous, threatens to erase early progress made by the US, and could actually overwhelm occupation forces. The report also says that there are two strands of violence, one from foreign fighters and one from Iraqi insurgents. In addition, it predicts that the capture of Saddam Hussein will not end the violence as he appears not to be in control of it. Some in the Bush administration think the report is too negative and L. Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, attaches a note to it downplaying the worsening conditions in Iraq. [Risen, 2006, pp. 141-142; Wilson, 2007, pp. 157] Meyer will file another such report in November (see November 10, 2003).
In an interview, the US officer in charge of interrogations at Abu Ghraib acknowledges that, as per the directive from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (see December 2, 2002), detainees are subjected to stress positioning. Stress positions are a violation of the Geneva Conventions. [Huffington Post, 4/21/2009]
9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) lies about Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, Osama bin laden’s highly trusted courier, in an apparent attempt to protect bin Laden. KSM was captured by the US in March 2003 (see February 29 or March 1, 2003), and soon was interrogated and tortured with the use of waterboarding (see Shortly After February 29 or March 1, 2003). US intelligence does not yet know Ahmed’s real name, but it does know his alias, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, and it believes he is one of bin Laden’s most trusted couriers. Later reports suggest that KSM is not asked about Ahmed until the autumn of 2003. Some accounts will claim that KSM is no longer being waterboarded by this time. However, other accounts contradict this. In any case, other torture techniques, known by the euphemism “enhanced interrogation,” are still sometimes being used on him. [New York Times, 5/3/2011] In 2011, CIA Director Leon Panetta will make comments that make clear KSM is asked about Ahmed while being waterboarded. He will say: “[N]ot only did the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed not provide us with key leads on bin Laden’s courier, Abu Ahmed; it actually produced false and misleading information. [KSM] specifically told his interrogators that Abu Ahmed had moved to Peshawar [Pakistan], got married, and ceased his role as an al-Qaeda facilitator—which was not true, as we now know. All we learned about Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti through the use of waterboarding and other ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ against [KSM] was the confirmation of the already known fact that the courier existed and used an alias.” [Washington Post, 5/12/2011]
The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) sends a team to Iraq to train interrogators in harsh, SERE-derived methods of interrogation (see December 2001, January 2002 and After, July 2002, and July 1-2, 2002). JPRA personnel demonstrate a number of methods to Special Military Unit (SMU) personnel, including “walling” (see May 10, 2005) and particular methods of physically striking detainees. JPRA personnel are present at several interrogations where detainees are placed in stress positions and repeatedly slapped. In at least one interrogation, JPRA personnel take part in abusing a prisoner, stripping him naked and giving orders to place him in a stress position for 12 hours. In August 2007, one JRPA official will tell the Senate Armed Services Committee that, in regards to stripping detainees, “we [had] done this 100 times, 1,000 times with our [SERE school] students.” [Huffington Post, 4/21/2009]
Shaklee logo. [Source: IAm4Kids (.com)]The “Animal Liberation Brigade” and “Revolutionary Cells,” two offshoots of the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC—see 1998 and 2002 and After) animal rights organization, bomb the offices of Shaklee Inc. in Pleasanton, California. No one is injured in the blast. SHAC has targeted Shaklee because its parent company, Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., does business with Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), long accused of abusing and torturing animals in its research practices. (Apparently the fact that People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), another animal rights organization, lists Shaklee as one of its “Caring Consumers” on its Web site does not affect the decision to bomb Shaklee’s offices.) The FBI offers a $50,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of the prime suspect in both the Shaklee and Chiron (see April - August 2003) bombings, Daniel Andreas San Diego of Sonoma, California. An anonymous email claiming responsibility for the bombing says that activists used a 10-pound ammonium nitrate bomb “strapped with nails.” Although the building sustains little damage, the email warns that “we will now be doubling the size of every device we make” and that “customers and their families are considered legitimate targets.… We gave all the customers the chance, the choice, to withdraw their business from HLS.” The email says: “Now you all will have to reap what you have sown.… You never know when your house, your car even, might go boom.… Or maybe it will be a shot in the dark.” [Anti-Defamation League, 2005]
The King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, Bosnia. [Source: Ca adian Broadcasting Corporation]Abdurahman Khadr is a CIA informant (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003) and has been posing as a prisoner in Guantanamo so he can inform on the other prisoners there (see Spring 2003). But in September 2003, he leaves Guantanamo because the CIA gives him a new assignment, to infiltrate al-Qaeda-linked groups in Bosnia. He is given a brief training course in undercover work and then sent to Bosnia on a false passport. US intelligence believes that Bosnia has become an important pipeline for al-Qaeda volunteers who want to fight in Iraq. Khadr spends time at the King Fahd mosque, a large Sarajevo mosque which the US believes is a center of al-Qaeda activity. He becomes friendly with a suspected recruiter for al-Qaeda operations in Iraq. The CIA then wants him to follow the pipeline to Iraq and inform on al-Qaeda operations there. But Khadr considers Iraq far too dangerous. He is a Canadian citizen, and he contacts his grandmother in Canada and has her go public with part of his story so he will not be of use as an informant any more. In November 2003, he returns to Canada, after the CIA fails to give him most of his promised salary for his informant work. In February 2004, he contacts Canadian reporters and tells them his full story about being a CIA informant. His father, Ahmed Said Khadr, was a founding member of al-Qaeda, and his family disowns him when they find out about his involvement with the CIA. [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2004]
Carmen Toro. [Source: Spanish Interior Ministry]In September 2003, Emilio Suarez Trashorras, Rafa Zouhier, Antonio Toro, his wife Carmen Toro, Rachid Aglif, Jamal Ahmidan (alias “El Chino”), and Mohammed Oulad Akcha meet at a McDonald’s restaurant in Madrid. The first five people are linked to a mine in the Asturias region of Spain and have no Islamist militant background. Ahmidan and Akcha are members of a group of Islamist militants and are meeting the others to buy explosives stolen from the mine. Ahmidan goes to Asturias at least five times from December 2003 to February 2004 to work out the explosives deal. He, Akcha, and others in their militant group will then use the explosives in the March 2004 Madrid train bombings (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). Interestingly, at least four of the five—Trashorras, Zouhier, and both Toros—are government informants at the time. Supposedly, none of them tell their handlers about this explosives deal. [El Mundo (Madrid), 6/10/2004] However, Zouhier will later claim that he repeatedly told his handler about the deal. He will say: “I told them. I mentioned all the suspicions I had regarding the explosives. In 2003 I warned that ‘these people want to sell 150 kilos’. I told them 1,000 times.” [Agence France-Presse, 2/28/2007] His handler, known by the alias Victor, will initially dispute this, but in 2007 he will finally admit that Zouhier did tell him in March 2003 that Trashorras and Antonio Toro were dealing in stolen explosives and had 150 kilograms of explosives ready to sell. Zouhier even passed on that they asked him about using cell phones as detonating devices. Police then began monitoring Trashorras and Toro (see March 2003). Trashorras, Zouhier, and Aglif will eventually be sentenced to various prison terms, while the Toros will be acquitted. Trashorras will get life in prison (see October 31, 2007).
Sheldon Bradshaw, a deputy assistant attorney general at the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), sends a memo to Roz Rettman of the Office of Management and Budget. The memo remains secret, but it concerns an unspecified piece of draft legislation. It is in response to a Freedom of Information Act Request for documents concerning the treatment of detainees. [ProPublica, 4/16/2009]
The Pittsburg County Courthouse, where Terry Nichols will be tried on 161 counts of first-degree murder. [Source: Associated Press]Oklahoma State District Judge Steven Taylor rules that convicted Oklahoma City bombing conspirator Terry Nichols, already serving life after being convicted of federal charges for his role in the bombing conspiracy (see June 4, 1998), will be tried in McAlester, Oklahoma, instead of in or near Oklahoma City. Nichols faces 160 (later amended to 161) state charges of first-degree murder, each of which could result in the death penalty (see May 13, 2003). Defense lawyers successfully argued that Nichols would suffer from “prejudicial publicity” among jurors from the Oklahoma City area, though they had argued that the trial should be moved out of state entirely. [New York Times, 9/4/2003; New York Times, 9/7/2003; New York Times, 9/9/2003]
A New York man is caught hiding in a crate that had been flown by cargo jet from New York to Dallas, raising questions about airport security. Charles McKinley wanted to go home, and had already had himself shipped as freight from Newark to Buffalo, then from Buffalo to Fort Wayne, Indiana, and on to Dallas, where his crate was shipped by truck to his mother’s house. The deliveryman reports McKinley to the local police. Critics say the McKinley incident is the latest in a string of episodes highlighting the vulnerability of the nation’s airports and cargo shipments. Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) tells a reporter: “Today, it was just a guy trying to fly cheaply from New York to Dallas to visit his parents. But in the future, a member of al-Qaeda could have himself packed into an air cargo container.” [CNN, 9/10/2003; Carter, 2004, pp. 15]
A frame of Saeed Alghamdi in his martyr video. [Source: Al Jazeera]A martyr video of 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi is broadcast on the Al Jazeera satellite network. Alghamdi says, “America is the enemy that every Muslim should fight.… I tell you that we are preparing something for you. God will punish you in a big way. And we promise the United States of America that we will stop you, that we will hurt you - and we will make sure that you don’t have any peace.” Alghamdi specifically mentions in the video that it was recorded December 23, 2000, and that it will serve as the reading of his final will and testimony before he leaves to the US. Al Jazeera has previously broadcast two 9/11 hijacker martyr videos (see April 15, 2002 and September 9, 2002), but while those only showed speeches, this seven-minute video also shows Alghamdi using a variety of weapons in Afghanistan, including a rocket launcher. The video also contains audio of a voice said to belong to Osama bin Laden praising Alghamdi. Bin Laden is heard saying, “He is a good person. He has good qualities. He is very righteous. He fears God, and God may protect him.” [CNN, 9/12/2003]
The legal experts at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) issue a memorandum amending the set of interrogation rules included in a September 10 memo (see September 10, 2003) by military legal experts in Iraq. The additional methods included in that memo can only be used with prior approval by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on a case-by-case basis, the OSJA document says. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 ] Like Major General Geoffrey Miller, the OSJA stresses the importance of collaboration between MPs and intelligence personnel. It also provides “safeguards such as legal reviews of the interrogation plans and scrutiny of how they were carried out,” the Washington Post later reports. [Washington Post, 6/12/2004] Additionally, the memo discusses how the Arab fear of dogs can be exploited. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 ] According to a later report (see August 25, 2004) by General George R. Fay, interrogators at Abu Ghraib immediately adopt the new set of rules. But Staff Judge Advocate Colonel Mark Warren will recall that the memo is not implemented until its approval by the US Central Command (CENTCOM). [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 ] Evidence, however, supports the Fay report. “After mid-September 2003,” Fay will write, “all [s]oldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib had to read a memorandum titled IROE [Interrogations Rules of Engagement], acknowledging they understood the ICRP, and sign a confirmation sheet indicating they had read and understood the ICRP.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 ] According to classified documents uncovered by the Senate Armed Services Committee (see April 21, 2009), CENTCOM lawyers begin objecting to the policies almost immediately. One e-mail, from a CENTCOM lawyer to a Staff Judge Advocate, warns, “Many of the techniques appear to violate [Geneva Conventions] III and IV and should not be used.” [Huffington Post, 4/21/2009]
Private Alyssa Peterson. [Source: Arizona Daily Sun]Private Alyssa Peterson, deployed as an Arabic-speaking interrogator in Iraq, commits suicide rather than participate in torturing Iraqi prisoners. Peterson, from Flagstaff, Arizona, serves with the 311th Military Intelligence Unit, a part of the 101st Airborne, at an American air base in Tal Afar. Her death is initially cited as an accident resulting from a “non-hostile weapons discharge,” a not uncommon citation. Shortly after her death, Army officials tell the Arizona Republic that “a number of possible scenarios are being considered, including Peterson’s own weapon discharging, the weapon of another soldier discharging, or the accidental shooting of Peterson by an Iraqi civilian.” In 2005, reporter Kevin Elston will probe more deeply into Peterson’s death; documents released under the Freedom of Information Act will show that, according to Elston’s report for radio station KNAU: “Peterson objected to the interrogation techniques used on prisoners. She refused to participate after only two nights working in the unit known as the cage. Army spokespersons for her unit have refused to describe the interrogation techniques Alyssa objected to. They say all records of those techniques have now been destroyed.” Official records show that Peterson had been “reprimanded” for showing “empathy” for the prisoners. The report of her death states, “She said that she did not know how to be two people; she… could not be one person in the cage and another outside the wire.” She was reassigned to gate duty, and sent to suicide prevention training, but, the report reads, “[O]n the night of September 15th, 2003, Army investigators concluded she shot and killed herself with her service rifle.” A notebook is found next to her body, but its contents are entirely redacted. Peterson also leaves a suicide note, which Elston will be unable to obtain. After reviewing the records documenting the circumstances of her death, Elston will say: “The reactions to the suicide were that she was having a difficult time separating her personal feelings from her professional duties. That was the consistent point in the testimonies, that she objected to the interrogation techniques, without describing what those techniques were.” Peterson’s parents will not be told of their daughter’s suicide for three years, but are told merely that she died as a result of an accident. [Huffington Post, 4/24/2009] In 2009, reporter and author Greg Mitchell will interview former Sergeant Kayla Williams, an Army interpreter who served briefly with Peterson at Tal Afar. Williams, like Peterson, objected to abusive techniques being used on prisoners, and is eventually transferred to different duties (see Late September 2003). Williams will note that there are probably more factors involved in Peterson’s suicide than her revulsion to torture. “It’s always a bunch of things coming together to the point you feel so overwhelmed that there’s no way out,” Williams will say. “I witnessed abuse, I felt uncomfortable with it, but I didn’t kill myself, because I could see the bigger context. I felt a lot of angst about whether I had an obligation to report it, and had any way to report it. Was it classified? Who should I turn to?… It also made me think, what are we as humans, that we do this to each other? It made me question my humanity and the humanity of all Americans. It was difficult, and to this day I can no longer think I am a really good person and will do the right thing in the right situation.” Mitchell will write, “Such an experience might have been truly shattering to the deeply religious Peterson.” [Huffington Post, 4/24/2009]
The 2007 PBS documentary “America at a Crossroads: The Brotherhood” will claim that Spanish investigators discovered this picture of Darkazanli holding a Kalishnikov rifle in Afghanistan. [Source: PBS]A Spanish judge issues an indictment against Mamoun Darkazanli and 34 others, alleging that they belonged to or supported the al-Qaeda cell in Madrid, which assisted the 9/11 hijackers in planning the attack. Darkazanli’s name appears 177 times in the 690-page indictment. He is accused of acting as bin Laden’s “financier in Europe.”
“The list of those with whom Darkazanli has done business or otherwise exchanged money reads like a Who’s Who of al-Qaeda: Wadih El-Hage, bin Laden’s one-time personal secretary; [Tayyib al-Madani], the husband of bin Laden’s niece and, before 9/11, al-Qaeda’s chief financial officer; and Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, the head of a training camp for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan who journeyed to Hamburg to visit Darkazanli in 1996.” [Chicago Tribune, 10/5/2003] The CIA had been monitoring Darkazanli sometime before December 1999 and had tried to convince Germany to “turn” him into an al-Qaeda informant. However, the CIA refused Germany’s request to share information regarding Darkazanli’s terrorist ties in the spring of 2000 (see Spring 2000). [Chicago Tribune, 11/17/2002]
An Associated Press (AP) report provides details of what alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) has apparently told his CIA interrogators. The article, based on “interrogation reports” reviewed by the AP, makes the following claims:
KSM worked on the Bojinka plot in 1994 and 1995 in the Philippines with Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah;
After Yousef and Murad were captured (see January 6, 1995 and February 7, 1995), KSM began to devise a new plot that focused on hijackings on US soil;
KSM first pitched the 9/11 plot to Osama bin Laden in 1996. He wanted bin Laden “to give him money and operatives so he could hijack 10 planes in the United States and fly them into targets”;
After bin Laden agreed in principle, the original plan, which called for hijacking five commercial jets on each US coast, was modified several times. Some versions even had the planes being blown up in mid-air, possibly with the aid of shoe bombs. Bin Laden scrapped various parts of the plan, including attacks on both coasts and hijacking or bombing some planes in East Asia as well;
The original four al-Qaeda operatives bin Laden offered KSM for the plot were eventual hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, as well as Khallad bin Attash and Abu Bara al-Yemeni. “All four operatives only knew that they had volunteered for a martyrdom operation involving planes,” one interrogation report apparently states;
The first major change to the plans occurred in 1999 when the two Yemeni operatives could not get US visas (see April 3, 1999). [Associated Press, 9/21/2003] (According to the 9/11 Commission Report, KSM actually says Abu Bara al-Yemeni never applied for a US visa); [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 492]
Bin Laden then offered KSM additional operatives, including a member of his personal security detail;
At that time the plot was to hijack a small number of planes in the United States and East Asia and either have them explode or crash into targets simultaneously;
In 1999, the four original operatives picked for the plot traveled to Afghanistan to train at one of bin Laden’s camps, where they received specialized commando training (see Late 1999);
Al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) was, according to the report, a “key event in the plot,” although it does not say whether KSM was physically present. On the other hand, it confirms the presence of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali;
KSM communicated with Alhazmi and Almihdhar while they were in the US using Internet chat software;
KSM has never heard of Omar al-Bayoumi, an apparent Saudi intelligence agent who provided some assistance to future 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi when they arrived in California. Neither did he arrange for anyone else in the US to assist Almihdhar and Alhazmi when they arrived in California. Despite this, Almihdhar and Alhazmi soon made contact with a network of people linked to Saudi intelligence services (see January 15-February 2000 and June 23-July 2001);
Bin Laden canceled the East Asian portion of the attacks in the spring of 2000, because, according to a quote from KSM contained in a report, “it would be too difficult to synchronize” attacks in the United States and Asia;
Around that time, KSM reached out to Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia. He began “recruiting JI operatives for inclusion in the hijacking plot as part of his second wave of hijacking attacks to occur after Sept. 11,” one summary reportedly says;
Zacarias Moussaoui also went to Malaysia in the run-up to 9/11 (see September-October 2000);
In its final stages, the plan called for as many as 22 terrorists and four planes in a first wave, followed by a second wave of suicide hijackings that were to be aided possibly by al-Qaeda allies in Southeast Asia;
The hijacking teams were originally made up of members from different countries where al-Qaeda had recruited, but in the final stages bin Laden chose instead to use a large group of young Saudi men to populate the hijacking teams;
KSM told interrogators about other terror plots that were in various stages of planning or had been temporarily disrupted when he was captured, including one planned for Singapore (see June 2001 and November 15-Late December 2001);
KSM and al-Qaeda were still actively looking to strike US, Western, and Israeli targets across the world as of this year. [Associated Press, 9/21/2003]
These statements attributed to KSM are similar to later statements attributed to him by the 9/11 Commission Report. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004] The Associated Press article cautions that US authorities are still investigating what KSM is telling them, “to eliminate deliberate misinformation.” [Associated Press, 9/21/2003] KSM made some or all these statements under torture, leading some to question their reliability (see Shortly After February 29 or March 1, 2003, After March 7, 2003, June 16, 2004, and August 6, 2007).
In September and October 2003, Mohdar Abdullah, an associate of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar who is being held in a US jail, allegedly brags to fellow prisoners that he knew the two hijackers were planning a terrorist attack (see Early 2000 and see Late August-September 10, 2001). Despite suspicions that he knowingly assisted the hijackers’ plans, Abdullah is only being held for an immigration violation, and he is due to be deported soon. But, according to the 9/11 Commission, the US Attorney for the Southern District of California decides not to prosecute him on charges stemming from these new allegations. Furthermore, the US Justice Department does not even delay his deportation to allow further investigation of this new information. In May 2004, the 9/11 Commission first hears about the new evidence against Abdullah. However, Abdullah is deported to Yemen on May 21, 2004 (see May 21, 2004). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 217-219] Abdullah is a Yemeni citizen, and he has been stuck in prison for many months because the Yemeni government does not want him back. According to his lawyer, he is only able to be deported after intense pressure by the State Department on the Yemeni government (see May 21, 2004). [San Diego Union-Tribune, 5/26/2004] Not long after Abdullah is deported, a surveillance video will be discovered from the Los Angeles airport, showing Abdullah, Alhazmi, and an unknown third man seemingly casing the airport and recording security measures with a video camera (see June 10, 2000). It is not known when exactly this video is discovered, but a grand jury subpoena for it will be dated October 2004. In September 2006, some anonymous law enforcement officials will tell NBC News that they regret deporting Abdullah, given the discovered video. These officials will say that the FBI has reopened its investigation into Abdullah and is reexamining all of his contacts in the US. NBC News will comment: “Why didn’t they find these tapes until 2004 isn’t known—especially since the FBI knew that on the day these tapes were shot in June 2000, one of the hijackers went to Los Angeles Airport for a flight home to Yemen. Critics are certain to question whether the FBI again missed an important clue, and let a possible accomplice get away.” [MSNBC, 9/8/2006]
Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil. [Source: Joel Nito / Agence France-Presse]An “envoy” of bin Laden’s brother-in-law is accused of running al-Qaeda front companies in the Philippines and is deported. Mahmoud Afif Abdeljalil, a Jordanian, was arrested in the Philippines in early 1995 and accused of supporting the Bojinka plot, but then was let go (see January 6, 1995 and April 1, 1995-Early 1996). He is arrested in the Philippines again on this day while attempting to sell some properties owned by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law. [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002; Time, 10/27/2003] Philippine officials call him a suspected al-Qaeda operative who had been in close contact with militants from the Abu Sayyaf and other groups. He is called an “envoy” or “point man” for Khalifa, and reputedly took over some of Khalifa’s business front companies after Khalifa left the country in 1994 (see December 1, 1994). His house was used as a safe-house and meeting place for al-Qaeda operatives. [Agence France-Presse, 10/23/2003; Associated Press, 10/23/2003] However, despite all these serious allegations, Abdeljalil is deported back to Jordan in early 2004. [Associated Press, 3/1/2004]
A man thought to be al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri calls for the overthrow of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in an audio cassette made public on this day. The man calls on Pakistanis to “unite and cooperate to topple this traitor and install a sincere leadership that would defend Islam and Muslims.” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 230, 436] There will be two apparently al-Qaeda-linked assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003 (see December 14 and 25, 2003).
Kayla Williams. [Source: Bowling Green State University]Sergeant Kayla Williams, an Army interpreter, witnesses prisoners being abused while being detained in Mosul. Williams is troubled by the death of an acquaintance, Private Alyssa Peterson, who actually committed suicide rather than take part in the torture of prisoners (see September 15, 2003 and After). Williams witnesses an incident that closely parallels the kind of interrogation Peterson objected to. She is taken into a special holding area called “the cage,” where she sees US soldiers punching a naked detainee in the face and burning him with lit cigarettes. There is no interrogation, just the brutalization of a prisoner. Williams will later write: “It’s one thing to make fun of someone and attempt to humiliate him. With words. That’s one thing. But flicking lit cigarettes at somebody—like burning him—that’s illegal.” She will later write that soldiers will soon tell her that “the old rules no longer applied because this was a different world. This was a new kind of war.” In 2005, Williams will recall the incident on CNN: “I was asked to assist. And what I saw was that individuals who were doing interrogations had slipped over a line and were really doing things that were inappropriate. There were prisoners that were burned with lit cigarettes. They stripped prisoners naked and then removed their blindfolds so that I was the first thing they saw. And then we were supposed to mock them and degrade their manhood. And it really didn’t seem to make a lot of sense to me. I didn’t know if this was standard. But it did not seem to work. And it really made me feel like we were losing that crucial moral higher ground, and we weren’t behaving in the way that Americans are supposed to behave.” After that session and several others that same day, she tells a superior officer that she will not take part in future interrogations. “I sat through it at the time,” she will recall. “But after it was over I did approach the non-commissioned officer in charge and told him I think you may be violating the Geneva Conventions.… He said he knew and I said I wouldn’t participate again and he respected that, but I was really, really stunned.” In 2009, Williams will say: “In general, interrogation is not fun, even if you follow the rules. And I didn’t see any good intelligence being gained. The other problem is that, in situations like that, you have people that are not terrorists being picked up, and being questioned. And, if you treat an innocent person like that, they walk out a terrorist.” [Huffington Post, 4/24/2009]
Since late 2002, Abdelkader Farssaoui, a.k.a. Cartagena, has been informing on a group of Islamist militants for the Spanish police and the intelligence agency UCI (see September 2002-October 2003). He is an imam and is highly trusted by the other members of the group. He attends all their secret meetings. In October 2003, he attends another meeting by this group that starts around 11:00 p.m. and ends at six in the morning. As usual, he starts the meeting by leading the group in prayer. Then Madrid train bombings mastermind Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet speaks for a long time. For the first time, Fakhet calls for martyrs. He says that it is not enough to just be a mujaheddin, but martyrs are needed for action in Madrid. All the people in the group, including Farssaoui, reply that they are ready to be martyrs. Farssaoui is so worried about this meeting that he immediately contacts his police handlers the next day and tells them what happened. But the police do not seem overly concerned. Farssaoui will later tell him that his handlers, led by police inspector Mariano Rayon, tell him that Fakhet’s group talks big, but will never actually do anything. (This is in spite of the fact that several members of the group were arrested several months earlier for alleged involvement in a series of bombings in Morocco (see Late May-June 19, 2003).) Farssaoui is told to immediately leave Madrid for another assignment. He does, thus ending his connection to the bombers. It is later believe that this meeting marks the moment the group begins to go operational with an attack plan, which will result in the bombing of trains in Madrid several months later (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). Farssaoui says that his handlers forbid him to share what he learns with judge Baltasar Garzon, who is leading investigations into al-Qaeda related cases in Spain. The testimony Farssaoui will give in 2007 will contradict some details of earlier testimony he gave in the same trial, but he will claim that it took him time to find courage to tell the whole truth. [El Mundo (Madrid), 10/21/2004; El Mundo (Madrid), 2/13/2006; El Mundo (Madrid), 3/7/2007; ABC (Spain), 3/7/2007]
9/11 Commission staff director Philip Zelikow and several members of his staff embark on a fact-finding mission to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries. While in Pakistan, they interview at least two senior members of the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency. Whether they are investigating a possible ISI role in the 9/11 plot remains unclear. [United Press International, 11/5/2003]
Dennis Mahon, a veteran white supremacist (see 1973 and After, August 1994 - March 1995, November 1994, and February 9, 1996 and After) and member of the White Aryan Resistance (WAR), leaves a voice message at the Scottsdale, Arizona, Office of Diversity and Dialogue that is so menacing as to attract the attention of law enforcement authorities. Mahon, speaking in reference to Scottsdale’s upcoming Hispanic heritage week celebration, says: “You guys, you, you, rich white people you really, you really are something else. If, if I had my way I’d sic about hundred thousand illegal aliens right into Scottsdale and see how you like your damn heritage. The White Aryan Resistance is growing in Scottsdale. There’s a few white people who are standing up. Take care.” Authorities later suspect Mahon of bombing the office (see February 26, 2004 and After). [TPM Muckraker, 1/10/2012]
A Pakistani attack helicopter fires at Ahmed Said Khadr’s safe house. [Source: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation]Al-Qaeda leader Ahmed Said Khadr is killed in a shootout with the Pakistani army. The police received reports that senior members of al-Qaeda were hiding in South Waziristan, part of Pakistan’s tribal region near Afghanistan. The army attacks their safe house. After several hours of shooting, eight people in the safe house are killed and 18 are taken prisoner. One of the killed is later identified as Khadr. He is a long time Canadian citizen who ran a Canadian charity front called Human Concern International. After his death, a sympathetic jihadist group will refer to him as a “founding member” of al-Qaeda. [National Post, 10/14/2003; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 4/20/2006] In fact, thousands of al-Qaeda-linked militants have been hiding out in South Waziristan since early 2002, with the assistance of some in the Pakistani government (see Late 2002-Late 2003). The attack comes as Pakistan is under increasing international pressure to do something about the al-Qaeda safe haven, and takes place just days before Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is due to visit Pakistan. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid will later comment, “Buying time by carrying out an attack just before the visit of a senior US official became a pattern for [Pakistan].” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 270]
Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, said to be an important operative for both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate, is shot and killed by government forces in the Philippines. Al-Ghozi had escaped from a high-security prison in July 2003, along with two Abu Sayyaf militants. There are many questions about the escape, including suggestions that both of his fellow escapees, Omar Opik Lasal and Abdulmukim Edris, were long-time government informants (see July 14, 2003). Edris was killed in early August 2003. Supposedly he was arrested and then volunteered to show soldiers where al-Ghozi was hiding out. Along the way, he attempted to grab a weapon from a soldier and was shot. [BBC, 8/7/2003] His death came about two weeks after it was reported that he was a government informant. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7/23/2003] Lasal was rearrested on October 8, 2003. He will later admit that he was an informant and helped the government keep tabs on where al-Ghozi was hiding. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10/15/2003] Al-Ghozi is said to be shot while attempting to evade soldiers on a highway near a town in the southern Philippines, a heavily Muslim area. However, police officers and residents in the area say there is no sign of a firefight. The Sydney Morning Herald will later says this “fuel[s] rumors that al-Ghozi had already been captured and then killed at the best time to boost [the Philippines]‘s anti-terrorism image.” The governor of the area, said residents say they didn’t hear any shootout. “There were only two shots heard. There was no firefight.” Al-Ghozi’s death comes just six days before President Bush is scheduled to visit the Philippines, causing some to claim that the killing was timed for maximum political effect. [Sydney Morning Herald, 10/14/2003] Aquilino Pimentel, president of the Philippines Senate, will suggest that both Edris and al-Ghozi were summarily executed after being arrested in order to silence them from potentially revealing their confederates in their prison escape. [Manila Bulletin, 10/18/2003]
A new audiotape thought to contain a message from Osama bin Laden is broadcast by Al Jazeera. On the 31-minute tape the speaker says that the US occupation of Iraq, a “new Crusader campaign against the Islamic world,” is bogged down in the “quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates” and suffering mounting casualties from guerrillas. He also compares supporters in Iraq to great Muslim warriors of the past and forbids them from working with the Ba’ath party. After describing democracy as “the religion of ignorance,” he addresses the question of Palestine, and attacks the “road map” for peace between Israel and Palestine as well as Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, saying he is similar to Afghani President Hamid Karzai. He highlights US financial losses and budget deficits after 9/11, and would also apparently like to fight in Iraq: “God knows, if I could find a way to get to your battlefields, I would not hesitate.” [Associated Press, 10/19/2003; Laden, 2005, pp. 207-211] He also says, “We reserve the right to respond at the opportune moment and place against all of the countries participating in this unjust war, in particular: Great Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.” [Irujo, 2005, pp. 257] Bin Laden had not specially threatened Spain in any previous speeches. According to a Spanish investigator, the Madrid al-Qaeda cell hears the speech, notices this, and begins planning an attack in Spain the next day. This will result in the Madrid train bombings only five months later (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). [Benjamin and Simon, 2005, pp. 10] However, some evidence suggests the cell was already planning a bombing from about late 2002. [Associated Press, 4/10/2004]
Amnesty International publishes a report stating that it believes that “the totality of conditions” in which “most” of the detainees at Guantanamo are being held may itself amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Amnesty notes that the Committee against Torture, established to oversee implementation of the Convention against Torture (see October 21, 1994), “has expressly held that restraining detainees in very painful positions, hooding, threats, and prolonged sleep deprivation are methods of interrogation which violate the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” [Amnesty International, 10/20/2003]
Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald testifies before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary about post-9/11 legislative changes, and says that the removal of the “wall” was a significant step forward for US counterintelligence. The wall was a set of procedures which regulated the passage of intelligence information within the FBI and from the FBI to prosecutors (see July 19, 1995). Fitzgerald says the removal of the wall represented “the single greatest change that could be made to protect our country.” He cites four cases that he says are examples of how the wall and other such obstacles have hampered counterterrorism efforts:
The arrest of Ali Mohamed. Fitzgerald claims it would have been “far less difficult” to arrest al-Qaeda operative Ali Mohamed for his involvement in the attacks on US embassies in East Africa (see September 10, 1998) had it not been for the wall. [US Congress, 10/21/2003] However, author Peter Lance will point out, “But Fitzgerald neglected to tell the senators that… prosecutors and FBI agents had been monitoring the bombing cell members for two years or that they’d had multiple face-to-face meetings with Mohamed himself.” Mohamed, who was called a “key figure” in the Day of Terror plot in the US press in early 1995 (see February 3, 1995), had actually met Fitzgerald a year before the arrest and told him that he had trained bin Laden’s bodyguards, lived in bin Laden’s house, loved and believed in bin Laden, and that he didn’t need a fatwa to attack the US, as it was obvious the US was the enemy (see After October 1997). [Lance, 2006, pp. 274-6, 299-300]
The Day of Terror conspiracy. After the partial success of the World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993), the conspirators planned to attack other targets in New York, but were arrested by the FBI, which had penetrated their cell. All of the arrested plotters were successfully convicted. However, Fitzgerald tells the committee, “Prosecutors were in the dark about the details of the plot until very late in the day.” [US Congress, 10/21/2003; Lance, 2006, pp. 118-9]
The Millennium Alert. Fitzgerald says that in 1999, investigations into suspected millennium plots were hampered because “criminal prosecutors received information only in part and with lag time so as not to breach the wall.” All attacks planned for the millennium failed, including one plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport (see December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000).
Sharing Wadih El-Hage’s grand jury interview. In 1997, Al-Qaeda operative El-Hage provided information about bin Laden and his associates to a grand jury. Fitzgerald wanted to pass some of this information along to intelligence investigators (see September 24, 1997) but was unable to because grand jury information cannot be shared with intelligence investigators. To get around this restriction, an FBI agent had to get El-Hage to repeat the information outside the grand jury room. (Note: this example is not directly related to the “wall” under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but rather to a similar obstacle governing the passage of information in the opposite direction—from criminal agents to intelligence agents). [US Congress, 10/21/2003]
Omar Bakarbashat is quietly deported to Yemen after spending two years in US prisons. Bakarbashat, a Yemeni citizen, was arrested shortly after 9/11 and held as a material witness. He knew and worked with 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi at a gas station (see Autumn 2000). He was eventually charged with an immigration violation. He pled guilty to creating phony immigration documents and a Social Security card, and then served a six-month sentence. However, he chose to remain imprisoned so he could fight deportation. But after two years in prison, he gives up and agrees to be deported. According to his lawyer, he is interrogated and briefly jailed in Yemen, and then is let go. After that, he moves to Saudi Arabia. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 5/26/2004] It has been claimed that one day before the 9/11 attacks, Bakarbashat and others appeared to be celebrating the upcoming attacks (see Late August-September 10, 2001).
Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the nonprofit think tank the International Crisis Group, later says that during a trip to Afghanistan in November 2003, he is told by US military commanders and State Department officials that they are frustrated by rules preventing them from fighting Afghanistan’s booming illegal drug trade. Author James Risen notes the US military’s rules of engagement in Afghanistan states that if US soldiers discover illegal drugs they “could” destroy them, which is “very different from issuing firm rules stating that US forces must destroy any drugs discovered.” An ex-Green Beret later claims that he was specifically ordered to ignore heroin and opium when his unit discovered them on patrol. Assistant Secretary of State Bobby Charles, who fights in vain for tougher rules of engagement (see November 2004), will later complain, “In some cases [US troops] were destroying drugs, but in others they weren’t. [Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld didn’t want drugs to become a core mission.” [Risen, 2006, pp. 152-162]
Nancy Powell. [Source: US Embassy in Nepal]The US Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell publicly complains that Pakistani militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban have reconstituted themselves. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf banned the groups in January 2002 (see Shortly After January 12-March 2002). Powell says, “These banned groups are re-establishing themselves with new names.” Several days later, Musharraf bans the groups again. Between November 15 and 20, six groups are banned, including Jamiat ul-Ansar (formerly Harkat ul-Mujahedeen) and Khuddam ul-Islam (formerly Jaish-e-Mohammed). Notably, Jamaat al-Dawa (the renamed Lashkar-e-Toiba) is not rebanned. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 230, 436] Powell’s comments simply state what has been well known for a long time. For instance, the Washington Post reported in February 2003 that the organizations were active again after changing their names. [Washington Post, 2/8/2003]
Following his release from prison in Syria (see October 5, 2003), former terror suspect Maher Arar issues a statement distancing himself from al-Qaeda. “I am not a terrorist. I am not a member of al-Qaeda and I do not know any one who belongs to this group,” Arar says. “All I know about al-Qaeda is what I have seen in the media. I have never been to Afghanistan. I have never been anywhere near Afghanistan and I do not have any desire to ever go to Afghanistan.” [Canwest News Service, 1/20/2009]
Imam Abdelkader Farssaoui, a.k.a. Cartagena, will testify under oath as a protected witness in 2007 that he was an informant and informed on a group of the 2004 Madrid train bombers from 2002 to 2003 (see September 2002-October 2003). He informed for the UCIE, a police unit dealing with terrorism. The group he watches is led by Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, who will later be considered one of about three top leaders of the bomb plot. Farssaoui moves from Madrid in October 2003 and stops informing on Fakhet’s group (see October 2003). But not long after that, he is back in Madrid and claims that he sees Fakhet go by on a moped with close associate named Said Berraj. He follows them, and sees Fakhet meeting with two UCIE officers who used to be his handlers at the same spot where he used to meet them. He does not see Berraj and assumes he has gone to the bathroom or something like that. The next day he asks his handler if Fakhet is an informant too, and his handler dodges the question. Farssaoui is wearing a motorcycle helmet and is not spotted. He keeps this information to himself until after the bombings. [El Mundo (Madrid), 3/7/2007; ABC (Spain), 3/7/2007] Berraj is said to be Fakhet’s assistant, and other sources will confirm that Berraj was a government informant in 2003. Berraj will flee Spain two days before the bombings and has not been seen since. [El Mundo (Madrid), 1/15/2007] About one month after the bombings, Fakhet will be killed with six of the other bombers after police surround their hideout (see 9:05 p.m., April 3, 2004).
The commander of US forces in Iraq, General Ricardo Sanchez, says the week of unprecedented violence in Iraq is nothing more than “a strategically and operationally insignificant surge of attacks.” Less than 24 hours later, the US will suffer its biggest single loss of troops since the invasion began (see November 2, 2003). [Knight Ridder, 11/2/2003; Rich, 2006, pp. 108]
Allekema Lamari. [Source: Spanish Interior Ministry]The Spanish intelligence agency Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) warns in a report that Barakat Yarkas’s al-Qaeda cell has reconstituted itself (see November 13, 2001) and is planning a new attack in Spain. It specifically warns that Allekema Lamari and Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet are leading the new effort and are planning an attack on an unknown but significant target. This warning is based on comments Lamari made to his close associates. [Irujo, 2005, pp. 243] The warning is accurate; Lamari and Fakhet will be two of the leaders of the Madrid bombings in March 2004 (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). In retrospect, it is not surprising that Spanish intelligence is aware of such a warning, because at least two of the bomb plotters are actually government informants, and one of them is close to Lamari and another is close to Fakhet (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). But surprisingly, no action appears to be taken. Neither Fakhet, Lamari, nor any other members of their group are arrested before the bombings. A government informant will later claim under oath as a protected witness that Fakhet also was a government informant (see Shortly After October 2003). Mariano Rayon, head of the CNI, will later say, “We concluded that there was a certain and immediate threat against Spain or Spanish interests abroad.” The threat level was already high, but it was raised to “very high.” [ABC (Spain), 5/3/2007]
An Afghani civilian later identified as Abdul Wahid dies from what his autopsy report calls “multiple blunt force injuries to head, torso, and extremities.” Wahid is being held by US forces at a forward operating base in Helmand province. [American Civil Liberties Union, 10/24/2005]
Abdulaziz al-Muqrin. [Source: Agence France-Presse]A suicide bombing at a housing compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, kills 17. Most of the victims are Muslims working in Saudi Arabia. US and Saudi officials believe the bombing was masterminded by Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, believed to be al-Qaeda’s top figure in Saudi Arabia. [BBC, 12/6/2004]
The bombed Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey. [Source: Murad Sezer / Associated Press]On November 15, 2003, two Jewish synagogues are struck by suicide truck bombs in Istanbul, Turkey. Five days later, the British HSBC Bank and British Consulate in Istanbul are hit by more truck bombs. Fifty-eight people are killed in the attacks, including the British consul general, and over 750 are wounded. Turkish investigators believe the attacks were orchestrated by local al-Qaeda operatives after getting approval from Osama bin Laden. [BBC, 11/20/2003; BBC, 2/16/2007] In 2007, seven people will be sentenced to life in a Turkish prison for their role in the attacks. One of them is Luai Sakra, who confessed to being one of the two masterminds of the attacks (see March 21, 2006-February 16, 2007). Forty-one people receive shorter sentences, and 26 people are acquitted. [BBC, 2/16/2007] Evidence will later emerge suggesting that Sakra was an informant for the CIA, Turkey, and Syria at least in 2000 and 2001 (see 2000 and September 10, 2001).
Two alleged Yemeni terror financiers, cleric Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad and his assistant Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed, are extradited from Germany to the US to face trial. The FBI claims that the two men supported both Hamas and al-Qaeda, with al-Moayad having provided Osama bin Laden with up to $20 million. They were arrested in Germany in January in a sting operation run by the bureau (see January 2003). The extradition follows a ruling by Germany’s highest court that the men will face a fair trial in the US, not a military court or other special tribunal. [BBC, 11/16/2003]
In his proposed 2005 budget, President Bush proposes reducing the budget of the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (AFGP) from $750 million to $500 million. The budget allocates, in total, $27 billion for the nation’s first responders over the next four years. A Council on Foreign Relations study, based on surveys of emergency responder groups, shows that the minimum necessary to secure the US from a second major terrorist attack is around $94 billion—almost four times the amount approved by Bush. [Carter, 2004, pp. 20-21; White House, 4/3/2004; Federal Election Commission, 1/16/2008] Congress will manage to increase the funding for the program to $542 million. It had hoped to increase funding to around $900 million. [Center for American Progress, 8/25/2004; Charles Schumer, 9/22/2006]
According to journalist Ron Suskind, at the end of 2003, “The carefully constructed global network of [al-Qaeda’s] sigint and what can be called finint, or financial intelligence, started to go quiet. In short, al-Qaeda, and its affiliates and imitators, stopped leaving electronic footprints. It started slowly, but then became clear, a definable trend.” Al-Qaeda resorts more to low-tech methods, such as human couriers. One senior US intelligence official will later say, “We were surprised it took them so long” to figure out the dangers of electronic communication. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 277-279]
Shehzad Tanweer. [Source: Metropolitan Police]Shehzad Tanweer, one of the suicide bombers in the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005), visits Pakistan. He visited Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, but he may have just been visiting family on those trips. However, investigators will later believe that on his 2003 trip, he meets Osama Nazir, a leader of the Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Investigators will later suggest that Nazir could have given Tanweer advice about bomb-making. Tanweer also meets with Sher Ali, alleged to be a Jaish-e-Mohammed recruiting agent with links to Nazir and al-Qaeda leader Amjad Farooqi. Tanweer will travel to Pakistan in late 2004 and meet with Nazir again (see November 18, 2004-February 8, 2005). Nazir will be arrested soon thereafter in Pakistan on charges of participation in several attacks there in 2002. Shortly after the 7/7 bombings, Nazir will confirm from prison that he met Tanweer in 2003 and 2004. [Guardian, 7/18/2005; Daily Telegraph, 7/19/2005; Time, 7/24/2005]
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