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A container leaking an unknown but potentially dangerous substance is reported at a Kuwaiti girls’ school in Kuwait City. [Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, 1/20/2008] The container is a storage tank that is initially shown to contain mustard agent and phosgene. The report causes a brief media sensation in the British and US press. Later, more intensive analysis of the data by British inspectors shows that the tank contained no chemical warfare agents, but instead contained a substance known as inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). The US Defense Department will confirm those reports. [Illnesses, 3/19/1998]
A biography of Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan called Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb is published in Pakistan. The book is written by Pakistan Observer editor Zahid Malik, who authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will call Khan’s “favorite scribe.” The book describes Khan’s work on a nuclear weapon for Pakistan. Levy and Scott-Clark will comment that “the scientist [Khan] was glorified while his nemesis Munir Ahmed Khan [former head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission] (along with every else who had crossed Khan) was rubbished.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 306, 519]
Paul Wolfowitz, the neoconservative undersecretary of policy for Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, promotes the export of advanced AIM-9M air-to-air missiles to Israel. This is discovered by a lengthy investigation by the Bush administration into the export of classified weapons technology to China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, aware that Israel has already been caught selling an earlier version of the AIM missile to China in violation of a written agreement between Israel and the US, intervenes to stop the missile sales. Wolfowitz retains his position at the Defense Department until he and most of his neoconservative colleagues are turned out of the federal government by the onset of the Clinton administration. [CounterPunch, 2/28/2004]
Muhammed Cengic, who has close ties to Bosnian intelligence, negotiates a military cooperation agreement with Turkey. According to Prof. Cees Wiebes, the agreement ostensibly involves Turkish purchases of Bosnian arms, but “it is reasonable to assume that the Turkish-Bosnian arms traffic in reality went in the opposite direction.” The Cengic family is very powerful in Bosnia. Western intelligence sources describe them as “Mafia.” [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 178-179] The clan also includes Hasan Cengic, who is one of the key figures in the Third World Relief Agency charity front and illegal weapons pipeline (see Mid-1991-1996).
A few weeks after China signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime, it ships 34 nuclear-capable missiles to Pakistan. The shipment is tracked by Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction. Analysis of spy satellite photographs even tells Oehler exactly where the missiles are in Pakistan—Sargodha Air Force Base. President Clinton is briefed on the developments, but no action against Pakistan or China is taken at this time. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 257-258]
The US Security Council votes to impose tough sanctions on Yugoslavia, which effectively refers to Serbia since most other Yugoslav republics have declared independence. The embargo requires all the countries of the world to cease trading in any commodity, including oil, and to freeze all its foreign assets. All air traffic links are suspended as well. Sales of medicine and food are exempted. The sanctions are meant to pressure Serbia to agree to a cease fire in the war in Bosnia. [New York Times, 5/31/1992]
Nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan discusses purchasing No-dong missiles with North Korea’s foreign minister, Kim Yong-nam, who is visiting Pakistan. Khan wants the missiles because he is competing with another Pakistani organization, the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), in missile design, and is losing the competition. The PAEC started designing nuclear-capable missiles before Khan, and can produce missiles with a longer range. The No-dong missiles would enable Khan to leapfrog the PAEC, as they are long-range ballistic missiles that would be able to strike deep inside India. Khan says that Pakistan could purchase the missiles, or the two countries could negotiate an agreement under which Pakistan would give North Korea nuclear weapons technology in exchange for the missiles. An agreement will eventually be reached (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244-245]
A secret weapons pipeline into Bosnia in violation of a UN arms embargo is exposed. Large transport planes have been arriving once a week for four weeks from Sudan to Maribor, Slovenia. The cargo is marked as humanitarian aid but in fact the planes are carrying tons of weapons, mostly from surplus stocks of old Soviet weapons. The planes are run by a company belonging to Victor Bout, a notorious illegal arms dealer who will later work closely with the Taliban in Afghanistan (see October 1996-Late 2001). [Farah and Braun, 2007, pp. 50-51, 268-269] Such planes have been bringing weapons through Croatia bound for Muslim Bosnia, but due to deteriorating relations between Croatia and Muslim Bosnia, the Croatian government stops the flights and impounds 120 tons of weapons. At the same time, chartered Russian helicopters fly more weapons directly into Muslim Bosnia. Austrian government agents learn that the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) is financing all of these shipments. They are working with Hasan Cengic, a radical imam who is also a Bosnian government official. The TWRA and Cengic switch to other routes. The next year, the German government will stumbled across an illegal weapons deal being negotiated in Germany by Bosnian Muslims and Turkish arms dealers and arrest around 30. TWRA was the financial broker of the deal. But despite the exposure of TWRA as a charity front, no government takes any action against it and it will continue to be the main vehicle by which Muslim Bosnia gets illegal weapons. [Washington Post, 9/22/1996; Farah and Braun, 2007, pp. 50-51, 268-269] Bout and Cengic will apparently continue working together. A 2004 Bosnian intelligence report will say that “Victor Bout in collaboration with Hasan Cengic is transporting weapons to Chechnya” via a Bout front company. [Farah and Braun, 2007, pp. 50-51, 268-269]
El Al Flight LY1862, en route from New York to Tel Aviv, crashes into a block of apartment buildings shortly after take-off from Schiphol Airport, located south-east of Amsterdam. At least 43 people on the ground are killed (The exact number of deaths is unknown, since many of the incinerated victims were undocumented immigrants). Information about the plane’s cargo and the crash is suppressed: El Al withholds information about the plane’s several tons of “military cargo;” 12 hours of videotape made during the rescue and clean-up operation (42 cassettes in all), along with police audiotapes, are erased and shredded; and El Al documents and the plane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) mysteriously disappear. It is later learned that the plane, a Boeing 747, was carrying several tons of chemicals, including hydrofluoric acid, isopro-panol and dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP)—three of the four chemicals used in the production of sarin nerve gas. The shipment of chemicals—approved by the US commerce department—reportedly came from Solkatronic Chemicals Inc. of Morrisville, Pennsylvania and its final destination was the Institute for Biological Research (IIBR) in Ness Ziona near Tel Aviv, Israel, which is reported to be the “Israeli military and intelligence community’s front organization for the development, testing and production of chemical and biological weapons.” A former IIBR biologist later tells the London Sunday Times in October of 1998, “There is hardly a single known or unknown form of chemical or biological weapon… which is not manufactured at the institute.” In fact, it was IIBR that provided the poison and the antidote used in the attempted assassination of a Hamas leader in Jordan in 1998. The IIBR does not appear on any maps and is off-limits even to members of Israel’s Parliament, the Knesset. Israel denies that the chemicals were to be used in the production of chemical weapons and instead claims that they were needed to test gas masks. But as an article in Earth Island Journal notes: “[T]his explanation is puzzling since it only takes a few grams to conduct such tests. Once combined, the chemicals aboard Flight 1862 could have produced 270 kilos of sarin—sufficient to kill the entire population of a major world city.” During hearings on the crash in 1999, it is learned that since 1973, El Al planes are never inspected by customs or the Dutch Flight Safety Board and that El Al security at Schiphol is a branch of the Israeli Mossad. Furthermore, it is discovered that every Sunday evening a mysterious El Al cargo flight arrives at Schiphol en route from New York to Tel Aviv. The flights are never displayed on the airport arrival monitors and the flights’ documents are processed in a special, unmarked room. [BBC, 10/2/1998; Earth Island Journal, 1999; Covert Action Quarterly, 10/20/2004] Over a thousand residents living near the crash site later become sick with respiratory, neurological and mobility ailments and a rise in cancer and birth defects is later detected among the population. [ZNet, 10/12/2002]
In 1996, the Washington Post reports that the Saudi Arabian government spent hundreds of millions of dollars to channel weapons to the Muslim Bosnians, and that the US government knew about it and assisted it. An anonymous Saudi official who took part in the effort will say that the US role “was more than just turning a blind eye to what was going on.… It was consent combined with stealth cooperation.… American knowledge began under [President George] Bush and became much greater under [President] Clinton.” The Bosnian program was modeled on Saudi and US cooperation to fund the mujaheddin in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The major difference is that if Afghanistan the Saudis and Americans split the costs, but in Bosnia the Saudis pay for everything. They spend $300 million on illegal weapons deliveries plus around $500 million in Saudi aid to the Bosnian government. The US helps because Saudi Arabia lacks the “technical sophistication” to mount the operation on their own. The Post will report, “The official refused to go into detail about the American role in the operation, other than to say that the Saudis had made use of the same ‘network’ of undercover operatives, arms salesmen, and ‘former this and former that’ set up during the Afghan operation.” The official does say, “We did not set up a formal structure, the way we did in Afghanistan. But logic tells you that without the consent of NATO, the United States, and Germany, there was no way it could have happened.” Most of the weapons go through Croatia since Bosnia lacks good access to the sea, and the Croatian government takes a cut of up to half of all the weapons. Some emergency deliveries are made through “secret nighttime flights to Tuzla and other airports under the control of the Bosnian authorities.” Other supplies come by sea, with NATO apparently turning a blind eye in their naval blockade of the coastline. The direct aid given to Bosnia is used to buy weapons on the black market at high prices, sometimes from Serb enemies. US government officials will later deny any such arrangement took place, but British, French, and other officials believe the US was secretly involved in efforts to arm the Bosnians. [Washington Post, 2/2/1996] Much of the money must go through the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), since most illegal weapons get to Bosnia through the TWRA. This charity front has ties to Osama bin Laden and other radical militants (see Mid-1991-1996).
The US government, in collaboration with Hasan Cengic and his father Halid Cengic, starts work on an airport in Visoko, Bosnia, northwest of Sarajevo. This will become a major destination of a secret US arms pipeline into Bosnia. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 179] US Special Forces are apparently secretly involved in the construction. [Scotsman, 12/3/1995] The Cengics are radical Muslims and Hasan Cengic is heavily involved with an illegal weapons pipeline into Bosnia controlled by radical militants (see Mid-1991-1996). The airport will be completed in late 1994 (see Late 1994-Late 1995).
A Pakistani vessel carrying ten containers of arms, destined for the Bosnian army, is intercepted in the Adriatic Sea. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 195] During this same time frame (between March 1992 and May 1993), Pakistan also airlifts sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles to the Bosnian Muslims, according to the later testimony of Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, who is head of Pakistan’s ISI during this period. [South Asia Tribune (Great Falls, VA), 12/23/2002]
The United States launches 45 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Zaafaraniyeh industrial complex in Baghdad, due to the suspicions of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors that it is involved in producing uranium enrichment equipment and missile components. [Barletta and Jorgensen, 5/1999; Roberts, 2008, pp. 121]
Combat engineering vehicles (CEVs) lined up outside the blazing Branch Davidian compound. [Source: PBS]The FBI and local law enforcement officials begin their planned assault on the besieged Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas (see 5:00 A.M. - 9:30 A.M. February 28, 1993, March 1, 1993, and April 17-18, 1993), despite indications that the Davidians inside the compound will retaliate either by firing on the gathered law enforcement officials, by torching the main residential building, or perhaps both (see April 18, 1993). [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
Warning - At 5:55 a.m., Richard Rogers, the commander of the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), orders two combat engineering vehicles (CEVs, unarmed modifications of Bradley fighting vehicles and the primary means for deplying CS “riot control agent” into the main building) deployed to the main building. One minute later, senior negotiator Byron Sage telephones the residence and speaks with Davidian Steve Schneider. At 5:59, Schneider comes to the phone. Sage tells him: “We are in the process of putting tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We will not enter the building.” Schneider replies, “You are going to spray tear gas into the building?” Sage says, “In the building… no, we are not entering the building.” At the conclusion of the conversation, Schneider or another Davidian throws the telephone out of the building. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] Minutes later, Schneider slips out, retrieves the phone, and ducks back inside. [Time, 5/3/1993]
Combat Vehicles Begin Deploying Gas, Davidians Open Fire - At 6:02 a.m., the two CEVs begin inserting CS gas into the compound, using spray nozzles attached to booms. The booms punch holes through the exterior walls of the building. The FBI uses unarmed Bradley Fighting Vehicles to deploy “ferret rounds,” military ammunition designed to release CS after penetrating a barricade such as a wall or window. As the CEVs and the Bradleys punch holes into the buildings for the deployment of the gas, Sage makes the following statement over the loudspeakers: “We are in the process of placing tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We are not entering the building. This is not an assault. Do not fire your weapons. If you fire, fire will be returned. Do not shoot. This is not an assault. The gas you smell is a non-lethal tear gas. This gas will temporarily render the building uninhabitable. Exit the residence now and follow instructions. You are not to have anyone in the tower. The [guard] tower is off limits. No one is to be in the tower. Anyone observed to be in the tower will be considered to be an act of aggression [sic] and will be dealt with accordingly. If you come out now, you will not be harmed. Follow all instructions. Come out with your hands up. Carry nothing. Come out of the building and walk up the driveway toward the Double-E Ranch Road. Walk toward the large Red Cross flag. Follow all instructions of the FBI agents in the Bradleys. Follow all instructions. You are under arrest. This standoff is over. We do not want to hurt anyone. Follow all instructions. This is not an assault. Do not fire any weapons. We do not want anyone hurt. Gas will continue to be delivered until everyone is out of the building.” Two minutes later, Davidians begin firing on the vehicles from the windows. The gunfire from the Davidians prompts Rogers and FBI commander Jeffrey Jamar to decide to change tactics; at 6:07 a.m., the assault forces begin deploying all of the gas at once instead of dispersing it in a controlled manner over the course of 48-72 hours as originally envisioned. [Dean M. Kelley, 5/1995; PBS Frontline, 10/1995; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996; USMC Weapons, 2002] (Jamar will later testify that before the assault even began, he was “99 percent certain” that the FBI would have to escalate its assault because the Davidians would open fire.) [House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] As a CEV demolishes the back wall of the gymnasium area of the compound, negotiators broadcast: “David, we are facilitating you leaving the compound by enlarging the door.… Leave the building now.” [Cox News Service, 1/30/2000] Jamar will later explain that the Bradleys do not carry military weaponry. “Of course we had all the firepower removed,” he will say in a 1995 interview. “There were no cannons or anything on them. We used them for transportation. And they’re more than a personnel carrier—they’re a track vehicle. I mean it’s mud, just thick mud there the whole time. And the agents learned how to drive ‘em. But the idea was to protect them as best we could. And we didn’t know—they talked about blowing a 50—did they have rockets? Who knows? Did they have explosives buried in various vicinities? Are they prepared to run out with Molatov cocktails? What’s in their mind?” Jamar is referring to threats made by Koresh and other Davidians to blow up FBI vehicles. As for the CEVs, they are tanks modified for construction and engineering purposes, and are often used as bulldozers. Observers watching the events live on television or later on videotape will sometimes mistake the CEVs for actual tanks, though two M1A1 Abrams tanks are actually on site and take part in the assault. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995; PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
House Report: Davidians Would Certainly Consider FBI's Actions an Assault - A 1996 report by a House of Representatives investigative committee (see August 2, 1996) will note that it is almost impossible for the Davidians not to consider themselves under assault, with tank-like vehicles tearing holes in the building, CS being sprayed everywhere, grenade-like projectiles crashing through windows, men in body armor swarming around the compound, and the sounds of what seems like combat all around them. “Most people would consider this to be an attack on them—an ‘assault’ in the simplest terms,” the report will find. “If they then saw other military vehicles approaching, from which projectiles were fired through the windows of their home, most people are even more likely to believe that they were under an assault. If those vehicles then began to tear down their home there would be little doubt that they were being attacked. These events are what the Davidians inside the residence experienced on April 19, yet the FBI did not consider their actions an assault.” Moreover, the FBI did not consider the close-knit, home-centered community the Davidians have long since formed. “Their religious leader led them to believe that one day a group of outsiders, non-believers, most likely in the form of government agents, would come for them,” the report will state. “Indeed, they believed that this destiny had been predicted 2,000 years before in Biblical prophecy. Given this mindset, it can hardly be disputed that the Davidians thought they were under assault at 6 a.m. on April 19.” [House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996]
Monitoring from Washington - At 7:00 a.m., Attorney General Janet Reno and senior Justice Department and FBI officials go to the FBI situation room to monitor the assault. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
Buildings Breached - At 7:30 a.m., a CEV breaches the side of one of the main buildings and injects large amounts of tear gas into the interior of the compound. At 7:58 a.m., gas is fired into the second floor of the back-right corner of the building. The FBI asks for more ferret rounds, and by 9:30 a.m., 48 more ferret rounds arrive from Houston. The assault is hampered by the FBI’s dwindling supply of ferret rounds, a CEV with mechanical difficulties, and high winds dispersing the gas. Another CEV enlarges the opening in the center-front of the building, with the idea of providing an escape route for the trapped Davidians. A third CEV breaches the rear of the building, according to a later Justice Department report, “to create openings near the gymnasium.” [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
Clinton Told Assault Progressing Well - At about 11 a.m., Reno briefs President Clinton, tells him that the assault seems to be going well, and leaves for a judicial conference in Baltimore. During this time, a CEV breaches the back side of the compound. At 11:40 a.m., the FBI fires the last of the ferret rounds into the building. At 11:45 a.m., one wall of the compound collapses. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
Transcriptionist Escapes - Ruth Riddle, the typist and transcriptionist sent inside the compound by the FBI to help Koresh finish his “Seven Seals” manuscript (see April 18, 1993), escapes the compound before the fire. She brings out a computer disk containing the unfinished manuscript. [Dean M. Kelley, 5/1995]
Davidians Set Fires throughout Compound - At 12:07 p.m., according to the Justice Department and House reports, the Davidians start “simultaneous fires at three or more different locations within the compound.” An FBI Hostage Rescue Team member reports seeing “a male starting a fire” in the front of the building. Later analyses show that the first fire begins in a second-floor bedroom, the second in the first floor dining room, and the third in the first floor chapel. Evidence also shows that the fires spread according to “accelerant trails,” such as a trail of flammable liquid being poured on the floor. Some of the Davidians’ clothing found in the rubble also shows traces of gasoline, kerosene, Coleman fuel (liquid petroleum, sometimes called “white gas”), and lighter fluid, further suggesting that the Davidians use accelerants to start and spread the fires. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] Within eight minutes, the main building is engulfed in flames. One explosion, probably from a propane gas tank, is observed. Later investigation will find a propane tank with its top blown off in the debris. [House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] After the compound burns to the ground, FBI agent Bob Ricks tells reporters, “David Koresh, we believe, gave the order to commit suicide and they all willingly followed.” [New York Times, 4/20/1993] Some of the Davidians who survive the conflagration later claim that the Davidians did not start the fires, but arson investigators with the Justice Department and the Texas Rangers, as well as an independent investigator, will conclude that Davidians did indeed start the fires in at least three different areas of the main building. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995] A 1993 Treasury Department report (see Late September - October 1993) will produce audiotapes of Davidians inside the compound and transcripts of conversations, secured via electronic surveillance, discussing the means of setting the fires. Voices on the tapes and in the transcripts say such things as: “The fuel has to go all around to get started.” “Got to put enough fuel in there.” “So, we only light ‘em as they come in,” or as a slightly different version has it, “So, we only light ‘em as soon as they tell me.” Once the fires begin, high winds and the breaches in the walls cause the flames to almost immediately begin consuming the compound. [Dean M. Kelley, 5/1995] In 1999, Colonel Rodney Rawlings, the senior military liaison to the HRT, will tell reporters that he heard Koresh give the orders to start the fires over FBI surveillance “bugs” (see October 8, 1999). Sage later describes the horror that goes through him and his fellow agents when they realize that the Davidians have torched the compound. He will recall “pleading” with the Davidians to leave the compound, and say: “I can’t express the emotions that goes through you. I had to physically turn around away from the monitor to keep my mind focused on what I was trying to broadcast to those people.” He will recall being horrified by the failure of people to flee the compound. “I fully anticipated those people would come pouring out of there,” he says. “I’d been through CS teargas on numerous occasions [in training exercises]. And I would move heaven and earth to get my kids out of that kind of an environment. And that’s frankly what we were banking on. That at least the parents would remove their children from that kind of situation.” Of Koresh, he will say: “By him intentionally lighting that place afire and consuming the lives of 78 people, including over 20 young children, was just inconceivable to me. In 25 years of law enforcement I’ve never been faced with someone that was capable of doing that.” [PBS Frontline, 10/1995] Six years later, the FBI will admit to releasing two pyrotechnic grenades into the compound, but insists the grenades did not start the fires (see August 25, 1999 and After).
Plea for Release - At 12:12 p.m., Sage calls on Koresh to lead the Davidians to safety. Nine Davidians flee the compound and are arrested [PBS Frontline, 10/1995] , including one woman who leaves, attempts to return to the burning building, and tries unsuccessfully to fight off a federal agent who comes to her aid. [New York Times, 4/20/1993] One of the nine runs out of the building at around 12:28 p.m., indicating that even 21 minutes after the fire, it is possible for some of the inhabitants to make their escape. However, most of the Davidians retreat to areas in the center of the building and do not attempt to get out. [House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996]
'Systematic Gunfire' - At 12:25 p.m., FBI agents hear “systematic gunfire” coming from inside of the building; some agents believe that the Davidians are either killing themselves or each other. The House committee investigation later finds that FBI agents hear rapid-fire gunshots coming from the compound; while many of the gunshots are probably caused by exploding ammunition, “other sounds were methodical and evenly-spaced, indicating the deliberate firing of weapons.”
Fire Department Responds; Search for Survivors - At 12:41 p.m., fire trucks and firefighters begin attempting to put out the flames. HRT agents enter tunnels to search for survivors, particularly children. [Dean M. Kelley, 5/1995; PBS Frontline, 10/1995; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] No fire trucks are at the scene when the assault begins, and it takes around 25 minutes for the first fire department vehicles to respond to emergency calls from their stations in Waco. Bob Sheehy, mayor of Waco, later says the city fire department “first got a call after the fire had already started.” Ricks explains that fire engines were not brought to the compound earlier for fear that firefighters might have been exposed to gunfire from the compound, and because FBI officials did not expect a fire. “We did not introduce fire to this compound, and it was not our intention that this compound be burned down. I can’t tell you the shock and the horror that all of us felt when we saw those flames coming out of there. It was, ‘Oh, my God, they’re killing themselves.’” [New York Times, 4/20/1993]
Death Toll - In all, 78 Branch Davidians, including over 20 children, two pregnant women, and Koresh himself, die in the fire. Nineteen of the dead are killed by close-range gunshot wounds. Almost all of the others either die from smoke inhalation, burns, or both. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] The number is improperly reported in a number of media sources, and varies from 75 to 81. Even the House committee report does not cite a definitive total. [House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8/2/1996] Some of the FBI negotiators involved in the siege later say that they feel continued negotiations might have saved many, perhaps all, of the lives of those inside the compound. In an interview later in the year, one negotiator tells a reporter, “I’ll always, in my own mind, feel like maybe we could have gotten some more people out.” [New Yorker, 5/15/1995] But HRT member Barry Higginbotham, one of the snipers who observes the Davidians throughout the siege, will later state that neither he nor anyone on his team believed the Davidians would ever willingly surrender. Higginbotham will say: “We just felt that if you make them suffer a little more, deny them perhaps a little more food, lighting, power, things like that inside, that would cause more pressure on their leadership inside. And perhaps their leadership would go to Koresh and pressure him to start negotiating in good faith. It was hard to believe that Koresh was ever negotiating in good faith.” [PBS Frontline, 10/1995] In the hours after the conflagration, Ricks tells reporters: “We had hoped the women would grab their children and flee. That did not occur and they bunkered down the children and allowed them to go up in flames with them.… It was truly an inferno of flames.” Ricks says that authorities receive reports, perhaps from some of the survivors, that the children had been injected with some kind of poison to ease their pain. This claim is never confirmed. [New York Times, 4/20/1993]
In the Bunker - FBI investigators combing the building after the conflagration find an enormous amount of guns and other weaponry inside. Dr. Rodney Crow, the FBI’s chief of identification services and one of the officials who examine the bodies of the Davidians, spends much of his time in the compound’s underground bunker, where many of the bodies are found. Crow later says: “There were weapons everywhere. I don’t remember moving a body that didn’t have a gun melted to it, intertwined with it, between the legs, under the arm, or in close proximity. And I’d say 18 inches to 20 inches would be close proximity.… The women were probably more immersed in the weapons than anyone else, because there was so much weaponry inside the bunker. It was like sea shells on a beach, but they were spent casings and spent bullets. If you had rubber gloves and tried to smooth it away, you’d tear your gloves away from the bullet points that are unexploded, or unspent ammunition. Then as you went through layer after layer, you came upon weapons that were totally burned. Until we got down to the floor, and it was mint condition ammunition there. Ammunition boxes not even singed.” The most powerful weapon Crow finds is a .50-caliber machine gun. Some of the bodies have gunshot wounds. Crow will say: “My theory is there was a lot of euthanasia and mercy killing. That group probably were just about as active as anywhere in the compound, mercifully putting each other out of misery in the last moments.” In total, 33 bodies are found inside the bunker; almost all the women and children found inside the compound are in the bunker. Many are found to have died from suffocation or smoke inhalation (two died from falling debris), but some died from gunshot wounds, and one woman was stabbed to death. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995; PBS Frontline, 10/1995] Local medical examiner Nizam Peerwani later says he does not believe the people in the bunker committed suicide, saying: “There has been a lot of speculation if this is a mass suicide or not. And—did they all go there to die? Ah, we don’t really think so. What I feel personally is that they tried to escape. A bunker was perhaps the safest area in the compound.” [PBS Frontline, 10/1995] Sage will say that he knew the children were dead sometime around 12:30 p.m. He recalls terminating the negotiations at that time, “because I didn’t want the loudspeaker bank to interfere with instructions being given on the ground. At that point in time, I walked over to the site in shock, basically. And, uh, the first thing I asked is, ‘Where are the kids?’” He is told, “Nowhere.” Sage will say: “They had not come out. They had been consumed.” [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
Koresh's Fate - Koresh and Schneider are found in a small room the authorities call “the communication room.” Koresh is dead of a single gunshot wound to the forehead. Schneider is dead from a gunshot wound in the mouth. Peerwani later says: “Did David Koresh shoot himself and Schneider shoot himself? Or did Schneider shoot David Koresh and then turn around and shoot himself? Certainly both are possible. We cannot be certain as to what really transpired.” [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
No Ill Effects from Gas - Peerwani and his colleagues examine the bodies for damage caused by the CS gas used in the assault, and find none. While many of the Davidians were exposed to the gas, according to tissue and blood studies, none inhaled enough of it to cause anything more than short-term discomfort. Concurrently, Peerwani and his colleagues find no damage from the propellant used in the ferret rounds. A fire report later written by Texas-based investigators will call the tear gas operation a failure at dispersing the Davidians. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995; PBS Frontline, 10/1995] Medical examinations show that some of the children may well have been overcome by the gas, and rendered unable to escape, but the compound had not been gassed for an hour before the fires began, and CS has a persistence factor of only 10 minutes—in other words, the effects should have worn off by the time the fires broke out. The gas proves ineffective against the adults, because the adult Davidians are equipped with gas masks. [PBS Frontline, 10/1995]
Wrongly Executed Plan - The plan as signed by Reno called on law enforcement forces to deploy tear gas into the compound at stated intervals, then have agents retreat to await evacuees before approaching again. This “passive,” “restrained” approach was to have been followed for up to 72 hours before using assault vehicles to force entry. Instead, the agents wait only 12 minutes before beginning a motorized vehicle assault. [New Yorker, 5/15/1995]
Taking Responsibility - One of the unlikely “heroes” of the debacle is Reno. She signed off on the attack (see April 17-18, 1993), and within hours of the attacks, she holds a televised press conference where she says: “I made the decision. I am accountable . The buck stops here” (see April 19, 1993). She repeats this statement over and over again on national television. [New Yorker, 5/15/1995]
Entity Tags: Bob Ricks, Bob Sheehy, Branch Davidians, David Koresh, FBI Hostage Rescue Team, Barry Higginbotham, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Janet Reno, Jeffrey Jamar, Byron Sage, US Department of Justice, Nizam Peerwani, William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Richard Rogers, Rodney Rawlings, Rodney Crow, Ruth Riddle, Texas Rangers, Steve Schneider
Timeline Tags: 1993 Branch Davidian Crisis
North Korea test fires a long-range No-dong missile, and the test is attended by a Pakistani delegation, including nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and one of his associates, Brigadier Sajawal Khan Malik. Khan and the North Koreans have been discussing the conditions under which Pakistan might acquire the missiles for some time (see August 1992). The missile is said to have a range of 800 miles and to be able to carry a payload weighing 1000 kg. Although the missile is not yet able to carry a nuclear warhead, Khan believes adapting it to do so will not be a problem. Khan will eventually conclude a deal for the missiles through Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 245]
Nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan calls Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to get her approval for a takeover by Khan of a factory in Karachi. The factory, the People’s Steel Mill, had been closed down due to poor management and corruption. Bhutto will say she is surprised that Khan calls her at all: “Frankly, I was shocked. I had got used to not hearing from him.” According to Bhutto, “He said he could do something really hi-tech there that would aid all aspects of life but particularly his program at KRL [Khan Research Laboratories].” Bhutto agrees and the plant soon becomes a key component in Khan’s nuclear program. At the same time, Bhutto also agrees to go to North Korea to facilitate co-operation between the two countries’ nuclear programs (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244]
Newly re-elected Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto asks Pakistan army chief General Wahid Kakar about rumors she has heard of sales of nuclear equipment linked to Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Kakar denies that such sales are being made, but they do agree on one measure: giving the military control of access to Khan’s main research plant in Kahuta (see Late 1993). Bhutto will later say that at the start of her second term she made a decision not to become involved with Khan and his work, as she blamed it and her participation in it for her being thrown out of office at the end of her first term. She will also say that Khan was much changed by this time: “He was not the man I had met in my first term. The humility was gone. He was stubborn. Different. Rude. He was, having been awarded that strange title, ‘Father of the Bomb,’ now quite insufferable.” She also adds that Khan had become more religious and conservative, “quite the maulvi [religious scholar].” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 198, 498]
The Pakistani military sets up a control ring around Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta. The ring comes about following a conversation between Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan army chief Wahid Kakar (see Late 1993). Bhutto will later say Kakar tells her, “Why don’t we set up a command and control for KRL so the scientists can’t go in and out without passing through the army ring?” At the time she thinks this is a good idea, as the labs will be cut off from the outside world and the military will be in charge of the perimeter. KRL will therefore be “airtight” and the scientists will not have the opportunity to smuggle things out, which she has heard may be a problem. However, Bhutto, who is never trusted by Pakistan’s military, will later say that this solution “ultimately played into the military’s hands and weakened my own.” One reason is the person who is put in charge of the project: General Khawaja Ziauddin. Bhutto will comment: “I didn’t know him. It was only later I found out that he was connected to the ISI and the forces pitted against me.” Ziauddin is the nephew of General Ghulam Jilani Khan, a former ISI chief who had helped make Bhutto’s rival Nawaz Sharif. In addition, he is close to army chief General Aslam Beg and powerful former ISI boss General Hamid Gul. Ziauddin will go on to become a key player in Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation activities. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 198, 498]
Mohammed Loay Bayazid. [Source: Intelwire.com]According to reliable al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl (see June 1996-April 1997), in late 1993 he meets with a former high-ranking Sudanese government official to discuss buying enriched uranium. Is taken to an anonymous address in Khartoum, Sudan, and shown a two- to three-foot long metal cylinder with South African markings. Intermediaries demand $1.5 million to buy the cylinder which is supposed to contain uranium. Mohammed Loay Bayazid, a founding member of al-Qaeda and also president of the US-based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) at the time, is brought in to examine the deal. Al-Fadl is then instructed to write a document for al-Qaeda leader Mamdouh Mahmud Salim detailing the offer. Salim reviews the document and approves the purchase. Al-Fadl never sees the purchase go through, but he is given $10,000 for his role and is told the uranium will be shipped to Cyprus to be tested. He later learns from second-hand sources that the deal went through and the uranium was good. If so, there has been no sign of al-Qaeda attempting to use the uranium ever since. US intelligence does not know about the deal at the time, but learns of it when al-Fadl defects in 1996 (see June 1996-April 1997). The incident will be referred to in an indictment against Salim in 1998. [Boston Globe, 9/16/2001; New York Daily News, 10/1/2001; Lance, 2006, pp. 262-263]
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto agrees to visit North Korea at the request of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Khan asked Bhutto to go because he wanted more powerful missiles to carry nuclear weapons he has designed “into the depths of India.” Bhutto will later say she was shielded from Pakistan’s nuclear program and did not know about Pakistan’s missile capability until Khan told her. She will later describe her reply to Khan’s request: “I wanted it to be known that I would not stand in the military’s way, and when Khan told me that only a country like North Korea could provide the kind of intercontinental missiles we needed, I thought there was no harm in it. But I did tell him I would not give him the money to develop these missiles. I believed in parity. India had not escalated by creating such missiles, I thought, so Pakistan would not do so either.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244]
Husein Haqqani, an aide to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, tells her that a planned trip to North Korea at the request of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan to facilitate nuclear co-operation between the two countries (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After) is a bad idea and she should not go. Haqqani will later say: “North Korea was an outlaw state, with few morals or qualms about trading in anything illicit and it was at loggerheads with the US. I told her the military and Khan were trying to trick her and that we should not be doing arms deals with [North Korea]. But she ignored me and asked me to accompany her. I cried off. I let a colleague go in my place. I let him think I was giving him a chance when I was actually watching my own back. All I kept thinking was, what happens many years down the line when this trip to North Korea is gone over? Such a thing could ruin a career. There was this bad smell about it.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 245]
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visits North Korea after being asked to do so by nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan to help co-operation between the two countries on nuclear weapons and delivery systems (see Shortly Before December 29, 1993 and Shortly Before December 29, 1993).
Speech - At a formal dinner with North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung, Bhutto says: “Nuclear non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext for preventing states from exercising fully their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes geared to their economic and social development.” She adds: “Pakistan is committed to nuclear non-proliferation both at the global and regional level. It is not fair to cast doubts on Pakistan’s interests and to subject Pakistan to discriminatory treatment.”
Deal - Bhutto then asks Kim for blueprints for missiles that can deliver Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in a potential strike on India. Kim is surprised, but Bhutto emphasizes that “We need those missiles.” Kim agrees and proposes setting up technical teams, giving her information on computer discs to take home with her the next day.
Something More? - However, Bhutto will later remark: “They gave me a bag of materials. Kim said the teams each side selected would do the deal, whatever the deal was to be. I really had little idea of what they were discussing. I did wonder, though. Was it only missiles? They said it was to be a cash deal.” Bhutto will also say that General Khawaja Ziauddin, a close associate of Khan, was in charge of the deal for the Pakistanis.
Framed? - When Bhutto returns to Pakistan, she meets with one of her aides, Husein Haqqani, and shows him the bag of materials. Haqqani will later comment: “They could have been anything. It horrified me and I said so. She sensed then that the military had framed her. Her fingerprints were all over whatever their plan was for North Korea.” Bhutto gives the bag to Ziauddin, but will later say: “As far as I knew, the deal involved buying No-dong missiles for cash. But when I requested more information, the military clammed up.” After this trip, Bhutto is apparently not closely involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and is even unable to obtain information about its budget. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 247-249]
The Airborne Holographic Projector [Source: Air University]According to a 1999 Washington Post website report, the US Air Force starts a research program this year to develop a “holographic projector” as a psychological warfare weapon. Holograms are three-dimensional images created by laser technology. The US military explored the idea of using holograms during the 1991 Gulf War to deceive the Iraqis, but did not pursue it for technical reasons. One idea was to project a hologram of Allah several hundred feet in size over Baghdad, but this would take a mirror in space more than a mile square, plus huge projectors and power sources. Additionally, there are strict Islamic proscriptions on the depiction of Allah. However, the US military did not abandon the concept. “The Gulf War hologram story might be dismissed were it not the case that [the Post] has learned that a super secret program was established in 1994 to pursue the very technology for PSYOPS [psychological operations] application. The “Holographic Projector” is described in a classified Air Force document as a system to “project information power from space… for special operations deception missions.” [Washington Post, 2/1/1999; Sydney Morning Herald, 2/5/2000] A 1996 study commissioned by a US Air Force panel called “Air Force 2025” shows how a future “Airborne Holographic Projector” might look like. In this illustration, a virtual aircraft is created to deceive the enemy as to the size and location of attacking forces. [Air University, 1996; al, 6/1996, pp. 114 ]
Pakistan, China, and North Korea sign a formal technical assistance pact regarding some military systems. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the pact officially concerns missiles and guidance systems. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 249, 510] Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had recently visited North Korea to clinch an agreement under which the North Koreans would provide Pakistan with missiles that could carry nuclear warheads deep inside India (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After), and this visit may have played a role in spurring the pact.
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan begins a series of more than a dozen trips to North Korea. By 1998 Khan will be traveling to Pyongyang several times a month. The trips, supervised by Pakistani General Khawaja Ziauddin, follow an agreement concluded by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the North Koreans to supply Khan with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads designed by Khan deep inside India (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). Khan presumably travels to North Korea to facilitate the acquisition of the missiles, although he may also be passing on nuclear secrets to the North Koreans. Khan is accompanied by one of his key associates, Brigadier Sajawal Khan Malik, whose son Dr. Muhammad Shafiq ur-Rehman will tell journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark of the trips in 2006. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 249-250, 278, 510]
Ukraine agrees to give up its nuclear weapons. It is the last of the former Soviet states to give up its nuclear arsenal, and, as the New York Times’s Bill Keller will later observe, “probably the only one with the technological wherewithal to override Moscow’s centralized control systems and become an overnight nuclear state.” The Bush and Clinton administrations used a combination of diplomatic promises and pressure to convince Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons; the US has agreed to funnel large amounts of financial aid into the country as well as entering into a military partnership with it. Keller will note that at this time: “possession of nuclear weapons [i]s still understood as a serious impediment for a country seeking admission into the Western world. If you want… to join the party, you checked your nukes at the door.” [New York Times, 5/4/2003] Ukraine will ship the last of its nuclear weapons to Russia in June 1996. [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 6/2/1996]
People of various nationalities are seen at guest houses associated with Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan in Kahuta, near his main research facility. Muhammad Shafiq ur-Rehman, son of Khan’s military aide Sajawal Khan Malik, will say: “The two guest houses beside the lake were chock-a-block with foreigners. It was Babel. We were up to our necks in North Koreans, Chinese, Iranians, Syrians, Vietnamese, and Libyans. Dr. Sahib [Khan] never ceased to amaze me how he got these people in and out with no questions asked.” Peter Griffin, a British businessman who is a key supplier for Khan’s nuclear proliferation network, will confirm the presence of the North Koreans. Based on interviews with Griffin, authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will write: “[T]eams from [North Korea] were semi-permanently lodged at the guest house next door [to Khan’s residence]. Griffin frequently saw them when he was supplying building materials to Khan in the mid-1990s, although the North Koreans spoke insufficient English to take part in any conversation.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 255, 277]
The US begins flying spy planes over Serbia and Bosnia. In March 1994, the CIA begins flying Gnat-750 drone aircraft from Glader, a remote Albanian air force base in north-central Albania. [Associated Press, 5/7/1994] In December 1994, the CIA begins flying more drone aircraft from the Croatian island of Brac. [Associated Press, 2/3/1995] In July 1995, the US begins using the Predator remote spy drone over Bosnia, from the Glader base. [Associated Press, 7/21/1995] Such surveillance information is allegedly shared with Croat and Muslim forces, allowing them to bypass Serb defensive positions in battle. The US officially denies the existence of all these flights since the US is supposed to be neutral in the war. [Observer, 11/5/1995]
Andreas Strassmeir, the head of security for the far-right white supremacist community at Elohim City, Oklahoma (see 1973 and After), will later say he meets up with future Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh at a gun show in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He will recall buying a set of military fatigues from McVeigh. Strassmeir will tell FBI investigators: “I sold [McVeigh] a US Navy combat knife with a sheath. Later I returned… and bought a shirt, pair of trousers, and a pair of leather gloves from him. [Strassmeir is apparently referring to purchasing McVeigh’s old Army fatigues from him.] During this transaction we discussed the events that transpired at Waco.… As near as I can remember, we both agreed that it wasn’t right for the government to use such force against a religious group or to kill them for what they believed in.” Strassmeir will say he gives McVeigh a business card belonging to Elohim City and Robert Millar, and may tell McVeigh that his name is “Andy.” Strassmeir will claim this constitutes his only contact with McVeigh, though he may be lying (see April 1993). Attorney Dave Hollaway will later say that Strassmeir stayed with him for a time and had McVeigh’s Army fatigues with him; though McVeigh’s name had been ripped from the clothing, McVeigh’s initials were still on the clothing, and the shirt carried the patch for McVeigh’s unit, the “Big Red One.” Karen Anderson, the girlfriend of gun dealer Roger Moore (see March 1993), will also recall seeing McVeigh at the gun show. [PBS Frontline, 1/22/1996; Denver Post, 3/11/1997] McVeigh is preparing to visit Moore in Arkansas (see February - July 1994). McVeigh met Strassmeir at a Tulsa gun show almost a year ago (see April 1993).
President Clinton gives serious consideration to launching massive military strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facility at Yongbyon. The North Koreans are preparing to remove nuclear fuel rods from the internationally monitored storage site at the facility, expel the international weapons inspectors, and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which they had signed in 1985 (see July 1, 1968 and December 12, 1985). Clinton asks the UN to consider economic sanctions; in response, North Korea says sanctions will trigger a war. The Pentagon presents Clinton with a plan to send 50,000 US troops to South Korea, bolstering the 37,000 already in place, as well as an array of combat jets, naval vessels, combat helicopters, ground assault vehicles, and various missile and rocket systems. Clinton orders an emplacement of 250 soldiers to a logistical headquarters to manage the influx of weaponry. (In 2005, former Clinton administration officials will confirm that Clinton was quite willing to go to war with North Korea if need be.) But Clinton also extends diplomatic offerings to North Korea. He sets up a diplomatic back-channel to that nation in the form of former President Jimmy Carter, who has an informal conference with North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung. (The press portrays the Carter visit as a private venture without Clinton’s approval; later, former Clinton officials will verify that Clinton recruited Carter to go.) Some Clinton cabinet officials, particularly those who had served in the Carter administration, warn Clinton that Carter is a “loose cannon” and may well go beyond the parameters laid down by Clinton in negotiating with Kim. Vice President Gore and other senior officials urge Clinton to send Carter, believing that there is no other way to resolve the crisis. Clinton agrees with Gore. He believes that Kim has, in the words of reporter Fred Kaplan, “painted himself into a corner and needed an escape hatch—a clear path to back away from the brink without losing face, without appearing to buckle under pressure from the US government. Carter might offer that hatch.” Both sides, Kaplan will write, are correct. Carter succeeds in getting Kim to back down, and goes much farther than his instructions allow, negotiating the outline of a treaty and announcing the terms live on CNN, notifying Clinton only minutes before the news broadcast. That outline will become the Agreed Framework between the two nations (see October 21, 1994). [Washington Monthly, 5/2004; Slate, 10/11/2006]
Peter Galbraith. [Source: CBC]US President Bill Clinton and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake decide that they will give the Bosnians a “green light” for the arms supply pipeline from Iran to Croatia. The CIA is not consulted. Lake passes the word on to US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith by “cleverly” telling him that they have “no instructions” for him with regard to the Iranian arms shipments. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 167- 168] Two days later, Galbraith passes the “no instructions” message on to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, making it clear that the US government is giving him a green light for Croatia to conduct arms deals with Iran. [APF Reporter, 1997]
Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, a key associate of Pakistani nuclear proliferator A. Q. Khan, calls British businessman Peter Griffin to inquire about purchasing various machines for a workshop to be set up in Dubai. Griffin will later say he asks Tahir, “Is it nuclear?” but Tahir replies it is not. Tahir apparently tells Griffin the machines are for the Libyan National Oil Company, which wants to replace burnt-out machinery—a workshop in Dubai could manufacture spare parts without being troubled by sanctions. Griffin will say, “I saw no problem with that and sent over a container-load of catalogs, all the usual stuff for a standard machine shop.” Nothing will happen with the deal, which will turn out to be related to Libya’s nuclear program, until 1997 (see August 1997). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 366]
The US and North Korea sign a formal accord based on the outlined treaty negotiated by former President Jimmy Carter (see Spring and Summer 1994). The accord, called the Agreed Framework, primarily concerns North Korea’s nuclear program. The North Koreans agree to observe the strictures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (see July 1, 1968 and December 12, 1985), keep their nuclear fuel rods in storage, and allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in to inspect their nuclear facility. In return, the US, along with its allies South Korea and Japan, will provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear reactors specifically for generating electricity, a large supply of fuel oil, and a promise not to attack. The Framework also specifies that once the first light-water reactor is delivered in 2003, intrusive inspections would begin. After the second reactor arrives, North Korea would ship its fuel rods out of the country—essentially ending North Korea’s ability to build nuclear weapons. The Framework also pledges both sides to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” including the exchange of ambassadors and the lowering of trade barriers. North Korea will observe the treaty’s restrictions, at least initially, but the US and its allies never do; the economic barriers are not lowered, the light-water reactors are never delivered, and Congress never approves the financial outlays specified in the accord. By 1996, North Korea is secretly exchanging missile centrifuges for Pakistani nuclear technology. [Washington Monthly, 5/2004]
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto claims that her country does not have a nuclear weapons program in an interview with British entertainer David Frost. “We have neither detonated nor have we got nuclear weapons,” she says. “Being a responsible state and a state committed to non-proliferation, we in Pakistan, through five successive governments, have taken a policy decision to follow a peaceful nuclear program.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will describe Frost as “incredulous” at hearing this denial. They will add: “It was a lie. She knew it.” The Pakistani military keeps many of the details of the program from Bhutto, but she is aware of the outline and even went on a mission to North Korea to get missiles to deliver locally-produced warheads the previous year (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 255-256, 511]
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan supplies Iran with blueprints for an advanced P2 centrifuge, used to produce weapons-grade uranium. Iran already has some technology for centrifuges and spare parts provided by Khan in the 1980s (see 1987), but discovers that what it has is out of date. The new, German-designed P2 centrifuges are better than the earlier P1 versions, as they have rotors made from specialty steel and are more reliable. Khan also makes other deliveries of nuclear weapons technology to Iran around this time (see 1994). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 256]
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan visits Syria. According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, he meets with “a senior Syrian government official” and is accompanied by a Pakistani army officer, apparently Brigadier Sajawal Khan Malik. The visit is monitored by Israeli intelligence. Moshe Ya’alon, later head of Israeli military intelligence, will say: “Khan had a menu with him. He was offering nuclear assistance. But we do not know if the deal went through. What we determined was that although Khan was intent on selling to Damascus, he was also keen to use Syria as a conduit to deliver nuclear assistance to Iran. Nobody was looking at Syria in those days from a nuclear perspective.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 256]
China begins to provide assistance to Pakistan with the construction of a plant to manufacture missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. China has been supplying missiles to Pakistan for some time (see 1989 and 1991), and the plant is to produce a generic version of one of the Chinese missiles that is being delivered, the M-11. The facility is to be operated by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, which is run by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand. Blueprints of the M-11 will be used to produce a Pakistani version of the missile called the Hatf 3, which will have a range of 150 miles. US intelligence picks up on these developments, and they are reported to Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction. Estimates indicate that if the rapid progress is maintained, the facility will be completed by 1998. In addition, Oehler warns his superiors that if Pakistan does succeed in building the missiles and loading nuclear warheads onto them, it will probably sell this technology to other countries. However, the Clinton administration takes no action on this intelligence at this time. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment: “If the president accepted the assessment, he would have to impose sanctions that would potentially cost American companies billions of dollars in lost revenues if Beijing lashed out at being censured by Washington—particularly Boeing, which was negotiating a major contract with the Chinese aviation industry, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, which had a valuable deal with the China National Nuclear Corporation. However, not to act on Oehler’s analysis, backed as it was by hard intelligence, would have enhanced Pakistan’s nuclear capability, to the detriment of India.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 257]
The new peace accords and arms reductions negotiations between the US and Russia (see November 3, 1992, July 13, 1993, and September 28, 1994) are severely tested when the Russian military informs President Boris Yeltsin that it has detected a missile launch bound for Russian territory—possibly a nuclear missile from a US submarine launched to destroy the Russian government in Moscow. With the missile in flight, Yeltsin convenes an emergency teleconference of his senior defense officials and discusses launching a nuclear counterstrike against the US. Two minutes before the missile is to detonate on Russian soil—and the Russians are to launch the counterstrike—the Russians realize the “missile” is actually a Norwegian scientific rocket that poses no threat to their nation. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 175]
Apparent footage of one of the mysterious Tuzla flights, from a BBC documentary on the subject. [Source: BBC]UN observers and others report that frequent flights entering Bosnia are supplying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims in violation of the UN arms embargo. The flights clearly have the support of the US. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 177- 198] A UN official who witnesses the flights is physically threatened by three American officers and warned to keep silent. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 192] Journalists are also pressured and threatened by the US embassy, which is later said to have been acting on instructions from the State Department. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 192] A subsequent investigation conducted with the support of the Netherlands government will conclude that the operation was conducted by a third party, probably Turkey, with “the assent of parts of the US government.” [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 195-198] Tim Ripley, who covers the military conflicts in Yugoslavia for Jane’s Intelligence Review, blames the Tuzla flights and similar operations on “‘covert warriors’ of the NSC [National Security Council] and State Department.” [Ripley, 1999, pp. 93] Prof. Cees Wiebes, who conducts the Netherlands investigation, agrees saying that “the State Department and National Security Council (NSC) were involved, but not the CIA or the DIA.” According to a confidential source, “the operation was… paid for from a Pentagon Special Operations budget, with the complete assent of the White House. Probably the most important members of Congress were informed in the deepest of secrecy, and they were therefore ‘in the loop’ concerning the events.” [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 193] Ripley says that US NATO officers were not involved, but points out that NATO Commander Admiral Leighton Smith was careful to only deny “uniformed” US military involvement. Ripley suggests that American “freelance operatives” were brought in by “senior members of the Clinton Administration.” [Ripley, 1999, pp. 62-63] According to Ripley, “Senior US military commanders and CIA officials were just staggered by the ‘duplicity’ and ‘deceit’ at the heart of the Clinton Administration’s policies.” [Ripley, 1999, pp. 91]
The CIA reports that in the last three months China has delivered missile parts to Pakistan that can be used in the M-11 missile. China has been shipping missiles to Pakistan for some time (see 1989 and 1991). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 512]
The US Senate votes to lift some sanctions that were imposed on Pakistan due to its nuclear weapons program (see August 1985 and October 1990). The measure does not allow the US to sell Pakistan embargoed F-16 fighters, but, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, only leads to “a few million dollars being dispatched to a handful of Pakistan-based charities.” The amendment was proposed by Hank Brown (R-CO), chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The measure is opposed by John Glenn and other like-minded senators strongly against nuclear proliferation, but passes by one vote. Levy and Scott-Clark will comment, “It [the measure] was not a remedy and did nothing to bolster the fragile [Pakistani] democracy that had gone 10 rounds in the ring with the military and its ISI.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 265, 513]
On a visit to Iran, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto quietly asks Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani about possible nuclear weapons transactions between their two countries. The question is prompted by rumors Bhutto has heard about some kind of nuclear weapons deals between them, and is put to Rafsanjani at a meeting with Bhutto and Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari. Bhutto will later say: “I asked Rafsanjani: ‘Is there something going on? Is there a nuclear exchange?’ Rafsanjani looked surprised. He said he suspected it too but he said he knew nothing.” Bhutto will add that she later learns the Revolutionary Guard is the organization responsible for the deal in Iran, indicating Rafsanjani’s profession of ignorance may be genuine. The timing of this meeting is not entirely clear, as Bhutto visits Iran twice around this time, in December 1993 and November 1995. However, she is known to meet with Rafsanjani on November 7 during her second visit. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 255, 511]
A North Korean delegation visits Pakistan to discuss co-operation between the two countries. The delegation is led by Choe Kwang, vice chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, minister of the people’s armed forces, and marshal of the Korean People’s Army, who is responsible for North Korea’s nuclear procurement program.
Kwang Tours Pakistani Nuclear Facilities, Meets Pakistani Officials - General Wahid Kakar, chief of Pakistan’s army, takes Kwang on a tour of Pakistan’s leading nuclear weapons facility, Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), although security there is very strict and foreigners are generally not allowed near it. Kwang also visits a secret missile production facility near Faisalabad and a missile test site near Jhelum, in the northern Punjab. Additionally, Kwang meets Pakistani President Farooq Leghari, Defense Minister Aftab Shaban Mirani, and high-ranking military officials.
Agreement to Provide More Missiles - During the visit, North Korea signs an agreement to provide Pakistan with fuel tanks, rocket engines, and between 12 and 25 complete No-dong missiles, which can be used against India. The arms are to be produced by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee and delivered to KRL the next spring by the North Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, a front for North Korea’s nuclear procurement network. In return, KRL boss A. Q. Khan is to host North Korean missile experts in a joint training program. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 250, 510]
Pakistan, which owes North Korea US$ 40 million for No-dong missiles it has purchased (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After and November 19-24, 1995), tells the North Koreans it does not have the money and cannot pay for them. Instead, the Pakistanis offer North Korea a uranium enrichment plant, a proposal first discussed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and North Korea’s foreign minister Kim Yong-nam in 1992 (see August 1992). Israeli intelligence is monitoring Khan’s procurement network and learns of the proposal. It informs the US government, but the US does not show any special interest. General Moshe Ya’alon, who will later be chief of staff in the Israeli Defense Force, will comment: “I remember saying to the Americans some time in 1995 or 1996, ‘How to do think Pakistan is going to pay for all those No-dong missiles?’ But I was shouting myself hoarse. Nobody wanted to know.” According to North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop (see 1997), the deal between Pakistan and North Korea is concluded in the summer of 1996 during a visit to Korea by a technical delegation from Khan Research Laboratories. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 256-257, 281]
CIA leadership allegedly suppresses a report about Osama bin Laden’s hunt for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and only disseminates the report after pressure. After the CIA’s bin Laden unit, Alec Station, is created in early 1996 (see February 1996), one of its first tasks is to see if bin Laden is attempting to acquire WMDs.
Bin Laden a Bigger Threat than Previously Realized - Michael Scheuer, head of the unit in its early years, will later say that the unit soon discovers bin Laden is “much more of a threat than I had thought.… It became very clear very early that he was after [WMDs], and we showed conclusively at that point that he didn’t have them. But we had never seen as professional an organization in charge of procurement.” Scheuer will later tell Congress that when the unit finds detailed intelligence in 1996 on bin Laden’s attempts to get a nuclear weapon, superiors in the CIA suppress the report. Only after three officers in the CIA knowledgeable about bin Laden complain and force an internal review does the CIA disseminate the report more widely within the US intelligence community.
Incident Leads to Bunker Mentality - The incident contributes to a bunker mentality between the bin Laden unit and the rest of the CIA (see February 1996-June 1999). According to Vanity Fair, the CIA’s “top brass started to view Scheuer as a hysteric, spinning doomsday scenarios.” Some start referring to him and the bin Laden unit as “the Manson family,” in reference to mass murderer Charles Manson and his followers. [Vanity Fair, 11/2004]
Six Lithuanians and one Georgian are arrested in the town of Visaginas, Lithuania, for attempting to sell 100 kilograms of uranium on the black market. The uranium had been smuggled there from another post-Soviet republic, Kazakhstan. Following their arrest, the men tell the authorities that the uranium was for an anonymous buyer in Pakistan. The CIA comes to believe that Sunni extremists, possibly linked to Osama bin Laden, are behind the purchase. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 261]
China ships centrifuge parts to Pakistan to aid that country’s nuclear weapons program. The parts are 5,000 ring magnets, shipped by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to Karachi. They are for use in the suspension bearings of centrifuge rotors. The US learns of this shipment, and one of the officials who works on the case is Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction. Reportedly, CIA Director John Deutch also learns of the deal and tells a meeting at the White House that Chinese officials have approved it. Oehler, who has been arguing for sanctions on China because of its support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for some time, thinks that the administration will now have to apply sanctions. However, the Clinton administration does not act on the intelligence. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will later ask “officials in the State Department familiar with the deal” why no action was taken. One of the officials will say: “China did not respond well to sanctions. We tried: they achieved nothing. So, we did—well, nothing.” News of the deal is soon leaked to the US press. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 259, 512]
The Clinton administration announces that it has refocused the US missile defense program to emphasize so-called “theater missile defense” (TMD) systems that protect against short-range nuclear missiles, and will defer deployment of more advanced TMD systems until after the year 2000. The administration also announces its “3-plus-3” vision of a national missile defense (NMD) system, which stipulates the development over the next three years of the basic elements of such a system that could be deployed in three more years if a threat emerges that justifies such a decision. [Federation of American Scientists, 1/15/2008]
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan represents Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at the Defense Services Asia conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will later obtain a copy of KRL’s brochure for the conference. It reads in part: “Keeping pace with the emerging demands of the competitive international defense products market, KRL ventures to offer its expertise in the shape of services and products not only to the domestic consumer but also to an international audience of friendly countries.… KRL has earned credibility not only in South East Asia but also in the Middle East and West Asia.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 261]
US and British intelligence learn that uranium is being offered for sale in the Pakistani city of Peshawar. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment that Peshawar is the “gateway to Osama bin Laden’s new camps,” and that “someone was looking to construct the dirty bomb that [1993 World Trade Center bomber] Ramzi Yousef had failed to build in 1993.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 261]
Customs officers in Hong Kong intercept a convoy from China carrying 200 crates of rocket-fuel propellant. The shipment is bound for Khan Research Laboratories, the heart of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons industry. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 261]
The US State Department releases a report saying the Chinese government is not supplying equipment for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The report was drafted in response to a leak to the press saying that the US administration knew the Chinese government had signed off on the sale of Chinese magnets for Pakistani centrifuges (see Early 1996). However, the report says there is “no evidence that the Chinese government had wilfully aided or abetted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program through the magnet transfer.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment, “It flew in the face of the truth—in the same way that Bush officials had claimed F-16s could not be used to deploy a nuclear bomb” (see August-September 1989). Levy and Scott-Clark will add that Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction, is “furious” with the report and the lack of sanctions imposed on the Chinese. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 259]
British authorities complain to Pakistan’s High Commissioner in Britain, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, about the activities of an ISI agent named Mohammed Saleem. Saleem has been working under the cover of being a clerk at the high commission for five years, but in reality he is a procurement agent for the nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Hasan will later recall getting an angry phone call from British authorities: “They said the ISI had been buying and selling for the nuclear program. One official at my embassy, Mohammed Saleem, was accused of proliferation of WMDs. The British said Saleem was the new and primary European agent for Khan. I called up the ISI guys and asked them: ‘What are you doing?’ They told me to keep my nose out of it. Khan was not acting alone. He never acted alone. He was trading, using the ISI and the military. Both were untouchable.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 260-261]
Cover of ‘Tyranny’s Ally’. [Source: Amazon (.com)]Neoconservative David Wurmser, the co-author of “A Clean Break,” the recently prepared plan to redraw the Middle East (see July 8, 1996), writes a book, Tyranny’s Ally, in which he advocates that the US use military force to literally redraw the map of the Middle East. In his book, Wurmser says that Iran’s Shi’ites will be negated by Iraq’s Shi’ites, whom for some unexplained reason can be expected “to present a challenge to Iran’s influence and revolution.” Wurmser writes that by overthrowing Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, the US will destabilize the role of the mullahs in Iran as well. “Any serious display of American determination,” Wurmser writes, will cause “our regional enemies to wilt.” Overthrowing Hussein “will send terrifying shock waves into Tehran… and will promote pro-American coalitions in the region, unravel hostile coalitions.” We even asserts that “the Iraqi Shi’ites… if liberated from [Hussein’s tyranny], can be expected to present a challenge to Iran’s influence and revolution.” In 2007, author Craig Unger writes sarcastically, “Democracy would spread throughout the region! Israel would be secure and the US would have allies in the oil-rich states of Iran and Iraq! But, again, the text contained no facts to back up Wurmser’s assumptions.” Wurmser acknowledges those “who guided my understanding” as Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, “Clean Break” co-author Richard Perle, and Perle’s close colleague Douglas Feith, among others, leading Unger to observe, “In other words, the neocon echo chamber had begun to rely on itself to reinforce their own myths.” [Unger, 2007; Unger, 2007]
China sells Pakistan a special industrial furnace for moulding uranium, as well as advanced diagnostic equipment. The equipment is for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and is installed at Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta by Chinese technicians. The US discovers the sale, and one of the officials who receives a report on it and passes this on is Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction. However, the US takes no action against the Chinese over the transfer. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 259, 512]
An independent panel issues its report on recently released National Intelligence Estimate NIE 59-19, “Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years.” The panel, chaired by former CIA Director Robert Gates, was commissioned by Congressional conservatives as a “Team B” (see November 1976) to challenge and disprove the NIE’s finding that no rogue state such as North Korea or Iraq would be able to develop a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capable of striking the continental US or Canada until at least 2011. Gates’s panel includes former ambassador Richard Armitage; nuclear scientist Sidney Drell; former State Department and National Security Council official Arnold Kanter; Brookings Institution fellow Janne Nolan; former Defense Department official and RAND Corporation president Henry Rowen; and Major General Jasper Welch, a retired Air Force flag officer and former National Security Council staffer. The panel’s findings enrage those conservatives who pushed for its creation; the panel not only agrees with the NIE’s conclusions about the capabilities of those rogue nations, but finds that the Congressional conservatives’ allegations that the NIE had been “politicized” and written to satisfy Clinton administration positions have no basis in fact. “The panel found no evidence of politicization,” it reports, and adds: “There was no breach of the integrity of the intelligence process. Beyond this, the panel believes that unsubstantiated allegations challenging the integrity of intelligence community analysts by those who simply disagree with their conclusions, including members of Congress, are irresponsible. Intelligence forecasts do not represent ‘revealed truth,’ and it should be possible to disagree with them without attacking the character and integrity of those who prepared them—or the integrity of the intelligence process itself.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 12/23/1996; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 172] Congressional conservatives will demand, and receive, another study of the NIE that will provide them with conclusions more to their liking (see July 1998).
The US ends its 20-year moratorium on sales of advanced military equipment to Latin America (during which time it had remained the largest supplier of military equipment to the region) by offering to sell jet fighters to the Chilean military, which is headed by former dictator Augusto Pinochet. [Foreign Policy in Focus, 12/1997 ]
British Customs and Excise intercepts a shipment of maraging steel bound for Pakistan via Moscow at Gatwick Airport in London. The steel could be for use in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and was to be delivered to Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean official who facilitates nuclear co-operation between Pakistan and his government. When it investigates Kang, Customs and Excise discovers that he has also brokered a deal to buy maraging steel from the All-Russian Institute of Light Alloys in Moscow, and the purchase was made on behalf of Pakistan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 279]
Hwang Jang-yop, a former aide to President Kim Il-sung, becomes the highest-ranking North Korean official to defect. During debriefings, he tells investigators that Pakistan and North Korea made a deal to trade No-dong missiles for uranium enrichment technology after a delegation from Khan Research Laboratories visited North Korea in the summer of 1996 (see 1996). He claims that the secret enrichment plant is based in a series of caves near the town of Kumch’ang-ni, 100 miles north of Pyongyang, and 30 miles northwest of North Korea’s nuclear reactor at Yongbyon-kun. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 281] However, inspectors will later visit the location and find no technology there (see 1999).
An audit of SMB Distribution, a Dubai-based company owned by Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, finds a series problems in its accounts. The audit is conducted by Peter Griffin, like Tahir an associate of A. Q. Khan’s, at Tahir’s request. Based on an interview of Griffin, authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will say that Griffin discovers “major discrepancies between what was being bought and sold” by the company. This will lead Griffin to be suspicious of SMB Distribution, but he will continue to do business with Tahir (see, for example, July 2000). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 368]
US Space Command publishes its brochure, Vision for 2020, in which it summarizes its ambitions for weaponizing space. The report states that US Space Command views the militarization and weaponization of space as a means “to protect military and commercial national interests and investment….” Its back cover features a picture of a satellite striking a target in Iraq with a laser. [US Space Command, 2/1997 ; Foreign Service Journal, 4/2001]
Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction, appears before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. At a closed hearing he tells it that the administration has intelligence showing that China is shipping nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, but the administration is covering this up (see (April 1992), (Mid-1990s), Early 1996, May 1996, and September 1996). Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will say that by this time Oehler has “had enough” of the administration ignoring his work documenting the deals between China and Pakistan. “There was no consistent policy emerging,” they will write. “There was no strategy even. There was no considered attempt to rein China in or to tackle Pakistan, which was getting increasingly out of hand. There was just a steady drip, drip of doomsday technology from China to Pakistan and from Pakistan to—no one was exactly sure how many countries.” Therefore, Oehler makes the attempt to get the Senate to do something. Levy and Scott-Clark will say he found “the softest way he could to contradict his superiors short of becoming a whistle-blower.” However, no action is taken against China or Pakistan, and Oehler soon resigns (see October 1997). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 259-260]
Gary Milhollin, director of the non-profit Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Weapons, testifies to the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs about nuclear proliferation. He warns, “Most of the countries that worry Washington are interconnected, so the failure to confront proliferation by one usually means there will be a failure to confront proliferation by others.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 261]
The US military and other government agencies conduct a military exercise called “Eligible Receiver 97” to ascertain the nation’s vulnerability to electronic attacks by other states or terrorists. A Red Team of “hackers” from the NSA penetrates military computers and civilian infrastructure in the telecommunications and electricity industries. While the details are classified, officials say that the exercise shows that the US could suffer a catastrophic attack in the form of an “electronic Pearl Harbor.” The electricity could be shut down and the 911 emergency phone service could be disrupted. These fears will find confirmation after 9/11 when evidence of possible cyber attacks by al-Qaeda will be uncovered (see Summer 2001 and 2002). [CNN, 11/7/1997; Washington Times, 4/16/1998; Washington Post, 5/24/1998; CNN, 4/6/1999; Air Force Magazine, 12/2005] However, George Smith, a computer security expert, discounts the threat. An electronic Pearl Harbor, he says, is “not likely.” Computer viruses and other forms of computer attack are not effective weapons and the vulnerability of the civilian infrastructure is exaggerated. [Issues in Science and Technology, 1998]
Peter Griffin, a British businessman who has been working with the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network for two decades (see Summer 1976), sets up a company called Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The company’s establishment is a result of an order one of Khan’s other associates, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, has told Griffin he will place with him. Tahir first mentioned the order, said to be worth $10 million, in 1994 (see May 1994), but nothing had come of it then. Tahir now says that the deal, which he claims is for a machine shop to produce spare parts for the Libyan National Oil Company, is back on. As a result of Tahir’s inquiry, Griffin moves back to Dubai with his wife Anna and starts the company up. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 366]
A modernization program of the 1st Air Force’s air operation centers, which include NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), is started. Over the next several years, Litton Data Systems is tasked with computerizing the way the Air National Guard accomplishes its air sovereignty mission, which is the surveillance of US skies in coordination with the FAA. Until now, flight plans from the FAA have been “compiled in logs and have to be searched by hand to identify aircraft,” according to National Guard magazine. “The new system will mean fewer manual inquiries and phone contact with FAA officials about commercial aircraft. The FAA flight plan is now hooked up via computer with the new R/SAOCs [Regional/Sector Air Operation Centers] so operators can easily track friendly aircraft through our air space without having to get someone on the phone or thumb through written log books of flight plans. Composite air pictures are now shown in real time on the screen with no delay in transmission. Plans on the screen are shown as they are happening.” The software also allows computer simulations to be used for training purposes, so operators can “go through a situation at their terminals as if it were happening.” Col. Dan Navin, the special assistant to the commander of 1st Air Force, says, “It will enhance our ability to do what many say is the most important job of the Air Force, and that is air sovereignty.” The new systems should be fully operational in all seven 1st Air Force air operation centers by 2003. [National Guard, 9/1997] It is possible that this software is being used on the morning of 9/11, when a NORAD training exercise will include simulated information, known as “inject,” being shown on its radar screens (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Toronto Star, 12/9/2001]
US and British intelligence based on satellite imagery shows that by this time there are regular flights between Pyongyang and Islamabad, the capitals of North Korea and Pakistan. Most of the flights are made by large Ilyushin-76 transport planes. This clearly indicates deliveries are being made from one country to another, although it is not evident from the imagery what the content of the deliveries is. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 261] Other intelligence indicates that at this time Pakistan is swapping uranium enrichment technology for North Korean missiles (see 1997).
Gary Milhollin, a law professor and the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Weapons, testifies to a Senate committee and complains about a lack of US action over intelligence showing China is breaching treaty obligations. “We are simply watching the Chinese shipments go out, without any hope of stopping them,” says Milhollin. “All our present policy has produced is a new missile factory in Pakistan (see (Mid-1990s)), an upgraded nuclear weapons factory in Pakistan (see Early 1996), and new chemical weapon plants in Iran.” At the same hearing, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) criticizes President Clinton for “giving Chinese firms a green light to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 260, 512]
The Bundesnachrichtendienst, a German foreign intelligence agency, informs the US that Pakistan and Iran are cooperating on weapons purchases. According to the Germans, Pakistan has set up what authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will call a “network of dummy export companies” on behalf of the Iranians, and these companies are being used to purchase weapons bound for Iran. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 512]
Blackwater logo. [Source: Blackwater]In June 1997, three months after having been discharged from active duty, ex-Navy Seal Erik Prince incorporates the Blackwater Training Center. He purchases more than 4000 acres in Currituck County, North Carolina, for $756,000, and nearly one thousand acres in Camden County for $616,000. The new compound is built near the Great Dismal Swamp. The stated idea behind Blackwater was “to fulfill the anticipated demand for government outsourcing of firearms and related security training.” In May 1998, Blackwater opens for business. It is suggested that the early years of Blackwater are slow going, but the volume of secret contracts makes that difficult to verify. [Scahill, 3/1/2007]
The US begins to send Pakistan a series of demarches complaining about its nuclear proliferation activities. The sending of the demarches follows the receipt of intelligence about nuclear deals between Pakistan and North Korea. North Korea’s plutonium program is in abeyance at this time, but it has begun a uranium enrichment project and the US is aware of this. However, according to State Department official Robert Einhorn, Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is never mentioned in the demarches, at the CIA’s request. The CIA wants Khan’s proliferation network to continue to run and is worried that mentioning him in them would tip him off to what the CIA knows. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 280]
A military report released this year describes the “Joint Vision 2010” program, a series of “analyses, war games, studies, experiments, and exercises” which are “investigating new operational concepts, doctrines, and organizational approaches that will enable US forces to maintain full spectrum dominance of the battlespace well into the 21st century.”
“The Air Force has begun a series of war games entitled Global Engagement at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.” The same report mentions that the military is working on a “variety of new imaging and signals intelligence sensors, currently in advanced stages of development, deployed aboard the Global Hawk, DarkStar, and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)…” [US Department of Defense, 1998] Global Hawk is a technology that enables pilotless flight and has been functioning since at least early 1997. [US Department of Defense, 2/20/1997] While it may be mere coincidence, “Air Force spokesman Colonel Ken McClellan said a man named Mohamed Atta—which the FBI has identified as one of the five hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11—had once attended the International Officer’s School at Maxwell/Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, Ala.” But he adds that “there [was] discrepancies in the biographical data” (mainly the birth date) and that “it may just be a case of mistaken identity” (see also 1996-August 2000 and September 15-17, 2001) [Gannett News Service, 9/17/2001; Gannett News Service, 9/20/2001]
At some point in early 1998, the Pakistani military tells nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan that he should keep a lower profile. The request is apparently made as a result of US pressure on Pakistani nuclear proliferation operations. In addition, Western and Israeli intelligence services are aware of Khan’s operations in Dubai, a hub for his business, making it unsecure. In response to these twin stimuli, Khan will decide to make use of his contacts in Southeast Asia and Africa, to which elements of his operations will be relocated. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 282]
Scott Ritter. [Source: Public domain/ David Shankbone]Ahmed Chalabi meets Scott Ritter, a liaison for the UN weapons inspectors program, in his London apartment. When Chalabi asks Ritter what kind of information inspectors need, Ritter discloses all of the inspectors’ intelligence gaps. “I should have asked him what he could give me,” Ritter later tells the New Yorker. “We made the biggest mistake in the intelligence business: we identified all of our gaps.” The New Yorker reports: “Ritter outlines most of the UN inspectors’ capabilities and theories, telling Chalabi how they had searched for underground bunkers with ground-penetrating radar. He also told Chalabi of his suspicion that Saddam may have had mobile chemical- or biological-weapons laboratories.…” [New Yorker, 6/7/2004]
US spy satellites photograph North Korean technical and telemetry crews arriving at Sargodha air force base in Pakistan. Sargodha is a forward storage facility for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and is home to its fleet of F-16s, which can be used to deliver nuclear weapons during a strike on India. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 277] Additional North Koreans will visit the facility the next month (see March 1998).
Western intelligence agencies learn that Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean diplomat who facilitates nuclear co-operation between his government and Pakistan, is involved in negotiations between the Pakistan-based Tabani Corporation and a Russian company that makes mass spectrometers, lasers, and carbon fiber. They also learn he is discussing a purchase of maraging steel, which can be used in a nuclear program, but this steel is for his own government. The knowledge spurs MI6 and the CIA to increase their efforts to find out whether the North Koreans have established a cascade to weaponize uranium using technology obtained from Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 279-180]
In 1998, scientists at the US Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in Utah begin to turn wet anthrax into powder. Supposedly, this is to test how to defend against biological attacks. A spokesperson claims the anthrax produced that year is of a different strain than the Ames strain used in the 2001 anthrax attacks, but will not say if anthrax produced in other years is of the same strain or not. Dugway has had the Ames strain since 1992. In 1999, top bioweapons scientist William Patrick tells a group of US military officers that in the spring of 1998 he taught personnel at Dugway how to turn wet anthrax into powder. He says: “We made about a pound of material in little less than a day. It’s a good product.” This anthrax production will remain secret until the media discovers it in December 2001 (see December 13, 2001). Some will argue that this production of anthrax is in violation of an international biological weapons treaty that the US signed while others will argue it is not. [New York Times, 12/13/2001]
Two North Korean military officials, its chief of staff and the head of its strategic forces, visit Sargodha air force base in Pakistan. Sargodha is used for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and North Korean technicians are already present there (see February 1998). The US learns of this visit and concludes that the North Koreans have won access to Pakistan’s range facilities as a part of co-operation between the two countries on nuclear missile technology, which dates back several years (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 277]
The British intelligence service MI6 forms the opinion that Pakistani nuclear proliferator A. Q. Khan is using his North Korean connections in an attempt to purchase items for resale. The items include rare metals, magnets, and other difficult-to-source products. The purpose is to establish an export stock of goods that Khan can sell on to other countries. MI6 informs US intelligence agencies of its belief and the reasons for it (see 1997 and February 1998). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 279-280]
Pakistan’s first nuclear test take place underground but shakes the mountains above it. [Source: Associated Press]Pakistan conducts a successful nuclear test. Former Clinton administration official Karl Inderfurth later notes that concerns about an Indian-Pakistani conflict, or even nuclear confrontation, compete with efforts to press Pakistan on terrorism. [US Congress, 7/24/2003] Pakistan actually built its first nuclear weapon in 1987 but kept it a secret and did not test it until this time for political reasons (see 1987). In announcing the tests, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declares, “Today, we have settled the score.” [New York Times, 5/4/2003]
Pakistan conducts the sixth and last of a series of nuclear bomb tests that started two days earlier (see May 28, 1998). Samples taken by US aircraft over the site indicate that the test may have involved plutonium, whereas uranium bombs were used for the other five. After the US learns that the tests are witnessed by Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean involved in that country’s proliferation network (see Early June 1998), and other North Korean officials, it will speculate that the final test was performed by Pakistan for North Korea, which is better known for its plutonium bomb program. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment, “In terms of nuclear readiness, this placed North Korea far ahead of where the CIA had thought it was, since [North Korea] had yet to conduct any hot tests of its own.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 278]
A Korean diplomat’s wife named Kim Sa-nae is shot dead outside a guest house associated with Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan in Islamabad, Pakistan. Government officials claim it was a tragic accident and that she was simply caught in a crossfire resulting from a domestic dispute. However, the US discovers that the woman had been shot execution-style and was the wife of Kang Thae Yun, a North Korean who was the economic counsellor at its embassy in Pakistan. Kang is already on the US nuclear watch-list and, based on interviews conducted by the CIA, the US comes to believes that Pakistan’s ISI had her killed because she was preparing to pass on sensitive material about nuclear transfers between Pakistan and North Korea to Western contacts. This theory is supported by the fact that Kang represented the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (CSC), also known as the North Korean Mining Development Trading Corporation, which had shipped No-dong missiles to Pakistan in 1994 (see January 1994). In addition, defectors have said that the most important job of North Korean embassies around the world is to help efforts to seek nuclear technology and this was Kang’s primary role in Islamabad, where he frequently visited Khan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 276-277] Kang disappears from Pakistan around the time his wife’s body is flown home to North Korea (see Mid-June 1998).
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan takes five pieces of luggage, including two large crates that nobody is allowed to check, to North Korea. The crates contain P-1 and P-2 centrifuges for enriching uranium, drawings, technical data, and uranium hexafluoride, which is needed to start the uranium enrichment process. Khan takes the goods on a plane belonging to Shaheen Air International, which makes regular flights between North Korea and Pakistan to facilitate nuclear technology transfers (see (1998 and Possibly After)). The stated purpose of the flight is to carry the body of Kim Sa-nae, a North Korean diplomat’s wife who was recently murdered in Pakistan (see Early June 1998). The diplomat, Kang Thae Yun, is said to be involved in North Korea’s nuclear proliferation attempts and disappears around the time of this flight. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 278]
A five-day wedding celebration in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, provides an opportunity for key players in A. Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling ring to get together and discuss moving some of their operations from Dubai to Southeast Asia and Africa. The groom is Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, a key facilitator for Khan who is to marry a woman named Nazimah, the daughter of his aunt and a Malaysian diplomat. Other key players who attend the meeting include European figures in the network Henk Slebos and Peter Griffin, Griffin’s wife Anna, Brigadier Sajawal Khan Malik, a Pakistani military official close to Khan, Farooq Hashmi and Mohammad Farooq, other Pakistani associates of Khan, and Dr. Riaz Chowhan, a general and Khan’s physician. Abdul Siddiqui, father of a London-based Khan associate, is also in attendance, as are 300 employees from a Dubai-based Khan front company called SMB Computers and 100 scientists from Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan. Griffin will say that Khan keeps a low profile at the wedding, commenting, “He made no mention of the recent nuclear tests in Pakistan and kept in the background throughout the celebration.” Khan and his associates spend some time planning to relocate some of their operations, as their hub in Dubai is now well known to intelligence services (see Early 1998). Some elements are to be moved to Southeast Asia and some to Africa, and a new client list is also discussed. Intelligence agents working for Britain and the US also attend the wedding and learn of what Khan is planning. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 282-283]
Entity Tags: SMB Computers, Riaz Chowhan, Peter Griffin, Kahuta Research Laboratories, Henk Slebos, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Abdul Siddiqui, Anna Griffin, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Farooq Hashmi, Mohammad Farooq
Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
The White House convenes a small team of senior officials to look behind the nuclear program of North Korea, which appears to be attempting to start a uranium enrichment program, and focuses on Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Khan travels to Pyongyang several times a month and, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, he is the “most visible common denominator” in Pakistan’s proliferation network and “a flag to be followed.” Levy and Scott-Clark point out that, although the US has been aware of Khan’s activities for over two decades (see November 1975), this is the “first serious attempt at interdicting the Pakistani operation.”
Experienced Officials Head Team - The officials include Robert Gallucci, President Clinton’s special envoy on ballistic weapons and WMD, who has been monitoring Pakistan’s nuclear program for 20 years and had helped negotiate an agreement with North Korea in 1994. Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation, Karl Inderfurth, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, and Gary Samore, a senior director for non-proliferation at the National Security Council, are also on the team.
Problems - However, there are some initial problems. For example, the officials already have so much work that one will characterize it as a “five minute [info] dump on Khan.” Levy and Scott-Clark will comment: “There was a surfeit of material, much of it higgledy-piggledy, since over the years no organized overview had been taken of Pakistan’s illicit trade. Instead, a multiplicity of agencies in intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs had all assigned analysts to work on the Khan conundrum, stovepiping what they discovered, so no one agency knew everything.”
More than Missiles - The group soon receives evidence showing that the dealings between North Korea and Pakistan do not involve just missiles, but also uranium enrichment technology (see 1997, 1998, (1998 and Possibly After), February 1998, February 1998 or Shortly After, Early June 1998, and Mid-June 1998). Einhorn will later say: “In 1998 we began to get some information of North Korean-Pakistani deals that went way beyond missiles. There was a nuclear dimension to this arrangement. There were Pakistani and North Korean weapons specialists getting together, including people from KRL [Khan Research Laboratories]. There was a pattern to the interactions.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 278-280]
Congressional conservatives receive a second “alternative assessment” of the nuclear threat facing the US that is far more to their liking than previous assessments (see December 23, 1996). A second “Team B” panel (see November 1976), the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, led by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and made up of neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, finds that, contrary to earlier findings, the US faces a growing threat from rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, who can, the panel finds, inflict “major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision.” This threat is “broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly” than previously believed. The Rumsfeld report also implies that either Iran or North Korea, or perhaps both, have already made the decision to strike the US with nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan has recently tested nuclear weapons (see May 28, 1998), it is not on the list. Unfortunately for the integrity and believability of the report, its methodology is flawed in the same manner as the previous “Team B” reports (see November 1976); according to author J. Peter Scoblic, the report “assume[s] the worst about potential US enemies without actual evidence to support those assumptions.” Defense analyst John Pike is also displeased with the methodology of the report. Pike will later write: “Rather than basing policy on intelligence estimates of what will probably happen politically and economically and what the bad guys really want, it’s basing policy on that which is not physically impossible. This is really an extraordinary epistemological conceit, which is applied to no other realm of national policy, and if manifest in a single human being would be diagnosed as paranoia.” [Guardian, 10/13/2007; Scoblic, 2008, pp. 172-173] Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will be dubbed the “Axis of Evil” by George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union speech (see January 29, 2002).
North Korea launches a Taepodong-1 (TD-1) ballistic missile eastward over Japan. The second stage of the missile splashes down in Pacific waters well past Japan. Though the missile was intended to launch a satellite into Earth orbit (a task in which it failed, though the North Koreans will claim otherwise), the test flight also proves that North Korea could strike Japan and other regional neighbors with nuclear missiles if it so desires. It could also reach Hawaii and the outskirts of Alaska with a small payload, though nothing large enough to be a nuclear device. The test alarms the US, and catches the US intelligence community somewhat unawares, though US intelligence had earlier predicted that North Korea would be able to deploy some sort of ICBM. The TD-1 is a significant development over its earlier single-stage Scud C and Nodong single-stage missiles. Another area of concern is North Korea’s stated willingness to sell its missile and nuclear technology to other countries; any missile improvements it successfully develops are likely to spread to other weapons programs. [Scoblic, 2008, pp. 173; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 1/12/2008] According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, the missile’s basic design is similar to the Hatf range produced by Pakistan, which itself was based on the Chinese M-11 missile. The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) therefore thinks this is further evidence of military co-operation between Pakistan and North Korea. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 277, 515]
Gordon Oehler, a former US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction, testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Clinton administration’s non-proliferation efforts. Oehler resigned in disgust the previous year as the administration was ignoring his warnings of Chinese proliferation to Pakistan and other countries (see October 1997). He tells the committee that “analysts were very discouraged to see their work was regularly dismissed.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 260, 512]
US President Bill Clinton and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reach an agreement on co-operation between their countries. According to a deal offered by Clinton, the US will refund Pakistan most of the $470 million it owes for a group of F-16 fighters ordered and paid for by Pakistan but never delivered (see August-September 1989). In return, Clinton asks Sharif to close down Pakistani nuclear proliferator A. Q. Khan and his operations, as well as training camps for radical Islamists in Afghanistan that are supported by Pakistan. However, Sharif does not fulfill his end of the bargain, and the Pakistani government continues to support both Khan and the training camps. According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Sharif thinks he can get away with the inaction because of Clinton’s preoccupation with the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal and the US’s generally permissive attitude to Pakistani nuclear weapons. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 286]
An AC-130. [Source: US Air Force]In the immediate aftermath of a decision not to attack bin Laden with cruise missiles for fear of collateral damage (see December 18-20, 1998), the US military looks for other options than the inaccurate cruise missiles. On this day, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton formally directs Generals Anthony Zinni and Peter J. Schoomaker to develop plans for an AC-130 gunship attack against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. The AC-130 is an aircraft designed specifically for special forces missions. It can fly in fast or from a high altitude, undetected by radar. It is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided projectiles that are much less likely to cause collateral damage. The two generals do submit such a plan on January 12, 1999, but the plan will never be developed beyond this initial document. One reason is that Zinni is against the idea. Another obstacle is that due to technical reasons the AC-130s would need to be based in a nearby country (most likely Uzbekistan, which is the most supportive of US efforts to get bin Laden at this time (see 1998 and After)). Political agreements allowing for basing and overflight rights would have to be arranged, but there is never any attempt to do so. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 135, 486]
Intelligence reports suggesting that “rogue states” are trying to obtain uranium spark concern within the French government about the security of the two French consortiums that control Niger’s uranium industry. [Financial Times, 8/2/2004] France has reportedly learned that uranium is being extracted from abandoned mines and being sold on the international black market. [La Repubblica (Rome), 10/24/2005] The French consortium, Cogema, controls the only two mines in Niger and transports all the ore to the port of Cotonou in neighboring Benin. From there it is exported to France, Spain, and Japan. [Los Angeles Times, 2/17/2004]
Following an agreement with the US government, North Korea allows inspectors to visit the alleged site of its uranium enrichment facility, a series of caves near the town of Kumch’ang-ni, 100 miles north of Pyongyang, and thirty miles northwest of North Korea’s nuclear reactor at Yongbyon-kun. However, the inspectors only find hollowed-out caverns. The intelligence on which the inspection was based was provided by North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 281]
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and a Pakistani army general travel to North Korea to buy shoulder-launched missiles, according to a later interview of Khan. [Associated Press, 7/5/2008]
A. Q. Khan (left) and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. [Source: CBC]Due to US pressure over Pakistan’s links to North Korea’s nuclear program, some Pakistani officials begin to question whether nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan should continue to play such an active part in his country’s nuclear dealings. General Feroz Khan will later reflect: “It began to dawn on everyone that perhaps Khan had done enough. It was time for others to take over—who were a little less public and whose anonymity suited the secret program better.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will add, “A. Q. Khan, Islamabad’s greatest asset, was becoming a liability because of his ubiquity and ego.” The pressure results from a White House group formed in 1998 (see (Mid-1998)). One of the members of the group, Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation Robert Einhorn, will later say: “I recall a meeting at the residence of [Pakistani President] Nawaz Sharif where we raised the North Korean centrifuge connection. It was raised at the [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott level, at the Clinton level too. Eventually the Pakistanis said, ‘We’ll look into this.’ They knew that they had to do something as we were not going to go away.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 516]
Aircraft operated by Shaheen Air International, an airline run by Pakistan’s Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, and Pakistani air force C-130 transporters make regular trips between North Korea and Pakistan. They carry technology the countries are exchanging for work on their missile and nuclear weapons programs. By January 1998, the US is observing at least nine flights per month between Islamabad and Pyongyang. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 278, 180] It is unclear how long these flights continue, although they presumably stop no later than when A. Q. Khan makes a public confession of his activities in 2004 (see February 4, 2004).
In early February 1999, US intelligence gains good information that Osama bin Laden is bird hunting with members of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) royal family in an uninhabited region of Afghanistan (see February 11, 1999). A later book by Daniel Benjamin and Stephen Simon, both officials in the Clinton administration, will note, “At the moment the Tomahawks [US missiles] were being readied, the United States was in the final stages of negotiations to sell eighty Block 60 F-16s, America’s most sophisticated export fighter jets,” to the UAE government. “America’s relationship with the [UAE] was the best it had in the [Persian] Gulf, and the [Clinton] administration had devotedly cultivated Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE’s president and the leader of the country’s royal clans.” [Benjamin and Simon, 2002, pp. 281] The F-16 fighter deal is worth about $8 billion. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is particularly close to the UAE royal family, having negotiated arms deals and US military basing agreements with them for several years. He has a hand in negotiating the F-16 deal in 1998. In fact, just days before the US learned of bin Laden’s presence in the hunting camp, Clarke was in the UAE working on the fighter deal. [Coll, 2004, pp. 486; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 128] Journalist Steve Coll will later say: “If the United States bombed the camp and killed a few princes, it could potentially put [business deals like that] in jeopardy—even if bin Laden were killed at the same time. Hardly anyone in the Persian Gulf saw bin Laden as a threat serious enough to warrant the deaths of their own royalty.” Clarke is one who votes not to strike the camp, and others within the US government will speculate that his UAE ties had a role in his decision. [Coll, 2004, pp. 447-450] Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit at the time, will later comment: “Why did President Clinton fail to attack? Because making money was more important than protecting Americans.” [Scheuer, 2008] The missile strike does not take place and the fighter deal is successfully completed. Some US officials, including Scheuer, will be very irate and vocally complain later this month (see Shortly After February 11, 1999).
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